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THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR
EASTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA

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KARL FONTENOT,
Petitioner,
v.
JOE ALLBAUGH, WARDEN,
Respondent.

No. CIV 16-069-JHP-KEW

OPINION AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss Second Amended
Habeas Corpus Petition filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Dkt.#s 123, 147).1 Petitioner filed
a response to the motion on May 14, 2019 (Dkt.# 150).
Petitioner’s case is one of three the United States District Court for the Eastern District
of Oklahoma has found to involve a dream confession of dubious validity.2 The players in this
case, Pontotoc County District Attorney William Peterson, Ada Police Detective Dennis Smith,
and Oklahoma State Bureau of Investigation Agent Gary Rogers, were all involved in these
suspect confessions and were all involved in Petitioner’s case.

1

Respondent was ordered to respond to the Second Amended Petition on February 14, 2019. (Dkt.# 118). Pursuant to Rule
5(a) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases Respondent was not required to answer the petition unless ordered to do
so by the court. Once the Respondent was ordered to respond, the Respondent was required to address all allegations
in the Second Amended Petition. “The answer must address the allegations in the petition. In addition, it must state
whether any claim in the petition is barred by a failure to exhaust state remedies, a procedural bar, nonretroactivity, or a statute of limitations.” Id. at 5(b).” (emphasis added).
2
See Second Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, Dkt.# 123, Ex.# 61. (“This is at least the third murder
conviction in Pontotoc County, Oklahoma, from 1985 through 1988 which was based upon an alleged “dream confession”
and circumstantial evidence which resulted in the death penalty. See Fontenot v. State, 742 P.2d 31 (Okla. Crim. App.
1987)(appeal after new trial, 881 P.2d 69 (Okla. Crim. App. 1994); Ward v. State, 755 P.2d 123 (Okla. Crim. App. 1988);
State ex rel. Peterson v. Ward, 707 P.2d 1217 (Okla. Crim. App. 1985); See also Robert Mayer, The Dreams of Ada, 37-38
(1987); Williamson v. Reynolds, 904 F.Supp. 1529 (ED OK 1995).

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The prosecution has acknowledged that Petitioner’s confession lacked any corroborating
evidence. Besides the confession, there was no direct or circumstantial evidence connecting
Petitioner to this crime. Further, despite three court orders, the Pontotoc County District
Attorney’s Office, numerous law enforcement agencies, and Respondent have repeatedly failed
to disclose documents relevant to Mr. Fontenot’s case for over twenty-five years. At the same
time, Respondent both in state post-conviction and in these proceedings argues laches as an
affirmative defense to Mr. Fontenot’s assertions of actual innocence and numerous
constitutional violations. The audacity of that argument in the face of newly “discovered” Ada
Police Reports is astounding.
The investigation into Mr. Fontenot’s case has revealed both documents and witness
statements that prove an alibi defense, and substantiate proof of the ineptness of the police
investigation. The newly discovered evidence undermines the prosecutor’s case and provides
solid proof of Mr. Fontenot’s probable innocence. “Probable innocence” is established if Mr.
Fontenot presents “new facts [that] raise[] sufficient doubt about [the petitioner’s] guilt to
undermine confidence in the result of the trial…” Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 317 (1995)
(emphasis added). To establish the requisite probability, the petitioner must show that it is more
likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted him in the light of the new
evidence.” Id. at 327; see also House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518, 538 (2006)( a federal court presented
with Schlup claim “must make” ‘a probabilistic determination about what reasonable, properly
instructed jurors would do.’”). Once a federal court makes such a finding, a gateway claim of
innocence exists removing any procedural obstacles allowing the substantive review of Mr.
Fontenot’s claims. See House, 547 U.S. at 536-537; Case v. Hatch, 731 F.3d 1015, 1036 (10th
Cir. 2013). The evidence presented in Mr. Fontenot’s Second Amended Petition establishes his
probable innocence and merits the removal of any procedural hurdles.
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Petitioner, a prisoner currently incarcerated at North Fork Correctional Facility in Sayre,
Oklahoma, is challenging his convictions in Hughes County District Court Case No. CF-88-43 for First
Degree Murder, Robbery with a Dangerous Weapon, and Kidnapping.
He sets forth the following grounds for relief:
I.

Newly discovered evidence establishes that Mr. Fontenot is innocent, satisfying the gateway
requirements of Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298 (1995).

II.

Mr. Fontenot’s Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated when the Pontotoc County District
Attorney’s Office withheld evidence in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).

III.

Mr. Fontenot’s Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment fundamental right to counsel was violated by
the Ada Police Department’s interference with attorney-client privilege.

IV.

Mr. Fontenot’s Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel was violated when his
trial counsel failed to investigate the case and present viable evidence supporting his innocence.

V.

Mr. Fontenot’s Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of appellate counsel was violated
when his appellate counsel failed to present viable constitutional claims in Mr. Fontenot’s direct
appeal proceedings.

VI.

Mr. Fontenot’s due process rights were violated due to police misconduct when taking a false
confession and the prosecution knowingly introduced false testimony during his trial in violation
of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.

VII.

The evidence was insufficient to convict Mr. Fontenot because the State failed to show the
existence of the corpus delicti of the charged crimes outside of the confession and failed to
establish the trustworthiness of the confession in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.

VIII.

The State’s injection of inadmissible hearsay from the extrajudicial confession of
Mr. Ward in Mr. Fontenot’s trial violated his constitutional right of confrontation.

IX.

Mr. Fontenot’s Fourteenth Amendment due process rights were violated due to the police
misconduct that permeated the investigation into Mrs. Haraway’s disappearance.

Respondent has filed a motion to dismiss the Second Amended Petition as barred by the statute
of limitations set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d), and the state bar of laches. (Dkt.# 147). Respondent also
asserts the Second Amended Petition includes unexhausted claims, rendering it a mixed petition. Id.
Petitioner responds he has established the actual innocence gateway removing the procedural
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impairments, and all of his claims should be deemed exhausted. (Dkt.# 150).
PROCEDURAL HISTORY3
On April 24, 1984, Donna Denice Haraway was last seen at McAnally’s convenience store
in Ada, Oklahoma. A few customers arrived to find the store empty and called emergency
services. Several law enforcement agencies responded to the scene including the Ada Police
Department (“APD”), and the Pontotoc County Sheriff’s Office. Later, the Oklahoma State
Bureau of Investigation joined the local agencies in the investigation.
On October 12, 1984, with Mrs. Haraway still missing, the police contacted Thomas Ward
in Norman, Oklahoma, and interviewed him for more than two hours. (PH Tr. 506). Mr. Ward
denied any involvement or knowledge of what happened to Mrs. Haraway. ( Tr. 1336). Mr. Ward
returned to the Oklahoma State Bureau of Investigation to take a polygraph test the next day. After
nine hours of interrogation, police videotaped Mr. Ward give a statement in which he described
being with Odell Titsworth and Karl Fontenot the night of Mrs. Haraway’s disappearance. Mr.
Ward also stated the three robbed McAnally's, kidnapped Mrs. Haraway, raped, and stabbed her
to death. Based solely on Mr. Ward’s confession, police arrested Mr. Fontenot the next day. Mr.
Fontenot was interrogated and confessed in similar fashion as Mr. Ward.

3

There are several records cites within this Opinion and Order. Abbreviations to the various court records, hearings, and
trials will be as follows:
OR: Original trial court record
P/H: Preliminary Hearing Transcript (there was only one preliminary hearing held in this case even after remand
from the OCCA).
J/T date and page: Joint trial of Thomas Ward and Karl Fontenot in 1986.
N/T date and page: Fontenot’s trial held over several days in 1988.
Ward N/T date and page: Thomas Ward’s trial held over several days in 1989.
State’s Exhibit : State exhibits from Mr. Fontenot’s trial.
The Court also takes judicial notice of the public records of the Oklahoma State Courts Network at http:/www.oscn.net.
See Pace v. Addison, No. CIV-14-0750-HE, 2014 WL 5780744, at *1 n.1 (W.D. Okla. Nov. 5, 2014).

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Nineteen days later, the Pontotoc District Attorney’s Office filed charges against Mr.
Fontenot and Mr. Ward in Case No. CRF-84-183 including Count I, Robbery with a Dangerous
Weapon; Count II, Kidnapping; Count III, First-Degree Rape; and Count IV, First-Degree
(Malice Aforethought) Murder. (O.R. 112). On November 8, 1984, the State filed a Bill of
Particulars against each defendant alleging the following aggravating circumstances: (1) the
murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel; (2) the murder was committed for the purpose
of avoiding or preventing a lawful arrest or prosecution; and (3) the existence of a probability that
the defendant would commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing threat
to society. (O.R. 591, 592). Mr. Fontenot was appointed counsel on November 29, 1984, 42 days
after his arrest. (O.R. 30).
The Pontotoc District Court held a joint preliminary hearing on February 4, 1985. Mr.
Fontenot and Ward were bound over for trial on Count I, Robbery with a Dangerous Weapon;
Count II, Kidnapping; and Count IV, Murder in the First Degree. (O.R. 592-A-592-B). The
magistrate found insufficient evidence to order either defendant to trial on Count III, First- Degree
Rape. (P/H 1047). The State appealed to the District Court to reinstate Count III, but was
overruled. (Tr. 26-27). The State appealed the ruling to the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals.
On September 6, 1985, while the State's appeal on the rape charge was pending, the State
dismissed the rape charge and amended the Information to allege Count I, Robbery with a
Dangerous Weapon; Count II, Kidnapping; and Count III, First Degree (Malice Aforethought)
Murder, and proceeded to trial. (O.R. 475).
Both Mr. Fontenot and Mr. Ward were convicted on all counts in a jury trial held on
September 24, 1985. The trial court sentenced both to twenty years imprisonment on Count I, and
ten years imprisonment on Count II. During the penalty phase of the trial, the jury found the
existence of the three aggravating circumstances and no mitigation. Mr. Fontenot and Mr.
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Ward were sentenced to death. An appeal was timely filed for both men in the Oklahoma Court of Criminal
Appeals.

During the pendency of the appeal, a man found a skull in Hughes County, Oklahoma,
which initiated a search of the area. Eighteen months after Mrs. Haraway’s disappearance, her
skeletal remains were recovered after several searches of the area. The medical examiner found a
bullet hole in the back of her skull was the only evidence of a probable cause of death. (N/T
6/9/1988 at 130). The medical examiner also found no evidence of any stabbing or burning of the
remains. (N/T 6/14/1988 at 134, 136). The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals reversed both
the conviction and sentence over Bruton violations in Fontenot v. State, 742 P.2d 31 (Okla. 1987);
See Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968).
Following remand, Mr. Fontenot was tried in Hughes County, Oklahoma, after a change
of venue motion was granted by the trial court. On June 7, 1988, the State filed an Amended
Information alleging Counts I, II, and III, Robbery with a Dangerous Weapon, Kidnapping and
Murder in the First Degree (malice aforethought), respectively, adding to Count IV the cause of
death by gunshot. (O.R.II 76.) Another preliminary hearing was not held. Mr. Fontenot’s jury trial
started on June 7, 1988, in Hughes County District Court. (N/T 6/6/1988 at 1). On June 14, 1988,
Mr. Fontenot was convicted on all counts. (N/T 7/8/1988 at 104; O.R. II at 165, 166, 167). The
jury assessed punishments of twenty (20) and ten (10) years imprisonment on Counts I and II
respectively. (O.R.II at 65, 166). Following the penalty phase, the jury found the existence of the
three alleged aggravating circumstances and on June 14, 1988, set Mr. Fontenot's punishment at
death. (O.R II at 168, 169). Judgment and sentence in accordance with the jury's verdicts were
imposed on July 8, 1988. Mr. Fontenot filed a timely notice of appeal to the Oklahoma Court of
Criminal Appeals.
Mr. Ward was tried in Pottawattamie County on the same charges almost a year after Mr.
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Fontenot was convicted. Before the same trial court, Mr. Ward’s trial began on May 31, 1989,
and concluded on June 16, 1989. The jury found Mr. Ward guilty on all charges.
However, the jury imposed a sentence of life imprisonment with the possibility of parole.
On June 8, 1994, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed Mr. Fontenot’s
convictions, but overturned his death sentence due to a life without the possibility of parole jury
instruction being omitted during the penalty phase. Fontenot v. State, 881 P.2d 69 (Okla. 1994).
The Court remanded Mr. Fontenot’s case for resentencing. Mr. Fontenot was subsequently
sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole.
An Application for Post-Conviction Relief was filed in the District Court of Pontotoc
County on July 24, 2013. After requesting additional time to respond, the State filed its
response on September 17, 2014. Without an evidentiary hearing, the district court issued its
post-conviction findings on December 31, 2014, denying relief based on the Respondent’s
assertion of Laches. Mr. Fontenot timely filed an appeal to the Oklahoma Court of Criminal
Appeals on March 2, 2015. He raised all claims from his state post-conviction proceedings
and challenged the laches decision. On November 2, 2015, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal
Appeals affirmed the state post-conviction court’s order denying relief finding the application
was barred by laches. Mr. Fontenot filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus seeking relief
from his state court convictions.(Dkt.# 4).
Since Mr. Fontenot filed his initial Petition, he has engaged in discovery, served several
subpoenas, and conducted depositions. The Court authorized discovery, including production and
review of the Pontotoc County District Attorney’s files. (Dkt.# 24, 44). During the process, Mr.
Fontenot’s counsel served a subpoena on the Ada Police Department and in response their
organization stated no documents existed. Within the District Attorney’s files, counsel discovered
reports never disclosed to prior defense counsel. Based upon that discovery, Mr. Fontenot’s
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counsel was allowed to file an Amended Petition.(Dkt.# 77).
Shockingly, thereafter, additional documents were produced by Respondent and the Ada
Police Department, but not to Mr. Fontenot. Pursuant to Thomas Ward’s subpoena during state
post-conviction proceedings, Respondent received Ada Police Reports. These documents were
not immediately turned over to Mr. Fontenot’s counsel. Once Mr. Fontenot’s counsel discovered
this, they requested the records which were subsequently disclosed. Based upon these events, this
Court permitted Mr. Fontenot to file the instant Second Amended Petition. (Dkt.# 123).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On April 28, 1984, Donna Denice Haraway was employed as a convenience store clerk at
McAnally’s gas station and store in Ada, Oklahoma. Testimony presented at both of Mr.
Fontenot’s trials explained that Mrs. Haraway walked out of the store with a white male. They both
got into a pickup truck and drove away. What exactly happened to Mrs. Haraway in the days and
months after her disappearance remained a mystery until her remains were found in Gerty,
Oklahoma, more than a year and a half after her disappearance. (Dkt.#123, Ex.# 44). Police found
her skeletal remains spread across a large area that required several searches to locate. Id. The
Oklahoma Medical Examiner’s Office determined the cause of death was a gunshot wound to her
head. Marks found on her ribs were found to be caused by animals instead of stab wounds. Id.
APD Detective Dennis Smith, and OSBI Agent Gary Rogers headed the investigation into
Mrs. Haraway’s disappearance. Along with these two officers, APD Detective Mike Baskins
handled key parts of the investigation, and was responsible for the McAnally’s crime scene. From
the period of late April until October 1984, OSBI and APD investigated many alternate suspects
and leads. Sometime in late September or October, Detectives Smith and Baskins interviewed Jeff
Miller who provided information gleaned from other individuals that implicated Thomas Ward
and Karl Fontenot. Based on this uncorroborated conversation, police sought out Thomas Ward
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and then, Mr. Fontenot as their suspects.
The case against Mr. Fontenot rests primarily on his confession given in October 1984.
In his confession, Mr. Fontenot states that he, along with Odell Titsworth, and Tommy Ward
robbed McAnally’s, kidnapped and murdered Mrs. Haraway before burning her body. After
extensive investigation into various areas around Pontotoc County, Oklahoma, the OSBI and
APD were unable to locate Mrs. Haraway’s remains or any physical evidence corroborating Mr.
Fontenot’s confession. In fact, not one detail of Mr. Fontenot’s confession could ever be
corroborated with any evidence in the case.
Along with the confessions, the Pontotoc County District Attorney’s case included
three witnesses who arrived at McAnally’s after Mrs. Haraway’s disappearance. These three
men testified as to what they witnessed upon arriving at the store. The witnesses said a man and a
woman exited the front door and got in a pickup that was parked about 10 feet away, parallel to
the door, facing east. (N/T 6/10/1988 at 60). The man had one arm around her waist. (N/T 6/9/1988
at 66) The pickup was light-colored, "late model, late '60s, early '70s," with an intact tailgate,
"greenish, gray" with primered spots and "gray primer." (N/T 6/10/1988 at 40-41, 47,
59). Not realizing anything was amiss, one of the witnesses entered the store finding it empty.
Soon afterwards, witnesses called the Ada police after finding the cash register open and all of
Mrs. Haraway’s belongings, including her purse and school books, still in the store.
While attempting to secure McAnally’s, law enforcement received reports of two men
who had been at a nearby convenience store earlier in the evening. Karen Wise, the convenience
store clerk at J.P. 's Pak-To-Go (“J.P.’s”), a half mile west of McAnally's, and James Paschal, a
customer at J.P. 's, told police of two men who were in the store between 7 p.m. and 8:30 p.m.
Ms. Wise said the men made her nervous. Both Ms. Wise and Mr. Paschal described the pickup
seen with the men at J.P. 's as a "red primered truck ... mostly red primer ... [with] grey primered
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spots," and an "older model" Chevrolet of uniform color with a tailgate that was either missing or
painted a different color. (N/T 6/9/1988 at 193, 214, 225).
Ms. Wise positively identified Mr. Ward as one of the men she saw in J.P.’ s. Id. at 185;
(State's Exhibit #s 5 and 51). The second man seen by Ms. Wise at J.P. 's was 6 feet to 6 feet and
2 inches tall, white male, sandy brown hair. (State's Exhibit # 5). However, Mr. Fontenot’s height
is 5’9.” Neither Ms. Wise nor Mr. Paschal identified Mr. Fontenot as the second man. Ms. Wise
testified that the second man she had seen on April 28, 1984, had lighter hair than Mr. Fontenot
and that Mr. Fontenot was shorter than the man she had seen. (N/T 6/9/1988 at 194-195). Ms. Wise
also testified that she had seen a man staring at her apartment while Mr. Fontenot was incarcerated,
and she believed this man resembled the second man at J.P. 's with Mr. Ward. (P/H 1063, N/T
6/9/1988 at 197-199). Ms. Wise said this same man was a spectator at the preliminary hearing. (PH
Tr. 161; F-85-769; Tr. 968-969, 981-982, 984-985; N/T 6/9/1988 at 200-202).
Several other witnesses testified about pickup trucks seen that night having a similar
description as the one seen at McAnally’s and J.P.’s. However, the crux of the District Attorney’s
case rested on the confession and an identification by Jim Moyer, a customer in McAnally’s that
night.
Based on this testimony, Mr. Fontenot was convicted in both trials and sentenced to death.
His death sentence was overturned after the second trial resulting in a re-sentencing to life without
the possibility of parole.4

4. The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals (OCCA) set forth facts surrounding Mrs. Haraway’s abduction and murder in
the appeal of Mr. Fontenot’s first trial. Fontenot v. State, 742 P.2d 31, 32 (Okla. Crim. App. 1987). The OCCA’s factual
findings are entitled to a presumption of correctness. 28 U.S.C. Section 2254(e)(1). The facts as set forth by the OCCA are
consistent with the above recitation and have been given a presumption of correctness by this Court:
Donna Denise (sic) Haraway was abducted after being robbed at the convenience store where she
was working on April 28, 1984, in Ada, Oklahoma. [Fontenot] and Tommy Ward were tried for the
crimes during September, 1985. In October of 1984, Tommy Ward made a statement to law
enforcement officers which inculpated Fontenot, an individual named Odell Titsworth, and to a
slighter degree, himself. Fontenot and Titsworth were arrested as a result and Fontenot gave a different

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Disturbingly, the recent discovery of Ada Police Department reports contain evidence that
may have changed the trial of Mr. Fontenot dramatically, including confidential letters written by
Mr. Fontenot to his trial attorney, George Butner. In these letters, he provides names of people to
corroborate his alibi. Additionally, he recanted his confession and detailed police attempts to make
him confess while in custody. Other newly discovered exculpatory reports include a previously
undisclosed handwritten report taken from Gene Whelchel about his description of the men he had
seen in McAnally’s. (Dkt.# 123, Ex.# 96). The report was made on April 30, 1984, two days after
Mrs. Haraway went missing. It provides extremely detailed descriptions of the men, down to
Suspect #2 having muscular arms, a narrow waist, and larger shoulders. He describes acne scars
on Suspect #2. He describes Suspect #1 as a “neat looking guy” with an athletic build and probably
right handed. These details were never provided to defense counsel and would have been essential
in cross examining Mr. Whelchel and other witnesses.
Also, recently provided to defense counsel was an interview with James Boardman, an
employee with the Ada newspaper. (Dkt.# 123, Ex.# 93). Mr. Boardman was in McAnally’s store

statement substantially in agreement with Ward’s except that it more clearly inculpated Ward.
In each [of] Ward’s and Fontenot’s statements, the instigator and ringleader in the criminal acts
was said to be Titsworth. However, Titsworth was eliminated as a suspect within a few days of his
arrest because of clear proof the police had that he had not been an accomplice.
According to the statements of Ward and Fontenot, Haraway was robbed of approximately $150.00,
abducted, and taken to the grounds behind a power plant in Ada where she was raped. According to
[Fontenot’s] version, she was then taken to an abandoned house behind the plant where Titsworth
stabbed her to death. She was then burned along with the house. When Haraway’s remains were
found in Hughes County, there was no evidence of charring or of stab wounds, and there was a single
bullet wound to the skull.
The evidence at trial revealed that two men, one of whom was positively identified as Tommy Ward,
played pool at J.P.’s convenience store in Ada, Oklahoma from about 7:00 p.m. until about 8:30 p.m.
the evening of April 28, 1984. Around 8:30 p.m., the two men left the store. Shortly thereafter, Tommy
Ward was seen leaving with Haraway from the convenience store where she worked which was across
the road and a quarter of a mile away from J.P.’s. Fontenot was said to resemble the man with Ward
at J.P.’s, but could not be identified as having sandy brown hair and being six foot to six foot 2 inches
tall. Fontenot had dark brown hair and was several inches shorter than the description given. One
witness went so far as to tell a detective and a private investigator, and attempted to tell the District
Attorney, without success, that Fontenot was not the man he saw in J.P.’s. Other than the statements
given by Ward and Fontenot, there was no other evidence linking [Fontenot] to the crimes.

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at 5 p.m. on April 28, 1984, and encountered two men that in his opinion were “acting funny.” He
saw Mrs. Haraway there. Ada police officers went back to Mr. Boardman after Mr. Fontenot was
arrested in October 1984 and he could not identify Mr. Fontenot as one of the men he saw.
Additionally, two witnesses whose names were written on the McAnally’s register tape, provided
almost the exact information to the Ada Police that they did to post conviction investigators when
they provided their affidavits. (Dkt.# 123, Ex.# 94).

I.

MR. FONTENOT QUALIFIES FOR SUNBTANTIVE REVIEW UNDER
BOTH THE ACTUAL INNOCENCE AND CAUSE AND PREJUDICE
EXCEPTIONS
A. Statute of Limitations

Respondent alleges the Second Amended Petition is barred by the statute of limitations,
pursuant to the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), codified at
28 U.S.C. Section 2244(d). According to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1) a state petitioner challenging
his felony conviction must file his Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus prior to the lapse of the
one-year statute of limitations. However, the U.S. Supreme Court has found this statute of
limitations may be waived upon a credible finding of actual innocence. McQuiggin v. Perkins,
569 U.S.383, 133 S.Ct. 1924, 1935, 185 L.Ed.2d 1019 (2013).
Further, numerous jurisdictions, including the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals have found
that to prevent a manifest injustice of continuing to incarcerate one who is actually innocent, a
number of procedural defects will be waived. See Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 454
(1986)(allowing successive petitions with rejected constitutional claims); McClesky v. Zant, 499
U.S. 467, 494-495 (1991)(excusing “abusive petition” exception in federal habeas); Keeney v.
Tamayo-Reyes, 504 U.S. 1, 11- 12(1992)(actual innocence trumps failure to develop facts in
state court); Lopez v. Trani, 628 F.3d 1228, 1230-31 (10th Cir. 2010)(actual innocence is an
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exception to procedural barriers in a petitioner’s case including statute of limitations); see also
Lee v. Lampert, 653 F.3d 929, 932 (9th Cir. 2011) (allowing actual innocence cases to receive
substantive review despite being time-barred); Souter v. Jones, 395 F.3d 577, 602 (6th Cir. 2005);
San Martin v. McNeil, 633 F.3d 1257, 1267-68 (11th Cir. 2011); Jones v. State, 591 So.2d 911,
915-16 (Fla. 1991) (permitting actual innocence based on new evidence in a writ of error coram
nobis); In re Clark, 855 P.2d 729, 760 (Cal. 1993)(claims of factual innocence based on newly
discovered evidence permitted at any time regardless of delay or failure to raise claim
previously); Summerville v. Warden, 229 Conn. 397, 244 (Conn. 1994)(allowing state habeas
corpus petition on newly discovered evidence of innocence even with other procedural
problems); People v. Washington, 171 Ill. 2d 475, 489 (Ill. 1996)(procedural due process allows
newly discovered evidence of innocence at any time); Ex parte Elizondo, 947 S.W.2d 202, 205
(Tex. Crim. App. 1996)(permitting a claim of actual innocence action in the interest justice);
State ex rel Amrine v. Roper, 102 S.W.3d 541, 547 (Mo. 2003)(permitting actual innocence to
be raised in state habeas corpus proceedings outside of the normal post-conviction avenue); State
v. Armstrong, 2005 WI 119 (WI 2005)(state supreme court could use its inherent power to
remedy a miscarriage of justice); Montoya v. Ulibarri, 142 N.M. 89,97 (N.M. 2007)(allowing
actual innocence claims in state habeas petition as an act of fundamental fairness). While Mr.
Fontenot is filing his habeas corpus petition beyond the one-year statute of limitations, he claims
he is actually innocent of his convictions and the failure to file timely was through no fault of
his own.5

5

Petitioner’s convictions became final before the enactment of the AEDPA. Therefore, the statute of limitations
commenced on the AEDPA’s enactment date of April 24, 1996 and expired on April 24, 1997. See Serrano v. Williams,
383 F.3d 1181, 1183 (10th Cir. 2004). Because his habeas corpus petition was not filed until February 24, 2016, this action
is time-barred under 28 U.S.C. Section 2244(d)(1)(A). (Dkt.# 4). Further, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 2244(d)(2), the
statute of limitations is tolled while a properly-filed application for post-conviction relief or other collateral review of the
judgment at issue is pending. On July 24, 2013, Petitioner filed an application for post-conviction relief in Pontotoc County
Case No. CRF-1984-183. (Dkt.# 99-2). The post-conviction application was denied by the state district court on December
31, 2014. (Dkt.# 99-8). On October 29, 2015, the OCCA entered an Order Granting Motion to [Allow] Associate Counsel

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An unexplained delay in presenting new evidence may bear on a determination of
whether a petitioner has made the requisite showing to overcome the statute of limitations.
However, in the instant case Mr. Fontenot did not “sit on” newly discovered evidence for
over twenty years before raising these claims in state post-conviction or federal habeas
corpus as the State suggests. See infra at 62-118. While records were disclosed to the
Oklahoma Indigent Defense Services (OIDS) at some point after the December 1992
Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals (“OCCA”) order, there is no evidence that Mr.
Fontenot personally knew of their existence. Further, he had no means by which he could
have developed these records had he known. He could not investigate them, find witnesses
mentioned in them, obtain affidavits and supporting evidence, and submit it all to a court.
Given that Mr. Fontenot is learning disabled, it makes the possibility of this occurring even
more remote, if not impossible.
Further, these records were not disclosed until after his second direct appeal was
almost finished. His appellate counsel’s opening brief had been filed and there was no means
for further factual development at that point. When the OCCA affirmed his conviction, but
overturned his sentence, there was no means to develop these documents to challenge the
underlying conviction. Attorney Mark Barrett, who represented Thomas Ward, Mr.
Fontenot’s co-defendant, removed Mr. Fontenot’s files, including the OSBI reports from the
OIDS office without any authorization or release from Mr. Fontenot. Mr. Barrett claims to
have been representing both Mr. Ward and Mr. Fontenot, but only filed a state postconviction brief for Mr. Ward in October 2017. Mr. Barrett never filed a state application

and Affirming Denial of Post-Conviction Relief in Case No. PC-2015-76. (Dkt.# 99-10). Petitioner filed a petition for writ
of habeas corpus in this Court on February 24, 2016. (Dkt.# 4). Because he did not file his post-conviction proceedings
until after the one-year limitations period had expired, he is not eligible for statutory tolling. See May v. Workman, 339
F.3d 1236, 1237 (10th Cir. 2003).

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for Mr. Fontenot. Mr. Barrett’s representation of both Mr. Ward and Mr. Fontenot represents
a conflict which Mr. Fontenot raised, and Respondent questioned, during post-conviction
proceedings. Those questions remained unresolved at the time of the state court’s order
denying the post conviction application.
Respondent also argues that Mr. Fontenot’s filing of a “Reply and Motion for
Summary Judgment” precludes any additional factual development in the instant federal
habeas corpus proceedings. (Dkt.# 148). However, a summary judgment motion is not a
waiver of any further factual development, it is a pleading that alleges there are certain issues
that can be decided based on the known evidence at the time. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56. When facts
are unavailable to a non-movant, the court may “allow time to obtain affidavits or
declarations or to take discovery.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(d). Further, if a court denies the motion,
it does not necessarily end the litigation. Instead, the case may continue with further factual
development, including a possible evidentiary hearing, or trial. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(g).
Similarly, in post-conviction proceedings, a summary judgment motion does not preclude
any further factual development. It merely suggests to the state court that there are certain
issues that may be decided based on the evidence before the court at that point in time.
In this case, it appears there was there was never any waiver of additional factual
development beyond the motion for summary judgment. At the last hearing in state court,
both parties sought additional factual development beyond the motion based on two grounds:
a prior discovery agreement and a potential evidentiary hearing for both sides. (Dkt.# 105,
Ex.# 1,

Minute order). After that, Respondent had actually requested more time for

discovery and in an Agreed Motion for Extension of Time asked for an extension to
respond.(Dkt.# 105, Ex.# 2, Agreed Motion).
Further, the Post Conviction Findings issued by the state court do not reach the
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substantive merits or address the facts of an of Mr. Fontenot’s claims. (Dkt.# 99, Ex.# 8).
The Court simply found: “Claim of actual innocence, ineffective assistance of counsel,
prosecutorial misconduct and Brady violation could have been submitted much
earlier…[s]imply, too much time has elapsed due to Petitioner’s own inaction.” Id.
Discovery was ongoing when the trial court’s post conviction findings were entered.
However, neither Mr. Fontenot, nor the Court were aware of the lack of full disclosure by
the Pontotoc County District Attorney’s Office that demonstrated Mr. Fontenot did not
unduly delay asserting his constitutional claims. Further, there was no review of whether or
not Mr. Fontenot’s actual innocence in and of itself merited relief under state law. In fact,
following the filings cited above, “there were no further hearings before the state court
abruptly filed the two-page order denying relief on New Year’s Eve 2014, the day before the
state judge retired.” (Dkt.# 105, at 4). Because the state court never ruled on the motion for
summary judgment, the State’s reliance on it is misplaced.
Mr. Fontenot’s actual innocence is discussed infra pp. 17-48.

