Case 2:17-cv-00370-RSL Document 105 Filed 04/25/19 Page 1 of 12

Honorable Robert S. Lasnik

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON
AT SEATTLE

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CHAMBER OF COMMERCE OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA; and
RASIER, LLC,

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Plaintiffs,
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vs.
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THE CITY OF SEATTLE; SEATTLE
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DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE AND
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ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES; and
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CALVIN W GOINGS, in his official capacity )
as Director, Finance and Administrative
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Services, City of Seattle,
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Defendants.
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No.

17-cv-00370-RSL

DEFENDANTS’ REPLY IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION TO PERMIT DISCOVERY
NECESSARY TO OPPOSE SUMMARY
JUDGMENT
NOTED ON CALENDAR: April 26, 2019

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REPLY ISO MOTION TO PERMIT DISCOVERY (17-cv-00370)

PETER S. HOLMES
Seattle City Attorney
701 Fifth Avenue, Suite 2050
Seattle, WA 98104
(206) 684-8200

 Case 2:17-cv-00370-RSL Document 105 Filed 04/25/19 Page 2 of 12

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

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TABLE OF CONTENTS ................................................................................................................. i

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .......................................................................................................... ii

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I.

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The Labor Exemption Can Apply to Independent Contractors ..................................................... 1
A.

The Text of the Clayton and Norris-LaGuardia Acts Does Not Distinguish
Between Workers on the Basis of Common Law Standards ....................................... 1

B.

The “Employees” Covered by Pre-1947 Labor Relations Statutes Included
Independent Contractors............................................................................................... 3

C.

The Chamber’s Authorities Involved Independent Entrepreneurs .............................. 4

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II.

Per Se Rules May Not Apply To Coordinated Driver Conduct................................................... 5

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ............................................................................................................. 8

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REPLY ISO MOTION TO PERMIT DISCOVERY (17-cv-00370) - i

PETER S. HOLMES
Seattle City Attorney
701 Fifth Avenue, Suite 2050
Seattle, WA 98104
(206) 684-8200

 Case 2:17-cv-00370-RSL Document 105 Filed 04/25/19 Page 3 of 12

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

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Court Cases
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Am. Med. Ass’n v. United States,
317 U.S. 519 (1943) .................................................................................................................... 5

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Am. Needle, Inc. v. NFL,
560 U.S. 183 (2010) .................................................................................................................... 5

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BMI v. CBS,
441 U.S. 1 (1979) .................................................................................................................... 5, 6

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Burlington Northern Santa Fe Railway Co. v. Teamsters Local 174,
203 F.3d 703 (9th Cir. 2000) ...................................................................................................... 2

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Chamber of Commerce v. Seattle,
890 F.3d 769 (9th Cir. 2018) ...................................................................................................... 6

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Columbia River Packers Association v. Hinton,
315 U.S. 143 (1942) ................................................................................................................ 4, 5

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Conley Motor Express, Inc. v. Russell,
500 F.2d 124 (3d Cir. 1974)........................................................................................................ 5

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Freeman v. San Diego Ass’n of Realtors,
322 F.3d 1133 (9th Cir. 2003) .................................................................................................... 6

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Hunt v. Crumboch,
325 U.S. 821 (1945) .................................................................................................................... 1

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H.A. Artists & Associates, Inc. v. Actors’ Equity As’sn,
451 U.S. 704 (1981) .................................................................................................................... 2

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Jacksonville Bulk Terminals, Inc. v. International Longshoreman’s Association,
457 U.S. 702 (1982) ................................................................................................................ 1, 2

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L.A. Meat & Provision Drivers Union Local 626 v. United States,
371 U.S. 94 (1962) ...................................................................................................................... 5

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Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co. v. Darden,
503 U.S. 318 (1992) .................................................................................................................... 4

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NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla.,
468 U.S. 85 (1984) .................................................................................................................. 5, 6

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New Prime, Inc. v. Oliveira,
139 S.Ct. 532 (2019) ........................................................................................................... 2, 3, 4

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NLRB v. Hearst Publications,
322 U.S. 111 (1944) .................................................................................................................... 4

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Prince v. Schwartz,
180 N.Y.S. 703 (App. Div. 1920) ............................................................................................... 3

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REPLY ISO MOTION TO PERMIT DISCOVERY (17-cv-00370) - ii

PETER S. HOLMES
Seattle City Attorney
701 Fifth Avenue, Suite 2050
Seattle, WA 98104
(206) 684-8200

