Case 2:19-cv-01862-GW-PJW Document 40 Filed 07/15/19 Page 1 of 10 Page ID #:629

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL
Case No.

CV 19-1862-GW(PJWx)

Title

Optimum Productions et al v. Home Box Office, et al.

Present: The Honorable

Date

July 15, 2019

GEORGE H. WU, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Javier Gonzalez

Katie E. Thibodeaux

Deputy Clerk

Court Reporter / Recorder

Tape No.

Attorneys Present for Plaintiffs:

Attorneys Present for Defendants:

Bryan J. Freedman
Jonathan P. Steinsapir
Howard Weitzman

Theodore J. Boutrous, Jr.
Daniel M. Petrocelli
Drew E. Breuder
Stephanie S. Abrutyn

PROCEEDINGS:

PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO COMPEL ARBITRATION [18]

The Court’s Further Consideration of Motion to Compel following Supplemental Briefing is circulated
and attached hereto. Court hears further argument. For reasons stated on the record, the Court will
postpone the determination of this motion pending Defendant’s filing of its proposed anti-Slapp motion.
Motion is to be filed by August 15, 2019, Opposition to be filed by August 29, 2019, and Reply due on
or before September 5, 2019. Hearing on the motion is set for September 16, 2019 at 8:30 a.m.

:
Initials of Preparer
CV-90 (06/04)

CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL

35

JG
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Optimum Productions et al v. Home Box Office et al; Case No. 2:19-cv-01862-GW-(PJWx)
Further Consideration of Motion to Compel Arbitration following Supplemental Briefing
I.

Background
Plaintiffs Optimum Productions and the Estate filed a petition to compel arbitration against

HBO1 in Los Angeles County Superior Court. See generally Petition, Docket No. 1-1. The
Petition seeks to arbitrate claims for breach of contract (disparagement clause) and breach of the
covenant of good faith and fair dealing. See generally id. HBO removed the action claiming
diversity jurisdiction. See Notice of Removal, Docket No. 1, ¶ 4. Plaintiffs then moved this Court
to remand the action to the Superior Court or, alternatively, to compel arbitration. See Motion to
Remand, Docket No. 17; Arbitration Motion, Docket No. 18.
On May 23, 2019, the Court denied Plaintiffs’ Motion to Remand and denied in part
Plaintiffs’ Arbitration Motion. See Minutes in Chambers – Ruling on Plaintiffs’ Motion to
Remand, Docket No. 28; Minutes of Plaintiffs’ Motion to Remand (“Partial Ruling”), Docket No.
27. Specifically, the Court denied Plaintiffs’ Arbitration Motion to the extent it argued that the
Agreement delegated the arbitrability question to the arbitrator. See Partial Ruling at 12; Minutes
in Chambers – Ruling on Plaintiffs’ Motion to Remand, Docket No. 28 (making the Partial Ruling
final and emphasizing that the Court would decide arbitrability). The Court reserved judgment on
whether Plaintiffs’ claims were arbitrable and ordered supplemental briefing from the parties on
the matter. See Minutes in Chambers – Ruling on Plaintiffs’ Motion to Remand, Docket Nos. 28.
The parties submitted the briefing accordingly.2 See Defendant’s Supplemental Memorandum in
Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Arbitration Motion (“Def.’s Supp.”), Docket No. 30; Plaintiffs’
Supplemental Brief in Support of Arbitration Motion (Pls.’ Supp.”), Docket No. 36.3
II.

Legal Standard
The Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) reflects a “liberal federal policy favoring arbitration.”

AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 339 (2010) (citation omitted). “By its terms,

1

Unless otherwise noted, the defined terms herein have the same meaning as those in the Court’s Partial Ruling (see
Docket No. 27).

2

The Court will not repeat the factual background here. The parties should refer to the description in the Partial
Ruling.
3
For the purposes of this tentative ruling, the Court considered the parties’ original briefing filed ahead of the Partial
Ruling, as well as the supplemental briefs filed afterwards.