B. Procedural Default
Respondent also argues that the petition is procedurally barred by the OCCA’s
application of laches. Courts may not consider claims that have been procedurally defaulted on
adequate and independent state procedural grounds “unless the petitioner can demonstrate cause
for the default and actual prejudice as a result of the alleged violation of federal law, or
demonstrate that failure to consider the claims will result in a fundamental miscarriage of
justice.” Byrd v. Workman, 645 F.3d 1159, 1167 (10th Cir. 2011). Specifically, Respondent
contends that because the Oklahoma Courts found Mr. Fontenot had “forfeited [the] right [to
have his post-conviction claims heard] through his own inaction” he should be procedurally
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barred from pursuing them now. (Dkt.# 148, Exhibit # 10, at 3-4)(emphasis added).
Mr. Fontenot, however, again contends that all procedural bars have been removed
because his case fits within the “actual innocence” gateway exception that would permit federal
habeas review of his alleged procedurally defaulted claims, and his alleged “Brady error” serves
as the “cause and prejudice” sufficient to serve the same function. Mr. Fontenot also contends
Respondent cannot assert laches as an affirmative defense for undue delay when their own
actions continue to subvert his ability to litigate his claims in a timely manner.
Like the time bar applied in statute of limitation cases, in general, absent a showing of
cause and prejudice, a habeas court will not entertain a claim that has been defaulted in state
court because of a procedural state court bar. See Dretke v. Haley, 541 U.S. 386, 388 (2004).
However, there are several narrow, but critical, exceptions to this general rule. First, the Court
requires that the rule must be adequate and independent – that is, it was firmly established,
regularly followed, and consistently applied at the time of the alleged default. Ford v. Georgia,
498 U.S. 411 (1991). Second, there is “a narrow exception to the general rule when the habeas
applicant can demonstrate that the alleged constitutional error has resulted in the conviction of
one who is actually innocent of the underlying offense.” Id.; see Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298
(1995); House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518 (2006). Third, there is an exception in claims of Brady error,
where the elements of the substantive claim itself mirror the cause and prejudice inquiry and
proof of one is necessarily proof of the other. See Banks v. Dretke, 540 U.S. 668 (2004). Mr.
Fontenot qualifies for substantive review under both the actual innocence and the cause and
prejudice exceptions.
C. Actual Innocence
As explained above, Mr. Fontenot’s actual innocence can equitably toll the AEDPA’s
statute of limitations. Miller v. Marr, 141 F.3d 976, 978 (10th Cir. 1998). “Actual innocence, if
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proved, serves as a gateway through which a petitioner may pass whether the impediment is a
procedural bar…[or] expiration of the statute of limitations.” McQuiggin v. Perkins, 569 U.S. 383,
386 (2013). The purpose of the procedural actual innocence standard is to prevent a manifest
injustice of the continued incarceration of one who is actually innocent. When asserting actual
innocence in federal habeas corpus, a petitioner must present newly discovered evidence that a
jury did not consider during their deliberations. See Schlup, 513 U.S. at 327. Specifically, newly
discovered evidence consisting of “trustworthy eyewitness accounts” and “critical physical
evidence” provide the factual basis for the gateway claim. Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 324
(1995); see also Cummings v. Sirmons, 506 F.3d 1211,1223-1224 (10th Cir. 2007); O'Boyle v.
Ortiz, 242 Fed. Appx. 529, 530-531 (10th Cir. 2007)(discussing that petitioner must demonstrate
the newly discovered evidence was not available at trial); Sistrunk v. Armenakis, 292 F.3d 669,
673 n. 4 (9th Cir. 2002); Carriger v. Stewart, 132 F.3d 463, 478 (9th Cir. 1997). Once an actual
innocence gateway is established, any procedural defects in Mr. Fontenot’s constitutional claims
are removed permitting this Court to evaluate each claim on its merits. See Schlup, 513 at 315.
The significance of the evidence presented below casts grave doubt on the validity of Mr.
Fontenot’s convictions.
Once the factual grounds of actual innocence are present, a federal court’s review must
assess whether “the petitioner [has shown] that it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror
would have convicted him in light of the new evidence.” Schlup 513 at 327; see also House v.
Bell, 547 U.S. 518, 528 (2006). The Supreme Court instructs federal courts to examine the strength
of the prosecution’s case at trial when weighing the significance of all newly discovered evidence.
See House, 547 U.S. at 539-553 (assessing newly discovered evidence within the state’s theory of
the case at trial). The State’s theory of the case shows what evidence is significant to the jury’s
determination of guilt. More importantly, the state’s theory of the case demonstrates the strength
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of the case against a defendant.
The Pontotoc County District Attorney’s Office tried Mr. Fontenot twice for the robbery,
kidnapping, and murder of Donna Denice Haraway. In both trials, the prosecution’s case against
Mr. Fontenot rested on his confession regarding the robbery of McAnally’s, the kidnapping of
Mrs. Haraway from the store, and her subsequent murder.( N/T 6/14/1988 at 34-36). During trial,
the prosecution acknowledged the plethora of inconsistencies between his confession and all the
other evidence found in the case. A key discrepancy was Mr. Titsworth’s non-involvement in the
crime, although he was identified by both Mr. Ward and Mr. Fontenot in their confessions as
being present during the alleged murder:
Well, what does Officer Rogers, and Officer Smith, and Officer Baskins say? It is
not unusual to have them tell you part lies. I ask you to consider ladies and
gentlemen, first of all, Odell Titsorth[sic] was not there. Therefore, part of the story
had to be a lie. Anytime he said Odell Titsworth [sic] did anything, the rest of the
story had to be a lie, because Tommy and him, one of them had to do it, what Odell,
what they said Odell did. So, of course, it is going to appear there are some lies, and
some mistruths and it is not going to match exactly to the facts as told by the
Defendant.
(N/T 6/14/1988 at 94). Evidence showed Mr. Fontenot was unable to describe, or identify Mr.
Titsworth when asked to do so by law enforcement. ( J/T at 2074-75; P/H 968, 994-95). Both Ada
Police Detectives Smith and Baskins admitted that nothing in Mr. Fontenot’s confession was
corroborated by their investigation. ( P/H 546-547; N/T 6/10/1988 at 178-179). Once Mrs.
Haraway’s remains were found, the medical examiner’s report further disproved the confession
by showing the cause of death to be a gunshot wound to the head and refuting that there were any
knife-marks on her ribs. (Dkt.# 123, Ex.# 46).
In addition to the confession, the prosecution relied on two witnesses who identified Mr.
Fontenot as being both at McAnally’s and hanging around J.P.’s convenience store. (N/T
6/14/1988 at 21, 70-71). Those witnesses were James “Jim” Moyer (see infra at 33-37)
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and Karen Wise (see infra at 37-40). This was the crux of the evidence brought against
Mr. Fontenot to obtain his conviction.
The remainder of the evidence presented against Mr. Fontenot focused on his guilt by
association with his co-defendant, Tommy Ward. Much of the prosecution’s opening statement,
closing argument, and rebuttal focused on Mr. Fontenot’s guilt by association with his codefendant. ( N/T 6/8/1988 at 31-35; N/T 6/14/1988 at 17-19, 35-36, 70, 79). Instead of direct
evidence inculpating Mr. Fontenot, the prosecution asked the jury to infer his guilt, based on Mr.
Ward’s guilt. In fact, much of the State’s case focused on the witnesses who saw Mr. Ward in
J.P.’s, or McAnally’s, (N/T 6/14/1988 at 20-21, 27). Mr. Ward’s possible possession of the knife,
Id. at 17, and his family’s access to a grey pickup truck. Id.
During Mr. Fontenot’s second trial, the prosecution recounted the testimony of several
witnesses who had given statements to law enforcement that were never provided to Mr.
Fontenot’s defense counsel. Specifically, those witnesses were Janet Weldon (aka Lyon), who
was Mrs. Haraway’s mother; James Watt, who was Mrs. Haraway’s co-worker at McAnally’s; Richard
Holkum, an Ada Police Officer; and Karen Wise, the sales clerk at J.P.’s convenience store. Without
these witnesses’ prior statements to police, defense counsel was unable to cross examine the
prosecution witnesses about critical evidence that either exonerated Mr. Fontenot, or impeached the
testimony of various police officers. While defense counsel presented some evidence challenging the
confession, he could not provide evidence establishing Mr. Fontenot’s innocence, or the inherent
weaknesses in the police investigation.
All the evidence presented at trial must be evaluated along with the newly discovery
evidence presented herein. See House, 547 U.S. at 537-538. The federal court must conduct a
cumulative assessment of the prosecution’s evidence at trial, along with the newly discovered
evidence when considering whether actual innocence is proven.
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Our review in this case addresses the merits of the Schlup inquiry, based on a fully
developed record, and with respect to that inquiry Schlup makes plain that the
habeas court must consider "'all the evidence,'" old and new, incriminating and
exculpatory, without regard to whether it would necessarily be admitted under
"rules of admissibility that would govern at trial."
Id.
The investigation into Mr. Fontenot’s case has revealed both documents and witness
statements that prove an alibi defense, and substantiate proof of the ineptness of the police
investigation. The newly discovered evidence undermines the prosecutor’s weak case and
provides proof of Mr. Fontenot’s probable innocence. As noted supra at p. 2, “Probable
innocence” is established if Mr. Fontenot presents “new facts [that] raise[] sufficient doubt
about [the petitioner’s] guilt to undermine confidence in the result of the trial…” Schlup
v. Delo, at 317 (emphasis added). To establish the requisite probability, the petitioner must show
that it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted him in the light of
the new evidence.” Id. at 327; see also House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518, 538 (2006)( a federal court
presented with a Schlup claim “must make” ‘a probabilistic determination about what
reasonable, properly instructed jurors would do.’”). Once a federal court makes such a finding,
a gateway claim of innocence exists removing any procedural obstacles allowing the substantive
review of Mr. Fontenot’s claims. See House, 547 U.S. at 536-537; Case v. Hatch, 731 F.3d 1015,
1036 (10th Cir. 2013). The evidence presented in Mr. Fontenot’s Second Amended Petition puts
the entirety of his case in a different light meriting the removal of any procedural hurdles.
Some of the new evidence presented includes evidence that Mrs. Haraway was being
harassed and stalked by a man in the weeks and months leading up to her disappearance. The
sole eyewitness, Jim Moyer, placing Mr. Fontenot in McAnally’s recanted his identification.
Karen Wise, the convenience store clerk at J.P.’s was pressured by both the police and
prosecution to change her description of the men she saw at her store to fit the police theory
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of the crime.
Further, a medical examiner’s report withheld by the prosecution shows not only a
mishandling of the crime scene - a pattern in this case - but more importantly shows that Mrs.
Haraway possibly gave birth to a child sometime before her death (a striking fact given she had
told a friend she was pregnant at the time of her abduction). The totality of this newly discovered
evidence establishes Mr. Fontenot’s probable innocence. After a cumulative assessment, it is
evident to this Court that, “more likely than not, no reasonable juror would have convicted him.”
Schlup, 513 U.S. at 327.
1. Newly Discovered Evidence Establishes Mr. Fontenot’s Alibi.
Investigators knew Mr. Fontenot had told them he was elsewhere when Mrs. Haraway
was abducted. Within the Oklahoma State Bureau of Investigation (OSBI) records are documents
corroborating Mr. Fontenot’s whereabouts the night of April 28, 1984. The defense never got
these documents. The facts show Mr. Fontenot agreed to submit to a polygraph examination on
October 21, 1984. Within the OSBI prosecutorial6 submitted to the Pontotoc County District
Attorney’s Office is a report of Mr. Fontenot’s conversation with OSBI Agent Rusty
Featherstone. (Dkt.# 123, Ex.# 43, prosecutorial bates 142-143). During that conversation, Agent
Rusty Featherstone reported the following:
During the pretest interview, FONTENOT indicated he has never been in the
McAnally’s convenience store nor even having driven by it. He has never seen
DONNA DENICE HARAWAY before and does not believe he would recognize a
picture of her if shown it now, although he recalls seeing a picture of a girl when
she was first reported missing . . . FONTENOT recalls on the evening of Saturday,
April 28, 1984, he went to the apartment of GORDON CALHOUN, arriving there
at approximately dark or shortly after the kegs arrived. CALHOUN lives adjacent
to ROBERTSES, where FONTENOT was currently staying. At the party
FONTENOT recalls drinking and doing marijuana and then returning to the
ROBERTS apartment where he slept on the floor all night. He believes he returned
to the apartment between 2330 and 2400 hours that night. . .”
6

The prosecutorial is a report created by the OSBI agents and given to the Pontotoc County District Attorney to review for
charging decisions and prosecution. It does not contain the entirety of the investigative documents from law enforcement.

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Id. 7 Later in the statement, Agent Featherstone stated that Mr. Fontenot mentioned a man
named Bruce who was also at the party along with a Michael Shane Lindsay. Id.
During the post-conviction investigation, it was determined the Bruce mentioned was
Bruce DePrater who acknowledged being at the party and seeing Mr. Fontenot there the whole
evening. (Dkt.# 123, Ex.# 8). Interestingly, Agent Featherstone found Mr. Fontenot’s polygraph
results were inconclusive but bordering on deceptive. (Dkt.# 123, Ex.# 44 at 605, 628)(explaining
that the examiner cannot make definitive determinations on whether Mr. Fontenot was truthful or
deceptive on questions about the disposal of Mrs. Haraway’s body and whether he stuck her with
a knife).
Mr. Fontenot also made a handwritten statement on October 21, 1984, recanting his
confession. In his letter, he said he had simply agreed with the story OSBI Gary Rogers told him
and lied on the video. (Ex.# 44 at 626). He explained that he had never been to McAnally’s or ever
met Mrs. Haraway, and reaffirmed his presence at the party. (Dkt.# 123, Ex.# 44 at 625-627).
What is significant is that both the OSBI and Ada Police Department had proof of this
party based upon several witness reports, dispatch records, and police reports. However, this
evidence was never provided to the defense. Ada Police radio logs show several calls made in
response to a loud party held at Gordon Calhoun’s apartment. One of the officers who responded
to this call, Ada Police Officer Larry Scott wrote a report specifically mentioning the “Gordon
Calhoun” party and warning the revelers to keep it down or go to court. (Dkt.# 123, Ex.# 43,
prosecutorial bates 98).

7

When Mr. Fontenot attempted to explain his whereabouts to Detective Smith and Agent Rogers, they interpreted it
as confirmation of whatever Jeff Miller told them over the summer. They failed to independently assess whether the
party occurred as Mr. Fontenot stated rather than as confirmation of Mr. Miller’s version of what occurred. Counsel
for Mr. Fontenot represents that “ If they did investigate it, those documents have never been disclosed to any defense
counsel including undersigned counsel.” (Dkt.# 77, pg. 21, n.4).

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Other witnesses who knew about the party at Mr. Calhoun’s apartment testified at Mr.
Ward’s trial, but not at Mr. Fontenot’s. One of these witnesses, Stacey Shelton, not only
remembered the events of that night, but remembered some of the other people present. Stacey
Shelton attended the party at Gordon Calhoun’s apartment. She testified at Mr. Ward’s trial
about the party and others who attended:
Q Did you have occasion to attend a party at Gordon Calhoun’s apartment on April
28th, 1984?
A Yes, sir. It was the graduation party for my younger brother, Bruce.
Q And how did you come to go to that party?
A I was at a club called LaFraqua that night and I had seen my younger brother
there, and Gordon, and they told me that they were having a party at his apartment
and asked if wanted to come.
Q. Now, do you recall who went to that party with you?
A Yes, sir. My roommate, Laura Ingram, my boy -- a boy I knew who I ended up,
I ended up dating for two years, that was our first date, and Lyndel Gibson and his
roommate. I don't recall his name. I'm sorry, it wasn't his roommate, it was a friend.
Q And did you see anyone at the party that you knew?
A My brother, Bruce, was there, Gordon was there, my next-door neighbors from
my home in Konawa were there, Chris and Eric Thompson. And of course, I knew
Laura and Lyndel and was familiar with the friend that Lyndel brought.
Q Now, have you seen a lady in the hall today known as Janette Roberts?
A Yes. They called her "Red". She was at that party, yes.
Q. You saw her at the party also?
A. Yes, I did.
Q. Now, do you recall about what time you got to the party?
A. It was late. The club didn’t close until midnight, and I want to say that that is
8

Mr. Ward’s trial took place in 1989, after Mr. Fontenot’s trial and conviction on June 8-14, 1988. 

24

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about the time we went, around that time, somewhere. I knew that it was late.
Q. All right. Did you see the Defendant, Tommy Ward, at that party?
A. I can’t say positively that I did, no. There were probably twenty to twenty- five
people there and, like I said, the only ones I knew were about six or seven people.
Q. All right. Now at the time of the first trial of this case, who were you working for?
A. A radio station in Ada, KADA Radio.
Q. And what were you doing for them?
A. I was a news anchor and reporter.
Q. And did you attend that trial?
A. Yes, sir, I did.
Q. And did anything happen in that trial to surprise you?
A. Yes, sir. I viewed a videotape where Mr. Ward was talking to some detectives
and he told them that the night that Denice Haraway was taken, he was at a party
and he started describing in minute detail about the party. He told of my little
brother playing the electric guitar and Gordon was playing on the drum set and of
two guys from Konawa asleep in the bedroom and also told of the police coming
about 1:00 o’clock in the morning telling us to quiet down. And the minute I
saw that, I knew that he had been there to know that.
Q. Now, did you know who these people from Konowa were?
A. Yes. They were Chris and Eric Thompson. I grew up next door to them.
Q. Now, did you see them asleep at that party?
A. Yes, sir, I did.
Q. And where were they asleep?
A. In the bedroom. One was on the bed and one was on the floor.

(Ward Vol. 10, at 193-195). Ms. Shelton had told the police and prosecution that she was at the
party and knew who was there. Instead of notifying George Butner, counsel for Mr. Fontenot, of
evidence supporting Mr. Fontenot’s alibi, the prosecution’s reaction to her information was to
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pressure her to recant.
As I was watched the video, I realized that Ward was referring to a party I had
attended at Gordon Calhoun's house. My brother, Bruce DePrater, was from
Konawa and had been playing the guitar and Gordon had been playing the drums.
Ward has also eluded to the fact that there were two other boys from Konawa at the
party who were passed out on a bed. Those two boys were my childhood neighbors,
Chris and Eric Thompson. I remembered them being at the party and indeed, they
were passed out on a bed in an adjacent room to the living room.
I also remember Janette Blood being at the party with several of her friends. At the
time, I did not know who she was or her name, but, I remembered her specifically
because after I remarked that everyone needed to lower the noise because of the
warning from the police, she came up to me and yelled in my face. She was easy to
remember because of her flaming red hair and missing teeth. It was only at the trial,
when she testified that I learned her name.
I specifically remember the night of the party as Saturday, April 28, 1984. First, my
brother had invited me to the party after seeing me with my roommate Laura
Ingram, and my date, Lyndel Gibson, at a local dance club. All three of us went to
the party with the intent of only staying for a short while. It was the first time I had
gone out with Lyndel, who I ended up dating for the next two years. It was the one
and only time I went to Calhoun's house. I kept a calendar, almost like a diary, of
everything I did. I wrote it in my calendar the following day. Also, during that time,
I never went out on Friday nights because I worked on Saturday mornings and liked
to go to bed early.
The police should have been aware of the date of the party since they arrived at the
house a couple times to quiet the party. However, the police would not have been
aware of everyone at the party. I know this because my friend, Laura and I were
hidden in a different part of the house when the officers arrived and never interacted
directly with them. After watching the video of Tommy Ward describing the April
28, 1984, party, I left the courtroom and approached Dennis Smith. I told him that
there was no way Ward would know details about the party unless he was there.
Smith told me that anyone could have told him about the party. I argued with him
that Ward would not have known all the details that he spoke about if someone had
just told him about it. He said to me, "I don't want to hear it," and turned and walked
away.
I later informed Mike Baskins about the accuracy of Ward's description of the
party that night. I insisted that Ward and Fontenot couldn't have committed
the crime since they were at the party that night. Baskins argued with me
concerning the validity of the alibi, claiming that police logs showed that the
party actually took place on a Friday night. I knew that could not have been
correct and several years later, I discovered that the police log actually showed
that the party was, in fact, on Saturday night.
At the second trial of the defendants, I testified for the defense, verifying that
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Tommy Ward's details matched what I had seen at the party.
After testifying at the trial, I was confronted by Bill Peterson who brought me
into an office he and Chris Ross were using within the courthouse. Once I was
there, Peterson told me I was to get back on the stand and recant my testimony.
I told him I wouldn't do it because I had told the truth. He made me stay in
the office for about half an hour and then came back in with what he told me
were trial transcripts. He ordered me to read them. I did and then he yelled at
me saying that I was lying because, he said, the transcripts didn't match my
testimony. Again, he demanded that I return to the stand to recant my
previous testimony and again, I refused telling him that while not everything
I testified to was in the transcript he showed me, that I clearly remembered
what took place that night and I clearly remembered seeing the tape sometime
during the preliminary hearing or trial, although I could not recall exactly
which one.
Peterson was extremely volatile during the course of this confrontation. He
slammed his fist on the desk. He slammed the transcript on the desk. He was red
faced and yelling almost to the point of spitting. He insisted over and over again that
I go "back on the stand and testify that everything you said was wrong."
Because I refused, he told me I was not to leave his office until I agreed to recant.
I stayed in the office for several more hours while the trial continued. He would
come into the office during breaks and again demand that I retake the stand, which
I refused to do. At the end of the day, he let me go, but told me I was to return every
day until I agreed to recant. He told me he was going to recall me and rip my
testimony to shreds and although I returned each day of the trial and was made to
sit on a bench in the hallway until the trial concluded, he never recalled me, and I
refused to go on the stand of my own accord and recant.
Peterson left me with the impression that if I did not remain in his office the first
day or return the following days that I would be jailed. I missed several days of
work because of it.
I interpreted all of the foregoing actions by Peterson as intimidating, although I
continued to stand by my testimony.
(Dkt.# 123, Ex.# 12) (emphasis added). While Ms. Shelton could not remember specifically Mr.
Fontenot being at the party, her knowledge of who else was present provided new evidence
supporting Mr. Fontenot’s alibi. Specifically, she named her brother, Bruce DePrater, and Eric and
Chris Thompson as being at Mr. Calhoun’s apartment.
When interviewed, Mr. DePrater not only remembered the party but knew Mr. Fontenot:
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Sometime prior to this party, I recall traveling to Texas with Gordon Calhoun to
purchase one or two kegs of beer, and probably some cases of beer. The alcohol
content for beer sold in Texas was higher than that of beer sold in Oklahoma,
making 'Texas Beer' more desirable.
I recall Eric and Chris Thompson, from Konawa attended this party. I recall that
Eric Thompson had passed out early that night; but, during the daylight hours I
witnessed an incident between Eric Thompson and Karl Fontenot while they were
both standing around talking at Gordon Calhoun's party. Karl Fontenot was refilling
a beer can from the keg's spout and joking to Eric that he (Karl) was only having
one beer.
Later that same night, probably around 11 pm or shortly thereafter, I recall planning
a trip to La Fragua, a college bar in Ada, with Chris Thompson. Chris and I wanted
to visit the bar and invite women to come back to Gordon's keg party. On the way
out, I recall mentioning this plan to Karl Fontenot, who responded by making an
inappropriate gesture involving the tugging upward on his belt, while commenting
verbally that he and Tommy had already been with an older woman that evening.
At La Fragua that night, I recall seeing my sister Stacy Deprater. She was with her
friend Laura Ingram and on a date with Lyndel Gibson. Surprisingly, my sister
Stacy and her friend and date came back to Gordon Calhoun's party that night, after
La Fragua closed at midnight.
Later that same night, after my sister and her friends had gotten to Gordon
Calhoun's party, I recall playing guitar while Gordon played his drums. While we
were both playing loudly, someone announced that a police officer was coming up
the stairs to Gordon's apartment.
Almost simultaneously, I recall Karl Fontenot running by me telling me to follow
him, that he knew a good place to hide. I had no reason to hide, and to this day, I
don't know why I followed Karl Fontenot into this strange hiding place, but I did.
Karl showed me a hidden passageway, which seemingly connected Gordon
Calhoun's kitchen with his neighbor Janette's apartment. This passageway was
hidden behind Gordon's refrigerator. That is where Karl and I stayed until the police
officer left.
I believe each of these incidents occurred on the same night, during the same party
at Gordon Calhoun's apartment sometime during the spring of 1984.
(Dkt.# 123, Ex.# 8). Along with Mr. DePrater, Eric Thompson also remembers Mr. Fontenot
being at the party that evening. (Dkt.# 123, Ex.# 9). Such information was crucial to Mr.
Fontenot’s defense at trial because it established his whereabouts for the night; precluding the
belief he was involved in Mrs. Haraway’s abduction.
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Mr. Fontenot recanted his confession shortly after he gave it.(Dkt.# 123, Ex.# 44 at 626).
More importantly, in both his interview for the polygraph and afterwards he provides as much
information as he can about a party he attended six months prior. Given that the videotape
confession of Mr. Fontenot only contains the confession and not the interrogation that occurred
beforehand, his statements providing his whereabouts to law enforcement are critical new
evidence. The prosecution failed to disclose these documents to Mr. Fontenot’s trial attorney,
George Butner.
The OSBI records that were withheld from defense counsel document Mr. Fontenot’s alibi
and his recantation and are important for two reasons. First, these documents provide independent
corroboration of any conversations between Mr. Fontenot and his trial counsel. Given that he
never testified at any hearing, these documents would impeach Agent Rogers’ and Detective
Dennis Smith’s testimony about the veracity of the confession. Both law enforcement officers
admitted that nothing in the confession could be substantiated. Therefore, OSBI reports reflect
that Mr. Fontenot denied any involvement and told officers about the party with specific names
of people in attendance shows substantial flaws in their investigation.
Second, these reports provide new investigative leads defense counsel could have
followed. Had Mr. Fontenot’s defense been given this information, they could have investigated
the people who attended Mr. Calhoun’s party the night of April 28th. These people remember
seeing Mr. Fontenot from the very early part of the evening until much later into the night. Their
accounts clearly show that at no time did Mr. Fontenot leave to participate in whatever transpired
with Mrs. Haraway. Affidavits from party-goers, Eric Thompson, Bruce DePrater, and Stacey
Shelton along with police reports from Janette Blood place Mr. Fontenot at the party for the
entirety of the night.
2. Donna Denice Haraway was being Harassed by an Unknown Man.
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The Pontotoc County District Attorney maintains it did not have most of the OSBI and
other law enforcement records made during the investigation into Mrs. Haraway’s disappearance
and murder. Amongst those records not turned over to the prosecution or defense counsel include
OSBI reports about witness accounts to police detailing Mrs. Haraway’s statements to them about
how she received obscene telephone calls during her shifts while working at McAnally’s.
According to a co-worker, these calls had stopped for a period in the early months of 1984, but
began again in the weeks leading up to her disappearance. (Dkt.# 123, Ex.# 62). Mrs. Haraway
told the witness that the male caller telephoned the store during her shifts in the evenings from
Thursday to Sunday. Id.
Mrs. Haraway’s mother, Janet Lyon, also told police that her daughter had told her about
the calls and said that she feared these calls and did not like working at McAnally’s. These calls,
greatly distressed Mrs. Haraway, her family, and co-workers.
According to Janet, Donna told her on the phone she hated working at the store
because it did not have an alarm and a lot of weirdo’s come in and out of the store.
She told Janet that she was going to look for another job because she felt uneasy
working at the store alone at night. She told Janet that the phone calls had started
again but didn’t go into the whole story. Janet said that earlier Donna had been
receiving calls at work from a man that said he was going to come out to the
store some night and wait outside while she was working. She said that Donna
was upset because she had asked for the night off and a guy refused to work, and she
had to work anyway.

(Dkt.# 123, Ex.# 43, prosecutorial bates 20, 109)(emphasis added). OSBI Agents received
similar information from the store manager, Monroe Atkeson, about a conversation he had with
Steve Haraway, Mrs. Haraway’s husband.
Mrs. Haraway’s husband, Steve, also told police about the harassing phone calls his wife
received. On the night of her disappearance, the police spoke with Steve Haraway who told them:
“Steve received a phone call from the police who told him that his wife was missing. He knew of
no one that Donna was having problems with at the store, other than she had received two to three
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obscene phone calls at the store. The last phone call was two or three weeks prior to her
disappearance.” (Dkt.# 123, Ex.# 43, prosecutorial bates 20).
OSBI Agents received similar information from the store manager, Mr. Atkeson when
agents interviewed him on April 30, 1984. He recounted a conversation with Steve Haraway
about a Vietnam Veteran that had been harassing Mrs. Haraway. (Dkt.# 123, Ex.# 44, OSBI
0006). She received several obscene telephone calls during her shifts. Id. Mr. Atkeson told police
he had seen the veteran that Steve spoke of who was described as a white male, six feet, 190
pounds, black hair, brown eyes, mustache, light complexion, who usually drove a white
Chevrolet Chevette and bought a soft drink. Id. Mr. Atkeson believed that the veteran attended
a rehabilitation school in Okmulgee. Id.
James D. Watts, a co-worker of Mrs. Haraway’s from McAnally’s had also given police a
statement about the obscene phone calls that Mrs. Haraway had received, a statement that likewise
was not produced to the defense. Mr. Watts gave a statement to Pontotoc County District
Attorney’s Office investigator Lloyd Bond on July 25, 1985. Mr. Watt explained that “Denice had
told me of some obscene phone [calls] she had received at the store for a while, these calls upset
her a great deal. She could not recognize the voice over the phone. The calls stopped about one
month before she disappeared.” (Dkt.# 123, Ex.# 62).
Other individuals were not interviewed by police who had knowledge about the impact
these calls had on Mrs. Haraway. Anthony Johnson, a frequent customer at McAnally’s,
remembered a conversation he had with Mrs. Haraway a week before her disappearance.
Johnson is a co-worker with Tommy Ward’s sister, Tricia Wolf in an Ada,
Oklahoma plant. Johnson admitted to this investigator that one week before
Haraway’s disappearance he was in the McAnally’s convenience store when
Haraway asked him where she could buy a gun. Haraway referenced the need for a
gun with some funny calls she had recently been receiving. Haraway said she didn’t
really know who was making the calls, and that the caller never really said anything,
just did some heavy breathing on the phone. Johnson asked Haraway if she had any
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ex-boyfriends that could be making these calls and said that in Johnson’s opinion,
she knew who was making the calls but did not seem to want to indicate who it was.
(Dkt.# 123, Ex.# 22). Further, just two days before Mrs. Haraway went missing, she spoke
with Darlene Adams, another customer at McAnally’s. Mrs. Haraway explained she was
afraid of working nights at the store, but her schedule would not be changed. (Dkt.# 123, Ex.#
1).
It is unclear whether the Ada police or the OSBI ever investigated who was making these
calls to McAnally’s. No telephone records were obtained of incoming calls to the convenience
store according to the disclosed OSBI reports. No witnesses were interviewed regarding men who
may have hung around the store or watched Mrs. Haraway in the months and weeks leading up to
her disappearance. Obviously, whomever was making these calls knew her work schedule because
the telephone calls occurred only during her shifts. (Dkt.# 123, Ex.#s 15 & 44, OSBI 0006). The
man making these calls targeted Mrs. Haraway and had been doing so for an extended period of
time before her abduction. Id.
This newly discovered evidence was not presented to either of Mr. Fontenot’s juries
because the prosecution failed to disclose it to defense counsel. Beyond the failure to disclose,
this evidence illustrates the defects in the police investigation into Mrs. Haraway’s
disappearance. This evidence should have been investigated in 1984, given this evidence was
willingly provided by those closest to Mrs. Haraway either on the night of her disappearance, or
within a day or so of it. This is not a situation where only one person made a comment about a
few suspicious telephone calls. Instead, numerous people including her husband, manager, coworker, customers, and mother were aware of this conduct and recognized its obvious relevance
to the case. They immediately shared this information with police in the hopes that it would
assist in their investigation into her mysterious disappearance. Instead, the police ignored it and

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the prosecution withheld it from Mr. Fontenot’s defense.

