EXHIBIT A

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
ATLANTA DIVISION
DONNA CURLING, ET AL.,
Plaintiffs,
Civil Action No. 1:17-CV-2989-AT

v.
BRAD RAFFENSPERGER, ET AL.,
Defendants.

THIRD AMENDED COMPLAINT
Plaintiffs Donna Curling, Donna Price, and Jeffrey Schoenberg hereby
allege and plead for their Third Amended Complaint as follows:
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
1.

The right to vote is the most fundamental and sacrosanct of all of the

rights conferred on U.S. citizens by the Constitution as well as by the Georgia
Constitution and Georgia state law. It is the foundation of our democracy. As the
Supreme Court has set out in unambiguous terms, “[n]o right is more precious in a
free country than that of having a voice in the election of those who make the laws
under which, as good citizens, we must live. Other rights, even the most basic, are
illusory if the right to vote is undermined.” Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 17
(1964). See also Wexler v. Anderson, 452 F.3d 1226, 1232 (III) (11th Cir. 2006)

 (“The right to vote is fundamental, forming the bedrock of our democracy.”). The
Georgia Constitution as well reflects the drafters’ recognition of the vital role that
the right to vote plays in the management of the State’s affairs by explicitly
providing that “[e]lections by the people shall be by secret ballot and shall be
conducted in accordance with procedures provided by law.” Ga. Const. Art. II § 1,
¶ 1.
2.

In reaction to the profound challenges that emerged from the 2000

Bush-Gore presidential election, many states, Georgia among them, turned to
paperless electronic voting systems in the expectation that this technology would
prevent a reprise of that election’s problems. Plaintiffs raise no questions regarding
the intent behind that change. However, over the years, it has been increasingly
apparent that paperless electronic voting systems have not, and could not, live up
to expectations. Indeed, the system is now known to be so vulnerable to intrusion
and manipulation that the nation’s leading cybersecurity experts have been going
to great lengths to educate both the states and Congress about the perils inherent in
those systems, and to urge the return to paper ballots.
3.

Despite the inclination to put great faith in the wonders of technology,

it is decidedly not the answer when it comes to voting systems. The Direct
Recording Equipment (“DRE”) voting system (“DRE Voting System”) used in
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 Georgia is a prime illustration of the regrettable incompatibility between the
functioning of the current electronic voting system and the voters’ right to cast a
ballot and have that vote accurately counted. Because of such concerns, states
across the country, in increasing numbers, have been returning to the safety of
paper ballots, with only five states remaining, like Georgia, using all electronic
voting.
4.

The inherent vulnerabilities of DREs tremendously compromise the

rights of voters in any jurisdiction. Furthermore, the integrity of Georgia’s DRE
Voting System was significantly eroded as a consequence of the misfeasance and
malfeasance of the Defendants: The central server used both to store voters’
personal identifying data and to program every electronic voting machine in
Georgia was readily accessible in the many months (and possibly years) leading up
to the 2016 Presidential election, and subsequent 2017 elections -- and accessible
not merely to cybersecurity experts, but to anyone with a modicum of familiarity
with computer use. The central server was wide open for anyone to enter the
system and readily access personal data of Georgia voters. Furthermore, such an
intruder could also easily manipulate the server’s data and voter registration
software, and thereby render legitimate voters ineligible, add fictitious voters to the

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 list, and switch votes so as to increase the numbers for the candidate of the
intruder’s choosing.
5.

The gross abrogation of the Constitutional and statutory obligations to

protect the franchise rights of Georgia voters did not stop there. Instead, when the
security failure was discovered by a local cybersecurity expert and brought to the
attention of two of the Defendants, the expert was warned to drop the issue. And it
was not only the warnings from this cybersecurity expert that these Defendants
ignored. Later, they would turn a blind eye to other critical warnings from more
than twenty leading cybersecurity and voting system experts, from the Department
of Homeland Security (“DHS”), from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”),
and from the Election Assistance Commission (“EAC”).
6.

Indeed, Georgia’s Secretary of State (“GA SOS”) not only ignored

each of these warnings, but also refused the offers of assistance in remedying the
problems that the DHS and the FBI urged it to accept. Rather, GA SOS publicized
completely unfounded allegations of an attempted takeover of Georgia’s electoral
system by the federal government.
7.

Even under the very best of circumstances – with the current voting

systems properly installed, programmed, and operated – the inherent flaws in the
DREs render it not possible for the state to comply with the election law or to
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 protect the rights of Georgia voters. Yet, these are not the best of circumstances;
far from it. Rather, there is compelling evidence that the rights of Georgia voters
guaranteed by Georgia statute and the U.S. and Georgia constitutions to have their
votes counted accurately, have been flagrantly and repeatedly breached by
Defendants’ conduct.
8.

This case is not merely about a technical violation or a theoretical

risk. It is about forcing voters to choose between totally relinquishing their right to
vote and acquiescing to cast their vote despite very real risks: the risk that their
vote will not be properly counted; the risk that the declared results will be contrary
to the will of voters; and furthermore, the risk that there will be no way to verify
the validity of the election.
9.

Any question of convenience of Defendants and their commitment to

a woefully flawed and wholly indefensible voting system must not be permitted to
take priority over the statutory and Constitutional rights of Georgia voters.
10.

This complaint sets forth the violations of law and the other serious

irregularities that occurred during the November 8, 2016 General Election, (“2016
General Election”), the April 18, 2017, 6th Congressional District Special Election
(“Special Election”), the June 20, 2017, 6th Congressional District Runoff Election
(“Runoff”), and the May 2018 and November 2018 General Elections
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 (collectively, the “Relevant Previous Elections”) causing the results of such
elections to be indeterminable.
11.

This complaint also sets forth violations of law resulting from

Defendants’ continued failure to implement a constitutionally-acceptable election
system. Despite warnings from cybersecurity experts, government officials, and
even this Court, Defendants still intend to utilize their flawed DRE Voting System
in upcoming elections during Fall 2019. Additionally, while Defendants are
implementing a paper ballot system for certain 2020 elections, they have chosen to
force all of Georgia’s voters to use ballot-marking devices (“BMDs”) which suffer
from the same security vulnerabilities as Defendants’ flawed DRE Voting System.
12.