 Case 2:17-cv-00370-RSL Document 105 Filed 04/25/19 Page 4 of 12

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Spence v. Southeastern Alaska Pilots’ Association,
789 F.Supp. 1007 (D. Alaska 1990) ........................................................................................... 5

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United States v. A. Lanoy Alston,
974 F.2d 1206 (9th Cir. 1992) .................................................................................................... 3

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United States v. Silk,
331 U.S. 704 (1947) .................................................................................................................... 4

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United States v. Women’s Sportswear Mfrs. Association,
336 U.S. 460 (1949) .................................................................................................................... 5

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Administrative Decisions

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Railway Employees’ Department v. Indiana Harbor Belt Railroad Co.,
No. 982, 3 R.L.B. 332 (1922) ..................................................................................................... 3

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United Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way Emps. & Railway Shop Laborers v.
St. Louis-San Francisco Railway Co.,
No. 1230, 3 R.L.B. 700 (1922) ................................................................................................... 4

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Federal Statutory Authorities

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15 U.S.C. §17 .................................................................................................................................. 1

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29 U.S.C. §52 .................................................................................................................................. 2
29 U.S.C. §101 ............................................................................................................................ 1, 2

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29 U.S.C. §113 ............................................................................................................................ 1, 2

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29 U.S.C. §152 ................................................................................................................................ 4

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Additional Authorities

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Black’s Law Dictionary (3d ed. 1933) ............................................................................................ 3

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REPLY ISO MOTION TO PERMIT DISCOVERY (17-cv-00370) - iii

PETER S. HOLMES
Seattle City Attorney
701 Fifth Avenue, Suite 2050
Seattle, WA 98104
(206) 684-8200

 Case 2:17-cv-00370-RSL Document 105 Filed 04/25/19 Page 5 of 12

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I.

The Labor Exemption Can Apply to Independent Contractors.

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In opposing Seattle’s request to conduct limited discovery before responding to the

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Chamber’s motion for summary judgment, the Chamber asks this Court to rule as a matter of law that

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the labor exemption to federal antitrust law can never apply to individuals who are “independent

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contractors” rather than “employees” or “servants” under the common law. But the Chamber cannot

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cite a single precedent adopting this narrow rule. That is not surprising, because the very purpose of

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the Norris-LaGuardia Act—one of two statutes that form the basis for the labor exemption—was “to

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overrule judicial decisions that had unduly restricted the … labor exemption from the antitrust laws.”

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Jacksonville Bulk Terminals, Inc. v. Int’l Longshoreman’s Ass’n, 457 U.S. 702, 712 (1982). This

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Court should reject the Chamber’s unduly narrow interpretation of the exemption.
A.

The Text of the Clayton and Norris-LaGuardia Acts Does Not Distinguish
Between Workers on the Basis of Common Law Standards.

The Chamber initially contends that the language of the Clayton and Norris-LaGuardia Acts
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demonstrates that the labor exemption does not apply to individuals with the common law status of
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independent contractor. Chamber Resp. at 2-3. But the Chamber ignores the Clayton Act’s core
statutory language that “[t]he labor of a human being is not a commodity or article of commerce.” 15
U.S.C. §17. That language focuses solely on whether the “market” at issue involves human labor

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rather than a good, commodity, or service, without distinguishing between common law
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servants/employees and independent contractors. See Hunt v. Crumboch, 325 U.S. 821, 824 (1945).
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None of the other statutory provisions the Chamber cites distinguishes between common law
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employees and independent contractors. The Clayton Act’s statement that “labor, agricultural, or
horticultural organizations” cannot be deemed “illegal combinations or conspiracies in restraint of
trade, under the antitrust laws,” 15 U.S.C. §17, and the Norris-LaGuardia Act’s prohibition on
injunctions “involving or growing out of a labor dispute,” 29 U.S.C. §101, both reference “labor,” not
common law employees. Norris-LaGuardia defines a labor dispute as “any controversy concerning
terms or conditions of employment,” 29 U.S.C. §113(c), but when that law was enacted the term
“employment” encompassed work by independent contractors as well as common law employees.

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REPLY ISO MOTION TO PERMIT DISCOVERY (17-cv-00370) - 1

PETER S. HOLMES
Seattle City Attorney
701 Fifth Avenue, Suite 2050
Seattle, WA 98104
(206) 684-8200

 Case 2:17-cv-00370-RSL Document 105 Filed 04/25/19 Page 6 of 12

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New Prime, Inc. v. Oliveira, 139 S.Ct. 532, 540 (2019) (“All work was treated as employment,

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whether or not the common law criteria for a master-servant relationship happened to be satisfied.”).