1

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the [FAA] leaves no room for the exercise of discretion by a district court, but instead mandates
that district courts shall direct the parties to proceed to arbitration on issues as to which an
arbitration agreement has been signed.” Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 213
(1985) (emphasis in original); see also 9 U.S.C. § 4. “The court’s role under the Act is therefore
limited to determining: (1) whether a valid agreement to arbitrate exists and, if it does, (2) whether
the agreement encompasses the dispute at issue. If the response is affirmative on both counts, then
the Act requires the court to enforce the arbitration agreement in accordance with its terms.”
Daugherty v. Experian Info. Solutions, Inc., 847 F. Supp. 2d 1189, 1193 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (quoting
Chiron Corp. v. Ortho Diagnostic Sys., Inc., 207 F.3d 1126, 1130 (9th Cir. 2000)). “While the
Court may not review the merits of the underlying case ‘[i]n deciding a motion to compel
arbitration, [it] may consider the pleadings, documents of uncontested validity, and affidavits
submitted by either party.’” Macias v. Excel Bldg. Servs. LLC, 767 F. Supp. 2d 1002, 1007 (N.D.
Cal. 2011) (quoting Ostroff v. Alterra Healthcare Corp., 433 F. Supp. 2d 538, 540 (E.D. Pa.
2006)).
III.

Discussion
As set forth in the Partial Ruling, the Agreement included the Arbitration Provision:
Any dispute arising out of, in connection with or relating to this
Agreement shall be submitted for binding and final arbitration
before a retired judge of the Superior Court of the State of California
for the County of Los Angeles who shall be mutually selected by the
parties. In the event that the parties cannot agree on the selection of
such a retired judge within 30 days after one of the parties notifies
the other in writing that there is any such dispute to be resolved, each
party shall select such a retired judge, and the two retired judges so
selected shall then select a third retired judge who shall serve as the
sole judge in connection with such dispute. If the two partyappointed judges are unable to select a third judge within 30 days
after their appointment, the sole retired judge in connection with
such dispute shall be selected by the Superior Court of the State of
California for the County of Los Angeles. The retired judge so
selected shall conduct the arbitration in conformity with the rules of,
and as if it were conducted by, the American Arbitration
Association.