For these reasons and those demonstrated below, Plaintiffs

respectfully ask the Court: (1) to hold Defendants liable for the violations of
Georgia voters’ rights in connection with the Relevant Previous Elections, and to
ensure that those rights are protected in connection with the scheduled Fall 2019
and all future elections, (collectively, the “Relevant Pending Elections”) and (2) to
enter an order providing such relief as is necessary and appropriate to protect
Georgia’s voters from such future, irreparable harm.

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 PLAINTIFFS
13.

Plaintiffs are electors who are residents of Georgia as well as electors

of the State of Georgia who are concerned about the integrity, credibility, security,
and reliability of the electoral process. All Plaintiffs have cast ballots in one or
more of the Relevant Previous Elections, and all have cast ballots on the DRE
Voting System in one or more of the Relevant Previous Elections.
14.

DONNA CURLING (“Curling”) is an elector of the State of Georgia

and a resident of Fulton County. Curling voted in the Relevant Previous Elections,
and intends to vote in all future elections for which she is eligible.
15.

Due to concerns over the integrity of prior Georgia elections, Curling

requested that GA SOS reexamine Georgia’s DRE Voting System. Curling also
chose to exercise her right to cast her vote using a verifiable paper ballot in the
Runoff, so as to ensure that her vote would be permanently recorded on an
independent record. To do so, Curling persisted through considerable
inconvenience – only to be incorrectly told by GA SOS and the Fulton County
Board of Registration and Elections that she had not, in fact, cast a ballot, creating
irreparable harm that her ballot was not counted. Without the intervention of this
Court, Curling will be compelled to choose between relinquishing her right to vote
and acquiescing to cast her vote under a system that violates Georgians’ rights and
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 cannot reliably determine election outcomes that can be legally certified. As such,
Curling has standing to bring her claims.
16.

Plaintiff DONNA PRICE (“Price”) is an elector of the State of

Georgia and a resident of DeKalb County. Due to concerns over the integrity of
prior Georgia elections, prior to the Runoff, Price joined the group of 13 other
electors who exercised their right under O.C.G.A § 21-2-379.2(a) to request that
GA SOS reexamine Georgia’s DRE Voting System – a request GA SOS
effectively denied, abridging her rights to assure that future elections would be
conducted on compliant systems. She cast her vote on a DRE in the 2016 General
Election, and intends to vote in all future elections for which she is eligible.
Without the intervention of this Court, Price will be compelled to choose between
relinquishing her right to vote and acquiescing to cast her vote under a system that
violates her right to vote and to have her vote accurately counted. As such, Price
has standing to bring her claims.
17.

Plaintiff JEFFREY SCHOENBERG (“Schoenberg”) is an elector of

the State of Georgia and a resident of DeKalb County. He cast his ballot on DRE
machines in all the Relevant Previous Elections and intends to vote in all future
elections for which he is eligible. In casting his ballot in a voting system that
abridged his right to participate in a legally conducted election with a determinable
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 and certifiable result, Schoenberg suffered irreparable harm. Without the
intervention of this Court, Schoenberg will be compelled to choose between
relinquishing his right to vote and acquiescing to cast his vote under a system that
violates his right to vote and to have his vote accurately counted. As such,
Schoenberg has standing to bring his claims.
DEFENDANTS
18.

Defendant BRAD RAFFENSPERGER (“Secretary Raffensperger”) is

the Secretary of State of Georgia and, in that role, also serves as Chair of the State
Election Board. Secretary Raffensperger’s predecessor, current Georgia Governor
Brian P. Kemp, was responsible for the Relevant Previous Elections, and Secretary
Raffensperger is responsible for the orderly and accurate administration of
Georgia’s electoral processes and the Relevant Pending Elections. This
responsibility includes the duty to ensure that legally compliant voting systems are
in place, and to conduct any reexaminations of Georgia’s DRE Voting System
currently in use, upon request or at his own discretion.
19.

Defendants DAVID J. WORLEY, REBECCA N. SULLIVAN, ANH

LEE, and SETH HARP (“State Election Board Members”) are members of the
State Election Board in Georgia. As such, for the Relevant Previous Elections, and,
for the Relevant Pending Elections, they were responsible and continue to be
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 responsible for (1) promulgating rules and regulations to ensure the legality and
purity of all elections, (2) investigating fraud and irregularities in elections, and (3)
reporting election law violations to the Attorney General or appropriate district
attorney.
20.

Defendants MARY CAROLE COONEY, VERNETTA NURIDDIN,

KATHLEEN D. RUTH, MARK WINGATE, and AARON JOHNSON (“County
Election Board Members”) are members of the Fulton County Board of
Registration and Elections who were, for the Relevant Previous Elections, and, for
the Relevant Pending Elections, continue to be, responsible for conducting the
elections in Fulton County.
21.

All Defendants are sued only in their official capacities.
I. JURISDICTION AND VENUE

22.

On August 8, 2017, Defendants consented to jurisdiction when they

removed this action on the basis of Federal Question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §
1331. Dkt. No. 1-14.
23.

Further, this Court has jurisdiction over this action pursuant to 28

U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1343, 1367, 2201, and 2202.

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 24.

Venue lies in this court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) because all

reside in the district and a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to
the Plaintiffs’ claims occurred in this judicial district.
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
A.

Georgia’s DRE Voting System is Fundamentally Flawed and
Vulnerable
25.

Georgia’s DRE Voting System relies primarily of the use of DRE

voting computers, which, by design, directly record an elector’s vote on an
electronic medium. See O.C.G.A. §§ 21-2-379.1 to -379.12; see also Ga. Comp.
R. & Regs. 183-1-12.01. The DREs used in Georgia provide no method through
which voters can be assured that their vote has been accurately recorded, in
contrast with an anonymous paper ballot which the voter marks and reviews before
he casts his ballot. DREs produce neither a paper trail nor any other means by
which the records of votes cast can be audited.
26.