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The Chamber contends that Jacksonville Bulk Terminals limited the Norris-LaGuardia Act’s

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prohibition on injunctions to disputes involving common law employees, Chamber Resp. at 3, but

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Jacksonville Bulk Terminals emphasized the breadth of the prohibition and rejected the narrow

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construction proposed by the employer in that case, concluding that Norris-LaGuardia applied to a

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strike motivated by politics instead of economic self-interest. 457 U.S. at 704, 711-12. The Court

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stated that the “employer-employee relationship” must be the “matrix” of a controversy for it to be

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covered by Norris-LaGuardia, but nowhere suggested that the existence of such a relationship turns

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upon common law standards. To the contrary, the Court explained that it has consistently “refused to

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give the Act narrow interpretations that would have restored many labor dispute controversies to the

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courts,” and concluded that a labor dispute existed because the conflict involved a “labor group” in a

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dispute regarding its members’ “obligation to provide labor.” Id. at 712, 714 (quotation omitted).1

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The Chamber also relies upon the Clayton Act’s prohibition on injunctions in cases “between

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employers and employees.” 29 U.S.C. §52. But the courts’ narrow interpretation of that provision was

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precisely what prompted Congress to enact Norris-LaGuardia, which clarified that the prohibition on

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labor injunctions applies “regardless of whether or not the disputants stand in the proximate relation

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of employer and employee.” 29 U.S.C. §113(c). The Chamber insists that this language should be

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construed narrowly, Chamber Resp. at 4, but both Congress and the Supreme Court have rejected

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that approach. Jacksonville Bulk Terminals, 457 U.S. at 712 (Norris-LaGuardia’s language “must

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not be narrowly construed because the statutory definition itself is extremely broad and because

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Congress deliberately included a broad definition to overrule judicial decisions that had unduly

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restricted the Clayton Act’s labor exemption from the antitrust laws”). Under Norris-LaGuardia,

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laborers’ ability to engage in collective activity without facing the threat of federal antitrust

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In Jacksonville Bulk Terminals, H.A. Artists & Assocs., Inc. v. Actors’ Equity As’sn, 451 U.S. 704 (1981), and
Burlington Northern Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Teamsters Local 174, 203 F.3d 703 (9th Cir. 2000), there was no dispute that
the workers at issue were common law employees, and thus no need for the Court to consider whether the labor
exemption can apply to individuals with the common law status of independent contractor. See Jacksonville Bulk
Terminals, 457 U.S. at 713; H.A. Artists, 451 U.S. at 717 n.20; Burlington Northern, 203 F.3d at 705.
REPLY ISO MOTION TO PERMIT DISCOVERY (17-cv-00370) - 2

PETER S. HOLMES
Seattle City Attorney
701 Fifth Avenue, Suite 2050
Seattle, WA 98104
(206) 684-8200

 Case 2:17-cv-00370-RSL Document 105 Filed 04/25/19 Page 7 of 12

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liability does not turn upon such fine-grained distinctions.2

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B.

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The “Employees” Covered by Pre-1947 Labor Relations Statutes Included
Independent Contractors.

The Chamber’s legal arguments are premised on the assumption that the Clayton Act’s
reference to “employees” and the Supreme Court’s references to “employer-employee relationships”

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covered by the Clayton Act and Norris-LaGuardia are limited to relationships that would be
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characterized as master-servant relationships at common law. But that “precarious premise” is

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historically incorrect, as the Supreme Court recently recognized. New Prime, 139 S.Ct. at 542-43.
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When the Clayton and Norris-LaGuardia Acts were enacted, “employee” was not used to refer
exclusively to individuals with common law “servant” status, and was often used as a synonym for
“worker.” See, e.g., Prince v. Schwartz, 180 N.Y.S. 703, 704 (App. Div. 1920) (“[I]t must be held
that the employé was an independent contractor.”); Black’s Law Dictionary 951 (3d ed. 1933) (“If

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the employee is merely subject to the control or direction of the employer as to the result to be
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obtained, he is an independent contractor.”). This was particularly true in federal labor relations
statutes. The Railroad Labor Board “interpreted the word ‘employee’ in the Transportation Act of
1920 to refer to anyone ‘engaged in the customary work directly contributory to the operation of the
railroads,’” including both common law employees and independent contractors. New Prime, 139
S.Ct. at 543 (citing Transportation Act of 1920, §§304, 307, 41 Stat. 456; Ry. Employees’ Dep’t v.