Agreement at p. 45 of 54. The Agreement also incorporated “confidentiality provisions,” which
were set forth in an attached “Exhibit 1.” Id. (“It is understood that HBO shall comply with the
confidentiality provisions set forth in Exhibit I attached hereto and incorporated herein by this
reference.”); Petition ¶ 31. The confidentiality provisions state “HBO shall not make any
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disparaging remarks concerning Performer or any of his representatives, agents, or business
practices or do any act that may harm or disparage or cause to lower in esteem the reputation or
public image of Performer.” Petition ¶ 33; Agreement at p. 51 of 54 (“Disparagement Clause”).
They also state that “HBO shall not in any manner nor at any time (either during or after HBO’s
contact of HBO’s relationship with Licensor and/or Performer), use or disclose, directly or
indirectly . . . . any . . . ‘Confidential Information.’ ” Agreement at p. 50 of 54. The confidentiality
provisions also include the clause that:
In the event that either party to this agreement brings an action to
enforce the terms of these confidentiality provisions or to declare
rights with respect to such provisions, the prevailing party in such
action shall be entitled to an award of costs of litigation . . . in such
amount as may be determined by the court having jurisdiction in
such action.
Id. at p. 52 of 54.
A. Whether a Valid Arbitration Provision Exists Herein
Defendant first argues that no valid arbitration agreement exists because the confidentiality
provisions state that the prevailing party in an action to enforce the provisions is entitled to an
award of the costs of litigation as may be determined by the court having jurisdiction in such
action. See Def.’s Supp. at 1. Based on this clause, Defendant insists that the more-specific
language in the confidentiality provisions overrides the Agreement’s Arbitration Provision, and
that therefore, a court must resolve any dispute. Id. at 1-2. Further, anticipating Plaintiffs’
arguments, Defendant contends: (1) that there is no indication that the reference to the court in the
confidentiality provisions was intended for actions seeking injunctive relief; and (2) that even
accepting that the confidentiality provisions were incorporated into the body of the Agreement, if
the Court were to hold that the Arbitration Provision trumps the reference to the court, that would
render the reference to the court superfluous. See id. at 2-3.
Plaintiffs first respond that Defendant conflates who has the burden of establishing
arbitrability. See Pls.’ Supp, at 1. Plaintiffs clarify that establishing the existence of an arbitration
clause is their burden, but that the existence of the Arbitration Provision is undisputed. See id.
Instead, Plaintiffs assert that Defendant is challenging the scope of the Arbitration Provision. Id.
The Court would agree with Plaintiffs’ framing of the burden question. See Henry Schein,
Inc. v. Archer and White Sales, Inc., 139 S. Ct. 524, 530 (2019) (“[B]efore referring a dispute to
an arbitrator, the court determines whether a valid arbitration agreement exists.”) (emphasis
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added); Knutson v. Sirius XM Radio Inc., 771 F.3d 559, 565 (9th Cir. 2014) (“Sirius XM, as the
party seeking to compel arbitration, has the burden of proving the existence of an agreement to
arbitrate by a preponderance of the evidence.”); Comer v. Micor, Inc., 436 F.3d 1098, 1104 n.11
(9th Cir. 2006) (“[T]he Federal Arbitration Act reflects ‘a liberal federal policy favoring arbitration
agreements,’ that policy is best understood as concerning ‘the scope of arbitrable issues.’
” (quoting Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24–25, 103 S.Ct.
927, 74 L.Ed.2d 765 (1983)). Whether a particular dispute falls within an arbitration agreement,
however, is subject to the presumption in favor of arbitration. See Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp.,
460 U.S. at 24-25 (“The Arbitration Act establishes that, as a matter of federal law, any doubts
concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration.”).
Defendant cannot not seriously dispute the existence of the Arbitration Provision in the
body of the Agreement. Instead, the thrust of Defendant’s position is that the Arbitration Provision
does not apply to disputes that arise under the Disparagement Clause in the confidentiality
provisions. See Def. Supp. at 1 (“Plaintiffs cannot satisfy their burden of proving that a valid
agreement to arbitrate exists because the very provision on which their Motion rests makes clear
that any disputes must be resolved by “the court,” not an arbitrator . . . . While the body of the
1992 Agreement contains an arbitration provision, the document that contains the nondisparagement sentence contains a different, more specific clause requiring judicial resolution of
disputes.”). Because the Agreement incorporated the confidentiality provisions, it does not make
sense to treat the provisions as a separate document or contract. Thus, the confidentiality
provisions are part of a contract that contains the Arbitration Provision. As such, the Court would
conclude that an arbitration agreement exists, and will address below whether this dispute is within
the scope of the agreement.
B. Whether the Arbitration Provision Encompasses the Present Dispute
1. Reference to a Court in the Confidentiality Provisions
First of all, the plain language of the clause containing the reference to a court in the
confidentiality provisions does not make it clear that any dispute under the provisions must be
litigated in court, as Defendant argues. The clause begins, “in the event that either party to this
agreement brings an action to enforce the terms of these confidentiality provisions . . . .”
Agreement at p. 52 of 54 (emphasis added). The conditional nature of the opening sentence
suggests that the clause only applies if a party brings an action to enforce the terms. It says nothing
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about where such an action may be brought. And, as Plaintiffs point out, even if the Arbitration
Provision requires arbitration, there are reasons that the parties could be in court. Pls.’ Supp. at 4.
Most obviously, one of the parties could resist arbitration, forcing the other party to seek court
intervention. A party could also seek injunctive relief or confirmation of an arbitration award in
court.
Moreover, the reference to the “the court having jurisdiction,” could very well include an
arbitrator as well as a court of law. Reading the “court having jurisdiction” language to include
an arbitrator would negate any concern that the clause was inconsistent with or superfluous to the
Arbitration Provision. See Harris v. Sandro, 96 Cal. App. 4th 1310, 1312 (2002). In Harris, the
plaintiff obtained an option agreement that provided: “Any dispute or claim in law or equity
arising out of this contract or any resulting transaction shall be decided by neutral binding
arbitration in accordance with the rules of the American Arbitration Association.”