These inherent problems are exacerbated by the fact that Georgia uses

DREs that run on antiquated software that is programmed by and downloaded from
one central location, the Center for Elections Systems (“CES”), formerly located at
Kennesaw State University (“KSU”), and now located within GA SOS’s office.
Relying on a single site renders Georgia’s DRE Voting System far more vulnerable
than systems that are managed through numerous sites at the county level across
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 the state. In Georgia, only one server needs to be compromised in order for an
intruder to exploit it, making Georgia elections a tempting target.
27.

The Georgia Global Election Management System (“GEMS”) is beset

by vulnerabilities.
28.

Defendants have publicly represented that because Georgia’s GEMS

database was unique and confidential, hackers could not design malware
compatible with that database. In reality, however, the Georgia GEMS database is
structured identically to databases that have been available on the internet since
2002. Therefore, by Defendants’ own admission, the GEMS system is critically
vulnerable.
29.

Compounding these concerns is the fact that Georgia has not updated

or provided patches to its GEMS database software since approximately 2005.
30.

Despite these vulnerabilities, Georgia has not collected all of the

approximately 50,000 DRE memory cards employed by Georgia during elections
for testing or reformatting since 2013 or 2015. Similarly, Georgia has never tested
or otherwise checked the internal memory of its DRE voting machines.
31.

In addition to the problems associated with the DRE Voting System in

general, and the added vulnerabilities created by Georgia’s antiquated software and

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 single point of entry, Georgia’s DRE Voting System has long been at further risk
because of gross mismanagement.
32.

For example, CES Director Michael Barnes transfers data directly

from the GEMS central server using a USB drive to a public computer that is
connected to the internet. After being exposed to the internet, this USB drive is
then reinserted back into the GEMS server. Notably, while Barnes maintains this
USB drive in a locked desk drawer, he leaves the key to this drawer unlocked in
the same desk.
33.

Additionally, outside contractors working from their own homes on

their own personal computers, construct the GEMS database used for Georgia’s
elections.
B.

The Exposure and Breaches of Georgia’s DRE Voting System Have
Been Undeniably Established
34.

In August of 2016, a professional cybersecurity expert residing in

Georgia, Logan Lamb (“Lamb”), who was interested in the state’s election system,
accessed CES’s public website. Shockingly, Lamb was able to access key
components of Georgia’s electronic election infrastructure, without so much as
entering a password. It should be noted that these actions were in accordance with
both the law and the general standards followed by most professionals in the
cybersecurity industry.
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 35.

In accessing these election system files, Lamb found a startling

amount of private information, including: driver license numbers, birthdates, and
the last four digits of social security numbers for over six-and-a-half million
Georgia voters; the passwords given to polling place supervisors on election day to
control the opening and closing of the DREs and to make administrative
corrections in the event a DRE encountered a problem; and executable programs
that could be used to implant malware and vote stealing programs in the system.
36.

This publicly available information easily found by Lamb provided

everything a bad actor would need to interfere with an election and to manipulate
its outcome – while likely avoiding detection.
C.

The Defendants’ Unwillingness to Recognize and Respond to the
Problems
37.

Lamb immediately alerted Merle King (“King”), the Georgia official

responsible for overseeing, managing, and securing Georgia’s electronic election
infrastructure, to the serious security vulnerabilities he had discovered. In response,
Lamb was cautioned by King that if he talked about it, he would be “crushed by
the politicians downtown.”
38.

Upon information and belief, not only did Georgia fail to take

remedial action when alerted to the problem Lamb raised, it failed to act even in
the face of the detailed information on the cybersecurity threats facing the nation’s
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 election systems, and the recommended specific steps to reduce the risk, which
were disseminated by the FBI, the DHS, and the EAC. The press reported that
Georgia was the only state to refuse all federal assistance to help ensure the
security of its election infrastructure. Neither did the state officials respond to a
letter that had been drafted by a group of over twenty voting system and
cybersecurity experts expressing their heightened concerns about Georgia’s DRE
Voting System.
D.

The Consequences of Georgia’s Failure to Act
39.

In February 2017, a cybersecurity colleague of Lamb’s, Chris

Grayson (“Grayson”), was able to repeat what Lamb had done seven months
earlier. Around that same time, Lamb also found that, not only could he still easily
access and download the same information as he had previously done, he
discovered additional and updated information, including more recent database
files and passwords.
40.

Upon information and belief, Grayson notified a colleague and a

faculty member at KSU of his findings. This colleague then notified KSU’s
University Information Technology Services (“UITS”) Information Security
Office, which in turn notified King. The day after Grayson’s notification, the KSU

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 UITS Information Security Office seized CES’s server. Two days after Grayson’s
notification, the FBI had been alerted and took possession of the server.
41.

On at least two occasions prior to the seizure by the FBI, King and

CES were made aware of this data breach. KSU issued a press release as to this
data breach on March 1, 2017, and press accounts report that GA SOS was aware
of this breach by March 3, 2017.
42.

In a separate incident, on April 15, 2017, four electronic pollbooks

and memory cards containing the PII of voters in Cobb County were stolen. Press
accounts have quoted Cobb County election officials as stating that these pollbooks
contained state-wide voter information.
43.

Upon information and belief, Defendants failed to notify the consumer

reporting agencies and the 6.5 million Georgia voters whose personal identifying
information had been compromised by the CES system, as required by O.C.G.A §
10-1-912. Their failure to do so exposed those voters to substantially greater risk of
their personal data being misused in ways that would harm them. And even after
the occurrence of an actual security breach in April 2017 – the theft of electronic
pollbooks containing statewide voter registration database and software to program
voter access cards – no action was taken to properly report either security breach of
voter data.
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 44.

The DRE Voting System did not, and cannot ever, meet Georgia’s

constitutional statutory requirements, and caused each of the Relevant Previous
Elections to generate indeterminable results, abridging numerous state and federal
rights of the Plaintiffs and all other Georgia voters.
E.

Georgia’s Own Experts Have Confirmed These Vulnerabilities
45.

GA SOS engaged cybersecurity experts Fortalice to conduct

assessments of their cybersecurity infrastructure. Notably, GA SOS did not engage
Fortalice to conduct any assessment of its election cybersecurity, include its DREs
or the GEMS database and servers, despite Fortalice’s ability to conduct such
analysis.
46.