3. The Only Eyewitness Who Identified Mr. Fontenot Recants His
Identification.
Jim Moyer is the only witness who placed Mr. Fontenot in McAnally’s the night of Mrs.
Haraway’s disappearance. Mr. Moyer’s account of that night changed over time. From his first
interviews with the Ada Police to his testimony at the preliminary hearing and trial, he was not
consistent. ( Dkt.# 123, Ex.# 102). He testified that he saw both Tommy Ward and Mr. Fontenot
in McAnally’s shortly before Mrs. Haraway’s disappearance. (P/H at 213-214). He testified that
while talking to Mrs. Haraway during his purchase of cigarettes, he saw two men walking into
the store; one man with dark hair while the other one was blond. (P/H at 218-220). However,
this testimony is not what he originally told police in 1984. He was interviewed twice by Ada
Police. The first time was on April 30, 1984, by Ada Police Officer Barrett:
MOYER advised he went to McAnally’s at 7:30 p.m., Saturday, 4-28-84.
A pickup pulled in faceing [sic] the building between the door and the
ice machine. A dark- haired guy came in the store first, then a blond
haired guy came in later. MOYER left approximately one minute after
they came in. The pickup was about a 67-69 Chevrolet, light gray, rough
looking. MOYER glanced at the tag but cannot remember it. The pickup
may have had a trailer hitch on it.
(Dkt.# 123, Ex.# 102). His second interview with Ada Police Officers D.W. Barret and Fox, he
told a completely different story.
On 11-6-84 Dets Barrett and Fox went to Martins Phillip 66 station on
Arlington and talked to Jim Moyer. Mr. Moyer said he went to McAnally’s
on Arlington about 7:30 p.m. on 4-28-84. Mr. Moyer said there was a dark
haired male at the back of the store, but he did not get a very good look at
him. While Moyer was at the counter talking with Denice Haraway a second
male came in the door and walked past him. This person he described as being
blond headed and of average height and weight. Moyer said he stayed in the
store only a minute or two after the second subj. came in. As he was leaving
he saw a pickup parked into to the curb facing the store. He only knew it was
prior to a 1971 model and was a Ford or a Chevy. Moyer looked at the picture
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lineups and said the pictures that most resembled the men he saw was #1 in
the Ward folder and #2 in the Titsworth folder.

(Dkt.# 123, Ex.# 102). These Ada Police Reports should have been made available to defense
counsel during pretrial proceedings in both 1984-1985, and prior to Mr. Fontenot’s second trial
in 1988. As such, it is a Brady violation for failure to disclose impeachment evidence and prior
inconsistent statements. Further, this report was just made available in the instant proceedings
in 2019.
Not only was the sequence of events from the men being in the store different than his
testimony, but he was not shown Mr. Fontenot’s photospread. As the prosecution relied upon
him to put Mr. Fontenot in the store, it is interesting that he was not asked to identify him
during his interview. Mr. Moyer’s account of his time in McAnally’s is widely inconsistent
from his original interview, through his preliminary hearing and trial testimony.
Mr. Moyer identified Mr. Fontenot in the courtroom as the dark-haired man who walked
towards the back of the store. (N/T 6/9/1988 at 16). But during cross examination, Mr. Moyer
admitted doubts about his identification of Mr. Fontenot.
Q. All right. You have had an opportunity at Preliminary Hearing to stand next to
and look at the height of Karl Fontenot, didn't you?
A. Yes.
Q. And as I recall that, Mr. Fontenot was two to three inches shorter than you were.
Is that correct?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay. so, if you were, in fact, five ten, Mr. Fontenot would be five seven to five
eight. Is that correct?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay. And, in fact, then to be taller than you, he would have to have heels on
his boots about three to four inches tall, but even to reach a six- foot height, the
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composite reflects he would have to have five to seven inch boots then.
Is that correct?
A. To match that height, yes.
Q. And after you came up here to Preliminary Hearing, had an opportunity to look
at the height of Mr. Fontenot, had an opportunity to look around the courtroom,
sometime after the Preliminary Hearing you became convinced that Karl Fontenot
was not the man, didn't you?
A. I became confused about it.
Q. You became so confused or convinced that you attempted to contact the District
Attorney's Office and say that Karl Fontenot was not the second man, didn't you?
A. At a time, yes.
Q. Okay. All right. In fact, you tried to get a hold of the District Attorney all summer
to tell him that, didn't you?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay. The District Attorney wouldn't return your telephone calls would he?
A. Well, I never left my name.
Q. Okay. so, you just called the District Attorney's Office for a couple of months
during the summer and never left your name. Is that right?
A. Yes.
Q. All right. You believed, Mr. Moyer, that there was someone sitting in the back
of the courtroom that was more familiar to you that evening as being in McAnally's
on April 28th, 1984, didn't you?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay. And you did that because of the fact that this gentlemen was wearing boots,
you saw those out in the hall, didn't you?
A. Yes.
Q. His hair was longer than Mr. Fontenot's?
A. Yes.
Q. He was much taller than Mr. Fontenot?
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A. Yes.
Q. Okay. And, in fact, you became convinced that that was, in fact, the second man,
didn't you?
A. Well, I don't know if I was convinced about it.

(N/T 6/9/1988 at 24-26). His doubts make sense in the context of his initial interview where he
was never asked to identify Mr. Fontenot and his time of actually viewing either man in the
store was seconds at most. However, Mr. Moyer clarified his position from Mr. Fontenot’s trial
in 1988. When interviewed during post-conviction he now asserts:
While at the courthouse testifying in the preliminary hearing, I saw a man in the
back of the courtroom I had seen before. I also saw him downstairs, where I had
been waiting to testify. I also saw this man speak to Tommy Ward during the
preliminary hearing. It came to me that this was the same man I had seen in
McAnally's with Tommy Ward. He looked more familiar to me. I was no longer
one hundred percent sure about my identification of Karl Fontenot.
After that, I tried to call Mr. Peterson, the District Attorney, to tell him I was no
longer one hundred percent sure that Karl Fontenot was the man I had seen in
McAnally's that night. In fact, I was leaning more in the direction of Steve Bevel,
the man I saw at the courthouse. While I was never able to speak with Mr. Peterson,
I did speak with someone else in the district attorney's office. I told this person of
my concern. This person said to me, "It was not him (Bevel)."
After that, I was afraid to change my story. I felt pressure from both sides. I
overheard the lawyers argue about the content of the story I had given to Richard
Kerner, an investigator working for Mr. Wyatt, while I was on the stand. On one
hand, I felt betrayed by Mr. Kerner, as he tape-recorded our conversation without
my consent. On the other hand, I felt like it was Steve Bevel that I had seen with
Tommy Ward that night. I felt conflicted. I chose to then state that I was confused
about the identity of the man with Tommy Ward.
I am now convinced that my assessment, at the time of the preliminary hearing,
that Steve Bevel was the man with Tommy Ward, was correct. I am confident
that Karl Fontenot was not the man I saw at McAnally's. The man I saw at
McAnally's was definitely taller than Karl Fontenot and had much more
intimidating look about him. At this time, I am about 95% sure that it was
Steve Bevel, not Karl Fontenot, that I saw in McAnally’s on April 28, 1984.
(Dkt.# 123, Ex.# 14)(emphasis added).
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When Mr. Moyer told the prosecution he was unsure about his identification of Mr.
Fontenot, he was told he was wrong in his identification of Mr. Bevel. See also Ward Vol. 3 p.
97-99 ,“Not positive about the dark- haired person.” Mr. Moyer’s uncertainty as to whom he
saw in McAnally’s with Mr. Ward casts further doubt of Mr. Fontenot’s involvement in this
crime. Without Mr. Moyer’s identification, no evidence places Mr. Fontenot in McAnally’s
besides the false confession.
4. Law Enforcement Pressured Karen Wise to Change Her Account of
What Transpired in J.P.’s Convenience Store.
Karen Wise was a crucial witness not only for the investigation into Mrs. Haraway’s
disappearance, but for the prosecution of Mr. Fontenot. After going to McAnally’s in response to
the initial report that Mrs. Haraway was gone, Ada Police Detective Mike Baskins travelled to
J.P.’s to inquire about the men who had been reported as rowdy earlier in the evening. When
Detective Baskins arrived, Ms. Wise told him how two men were in the store that night harassing
her. Both men came up to the counter several times to get change for the video game machines
and buy alcohol.(N/T 6/8/1988 at 161-162). She described the two men as follows: a blond male
5’8” tall dressed in a white t-shirt and jeans with his hair parted in the middle. The second man
was a bit shorter than the blond with dark, shoulder length hair also dressed in a t-shirt and jeans.
(Id. at 165-166). Law enforcement, with no indication that the men seen in J.P.’s were connected
in any way with McAnally’s, decided to construct composites of the two men from Ms. Wise’s
description. Id. at 167; see also (Dkt.# 123, Ex.#s 76-77). These composites became the suspects
for the crux of law enforcement’s investigation.
However, despite the composites and descriptions, Ms. Wise never identified Mr.
Fontenot as one of the men she saw at J.P.’s on April 28, 1984.( N/T 6/8/1988 at 177 & 193194). Mr. Fontenot was both shorter and had lighter hair than the man accompanying Mr. Ward.
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Further, when shown Mr. Fontenot’s line-up, she was unable to identify him. (Dkt.# 123, Ex.#
43, prosecutorial bates 138, 0377). While the Ada Police Detective Dennis Smith testified that
Ms. Wise called him after the line-up and identified Mr. Fontenot, there was no police report
supporting the subsequent identification.
Creating more doubt is Ms. Wise’s affidavit that she saw four men in J.P.’s on April 28,
1984, rather than two men that became the center of the prosecution’s theory of the case.
That evening, after reports that Denice Haraway was missing, I was interviewed by
the police. They asked me to help them construct composite drawings of two young
men who were in J.P's that night. At first, I didn't want to help with the drawings. I
told police that just because they were in J.P's didn't mean they had hurt Ms.
Haraway or taken her anywhere. I said they were just kids.
Another reason I didn't want to help with the drawings at first was that there were
four men who were at J.P.'s at the same time. The police wanted drawings of only
two men. I told police that there were two other men present, but police insisted
that there were only two men.
I was particularly nervous because of two other men in the store that evening. I
knew them. They were in the store that night during approximately the same time
as the men who were later reported to be Tommy Ward and Karl Fontenot. I told
police - on April 28, 1984 - that there were four men hanging out around the store
for an extended period of time, instead of two. I told police that I recognized two
of the men and knew their names and did not know the names of the other two.
Prior to the first trial (the trial at which Tommy Ward and Karl Fontenot were
tried together), I met with Bill Peterson, at his request, to discuss the case with
him in preparation for my testimony. l told Bill Peterson that the other two
men were in J.P's at the same time as the two persons in the sketches. I told
him I was afraid of the other two men because of the way they were behaving
in the store. Bill Peterson said he already had the "ones who did it." I told him
the names of the two men I knew were in the store. Those two men were Bubba
Daggs and Jim Bob Howard. Bill Peterson said that Jim Bob Howard couldn't
have committed the murder because he "didn't have the I.Q. of a grub worm."
Bill Peterson said that I couldn't bring up in Court that Jim Bob Howard and
Bubba Daggs were with the other two men. He said it couldn't be mentioned
because it wasn't relevant. I was not at all comforted by that because I didn't
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think Peterson had all of the people that might have been involved.
It bothers me that I couldn't discuss the other two men, because I don't think
all of the truth came out. I never mentioned to the defense directly anything
about the other two men, except to the extent my June 8, 1988 testimony made
reference to them. (See paragraph 10). I got the impression from law
enforcement that I wasn't supposed to talk about the other two men. It was not
until a number of years after all the trials were over that I finally mentioned
the other two men to representatives of Ward and Fontenot.
(Dkt.# 123, Ex.# 13) (emphasis added). The police investigation focused on the wrong suspects
from the beginning in both number and description. That four rambunctious men were in J.P.’s
on a Saturday night is in no way relevant to the events of McAnally’s where eyewitnesses
repeatedly told police they saw one man walking out of the store with Mrs. Haraway. (N/T
6/9/1988 at 38, 40, 47-48, 51, 59-60). Like Mr. Moyer’s experience, when Ms. Wise tried to
clarify what she saw to prosecutors, she was pressured to change her story to conform to what
the State sought to present. This pattern of police and prosecutorial misconduct permeated the
case against Mr. Fontenot.
Ms. Wise shared her frustrations over the improper tactics of law enforcement. She told
her best friend, Vickie Jenkins, what she truly saw and her interactions with the state:
She advised that Wise was sure Ward was in J.P.'s this evening along with three
other males. Wise said Ward kept watching her all the while he was in the store
which made Wise uneasy. Jenkins believes that another J.P.'s employee, one Jack
W. Paschall, East of City, telephone 436-1611, pointed out the suspect truck to
Wise. Jenkins further related that Wise was upset about the composite
drawings because the police just weren't doing them right. She did not know
what was being done wrong with these drawings. Jenkins and the owner of
J.P.'s related that Wise was very upset with the Ada Police over this
investigation because they have harassed her over and over and made
promises to her that were broken. Jenkins knew nothing about Wise saying that
the two guys she observed coming into the store after Ward was arrested.
(Dkt.# 123, Ex.#s 23 and 3 at 2, 10-11) (emphasis added). Both Ms. Wise and Ms. Jenkins further
substantiate the improper actions of law enforcement in dealing with witnesses in this case. Like
Ms. Shelton and Mr. Moyer, Ms. Wise was pressured to conform her true account of what
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transpired to an improbable theory with no connections to the facts and no evidentiary support.
Instead of focusing on the facts and evidence gleaned from McAnally’s, the actual crime scene,
police almost immediately generated two suspects matching descriptions of two of the four
individuals in J.P.’s with no evidence that these men were seen at the crime scene.
5. Numerous Inconsistent Statements about the Gray Primered Truck
The prosecution’s theory of the case rested on both Mr. Ward and Mr. Fontenot forcing
Mrs. Haraway into a gray primered pickup truck and driving off with her.( N/T 6/8/88 at 3233). During closing arguments, the prosecution recounted several witnesses’ testimony about
t

seeing the gray pickup the night of April 28 . ( N/T 6/14/88 at 17, 22, 27, 68, 75, 85, & 9395). However, there was little consistency between witnesses as to what type of truck was seen.
Specifically, there was considerable differences in the size, color, body type and tire size
depending on the person questioned. Mr. Fontenot’s defense counsel was unable to cross examine
many prosecution witnesses about their inconsistent statements about what the gray pickup truck
looked like.
The official OSBI description of the pickup was an early model “Chevy pickup truck
w/light gray primer color, narrow bed w/oversized tires on rear; rear end was jacked up.” (Dkt.#
123, Ex.# 44, OSBI 0004). This description was distributed to the FBI and numerous counties and
states on April 29, 1984. Id. One problem with this description is that it did not provide the specific
year of the pickup truck. For example, Chevrolet pickup body styles changed greatly from the
early 60’s to the 80’s. (Dkt.# 123, Ex.#s 82-84). Because of the numerous types of Chevrolet
pickups on the road during that time, and likely being driven in Ada during that time, specificity
was critical to identifying the correct pickup seen by witnesses. Instead, there were conflicting
reports of the pickup described by three witnesses who first saw the suspect and victim leave
McAnally’s.
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Lenny Timmons described the truck as a green and gray, older Chevy pick-up that was
not well maintained. (Dkt.# 123, Ex.# 44, OSBI 0842). Further, the rear wheels or tires were
plain. Id. David Timmons thought the pickup was blue, rough, and had dents on the side. The
rear bumper was white, possibly raised in the rear. (Dkt.# 123, Ex.# 44, OSBI 0851). Gene
Whelchel said the pick-up was full sized and light colored. He suggested it might be an early
1970s model, but he was sure it was not a narrow bed. (Dkt.# 123, Ex.# 44, OSBI 0060). These
three men reported seeing Mrs. Haraway get into the pick-up truck with a white male. (Dkt.#
123, Ex.# 44, OSBI 0061-0063). However, their descriptions not only conflict with each other
but with the official description used by OSBI. See Dkt.# 123, Ex.# 21, explaining the
difficulties encoding memories for various events.
The prosecution’s theory relied on other witnesses who supposedly saw the same pickup
truck driving around town the night of Mrs. Haraway’s disappearance. OSBI reports state that
James Moyer, described the pickup truck as light gray, rough looking, a 1967 to 1969 Chevy
pickup. (Ex.# 44, OSBI 0245; Ex.# 82). However, his trial testimony was not nearly as specific.
Q. Okay. And did you see what kind of vehicle these two people drove up in?
A. Yes. It was a Chevy pickup, gray primered.
Q. Okay. And do you have any way of knowing what year it was?
A. I'm not too good on years on Chevy pickups. It was . . .
Q. Okay. That's fine. Do you recall whether it was a painted pickup or a primered
pickup?
A. It was primered. It was a flat color, not a glossy color.
Q. Okay. It was a gray primered Chevrolet pickup?
A. Yes, sir.
(N/T 6/9/1988 at 16). Because they had not been given Mr. Moyer’s statement to police, defense
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counsel was unable to cross examine Mr. Moyer on his inconsistent statements concerning the
truck, which was a critical part of the prosecution’s case.
The descriptions of the pickup truck from J.P.’s employees conflict with those from
McAnally’s witnesses. For example, Karen Wise told the police the truck was an older model,
short bed, with maybe a step side, “light color spots” on the driver’s side door and bed, with a
darker color – possibly reddish brown primer on it. Most of the pick-up was “primered.” (Dkt.#
213, Ex.# 44, OSBI 0058-0059; Ex.#s 82 and 83, examples of possible truck body styles). The
truck had wide back tires and possibly a loud exhaust. Id. At trial, she testified:
Q. And do you recall how these two individuals arrived at your store, how they got there?
A. I didn't really realize until the customers kind of let up some, until I saw what cars was
still there. There was a pickup truck parked out front.
Q. And do you recall the color of it?
A. It was red and gray primered colored.
Q. Okay. The entire driver's side or just from the door back or from the back door back
or –
A. Well, all I can basically remember is from the driver's side door back, because that was
where it was real spotty, it was some red and some gray and that is the only reason I
remember that.
(N/T. 6/8/1988 at 162). As in Mr. Moyer’s testimony, Ms. Wise’s police report varies in details
that would have aided a jury in assessing whether these people were talking about the same truck.
Jack Paschal, who was in J.P.’s that evening, saw the men in the back of the store. He also
described the pick-up truck. He told police it was an older model, maybe a mid-60’s to early 70s
Chevy with primer paint on it. (Dkt.# 123, Ex.# 43 at 10, 63). He thought the tailgate was either
bent badly or missing. Id. His trial testimony is mostly consistent with the description provided
to the police including his inability to make out the truck’s color due to the lighting at the store.
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(N/T 6/8/88 at 214-215). However, it does not coincide with the description provided by
OSBI, or McAnally witnesses.
The conflicting accounts of the pickup truck are critical evidence casting doubt on
whether these prosecution witnesses saw the same truck, or many trucks that happen to look
alike. The prosecution’s theory of the case focused on a gray primered truck being used in the
abduction. If the defense had the opportunity to point out the numerous police reports of these
witnesses providing conflicting descriptions of the truck, it would have cast significant doubt on
whether the truck was used at all since it was never located.
As exhibit numbers 82-84, attached to the Second Amended Petition illustrate, Chevrolet
manufactured several body styles, cab sizes, and bed sizes from the 60’s up to the early 80’s.
(Dkt.# 123, Ex.#s 82-84). At no time did law enforcement show these witnesses pictures of trucks
to make sure they identified the correct model. Failure to glean cohesion in a crucial piece of
evidence in the police’s investigation demonstrates another example of the poor quality of the
police investigation in this case. There was no connection between a truck seen at McAnally’s
and the one seen at J.P.’s earlier that evening. Yet, the lead detectives and prosecution insisted
that such a connection existed regardless of the numerous versions of what the truck looked like.
Had a jury known about the high number of inconsistencies in truck descriptions, it would have
created doubt as to the prosecution’s witnesses who later testified they saw several men in grey
pickup trucks near the power plant. (N/T 6/8/1988 at 33-35). Jurors could also conclude that
alternate suspects may have had more motive to commit this crime than Mr. Fontenot, who had
no interaction with the police until October of 1984.
6. Undisclosed Portions of the Medical Examiner’s File
The skeletal remains of Donna Denice Haraway were found in Gerty, Oklahoma in January
1986, while Mr. Fontenot’s initial direct appeal was pending. (Dkt.# 123, Ex.# 46, at 1). The
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location where the body was found is on the opposite side of the county from where Mr. Fontenot
confessed to leaving the body. Further, how the bones were found, ultimate determination of the
cause and manner of death did not match any details of his confession. The State’s theory, based
solely on Mr. Fontenot’s confession, argued that Mrs. Haraway was robbed, kidnapped, and
murdered with a knife.( N/T 6/8/1988 at 33-35). She was supposedly stabbed numerous times, her
remains were burned and left at a power station west of Ada.( J/T 2593-94, 2735-36, 2742-43).
However, both the location of her remains and the medical examiner’s report disproved his
confession. A full review of the medical examiner’s report documents the cause of death as a single
gunshot wound to the head. (Dkt.# 123, Ex#. 46, at. 1, 3, 12, 40). There were no knife wounds on
any of the bones uncovered at the Gerty crime scene. (Dkt.# 123, Ex.# 46, at 20, 36, 40).
While certain parts of the medical examiner’s file were released to Mr. Fontenot’s initial
direct appeal counsel, the full 43-page report was not. (Dkt.# 123, Ex.# s 46, 11). Specifically,
two key pages of the report were not provided despite the fact the trial court ordered full
disclosure of the ME’s Report.(Dkt.# 123, Ex.# 59). The initial page not disclosed describes the
improper procedure followed by OSBI agents and other law enforcement personnel who were
tasked to properly document and preserve evidence from the Gerty crime scene.
1-21-86 1650 I returned a call to Hughes County District Attorney Bill Peterson

concerning some bones that were found. Mr. Peterson didn’t know anything, about
the discovery but they are thought to be the remains of a missing store clerk -Donna Hariway.[sic] No ME was notified. He stated that the OSBI was notified
out of McAlister.[sic] That some people from the OKC office had come down. [sic]
OSBI Lab people out of OKC did photo the scene and they just had a field day
picking up bones. No diagrams. The OSBI agent out of McAlester never showed
up at the scene. Mr. Peterson believes that the bones are en route to OKC but didn’t
know for sure. The sheriff didn’t know where the bones were but thought that the
OSBI had them. Notified the OSBI in OKC & spoke with Rick Spense. He didn’t
have the bones but thought that the lab man David Dixon had them. I spoke with
the Sheriff Orvall Rose who didn’t know where they were. Finally the OSBI found
them in their lab and delivered them at 2040 by Ann Reed. Come to find out the
bones were found by a trapper.
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Several problems with this case:
#1 No one notified a county medical examiner which would’ve been more than
happy to go to the scene.
#2 Since no one notified a medical examiner or the DA they had no legal
authority to remove the body.
#3 This is Tulsa’s jurisdiction so therefore the remains should’ve been
transported to Tulsa.
#4 If this is not Donna Haraway, they’ve screwed up the crime scene.
#5 No one seems to give a “shit” and provide OCME with any information on
Ms. Haraway.
(Dkt.# 123, Ex.# 46, at 10) (emphasis added).
The incompetence in processing and handling the Gerty crime scene is a critical failure by
law enforcement given that very little physical evidence was found besides the skeletal remains.
It continues a pattern of general disregard, or lack of professional capacity demonstrated by the
police involved in this case from the initial call at McAnally’s to the Gerty crime scene. 9 (Dkt.#
123, Ex.# 20). More importantly, no evidence of the flowered blouse described in Mr. Fontenot’s
confession was found at the scene further discrediting Mr. Fontenot’s already weak and baseless
confession. Due to the improper processing of the Gerty crime scene, it cannot be determined if
Mrs. Haraway was murdered at this location, or her body was taken there.
Further, no bullet or casing was found potentially leading to the actual perpetrator. The
medical examiner investigator’s report detailing the careless and unprofessional scene processing
was withheld from the defense. The investigator opined that any ability to determine what
happened to Mrs. Haraway was lost by virtue of law enforcement’s incompetence. Such inept
police work coincides with the processing of the scene at McAnally’s where evidence was
destroyed rather than collected. (N/T 6/9/1985 at 103-110-111; J/T 1259-1240, 1422-23, 1439,

9

The police failed to properly secure McAnally’s after Mrs. Haraway’s disappearance. They allowed customers to
continue to use the store and allowed access Mr. Atkeson, the owner, to wipe down the counter and dispose of trash
destroying valuable evidence. (N/T 6/10/1988 at 156; JT p. 1239-1240, 1422-23, 1439, 1441, 1447-48). Further, Ada
police officers failed to follow up on witnesses who called in about what they saw in the store prior to Mrs. Haraway’s
disappearance.

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1441, 1447-1448).
Another part of the original medical examiner’s file not disclosed was the forensic
anthropology report about the skeletal remains evaluated by Dr. Richard McWilliams.10 His
report indicates that the skeletal remains are of a woman who gave birth. There is no evidence
that Mrs. Haraway had given birth at any time before her abduction.
Skeletal remains examined this date revealed partial skeletal remains of an Indian
white female less than 35 years of age and more likely 25 years of age. Marks on
the pelvis indicated she had given birth to at least one child.
INJURIES:
1. Bullet entrance wound at the left lambdoidal suture and exit wound at the
right coronal suture.
2. A scalloped cut wound on the superior rim of the left 6th or 7th rib.
(Dkt.# 123, Ex.# 46, at 12). As documented in Mr. Fontenot’s Second Amended Complaint, Dr.
McWilliams, a forensic anthropologist, wrote a text book regarding the evaluation of human
bones for the purposes of identification. (Dkt.# 123, Ex.# 25). Forensic Anthropology: The
Structure, Morphology, and Variation of Human Bone and Dentition, Mahmoud El-Najjar and
K. Richard McWilliams, (1978). Per both doctors’ research, the evaluation of skeletal remains
permit not only the determination of gender, but whether a woman has experienced childbirth.
Another kind of pitting occurring in the innominate is parturition or postpubic pits.
This is one or usually more deep pits found on the posterior surface of the pubic
bone roughly parallel to the edge of the pubic symphysis. Angel (1969) and Stewart
(1957, 1970) agree that these pits are associated with childbirth trauma and
therefore are diagnostic of female pelvis.
Nemeskeri (1972) has published a five-stage scheme for estimation of the number
of pregnancies a female has experienced. The method is based upon observed
degenerative changes in pubic symphyses in adult female innominates which are
assumed to be attributable to pregnancy. Nemeskeri observed that the number of
pregnancies he attributed to each stage remained to be verified by control
investigation in autopsy material.
10

The ME’s Office states that all photographs, x-rays, bench notes, and any further documentation other that the report
itself is missing pertaining to Denice Haraway’s case.

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Id. at 81-82. Further, Petitioner states that “according to the Smithsonian Institute, the back pelvic
bones would show marks where the ligaments tore during natural childbirth. See Smithsonian
Nation Museum of Natural History, http://anthropology.si.edu/writteninbone/difficult_births.html
(last visited 2013).” Anthropologists consistently evaluate the pelvic bones not only to ascertain
gender, but to tell more about the skeletal remains of the person. Id.
This previously undisclosed evidence is a startling revelation in this case. If Mrs. Haraway
was three months pregnant at the time of her abduction, which the evidence indicated, then it was
impossible for Mr. Fontenot to have killed Mrs. Haraway on April 28, 1984. Such information is
crucial not only in determining what caused her death but, equally important, what happened to
her prior to her death. Combined with the newly obtained evidence showing that the APD and
OSBI mishandled the evidence collection at both crime scenes, it is apparent that law enforcement
deprived Mr. Fontenot of the ability to argue an alternate suspect and motive for Mrs. Haraway’s
abduction and murder.
That Mrs. Haraway’s pelvic bones showed indications of natural childbirth is newly
discovered evidence of innocence. Her friends and family are adamant that she did not have a
child prior to her disappearance. However, shortly before her disappearance, Mrs. Haraway
informed Karen Wise, convenience store clerk at J.P.’s, that she was three months pregnant.
(Dkt.# 123, Ex.# 2). Ms. Wise shared this information with her best friend, Vickie Blevins. (Dkt.#
123, Ex.# 2). Given the evidence of natural childbirth from the marks on her pelvis, it is possible
Mrs. Haraway had a child sometime before her skeletal remains were found in Gerty, Oklahoma
over a year and a half after her disappearance and months after Mr. Fontenot was in custody.
Such evidence undermines the state’s entire theory as to the motive of Mrs.
Haraway’s kidnapping and what happened to her in the months leading up to her death. The

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State’s failure to disclose the entirety of the medical examiner’s report deprived the defense of
meaningful avenues of investigation regarding the motive of Mrs. Haraway’s abductor along with
impeachment evidence regarding the processing of the Gerty crime scene. Had a jury been
presented with such evidence, there is a reasonable probability of a different result due to the
weakness in the prosecution’s theory of the case.
“The miscarriage of justice exception …survived the AEDPA’s passage.” McQuiggin v.
Perkins, 569 U.S. at 393. “A prisoner’s proof of actual innocence may provide a gateway for
federal habeas review of a procedurally defaulted claim of constitutional error.” House, 547 U.S.
at 537-538. Accordingly, the Court finds Mr. Fontenot has overcome all procedural bars as
“[s]ensitivity to the injustice of incarcerating an innocent individual should not abate when the
impediment is AEDPA’s statute of limitations.” McQuiggin v. Perkins, 569 U.S. at 393.
II.

EXHAUSTION OF STATE COURT REMEDIES

Respondent alleges Petitioner’s Second Amended Petition contains three claims that have
not been presented to the state courts, rendering it a “mixed petition” containing unexhausted
claims. Specifically, the Respondent contends Mr. Fontenot did not raise the claims of; (1)
ineffective assistance of appellate counsel 11; (2) the imposition of the bar of laches by the State

11

. Respondent argues that Mr. Fontenot’s claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel is unexhausted. However, the
Court finds Mr. Fontenot fairly presented this claim in both his amended and state post-conviction petition and his opening
brief to the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals. Thus, Mr. Fontenot presented the substance of the constitutional claim in
state court. See Bland v. Sirmons, 459 F.3d 999, 1011 (10th Cir. 2006). The state court is not obligated to rule on the claim
for it to be rendered exhausted. A petitioner is only required to submit the constitutional basis and facts to the state court in
order to satisfy the exhaustion requirement. Further, a simple reading of the state amended application for post-conviction
relief shows that the ineffective assistance of appellate counsel was fairly raised in the petition, as the petition clearly
asserts that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate and use the evidence asserted as the basis for the
ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim. Mr. Fontenot’s counsel alleged in the Amended Brief in Support of
Application for Post Conviction Relief that Mr. Fontenot’s Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel was
violated when his trial counsel failed to investigate the case and present viable evidence supporting his innocence. (Dkt.#
99, Exhibit #2 at 59). After discussing the many errors committed during the trial counsel continued, “It is the defense
counsel’s duty to investigate all aspects of the State’s case including physical evidence introduced at trial… Further,
appellate counsel, likewise should have pursued this evidence in building a defense for Mr. Fontenot. Id. at 69. Supporting
exhibits from appellate counsel were attached to the claim. Finally, the Court finds this claim is also considered exhausted
because Mr. Fontenot has satisfied the “miscarriage of justice exception” by establishing his actual innocence. See infra.

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Courts did not prevent Petitioner from fully developing his actual innocence, Brady, or any other
federal claim in the state courts, and (3) Brady claim based on newly discovered evidence
presented in the instant case. The Court finds, however, that Mr. Fontenot’s Second Amended
Petition can be reviewed on the merits due to the futility of exhaustion, Fed.R.Civ.P.15(b) and
(c), and Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b) and 60(d).