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Indiana Harbor Belt R.R. Co., No. 982, 3 R.L.B. 332, 337 (1922)); see also United Bhd. of Maint. of
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Way Emps. & Ry. Shop Laborers v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. Co., No. 1230, 3 R.L.B. 700, 702
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(1922) (same). “[T]he Erdman Act, a statute enacted to address disruptive railroad strikes at the end
of the 19th century, seems to evince an equally broad understanding of ‘railroad employees,’”
defining those “employees” to include “‘all persons actually engaged in any capacity in train operation

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In many instances, whether a particular group of workers are properly classified as employees or independent
contractors under the common law will be a subject of dispute. See, e.g, Dkt. #52, at 21 (noting “the NLRB’s long
consideration” of whether certain Ordinance-covered drivers “fall within the NLRA’s definition of ‘employee’”).
Under the Chamber’s approach, workers could face federal criminal prosecutions for incorrectly concluding that they
were common law employees entitled to engage in collective activity under the labor exemption. See, e.g., United
States v. A. Lanoy Alston, 974 F.2d 1206, 1214 (9th Cir. 1992) (federal criminal prosecution of dentists who had
lobbied prepaid dental plans to increase fees they paid for dentists’ services).
REPLY ISO MOTION TO PERMIT DISCOVERY (17-cv-00370) - 3

PETER S. HOLMES
Seattle City Attorney
701 Fifth Avenue, Suite 2050
Seattle, WA 98104
(206) 684-8200

 Case 2:17-cv-00370-RSL Document 105 Filed 04/25/19 Page 8 of 12

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or train service of any description.’” New Prime, 139 S.Ct. at 543 & n.12 (citing Act of June 1, 1898,

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ch. 370, 30 Stat. 424); see also Newlands Act, ch. 6, 38 Stat. 103, 104 (1913) (same).3 NLRB v. Hearst

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Publications, 322 U.S. 111, 124 (1944), interpreted the NLRA in a similar manner.

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To be certain, 1947’s Taft-Hartley Act subsequently limited the NLRA’s coverage to

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individuals who would be classified as employees at common law. 29 U.S.C. §152(3). But that

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statutory change to the NLRA—which did not amend the Clayton or Norris-LaGuardia provisions

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on which the labor exemption is based—did not change the fact that the term “employee” was not

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limited to common law servants when Congress enacted the Clayton and Norris-LaGuardia Acts.

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The Chamber argues that Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318 (1992),

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“overruled Hearst’s reasoning” and requires this Court to construe the term “employee” as limited to

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common law servants. Chamber Resp. at 5-6. But Darden considered the later Employee Retirement

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Income Security Act of 1974, not the Clayton or Norris-LaGuardia Acts or any other pre-Taft-Hartley

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legislation. While acknowledging that Hearst was correctly decided, Darden held that the

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congressional response to Hearst and to a similar ruling in United States v. Silk, 331 U.S. 704, 713-

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14 (1947), justified presuming that Congress incorporated the common law distinction between

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servants and independent contractors into post-Taft-Hartley employment legislation. 503 U.S. at 324-

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25. As New Prime demonstrates, that presumption is inapplicable to pre-Taft-Hartley statutes.
The Chamber’s Authorities Involved Independent Entrepreneurs.

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C.

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Finally, the Chamber suggests that prior decisions denying the labor exemption to

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independent entrepreneurs like fisherman and physicians were decided solely on the basis of the

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entrepreneurs’ status as common law independent contractors. Chamber Resp. at 7. But each of the

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cited Supreme Court decisions was careful to note the features of the entrepreneurs’ business practices

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that distinguished them from laborers. See Columbia River Packers Ass’n v. Hinton, 315 U.S. 143,

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As its extended discussion of the Transportation Act of 1920 and the Erdman Act makes clear, New Prime in no way
suggested that the use of the term “employee” in early 20th century labor relations statutes was necessarily limited to
common law servants, as the Chamber incorrectly contends. See Chamber Resp. at 6-7. The portions of New Prime
cited by the Chamber simply acknowledge that the term “worker” indisputably includes both common law servants
and independent contractors while “employee” is more ambiguous, and that the term “employee” both lacked the
“historical baggage” of “servant” and as a separate matter proved useful because it “fully encompassed the broad
protections [legislators] sought to provide” through worker-protective legislation. 139 S.Ct. at 541, 542 n.7.
REPLY ISO MOTION TO PERMIT DISCOVERY (17-cv-00370) - 4