Fortalice identified significant cybersecurity deficiencies with GA

SOS’s network.
47.

For example, in an October 2017 assessment, Fortalice identified

twenty-two cybersecurity risks within GA SOS’s IT operations, categorizing most
of these risks as significant.
48.

One of these risks was widespread local administrative rights,

meaning that all GA SOS users who had any level of log-in credentials also were
granted administrative rights on their work stations. This increased the likelihood
that malware or a malicious actor could successfully compromise a user’s work
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 station through email, web, or removal media. GA SOS’s experts found that the
problem was particularly acute because not only did users have administrative
rights on their own work stations, but they also had administrative rights on all
work stations. This meant that if an attacker gained access to a single work station,
they could quickly access any other work station, gain administrative rights, and
spread malware, install remote access tools, or access sensitive data.
49.

Another risk identified by Fortalice in their October 2017 assessment

was a lack of two-factor authentication for remote access. This meant that GA
SOS users were able to remotely access the GA SOS network using only a user
name and a password. According to Fortalice, this level of security was
insufficient, particularly given the possibility of phishing attacks or the potential
theft of GA SOS credentials.
50.

Fortalice also expressed an overarching concern for the lack of control

and oversight GA SOS was able to maintain over its voter registration database.
Indeed, GA SOS employees informed Fortalice that the voter registration database
represented GA SOS’s greatest cybersecurity vulnerability.
51.

As part of its October 2017 assessment, Fortalice conducted a

penetration test of GA SOS’s networks. Fortalice was able to successfully
penetrate GA SOS’s network and gain administration rights to that network.
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 52.

In February 2018, Fortalice conducted an additional cybersecurity

assessment, focusing on the independent vendor that Georgia retained to manage
its voter registration database. Fortalice identified fifteen additional security risks
involving Georgia’s voter registration database. For example, Fortalice found that
the contract between GA SOS and the independent vendor did not contain any
cybersecurity requirements. Fortalice found that the vendor was relying on
outdated software that was known to contain critical security vulnerabilities.
Fortalice noted that an attacker with sufficient time and resources could exploit
those vulnerabilities. Fortalice also identified certain remote access vulnerabilities.
Specifically, the vendor did not block VPN connections from the IP addresses of
known threats or foreign countries. Additionally, Fortalice identified a number of
missing critical operating system patches, unsupported software, and vulnerable
third-party software.
53.

In November 2018, Fortalice conducted a third assessment of GA

SOS’s cybersecurity. As part of this assessment, Fortalice made an additional
twenty recommendations to GA SOS to improve its cybersecurity.
54.

Notably, of the twenty-two risks identified by Fortalice in October

2017, only three had been remediated as of November 30, 2018, just weeks after
the November 2018 midterm elections.
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 55.

Based on this assessment, on a scale of zero to one hundred, Fortalice

graded GA SOS’ cybersecurity as a 53.98.
56.

Despite the fact that Fortalice had identified significant cybersecurity

vulnerabilities with Georgia’s voter registration database in its October 2017 and
February 2018 assessments, GA SOS instructed Fortalice not to review the voter
registration database in November 2018.
57.

Notwithstanding Fortalice’s warnings, in November 2018, on the eve

of an election, it was publicly revealed that Georgia’s voter registration database
had serious, remotely-exploitable vulnerabilities.
58.

Another expert retained by GA SOS, Dr. Michael Shamos, has

repeatedly criticized GA SOS’s election cybersecurity practices.
59.

For example, while Dr. Shamos believes that Georgia should test each

memory card before it places it into a DRE machine, upon information and belief,
Georgia does not do so.
60.

Similarly, while Dr. Shamos believes that Georgia should conduct

comparative and forensic analyses to determine whether its DRE machines and
software are properly functioning, upon information and belief, Georgia does not
do so.

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 61.

Additionally, while Dr. Shamos believes that Georgia should conduct

parallel testing on its DRE machines, by selecting at least one machine to test in
every single county, upon information and belief, Georgia does not conduct
parallel testing in this manner. Instead, Georgia tests only a single machine out of
the approximately 27,000 machines used in Georgia elections. Dr. Shamos,
Defendants’ own expert, does not have confidence in Georgia’s testing procedures,
which test only one machine out of approximately 27,000.
F.

Georgia Failed to Act Despite Growing Threats to U.S. Election
Security
62.

Georgia’s stubborn failure to address these critical security

vulnerabilities comes amidst revelations that Russia and other foreign nations are
increasingly targeting U.S. election systems with increasing sophistication.
63.

The Mueller Report revealed that “[t]he Russian government

interfered in the 2016 presidential election in sweeping and systematic fashion.”
Notably, evidence of Russian interference “began to surface in mid-2016.”
64.

In July 2018, Special Counsel Robert Mueller released an indictment

that confirmed that Georgia was specifically targeted by a Russian operative.
65.

The Senate Intelligence Committee confirmed these findings in a

bipartisan report. According to the Senate Intelligence Committee, hackers likely
tried to access election systems in all fifty states during the 2016 elections. Russia
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 “directed extensive activity, beginning in at least 2014 and carrying into at least
2017, against U.S. election infrastructure at the state and local level.” The report
specifically found that “[s]tate election officials, who have primacy in running
elections, were not sufficiently warned or prepared to handle an attack from a
hostile nation-state actor.”
66.

The Senate Intelligence Committee noted that Russian operatives

engaged in operations to scan the election-related state infrastructure of all fifty
states, conducting research on election-related web pages, voter ID information,
election system software, and election service companies.
67.

Further, Robert Mueller confirmed during his July 2019 testimony to

Congress that Russia’s interference in our elections continues to this day. And, as
he testified, “[m]any more countries are developing the capability to replicate what
the Russians have done.”
68.

Given this extensive risk, cybersecurity experts and government

officials have instructed that states implement paper ballot systems with optical
scanners that include a voter-verified paper trail.
69.

Georgia has ignored this guidance.

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 G.

Georgia’s Proposed Election System Remains Unconstitutional
70.