A. Futility
According to 28 U.S.C., Section 2254 (c ), constitutional claims must be fairly presented
to the state court prior to being raised in a federal habeas corpus petition. See Picard v. Connor,
404 U.S. 270, 277-278 (1971); Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509 (1982). Although interests of
federalism and comity create a presumption in favor of requiring a petitioner to exhaust available
state remedies, the failure to exhaust is not an absolute bar to federal jurisdiction over a habeas
petition. See Granberry v. Greer, 481 U.S. 129, 141 (1987)(failure to exhaust does not deprive
appellate court of jurisdiction to consider merits of habeas corpus application); Harris v.
Champion, 15 F.3d 1538, 1554-55 (10th Cir. 1994)(exhaustion is based on principles of comity;
exhaustion is not jurisdictional). Courts recognize it is futile for a petitioner to return to state postconviction when state courts fail to provide substantive review of constitutional claims. See Bear
v. Boone, 173 F.3d 782, 785 (10th Cir. 1999).
If a state routinely imposes a procedural bar on those claims which are being exhausted,
the exhaustion requirement may be bypassed. See Duckworth v. Serrano, 454 U.S. 1, 3 (1981)
(“An exception is made only if there is no opportunity to obtain redress in state court, or if the
corrective process is so clearly deficient as to render futile any effort to obtain relief.”); Coleman
v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 735 n.1 (1991); Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 269 (1989) concurring
opinion. Okla. Stat. tit. 22, Section 1086 delineates when successor post-conviction applications
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are permitted.
All grounds for relief available to an applicant under this act must
be raised in his original, supplemental, or amended petition. Any
ground not so raised, or knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently
waived in this proceeding that resulted in the conviction or sentence
or in any other proceeding the applicant has taken to secure relief
may not be the basis for a subsequent application, unless the court
finds a ground for relief asserted which for sufficient reason was not
asserted or was adequately raised in the prior application.
(emphasis added).
Oklahoma’s successor state post-conviction process is ineffective in providing any hope of
substantive review of Mr. Fontenot’s constitutional claims. As discussed infra, Mr. Fontenot has
alleged sufficient reasons either for not asserting these claims, or proving they were adequately
raised in the prior application.
Mr. Fontenot asserts it would be futile to proceed with a state post-conviction action
because the claims would be procedurally barred based upon the consistent pattern and practice
of the OCCA. The Court agrees the claims that Respondent asserts Mr. Fontenot needs to exhaust
would be procedurally barred in a successor application. See Johnson v. State, 823 P.2d 370, 372
(Okla. Crim. App. 1991); Moore v. State, 889 P.2d 1253 (Okla. Crim. App. 1995). Therefore, the
Court finds a return to state court is futile, and federal habeas relief is available. 28 U.S.C., Section
2254(b)(1)(B)(ii).
Specifically, if Mr. Fontenot returned to state post conviction on a successor action to
exhaust his claims, those claims would be procedurally barred based upon a consistent pattern
and practice of the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals (“OCCA”). In fact, Mr. Fontenot’s Post
Conviction Application in which he already raised both a Brady violation and an ineffective
assistance of appellate counsel claim, was denied based upon laches. In a 2 page order, the state
court, without discussion, while discovery was ongoing, and without ruling on the pending
summary judgment motion, denied Mr. Fontenot’s application for post conviction relief. (Dkt.#
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99, Exhibit # 8). The court stated, “Simply too much time has elapsed due to Petitioner’s own
inaction.” Id. This two page order is dated December 31, 2014, the day before the state court
judge retired. Now, approximately 4 ½ years later, Mr. Fontenot is still receiving evidence from
the State in the instant litigation.
Mr. Fontenot contends the futility is further illustrated by the habeas litigation of Petitioner
Beverly Moore’s actual innocence claim in the Western District of Oklahoma in Beverly Michelle
Moore v. Warden Millicent Newton-Embry, Western District Court Case No. CIV-09-985-C;
(Dkt.# 148, Respondent’s Br. at 85). The federal district court found that Ms. Moore established
the actual innocence gateway but was concerned about her unexhausted constitutional claims. She
consequently filed a second state post conviction petition in the state district court.
After almost six years of litigating her unexhausted claims, the state district court found
all of Ms. Moore’s claims procedurally barred. During this process, Ms. Moore repeatedly
requested that the federal court find the state post-conviction proceeding inadequate to provide
any substantive review of her constitutional claims. The unnecessary delay in the state evidentiary
hearing process due to the decisions to bifurcate based on the elements of each constitutional
claim, scheduling issues, and transcript complications demonstrates the failings of the state
process to promptly handle successor claims. Based on the similarity of Mr. Fontenot’s claims
and Ms. Moore’s, Mr. Fontenot would face the same procedural bar imposition by the OCCA.
When the highest state court can be counted on to impose a procedural bar, exhaustion is
futile. See Goodwin v. Oklahoma, 923 F.3d 156, 157 (10th Cir. 1991)(exhaustion is not required
“where the state’s highest court has recently decided the precise legal issue petitioner seeks to
raise in his federal habeas petition.”); Richie v. Simmons, 563 F.Supp. 2d 1250, 1274 (ND OK
2008)(finding that an ineffective assistance of counsel claim concerning undiscovered statements
would be procedurally defaulted by state courts concerning exhaustion); Rojem v. State, 925 P.2d
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70 (Okla.Crim.App. 1996); See e.g., Granberry v. Greer, n. 8 , citing Marino v. Ragen, 332 U.S.
561, 564 (1947)(Rutledge, J., concurring)(exhaustion should not be required “whenever it may
become clear that the alleged state remedy is nothing but a procedural morass offering no
substantial hope of relief.” ).
Even in capital cases where new evidence is found in federal habeas proceedings
establishing a Brady violation, a return to state court in a successor petition results in the
imposition of a procedural bar. In Douglas v. Workman, the OCCA denied both Mr. Powell’s and
Mr. Douglas’ successor applications on strictly procedural grounds, holding that the claims were
barred by Rule 9.7(G)(3), Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals, 22 Okla.Stat. Ch. 18 app’x
(2003), which requires successive post-conviction petitions to be filed “sixty (60) days from the
date the previously unavailable legal or factual basis serving as the basis of the claim for the new
issue is ….discovered.” Douglas v. Workman, 560 F.3d 1156, 1167-68, 1171-72 (10th Cir. 2009).
There is no basis to find that the state court has any available means for substantive review through
a successive state application.
Further, as Mr. Fontenot has argued his actual innocence, it constitutes a manifest injustice
for him to return to state court thereby delaying his right to substantive review of his wrongful
conviction. The failure to totally exhaust his state remedies does not divest this Court of
jurisdiction over the merits of Mr. Fontenot’s constitutional claims. See Granberry v. Greer, 481
U.S. 129, 131 (1987). In determining whether the “interests of justice” warrant requiring Mr.
Fontenot to pursue additional state remedies, the Court considers the interests of comity and
federalism. Granberry, 481 U.S. at 134, Harris v. Champion, 15 F.3d 1538, 1555-57 (10th Cir.
1994)(holding that excessive delays in the state system in resolving claims for relief justified the
federal court excusing the prisoner from having to exhaust the state remedies). Similarly, this case
presents unusual circumstances, or circumstances of peculiar urgency that warrant the federal
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court taking action. Granberry, 481 U.S. at 134; Harris v. Champion, 48 F.3d 1127, 1133 (10th
Cir. 1995)(noting that the federal court should determine whether “the interests of comity will be
better served by hearing the merits of the claims); see also, Granberry v. Greer at 134, citing Ex
Parte Hawk, 321 U.S. 114, 117 (1944)(“this Court reiterated that comity was the basis for the
exhaustion doctrine: ‘it is a principle controlling all habeas corpus petitions to the federal
courts, that those courts will interfere with the administration of justice in the state courts
only ‘in rare cases where exceptional circumstances of peculiar urgency are shown to
exist.’” (emphasis added). The entire basis for this Court entertaining this mixed petition at all is
due to the continued behavior by state actors in failing to abide by numerous court orders and
subpoenas to disclose records.
The Tenth Circuit has stated that a petitioner able to satisfy the “miscarriage of justice”
standard could be excused from the habeas exhaustion requirement. See Gradiz v. Gonzales, 490
F.3d 1206, 1209 (10th Cir. 2007)(looking to habeas law to carve the exception to statutory
exhaustion requirement under the Immigration and Nationality Act). The Seventh Circuit has also
determined that “actual innocence” is a ground upon which a federal court can relax the total
exhaustion requirement. Milone v. Camp, 22 F.3d 693, 699-701 (7th Cir. 1994). Moreover, it
should be noted that the exhaustion rule and the procedural default rule both serve the same
general purposes of principles of comity and federalism. See e.g. Edwards v. Carpenter, 529 U.S.
446 (2000), and there is no question actual innocence serves as a narrow exception to the
procedural default rules. House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518, 536-67 (2006); Schlup, 513 U.S. 298
(2005). In fact, “[i]f petitioner is actually innocent of the crime for which he was convicted, it
may be a ‘fundamental miscarriage of justice’ for a federal court not to entertain his constitutional
claims.” Milone v.Camp, 22 F.3d at 700. Because Mr. Fontenot satisfies the “miscarriage of
justice” exception by establishing his actual innocence, he has established the unique and
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compelling circumstances sufficient to warrant being excused from having to return to state court.

B. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15
In Banks v. Dretke, 540 U.S. 668, 704 (2004), the United States Supreme Court found
Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(b) applicable in federal habeas proceedings. Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(b)(2) provides that
“when an issue not raised by the pleadings is tried by the parties’ express or implied consent, it
must be treated in all respects as if raised in the pleadings. A party may move –at any time, even
after judgment – to amend the pleadings to conform them to the evidence and to raise an
unpleaded issue.” Further, Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(c)(1) provides that an amendment to a pleading relates
back to the date of the original pleading when …the amendment asserts a claim or defense that
arose out the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set out ---or attempted to be set out—in the
original pleading.’ (emphasis added).
In the instant case, Mr. Fontenot presented his Brady claim both to the state district court
and the OCCA in his request for post conviction relief. See further discussion Brady claim infra
at pp. 62-118). However, On January 31, 2019, over four and half years from the initial state court
order, and two years from the federal subpoena authorized by this Court, Mr, Fontenot’s counsel
became aware the Ada Police Department had released police reports to counsel for Thomas
Ward, Mr. Fontenot’s co-defendant pursuant to a joint discovery motion. Respondent was served
with the Ward subpoenas requesting discovery from various law enforcement agencies, including
the Ada Police Department. After decades of discovery requests by Mr. Fontenot, and years
after the instant litigation began in this court, over 300 pages of police reports were disclosed
by the City Attorney of Ada to Ward’s counsel and Respondent on January 4, 2019. At no
time did Respondent or the City Attorney for Ada contact Mr. Fontenot’s counsel regarding
the discovery of the Ada Police Reports. Laches is an equity defense based upon the premise
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that the undo delay penalizes the state. However, unclean hands negate an assertion of laches as
the Respondent’s actions contributed to the malfeasance or severe wrongdoing regarding the
claims at issue.
Mr. Fontenot’s counsel, and this Court were extremely surprised to learn of the “discovery”
of the Ada Police Department Reports since Mr. Fontenot had served this Court’s subpoena to
the Ada Police Department in February 2017 and received nothing in response. (Dkt.# 114, Ex.#
3). Further, counsel for Respondent was aware of the 2017 subpoenas because he had been
provided copies of them by Mr. Fontenot’s counsel.
Respondent did not forward the 300 pages of new discovery to Mr. Fontenot’s counsel until
contacted by him; nearly a month after receiving the documents himself. It is important to note
that Respondent’s attorney is counsel in both the instant case and in Mr. Ward’s state postconviction proceedings. As such, he agreed to discovery in Mr. Ward’s case in much the same
manner as he did in Mr. Fontenot’s case. (Dkt.# 114, Ex.# 5). Further, he knew a state court
subpoena had been issued to the Ada Police Department in late November 2018. Id. Yet, counsel
did not notify opposing counsel, or this Court of the Ada Police Department’s disregard of this
Court’s subpoena. Instead, Mr. Fontenot’s counsel learned of the undisclosed documents’
existence from Mr. Ward’s counsel.
A repeated pattern of failing to comply with court orders and subpoenas has plagued the
State for over three decades, and resulted in the necessity of the Second Amended Petition. During
state post-conviction, Mr. Fontenot requested the very records from the Ada Police Department
that are now at issue. Post-conviction counsel was told the records did not exist. (Dkt.# 150, Ex.#
5). Mr. Fontenot again sought these records in the instant federal habeas corpus proceedings. The
City of Ada Attorney informed counsel there were no records. (Dkt.# 150, Ex.# 6).
The nondisclosure is a direct violation of this Court’s subpoena to the Ada Police
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Department and the state court order which focused on these very documents. (Dkt.# 114, Ex.#s
1, 2). In his March 17, 2017, response to this Court’s subpoena, the Ada City Attorney stated that,
“I inquired of Chief Miller regarding the requested documents and he has informed me that the
City of Ada Police Department no longer has any of the documents requested. (Dkt.# 150, Ex.3).
The Ada Police Department had similarly told counsel in Mr. Fontenot’s state post-conviction
proceedings that there were no records to be produced. That the police department has now
“found” records for Mr. Fontenot’s co-counsel that were “unavailable” in the instant and prior
proceedings is troubling. “A rule thus declaring ‘prosecutor may hide, defendant must seek,’ is
not tenable in a system constitutionally bound to accord defendants due process.” Banks v. Dretke,
540 U.S. at 696.
A claim keeps its exhausted status so long as the newly developed facts do not
fundamentally alter the claim reviewed by the state courts. See generally, Vasquez v. Hillery, 474
U.S. 253, 260 (1986). This Court finds these new documents provide supplemental evidence and
do not fundamentally alter Mr. Fontenot’s Brady claim already considered by the state courts.
Further, pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(c)(1), these documents relate back to Mr. Fontenot’s original
Brady claim as they “arose out of the conduct, transaction, [and] occurrence set out --- or
attempted to be set out—in the original pleading.” Id.
Finally, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals has also concluded that there are circumstances
a claim raised in an initial habeas petition can be supplemented. Douglas v. Workman, 560 F.3d
1156, 1187 (10th Cir. 2009). In such instances, defendants are not subject to the exhaustion
requirements of the AEDPA.

In reaching this conclusion, we note the AEDPA itself ‘does not define the terms ‘second
or successive.’” United States v. Lopez, 534 F.3d 1027, 1033 (9th Cir. 2008), reh’g granted, 301
Fed.Appx. 587, 588 (9th Cir. 2008); see also Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930 (2007)(noting
that “[t]he phrase ‘second or successive’ is not self-defining,” but “takes its full meaning from
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[the Supreme Court’s] case law, including decisions predating the enactment of [AEDPA]”);
United States v. Scott, 124 F.3d 1328, 1329 (10th Cir. 1997)(noting AEDPA “does not define what
is meant by ‘second or successive’”). And “[t]he [Supreme] Court has declined to interpret
‘second or successive’ as referring to all Section 2254 applications filed second or successively
in time, even when the later filings address a state-court judgment already challenged in a prior
Section 2254 application. Panetti, 127 S.Ct. at 2853 (emphasis added). In deciding whether a
pleading should be deemed a second or successive pleading subject to 28 U.S.C. Section
2244(b)’s restrictions, the Supreme Court instead looks to the purposes of AEDPA, which are “to
further the principles of comity, finality, and federalism.” Id. at 2854 (quotation marks omitted).
The Court has further indicated that “[t]hese purposes, and the practical effects of our holdings,
should be considered when interpreting AEDPA. This is particularly so when petitioners run
the risk under the proposed interpretation of forever losing their opportunity for any
federal review…” Id. (quotation marks omitted)(addressing a situation where petitioners
might forever lose review of their unexhausted federal habeas claims). The Court has, thus,
“resisted an interpretation of the statute that would produce troublesome results, create
procedural anomalies, and close our doors to a class of habeas petitioners seeking review
without any clear indication that such was Congress’ intent. Id. (quotation omitted); see also
Castro v. United States, 540 U.S. 375, 380-81 (2003).
Id. at 1187-1188 (emphasis added).
In Douglas the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals was specifically addressing a claim of
prosecutorial misconduct which the defendant had raised in his initial habeas petition. Defendant
was allowed to supplement his previously asserted prosecutorial misconduct claim with his newly
discovered Brady allegations, which involved proven willful misconduct by the prosecutor. The
defendant in Douglas discovered the existence of an agreement between a key witness and the
prosecutor which the “State not only suppressed [ ] by presenting false, uncorrected testimony
denying the existence of any deal between the prosecutor and Smith, it also relied heavily on the
lack of any deal in vouching for the credibility of [the witness]. The denial of the opportunity to
impeach [the witness] on the evidence clearly prejudiced [the defendant]. Id. at 1187.
The Court concluded that Brady requires disclosure of tacit agreements between the
prosecutor and a witness. Douglas v. Workman, 560 F.3d 1156, 1186 (10th Cir. 2009). In light of
the materiality and prejudice caused by such agreements the Court found it was appropriate to
treat the defendant’s Brady claim as a supplement to his prosecutorial misconduct claim first

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raised in his initial habeas petition. “The threat of incorrect jury verdicts is further increased by
tacit agreements, because when testifying, a witness whose agreement is tacit, rather than explicit,
can state the he has not received any promises or benefits in exchange for his testimony
…Likewise the prosecutor can argue to the jury that the witness is testifying disinterestedly,
which artificially increases the witness’s credibility –artificially, that is, because the premise of
the argument is false.” Id. at 1186-1187 citing Bell v. Bell, 512 F.3d 223, 244-45 (6th Cir. 2008).
As will be discussed infra at pp. 102-108, the prosecutor in this case, as in the Douglas
case, is alleged to have had a tacit agreement with a key witness, Terri Holland (formerly Terri
McCartney), who testified against Mr. Fontenot in his preliminary hearing and joint trial. She
claimed to have heard Mr. Fontenot speak about his involvement in Mrs. Haraway’s abduction
and murder. (P/H 888-931). Ms. Holland also testified there was no deal between her and the
prosecutor, which testimony was never corrected by the prosecution. Ms. Holland was
specifically asked, “Were there any deals made by you and the District Attorney’s Office, any
agreements, any considerations, any agreements not to file or proceed on an “after former” charge
against you?” (PH at 896). Ms. Holland answered , “No.” Id.
Ms. Holland had a history of being a snitch. At the same time she claimed to have heard
Mr. Fontenot confess, she also claimed to have heard Ron Williamson make incriminating
comments about his involvement in Debbie Carter’s murder. Her testimony in the Williamson
case proved to be false. See Williamson v. Reynolds, 904 F.Supp. 1529 (E.D. OK 1995). In fact,
the same District Attorney’s Office used her testimony in both Mr. Williamson’s and Mr.
Fontenot’s cases.
Ms. Holland was interviewed by Pontotoc County District Attorney Investigator Lloyd
Bond and Pontotoc County Sheriff Deputy Tom Turner. (P/H 883-884, 897-898). Deputy
Turner’s interview report was included in the OSBI reports that Mr. Fontenot’s counsel obtained
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in the instant case, which were not a part of the prosecutorial report and had not been given to the
defense. (Dkt.# 123, Ex.# 44 at 282-289). Ms. Holland’s statement as recounted by Deputy Turner
in his report has numerous inconsistencies with her preliminary hearing and trial testimony.
Although the prosecutorial table of contents references Ms. Holland’s videotaped statements, the
State divulged no such videotape statement to defense counsel.
Because of Ms. Holland’s history as a snitch, her testimony was used by the prosecution to
bolster an uncorroborated confession. She was placed in a cell near Mr. Fontenot for this very
purpose. As part of the newly produced Brady material provided to this Court is an affidavit from
Ms. Holland’s husband who represents Ms. Holland (now deceased) committed perjury when she
testified in Mr. Fontenot’s preliminary hearing and joint trial. He states that because of an
agreement she had with the prosecutor; that if she testified against Mr. Fontenot, he would be
released from jail and they could marry. See infra at 108. Furthermore, Mr. Holland’s charges
and plea agreement were found in the Pontotoc County District Attorney’s file made available
during the instant proceedings. (Dkt.# 86 at 30-31). These documents support Mr. Holland’s
statement of the benefits received and the timing of when he received them.
As in the Douglas case, the prosecutor in Mr. Fontenot’s case also acted willfully, and not
just negligently or inadvertently. His conduct warrants special condemnation and justifies
permitting Mr. Fontenot to supplement his habeas petition. “It has long been established that the
prosecutor’s deliberate deception of a court and jurors by the presentation of known false evidence
is incompatible with the rudimentary demands of justice.” Id. at 1190, citing Banks v. Dretke, 540
U.S. 668, 694 (2004)(quoting Giglio, 405 U.S. at 153).

C. Fraud on the Court
The prosecutor’s knowing use of false testimony involves, not “just” prosecutorial
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misconduct, but “more importantly … [the] corruption of the truth seeking function of the trial
process.” Douglas v. Workman, 560 F.3d at 1191 citing United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 104
(1976). Further, it was the prosecutor’s conduct in this case in taking affirmative action, after Mr.
Fontenot’s trial, to conceal the tacit agreement made in exchange for Terri Holland’s testimony
that prevented Mr. Fontenot from discovering the Brady claim in time to assert that claim
originally in his first habeas petition. In light of these circumstances, it is appropriate to treat this
newly discovered evidence as a supplement to Mr. Fontenot’s original Brady claim, instead of
requiring exhaustion. To hold otherwise, “would be to allow the government to profit from its
own egregious conduct.” Id. at 1193. There continue to be disclosures of exculpatory and
impeachment evidence starting with Mr. Fontenot’s second appellate process and continuing
through these proceedings.
“The prosecutor’s conduct at issue here, then, is akin to a fraud on the federal habeas
courts; that is, the prosecutor took affirmative actions to conceal his tacit agreement with the
state’s key witness until it was too late, procedurally, for [the defendant] to use that undisclosed
agreement successfully to challenge his capital conviction.” Id. In other circumstances, the
Supreme Court has noted that fraud on a federal habeas court might exempt a petitioner from
meeting the strict limitations AEDPA places on second and successive requests for habeas relief.
Douglas v. Workman, 560 F.3d at 1193. Additionally, as discussed supra, the State in this case
flagrantly disregarded the federal subpoena issued by this Court. At the very least, new evidence
has been presented which is over 30 years old, the subject of numerous State and Federal court
orders, and was withheld from Mr. Fontenot and the Courts. The newly discovered evidence
recently discovered by the City of Ada was not divulged to this Court by the State.
While the fraud on the court cases may, or may not apply directly to the circumstances of
this case, they lend support to this Court’s decision to treat Mr. Fontenot’s Brady claim as part of
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his initial request for habeas relief. See Douglas v. Workman, 560 F.3d at 1193. “Where a prisoner
can show that the state purposefully withheld exculpatory evidence, that prisoner should not be
forced to bear the burden of section 2244, which is meant to protect against the prisoner himself
withholding such information or intentionally prolonging the litigation. Id. citing Workman v. Bell,
227 F.3d 331, 335 (6th Cir. 2000). Further,
fraud upon the court calls into question the very legitimacy of a judgment. That
characterization of the situation which arises when the prosecution fails to reveal exculpatory
evidence to the defense would seem to satisfy, at least in spirit, the requirement of section 2244.
The difference between questions of fraud upon the court and ordinary newly-discovered evidence
situations is that an allegation of fraud upon the court casts a dark shadow over the prosecution’s
intentions. The situation suggests that a judgment may have been reached with the assistance of a
prosecutor who may not have had the intention of finding the true perpetrator. Such a judgment is
inherently unreliable, and therefore satisfies the requirements of section 2244 in spirit. Id.
Moreover, [p]rosecutors are subject to constraints and responsibilities that don’t apply to other
lawyers. While lawyers representing private parties may --- indeed, must ----do everything
ethically permissible to advance their client’s interests, lawyers representing the government in
criminal cases serve truth and justice first. The prosecutor’s job isn’t just to win fairly, staying well
within the rules. As Justice Douglas once warned, “[t]he function of the prosecutor under the
Federal Constitution is not to tack as many skins of victims as possible to the wall. His function is
to vindicate the right of people as expressed in the laws and give those accused of crime a fair trial.
Douglas v. Workman, 560 F.3d at 1194, citing Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 648-49
(1974)(Douglas, J. dissenting).
For similar reasons, in this case, which involves fraud perpetrated on Mr. Fontenot and this
Court, Mr. Fontenot is permitted to supplement his Brady claim with all the newly discovered
evidence produced in the instant case. See also, United States v. Smiley, 553 F.3d 1137, 1144 (8th
Cir. 2009), where the court agreed that defendant’s fraud on the court motion was not a second or
successive petition and “reasoned that the fact the case involved a criminal sentencing process,
rather than a civil proceeding such as in Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford Empire Co., 322 U.S.
238 (1944) was inconsequential, …and as such, is not a second or successive 2255 motion.” The
Supreme Court, as long ago as Mooney v. Hologan 294 U.S. 103, 112 (1935), stated that deliberate
deception of a court by the presentation of false evidence is incompatible with “rudimentary

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demands of justice.” This was reaffirmed in Pyle v. Kansas, 317 U.S. 213 (1942).
The same result obtains when the State, although not soliciting false evidence, allows it to go
uncorrected when it appears.” (Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269 (1959). Tampering with the
administration of justice in the manner indisputably alleged here involves far more than an inquiry
to a single litigant.” It is a wrong against the institutions set up to protect and safeguard the public,
institutions in which fraud cannot complacently be tolerated consistently with the good order of
society. Surely it cannot be that preservation of the integrity of the judicial process must always
wait upon the diligence of litigants. The public welfare demands that the agencies of public justice
be not so impotent that they must always be mute and helpless victims of deception and fraud.”
Hazel-Atlas, 322 U.S. at 246.
III.

MR. FONTENOT’S FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS WERE
VIOLATED
WHEN
THE
PONTOTOC
COUNTY
DISTRICT
ATTORNEY’S OFFICE WITHELD EVIDENCE IN VIOLATION OF
BRADY V. MARYLAND.

The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires prosecutors to disclose to
the defense all evidence favorable to the accused concerning guilt and penalty. Brady v.
Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963); Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 153-56 (1972); United
States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 676 (1985); Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 437 (1995). This duty
extends to, “ all stages of the judicial process.” Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 60, 94 L. Ed.
2d 40, 107 S. Ct. 989 (1987); see also Smith v. Roberts, 115 F.3d 818, 820 (10th Cir. 1997). There
are three elements of a Brady violation: “[t]he evidence at issue must be favorable to the accused,
either because it is exculpatory, or because it is impeaching; that evidence must have been
suppressed by the State, either willfully or inadvertently; and prejudice must have ensued.” Banks
v. Dretke, 540 U.S. 668, 691 (2004) quoting Strickler, 527 U.S. at 281-82 (1999). Due process
also places upon the prosecutor a corresponding duty to correct false or misleading evidence that
is harmful to the defendant. Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269 (1959).
A prosecutor has an independent obligation to locate Brady materials within the
possession of law enforcement.
Third, the "prosecution" for Brady purposes encompasses not only the individual
prosecutor handling the case, but also extends to the prosecutor's entire office, .
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. . as well as law enforcement personnel and other arms of the state . . . to the text
of the note involved in investigative aspects of a particular criminal venture.
Logically, then, it follows that because "'"investigative officers are part of the
prosecution, the taint on the trial is no less if they, rather than the prosecutors,
were guilty of nondisclosure."'
Smith v. Secretary of N.M. Dep't of Corrections, 50 F.3d 801, 824 (10th Cir. 1995); see also
United States v. Buchanan, 891 F.2d 1436, 1442 (10th Cir. 1989)(discussing the failure on the
part of law enforcement to disclose Brady materials falls upon the prosecutor).
The prosecution’s failure to disclose police reports of alternate suspects with connections
to the victim is a Brady violation as that evidence is potentially exculpatory, impeachment of the
quality of a police investigation, and aids a defense investigation. See Smith, 50 F.3d. 801 at 829830; see also Bowen v. Maynard, 799 F.2d 593, 612-13 (10th Cir. 1986). Given that multiple police
agencies often investigate a criminal matter, it is incumbent upon the prosecutor to ensure that
Brady materials are obtained for disclosure to defense counsel in accordance with the Fourteenth
Amendment. See Smith at 824; see also United States v. Thornton, 1 F.3d 149, 158 (3d Cir. 1993),
holding that prosecutors are obligated to conduct a “thorough inquiry" of police for Brady
materials); United States v. Osorio, 929 F.2d 753, 762 (1st Cir. 1991); see generally Tiscareno v.
Anderson, 639 F.3d 1016, 1022 (10th Cir. 2011) (discussing other state actors who worked on a
criminal matter that would fall within Brady’s obligations).
The U.S. Supreme Court holds that a prosecutor fails his Brady obligation when he does
not obtain exculpatory, impeachment evidence that aids a defense during the pretrial process and
disclose to the defense. See U.S. v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 675 (1985); see also Kyles v.
Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 437-38 (1995); Williams v. Whitley, 940 F.2d 132 (5th Cir. 1991); United
States v. Brooks, 296 U.S. App. D.C. 219, 966 F.2d 1500, 1500-04 (D.C. Cir. 1992) holding a
prosecution's duty to learn of Brady evidence includes files of the police department's homicide
and internal affairs divisions). That a state court rule or law excused a prosecutor from having to
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disclose any evidence to defense counsel does not supersede that prosecutor’s obligations under
the United States Constitution.
A prosecutor who adopts an open-file policy of disclosure does not remove his
obligations under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
We certainly do not criticize the prosecution's use of the open file policy. We
recognize that this practice may increase the efficiency and the fairness of the
criminal process. We merely note that, if a prosecutor asserts that he complies with
Brady through an open file policy, defense counsel may reasonably rely on that file
to contain all materials the State is constitutionally obligated to disclose under
Brady.

Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 283 fn. 23; see also Banks v. Dretke, 540 U.S. 668, 693 (2004)
(defense counsel may rely on the prosecution’s assertion that Brady evidence will be disclosed).
Therefore, if a prosecutor utilized an open-file policy, the defense and courts will rely on that
assertion as an assurance that all exculpatory, impeachment, and evidence that aids the defense
will be within the file. That reliance extends to a defendant’s post-conviction counsel. See Strickler,
527 at 284.
The prosecution is obligated to disclose impeachment evidence as well. For evidence to
be considered material, it does not have to “reflec[t] upon the culpability of the defendant.
Exculpatory evidence includes impeachment evidence that is material to the case against the
accused.” See Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269 (1959). Impeachment evidence is evidence
that can be used to challenge the credibility of a prosecution witness or that can be used to
challenge the prosecution’s case. Bagley, 473 U.S. at 676 (Brady’s disclosure requirements apply
to any materials that, whatever their other characteristics, can be used to develop impeachment
of a prosecution witness). There is no distinction between exculpatory and impeachment
evidence under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Kyles, 514 U.S. at
433.
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Evidence is material under Brady when it could “reasonably be taken to put the whole
case in such a different light as to undermine confidence in the verdict.” Strickler v. Greene, 527
U.S. at 290. “A ‘reasonable probability’ of a different result is accordingly shown when the
government's evidentiary suppression ‘undermines confidence in the outcome of the trial.’" Kyles
v. Whitley, 514 at 434, quoting Bagley, 473 U.S. at 678. Withheld evidence is material whenever
it would have affected the course of the defense investigation, or the strategy defense counsel
would have employed at trial. See Bagley, 473 U.S. at 683; United States v. Perdomo, 929 F.2d
967, 97 (3d Cir. 1991) “[T]he Bagley inquiry requires consideration of the totality of the
circumstances, including possible effects of nondisclosure on the defense’s trial preparation.”
United States v. Spagnoulo, 960 F.2d 990, 994 (11th Cir. 1992); see also Smith, 50 F.3d at 827
(Brady violation found when withheld evidence affected defense preparation or presentation).
In determining the merits of Mr. Fontenot’s claim under Brady, “[t]he question is not
whether [Mr. Fontenot] would more likely than not have received a different verdict with the
evidence, but whether in its absence he received a fair trial, understood as a trial resulting in a
verdict worthy of confidence.” Kyles, 514 U.S. at 437. The Court should not evaluate the evidence
item-by-item, but in terms of its cumulative effect on the fairness of the trial. Id. at 436. For Mr.
Fontenot to be entitled to a new trial, he only has to meet the standard ----- whether it would have
affected the judgment of the jury.
In this case, Brady’s materiality prong is satisfied by the fact that the prosecution withheld
evidence on several key points. Had Mr. Fontenot’s defense counsel been provided the evidence
presented below, he could have shown an alibi defense clearly establishing his whereabouts when
Mrs. Haraway disappeared. Further, substantial impeachment and exculpatory evidence
suppressed or ignored by the prosecution would have certainly affected the jury’s judgment of
guilt on all the charges.
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A.

The Pontotoc District Attorney’s Office Did Not Disclose Brady v. Maryland
material as a Matter of Policy.

