Testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
Under Secretary for Political Affairs David Hale
Wednesday, July 24, 2019
Chairman Risch, Ranking Member Menendez, distinguished Members
of the Committee, thank you for inviting me to testify today.
The Trump Administration has implemented an unprecedented pressure
campaign on Iran with two objectives: First, to deprive the Iranian
regime of the money it needs to support its destabilizing activities.
Second, to bring Iran to the negotiating table to conclude a
comprehensive and enduring deal as outlined by Secretary Pompeo in
May of 2018.
President Trump and Secretary Pompeo have expressed clearly
America’s willingness to negotiate with Iran without preconditions when
the time is right. We have also been clear about our desire for peace and
our readiness to begin normalizing relations should we reach a
comprehensive deal. We have put the possibility of a much brighter
future on the table for the Iranian people, and we mean it.
The comprehensive deal we seek with the Iranian regime should address
four key areas: its nuclear program, its ballistic missile development and
proliferation, its support for terrorist groups and proxies, and Iranian
treatment of U.S. citizens, such as the wrongful detention of U.S.
citizens like Siamak Namazi and Xiyue Wang, and the case of our
missing citizen Bob Levinson.
Over a year ago, Secretary Pompeo laid out twelve points describing the
negotiated deal we seek. These points reflect the wide extent of Iran’s
malign behavior as well as the global consensus before the JCPOA, as
reflected in multiple UN Security Council resolutions that were adopted
starting in 2006 following the revelation of Iran’s nuclear violations.
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 Before we re-imposed sanctions and accelerated our pressure campaign,
Iran was increasing the scope of its malign activity, emboldened by the
resources and legitimacy provided by our participation in the JCPOA.
These actions included engaging in expansive missile testing and
proliferation, as well as continuing to unjustly detain American citizens
and those of our allies.
Iran also deepened its involvement in regional conflicts.
In Yemen, Iran has provided funding, weapons, and training to the
Houthis, only prolonging the conflict and suffering of the Yemeni
people. Iran seeks to exploit Yemen’s war to undermine its adversaries
and expand its regional power. By contrast, America has given more
than $2 billion to help the Yemeni people since the start of the conflict.
Iran has provided zero dollars for humanitarian assistance in Yemen.
The Iranian regime would rather buy explosive drones to attack civilian
airports and infrastructure than provide for the welfare of the Iranian
people.
In Syria, Iran supports a regime that has killed hundreds of thousands,
displaced millions of its own citizens, and which continues to spread
violence throughout the country. Iran is trying to deepen its roots in
Syria –economically, militarily, and socially - and use it as a forward
operating base to threaten Syria’s neighbors, especially Israel and
Jordan.
In Lebanon, Iran uses Hizballah to provoke conflict with Lebanon’s
neighbors, imperil the Lebanese people, and generate instability.
American pressure is aimed at reversing these trends. Today, the regime
and its proxies are weaker than when our pressure began.

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 Shia militant groups in Syria have stated that Iran no longer has enough
money to pay them as much as they have in the past. Hizballah and
Hamas have enacted unprecedented austerity plans because of a lack of
funding from Iran. In March, Hizballah’s leader Hassan Nasrallah
publicly said Hizballah needed financial support to sustain its
operations. Hizballah has placed donation boxes in some small
businesses and grocery stores asking the public for spare change.
We are also making it harder for Iran to expand its own military
capabilities. Starting in 2014, Iran’s military budget increased each year
until it hit nearly $14 billion in 2017. From 2017 to 2018, when our
pressure campaign went into effect, military spending fell by nearly 10
percent. Iran’s 2019 budget proposed even steeper cuts, including a 28
percent cut to their defense budget and a 17 percent cut for IRGC
funding. The IRGC’s cyber command is now low on cash, and the
IRGC has told Iraq’s Shia militia groups that they should start looking
for other sources of revenue.
Our pressure is working. It is making the cost of Iran’s violent and
expansionist foreign policy prohibitive.
Our policy is at its core an economic and diplomatic one. We are
focusing on maximizing economic pressure on the regime, linking that
pressure to its malign activities, and simultaneously increasing Iran’s
diplomatic isolation. Recently, Iran has responded to this campaign with
violence. Our diplomacy and economic pressure does not entitle Iran to
undertake violence against any nation or to threaten maritime security.
As the Secretary has said, Iran should meet diplomacy with diplomacy,
not with terror, bloodshed, and extortion.

