SUMMARY OF NZ SPECIAL. OPERATIONS FORQES SUPPORT TO THE NZ PRT IN AFGHANISTAN DEPLOYMENT 1. The deployment of a Special Operations Task Force (SOTF) to Afghanistan was originally approved from late September 2009 for 18 months. This deployment was extended for a further 12 months and ceased on 31 Mar 2012. The initial deployment comprised of 81 personnel and at its height rose to 92 (including LAV crews). It then reduced to a mandate of for rotations four to six (March 2011 to March 2012). The ?rst three rotations were of six months duration with the last three being four month deployments. The deployment included NZDF support staff an NZDF Legal Officer, to Kabul. Afghanistan. MANDATES 2. As a constituent part of ISAF, the SOTF had legal authority to carry out the ISAF tasks identi?ed under UN Security Council resolutions 1386 (2001), 1510 (2003) and 1833 (2008). In the execution of ISAF tasks, the SOTF was covered by the Military Technical Agreement (MTA) between ISAF and Afghanistan, and related agreements and arrangements that had been entered into between NZ, NATO and the other Member States of In addition, the SOTF could also perform national tasks in direct support of the NZ PRT, NZDF personnel providing training assistance to the Afghan National Security Forces, and other NZ military or civilian personnel who were present in Afghanistan for the purpose of providing humanitarian or reconstruction assistance. Accordingly Task Force (TF) 81 personnel were covered by the MTA between NZDF and Afghanistan when conducting such tasks. TASKS 4. Insurgents (INS) had continued to target Kabul from safe havens in provinces surrounding Kabul as they become increasingly pressured by lSAF/coalition operations. Targets included government of?cials and infrastructure, Afghan security forces, ISAF/coalition troops, embassies and hotels. Individual, high- pro?le incidents were having a disproportionate impact on the perceptions of international actors and the Afghanistan political elite located in Kabul. The capability of insurgents to act would be hindered by improved Afghan security force capacity in the capital and lSAF/National Directorate of Security (NDS) intelligence-led operations to disrupt insurgent networks operating in Kabul. The NZDF SOTF was deployed to maintain stability, defeat the insurgency, mentor the Crisis Response Unit (CRU) and enhance the reputation of the NZDF and GONZ. SPECIFIC TASKS 5. The SOTF conducted the following tasks: (son) a. Special reconnaissance in Kabul and adjacent provinces to identify and detect insurgent forces and Improvised Explosive Device (IED) networks in order to interdict these before they resulted in attack against coalition and ANSF elements; b. Direct action tasks against insurgent networks in support of ISAF and 0. Military assistance, support and in?uence tasks, including training support and mentoring to the and d. NZ national support tasks including support to NZDF elements in Afghanistan including SOLE support to the NZ PRT, VIP protection and hostage rescue as necessary. CONSTRAINTS 6. The following constraints were placed on this deployment: a. SOTF to remain under NZ national command at all times; b. Priority may be placed on NZ national tasks as and when required; c. SNO SOTF is to be satis?ed that the tasks assigned to the NZSOTF will receive the appropriate level of intelligence, logistic and combat support to ensure force protection and the maximum chance of mission success; d. NZDF personnel will not conduct any cross border Operations; e. The conduct of operations beyond Regional Command (RC) Capital and its six surrounding provinces as directed by COM ISAF SOF is to be authorised by CDF. f. NZDF personnel will not be involved in poppy eradication and GDP approval is required for any counter-narcotics operations?; and g. Hostage rescue of NZ nationals will require SUPPORT TO THE 7. Over the period of the deployment the SOTF provided operational support to the PRT. _So_me examples include: Kinetic interdiction - Acquisition of RC-East and ISAF SOF Air and Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) resources to support operations targeting Bamyan based Insurgents There is a clear nexus between the Taleban and the narcotics industry and other criminal behaviour. In this regard the SOTF were requested to undertake specific operations against Taleban or installations invoived in the supply or manufacture of narcotics. Bk11.001.000011 SEE-REF The conduct of four High Risk Arrest operations to detain insurgents responsible for or planning to conduct attacks on the (BURNHAM, NOVA YAMAHA and PSR(sen)1 - BURNHAM was the response to the Lt O'Donnell incident conducted on 21 Aug 10 in Baghlan. Thirteen insurgents were killed by the SOTF. - NOVA was Tala wa Barfek where drugs and weapons were recovered - YAMAHA was an op on 16 Jan 11 where ?ve military aged males including three insurgents of signi?cant interest were apprehended. Unrelated Operation outside TOR - PSR(sen)1 The development, liaison and handover of INS target to OEF SOF to conduct kinetic operations on behalf of SOFTF and Support and in?uence operations Establishment of Intelligence liaison between TF-954 ??R'and Bamyan NDS to identify INS network responsible for attacks on Intelligence development of insurgents. facilitators and commanders responsible for planning and conducting attacks on This resulted in INS approved for ISAF targeting via ISAF SOF JPEL approvals process Intelligence monitoring of these targets to enable JPEL updates to maintain those INS as ISAF vetted targets Intelligence liaison with to enable SOF targeting of Baghlan based insurgents who pose a direct threat to in Bamyan Ongoing All-Source development of Bamyan insurgent threat networks by TF954 enablers (Bunham IFC) to identify key threat nodes and TTP and assessment of role, function and future intent Ongoing monitoring of emerging threats to for future kinetic operations support Obtaining ISAF SOF support and resources to to ?nd and ?x Bamyan/Baghlan based insurgents posing an immediate threat to Obtaining ISAF SOF support for target development of known INS groups posing a threat to Provision of JTAC to control all missions in support of Provision of ISAF SOF imagery analysis capabilities in support of force protection missions Bk11.001.000011 SE-G-R-E-T Conduct of ground based reconnaissance to identify and locate insurgents and identify linkages to of?cial groups in Kabul PSR(sen)1 - PSR(sen)1 was a JPEL and the operational planner/shadow governor for the area. He was involved in the planning of the O?Donnel attack. When rotation three took over residing in PAK but travelling to KBL for meetings, and travelling to Bamyan now and then. SOTF isolated the link meeting in KBL, Intent was to ?nd where was meeting so could be uplifted in KBL. OD advicet liaison and mentoring Provision of SOLE teams attached to for over 12 months to identify and develop sound force protection tactics, procedures and measures within patrols Provision of tactical advice to Command and Operations staff during attacks on the Provision of planning advice during patrol planning to maximise force protection Provision of SOLE team to during periods of heightened INS activity SOTF Ops liaison with ISAF and OEF SOF in RC-N to facilitate SOF operations against Baghlan based Insurgents who are responsible for or who pose an immediate threat to the in Bamyan Liaison with ANSF at the directorate/ministerial level to enable Investigation and Prosecution of Bamyan based insurgents by the Afghan judicial system Ongoing ISAF Joint Command and Regional Command East Headquarters staff work to secure ISAF supporting assets such as ISR, Rotary Wing transport, Air Reaction Force, Indirect Fires and Air Weapons Teams as Force Protection options on behalf of the - TF-954 Regional Command Boundary in close proximity to the by instigating and maintaining ISAF Joint Command ISAF SOF and supporting assets rapid entry to the Baghlan area. Bk11.001.000011 . to ISAF Joint Command and Regional Command East in order to allow ISAF SOF operations to disrupt INS threats to the SUMMARY 8. In addition, over the period of the deployment the SOTF defeated or disrupted 32 attacks on Kabul. It physically responded to and resolved 15 spectacular attacks on Kabul. It also supported many high risk arrests with it?s partner force who were trained and mentored to a high standard. Bk11.001.000011