The Pontotoc County District Attorney’s Office had a pattern and practice of not
divulging documents gathered from a variety of law enforcement agencies. This pattern began
during Mr. Fontenot’s 1985 pretrial proceedings, his 1987 retrial proceedings, his 1992
resentencing, his 2014 post-conviction proceedings, and has continued throughout the current
proceedings. Despite assurances of open file policies, or full compliance with Brady v. Maryland
made by both Mr. Peterson and Mr. Ross, documents that were and continue to be exculpatory,
impeachment, and aid defense counsel remained in their custody.12 (Dkt.# 123, Ex.#s 78 at 14,
37; Ex.# 79 at 21, 25, 52-53). Despite the prosecution’s claim of ignorance about the police
investigation and reports, the DA’s investigator, Lloyd Bond assisted in the investigation of the
disappearance of Mrs. Haraway alongside Ada Police Detectives Smith and Baskins.( Dkt.# 123,
Ex.#s 62, 88). Because of the prosecution’s alleged “hands off” approach to obtaining Brady
materials, the likelihood that Brady materials would not be made available to defense counsel
was all but assured.
The practice of the District Attorney’s Office was to rely wholly on a “prosecutorial”
when engaged in the charging and prosecution of a defendant. A prosecutorial was compiled
through an OSBI regional office located in McAlester, OK. According to OSBI Agent Gary
Rogers, all his interviews and reports, and reports from other agencies, were sent directly to the
regional office and stored there. (Dkt.# 123, Ex.# 80, at 10). He explained how his regional

12

The entirety of the Pontotoc County District Attorney’s Office file concerning the prosecution of Mr. Fontenot,
and his co-defendant, Mr. Ward, was copied pursuant to a federal subpoena. Within that file were Ada Police Reports
and DA investigative files of witness statements and reports along with other documents that should have been made
available to either Mr. Fontenot’s or Mr. Ward’s defense attorneys prior to trial.

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supervisor edited and compiled the reports that became the prosecutorial. Id. at 10-11.

Once completed, it was sent directly from the regional office to the District Attorney’s
Office. Id. Mr. Peterson testified that the prosecutorial was the only document he used to charge
Mr. Fontenot. (Dkt.# 123, Ex.# 78, at 15).
The District Attorney’s reliance on law enforcement bringing files to them rather than
pursuing information to ensure their compliance created a culture where volumes of documents
were never seen by prosecutors, or if they were, they were pushed aside as irrelevant to the case
they were building against Mr. Fontenot despite evidence to the contrary. (Dkt. 123, Ex.# 78, at
4-5). What resulted was a haphazard investigation where evidence in police custody was
destroyed, interviews were mishandled, and proper police procedure was neglected. The
consistent thread in Mr. Fontenot’s collateral proceedings has been that OSBI conducted the
investigation and whatever documentation was gathered was housed by OSBI. The OSBI
compiled a “prosecutorial” summary of police reports, witness interviews, and relevant evidence
on the suspect(s) they believed were involved in the criminal offense.(Dkt.# 213, Ex.# 78, at 1012).
Even more egregious was the pattern of not disclosing the prosecutorial or any other
discovery to defense counsel.(Dkt.# 123, Ex.# 78, at 48-49). This pattern and practice resulted
in a systemic due process violation of Mr. Fontenot’s constitutional rights. See Miller-El v.
Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322 (2003)(explaining how the use of policy and practice of the prosecution
to strike minority jurors supports a Batson constitutional violation), Connick v. Thompson, 131
S.Ct. 1350 (2011)(holding that deliberate indifference to the need for Brady training could result
in a 42 USC § 1983). The only disclosures made to defense counsel during trial were court
ordered and extremely limited in nature.
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After repeated requests for Ada Police Reports and to the other law enforcement agencies
to disclose their parts of the investigation, their reports were nevertheless, not made available.
However, they did exist. ( Dkt.# 123, Ex.# 87). While not every document may be material to Mr.
Fontenot, it illustrates that there were in fact separate files by the DA’s investigator and the Ada
Police Department within their custody during the trials. Those specifically pertaining to Mr.
Fontenot will be discussed below.
1.

Pontotoc District Attorney’s failure to ensure Brady materials were
obtained from law enforcement.

The OSBI and Ada Police Department conducted the investigation into Mrs. Haraway’s
disappearance and murder. The two primary law enforcement officers responsible were OSBI
Agent Gary Rogers and Ada Police Detective Dennis Smith.13 The Ada Police Department and
OSBI kept separate files of all interviews conducted, evidence collected, and other aspects of the
investigations, OSBI Agent Rogers was ultimately responsible for the case. (Dkt.# 123, Ex.# 53,
at 33); (P/H p. 533-36, 947-948). The preparation of the prosecutorial was done by OSBI Agents.
(Dkt.# 213, Ex.# 80, at 11-12, 19-20). The prosecutorial was comprised of the relevant police
reports, witness statements, and documents that the OSBI administration deemed relevant for the
district attorney’s review. (Dkt.# 123, Ex.# 55, at 13, 56). These documents were edited and culled
internally by other OSBI supervisors prior to the final prosecutorial report’s release to the district
attorney’s office. (Dkt.# 123, Ex.# 29, at 968-978). Based on the evidence presented in the
prosecutorial, and only that evidence, would the district attorney pursue charges. (Dkt.# 123, Ex.#
55, at 13, 56).The prosecutorial generated by OSBI from the police investigation into the abduction
and homicide of Donna Denice Haraway consisted of approximately 146 pages. (Dkt.# 123, Ex.#

13

These two officers led the investigation into the Debbie Carter homicide which occurred prior to Mrs. Haraway’s
abduction from McAnally’s.

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43). However, discovery has revealed there were hundreds of police reports from the various law
enforcement agencies that investigated the case that were not included in the prosecutorial by the
OSBI, and ultimately not available to Mr. Fontenot’s defense counsel.
Pontotoc County District Attorney Peterson testified that he relied solely on OSBI Agent
Roger’s prosecutorial report to charge and prosecute Mr. Fontenot. (Dkt.# 123, Ex.# 78, at 1112). His reliance on the prosecutorial would not be problematic if he had ensured his officers
provided him with the evidence necessary for his compliance with his Brady obligations. In a
prior deposition taken on this very issue, Mr. Peterson admitted understanding his obligations
under Brady and its progeny, but failed to actively pursue such evidence from the various law
enforcement agencies investigating cases in his jurisdiction.14 (Dkt.# 123, Ex.# 55, at 142-143).
Mr. Peterson took very little active measures to ensure evidence that must be disclosed to defense,
was, in fact, given to him by his law enforcement agencies so that he could comply with his
constitutional obligations.
Q. And isn’t it your responsibility as the prosecutor to make sure that exculpatory
evidence is disclosed to you from police?
A. Well, I would hope that they would do that.
Q. Well, in your 20 or so years as a prosecutor in Ada, haven’t you tried to direct,
first, Ada police officials about the need to disclose exculpatory material?
A. They are aware that they need to give me all the evidence in a case. All of
it, not just portions of it, but, all of it.
Q. How have you communicated --A. Exculpatory –
Q. How have you communicated that to the Ada police?
A. I’ve told them over and over again.
Q. Have you had training courses?
A. I haven’t given them training courses.

14

The depositions referenced were taken from the Ron Williamson and Dennis Fritz civil suit.

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Q. Have you directed anybody to give them training courses?
A. No, sir.
(Dkt.# 123, Ex.# 54, at 351-352, and Ex.# 53, at 214-216) (emphasis added). Mr. Peterson
recognized his obligation to obtain evidence but made no effort to receive the material, or to inform
law enforcement of its obligations to turn over evidence. Similar to the facts in the Williamson
and Fritz case, the defense was denied critical evidence that was exculpatory or impeaching while
it remained in the custody of law enforcement. There is no proof this crucial evidence was ever
made available to Mr. Fontenot’s trial counsel. Rather, Mr. Peterson fought to keep such evidence
from ever being given to defense counsel during either the joint or separate trials of Mr. Ward and
Mr. Fontenot.
Further, Mr. Peterson’s own understanding of what evidence must be disclosed was
dubious at best. His misunderstanding of his obligation to disclose exculpatory and impeachment
evidence hampered not only the actions of his office but led to his willful ignorance of evidence
that challenged the state’s case. “Exculpatory evidence is . . . all fact-based, whether it is
exculpatory or not, and it has to be material.” (Dkt.# 123, Ex#. 54, at 371, 368). Mr. Peterson’s
failure to grasp that exculpatory evidence shows that defendant did not commit the crime, and is
material to the case at hand, is the clearest indication of his ability to discern what evidence should
be disclosed. Further, it demonstrates his inability to properly instruct not only those assistant
district attorneys assisting him in the prosecution of Mr. Fontenot, but to direct the police officers’
compliance in giving him “all the evidence in the case.”
Mr. Peterson attempted to satisfy his disclosure obligations by instituting an open file
policy within the Pontotoc County District Attorney’s Office. Under that policy, all
documentation that was not work product was available for defense counsel to review pretrial.
(Dkt.# 123, Ex.# 78, at 14-15, 90). As the Haraway investigation concluded, the only
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documentation the prosecution had was the prosecutorial. (Dkt.# 123, Ex.# 78, at 11-12, and Ex.#
79, at 11-12). Thus, the prosecutor’s file was devoid of volumes of relevant and exculpatory
evidence that police had gathered – in effect the open file was empty. An open file policy is a
good step towards ensuring compliance under Brady and its progeny, but it does not absolve a
prosecutor’s obligation to turn over exculpatory, impeachment evidence that aids a defense
investigation. See Kyles, 514, U.S. at 421 (“and we hold that the prosecutor remains responsible
for gauging that effect regardless of any failure by the police to bring favorable evidence to the
prosecutor’s attention”). Once alerted to the specific needs and requests of defense counsel, the
district attorney is on notice that such evidence is necessary for a defendant’s case. See Bagley,
473 U.S. at 682; (Dkt.# 123, Ex.# 81 pg. 12-15). However, the Pontotoc County District
Attorney’s Office never even asked the Ada Police Department or the OSBI whether they had
obtained all the law enforcement reports.
2.

Lack of training of law enforcement to understand what evidence
constituted Brady material.

Similarly to the lapse in understanding demonstrated by the Pontotoc County District
Attorney’s Office, both OSBI and the APD lacked any training of what evidence obtained during
a police investigation must be disclosed. Under the custom, policy, and practice of the Ada Police
Department, the captain determined who was assigned to handle a specific investigation. (Dkt.#
123, Ex.# 51, at 71). The captain supervised the other investigator on the case, but no one directly
supervised his work on a case. It is the responsibility of the lead investigator to determine what
reports to include in the prosecutorial report or case report, which is sent to the district attorney’s
office. (Dkt.#23, Ex.#s 51, at 71; Ex.# 18, at 52). However, officers within the department did not
understand what evidence they were required to provide the district attorney or when it must be
disclosed.
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The Ada Police Department did not have its own internal training program in the 1980s
based on APD Assistant Chief Richard Carson’s testimony. (Dkt.#123, Ex.# 49, at. 10-11). Police
officers did not receive any training on exculpatory evidence. Id. (Dkt.# 123, Ex.# 49, at 68).
Carson did not know of any training programs on exculpatory evidence (Dkt.# 123, Ex# 49, at
68). Even decades later, there are no internal training programs in the Ada Police Department that
address exculpatory evidence. (Dkt.# 123, Ex.# 49, at 68; Ex.# 18, at 51-52). He further explained
the lack of training or systematic way to ensure such evidence ever made its way to the Pontotoc
County District Attorney’s Office. (Dkt.# 123, Ex.# 48, at 67-69).
Ada Police Department Chief Fox15 explained that it was APD policy to give total
discretion to the detectives, or any individual officer to determine what information to turn over
to the district attorney. (Dkt.# 123, Ex.# 48, at 59-60); see also (Dkt.# 123, Ex.# 65, at 79-81).
However, when asked what exculpatory evidence meant, Chief Fox said he was unfamiliar with
the term “exculpatory evidence.” He said there was no policy in the Ada Police Department
regarding evidence favorable to a defendant that might indicate innocence. (Dkt.# 123, Ex.# 48,
at 67, 76). The current director of training, Carl Allen, a director of training for police officers,
stated in his deposition that he was familiar with the term “exculpatory evidence,” but that the
meaning of it “elude[d] him right now.” (Dkt.# 123, Ex.#50, at 30-310). Further, he could recall
no internal training in the Ada police department on exculpatory evidence being covered in the
mandated, statewide law enforcement training (CLEET). (Dkt.# 123, Ex.# 50, at 31; Ex.# 18, at
52)
While the Ada Police Department obviously lacked any institutional training or
organizational structure to ensure that exculpatory evidence made its way to the prosecution,
OSBI’s policy did little to ensure its compliance with Brady. Agent Rogers understood that any

15

Chief Fox assisted in the investigation of Tommy Ward also. (Dkt.# 123, Ex.# 88).

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evidence uncovered that was beneficial to a defendant should be turned over. (Dkt.# 123, Ex.#
52, at 92). However, OSBI’s mandate that all reports and evidence come from its central
repository limited his ability to give information directly to Mr. Peterson.
Q In other words, it was -- as far as you understood it, it was the custom, policy,
and practice of the OSBI that you only give the prosecutor the documents in the
prosecutorial report, going through the regional office?
A That's correct, yes, sir.
Q And if you were to give them any other document, you would route that through
the regional office the way you did the prosecutorial summary?
A Yes, sir.
Q And did you deviate in your personal custom, policy, or practice and give Mr.
Peterson, in the course of this investigation, any documents other than the ones
that went through the regional office, which include this prosecutorial summary?
A None that I recall, sir.
Q And did you ever tell Mr. Peterson that you had a practice of tape-recording
witness interviews and then erasing them?
A No, sir.
(Dkt.# 123, Ex.# 52, at 90-91). Even when confronted with exculpatory evidence, Agent Rogers
did not deviate to disclose this to the prosecutor unless the prosecutor specifically sought such
evidence from the OSBI repository. (Dkt.# 123, Ex.# 52, at 96). However, even if Agent Rogers
did want to provide evidence beneficial to a defendant in his prosecutorial report, his immediate
supervisor had wide latitude to edit his reports before providing them to Mr. Peterson.

Q. And you were the person that made the decision as to what you were going to
include in the prosecutorial summary . . . documents sent over the course of time
to the regional office and were in the OSBI file.
A. Well, I’ll have to clarify that to a degree. My supervisor, B.G. Jones would
have quite a bit of input, as far as what would be included and what is not, as far
as when you put the prosecutorial together.

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***
Q. And between you and Mr. Jones, you would decide what to put in and what not
to put in.
A. Well, the bottom line, sometimes was Mr. Jones would either include or exclude
stuff that I may or may not think should be in the report.
Q. Well, before the prosecutorial summary was submitted, did you review it?
A. Yes, sir. I believe I did.
Q. And would it be your ordinary practice to review it, not just in this case, but in
any case?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And it you found that certain reports or interviews in the prosecutorial report
left out information that might be exculpatory, beneficial to a defendant, you
would make sure that they got put in.
A. If I was aware of it.
(Dkt.# 123, Ex.# 52., at 212, 213). The lack of any organizational structure or policy ensuring
the proper disclosure of exculpatory and impeachment evidence from the APD and OSBI to the
Pontotoc County District Attorney’s Office resulted in systemic Brady violations not only in
Mr. Fontenot’s case but others as well. The misunderstanding of the law and its requirements
demonstrated by the Pontotoc County District Attorney made certain that vital evidence
favorable to the defense would never be disclosed in accordance with state and federal law.
Documents uncovered after Mr. Fontenot’s convictions and direct appeals show
exculpatory, impeachment, and other evidence which would have furthered his defense and
investigation were never turned over to defense counsel prior to trial. Over 860 pages of police
reports, witness statements, criminology reports, and polygraphs – all detailing the investigation
into the events leading to Mrs. Haraway’s murder – weren’t disclosed until years after trial.
(Dkt.# 123, Ex.# 44). Of the 860 pages of OSBI, APD, and various other law enforcement reports
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within the State’s custody, the Pontotoc County District Attorney’s Office relied only on the 160
pages of the prosecutorial. (Dkt.# 123, Ex.# 43). In January 2014, an additional 263 pages of
OSBI reports were disclosed pursuant to an agreement between post-conviction counsel and the
Oklahoma Attorney General’s Office.16 Of these additional reports, approximately forty-five
were never disclosed either at the time of trial or under the OCCA’s order.17 In May 2017, the
Pontotoc County District Attorney’s entire file was disclosed pursuant to a federal subpoena.
Within those files were DA investigative reports along with Ada Police Reports that should have
been disclosed. (Dkt.# 123, Ex.#s 85 – 90). More recently, on February 6, 2019, hundreds of
pages of Ada Police Reports were disclosed for the first time based on a state court subpoena
from Thomas Ward’s state post-conviction litigation.
The fact that long withheld law enforcement documentation pertaining to the investigation
of Denice Haraway’s disappearance and murder continues to surface clearly demonstrates that all
the necessary records related to this case were not disclosed during post- conviction proceedings.
This has continued through the instant action. Because Brady violations are evaluated
cumulatively based on all undisclosed evidence and the evidence presented at trial,
the continual failure of the state to fully disclose all exculpatory and impeachment evidence
that aids the defense makes it difficult for Mr. Fontenot to fully articulate the actual prejudice
he suffered due to the State’s actions. See Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 421 (1995).

16

The 263 pages of discovery were disclosed to post conviction counsel pursuant to an agreement between the parties
concerning Mr. Fontenot’s post conviction request for discovery filed in October 2013. Specifically, Mr. Fontenot sought
disclosure of documents mentioned in the original OSBI Reports that were not included. According to these OSBI reports,
these investigative reports were witness statements, taped recordings, or other reports from key witnesses in the State’s
investigation leading to the arrest and prosecution of Mr. Fontenot. While some of these documents were duplicates of
some of the information provided in the original 860 pages of material, there were several new or altered documents that
had never been disclosed to any defense attorney for Mr. Fontenot. The post conviction discovery remained unsolved at the
time the post conviction court denied Mr. Fontenot’s application based on laches.
17
The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals ordered the full disclosure of all OSBI records to Mr. Fontenot’s second
direct appeal counsel during the pendency of that appeal. Clearly, OSBI did not fully comply with that order as further
reports were only given to post-conviction counsel in 2014, and again in 2019.

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The State’s failure to properly gather and disclose such crucial information in a timely
fashion continues to derogate Mr. Fontenot’s state and federal constitutional rights to substantive
due process. The police or prosecution had most, if not all, of this evidence prior to Mr.
Fontenot’s first trial in 1985. All the while, the defense filed discovery requests and the trial court
ordered the production of exculpatory evidence that the prosecutor never delivered. Even after
the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals ordered the full disclosure of all OSBI records in the
Haraway case, files referenced in the investigate reports show non-compliance with the Court’s
order. (Ex.#s 38 & 59). This blatant disregard for court precedent and ordered discovery has
continued throughout Mr. Fontenot’s case and demonstrates a clear pattern of police and
prosecutorial misconduct that requires reversal of his conviction.
B.

Mr. Fontenot’s Defense Counsel Repeatedly Requested Exculpatory,
Impeachment Evidence

George Butner represented Mr. Fontenot throughout both of his trials. During the pretrial
proceedings in both cases, he filed numerous discovery motions and made requests on the record
for discovery of police and interview reports within the possession of the APD and OSBI. Mr.
Butner specifically alerted the prosecution to the following pieces of evidence he required:
1) The identities of alternate suspects. (Dkt.# 123, Ex.# 72).
2) All statements of witnesses in the case. (Dkt.# 123, Ex.# 73).
3) Production of witnesses and how the investigation led to Ward and Fontenot.
(P/H p. 769).
4) Statements of Jeff Miller. (P/H pp. 496, 502-208, 710-712).
5) Criminal records of any prosecution witness. (Dkt.# 123, Ex.# 74).
6) Exculpatory evidence. (Dkt.# 123, Ex.# 74).
7) Any and all medical, forensic, or chemical report made, or completed in the future,
regarding the angle and location of purported or actual knife wound upon the remains of
Donna Denice Haraway, regarding the location and comparison of any fibers or hairs
located upon either the remains or the clothing of Donna Denice Haraway, regarding the caliber
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of the projectile which did or may have caused the bullet wound to the back of the skull of Donna
Denice Haraway, in the now or future control or possession of any Federal, State, County, or
Municipal governmental agency, or any agent or member thereof. (Dkt.# 123, Ex.# 72).

8) Written or taped statements of any witness concerning any alternate suspects or
those providing information involving the investigation of Donna Denice Haraway.
(Dkt.# 123, Ex.# 72).
9) Moyer’s statement not disclosed. (P/H at 246-247).

10) The criminal record of any person the State intends to call as a witness in its case-inchief or in rebuttal. (Ex.# 75).
11) Any sworn statements that the State has in its file regarding this particular case.
(Dkt.# 123, Ex. #75).

12) All information of whatever form, source or nature, which tends to exculpate the
Defendant either through an indication of his innocence or through the potential
impeachment of any state witness, and all information of whatever form, source or
nature which might lead to evidence which tends to exculpate the Defendant whether
by indicating his innocence or impeaching the credibility of any potential state's
witness, and all information which may become of benefit to the Defendant in
preparing or presenting the merits of his defense of innocence at trial. This request
includes all facts and information of whatever form, source or nature which the
District Attorney or his assistants or the police and sheriff's departments has or
knows about, which is or may be calculated to become of benefit to the Defendant
either on the merits of the case or on the question of the credibility of witnesses.
(Dkt.# 123, Ex.# 75) (emphasis added).
Mr. Butner repeatedly requested discovery from the Pontotoc County District Attorney’s
Office for disclosure of evidence necessary to formulate a viable defense against the serious
charges his client faced. Instead, Bill Peterson, Pontotoc County District Attorney made scant
disclosures and stonewalled against providing any evidence to defense counsel in both trials.(P/H
at 82-89, 96-99; N/T 406, 502-503, & 769-771). This left defense counsel clearly lacking evidence
he was entitled to have acquired.
The requested evidence would have been extremely helpful, fitting within the defense’s
theory of the case and would have been used if provided. At the very least, the information gleaned
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from these police reports would have aided in providing witnesses relevant to Mr. Fontenot’s
alibi, establish that alternate suspects had both motive and opportunity to kidnap Mrs. Haraway,
and that because of an apparent stalker -- Mrs. Haraway feared being at McAnally’s. These viable
defense theories would have created reasonable doubt in the minds of the jury had not the
prosecution wrongfully tipped the scales in its own favor. “When the prosecutor receives a
specific and relevant request, the failure to make any response is seldom, if ever, excusable.”
U.S. v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 107 (1976). As the Supreme Court explained further,
The more specifically the defense requests certain evidence, thus putting the
prosecutor on notice of its value, the more reasonable it is for the defense to assume
from the nondisclosure that the evidence does not exist, and to make pretrial and
trial decisions on the basis of this assumption . . . [T]he reviewing court may
consider directly any adverse effect that the prosecutor’s failure to respond
might have had on the preparation or presentation of the defendant’s case.
Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682-83 (emphasis added); see also Davis v. Cline, 277 Fed.Appx. 833, 839840 (10th Cir. 2008). Because the prosecution either thwarted or failed to disclose evidence that it
requested, Mr. Butner’s reliance on those assertions was reasonable given the circumstances. See
Banks, 540 U.S. at 693.
The prosecution’s willful ignorance and refusal to seek out evidence that the defense
notified him was important only heightens the violation. “The individual prosecutor has a duty to
learn of any favorable evidence known to the others acting on the government's behalf in the case,
including the police. But whether the prosecutor succeeds or fails in meeting this obligation
(whether, that is, a failure to disclose is in good faith or bad faith,) the prosecution's responsibility
for failing to disclose known, favorable evidence rising to a material level of importance is
inescapable.” Kyles, 514 U.S. at 437-438-9 (citations omitted). Whether anyone in the Pontotoc
County District Attorney’s Office knew about the evidence within the custody of the OSBI, APD,

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or Pontotoc Sheriff’s Office18 or any agency assisting in the Haraway investigation, their
obligation was evident and based firmly in the law: Locate the evidence and disclose to defense.
Mr. Peterson and his staff failed to do so which resulted in numerous Brady violations.
C.

Material Evidence Was Withheld from Mr. Fontenot’s Defense Counsel

The Pontotoc County Prosecutor’s Office failed to disclose both exculpatory, and
impeachment evidence that aided the defense from various sources. Those agencies include its
own files, the OSBI’s, the ME’s Office, the Pontotoc County Sheriff’s Office files, and the Ada
Police Department files. A consistent pattern has been the constant drip of documents during the
course of appellate review, post-conviction, and federal habeas corpus. Because Brady claims are
evaluated cumulatively, the failure of the Pontotoc County District Attorney’s Office and
Respondent to ensure the complete disclosure of these documents as mandated by the Fourteenth
Amendment resulted in the state post-conviction proceedings not being the full and fair
proceedings contemplated by the AEDPA. See Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 504 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1992).
The APD reports were fist uncovered during the disclosure of the Pontotoc County District
Attorney’s Offices files pursuant to this Court’s subpoena. (Dkt.# 123, Ex.# 87). These files were
demonstrated a consistent pattern and practice of state actors failing to review their files and
disclose documents they had a continuing obligation to disclose. See Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480
U.S. 39, 60 (1987); Douglas v. Workman, 560 F.3d 1156, 1173 (10th Cir. 2004) citing Smith v.
Roberts, 115 F.3d 818, 820 (10th Cir. 1997).
In February 2019, despite both a state court order and a subpoena issued by this Court,

18

Counsel represents that neither they, nor appellate or trial counsel received any police reports from the APD,
Pontotoc County Sheriff’s Office, or the Oklahoma Highway Patrol, prior to the filing of the instant Second
Amended Petition. 

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hundreds of additional pages of Ada Police Reports were “discovered” pursuant to Thomas Ward’s
state court subpoena. This set of police reports contains numerous documents that are both
exculpatory and impeachment evidence against the prosecution’s witnesses at trial. As Mr.
Fontenot pled previously and continues to assert, the totality of these documents eviscerate the
Prosecution’s theory of the case making it untenable that Mrs. Haraway disappeared in the manner
suggested and further support Mr. Fontenot’s assertions that he was not present at McAnally’s
because he was at a party. There is no doubt that this evidence, had it been disclosed would have
been instrumental in establishing a viable defense for Mr. Fontenot showing a reasonable
probability of a different result.
1.

OSBI and Ada Police Department Reports establishing Mr.
Fontenot’s alibi

OSBI reports establish that Mr. Fontenot was at a party the night of April 28, 1984, during
the time the police and prosecution believed that Mrs. Haraway disappeared. According to the
prosecution’s theory, Mrs. Haraway left from McAnally’s with a White male between 8:30 pm
and 8:45 pm. (N/T 6/14/88 at 25-26). Evidence was admitted that the first APD officer arrived
close to 9 pm. (N/T 6/9/88 at 86). The prosecution’s theory was that Mr. Fontenot and his codefendant were with Mrs. Haraway from the time Mrs. Haraway was taken until they supposedly
killed her later that evening. (N/T 6/3/88 at 51-55; 6/14/88 at 35-36).
However, Mr. Fontenot told OSBI agents that he attended a party the night of Mrs.
Haraway’s disappearance. This statement was not divulged to the defense by the prosecution
prior to any of his trials. Mr. Fontenot was arrested on October 19, 1984, and polygraphed by
OSBI Agent Rusty Featherstone. When asked where Mr. Fontenot was on the night in question,
Mr. Fontenot explained:
He went to the apartment of Gordon Calhoun, arriving there at approximately dark
or shortly after the kegs arrived. Calhoun lives adjacent to the ROBERTS, where
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FONTENOT was currently staying. At the party, FONTENOT recalls drinking and
doing marijuana and then returning to the ROBERTS apartment where he slept on
the floor all night. He believes he returned to the apartment between 2330 and 2400
hours that night and recalled that later that night Tommy Ward also ended up
spending the night at the ROBERTS apartment.
(Dkt.# 123, Ex.# 43, prosecutorial bates 142).19
Furthermore, because the entirety of Mr. Fontenot’s interrogation was not recorded, there
is no indication of what exculpatory evidence he provided prior to the video camera being turned
on. Any statement made by him in which he refutes the confession was paramount to the defense.
Likewise, on October 21, 1984, in a handwritten statement, Mr. Fontenot recanted his confession.
In his letter, which he gave to law enforcement, Mr. Fontenot said he had agreed with the story
OSBI Gary Rogers told him and had lied on the video. (Dkt.# 123, Ex.# 44 at 626). He explained
that he had never been to McAnally’s or ever met Mrs. Haraway, and reaffirmed his presence at
the party. (Dkt.# 123, Ex.# 44 at 625-627).
This undisclosed evidence would aid a defense theory that Mr. Fontenot was innocent,
pressured to confess, and fed key details by the police. Defense counsel requested such evidence
several times prior to trial. (Dkt.# 123, Ex.#s 73-75). Had these documents been disclosed, defense
counsel could have interviewed Agent Featherstone and questioned him about Mr. Fontenot’s
statements prior to polygraph examination.20 Mr. Fontenot’s recantation within days of his
confession and that the handwritten note was in OSBI’s custody drastically undercut the reliability
of the confession and would have aided defense counsel in proving Mr. Fontenot’s confession was
false. (Dkt.# 123, Ex.# 44 at 626); (N/T 6/14/88 at 51-62).

19 

At the very minimum, the prosecution was obligated to turn over any statements made by a defendant to his counsel.
The State did disclose Mr. Fontenot’s recorded confession, but not his prior alibi statement. The statement clearly is
exculpatory under Brady. “If the exculpatory evidence ‘creates a reasonable doubt’ as to the defendant's culpability, it
will be held to be material.” United States v. Starusko, 729 F.2d 256 260 (3d Cir. 1984) quoting United States v. Agurs,
427 U.S. 97, 112, 49 L. Ed. 2d 342, 96 S. Ct. 2392 (1976). 
20

According to Agent Featherstone, Mr. Fontenot’s polygraph was inconclusive but bordering on deceptive. (Dkt.# 123,
Ex.# 44 at 605, 628).

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Additionally, the statement would have been essential impeachment evidence to use in
cross examining Detective Smith and Agent Rogers about their interrogation, investigation, and
lack of any corroborating evidence of the confession. This violation was compounded by the fact
that this was not the only evidence placing Mr. Fontenot in another location when the crime
occurred. Both OSBI and Ada Police Department were aware of this party that Mr. Fontenot was
at when Mrs. Haraway disappeared based upon several witness reports, dispatch records, and
police reports. Instead of investigating the information, the prosecution and police withheld the
information from the defense.
Janette Roberts also confirmed Mr. Fontenot’s presence at the party. (Dkt.# 123, E(x.#
44, OSBI 0139). Had police looked at the radio dispatch logs for April 28th, they would have
seen the neighbor complaints about the loud party at the Calhoun residence. (Dkt.# 123, Ex.#s
21

41, 42, & 89). Calls came in at 9:20 pm and 12:40 am about the loud music. Id. One of the
22

officers who responded to the second call, Ada Police Officer Larry Scott, wrote a report
specifically mentioning “Gordon Calhoun” party and warning the revelers to keep it down or go
23

to court. (Ex.# 43, at 98, 89). This report was also not provided to defense counsel.

Further, Stacey Shelton, (AKA Deprater-Brashier) testified at Mr. Ward’s trial, that she
had attended Mr. Calhoun’s party. She told Ada Police Chief, and Detectives Dennis Smith and
Mike Baskins that she knew of the party and knew the people who attended the party. (Ex.# 12).
They disregarded her information, failed to take a formal statement, did not investigate further

21 

The radio dispatch log shows the call to McAnally’s occurred at 8:50 pm. (Dkt.# 123, Ex.# 41.)

22 

While Officer Scott testified in Ward’s trial on June 13, 1989, he did not testify in Mr. Fontenot’s trial.

23

While the State focused on Mr. Fontenot’s ability to both be at the Calhoun party and participate in Mrs.
Haraway’s abduction and murder, this theory becomes inconceivable given that no witness identified him at either
McAnally’s or J.P.’s, he had no access to a truck, and people remember him being at the party for the entire night.
The prosecution lacks any evidence to the contrary besides the dubious confession.