Id. The

agreement also included a fee-shifting provision: “Should any litigation be commenced between
the parties . . . the party, Seller or Buyer, prevailing in such litigation shall be entitled to, in addition
to such other relief as may be granted, a reasonable sum for attorneys’ fees to be determined by
the court in such litigation or in a separate action brought for that purpose.” Id. A dispute arose
between the parties, they engaged in arbitration, and the arbitrator awarded attorneys’ fees to the
defendant. Id. The California Court of Appeal thereafter rejected plaintiff’s argument that the
arbitrator exceeded his authority by awarding fees. Id. at 1314. The plaintiff had seemingly argued
that the agreement required that a court make the fee award. Id. However, the California Court
of Appeal held:
The option agreement does not require that a “court” or judge, rather
than an arbitrator, make the fee award. All of the parties’ disputes
are to be submitted to arbitration. Where, as here, a contract both
compels arbitration and awards attorney’s fees to the prevailing
party in “litigation” arising out of the contract, the attorneys’ fee
provision applies to the arbitration. (Severtson v. Williams
Construction Co. (1985) 173 Cal.App.3d 86, 95 [220 Cal.Rptr.
400]; Taranow v. Brokstein, supra, 135 Cal.App.3d at pp. 667668.). Any other result would render the fee provision meaningless,
a result we must avoid where possible. (Civ. Code, § 1641; Tate v.
Saratoga Savings & Loan Assn (1989) 216 Cal.App.3d 843,
857 [265 Cal.Rptr. 440].) By the same reasoning, a contract that
both compels arbitration and requires a “court” to determine the
amount of the fee award must contemplate that an arbitrator will
make the fee award. Otherwise, fees could never be awarded
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because no “court” may decide a dispute under the contract; all such
disputes must be decided by an arbitrator.
Id. at 1314-15.
The Court finds the reasoning in Harris convincing. There, as here, the agreement included
a broad and mandatory arbitration clause, and a conditional (and somewhat ambiguous) reference
to a court in the context of attorneys’ fees or costs. As such, the Court would come to the same
conclusion as Harris and reconcile the possibly-inconsistent clauses by reading the reference to “a
court” in the confidentiality provisions to also encompass an arbitrator.
Throughout its supplemental brief, Defendant repeats that the reference to a court in the
confidentiality provisions is more specific than the Arbitration Provision, but does not explain
exactly why it is more specific.4 The Court disagrees. As stated above, the clause does not use
mandatory language to designate a particular forum for dispute resolution. It only says that the
court having jurisdiction can award the prevailing party costs. If anything, the Arbitration
Provision is clearer and more specific. The Arbitration Provision states in mandatory terms that
“[a]ny dispute arising out of, in connection with or relating to this Agreement shall be” arbitrated.
Agreement at p. 45 of 54. And because the confidentiality provisions were incorporated into the
Agreement, the plainest reading is that any dispute about those provisions would be governed by
the broad Arbitration Provision. Further, neither the Arbitration Provision nor the confidentiality
provisions include any “notwithstanding” language referring to the other to indicate that the
confidentiality provisions are exempt from the Arbitration Provision. Thus, for the foregoing
reasons, the Court would conclude that the language in the confidentiality provisions does not
mandate that only a court may hear disputes under that provision.
Lastly, the Court does not believe that the reference to “the court having jurisdiction” in
the confidentiality provisions renders the arbitrability of disputes under that clause ambiguous.
But, even if the Court did think that the clause created ambiguity, it would still be forced to find
the claims arbitrable because of the federal presumption of arbitrability. See Comedy Club, Inc. v.
Improv West Associates, 553 F.3d 1277, 1286 (9th Cir. 2009).
2. Relation to Leaving Neverland

4

Defendant’s citations to articulations of the general rule that the particular controls the general are unavailing because
Defendant does not explain how the confidentiality provisions are more specific that the Arbitration Clause, and
because Defendant fails to direct the Court to any case holding that a reference to a court is more specific than a broad
arbitration clause. See Def.’s Supp. at 3.