PETER S. HOLMES
Seattle City Attorney
701 Fifth Avenue, Suite 2050
Seattle, WA 98104
(206) 684-8200

 Case 2:17-cv-00370-RSL Document 105 Filed 04/25/19 Page 9 of 12

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144-45, 147 (1942) (fishermen “own or lease fishing boats,” “carry on their business as

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independent entrepreneurs,” exercise “extensive” control over supply of commodity, and in some

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instances “have a small number of employees of their own”); L.A. Meat & Provision Drivers Union

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Local 626 v. United States, 371 U.S. 94, 96, 102 (1962) (“grease peddlers” were “independent

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entrepreneurs whose earnings as middlemen consisted of the difference between the price at which

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they bought the restaurant grease from various sources and the price at which they sold it to the

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processors”; like Columbia River fishermen, they “were sellers of commodities”); United States v.

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Women’s Sportswear Mfrs. Ass’n, 336 U.S. 460, 463-64 (1949) (noting contractor’s significant

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“rentals, capital costs, overhead and profits” and stating contractor “is an entrepreneur, not a

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laborer”); Am. Med. Ass’n v. United States, 317 U.S. 519, 536 (1943) (physicians were “individual

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practitioners each exercising his calling as an independent unit” who believed “that they and all

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others should practice independently on a fee for service basis where whatever arrangement for

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payment each had was a matter that lay between him and his patient in each individual case of

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service or treatment”). If defendants’ undisputed independent contractor status were dispositive,

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the discussions of these other aspects of their business practices would have been unnecessary.4

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II.

Per Se Rules May Not Apply To Coordinated Driver Conduct.

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As Seattle has explained, the Supreme Court applies “the flexible Rule of Reason” instead of

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per se rules to restraints on competition that “are essential if the product is to be available at all.” Am.

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Needle, Inc. v. NFL, 560 U.S. 183, 203 (2010) (quoting NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla.,

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468 U.S. 85, 101 (1984)); see also BMI v. CBS, 441 U.S. 1 (1979). The Chamber does not dispute

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that the “driver coordinators” the Ordinance regulates enable the kind of price-fixing by drivers that

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would be per se unlawful unless such an exception applies. It contends, however, that this exception

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extends only to fixing consumer prices, not to drivers’ interactions with driver coordinators. But the

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Chamber’s argument depends upon a factual contention that has not yet been subjected to discovery—

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Conley Motor Express, Inc. v. Russell, 500 F.2d 124 (3d Cir. 1974), and Spence v. Southeastern Alaska Pilots’ Ass’n,
789 F.Supp. 1007 (D. Alaska 1990), likewise involved individuals who had made substantial investments in training or
specialized capital that are likely to distinguish them from the drivers covered by the Ordinance, who have no specialized
training and use their own general-purpose automobiles to transport passengers.
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REPLY ISO MOTION TO PERMIT DISCOVERY (17-cv-00370) - 5

PETER S. HOLMES
Seattle City Attorney
701 Fifth Avenue, Suite 2050
Seattle, WA 98104
(206) 684-8200

 Case 2:17-cv-00370-RSL Document 105 Filed 04/25/19 Page 10 of 12

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namely, that the coordinated driver conduct essential to the driver coordinators’ products is limited to

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fixing consumer prices and does not depend on other forms of coordination.

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Moreover, a restraint on competition “need not itself be essential” for the exception to per se

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rules recognized in American Needle, NCAA, and BMI to apply. Freeman v. San Diego Ass’n of

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Realtors, 322 F.3d 1133, 1151 (9th Cir. 2003). Instead, it must simply be “reasonably ancillary to the

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legitimate cooperative aspects of the venture.” Id. In NCAA, the Supreme Court applied the Rule of

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Reason to the NCAA’s fixing of the price to televise college football games and its restriction of the

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number of televised games, even though neither was “essential” to intercollegiate athletic

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competition. 468 U.S. at 100-03. That the NCAA’s member institutions legitimately cooperated in

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staging athletic competitions made per se rules inapplicable, even with respect to conduct in the

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distinct market for televising football games. Discovery is necessary here to determine, as a factual

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matter, whether permitting drivers to engage in collective negotiations regarding matters such as

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safety standards and background checks is reasonably ancillary to other legitimate forms of

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coordinated driver conduct, such as their agreement to provide rides dispatched by an application

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pursuant to uniform driver coordinator policies and pricing formulas.5

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The Chamber contends that the Ninth Circuit’s decision on appeal requires this Court to

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distinguish the relationship between driver coordinators and their drivers from the drivers’ provision

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of transportation to the public. Chamber Resp. at 11. But the Ninth Circuit drew that distinction only

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in concluding, for state action immunity purposes, that the Washington state laws authorizing the

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Ordinance lacked sufficiently clear language permitting drivers to fix prices for ride referrals.