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into her account, and did not inform Mr. Fontenot’s counsel about the information.
When Ms. Shelton explained her knowledge of the party, Mr. Peterson not only failed to
inform the defense about this crucial fact, he threatened Ms. Shelton and held her against her will
in an attempt to get her to recant her testimony after she testified in Mr. Ward’s trial. (Dkt.# 123,
Ex.# 12). While Ms. Shelton acknowledged she did not know many people at the party, she did
list people she knew who attended. Id. Amongst those people were Bruce DePrater and Eric
Thompson who also recall Mr. Fontenot’s attendance at the party and provided essential details
to prove Mr. Fontenot was there during the evening Mrs. Haraway was kidnapped and murdered.
(Dkt.# 123, Ex.# 95).
An alibi irrefutably shows a defendant could not commit a crime because he was
elsewhere when the crime was committed. This is critical evidence for a defense attorney, and
Mr. Fontenot’s defense attorney acknowledged he would have presented it if he had known of it.
“I was trying to pursue that at trial, that some other dude did it, and anything that would have
pointed me in any direction other than Karl, I would have appreciated it.” (Dkt.# 123, Ex.# 81 pg.
35).
In summary, Mr. Fontenot told police of his whereabouts during his interrogation at
OSBI. Police collected several statements from witnesses able to corroborate Mr. Fontenot’s
whereabouts. Yet this evidence was not included in the prosecutorial. The only conclusion is
that the exculpatory alibi evidence was intentionally kept from the prosecution’s knowledge as
Mr. Peterson considered charging Mr. Fontenot.
The party attendees, whom police knew and had identified, had no impetus to lie and could
have been interviewed by defense counsel and later testified about the timing of this party, who
else was present, and whether Mr. Fontenot was present the entire night. These essential witnesses
remember seeing Mr. Fontenot from the very early part of the evening until much later into the
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night. This makes it impossible for him to be involved in Mrs. Haraway’s disappearance. Their
accounts – willfully kept from the defense -- clearly show that at no time did Mr. Fontenot leave
to participate in whatever transpired with Mrs. Haraway. Affidavits from party-goers, Eric
Thompson, Bruce DePrater, and Stacey Shelton along with police reports from Janette Blood
place Mr. Fontenot at the party for the entirety of the night.
2.

People at McAnally’s the night of Mrs. Haraway’s Disappearance

According to the prosecution’s opening statement in Mr. Fontenot’s 1988 trial, both
Thomas Ward and Mr. Fontenot drove to McAnally’s in a grey pickup truck, robbed the store,
abducted Mrs. Haraway and then drove away.( N/T 6/81988 at 35). The witnesses to these events
were Gene Whechel and his nephews David and Lenny Timmons.( N/T 6/91988 at 34-69).
However, in the Ward trial, Lenny Timmons mentions that there were other people coming to the
store while they were there.( Ward N/T 6/21989 p. 160).
In response to Mrs. Haraway’s disappearance, Ada Police Detective Dennis Smith asked
people who shopped in McAnally’s the night of Mrs. Haraway’s disappearance to contact the
APD. (Dkt.# 123, Ex.# 28). Police theorized the last purchase before Mrs. Haraway’s
24

disappearance was a tallboy beer. (Dkt.# 123, Ex.# 44, OSBI 0496). In response to the APD
request, numerous people contacted the police department to explain their purchases and the time
they were in the store. Police interviewed many of those people who provided numerous details
of people, cars, and trucks around McAnally’s on April 28, 1984.(Dkt.# 123, Ex.#s 93, 94 and

24

The register tape from the day’s purchases was collected by Detective Baskins and placed into evidence by the
state at all three trials. (J/T 1160 State’s Exhibit 16; N/T 6/9/1988 at 197 State’s Exhibit 60; Ward N/T 6/12/1989
at 6, State’s Ex.# 60). While the entire roll was placed into evidence, it is unclear whether it was ever unrolled
during the trial by any of Mr. Fontenot’s attorneys during trial, or direct appeal. It was ineffective assistance of
counsel for defense counsel not to examine the entire roll.

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99). These reports refute the prosecution’s theory that Mrs. Haraway left the store with Mr. Ward
and Mr. Fontenot as the Timmons bothers and Gene Whechel went into the store.
Found in the most recent Ada Police Department reports recently produced was a report by
Carrie McClure who says she saw Mrs. Haraway at the store on April 28 around 8-8:30 p.m.
(Dkt.# 123, Ex.# 103). She was interviewed by Ada Police, but her name was never turned over
to Mr. Fontenot. She says that based on her contact with Ada Police that she thinks she was the
last person to see Mrs. Haraway at the store before her disappearance. Other witnesses provided
more detailed information calling into question the District Attorney’s case.
Jimmy Simpson told Ada Police Officer D.W. Barrett that he was in the store when no clerk
was at the counter.
Jimmy parked ten or fifteen feet west of the Ice box. Jimmy went into the
store and there was no one there. Jimmy went to the pop box and got a coke
and walked to the back of the store to the door going to the back room and
said “there is someone up front.” No one ever came out of the back room
so, Jimmy left the store. There was a car possibly a GM w/gr at the gas
pumps with three or four people around it. There was a pickup on the east
side of the store with a man in the driver side and a woman next to him.
It was dark, and Jimmy could not identify them. Jimmy did not see a car
on the east side of the building (Haraway’s vehicle). Jimmy saw a man
standing outside the store as he want in [sic] he thought was Odell
Titsworth. Jimmy had gone to school with Titsworth at Byng several
years earlier. Jimmy was unable to pick Titsworth out of a picture lineup.
(Dkt.# 123, Ex.# 100). Officer Barrett assumed Mr. Simpson arrived while Timmons and Whechel
waited for the police. However, this conflicts with their accounts that the man and woman in the
pickup truck drove away when they were in the store. Other witnesses mention this pickup truck
being at the store along with many other men around the time of Mrs. Haraway’s disappearance.
Mr. Simpson’s account would impeach the state’s theory of the case and the focus of their
investigation.
Also interviewed by police was James Boardman, an Ada newspaper employee. In another
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report taken by Ada Police Officer Barrett, he reported:
A few days after Denice Haraway disappeared Mr. Boardman called the police
dept. and advised he was at McAnally’s store on Arlington about 5 pm on
4-28-84. There were two men in the store that in his opinion were acting funny.
Subj #1 6 ft. brn hair, brn shirt, blue jeans.
Subj #2 6 ft. blond hair, blue plaid flannel shirt.
He thought they were in a light-colored pickup. Boardman was pretty sure Denice
was wearing a blue short sleeve t shirt.
Around the first of November 1984, James Boardman came to the police dept. and
was shown a picture lineup. Boardman picked #1 out of the Ward folder and
could not identify anyone from the Fontenot and Titsworth folders. Agent Rogers
and Lloyd Bond were present at this lineup.
(Dkt.# 123, Ex.# 93). Mr. Boardman’s interview report is exculpatory evidence for Mr. Fontenot.
OSBI Agent Rogers thought Mr. Boardman’s account was significant enough that he asked him
to view photospreads of all three suspects after Mr. Fontenot had been arrested. After the
description originally provided, he could not identify Mr. Fontenot as being at the store. Further,
Pontotoc County District Attorney investigator Lloyd Bond’s presence makes it much more likely
that District Attorney Peterson or Ross were aware of this witness and his report. Mr. Boardman’s
report should have been disclosed as exculpatory evidence. Mr. Butner could have interviewed
and called him as a witness refuting not only the confession but establishing other witnesses who
could not place him there. It also deprived the defense of arguing inconsistent factual accounts as
to what happened at the convenience store.
Another witness police interviewed was Duney Alford who came to the store close in time
to Mrs. Haraway’ disappearance. He told police
On 11-28-84, I talked with Duney Alford by telephone about the Haraway case.
Duney said that on the day she was taken, he had went to McAnalley’s (sic)
to get some soap. He pulled up to the front of the store and got out and went
inside. He said there was a guy standing by the front door on the inside of the
store. Duney spoke to him but the guy did not speak back. Duney said about
the only thing he remembers about the guy was that he was dark haired, kind
of slick downed, and that his hair was parted on the side. Duney said that when
he walked outside the store he noticed a pickup parked on the outside of the
store and that he remembers that it was a chalky gray color. He said that he
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knows Donna Haraway because he shopped at the store and she worked there.
Duney said as far as he can remember Donna Haraway was wearing blue jeans
and a light blue pull over blouse that day.
(Dkt.# 123, Ex.# 101). These witnesses provide significant insight into the people coming into and
out of the store. Several people remember seeing the pickup truck at the store for a much longer
period from what the prosecutors presented. The fact that the pickup was there refutes the theory
that the events at J.P.’s convenience store had anything to do with those at McAnally’s. Therefore,
these reports should have been made available for Mr. Fontenot’s defense counsel to raise the
reasonable doubt that whomever was involved was at the store for much longer than police
believed. Additionally, the description of the men and other people around the store create more
doubt as to whom may have been involved, and their motive. None of these witnesses place Mr.
Fontenot at the crime scene.
Beyond the list of people directly interviewed in the fall of 1984, were various other people
Police Detectives noted on April 28, 1984 while at the store. However, he wrote the names, times,
and contact information on the register tape for only 5 people, the last of whom was Gene
Whechel. (Dkt.# 123, Ex.# 32-38). Each of these people discussed with the APD what they
witnessed in McAnally’s. None of these reports were disclosed to defense counsel. Richard
Holkum, John McKinnis, Gary Haney and Guy Keyes provided evidence that was patently
exculpatory and impeachment evidence. Police never followed up on this evidence which
provided critical information as to an alternate suspect in a grey pickup truck, Mrs. Haraway’s
frame of mind that evening, and the thoroughness of the police investigation in the hours after she
was reported missing.
a. Richard Holkum
Richard Holkum was an off-duty Ada police officer who had visited McAnally’s on the
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night of April 28th. Notations on the McAnally’s register tape show his purchases occurring
between 7:45 pm to 8:00 pm, thirty minutes before Mrs. Haraway supposedly walked out of the
store with an unknown man.( N/T 6/9/1988 p. 34-35, 67-68). The crux of his trial testimony
focused solely on the clothing he saw Mrs. Haraway wearing the night of her disappearance. (N/T
6/9/1988 p.143-145). Further, he testified that he told lead Detectives Dennis Smith and Mike
Baskins immediately about being in the store that evening after he learned of the abduction.( N/T
6/9/1988 p. 144).
The clothing description was not all that Mr. Holkum witnessed in McAnally’s. The
omitted details he recalls reveal he gave his fellow Ada police officers significant information
about the pick-up truck Mrs. Haraway supposedly left in thirty minutes later.
That night, I recall stopping at McAnally's when it was still barely light out. I parked
my vehicle, near the west corner of the building. I believe I bought a six-pack of
beer, a loaf of bread and maybe some other things. I knew Denice Haraway and
spoke to her inside McAnally's that night. There was no one else in the store when
I stopped at McAnally's, however, one woman did step in and laid a penny on the
counter, telling Denice that she had given her too much change back for a previous
gas purchase. Both Denice and I thought that was odd, for the woman to bring back
a penny.
Everything in the store, including Denice, seemed normal. I did not detect any
tension or anything wrong. While standing at the counter making small talk with
Denice, I recall seeing two vehicles sitting on the eastern edge of the pavement
outside, just to the east of the gas pumps. These vehicles were parked parallel
with the driver's side facing each other and the drivers were apparently
talking. One vehicle was a green Ford Torino or Mercury Montego. The other
vehicle was a Chevy or GMC pickup truck painted primer gray. This pick-up
had a straight, conventional bed. I believe these vehicles were still parked next
to each other when I left McAnally's to drive home.
Based on my own memory, and knowing that civil twilight ended at 7:36pm that
night, I believe I was probably at McAnally's somewhere between 7:30pm and
7:45pm. The next morning, April 29, 1984, I first heard about the disappearance of
Denice Haraway when I got to work.
That day, I approached Det Dennis Smith and Det Mike Baskins about my visit to
McAnally's the night before. Neither Smith nor Baskins were interested in talking
to me about the Haraway disappearance. Neither formally interviewed me about
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what I saw or when I was there. My recollection of both of these detectives was
that they were not interested in talking to me about my visit to McAnally's. I
remember thinking that they "just blew me off."
Sometime later that day or that week, Det. Smith or Det. Baskins showed me the
register tape from McAnally's and asked me if I could ID my purchase on the tape.
I recall that this tape only had the prices, which made it difficult for me to find my
purchases. I'm not sure if I ever found my purchase at McAnally's that night. I recall
that both detectives were very condescending toward me for not being able to
immediately identify my purchases from the Saturday night.
I recall some time right before the trial of Tommy Ward and Karl Fontenot, OSBI
Agent Gary Rogers informally interviewed me about my stop at McAnally's on
4/28/1984. I recall that he was mainly interested in my recollection of what
Denice Haraway was wearing that night. I don't believe he took down any
information about the two vehicles I saw sitting outside the building.
(Dkt.# 123, Ex.# 6) (emphasis added).
Mr. Holkum’s description of a gray-primered pickup truck parked in the exact location
other witnesses testified to seeing it when Mrs. Haraway departed was remarkable. The State’s
theory was that whomever left the store with Mrs. Haraway got into a gray-primered pick-up truck
and drove off when David Timmons entered the store that night at approximately 8:30 pm based
on testimony and the dispatch logs.( N/T.6/15/1988 at 39). That Mr. Holkum saw a truck
remarkably similar in appearance to that described by the Timmons brothers and Gene Whelchel
at the store for at least half an hour before Mrs. Haraway’s disappearance changes the motive for
the abduction and suggests an alternate suspect(s). Because she was fearful about working the
night shift given the obscene and harassing phone calls, it creates a reasonable doubt as to Mr.
Fontenot’s involvement. Such evidence would have been something police and defense counsel
should have pursued. That the truck was driven by one man is also interesting because, clearly, it
was not two people as police and prosecution theorized and argued in their case against Mr.
Fontenot. Further, the total lack of interest in the eyewitness testimony of a fellow law enforcement
officer shown by the lead detectives would have been important impeachment on the quality of

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the investigation. His treatment and testimony about the APD bolsters the proof of a lack of
training to investigate the serious crimes facing the officers.(Dkt.# 123, Ex.#s 53, at 10, 12).
(Detective Smith discussing his level of training and the intuitiveness of police investigation).
b. John McKinnis
Mr. McKinnis grew up in Ada, Oklahoma, and frequented McAnally’s convenience store.
25

The register tape documents him in the store between 7:50 pm to 8:00 pm on April 28th. (Dkt.
# 123, Ex.# 35). Mr. McKinnis recalled his visit in stark detail.
In April of 1984, I was 22 years old and I lived in a trailer about 7 miles east of
Ada, Oklahoma. I worked in the oil field business for an Ada company. I often
stopped at McAnally's on East Arlington, which was on the eastern edge of town.
From my many stops at McAnally's I became familiar with Donna Denice Haraway,
who worked behind the counter in that store at night. I recalled Haraway as being a
happy and nice looking woman with a bubbly personality. Whenever I stopped at
McAnally's it was enjoyable to see her behind the counter. I knew she was teaching,
or studying to be a teacher. I was not aware that she was married.
On the night of April 28, 1984, a Saturday night, I stopped at McAnally's on my
way home and purchased a couple of items and paid with a twenty dollar bill. I
lived about 10 minutes east of McAnally's. I know that I got home that night
sometime after 8 pm, between 8 pm and 8:10pm.
While watching the local TV news that night, I learned that Denice Haraway had
disappeared while working at McAnally's. I recalled that when I had stopped in
at McAnally's earlier that night, there was a man I did not recognize standing
behind the counter a few feet from Haraway. He appeared to be someone
Haraway knew, an acquaintance, like a boyfriend or a husband or someone
like that. He appeared to be unhappy, or concerned about something. Denice
Haraway appeared to be her normal, happy self.
I also recalled the lone vehicle parked in front of McAnally's when I drove up,
presumably belonging to the man I saw behind the counter. It was a 1978
Chevy pick-up truck, light colored, maybe white, with gray primer spots
painted on the body. I immediately wondered if this man I saw behind the
counter might have had something to do with Haraway's disappearance. I
called the Ada Police.

25 

To the extent that the register tape was shown to defense counsel, Mr. Butner’s failure to follow-up on such leads
is a violation of the Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel.

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The dispatcher, or whoever I talked to said someone would call me back. Sometime
later that night, I received a call, apparently from a police investigator at
McAnally's. I believe I spoke to Mike Baskin. As I described my visit to McAnally's
a few hours earlier, and was able to determine the probable time of that visit as
being between 7:50pm and 8 pm, this police officer, said to me, "Here you are. I'm
looking at the cash register tape (at McAnally's) and see your purchase right here
with the twenty dollar bill." I described to this police officer, Mike Baskin, the man
I saw behind the counter with Haraway during my visit. This man was bigger than
me, standing about 5’10' to 6’1”, 210 lbs., with light colored hair, not very long.
This man was about my age or a little older, about 22 to 25 years old. He wore a
white t-shirt, and some type of work pants, maybe khaki or blue jeans. This man
looked clean, not rough-looking. He was not dirty, but appeared to have been out
working that day. He looked more like a construction worker, than a college
student.
I also described the truck that I saw parked outside McAnally's to the police
officer, Baskin. I knew it was a 1978 or maybe 1977 model, because it was the
new body style, which had changed for Chevy pick-ups around 1975 or 1976.
I told him that this truck had a short, conventional bed with lots of primer paint
prep spots. I recall that either during that call with Police Officer Baskin, or on
a call back to him later that night or the next day, this officer told me that what
I had seen wasn't relevant to their investigation into Haraway's disappearance.
I recall the police officer telling me that the guy I saw behind the counter, was
someone police knew. I recall him saying specifically, "Oh yeah, we know who
that was."
I recall being told that whatever happened to Haraway happened later in the
evening, so that anything I saw was not relevant to their investigation. After that
last phone call with the police officer, after that weekend, no one with the Ada
Police or any other police agency ever contacted me regarding Denice Haraway. I
never spoke to any police officer or investigator face-to-face, only by phone.
I knew both Tommy Ward and Karl Fontenot by face, from growing up in
Ada. That man I saw standing with Denice behind the counter at McAnally's
about 8 pm on April 28, 1984, was neither Tommy Ward nor Karl Fontenot.
At the time I believe I could have identified that person by his photograph. I never
spoke to anyone else about the Haraway case in an official capacity, until recently,
when I spoke to Dan Grothaus, an investigator with the Oklahoma Innocence
Project. He showed me a photo of what he believes is the register tape from
McAnally's on April 28, 1984. The photo of that register tape shows my name and
phone number hand-written next to a purchase of $2.61, paid for with a twenty
dollar bill.
I was able to tell Mr. Grothaus what I told that police officer that night. It was fairly
easy for me to remember that conversation with the police officer that Saturday
night, because I was so concerned about Haraway's disappearance, and wondered
what significance this man I saw behind the counter might have played in her
disappearance.
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(Dkt.# 123, Ex. # 5)(emphasis added).

Ada police interviewed Mr. McKinnis the day after Mrs. Haraway was reported missing. The
sparse notes from the police could have been followed up on in much the same manner as was done in
state post-conviction proceedings. Mr. McKinnis’ detailed account of the man he saw behind the
counter with Mrs. Haraway is exculpatory evidence that defense counsel should have given to the
defense to present to the jury. (Ex.# 81, at 35). This man was seen talking to another individual in a
Torino type car when police officer Holkum stopped. Mr. McKinnis, who grew up with Mr.
Fontenot in Ada, stated Mr. Fontenot was not the man behind the counter with Mrs. Haraway.
Considering Mr. McKinnis’ information in conjunction with the new evidence about Mrs. Haraway’s
potential stalker presents a very different picture of the abduction and the motive.
Further, whoever Mr. McKinnis saw stayed at the store for a much longer period than
suggested during Mr. Fontenot’s trial. The longer this man stayed around McAnally’s decreases
the likelihood that it could be Mr. Fontenot. Evidence such as this strengthens Mr. Fontenot’s
alibi defense and dovetails with the fact that other testimony proved the abductor’s description
does not match with Mr. Fontenot’s.
Additionally, Mr. McKinnis’ discussions with Detective Mike Baskins were extremely
important both to impeach the thoroughness of the investigation and to establish an alternate
suspect with whom the APD seemed familiar with. First, Mr. McKinnis provided a clear
description of a man in the store standing next to Mrs. Haraway. While Detective Baskins told
Mr. McKinnis that the police were aware of that individual, there are no disclosed police reports
that identify whom this man was, how the APD knew him, what his connection with Mrs.
Haraway was, why he was behind the counter that night, and why he was eliminated as a person

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26

of interest.

Another interesting flaw involves the lack of follow-up investigation into those who
stopped in the store. Based on several witness accounts, the APD failed to document leads from
witnesses who called the police. From the prosecution’s theory of the case, it made no sense to
ignore those present in McAnally’s shortly before Mrs. Haraway disappeared.( N/T 6/14/1988 p.
25-26).27 Since the APD stated they were aware of the individual identified to have been with
Mrs. Haraway, his identity should have been disclosed to defense counsel as either a potential
witness, or a suspect, what his conversation with Mrs. Haraway was about, and if he owned the
pickup truck seen by Officer Holkum and Mr. McKinnis. The APD’s continued apathy toward
vital evidence was a pattern that permeated several murder investigations and displayed the
agency’s inability to properly handle cases of this magnitude. (Dkt.# 123, Ex.#s 46 & 61).
Further, Mr. McKinnis’ interview with police continued their leads into the gray- primered
pickup truck that Mrs. Haraway departed in with an unknown White male. Officer Holkum and
Mr. McKinnis describe a Chevy pickup truck that conflicts with the description provided by David
and Lenny Timmons, and their uncle, Gene Whelchel. In those witnesses’ statements to OSBI
(also withheld from counsel), the men describe the pickup as being “late 60’s – 70’s,” “’72 pickup
possible dull dark blue with grey primer spots and a conventional straight bed,” and “light colored
full size pick-up possibly early ‘70’s, not a narrow bed.” (Ex.#44, OSBI 0060- 0063). The fact
that the truck was seen at the store as early as forty-five minutes before Mrs. Haraway’s abduction,
changes the profile of who may have taken her. Clearly, that person could not have been Mr.

26

The haphazard way the police investigation transpired is important to Mr. Fontenot’s defense because of the six
month delay in making an arrest, the specious information that led to his arrest, and the cumulative evidence
establishing both an alternative motive and suspect from the crime scene.
27

“Ladies and gentlemen, around 8:30 on April 28th, 1984, death drove up in front of McAnally’s in a gray primered
Chevrolet pickup, parked facing east in the drive …”

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Fontenot since he did not have access to such a truck and Mr. McKinnis who was a long-time
acquaintance, said Mr. Fontenot was not the man behind the counter.
Law enforcement’s failure to investigate the witness accounts they had in hand
demonstrates a consistent pattern of failing to develop evidence. See Bowen v. Maynard, 799 F.2d
593, 613 (10th Cir. 1986)(explaining that a Brady violation may occur because, “A common trial
tactic of defense lawyers is to discredit the caliber of the investigation or the decision to charge
the defendant, and we may consider such use in assessing a possible Brady violation.”); see also
Lindsey v. King, 769 F.2d 1034, 1042 (5th Cir. 1985).
c. Gary Haney & Guy Keys
Both Gary Haney and Guy Keys contacted police in response to Detective Dennis Smith’s
request for information carried in local television and newspapers. Mr. Haney states he was in
McAnally’s with his son about 8 p.m. and stayed about ten to twelve minutes. (Dkt.# 123, Ex.#
4). He said nothing unusual transpired during their time in the store. Id. The register tape does not
give a time for his arrival at the store. His purchase which took place after both Officer Holkum
and Mr. McKinnis. (Dkt.# 123, Ex.# 35). Mr. Keys also recalled being in the store on that day and
telling the police the same facts. (Ex.# 7). He is noted as arriving at McAnally’s at 8:25 pm. (Dkt.#
123, Ex.# 32). For both gentlemen, no police reports document how they had responded to
Detective Smith’s request for information, what, if any details they provided the APD, and
whether that information was developed by police in some meaningful fashion.
The timing of Mr. Key’s visit to McAnally’s is critical because it is five minutes before
David and Lenny Timmons arrived at McAnally’s with their uncle. If their account of arriving
close to 8:30 pm is true, then three other purchases must have been made in quick
succession to allow for the last transaction of a tallboy beer. (Dkt.# 123, Ex.# 33) (highlighted
in yellow)(emphasis added).
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Other evidence casts doubt regarding the timing of Mrs. Haraway’s disappearance.
Witnesses who arrived at McAnally’s only to find it empty prior to the Timmons’ arrival. A family
coming to get gas entered the store to find that Mrs. Haraway was not there. (Dkt.# 123, Ex.# 56).
Such witness accounts place further doubt about when precisely Mrs. Haraway went missing and
the circumstances surrounding her disappearance. Establishing the timing of Mrs. Haraway’s
departure from the convenience store is essential to proving to the jury that Mr. Fontenot was at a
party with numerous people during this timeframe.
Whether the APD received other calls which may have filled in the missing transactions
is unknown since no reports concerning who was in the store were provided to defense counsel.
This information would have been extremely helpful to narrow down the time when Mrs.
Haraway went missing. That supported Mr. Fontenot’s alibi, the possible people who had motive
to abduct her, and the pickup truck present around the store for thirty minutes prior to her
abduction. None of this evidence was ever presented at any of Mr. Fontenot’s trials, apparently
was not given to the prosecution via the OSBI prosecutorial, was not provided in post-conviction,
and continues to be withheld from Mr. Fontenot’s counsel.
d. Gene Whelchel
The last notation on the register tape lists a transaction with Gene Whelchel at 9:00 pm.
(Ex.# 37). Mr. Whelchel testified that he arrived at McAnally’s around 8:30 pm. (N/T 6/9/1988).
After realizing there was no clerk in the store, he called the owner of the store, the manager, and
the Ada Police.( N/T 6/9/1988 p. 63). The dispatch logs from the APD show the call at 8:50 pm.
(Dkt.# 123, Ex.# 41). The police responded to the scene shortly thereafter.( N/T 6/9/1985 p. 8586). After the initial APD patrol arrived, Detective Mike Baskins arrived at McAnally’s to start
the investigation. (P/H p. 462, 464). At the time the APD and the Detectives arrived, the crime
scene should have been secured to preserve evidence, e.g. fingerprints, cigarette butts, beer cans,
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Mrs. Haraway’s purse, all of which were found on the counter.(N/T 6/9/1985 p. 103-110-111;
J/T 1259-1240, 1422-23, 1439, 1441, 1447-1448). Instead, the police failed to secure the crime
scene. (Dkt.# 123, Ex.# 20). At the very minimum, had defense counsel known about the 9:00
p.m. transaction, numerous lines of cross-examination and impeachment would have been
pursued not only for law enforcement, but for Mr. Whelchel and the Timmons brothers, the
prosecution’s sole eyewitnesses. Police malfeasance that caused loss or degradation of evidence
was something defense counsel was entitled to use to investigate and pursue through direct and
cross examination. See Kyles, 514 U.S. at 445 (discussing how evidence can be material if its
disclosure helps defense counsel attack the thoroughness of law enforcement investigations).
Challenging the timing of events and the convenience store evidence was a key issue to Mr.
Fontenot’s defense. Uncertainty about the timing casts further doubt on Mr. Fontenot’s confession
and the quality of the police investigation. Specifically, defense counsel could have asked Mr.
Whelchel why his purchase was rung up after the police arrived and by whom. Mr. Butner could
have asked Monroe Atkeson, McAnally’s manager, who was there when police arrived, whether
he rung up the transaction, and if he knew any details of the sales that night.
Defense counsel would have examined witnesses about the names, dates, and purchases
from the register tape from Mr. Whelchel and the Timmons brothers to probe the accuracy of their
accounts. Further, the defense would have had the information necessary to cross examine
detectives about proper procedure for securing the crime scene and why the procedure was not
followed during a robbery and abduction. The continued pattern by the APD of failing to properly
document witness contacts and other crucial evidence underscores the lack of credibility and
reliability of their investigation and casts significant doubt about their ability to properly determine
what happened at McAnally’s.
Additionally, knowing the accounts of people in McAnally’s in the moments leading up
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to Mrs. Haraway’s disappearance supports Mr. Fontenot’s undisclosed alibi in two regards:
First, it would have been of utmost importance to the defense to inquire if anyone saw Mr.
Fontenot at the store. The withheld reports provide more people who were interviewed, shown
lineups, and did not inculpate Mr. Fontenot. They provide descriptions of men seen in the store
which support the possibility that either the man was known to Mrs. Haraway, or it could have
been someone stalking her beforehand. Without the benefits of the reports, defense counsel was
deprived of the opportunity of developing these defenses. Second, it provides a profile of a suspect
who did commit this crime. At least two witnesses who did not testify saw the primered truck at
McAnally’s. These witnesses also remember a gray pickup truck being at McAnally’s for much
longer than the prosecution asserts. The truck did not belong to Mrs. Haraway nor anyone who
was employed at the store. Whomever owned the truck either abducted Mrs. Haraway, or had
knowledge of what transpired in the store. In either situation, the police failed to investigate this
obvious lead and deprived Mr. Butner of the opportunity to do the same for his client.
3.