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Defendant next argues that the Arbitration Provision does not encompass the dispute
because the subject of the Agreement was a live concert performance by Michael Jackson in
Bucharest, Romania, on October 1, 1992 and Leaving Neverland has nothing to do with that
concert. See Def.’s Supp. at 3-4. Specifically, Defendant notes that Leaving Neverland does not
mention the concert in Bucharest, contains no concert footage from the performance, and does not
contain any “confidential information” that may have been disclosed to HBO in connection with
the Bucharest telecast. Id. at 4.
In response, Plaintiffs dispute Defendant’s characterization of the relationship between the
film and the Petition. See Pls.’ Supp. at 6. In the Petition, Plaintiffs alleged that Leaving Neverland
accused Jackson of abusing children during the tour that included the Bucharest concert. Petition
¶ 40. Regardless of the relation, Plaintiffs contend that Defendant’s argument goes to the merits
of the dispute rather than its arbitrability. See Pls.’ Supp. at 5-6. The Court tends to agree.
Plaintiffs’ petition is largely based on Defendant’s alleged breach of the Disparagement
Clause of the Agreement. See Petition ¶¶ 36-40. The Disparagement Clause reads:
HBO shall not make any disparaging remarks concerning Performer
or any of his representatives, agents, or business practices or do any
act that may harm or disparage or cause to lower in esteem the
reputation or public image of Performer or any person, firm or
corporation related to or doing business with Performer.
Agreement at p. 51 of 54. The language of the provision does not limit its effect to only disparaging
remarks related to the Bucharest concert, the tour, or any other topic. Read with the presumption
of arbitrability in mind, the Court thinks that the Arbitration Provision clearly encompasses the
current dispute. The Arbitration Provision requires that any dispute arising under the Agreement
must be arbitrated; the Disparagement Clause was incorporated into the Agreement; nothing on
the face of the Disparagement Clause limits its effect to certain types of disparaging statements;
and, in Leaving Neverland, HBO broadcast accusations that Jackson sexually abused children.
Whether the Disparagement Clause prohibits HBO from making those types of allegations
is a question of breach that an arbitrator must decide.
3. Expiration of the Agreement
Next, Defendant argues that the Arbitration provision does not encompass the instant
dispute because the Agreement has been fully performed and is expired. Def.’s Supp. at 5-6. The
Court previously noted that any challenge to the validity of the Agreement as a whole is a question
for the arbitrator. See Partial Ruling at 9-10 n.7. Moreover, even if the Agreement has expired,
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the Supreme Court has held that arbitration agreements may outlive the contract of which they are
a part. See Nolde Bros. v. Local No. 358, Bakery & Confectionery Workers Union, AFL-CIO, 430
U.S. 243, 252 (1977) (holding that the parties must arbitrate a dispute over severance pay even
though the agreement providing for severance pay and arbitration had expired and the claim for
the severance pay arose after the expiration); see also Litton Fin. Printing Div. v. N.L.R.B., 501
U.S. 190, 204 (1991) (reiterating “a presumption in favor of postexpiration arbitration of matters
unless negated expressly or by clear implication.’ ”) (quoting Nolde Bros,, 430 U.S. at 255));
Wamar Int’l, LLC v. Thales Avionics, Inc., 2019 WL 1877615, at *10 n.3 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 20,
2019) (“Even where an agreement has been terminated, the well settled jurisprudence that holds
arbitration agreements to a life and validity separate and apart from the agreement in which they
are embedded dictates that parties’ duties under an arbitration clause survive contract termination
when the dispute is over an obligation arguably created by the expired contract.” (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted); Brachfeld v. Hopkins, 2017 WL 10436075, at *5 (C.D.
Cal. Dec. 11, 2017) (“Absent an express agreement to the contrary, however, arbitration
agreements ‘survive[ ] contract termination when the dispute [is] over an obligation arguably
created by the expired agreement.’ ” (quoting Nolde Bros., 430 U.S. at 252) (alterations in
original)).
The rule in Nolde Brothers is not limitless, however, and only applies to disputes that
arguably arise under the contract at issue. See Nolde Bros., 430 U.S. at 252-53. But because
Plaintiffs’ claims allegedly arise under the Disparagement Clause of the Agreement, and because
there is no express clause terminating the Arbitration Provision at the expiration of the Agreement,
the Court would apply the Nolde Brothers presumption.5
C. First Amendment
Finally, Defendant argues that the Court should deny the Arbitration Motion because the
Arbitration Provision, “as applied here, is unenforceable as a matter of the First Amendment, due
process, and California public policy.” Def. Supp. at 7. HBO contends that it “is squarely
attacking the enforceability of arbitration provision itself, not arguing the merits as Plaintiffs have
wrongly claimed.” Id. Specifically, Defendant asserts that the Arbitration Provision itself is
5