In April 2019, Georgia passed H.B. 316, which provided for the use of

a paper ballot system to be marked by BMDs. In July 2019, Georgia confirmed
that it had awarded the contract for this new system to Dominion Voting Systems,
Inc. (“Dominion”).
71.

The system described in Georgia’s contract with Dominion calls for

in-precinct scanners/tabulators for 2D barcodes generated by BMDs (the
“Proposed Election System”). The BMDs, identified as Image Cast X models, are
also capable of producing a text summary, as opposed to an image of the actual
ballot, of an elector’s candidate selections. The ballot scanners tabulate votes from
each ballot based on the 2D barcode generated by the BMD and not based on the
written text summary of a voter’s selections. Therefore, no elector can visually
review and confirm whether the bar code accurately conveys their intended
selections.
72.

The Proposed Election System will not be substantially safer than the

current system because BMDs remain susceptible to manipulation, and the
proposed system does not provide a meaningful way for a voter to audit their vote.
73.

The 2D barcode produced by the BMD is not readable by a voter, but

is relied upon by the precinct scanner to tabulate votes in each precinct. The
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 legible written summary of a voter’s choice is not relied upon by the precinct
scanner at all.
74.

Therefore, while the Proposed Election System purports to provide a

voter with an auditable voting record, the voter is only able to audit the written text
summary and not the actual barcode on the ballot used to tabulate votes.
75.

In other words, despite the fact that cybersecurity experts and

government officials recommended a voting system that included a voter-verified
paper trail, the Proposed Election System will rely on a non-voter-verified barcode
as the elector’s actual vote.
76.

Further, these BMD systems have the same demonstrated security

vulnerabilities as those that plague Georgia’s DREs.
77.

Like any computer, a BMD is vulnerable to intentional forms of

manipulation (such as hacking, installation of malware, or alteration of installed
software), as well as unintentional forms of manipulation (such as bugs and
misconfiguration).
78.

Indeed, specific vulnerabilities have already been identified with

Dominion’s election software and hardware.

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 79.

Dominion’s election system was certified under a 14-year old

standard (Voluntary Voting System Guidelines (“VVSG”) 1.0) rather than the
more recent VVSG 1.1 or VVSG 2.0 standards.
80.

In February 2019, Texas voting systems examiners refused to certify

Dominion’s election management system based upon several problems with the
software. According to these examiners, “several of the problems did not appear to
have ready-made or simple solutions.” These problems included:
(a)

The ability of Dominion’s hardware to be connected to the

internet;
(b)

If the printer tray became ajar during the voting process the

system would wipe out all selections and require a voter to start over,
therefore requiring poll worker intervention and slowing down the
voting process;
(c)

The audit trail stored voter selections in sequential order, which

would permit the secrecy of the ballot box to be compromised;
(d)

Portions of the power cord connections are easily accessible

and may be unplugged by anyone;
(e)

The paths for import of election data into the election

management program revealed multiple opportunities for mistakes
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 and during testing required three separate restarts of the adjudication
process.
81.

During the 2019 DEFCON Voting Village,1 Dominion’s precinct

scanners were made available to participating hackers. These hackers identified
twenty vulnerabilities. One vulnerability was the ability of remote attackers to
implement a DNS attack. Another vulnerability was the existence of an exposed
flash card containing an .xml file that, if manipulated, would allow for scanned
votes to be redirected to a different candidate.
82.

Additionally, the ImageCast X BMDs rely on software released in

February 2015, which has not received security updates since March 2018.
83.

These many vulnerabilities could cause the BMD to print votes to the

2D barcode that do not match what the voter entered, or could cause a precinct
scanner to improperly tabulate votes.
84.

Moreover, these vulnerabilities are not alleviated by the text summary

available to an elector, because the 2D barcode actually relied upon to tabulate the
vote may not necessarily match the text summary.

1

DEFCON is a hacking conference held annually since its founding in 1993. Since 2017, DEFCON has featured a
Voting Machine Hacking Village, in which hackers attempt to infiltrate U.S. election infrastructure such as voting
machines, registration databases, and election office networks, to highlight potential cybersecurity vulnerabilities.

- 26 -

 85.

Further, even if the 2D barcode is identical to the text summary,

research has demonstrated that most voters are unlikely to review these summaries
even when specifically directed to do so.
86.

Additionally, polling place exit interviews of voters who do choose to

review a text summary of their vote reveal that some are unable to recall details of
the ballots they cast even moments before. Voters fail to recognize errors in
ballots presented to them for verification, or fail to recognize that the ballots
presented to them for verification were not the ones they actually cast.
87.

On those occasions where a voter does notice a discrepancy in a 2D

barcode, research suggests that they are far more likely to attribute the discrepancy
to their own mistake. Therefore, they are unlikely to raise concerns about a
systemic attack on an election.
88.

Even Dr. Shamos, the expert retained by GA SOS with respect to its

election cybersecurity testified that if a BMD is going to be used, the more reliable
approach is to use a BMD that produces a ballot readable by a human voter, rather
than a bar code.
89.

Georgia’s Proposed Election System is also susceptible to

manipulation because Georgia has not committed to risk-limiting audits for its

- 27 -

 upcoming elections.2 The limited assurance offered by the Proposed Election
System’s barcode verification is undermined by the absence of any commitment to
actually auditing those barcodes.
90.

For these reasons, Georgia’s Proposed Election System provides

Georgia’s voters with no greater guarantee than the current system that their votes
will be accurately recorded and tabulated.
III. CLAIMS
COUNT I: VIOLATION OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT
TO VOTE UNDER THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE
OF THE 14TH AMENDMENT AND OF 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(All Plaintiffs against All Defendants in their Official Capacities)
91.

Plaintiffs incorporate the allegations of paragraphs 1 through 90 above

as if expressly realleged herein.
92.

The right to vote is a fundamental right protected by the Due Process

Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.
93.

The fundamental right to vote encompasses the right to have that vote

counted accurately, and it is protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.

2

For example, the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine’s September 2018 report regarding
voting system integrity recommended the use of risk-limiting audits, in which individual randomly selected paper
ballots are examined until sufficient statistical assurance as to the integrity of an election is achieved.