Floyd DeGraw

Shortly after Mrs. Haraway’s disappearance, the APD focused their attention on a
suspect arrested in Texas for assaulting another woman named Donna.(Dkt.# 123, Ex.# 24). Police
mentioned to the press that Floyd DeGraw was a possible suspect in the Haraway case. (Dkt.#
123, Ex.# 26) This was the extent of information given by law enforcement into Mr. DeGraw’s
potential involvement. However, the APD and OSBI extensively investigated Mr. DeGraw. Their
investigation took place from shortly after April 28th until after December 1984, two months after
Mr. Fontenot was charged with Mrs. Haraway’s abduction and murder. (Ex.# 44, OSBI 07470750, 0751, 0754-0759). What is unclear is why these agencies, so focused in finding Mrs.
Haraway, stopped investigating Mr. DeGraw when his statements and behavior continued to
implicate himself in her abduction.
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Mr. DeGraw came to the attention of Pontotoc County law enforcement as a suspect
when he was arrested in Amarillo, Texas on May 3, 1984, for raping Donna Ellis and leaving
her naked in a field. (Dkt.# 123, Ex.# 24). Mr. DeGraw had several other prior convictions
including serving three years for malicious wounding and is currently serving life
imprisonment for stabbing a woman to death. Dkt.# 123, (Ex.#s 44, OSBI 0014 & 47). When
arrested in Amarillo, police searched his car. Prior to Mr. DeGraw’s arrest, someone had
apparently removed the back seat. When the car was searched, police found jewelry and other
belongings of women from several Oklahoma cities along with a stolen driver’s license from
a woman in Ada. (Ex.# 24, at 16-18). Police also found pornographic materials depicting
violence against women. (OSBI 0713- 0722). While in custody in Texas, Detective Dennis
Smith relayed information to OSBI Agent Gary Davis who was tasked with interviewing Mr.
DeGraw for the OSBI. (Dkt.# 123, Ex.# 44, OSBI 0014). Agent Davis took along an OSBI
criminalist to document and examine the contents of Mr. DeGraw’s car.
OSBI Reports show Mr. DeGraw had told agents he left Detroit in a friend’s car heading
west sometime in April 1984. Id. During his drive, he picked up a hitchhiker, Jeffrey Johnson, and
they journeyed to visit Johnson’s friend in Memphis, Tennessee. Id. While in Memphis, they
stayed several hours at Gordon Elliott’s house before continuing west on April 27th. Id. When
asked if the men drove through Oklahoma, specifically stopping in Ada, Oklahoma, DeGraw was
adamant that he slept through his entire drive through the state; if they had stopped, it was not in
Ada. (Dkt.# 123, Ex.# 44, OSBI 0027). However, most, if not all of Mr. DeGraw’s story turned
out to be a lie as shown by OSBI’s later investigation.
Not only did the OSBI send agents to interview Mr. DeGraw and search his car, a
polygraph examination was arranged. On May 10, 1984, Mr. DeGraw was polygraphed by
Amarillo Detective Jimmy Stevens. During the examination, Detective Stevens asked several
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questions pertaining to the Haraway case.
Concerning the kidnapping of the girl in Ada, Oklahoma, do you intend to be
truthful about?” DeGraw was very deceptive on this question. Also, on question #6,
which was “About ten days ago did you participate in a kidnapping in Ada,
Oklahoma? Lieutenant Stevens stated that DeGraw was deceptive in this. Also,
question #10 which was, “Have you ever seen the girl whose pictures is on the wall
in front of you now?”, was deceptive, but other questions that were asked, the
response was very flat, and Lieutenant Stevens felt that overall DeGraw was not
involved in the kidnapping of this girl from Ada.
(Dkt.# 123, Ex.# 44, OSBI 0024).
Reports show Detective Lieutenant Stevens had invited the OSBI to evaluate the polygraph
data for themselves. However, the results, if any, of OSBI’s assessment of the polygraph are
unknown to defense because it was not included in the disclosed OSBI reports. Further, OSBI files
do not contain either the raw data received from Amarillo Police, or any other parts of their
investigation. (Dkt.# 123, Ex.# 24, at 16-18). Whatever the OSBI’s opinion of Mr. DeGraw, this
did not end their investigation or eliminate him as a suspect.
OSBI Agent Davis, along with the Amarillo police, showed Mr. DeGraw pictures of Denice
Haraway during their interrogation. While police pointed out numerous inconsistencies in his story
about traveling from Detroit, Mr. Degraw claimed the reason he had problems with questions
related to Mrs. Haraway was because his cousin was kidnapped and raped when he was twelve.
(Dkt.# 123, Ex.# 44, OSBI 0024). Mr. DeGraw also stated that his sister looked like Mrs.
Haraway. Id. When pressed further about Mrs. Haraway,
At one time during the conversation and as Agent Davis put the picture of the victim
from Ada before DeGraw, DeGraw held his head in his hands and appeared about
to break down, but after recomposing himself, lifted his head with his eyes very red
and stated that he did not know anything about the woman who was abducted in
Ada, but hoped we would find her alive. DeGraw then became irritable, pacing the
floor, saying he did not want to answer any more questions and continued doing
this while Agent Davis continued talking. DeGraw then insisted on being taken
back to his cell and not answering any more questions. . .
(Ex.# 44, OSBI 0027). Mr. DeGraw admitted stealing money for his journey and discussed a
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robbery which had occurred several years prior. (Ex.# 44, OSBI 0025). He also discussed his
institutionalization for mental health issues including his tendency to, “fly off the handle.” (Ex.#
44, OSBI 0026).
Agent Davis investigated Mr. DeGraw’s story and quickly found several untruths. He
obtained court files from Missouri showing that Jeff Johnson who Mr. DeGraw claimed to have
travelled with was incarcerated on murder charges when he was supposedly traveling with Mr.
DeGraw. (Dkt.# 123, Ex.# 45). Agent Davis reached out to the Calloway Police Department in
Missouri for Jeffrey Johnson’s murder investigation file.(Dkt.# 123, Ex.# 85). The first page of
notes detail that the file was mailed to Agent Davis on May 22nd. Id.
Also, Gordon Elliott, who was supposedly Johnson’s longtime friend, spoke more
familiarly with Mr. DeGraw after his arrest in Texas. (Ex.# 44, OSBI 0021 & 0023). OSBI
recorded the call between Elliott and Mr. DeGraw regarding the Haraway case, but that tape, or a
transcript of the conversation was not provided to defense counsel and has yet to be disclosed.
(Dkt.# 123, Ex.# 44, OSBI 0023). Very little of Mr. DeGraw’s story checked out once investigated
by OSBI. These discrepancies in Mr. DeGraw’s version of events were troubling given his past
violence towards women, his lies to police about his activities in Oklahoma, the drivers license of
a woman from Ada, the timing of the rape in Amarillo, and his incriminating statements and
conduct when interviewed by OSBI.
Why and if OSBI and Ada PD eliminated DeGraw as a suspect remains a mystery given
his story was completely fabricated. His acknowledged deception during the polygraph,
emotional breakdown when questioned further about Haraway, his proximity to Ada, mental
health issues, and his consistent violence towards women made Mr. DeGraw a likely suspect.
His booking photograph shows a striking similarity to the composite drawings released by
police. (Dkt.# 123, Ex.#s 24, at 23; 76; & 77).
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Mr. DeGraw would certainly have been a prime target for a defense attorney. It is unclear
why the police investigation into DeGraw stopped when his story as to who he traveled with
proved to be a complete fabrication. Defense counsel was entitled to know the extent to which the
OSBI and APD investigated DeGraw in the week after Mrs. Haraway’s disappearance.
Investigators continued to generate reports even after Mr. Fontenot was charged with her
abduction and murder. (Dkt.# 123, Ex.# 44, at 0747-0750, 0751, 0754-0759). The withheld
evidence not only provided a viable alternative suspect for the defense, but it was ripe ground for
impeachment of law enforcement, based upon their failure to fully explore Mr. DeGraw’s lies or
to competently explain why he was apparently cleared as a suspect. The prosecution’s willful
failure to disclose this valuable evidence to the defense is a serious violation of the trust placed in
the prosecutor by the judicial system.
The failure of the district attorney to disclose such important exculpatory evidence is a
violation of Mr. Fontenot’s constitutional rights. See Kyle, 514 at 446 (finding the cross
examination into flaws in the police investigation a viable avenue regarding Brady evidence); see
also Bowen v. Maynard, 799 F.2d 593, 612 (10th Cir. Okla. 1986) (granting habeas relief because
withheld evidence of a different suspect created a “reasonable doubt” and “in the hands of the
defense, it could have been used to uncover other leads and defense theories and to discredit the
police investigation of the murders”); Smith v. Secretary of N.M. Dep’t of Corrections, 50 F.3d.
801, 830 (10th Cir. 1995)(failure to disclose alternate suspect police report was a Brady violation
because, “it dramatically altered and limited the effectiveness of Mr. Smith’s defense at trial. .
.would have been useful in ‘discrediting the caliber of the investigation or the decision to charge
the defendant’”). The fact that the State continues to withhold taped conversations between
DeGraw and Elliott, polygraph data, and other evidence pertaining to the DeGraw investigation
continues to deprive Mr. Fontenot of his Fourteenth Amendment constitutional rights.
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4.

Withheld interview reports and taped statements of Jeff Miller and
Terri Holland (McCarthy)

The OSBI prosecutorial contains a table of contents. It details the evidence collected
during the investigation. This table was not previously provided to the defense. (Dkt.# 123, Ex.#
43, at 7- 8). Included in the list is all physical evidence supporting the OSBI’s case against Mr.
Fontenot and his codefendant, Tommy Ward. This table of contents reveals three specific items
that were not disclosed to defense counsel:
1. The audio recorded interview of Jeffrey Miller;
2. The video tape interview of Jeffrey Miller and;
3. The audio tape of Terri Holland.
Jeff Miller was the person Detective Smith testified had given police the information that
led to both Mr. Ward and Mr. Fontenot being questioned and later arrested. (P/H at 502).
Detective Smith testified that Mr. Miller provided information against O’Dell Titsworth prior to
October 12, 1984, in a statement to police. (P/H at 710).
Given that Mr. Titsworth could not have been involved in any crimes related to Mrs.
Haraway’s death because he was in police custody at the time, any statements made by Mr. Miller
were suspect. Whatever Mr. Miller said became the catalyst for the law enforcement investigation
against Mr. Fontenot. However, it is unknown exactly what Jeff Miller said to the Ada Police
because no report or, statements detailing what Mr. Miller said, have ever been disclosed to the
defense even though the police have acknowledged possessing such information. Jeff Miller never
testified at any hearing or trial about what information he provided inculpating Mr. Fontenot.
Further, it is unclear what investigation, other than the interrogations of Mr. Fontenot and Mr.
Ward, that law enforcement conducted to verify any of the information Mr. Miller provided.
The police investigation into what happened to Mrs. Haraway had stalled prior to
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whatever information Mr. Miller provided. The police investigation rested completely on
whatever information Mr. Miller provided to Detectives Baskins and Smith. The State opposed
any action to disclose the information gleaned from Mr. Miller based on the work product
28

doctrine.

(

P/H at 765-771).

The disclosure of Mr. Miller’s statements and recordings were specifically and repeatedly
requested by defense counsel. (P/H at 496, 501-508, 710-712). Mr. Butner sought to understand
why, after six months, the police focused on Mr. Ward which led them to Mr. Fontenot.

A.

We interviewed everyone and then we had some additional information that came
in.

Q.

From whom?

A.

Jeff Miller.

Q.

When did that come in, approximately?

A.

Prior to October 12th, I’m not sure of the exact date.

Q.

Who is Jeff Miller?

A.

He lives here in Ada, that’s about all I know about him.

Q.

Did you interview Mr. Miller?

A.

Yes, we did.

Q.

Where?

A.

In the Police Department.

Q.

The District Attorney has advised that he is not among the list of witnesses in this
case. Did you feel his information in this case was pertinent, that it was
informative and useful?

28 

The work product doctrine does not excuse a prosecutor’s obligation to disclose Brady materials. See generally
Castleberry v. Crisp, 414 F. Supp. 945 (N.D. OK 1976). While a prosecutor’s thoughts and impressions are protected,
if there is exculpatory or impeachment evidence, that must be disclosed to a defendant prior to trial. See United States
v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 474-75, 116 S. Ct. 1480, 134 L. Ed. 2d 687 (1996) (Breyer, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment) (presupposing Brady overrides work-product doctrine)

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A.

Yes.

Q.

Do you have knowledge as to why he’s not being used as a witness?

A.

No, I don’t.

Q.

And it’s from his statement that you went back to Ward, is that correct?

A.

Well, it’s from his – what he told us, but the information that he had was from
someone else.

Q.

From whom?

A.

Several people I ---

Q.

Let me have their names please.

A.

I can’t think of them right off.

Ada Police Detective Mike Baskins. (P/H 1/14/85 at 501-502).
Defense counsel repeatedly requested Mr. Miller’s statements, or the people he mentioned
leading to Mr. Ward and Mr. Fontenot. Id. However, the district attorney fought any disclosure of
this evidence. “Judge, Mr. Wyatt doesn’t have any right to any more discovery than he had before,
and by standing up here and saying "they may be exculpatory" has nothing to do with whether
they are or not. And this police officer does not have to turn him over -- what he's trying to find
out, Judge, is [work] product, and he can’t do that through this mechanism or through a motion
for discovery or anything else.” Id. at 503. The trial court did order the disclosure of any of the
names Jeff Miller provided to police or his statements to police.
Terri (McCarthy) Holland testified during the preliminary hearing about hearing both Mr.
Fontenot and Mr. Ward confess to participating in the murder of Mrs. Haraway. She told a jail
trustee of her conversation with Mr. Fontenot. (P/H at 878-879). Afterwards, DA investigator
Lloyd Bond came to interview them concerning her statement. Id. at 883-884. Ms. Holland was
serving three years for hot checks. Id. at 888-889. She claimed to have heard Mr. Fontenot’s
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incriminating statements while being held at the Pontotoc County Jail. Strategically, she had been
placed by the Pontotoc County Sheriff in a cell across from him for nine days. Id. at 901.
A. Yeah, I hollered at Karl. Well, see, Ron Scott told us not to talk to each other.
Q. And who is Ron Scott?
A. The jailer.
Q. Okay.
A. The head jailer over there.
Q. And he told you not to talk to each other, is that correct?
A. Right. So, when he left the room and locked the big door, the first thing I do was holler
at Karl. Well, at first he wouldn’t answer me, and I guess it was about ten minutes and he
hollered at me, and he wanted a cigarette. And as the conversation went, I asked him what
he was in there for, and he told me.
Q. What did he tell you he was in for?
A. he told me that they – He asked me if I knew Donna Haraway; and I told him no, I
didn’t. And it just went from there, he told me about what had happened.
Q. Would you tell the Court what he told you, please.
A. He told me that him and Odell and Tommy went to the store; that Tommy and Odell
went in and got her; they took her out to an old house; there Odell raped her and then
Tommy; she run from Tommy; Tommy caught her. In the process, somehow, he cut her
down the arm and bit her on the titty, and Odell stabbed her to death, he killed her; then
Karl raped her. Uh – yeah, they kicked her off in a rotty part of the floor and poured
gasoline on her and burned her.
29

Id. at 890-891. During her cross examination, she acknowledged being interviewed by deputy
Tom Turner and videotaped by OSBI Agent Rogers a month after hearing Mr. Fontenot’s
supposed confession. Id. at 897-898. Mr. Butner requested access to her videotape statement to

29 

Ms. Holland’s cell was across from Mr. Fontenot’s even though he was moved to a juvenile section at one point.
(P/H 854, 872, 890-891). She then admitted she was trustee allowing her access to other area of the jail. Id. at 891.

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30

which both Mr. Peterson and Mr. Ross objected. Id. at 907-908. The trial court overruled the
defense request for the video. Id.
After the trial court found probable cause to hold Mr. Fontenot over for trial, Ms. Holland
testified during the joint trial. (J/T. at 1824). Ms. Holland admitted getting married in between the
preliminary hearing and her trial testimony on September 18, 1985. (J/T. at 1823). Her trial
testimony was consistent with her preliminary hearing testimony. (J/T at 1823-1854). However,
the district attorney still had not, and has never divulged the videotape or any police reports
concerning Ms. Holland’s statements about the jailhouse confession.
31

Ms. Holland was a known snitch who had previously served the district attorney in
30

Belying the DA’s office statement of open file discovery and disclosure, they fought any release of information
concerning witnesses. Regarding Ms. Holland, who had a history of providing such testimony, Mr. Peterson stated:
MR. PETERSON: First of all, Your Honor -- May, we approach the bench? They're entitled to sworn statements of
the Defendant. Okay? Sworn statements of any witness, that they're getting right now; and any statements by the
Defendant to law enforcement. Now, I fail to see where this woman is a law enforcement officer. (P/H 907-908).
Mr. Ross countered a defense counsel request for inconsistent statements:
MR. ROSS: Your Honor, in that these are right along the line of a prior written statement, they don't have a right to
see that. If there's an inconsistency -- only if we bring out an inconsistency, do they have a right to view it. We have
not done that with Ms. McCartney. I don't think they have a right to see the video tape until after the Defendants have
been bound over for trial. Id. at 909.
31

When she came forward claiming to have heard Mr. Fontenot confess, she also heard Ron Williamson confess at
the same time. The United States District Court found this problematic in Mr. Williamson’s habeas corpus litigation.
(pgs. 33-35, 61-62). During the Williamson & Fritz 42 USC §1983 civil litigation, Bill Peterson, Pontotoc County
District Attorney at the time of these trials, was asked about Terri Holland’s testimony in other cases and the Haraway
murder was discussed:
“Q All right. Did you know Terri Holland before this case?
A I knew of her.
Q Had you ever put her on as a witness before?
A Boy, I think she's-- as I'm sitting here, my memory is that she's testified, that I know of, in two different cases,
two homicides.
Q All right. One was the Haraway case?
A Yes.
Q That's the book that was called-- written about it called "The Dreams of Ada"?
A Yeah. That' s a book that was written about his idea of what the case was yeah.
Q And the Haraway murder case, Dennis Smith and Gary Rogers were also lead investigators?
A They were part of the investigative team, yes.
Q And were there also confessions in that case from some of the defendants that involved their statements that they
dreamed about the crime?
A No, sir. That's not how it happened at all.
Q Were there any such statements from defendants?
A There was videotaped statements of both Fritz and -- excuse me -- Fontenot and Ward making statements that

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another case in which she had claimed to have heard similar incriminating comments from
another inmate. (Dkt.# 123, Ex.# 61) (discussing her testimony in the Williamson case where
she supposedly overheard him confess to a murder).
A written version of her statement to Deputy Turner was included in the 860 plus pages of
OSBI Reports. (Dkt.# 123, Ex.# 44 at 282-289). Again, none of these documents had been
provided to the defense until long after all trials and well into the post-conviction process. The
withheld statement was taken on November 6, 1984, and contradicts several statements made by
Ms. Holland during her preliminary hearing testimony and trial testimony. Id. at 282. She
interweaved conversations with Mr. Ward, Mr. Titsworth, and Mr. Fontenot while also explaining
how all of this was relayed to other officers or jail personnel. Id. One commonality in Ms.
Holland’s withheld report was the inconsistency in the statements she attributes to Mr.
Fontenot.
Because the District Attorney failed to turn over this statement, Mr. Butner was unable to
impeach Ms. Holland’s inconsistent testimony during the preliminary hearing and joint trial.
(P/H. at 888-927). Just as important, it is unknown what transpired during the taped statement that
could have further undermined her credibility, or shed light on the benefits received for her
testimony. Her conduct in this case mirrors her testimony in the Williamson-Fritz wrongful

were very incriminatory, and at the end of Mr. Ward's statement, Mike-- excuse me—Dennis Smith asked him the
question, "is there anything else you would like to add to this?" And he said, "It all seems like a dream now."
Q Okay. Now—
A So there's where we get "Dreams of Ada."
Q So other than the Haraway case and this case, was there any other time that you had used Terri Holland as a
witness?
A Not to my memory.
Q And in both cases you used her as a jailhouse informant?
A. She happened to be in the jail at the same time these people, all these people were in jail. Yeah.
Q. All right. Now I’m showing you page --A She was not the entire case against Tommy Ward and Karl Fontenot.”
(Peterson Vol II, p. 360-362; Rogers Vol II, p. 415 similar testimony). 

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convictions. Ms. Holland received substantial benefits for her role in assisting the district attorney.
It appears Ms. Holland also got rewarded for her testimony by the prosecutor in this case, though
it has never been admitted by the prosecution. Randy Holland, Ms. Holland’s husband during the
time of Mr. Fontenot’s trial, explained the extent of her deals for her testimony:
I was formerly married to Terri Holland, now deceased. Terri and I got married
while I was an inmate at the Pontotoc County Jail, on September 4, 1985.
I was facing up to forty years, but Terri made a deal with Bill Peterson, the district
attorney in Pontotoc County. She agreed to testify for him in the state’s case against
Tommy Ward and Karl Fontenot. In exchange for her testimony, I was to receive
seven years on my pending case and we were given permission to marry while I
was in jail.
I only found out about the deal Terri made with Bill Peterson when Terri and I got
into an argument. We were living near the dam on Ft. Gibson Lake, in about 1992.
This was a very intense argument, and she let me know at that time what she had
done for me.
(Dkt.# 123, Ex.#s 10, 86). Clearly, any benefits conferred on a witness for the state, must be
disclosed to defense counsel. See U.S. v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667 (1985); Douglas v. Workman, 560
F.3d 1156 (10th Cir. 2009). The State only used Ms. Holland as a witness during the preliminary
hearing, However, this does not remove the constitutional obligation to disclose impeachment
evidence.
5.

OSBI Reports of Mrs. Haraway’s Fear of Being Stalked.

Several withheld interview reports indicate Mrs. Haraway was scared about working at
McAnally’s not only due to the clientele, but more importantly because of the harassing telephone
calls she received during her shifts. Whomever this man was making these harassing calls knew
her work schedule. Many of Mrs. Haraway’s friends, family, and co-workers knew this, and told
police, but the prosecution disclosed none of their statements to the defense.
James Watt, a co-worker, explained that Mrs. Haraway told him these calls had stopped
for a period in the early months of 1984, but began again in the weeks leading up to her
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disappearance. (Dkt.# 123, Ex.#s 15 & 62). Mrs. Haraway only worked at McAnally’s in the
evenings from Thursday to Sunday. (Dkt.# 123, Ex.# 15). All the witnesses agreed that these
calls, always from a man, greatly distressed her, her family, and her co-workers. Mrs. Haraway’s
sister, Janet, stated the fact that Mrs. Haraway was afraid of someone and did not like to work at
McAnally’s.
According to Janet, Donna told her on the phone she hated working at the store
because it did not have an alarm and a lot of weirdo’s come in and out of the store.
She told Janet that she was going to look for another job because she felt uneasy
working at the store alone at night. She told Janet that the phone calls had started
again but didn’t go into the whole story. Janet said that earlier Donna had
been receiving calls at work from a man that said he was going to come out to
the store some night and wait outside while he was working. She said that
Donna was upset because she had asked for the night off and a guy refused to
work, and she had to work anyway.

(Dkt.# 123, Ex.# 43, prosecutorial bates 20, 109) (emphasis added). This information was also
relayed to police by the store manager, Monroe Atkeson, about a conversation he had with Steve
Haraway, the victim’s husband.
Steve told Atkeson that a Vietnam Veteran had been harassing Donna and Donna
had received several obscene telephone calls. Atkeson had seen the veteran that
Steve spoke of and Atkeson described the veteran as a white male, six feet, 190
pounds, black hair, brown eyes, mustache, light complexion, usually drove a white
Chevrolet Chevette and bought a soft drink. Atkeson believed that the veteran
attended a rehabilitation school in Okmulgee.
(Dkt.# 123, Ex.# 44, OSBI 0006). The police also spoke with Steve Haraway who confirmed the
calls his wife received while working at McAnally’s. “Steve received a phone call from the police
who told him that his wife was missing. He knew of no one that Donna was having problems
with at the store, other than she had received two to three obscene phone calls at the store. The
last phone call was two or three weeks prior to her disappearance.” (Dkt.# 123, Ex.# 43,
prosecutorial bates 20). Clearly, the people closest to Mrs. Haraway were aware of a potential
threat that continued for months and weeks prior to April 28th.
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Another withheld document was a report from co-worker James D. Watts who testified for
the State at Mr. Fontenot’s trial. In an interview with the Pontotoc County Sheriff’s Office on July
25, 1985, Mr. Watt explained that “Denice had told me of some obscene phone calls she had
received at the store for a while, these calls upset her a great deal. She could not recognize the
voice over the phone and the calls stopped about one month before she disappeared.” (Dkt.# 123,
32

Ex.# 62).

The State did not turn over any of these vital reports to the defense. Information related to
potential suspects falls within the evidence a prosecutor must disclose to defense counsel. See
Kyles, 514 U.S. at 446 (evidence of alternative suspects allows the defense to attack “the reliability
of the investigation” if it shows that investigators were less than energetic in exploring other
potential suspects . . . After all, a “common trial tactic of defense lawyers is to discredit the caliber
of the investigation or the decision to charge the defendant . . ..”); Trammell v. McKune, 485 F.3d
546, 552 (10th Cir. 2007) (suppressing evidence of alternative suspects “could also have been used
to cast doubt on police officers’ decision to focus their attention . . . on [the defendant] rather than”
the other suspects).
Had reports from OSBI and the Sheriff’s office been disclosed, they would have aided
Mr. Fontenot’s defense to investigate alternate suspects who had intent along with motive and
opportunity to harm Mrs. Haraway. It is obvious from these statements that a likely suspect
existed that had been stalking Ms. Haraway for months, and provided a much more likely
suspect than Mr. Fontenot.
These statements tied in with the interview report of Anthony Johnson. Mr. Johnson, a

32

The duplicate version found in the District Attorney’s files pursuant to this Court’s subpoena shows notes from
one of the trials illustrating the prosecution’s awareness of this document despite his statements to the contrary.
(Dkt.# 123, Ex.# 78 at 50-51).

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frequent customer at McAnally’s, remembered a conversation he had with Mrs. Haraway a week
before her disappearance.
Johnson is a co-worker with Tommy Ward’s sister, Tricia Wolf in an Ada,
Oklahoma plant. Johnson admitted to this investigator that one week before
Haraway’s disappearance he was in the McAnally’s convenience store when
Haraway asked him where she could buy a gun. Haraway referenced the need for a
gun with some funny calls she had recently been receiving. Haraway said she didn’t
really know who was making the calls, and that the caller never really said anything,
just did some heavy breathing on the phone. Johnson asked Haraway if she had any
ex-boyfriends that could be making these calls and said that Johnson was of the
opinion that she knew who was making the calls but did not seem to want to indicate
who it was.
(Dkt.# 123, Ex.# 22). Mrs. Haraway was so afraid of the stalker that she wanted a gun to keep at
the store as protection. With such evidence, the defense could have pursed other witnesses who
would have known of Mrs. Haraway’s fears and potentially identified the alternate suspect.
Further, just two days before Mrs. Haraway went missing, she spoke with Darlene Adams, another
customer at McAnally’s. Mrs. Haraway explained to Ms. Adams she was afraid working at night
33

at the store, but her schedule would not be changed. (Dkt.# 123, Ex.# 3).
The State failed in two regards concerning this information. First, this evidence should
have been investigated in 1984, particularly because this information came from those closest to
Mrs. Haraway. This is not a situation where only one person made a side comment about a few
weird telephone calls. Instead, numerous people, including her husband, manager, co-worker,
customers, and mother were aware of this conduct. They immediately shared this information
with police in the hopes that it would assist in their investigation into her mysterious
disappearance. Instead, the police ignored it completely. At the time, it would have been possible

33 

Another line of inquiry could have been to Monroe Atkeson, McAnally’s store manager, about his awareness of
Mrs. Haraway’s fear about working in the store. Mr. Butner could have cross-examined him about the obscene phone
calls during her shift, or why he refused to change her schedule given her statements about the strange men in the
store.

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for law enforcement to pull McAnally’s telephone records to see who called the store. Further,
OSBI and APD could have cross-referenced callers with customers.
Second, despite their obligations, the police or prosecution kept this critical information
from defense counsel. This evidence should have been disclosed because it clearly points to
another person who watched and threatened the victim and could have generated additional
exculpatory evidence if investigated. See Bowen, 799 F.2d at 613.
D.

Prejudice from The Non-Disclosure of Exculpatory Evidence

No one in Mr. Fontenot’s defense had access to the OSBI or APD reports showing any of
the new witnesses accounts from McAnally’s, alternate suspects—including Floyd DeGraw,
witnesses supporting Mr. Fontenot’s alibi, the stalker of Mrs. Haraway, and the reports of Jeff
Miller’s statements and Terri Holland’s deal. Despite both trial and appellate counsel’s repeated
requests and attempts to gain access to such crucial information, exculpatory and vital
impeachment evidence was squelched. The withheld evidence clearly fell within the gambit of
the defense discovery pleadings and would have been vital to a defense.
Mr. Fontenot’s trial counsel, George Butner, received none of the evidence discussed
above as “newly discovered evidence of innocence” or “Brady” material. During his deposition,
he explained the flaws in the District Attorney’s open file policy and law enforcement’s
withholding of evidence from the defense.
You-- you go in. You sit down. I -- I want everything you've got. I want
your discovery. And if they -- if they mean that they're -- you're (sic) going to give
you the case file and let you go through it, then that's -- if the policy, the open file
policy, is appropriate, all of the things from 8 law enforcement should, in fact, be
in it, but we have discovered in other cases that not everything from law
enforcement is available and it seems to be more likely than not something that may
be classified as a Brady – Brady matter, because I'm -- I'm only speculating, but I
figure that law enforcement, if they went out and talked to George Butner about the
Donna Denice Haraway killing and I was in Zambia at the time, that it -- it was not
disclosed, okay. I mean, I just don't think that the law enforcement gathered
everything that they did to allow proper examination in the open file policy by
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defense counsel.

(Dkt.# 123, Ex.# 81 at 44).
And Mr. Peterson's position was that law enforcement was the integral part of his
being district attorney. Keep law enforcement happy, he stays with it a long time.
And, so, he -- I don't think -- to be perfectly honest with you, my opinion is that he
did not exercise appropriate professional supervision in requiring law enforcement
to get him the appropriate stuff. I mean – and Bill takes a lot of heat for this, but I
think they try it like the law enforcement officers want it tried and so law
enforcement officers sometimes just give him what they think he needs and so --

Id. at 16. Further, in his statement, Mr. Butner explained that he did not receive the OSBI
reports during his representation of Mr. Fontenot. As is now clear, these files were not in the
District Attorney’s open file by their own admission.
I represented Karl Fontenot from late 1984 through 1988, for Karl's first and second
trials. I did not represent Karl during his appeals. I handled all pre-trial and trial
matters for both trials including the preliminary hearing. During the scope of my
representation, I filed numerous pretrial motions requesting discovery and
disclosures of records, physical evidence, investigation reports, witness statements,
records, and other evidence pertaining to the disappearance and homicide of Donna
Denice Haraway. Additionally, I made numerous motions on the record during the
preliminary hearing and at various points in the trial asking for access to evidence,
police reports, and other evidence within the custody of law enforcement and
Pontotoc District Attorney's Office. In most cases, these requests were denied.
Tiffany Murphy, Director of the Oklahoma Innocence Project, provided me with
860 pages of Oklahoma State Bureau of Investigation reports (OSBI) of their
investigation of Donna Denice Haraway's disappearance, Central Office of the
Chief Medical Examiner's file, and photographs of McAnally's register tape from
4/28/1984. After reviewing these materials, I did not receive any of the OSBI
Reports from the Pontotoc District Attorney's Office or from OSBI prior to
either of Mr. Fontenot's trials. Additionally, I do not believe I received the whole
44 pages of ME's Office files. While I know the McAnally's register tape was
admitted at trial as a state's exhibit, I received no police reports about the
names, telephone numbers, and times of the men mentioned on the tape
regarding any interviews related to the events of April 28, 1984.
During both trials, my main focus was proving Mr. Fontenot's innocence. Any
evidence which would support proving his innocence was paramount.
Evidence that the law enforcement investigation strongly considered alternate
suspects for Ms. Haraway's abduction and murder would have been evidence
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that fit in the defense's innocence case. I was unaware of the extensive
investigation done into Floyd DeGraw by Ada Police Detective Dennis Smith,
OSBI Agents Gary Rogers and Gary Davis. I did not know he was polygraphed by Agent Davis and that DeGraw showed indications of deception
when asked about Ms. Haraway. Further, when DeGraw was interrogated by
Davis and Texas law enforcement, he grew agitated when asked about Mrs.
Haraway and abruptly ended the interview. Police reports related to
DeGraw's investigation, his rape conviction in Texas, and the possessions of
belonging from Oklahoma women would have been extremely important to
Mr. Fontenot's case.
Further, I was unaware that Ms. Haraway received obscene phone calls while
at work during the months and weeks leading up to her disappearance. I never
saw reports from various people like Monroe Atkeson, Janet Lyons, James
David Watts and others describing Ms. Haraway's great concern about a man
making obscene phone calls only while she worked at McAnally's. Janet's
report providing the names of all of Ms. Haraway's ex-boyfriends would have
been extremely helpful to determine if they were the source of these calls or
had motive to cause her harm. Also, Janet's comment that Ms. Haraway hated
working at McAnally is because it did not have an alarm, her knowledge that
the obscene phone calls continued to occur, and the bizarre people who came
into the store at night would have been helpful to establish Karl's innocence.
These OSBI reports would have been extremely helpful to further the defense
investigation into alternate suspects or people around McAnally's who were
watching Ms. Haraway.
I was unaware of the numerous OSBI reports supporting Mr. Fontenot's alibi
of attending Gordon Calhoun's party during the time Mrs. Haraway went
missing. Impeachment evidence from the OSBI reports regarding Gordon
Calhoun's interview that the party could have been the weekend of April 27th
or 28th was vital. This information ·would have helped substantiate Karl's
alibi during the time Ms. Haraway disappeared. Janette Roberts' report about
the party and Karl's attendance was important because I would have called
her to testify during the defense case-in-chief. I was unaware that Ada Police
Officer Larry Scott responded to one of the dispatch calls listed on the state's
radio log exhibit. Officer Scott's police report about responding to Gordon
Calhoun's party supported the alibi that the police were aware of the party.
Finally, I was not provided Karl's poly-graphed statement where he admits
being at the party. Such evidence would have been extremely useful to build a
viable defense that Karl had nothing to do with Mrs. Haraway's disappearance
and homicide.

(Dkt.# 123, Ex.# 16)(emphasis added).
The impact this evidence would have had on either of Mr. Fontenot’s trials or how Mr.