Defendant’s cite to Just Film, Inc. v. Merch. Servs., Inc., 2011 WL 2433044 (N.D. Cal. 2011) is inapposite. See
Arbitration Opp’n at 11-12. The court there did not hold that arbitration provisions expire along with their contracts.
To the contrary, the court recognized the Nolde Brothers line of precedent but held that the claims did not arise under
the agreement. Just Film, Inc., 2011 WL 2433044, at *5.

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suspect under the First Amendment because it allows Plaintiffs “a perpetual forum for them to
police what are clearly defamation-after-death claims in disguise,” and that the Court would
“enmesh[]” itself in the controversy by enforcing the Arbitration Provision. Id.6
Plaintiffs respond that Defendant’s arguments are “frivolous” because “[i]t is well
established that judicially enforcing arbitration agreements does not constitute state action.” Pls.’s
Supp. at 7 (quoting Roberts v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 877 F.3d 833, 838 n. 1 (9th Cir. 2017)
(emphasis added)). While the Court agrees that attempting to enforce an arbitration agreement in
a contract that includes a non-disparagement clause through the filing of a lawsuit does not initially
suggest the presence of state action, the initiation of the litigation itself can trigger First
Amendment concerns. See, e.g., California Code Civil Procedure § 425.16(a) (“The Legislature
finds and declares that there has been a disturbing increase in lawsuits brought primarily to chill
the valid exercise of the constitutional rights of freedom of speech and petition for the redress of
grievances.”). It cannot be doubted that Plaintiffs’ arbitration action is seeking to recover damages
based upon Defendants’ broadcasting a documentary.7 Whether that fact should have some effect
on the Arbitration Motion should be discussed more thoroughly at the hearing.
IV.

Conclusion
The Court has not at this time reached a final decision on the Arbitration Motion but will

decide the matter after hearing arguments of counsel.

6

The Court notes that Defendant’s Opposition attacked the Disparagement Clause rather than the Arbitration
Provision. See Opp’n at 16-22; id. at 16 (“The 1992 Agreement’s Non-Disparagement Sentence is Unenforceable.”);
id. at 17 (“Petitioners’ Interpretation of Non-Disparagement Sentence Violates HBO’s First Amendment and Due
Process Rights”); id. at 19 (“application of the vague and overbroad non-disparagement and Confidentiality Provisions
implicates and violates HBO’s due process and First Amendment rights.”). The Court will not consider any challenges
to portions of the Agreement aside from the Arbitration Provision. See Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna,
546 U.S. 440, 445-46 (2006) (“First, as a matter of substantive federal arbitration law, an arbitration provision is
severable from the remainder of the contract. Second, unless the challenge is to the arbitration clause itself, the issue
of the contract’s validity is considered by the arbitrator in the first instance.”).
7

Although Plaintiffs refer to Leaving Neverland as a documentary in quotes and characterize it as “one-sided” (see
Complaint at 2:9-12), they do not deny that it is in fact a documentary and subject to First Amendment protections.

9