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 Iran was responsible for the attacks at the UAE Port of Fujairah in May
as well as the assault on two oil tankers in the Gulf of Oman last month.
Iran was responsible for shooting down an American unmanned aircraft
lawfully operating in international airspace.
The President has been clear that this Administration does not seek
armed conflict with Iran. However, we have also been clear to the
regime that we will defend our citizens, forces, and interests, including
against attacks by Iran or its proxies. As Secretary Pompeo has noted,
the Administration’s goal is to find a diplomatic solution to Iran’s
destabilizing actions, not to engage in a conflict with Iran. The
Administration is not currently seeking a new authorization for use of
military force. Nor has the Administration, to date, interpreted either the
2001 or the 2002 AUMF as authorizing military force against Iran,
except as may be necessary to defend U.S. or partner forces engaged in
counterterrorism operations or operations to establish a stable,
democratic Iraq. Marik String, the Department’s Acting Legal Adviser,
is here today to speak to this issue in more detail and about AUMF more
generally.
Safeguarding freedom of navigation in, through, and around the Strait of
Hormuz is paramount. One-fifth of the world’s oil supply transits
through the Strait, with the majority fueling the economies of Europe
and Asia. We stand with our partners and allies to safeguard global
commerce and regional stability. At the direction of President Trump,
we are working to establish an international initiative to promote
freedom of navigation and the free flow of commerce in the Gulf. It is
vital that we and other nations preserve the ability and right of all vessels
to safely navigate the Strait of Hormuz.

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 While threatening maritime shipping and plotting attacks against U.S.
forces and interests, Iran is also continuing its longstanding practice of
nuclear extortion.
The Iranian regime’s recent announcement that it is accelerating its
uranium enrichment reminds us of the fatal flaws of the JCPOA deal. It
left Iran’s nuclear capabilities largely intact and placed Iran in a position
to pursue rapid breakout at a time of its choosing, if it decided to do so.
Mr. Chairman, the problems presented by Iran’s provocative building up
its stocks of nuclear material and increasing the level of enrichment are
problems that the world would have faced soon anyway – at the very
least because the terms of the JCPOA were time bound with
unacceptable sunset provisions.
But the secret nuclear weapons archive discovered last year reminds us
that Iran’s nuclear ambitions are in no way peaceful. Iran hid this
archive from the world before, during and after JCPOA negotiations.
Iran hid this archive while maintaining an organization headed by the
founder of Iran’s former nuclear weapons program – an organization
that employs scientists who worked on that nuclear weapons program.
Had we continued participating in the JCPOA until key aspects of the
deal began to expire, we would have been faced with an Iranian regime
that was more entrenched in the region and with an even greater
conventional arsenal. It would have continued to reap revenue from
abroad and funnel it into missile proliferation, support for terrorism,
proxy warfare, and regional destabilization. The Iran we would have
faced would be much more formidable than the Iran we in fact face.
We must learn from past mistakes. Any new deal must demand a full
accounting of Iran’s past and present nuclear activities, alongside
comprehensive and permanent restrictions on Iran’s activities and
capabilities. Our pressure will continue to deny Iran access to the
revenue streams it needs to destabilize the Middle East. It is time for the
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 Iranian regime to leave 40 years of terror and failure for their people
behind.
As we raise the cost of Iran’s expansionism and of the status quo, we
seek a comprehensive deal and a far more peaceful and stable
relationship.
Iranians in the United States and around the world contribute to the
vitality and success of their communities. We look forward to the day
when we can restore diplomatic relations with Iran and work together
with the Iranian people to bring them and their neighbors the peace and
prosperity they deserve.
Chairman Risch, Ranking Member Menendez, and other Members of
this Committee, I thank you again for the opportunity to testify before
you. I welcome the opportunity to answer your questions.

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