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Chamber of Commerce v. Seattle, 890 F.3d 769, 784-85 (9th Cir. 2018). The Court instructed the

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parties to “address on remand which mode of antitrust analysis—the per se rule of illegality or the

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rule of reason—applies,” without narrowing that inquiry. Id. at 781.
This Court should therefore grant Seattle leave to undertake discovery on both issues.

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The Chamber contends that Seattle’s interpretation of BMI “would shield from per se scrutiny musicians who fix
prices for their business purchases, such as buying pianos or studio time.” Chamber Resp. at 10. But the more apt
analogy is whether the exception recognized in BMI is limited to the blanket license, or would also extend to group
lobbying of BMI by the artists who license their songs for inclusion in its blanket license.
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REPLY ISO MOTION TO PERMIT DISCOVERY (17-cv-00370) - 6

PETER S. HOLMES
Seattle City Attorney
701 Fifth Avenue, Suite 2050
Seattle, WA 98104
(206) 684-8200

 Case 2:17-cv-00370-RSL Document 105 Filed 04/25/19 Page 11 of 12

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DATED this 25th day of April, 2019.

Respectfully submitted,

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PETER S. HOLMES
Seattle City Attorney

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By:

/s/Stacey M. Leyton
WSBA #53757

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Stephen P. Berzon (pro hac vice)
Stacey M. Leyton (pro hac vice)
P. Casey Pitts (pro hac vice)
Altshuler Berzon LLP
177 Post Street, Suite 300
San Francisco, CA 94108
Phone: (415) 421-7151
Fax: (415) 362-8064
E-mail: sberzon@altber.com
E-mail: sleyton@altber.com
E-mail: cpitts@altber.com
Gregory C. Narver, WSBA #18127
Sara O’Connor-Kriss, WSBA #41569
Assistant City Attorneys
Seattle City Attorney’s Office
701 Fifth Avenue, Suite 2050
Seattle, WA 98104
Phone: (206) 684-8233 — Gregory C. Narver
Phone: (206) 615-0788 — Sara O’Connor-Kriss
Fax: (206) 684-8284
E-mail: gregory.narver@seattle.gov
E-mail: sara.oconnor-kriss@seattle.gov
Attorneys for Defendants

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REPLY ISO MOTION TO PERMIT DISCOVERY (17-cv-00370) - 7

PETER S. HOLMES
Seattle City Attorney
701 Fifth Avenue, Suite 2050
Seattle, WA 98104
(206) 684-8200

 Case 2:17-cv-00370-RSL Document 105 Filed 04/25/19 Page 12 of 12

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
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I hereby certify that on this 25th day of April, 2019, I electronically filed this
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DEFENDANTS’ REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO PERMIT DISCOVERY

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NECESSARY TO OPPOSE SUMMARY JUDGMENT with the Clerk of the Court using the
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CM/ECF system, which will send notification of such filing to the below-listed:
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Timothy J. O’Connell
Michael A. Carvin
Jacqueline M. Holmes
Christian G. Vergonis
Robert Stander
Lily Fu Claffee
Steven P. Lehotsky
Kathryn Comerford Todd
Robert J. Maguire
Douglas C. Ross

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DATED this 25th day of April, 2019, at Seattle, Washington.

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tim.oconnell@stoel.com
mcarvin@jonesday.com
jholmes@jonesday.com
cvergonis@jonesday.com
rstander@jonesday.com
lfclaffee@uschamber.com
slehotsky@uschamber.com
ktodd@uschamber.com
robmaguire@dwt.com
douglasross@dwt.com

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By:

/s/Stacey M. Leyton
sleyton@altber.com

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REPLY ISO MOTION TO PERMIT DISCOVERY (17-cv-00370) - 8

PETER S. HOLMES
Seattle City Attorney
701 Fifth Avenue, Suite 2050
Seattle, WA 98104
(206) 684-8200