- 28 -

 94.

Defendants violated Plaintiffs’ fundamental right to vote by deploying

a DRE voting equipment system that by its design and management by
Defendants:
(a)

Failed to provide reasonable and adequate protection against the

real and substantial threat of electronic and other intrusion and
manipulation by individuals and entities without authorization to do
so;
(b)

Failed to include the minimal and legally required steps to

ensure that such equipment could not be operated without
authorization; to provide the minimal and legally required protection
for such equipment to secure against unauthorized tampering; to test,
inspect, and seal, as required by law, the equipment to ensure that
each DRE unit would count all votes cast and that no votes that were
not properly cast would not be counted; and to ensure that all such
equipment, firmware, and software is reliable, accurate, and capable
of secure operation as required by law;
(c)

Failed to provide a reasonable and adequate method for voting

by which Georgia electors’ votes would be accurately counted.

- 29 -

 95.

By choosing to move forward in using the non-compliant system,

Defendants willfully and negligently abrogated their statutory duties and abused
their discretion, subjecting voters to cast votes on an illegal and unreliable
system—a system that must be presumed to be compromised and incapable of
producing verifiable results.
96.

Upon information and belief, despite their knowledge that the DRE

Voting System does not comply and cannot be made to comply with the Election
Code, these Defendants willfully and knowingly plan to continue to use this noncompliant system in the Relevant Pending Elections.
97.

Upon information and belief, Plaintiffs received no notice that their

votes under the DRE Voting System could not be counted accurately due to
Defendants’ material non-compliance with the Election Code.
98.

Defendants’ violation of the Due Process Clause is patently and

fundamentally unfair and therefore relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is warranted.
Accordingly, Plaintiffs ask this Court to (a) declare that these Defendants violated
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment; (b) enjoin Defendants’ use
of Georgia’s DRE Voting System for future elections; and (c) award attorneys’
fees and costs for Defendants’ causation of concrete injury to Plaintiffs, whose
fundamental right to have their vote counted as cast was thwarted.
- 30 -

 COUNT II: VIOLATION OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT TO VOTE
UNDER THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE
OF THE 14TH AMENDMENT AND OF 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(All Plaintiffs against All Defendants in their Official Capacities)
99.

Plaintiffs incorporate the allegations of paragraphs 1 through 90 above

as if expressly realleged herein.
100. The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment mandates
that “[n]o State shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV § 1.
101. The Equal Protection Clause protects the manner of the exercise of the
right to vote, and a state may not value one person’s vote over that of another. U.S.
Const. amend. XIV § 1.
102. Upon information and belief, GA SOS and the County Election Board
Members allowed electors to vote in the Relevant Previous Elections using two
different methods: (a) voting using the DRE Voting System and (b) voting using
paper ballots (available to provisional and absentee voters).
103. Upon information and belief, absentee paper ballots are verifiable,
recountable ballots, which can be counted, reviewed, and discrepancies corrected
under the supervision of a court.

- 31 -

 104. DRE ballots are counted electronically and cannot reliably prevent or
detect errors or reliably determine the election results. The DRE Voting System:
(a)

Produces only an electronic representation of a vote, with no

independent reference document, and cannot therefore provide for a
means by which the accuracy of the recording of DRE ballots can be
tested or verified;
(b)

Does not provide reasonable and adequate protection, as

required by the Georgia Election Code, against the real and substantial
threat of electronic and other intrusion and manipulation by
individuals and entities without authorization to do so; or
(c)

Provide a reasonable and adequate method for voting by which

Georgia electors’ votes would be accurately counted.
105. The injuries suffered by Georgia electors were compounded
dramatically by Defendants’ failure to include the minimal and legally required
steps to ensure that such equipment could not be manipulated or operated without
authorization; to provide the minimal and legally required protection for such
equipment to secure against unauthorized tampering; to test, inspect, and seal as
required by law the equipment to ensure that the DRE Voting System would
properly count all cast votes and discount any improperly cast votes; and to ensure
- 32 -

 that all such equipment, firmware, and software is reliable, accurate, and capable
of secure operation as required by law, and properly certified to comply with
Georgia Election Code and Election Rules.
106. Upon information and belief, these Defendants failed to take such
steps to attempt to mitigate the security failures, and conduct an election on a
system that could comply with the Georgia Election Code. Instead, they continued
to rely on the DRE Voting System knowing that this voting system was unsecured,
breached, and compromised, could not be presumed to be safe, and was materially
non-compliant with applicable Election Code statutes and governing regulations.
107. By choosing to move forward in using the non-compliant system,
Defendants willfully and negligently abrogated their statutory duties and abused
their discretion, subjecting voters to cast votes on an illegal and unreliable
system—a system that must be presumed to be compromised and incapable of
producing verifiable results.
108. The voters of the respective ballots have not been treated equally in
that the votes of those who voted by DRE cannot be meaningfully recounted,
reviewed against an independent record to verify, or have discrepancies detected
and corrected. DRE votes are unequally weighted, with greater weight given to
those who vote by absentee paper ballot, whose votes can be verified as to voter
- 33 -

 intent, can be accurately recounted, and can have processing errors identified and
corrected, while votes cast by DRE, whose votes do not share those essential
advantages.
109. The rights of Georgia electors using DRE voting equipment to cast
their ballots in the Relevant Previous Elections were also not treated equally by
virtue of the egregious security failures in the CES election management server.
Although the CES security failures put all voting system components at risk, the
majority of the security failures could be mitigated for paper ballot votes, but not
for DRE votes. In an election contest, the paper ballots could be counted manually
and voter intent and accurate tabulation determined, regardless of security failures
that may impact DRE Voting System tabulations. DRE Voting System failures
cannot be so mitigated nor the impact determined, creating unequal weighting
between the two types of ballots cast.
110. The Plaintiffs who voted in Relevant Previous Elections using the
DRE Voting System are all similarly situated to other registered electors in the
same elections who voted using the DRE Voting System. All Plaintiffs are eligible
to vote in the Relevant Pending Elections which may employ the improper DRE
Voting System.

- 34 -

 111. Defendants’ conduct described herein violated the Fourteenth
Amendment right of these Plaintiffs to enjoy equal protection of the law.
112. Accordingly, Plaintiffs ask this Court to (a) declare that these
Defendants violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment;
(b) enjoin Defendants’ use of Georgia’s DRE Voting System for future elections;
and (c) award attorneys’ fees and costs for Defendants’ causation of concrete
injury to Plaintiffs, whose fundamental right to have their vote counted as cast was
unequally burdened.
COUNT III: VIOLATION OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT
TO VOTE UNDER THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE
OF THE 14TH AMENDMENT AND OF 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(All Plaintiffs against All Defendants in their Official Capacities)
113. Plaintiffs incorporate the allegations of paragraphs 1 through 90 above
as if expressly realleged herein.
114. The right to vote is a fundamental right protected by the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.
115. The fundamental right to vote encompasses the right to have that vote
counted accurately, and it is protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.

- 35 -

 116. Defendants threaten to violate Plaintiffs’ fundamental right to vote by
deploying the Proposed Election System that by its design:
(a)

Fails to provide reasonable and adequate protection against the

real and substantial threat of electronic and other intrusion and
manipulation by individuals and entities without authorization to do
so;
(b)

Fails to include the minimal and legally required steps to ensure

that such equipment cannot be operated without authorization; to
provide the minimal and legally required protection for such
equipment to secure against unauthorized tampering; to test, inspect,
and seal, as required by law, the equipment to ensure that all properly
cast votes are counted and that votes improperly cast are not counted;
and to ensure that all such equipment, firmware, and software is
reliable, accurate, and capable of secure operation as required by law;
(c)

Fails to provide a reasonable and adequate method for voting

by which Georgia electors’ votes will be accurately counted.
117. By choosing to move forward with the Proposed Election System,
Defendants willfully and negligently abrogated their statutory duties and abused
their discretion, subjecting voters to cast votes on an illegal and unreliable
- 36 -

 system—a system that must be presumed to be compromised and incapable of
producing verifiable results.
118. Upon information and belief, despite their knowledge that the
Proposed Election System does not comply and cannot be made to comply with the
Election Code, these Defendants willfully and knowingly plan to use this system in
the Relevant Pending Elections.
119. Defendants’ violation of the Due Process Clause is patently and
fundamentally unfair and therefore relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is warranted.
Accordingly, Plaintiffs ask this Court to (a) declare that Defendants’ Proposed
Election System violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment;
(b) enjoin Defendants’ use of the Proposed Election System for future elections;
and (c) award attorneys’ fees and costs for Defendants’ causation of concrete
injury to Plaintiffs, whose fundamental right to have their vote counted as cast will
be thwarted.
COUNT IV: VIOLATION OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT TO VOTE
UNDER THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE
OF THE 14TH AMENDMENT AND OF 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(All Plaintiffs against All Defendants in their Official Capacities)
120. Plaintiffs incorporate the allegations of paragraphs 1 through 90 above
as if expressly realleged herein.
- 37 -

 121. The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment mandates
that “[n]o State shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV § 1.
122. The Equal Protection Clause protects the manner of the exercise of the
right to vote, and a state may not value one person’s vote over that of another. U.S.
Const. amend. XIV § 1.
123. Upon information and belief, GA SOS and the County Election Board
Board Members plan on allowing electors to vote in the Relevant Pending
Elections using two different methods: (a) voting using the Proposed Election
System and (b) voting using paper ballots (available to provisional and absentee
voters).
124. Upon information and belief, absentee paper ballots are verifiable,
recountable ballots, which can be counted, reviewed, and discrepancies corrected
under the supervision of a court.
125. The Proposed Election System, particularly its BMD system which
generates an unreadable 2D barcode, cannot reliably prevent or detect errors or
reliably determine the election results. The Proposed Election System:

- 38 -

 (a)

Produces an unreadable 2D barcode to generate vote totals, and

cannot therefore provide for a means by which its accuracy can be
tested or verified;
(b)

Does not provide reasonable and adequate protection, as

required by the Georgia Election Code, against the real and substantial
threat of electronic and other intrusion and manipulation by
individuals and entities without authorization to do so; and
(c)

Does not provide a reasonable and adequate method for voting

by which Georgia electors’ votes would be accurately counted.
126. The injuries likely to be suffered by Georgia electors will be
compounded dramatically by Defendants’ failure to include the minimal and
legally required steps to ensure that such equipment cannot be manipulated or
operated without authorization; to provide the minimal and legally required
protection for such equipment to secure against unauthorized tampering; to test,
inspect, and seal, as required by law, the equipment to ensure that the Proposed
Election System will count all votes cast and that no votes that were not properly
cast for that election would be counted; and to ensure that all such equipment,
firmware, and software is reliable, accurate, and capable of secure operation as

- 39 -

 required by law, and properly certified to comply with Georgia Election Code and
Election Rules.
127. Upon information and belief, these Defendants failed to take such
steps to attempt to mitigate the security failures, and conduct an election on a
system that could comply with the Georgia Election Code. Instead, they intend to
rely on the Proposed Election System knowing that this system is unsecured, could
be breached and compromised, cannot be presumed to be safe, and is materially
non-compliant with applicable Election Code statutes and governing regulations.
128. By choosing to move forward in using the proposed non-compliant
system, Defendants willfully and negligently abrogated their statutory duties and
abused their discretion, subjecting voters to cast votes on an illegal and unreliable
system—a system that must be presumed to be compromised and incapable of
producing verifiable results.
129. The voters of the respective ballots have not been treated equally in
that the votes of those who will vote using the Proposed Election System cannot be
meaningfully recounted, reviewed against an independent record to verify, or have
discrepancies detected and corrected. These votes are unequally weighted, with
greater weight given to those who vote by absentee paper ballot, whose votes can
be verified as to voter intent, can be accurately recounted, and can have processing
- 40 -

 errors identified and corrected, while votes cast under the Proposed Election
System, whose votes do not share those essential advantages.
130. The Plaintiffs who intend to vote in the Relevant Pending Elections
using the Proposed Election System are all similarly situated to other registered
electors in the same elections who will vote using the Proposed Election System.
All Plaintiffs are eligible to vote in the Relevant Pending Elections which may
utilize the Proposed Election System.
131. Defendants’ conduct described herein violates the Fourteenth
Amendment right of these Plaintiffs to enjoy equal protection of the law.
132. Accordingly, Plaintiffs ask this Court to (a) declare that the Proposed
Election System violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment; (b) enjoin Defendants’ use of the Proposed Election System for
future elections; and (c) award attorneys’ fees and costs for Defendants’ causation
of concrete injury to Plaintiffs, whose fundamental right to have their vote counted
as cast will be unequally burdened.
COUNT V: DECLARATORY JUDGMENT
Declaring that the Proposed Election System Violates Act No. 24, H.B. 316
(All Plaintiffs Against All Defendants In Their Official Capacities)

- 41 -

 133. Plaintiffs incorporate the allegations of paragraphs 1 through 90 above
as if expressly realleged herein.
134. Act No. 24, House Bill No. 316 provides that “[a]s soon as possible . .
. all federal, state, and county general primaries and general elections as well as
special primaries and special elections in the State of Georgia shall be conducted
with the use of scanning ballots marked by electronic ballot markers.” The law
further provides “that such electronic ballot markers shall produce paper ballots
which are marked with the elector’s choices in a format readable by the elector.”
135. “Scanning ballot” is defined, in relevant part, as “a printed paper
ballot designed to be marked by an elector with a ballot marking device or
electronic marker or a blank sheet of paper designed to be used in a ballot marking
device or electronic ballot marker, which is then inserted for casting into a ballot
scanner.”
136. “Electronic ballot marker” is defined, in relevant part, as “an
electronic device that . . . uses electronic technology to independently and privately
mark a paper ballot at the direction of an elector . . . and print an elector verifiable
paper ballot.”
137. The Proposed Election System violates the clear mandates of Act No.
24, H.B. 316.
- 42 -

 138. Instead of producing “paper ballots which are marked with the
elector’s choices in a format readable by the elector,” the Proposed Election
System’s BMDs produce an illegible and unverifiable 2D barcode along with a text
summary of an elector’s choices.
139. Similarly, the proposed BMDs do not print an “elector verifiable
paper ballot.” Instead, the proposed BMDs produce a 2D barcode purportedly
constituting an elector’s paper ballot that is unverifiable by that elector.
140. Accordingly, Plaintiffs request that the Court declare that the
Proposed Election System violates Act No. 24, H.B. 316.
PRAYER FOR RELIEF
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs respectfully ask this court:
141. To grant declaratory relief deeming that Defendants have violated the
Georgia Constitution, the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, 42
U.S.C. § 1983, and Georgia election law, including Georgia’s system certification
regulations and safety and security provisions;
142. To grant injunctive relief prohibiting Defendants from using any
system or devices for voting, including, but not limited to, the DRE Voting System
and the Proposed Election System, that does not fully satisfy the obligations of the
Defendants under Georgia Code Sections 21-2-322, 21-2-379.1(8), 21-2-379.2 (a),
- 43 -

 21-2-379.2 (b), 21-2-379.2 (c), 21-2-379.6 (a), 21-2-379.6 (c), 21-2-379.7 (b), 212-379.7 (c), 21-2-379.7 (d)(3), 21-2-379.9 (b), 21-2-379.22(6), 21-2-379.22(8), 212-379.23(d), 21-2-379.24, and 21-2-379.26; Georgia Rule and Regulation Section
590-8-1-.01(a)(3); and Georgia Constitution Article II, Section 1, Paragraph 1 that
protect the rights of Georgia electors under Georgia law and under the Fourteenth
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
143. To grant an Order directing Defendants to submit to the Court within
thirty days of entry of the Court’s Order a plan providing in sufficient detail for the
Court to evaluate the specific steps they intend to take to comply with the terms of
the Court’s Order.
144. To award attorneys’ fees and costs for the deprivation of civil rights
arising from alleged Defendants’ patent and fundamental unfairness in conducting
elections on Georgia’s Voting System, causing 42 U.S.C. § 1983 violations; and
145. To grant all other relief this Court deems proper.

- 44 -

 Dated: August 16, 2019

Respectfully submitted,
/s/ David D. Cross
David D. Cross
(admitted pro hac vice)
John P. Carlin
(admitted pro hac vice)
Robert W. Manoso
(admitted pro hac vice)
Jane P. Bentrott
(admitted pro hac vice)
MORRISON & FOERSTER LLP
2000 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
Suite 6000
Washington, DC 20006
Telephone: (202) 887-1500
DCross@mofo.com
JCarlin@mofo.com
JBentrott@mofo.com
RManoso@mofo.com
Halsey G. Knapp, Jr.
GA Bar No. 425320
Adam M. Sparks
GA Bar No. 341578
KREVOLIN & HORST, LLC
1201 West Peachtree Street, NW
Suite 3250
Atlanta, GA 30309
Telephone: (404) 888-9700
HKnapp@khlawfirm.com
Sparks@khlawfirm.com
Counsel for Plaintiffs Donna Curling,
Donna Price & Jeffrey Schoenberg

- 45 -

 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
ATLANTA DIVISION
DONNA CURLING, ET AL.,
Plaintiffs,
Civil Action No. 1:17-CV-2989-AT

v.
BRIAN RAFFENSPERGER, ET AL.,
Defendants.

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE
I hereby certify that the foregoing document has been prepared in
accordance with the font type and margin requirements of LR 5.1, using font type
of Times New Roman and a point size of 14.
/s/ David D. Cross
David D. Cross

- 46 -

 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
ATLANTA DIVISION
DONNA CURLING, ET AL.,
Plaintiffs,
Civil Action No. 1:17-CV-2989-AT

v.
BRIAN RAFFENSPERGER, ET AL.,
Defendants.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on August 16, 2019, a copy of the foregoing was
electronically filed with the Clerk of Court using the CM/ECF system, which will
automatically send notification of such filing to all attorneys of record.
/s/ David D. Cross
David D. Cross

- 47 -