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Butner would have utilized such evidence is incalculable. (P/H. at 496, 502-503, 769; J/T at 18161817);( Dkt.# 123, Ex.# 81). Instead, defense counsel during both trials lacked the necessary
evidence to provide not only a viable defense to the state’s charges, but an alternative theory of
the crime, several alternate suspects, along with impeachment evidence for many of the State’s
witnesses. It is evident, in the absence of such exculpatory evidence, Mr. Fontenot did not,
“receive[] a fair trial, understood as a trial resulting in a verdict worthy of confidence.” Kyles,
514 U.S. at 434.
The egregious conduct by the State extends beyond the trial through Mr. Fontenot’s direct
appeal when the state discovered the remains of the victim. Appellate counsel properly sought
discovery of relevant evidence including the medical examiner’s reports, police reports, crime
scene information, and other related evidence. (Ex.#s 57 & 58). Although the trial court granted
her access to such evidence; the State continued to withhold the full medical examiner’s report,
photographs of the crime scene and other relevant evidence that would assist in the appeal. (Dkt.#
123, Ex.# 59).
During my representation of Mr. Fontenot in his first direct appeal, skeletal remains
later identified as Donna Denice Haraway were discovered on approximately
January 20 or 21, 1986, near Gerty in Hughes County, Oklahoma. Due to the timing
of this discovery and the unique circumstances of the case, and in anticipation of
filing a motion for new trial based on newly discovered evidence, I filed a Motion
to Disclose and Produce in Pontotoc County District Court on January 30, 1986,
regarding the discovery of the remains, the condition of the remains and the Hughes
County crime scene, and any interviews, reports, or investigations in connection
therewith. I further requested all material which was exculpatory or favorable to
Mr. Fontenot, which might be used to impeach prosecution witnesses who had
testified at his trial, or which might lead to the discovery of same. At a hearing on
this motion conducted March 3, 1986, I made a supplemental discovery request
asking for all statements placing or tending to place any other suspect or suspects
at or near the location of the discovery of Ms. Haraway's remains.
On March 3, 1986, the Pontotoc County District Court entered an Order granting
all of my discovery requests excepting only oral statements never reduced to
writing. In granting my motion, the district court ordered, inter alia, that reports,
medical examiner findings and photographs pertaining to the discovery of the
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remains, the examination of the remains, the analysis of the remains and any other
physical evidence uncovered at the crime scene be produced. Based upon this Order
the Pontotoc County District Attorney's Office disclosed to me two pages of
Oklahoma State Bureau of Investigation (OSBI) Criminalistics Examination
Reports and three pages of reports from the Office of the Chief Medical Examiner
for the State of Oklahoma. These five documents were appended to the Motion for
New Trial on Newly Discovered Evidence I filed with the Oklahoma Court of
Criminal Appeals on August 8, 1986. These five documents were the entirety of the
records disclosed to me by the State.
In the fall of 2012, Tiffany Murphy contacted me regarding the Oklahoma
Innocence Project's (OIP) review of Mr. Fontenot's case. We discussed what law
enforcement reports and records were disclosed to me in connection with the abovedescribed discovery proceedings. Ms. Murphy questioned me concerning
approximately 860 pages of Bates stamped OSBI reports, which I did not recall
ever having seen. In March of 2013, I reviewed approximately 860 pages of Batesstamped OSBI reports, apparently obtained by OIDS after I left employment there.
After I reviewed these documents, I confirmed to Ms. Murphy that I do not
recall ever having seen them before, although I had seen the two OSBI
documents and three medical examiner documents described in the previous
paragraph when they were disclosed to me by the Pontotoc County District
Attorney's office but without Bates stamps on them. In April of 2013, the OIP
sent me additional police reports, witness statements and other documents for
my review to ascertain whether they were disclosed to me during my
representation of Mr. Fontenot.
During litigation of Mr. Fontenot's direct appeal and his motion for new trial
based on newly discovered evidence, my main focus was his innocence. To that
end, any evidence which would support proving his innocence was paramount.
Evidence that law enforcement strongly considered alternate suspects for Ms.
Haraway's abduction and murder would have fit into the defense's case for
innocence.
(Dkt.# 123, Ex.# 11)(emphasis added). Neither counsel for Mr. Fontenot was required to continue
to seek such evidence. Banks v. Dretke, 540 U.S. 668, 695 (2004) (holding that defense counsel is
not required to scavenge for evidence the State was obligated to disclose). Instead they are entitled
to rely on the prosecution to do its job in meeting its constitutional obligations to disclose such
evidence. “Our decisions lend no support to the notion that defendants must scavenge for hints of
undisclosed Brady material when the prosecution represents that all such material has been
disclosed. As we observed in Strickler, defense counsel has no ‘procedural obligation to assert

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constitutional error on the basis of mere suspicion that some prosecutorial misstep may have
occurred.’" Id. at 695-696.
This Court’s evaluation of Mr. Fontenot’s Brady claim rests on whether the evidence puts
the case within an entirely different light concerning the evidence presented at trial and that which
was impermissibly withheld. When evaluating the evidence withheld, the Court must conduct a
cumulative evaluation of the evidence.
While the definition of Bagley materiality in terms of the cumulative effect of
suppression must accordingly be seen as leaving the government with a degree of
discretion, it must also be understood as imposing a corresponding burden. On the
one side, showing that the prosecution knew of an item of favorable evidence
unknown to the defense does not amount to a Brady violation, without more. But
the prosecution, which alone can know what is undisclosed, must be assigned
the consequent responsibility to gauge the likely net effect of all such evidence
and make disclosure when the point of "reasonable probability" is reached.
This in turn means that the individual prosecutor has a duty to learn of any
favorable evidence known to the others acting on the government's behalf in
the case, including the police.
Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. at 437 (emphasis added). A cumulative assessment of the evidence
presented places clear doubt on an already weak case against Mr. Fontenot. Id. at 436. There was
no physical evidence connecting him to McAnally’s, Mrs. Haraway, or her abduction and murder.
Further, the only witness who claims he saw Mr. Fontenot at McAnally’s, on the night in
question, tried to recant his identification at Mr. Fontenot’s second trial and has affirmatively done
so now. (Dkt.# 123, Ex.# 14). The evidence of Mr. Fontenot’s presence at Gordon Calhoun’s party
for the entirety of the night, and the investigative leads of that evidence, clearly reveal a reasonable
probability of a different result had this evidence been made available. The only evidence
remaining is Mr. Fontenot’s confession; a confession which lacks factual support and caused the
34

State’s own detectives to doubt its veracity as of the preliminary hearing. The State’s failure to

34 

Q. Okay, And so you didn’t believe anything they had said previously, did you? You didn't believe that, did
you?

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disclose these records and its resistance to disclosing the remainder of the outstanding evidence
resulted in a Fourteenth Amendment Due Process violation.

IV.

MR. FONTENOT’S SIXTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT TO COUNSEL WAS VIOLATED BY THE
ADA POLICE DEPARTMENT’S INTERFERENCE WITH ATTORNEYCLIENT PRIVLEGE.
The attorney-client privilege is the bedrock of any attorney’s ability to ensure

honest and open communication between lawyer and client. The Oklahoma Rules of
Professional Conduct Rule 1.6 mandate the confidentiality of information between a
lawyer and client. The comments to Rule 1.6 explain the importance of this rule as
[2] A fundamental principle in the client-lawyer relationship is that, in the
absence of the client’s informed consent, the lawyer must not reveal
information relating to the representation. See Rule 1.0(e) for the definition
of informed consent. This contributes to the trust that is the hallmark of
the client-lawyer relationship. The client is thereby encouraged to seek
legal assistance and to communicate fully and frankly with the lawyer even
as to embarrassing or legally damaging subject matter. The lawyer needs
this information to represent the client effectively and, if necessary, to advise
the client to refrain from wrongful conduct. Almost without exception, clients
come to lawyers in order to determine their rights and what is, in the complex
A I believed part of it.
Q You believed part of it, but you don't believe all of it. What part do you believe? What parts do you believe?
A Well, I believe that they're the ones that did kidnap her.
Q Okay. But you didn't believe the part about Odell Titsworth, you proved that to be wrong, didn't you?
A That’s correct.
Q. Didn't believe the part about the pickup, you proved that to be wrong, didn't you?
A Yes.
Q And you didn't believe the part about where the body is, because you went and looked. You don't believe that, do
you?
A No, sir,
Q So you want this Judge to pick and choose what you're picking and choosing, is that right? What to believe, is that
right? Now, Detective, I didn't hear the response, was there a response?
A (No audible response)
P/H p. 538-539 (George Butner cross examination of Detective Mike Baskins).

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maze of law and regulations deemed to be legal and correct. Based upon
experience, lawyers know that almost all clients follow the advice given, and
the law is upheld.
The Supreme Court recognized that interference by the state in a defense counsel’s
privileged communications with their client can unduly impair the effectiveness of that
counsel under the Sixth Amendment. See Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 554
(1977).
For a petitioner to establish a per se violation of the right to counsel, he must show
an, “intentional prosecution intrusion [] lack[s] a legitimate purpose.” Shillinger v.
Haworth, 70 F.3d 1132, 1140 (10th Cir. 1995). The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals found
that a fundamental denial of counsel occurred when, “its purposeful intrusion into the
attorney-client relationship and lacks a legitimate justification for doing so, a prejudicial
effect on the reliability of the trial process must be presumed.” Shillinger, 70 F.3d at
1142. Other Circuit Courts of Appeal have found similar grounds for per se Sixth and
Fourteenth Amendment violations where the prosecution retained records and
memorandums about trial strategy from privileged information from the defense. See
e.g. U.S. v. Danielson, 325 F.3d 1054 (9th Cir. 2003); U.S. v. Chaves, 902 F.3d 259 (4th
Cir. 1990); U.S. v. Mastoianni, 749 F.2d 900, 904-908 (1st Cir. 1984)(Sixth Amendment
violation analyzed when an informant attended defense meetings and law enforcement
debriefed him).
The Ada Police Department violated Mr. Fontenot’s Sixth Amendment
fundamental right to counsel when they seized letters he wrote to his defense counsel.
Found in the Ada police reports, and only recently disclosed, were original letters written
by Mr. Fontenot addressed to his defense attorney “George” Butner. From other
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documents discussed in the Second Amended Petition, Mr. Fontenot was incarcerated
by the Pontotoc County Sheriff. While in custody, his only means to communicate with
counsel were visits and letters. Mr. Fontenot wrote these letters while in custody
awaiting trial. In those letters, he asked questions about past legal visits, frustrations
about the delay in his trial, questions as to his absence from Thomas Ward’s court
hearing, and most significantly, leads and witnesses who could testify about his
innocence and alibi. (Dkt.# 123, Ex.# 95). One of the people Mr. Fontenot discussed
was his ex-girlfriend, Dottie Edwards, who he dated around April 28, 1984.
The Ada Police Department interviewed Dorothy Edwards on November 27,
1984, after Mr. Fontenot was in custody. The interview conducted by Ada Police Officer
D.W. Barrett consisted of the following:
Det. Barrett talked to Dorothy Edwards by telephone on 11-27-84 at 8:00 P.M.
while she was at work. She said she dated Karl Fontenot about three or four
times around the first of May 1984. She said they went in her Ford Torino.
When they went to the River they went in Jannette’s pickup. Jannette and
Mike Roberts, she and Karl and Tommy Ward all went to the river together.
Dorothy said she dated Karl two and a half or three weeks at the most. She
said one of the reasons she stopped dating Karl was when he told her that
the OSBI had come and talked to him about Denice Haraway. She said she
talked to Karl right after he talked to the OSBI. Karl told her he was not
in on it and had no knowledge of it. Dorothy does not remember if she was
dating Karl on 4-28-84. She did go with him while he was living with Janette.
She moved to Perry the last part of May 1984. Dorothy said she never saw
Karl or Tommy in a pickup other than Jannette’s. She said she went to school
with Brian Cox, but didn’t know if he owns a pickup. She has heard of Odell
Titsworth but does not know him. She went to school at Ada High with his sister
Kathy. Dorothy said she didn’t know of a Ronald Tisdale. She said she did not
go to any parties at Jannette’s.
Dorothy said she met Karl through Jannette when she worked at Taco Tico. She
said he seemed friendly, he had his own problems, his parents were dead and he
was still copeing [sic] with that, he was down because he couldn’t find a job,
she said, “he was just a sweet guy.”
Dorothy said she went to school with Tommy Ward and never liked him.
She tried not to go around Karl if Tommy was there. She was round him
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the day they went to the river, but she did not like him at all.
(Dkt.# 123, Ex.# 92).35 Ms. Edwards’ report demonstrates the police intercepted original
letters from Mr. Fontenot to his attorney, retained them, and investigated based on those
letters. These letters, beyond being the critical thread of communication between Mr.
Fontenot and his counsel, would have provided helpful information to Mr. Butner Mr.
Butner could have used these letters to prepare for trial and gained insight into Mr.
Fontenot’s behavior which could have helped his mitigation against the death penalty.
Along with Ms. Edwards, Mr. Fontenot tried to give counsel a list of people who could
confirm he was at Janette’s on April 28, 1984, i.e. witnesses crucial to his alibi. These
people included: Jannette Blood Roberts, Amy Blood, Bruce Self, Johnny Duck
Konawa, Gordon Calhoun, Joe Youngblood, and Regina Youngblood. (Dkt.# 123, Ex.#
95). Although OSBI interviewed some of these people, these reports were not disclosed
to defense counsel.
Mr. Fontenot expected these letters to be seen or delivered only to Mr. Butner.
However, these letters were never mailed or delivered to Mr. Butner. Mr. Butner has
reviewed these letters and states he was never made aware of them prior to either trial.
(Dkt.# 123, Ex.# 98). Further, Terri Hull, who represented Mr. Fontenot during the first
direct appeal and was counsel when Ms. Haraway’s remains were found, also confirmed
that she never saw these letters. (Dkt.# 123, Ex.# 97). There can be no legitimate reason
why the Pontotoc County Sheriff’s Office did not deliver these letters to Mr. Butner, or,
more significantly, how these letters diverted to the custody of the Ada Police
Department. See U.S. v. Shreck, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33158, 17 (ND OK

35

Ada police officers went to interview Mr. Fontenot shortly after 4-28-84, but he did not speak with them because he had
to go to work. ( N/T 6/10/1988 at 160-161). He was not interviewed again until he confessed in October 1984. Id. at 59-63.

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2006)(discussing per se violations of the Sixth Amendment where there are “affirmative
actions on the part of the government which comprised the attorney-client relationship.”)
It is now evident that police investigated several of the witnesses Mr. Fontenot had tried
to tell his attorney about as a means to undercut his alibi defense. Not only did they
commit the egregious act of withholding of exculpatory and impeachment evidence that
was favorable to Mr. Fontenot’s defense, they denied him even the ability to ensure his
attorney knew of this evidence.
A fundamental violation under the Sixth Amendment occurs when, “[t]here are
circumstances that are so likely to prejudice the accused that the cost of litigating their
effect in a particular case is unjustified.” U.S. v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 658 (9184). When
law enforcement interferes with the attorney-client relationship in a criminal context,
that interference may result in a fundamental violation per se. Here, Ada Police officers
gained possession of original letters from Mr. Fontenot, investigated the witnesses he
mentioned, and withheld evidence helpful to his defense. By keeping the original letters,
it crippled the privileged relationship between Mr. Fontenot and Mr. Butner.
The Court finds the actions of the Pontotoc County Sheriff and the Ada Police
were not legitimate, and further finds proof of prejudice to substantiate a Sixth
Amendment violation. Mr. Fontenot has met his burden to prove “a realistic possibility
of injury or benefit to the State.” Rodriguez v. Zavaras, 42 F.Supp. 29, 1059, 1084 (DC
Co. 1999) quoting Schillinger, 20 F.3d at 1142. The prejudice occurred when the use of
confidential letters from Mr. Fontenot to his counsel affected the attorney-client
relationship.
Amazingly, these stolen letters reveal key information about an affirmative
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defense to murder, mitigating evidence to the death penalty and other useful information
both through the trial and penalty phases.
As mentioned above, defense counsel never saw these letters. Mr. Butner did not
have evidence proving Mr. Fontenot’s alibi. (Dkt.# 123, Ex.# 81 at 34-37). The argument
that everything mentioned in these letters could have been relayed in a visit is without
merit given the lack of any defense presented at trial, the failure of Mr. Butner to call
any of the witnesses mentioned by Mr. Fontenot during the trial, or appellate counsel
seeing any indication in Mr. Butner’s files of interviews with the people mentioned in
the letters. And Respondent’s argument that there is no violation of attorney-client
privilege because the letters were not used against Mr. Fontenot, misses the point. These
were private communications between a defense counsel and his client about Mr.
Fontenot’s thoughts and ideas about his defense. In the letters, Mr. Fontenot discusses
witnesses, strategy, and his thoughts about Mr. Butner and the process. Mr. Butner stated
that he never saw these letters and Ms. Hull who had Mr. Butner’s files for the appellate
process echoed not seeing these communications. See Dkt.# 123, Ex.#s 97 & 98. Such
actions by the Ada Police Department, “impair[ed] the accused enjoyment of the Sixth
Amendment guarantee by disabling his counsel from full assisting and representing him.
Schillinger v. Haworth, 70 F.3d 1132, 1141 (10th Cir. 1995).
Respondent’s assertions of conversations between Mr. Butner and Mr. Fontenot
before the trial court regarding whether Mr. Fontenot took the stand and other
communications does not alleviate the possession of privileged correspondence hidden
from counsel.36 If Mr. Fontenot chose to communicate with his counsel via letters, that’s

36

During his deposition, Mr. Butner explained some of the problems he ran into while talking with Mr. Fontenot. (Dkt.#85,
Ex.#9 at 27. Mr. Butner agreed that Mr. Fontenot was limited intellectually and said, “It was his personality too, because he

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his right to do so and that communication is protected under the rules of professional
conduct and the Constitution. The number of times Mr. Fontenot and Mr. Butner
discussed their defense and the manner in which they chose to do so is privileged from
opposing counsel which included law enforcement. The Ada Police Department’s
confiscation of Mr. Fontenot’s privileged letters did not involve jail security or any
legitimate law enforcement function. Such actions violated Mr. Fontenot’s fundamental
right to counsel.
The importance of this rule is evident by the per se violation under the Sixth
Amendment. Despite what other communications occurred or did not occur, there is no
plausible explanation or justification for keeping such correspondence from defense
counsel. As the case law presented in the Second Amended Petition establishes, there is
a per se violation when there is an “intentional prosecution intrusion[] lack[s] a
legitimate purpose. Shillinger, 70 F.3d at 1140.
Conversely, the benefit to the prosecution and law enforcement is overwhelming
– they presented defense counsel from knowing about helpful witnesses. And their
actions foreclosed a fair trial by interviewing these people themselves and failing to
disclose those interviews. Such a violation of attorney-client privilege strikes at the heart
of the right to effective assistance of counsel guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment. The
interference by the State in the most sacred relationship is an unconscionable and
prejudicial infringement of Mr. Fontenot’s right to counsel.

was not, at that time, forward. I mean, he was reserved and – would not- he was not bubbling over with
information…[S]pecifics to Mr. Fontenot, a specific was not in his vocabulary. He was a young person and a - what
happened two days ago in Karl’s life, he in all probability, could not remember or could not recall…I’m not sure Karl
grasped at that time the gravity and the – and the issues because he was - he was a little quiet. “

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V.

MR. FONTENOT’S SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO EFFECTIVE
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL WAS VIOLATED WHEN HIS TRIAL
COUNSEL FAILED TO INVESTIGATE THE CASE AND PRESENT
VIABLE EVIDENCE SUPPORTING HIS INNOCENCE

A trial counsel’s function “is to make the adversarial testing process work in the particular
case.” Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 690 (1984). To prevail on a claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel, a convicted defendant must show that counsel's representation fell below an
objective standard of reasonableness, and that the deficient performance prejudiced the defendant,
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693, 104 S.Ct. 2067 and thus create a "reasonable probability" of a different
result. Id. at 694. See Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 390 (2005); Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S.
510 (2003); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2001).
Deficient performance is “measured against an objective standard of reasonableness under
prevailing professional norms.” Rompilla, 545 U.S. at 380. Courts “long have referred” to the
American Bar Association standards on the performance of counsel “as guides to determining
what is reasonable.” Id.; Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 524; Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688. [T]he American
Bar Association Standards for Criminal Justice in circulation at the time of [Mr. Fontenot’s] trial
describe the obligation in circumstances such as those in the instant case:
It is the duty of the lawyer to conduct a prompt investigation of the circumstances
of the case and to explore all avenues leading to facts relevant to the merits of the
case and the penalty in the event of conviction. The investigation should always
include efforts to secure information in the possession of the prosecution and law
enforcement authorities. The duty to investigate exists regardless of the
accused's admissions or statements to the lawyer of facts constituting guilt or
the accused's stated desire to plead guilty.

ABA Standards for Criminal Justice 4-4.1 (2d ed. 1982 Supp.)(emphasis added); see also
Rompilla, 466 U.S. at 400. Counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness in this case for several reasons. First, counsel failed to present evidence showing
Mr. Fontenot’s innocence of the charged actions when his co-defendant made statements
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exculpating him of the crime. Second, counsel neglected to investigate evidence showing that
Mrs. Haraway was being stalked by someone familiar to her. Finally, defense counsel failed to
impeach numerous State witnesses about their inconsistent statements.
a. Trial Counsel Was Ineffective for Failing to Introduce Tommy Ward’s
Sworn Statement Made During the Preliminary Hearing Exculpating Mr.
Fontenot from Involvement in Mrs. Haraway’s Case
On January 5, 1984, Tommy Ward testified in a closed hearing about his involvement in
Mrs. Haraway’s disappearance. This hearing took place in the middle of the only preliminary
hearing in this case. Different from Mr. Ward’s confession in October 2014, this testimony
occurred under oath with both defense counsel present along with several representatives for the
prosecution and law enforcement. Specifically, the trial judge, court reporter, Don Wyatt, Mr.
Ward’s defense counsel, George Butner, Mr. Fontenot’s defense counsel, Bill Peterson and
Chris Ross for the District Attorney’s Office, Ada Detectives Dennis Smith and Mike Baskins,
and several members of the Pontotoc County Sheriff’s Office. (Dkt.# 123, Ex.# 60 at 27).
Mr. Ward’s statement consisted of the following:
Defendant: And then we went from there [J.P.’s] to
McAnally’s.
Mr. Wyatt: You stopped at McAnally’s?
Defendant: Uh-huh.
Mr. Wyatt: Did you go in?
Defendant: Yeah.
Mr. Wyatt: Did Discus – or Ashley go in?
Defendant: yeah.
Mr. Wyatt: Why did you stop there?
Defendant: To get a beer.
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Mr. Wyatt: What happened when you got inside?
Defendant: I walked back towards the back to get a beer, and Marty started talking
to Donna (Denice Haraway), and—
Mr. Wyatt: Did Marty know Donna?
Defendant: Yeah.
Mr. Wyatt: How long had he known her?
Defendant: I don’t know.
Mr. Wyatt: But they knew each other?
Defendant: Yeah. They, you know, acquainted each other when he come in.
Mr. Wyatt: What happened?
Defendant: He started flirting with her and she told him that he was married – I
mean she was married. And then after she told him that she was married he goes,
“You must not be happily married because if you was happily married you wouldn’t
have to be working.” And then he started hinting around to her about saying, “Well,
if you marry me, and everything, you wouldn’t have to do nothing, like this or
anything.”
Mr. Wyatt: Okay. Now, where were you when this conversation took place?
Defendant: I was getting ready to walk on back towards the back. And then I was
kind of listening to them, you know, because I thought it was kind of funny, you
know, after her saying that she was already married and everything, and then – so
then I went on back to the back and then when I come on back up to the front he bent
over the counter and kissed her. And then he walked out the door. And then I walked
on up and payed [sic] for the beer. Then after I payed [sic] for the beer she come
around the counter and went out the door and I walked out behind her. And then I
walked out to the pickup, and then she – when I opened the door she goes, she was
talking to Marty, and she goes, “Are you serious about what you’re talking about?”
And he goes, “Yeah.” And so, she jumped in the pickup with him. And then we drove
from there to my house, and that’s when he let me out. It was about 9:00 when I got
back to my house.
(Dkt.# 123, Ex.# 60). Mr. Ward said he made this statement under oath because he felt it would
help his case and the police investigation into this case. Id. at 6. He testified that Mr. Fontenot did
not participate in these events, or have knowledge that they occurred. Id. at 25. In fact, Mr. Ward

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37

only told Mr. Fontenot about these events the morning of the hearing. Id. at 36. Further, Mr.
Ward testified the only reasons he implicated O’Dell Titsworth and Karl Fontenot in his October
38

1984 confession is because of Detective Smith’s suggestion of what to say. Id. at 27.
Mr. Ward’s testimony coincided with details from the crime scene. He explained his
purchase of a beer in the cooler at McAnally’s, drinking some of it and leaving it on the counter
after Mr. Ashley and Mrs. Haraway exited the store. Id. at 30. The last transaction on the
McAnally’s register tape shows $.80 for a Tallboy beer. (Dkt.# 123, Ex.# 34); (Dkt.# 123, Ex.#
43, prosecutorial bates 22), (Dkt.# 123, Ex.# 44, OSBI 0495). According to his statement, the
cigarette Lenny Timmons saw in the store belonged to Mr. Ward. (Dkt.# 123, Ex.# 60 at 30);
(J/T at 1089). All three, Mr. Ashley, Mr. Ward, and Mrs. Haraway, drove away in a gray, Chevy
pickup truck that belonged to Mr. Ashley. (J/T at 1682).
Lenny Timmons testified that he entered McAnally’s around 8:30 pm on April 28, 1984.
He described passing a man and woman leaving the store, getting into a pickup truck, and driving
away. (N/T 6-9-88 at 34). At the time, he paid little attention to the couple until he realized the
store clerk was missing. After alerting his brother, David, and uncle, Gene Whelchel, they
continued to search the store before calling police. All three men described a man climbing into
the pick-up truck with a woman they believed to be Mrs. Haraway. (P/H at 269-270, 308-313; N/T
6-9-88 p. 38, 47-48, 56). During Mr. Ward’s statement, he explained that he was the man walking

37 

Mr. Ward’s statement would have been admissible during Mr. Fontenot’s trial under Okla. Stat. tit. 12 §
2408(B)(3) given that any statement made by Mr. Ward placing himself at McAnally’s around the time of Ms.
Haraway disappeared is clearly against his penal interest. To the extent that Mr. Butner failed to prove Mr. Ward
was unavailable to testify is part of his ineffectiveness in failing to present this evidence.

38

In Mr. Fontenot’s recantation letter, he too stated that Detective Smith suggested much of the story in his
confession. See Dkt.# 123, Ex.# 44 at 626.

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Mrs. Haraway out of the store that evening. (Ex.# 60, at 9).
After Mr. Ward’s statement, the police interviewed Marty Ashley and several other people
Mr. Ward mentioned. Many of these people testified during the joint trial but not in Mr. Fontenot’s
39

trial. As the pattern continues to reveal, these interviews were not disclosed at either trial, or
through post-conviction proceedings. The sole exception was the taped statement of Marty Ashley
40

found during post-conviction. (Dkt.# 123, Ex.# 66). Detective Smith, along with Chief of Police
Fox, interviewed Mr. Ashley at the Paul’s Valley Police Station on January 10, 1985, the day after
Mr. Ward’s testimony. The police asked him his whereabouts on April 28, 1984, to which he said
he did not know. Id.
On cross examination during the joint trial, Mr. Ashley admitted that the police interviewed
him only one time, even after telling them he could not remember where he was on April 28,
41

1984. (Dkt.# 123, Ex.# 66; J/T 1678). Mr. Ashley, along with his girlfriend Theresa Mantzke,
acknowledged living in Ada at the time of Mrs. Haraway’s disappearance, but moving to Ardmore
very early in May 1984. (J/T at 1720). She also could not recount where Mr. Ashley was on April
28, 1984, but he was not with her. (J/T at 1724). The police failed to inquire whether Mr. Ashley
owned or had access to a pickup truck… which he in fact did. (J/T at 658, 1682).
The undisclosed interviews took place on the days following Mr. Ward’s testimony and

39  
These people include Marty Ashley, Shelly Mantzke, Theresa Mantzke, Jackie Mantzke, and Jay Dicus. (J/T 1646-

1742).
40 

The Ada Police interviewed Marty Ashley, Jay Dicus, Shelly Mantzke, Theresa Mantzke, and Jackie Mantzke to
investigate all or part of Mr. Ward’s testimony. Many of these individuals testified for the prosecution during the joint trial
and Mr. Butner attempted to examine them without the benefit of knowing what prior statements they made to police. (N/T
9-17-1985 at 1646-1740).
41 

The police took a photograph of Marty Ashley during their interview. (Dkt.# 123, Ex.#s 39,40). It is unknown
whether police received any calls as to whether Mr. Ashley resembled the composite drawing or if they showed any
other witnesses Mr. Ashley’s photograph.

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were conducted by Ada Police Detective Mike Baskins, Ada Police Detective Dennis Smith, and
DA Investigator Lloyd Bond. (Ex.# 88). These reports were individual interviews with little
purpose other than to disprove Mr. Ward’s testimony. There is no investigation into the
discrepancies provided by Mr. Ashley and his girlfriend’s testimony, or into where Mr. Ashley
was when Mr. Ward said Mr. Ashley drove off with Mrs. Haraway. Detective Baskins interviewed
Anthony Norman at the Ada Police Department about his knowledge of “Tommy Ward and Jackie
Mantzke.” (Dkt.# 123, Ex.# 88). Mr. Norman provided character evidence about Mr. Ward and
said he did not remember Mr. Ashley being at the Mantzke household when Mr. Norman was
there. Id. Detective Baskins concluded his report by stating, “Tommy did not seem sure about his
answers. He had to think before answering questions. He answered slowly and would not definitely
commit himself to questions.” Id. Clearly, the police investigation was committed to its theory of
the case despite the weaknesses and contradictory evidence that continued to emerge.
Mr. Ward’s statement should have been used by Mr. Fontenot’s defense counsel during
his trial. Clearly, this statement would have been admissible under Title 12 § 2804(B)(3)
42

Admission Against Penal Interest. See generally Funkhouser v. State, 1987 OK CR 44; 734 P.2d
815 (OK 1987)(outlining the procedure for declaring a witness unavailable and explaining that
there is no confrontation clause issue when there has been an opportunity to cross-examine the
witness); see also Britt v. State, 1986 OK CR 99; 721 P.2d 812 (Ok. 1986). The fact that Mr.
Butner failed to try to admit the statement into evidence, establish that Mr. Ward was unavailable
to testify in Mr. Fontenot’s trial, given that his own trial was scheduled after Mr. Ward’s.

42 

The State introduced Mr. Ward’s statement against him during his separate trial in 1989, through Detective
Dennis Smith who was present and could testify as to what occurred during the hearing. (Ward Vol. 6 p. 127132). Since, Detective Smith testified in Mr. Fontenot’s trial, defense counsel had the opportunity to introduce
such crucial exculpatory evidence in similar fashion.

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Further, this was evidence that strongly supported the defense’s case. The fact that Mr. Butner
repeatedly requested in discovery motions, in motions in limine, and on the record his desire for
exculpatory evidence and any evidence showing Mr. Fontenot’s lack of knowledge exacerbates
his ineffectiveness on this issue. Defense counsel knew Marty Ashley had no alibi, his girlfriend
was adamant he was not with her the day of the kidnapping, and both moved out of Ada days
after Mrs. Haraway disappeared. Not only does this evidence corroborate Mr. Ward’s statement,
it creates reasonable doubt as to Mr. Fontenot’s participation in the crimes against Mrs. Haraway.
(Dkt.# 123, Ex.# 81, at 35-36). What better evidence to present but Mr. Fontenot’s co-defendant
explaining not only that his client was unaware of his criminal actions, but that Mr. Fontenot was
only told about such criminal activity the morning of January 9, 1985. There could be no strategic
or tactical reason for such ineffective actions that deprived Mr. Fontenot of valuable evidence
showing his innocence. Mr. Butner concedes his ineffectiveness for failing to present this
evidence:
During the preliminary hearing, Tommy Ward made a sworn statement during a
closed hearing. I was present at the hearing along with Mr. Wyatt, counsel for Mr.
Mr. Ward, Pontotoc County District Attorney Bill Peterson, Assistant District
Attorney Chris Ross, and law enforcement. Mr. Ward gave a detailed statement
about being present at J.P.'s convenience store and McAnally's with Marty Ashley.
Mr. Ward stated that Mr. Fontenot was not present having nothing to do with the
events of April 28, 1984. This statement was very helpful to Mr. Fontenot's case
because it proved crucial evidence from his co-defendant that he had no
involvement in Mrs. Haraway's disappearance. While I used this statement in Mr.
Fontenot's joint trial with Tommy Ward, I did not introduce it into evidence
during Mr. Fontenot's second trial. I had no strategic reason for not using it.
It clearly fit within my trial strategy to show Mr. Fontenot had nothing to do
with Mrs. Haraway's homicide.
(Dkt.# 123, Ex.# 16) (emphasis added); (Dkt.# 123, Ex.# 81). Mr. Butner’s performance was
deficient for failing to include this exculpatory piece of evidence during his trial.
In determining whether a defendant has been prejudiced by his trial counsel’s deficient
performance, a court must consider whether a defendant has suffered actual prejudice from his
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attorney’s actions. Similar to Brady’s materiality standard, a defendant must establish those
deficiencies were prejudicial, defined as errors that collectively "undermine confidence in the
outcome," and thus create a "reasonable probability" of a different result, Strickland, 466 U.S at
694. As a court assesses whether a defendant suffered prejudice, it must assess the totality of the
evidence before the factfinder. Id. at 695. Given the absence of any independent physical evidence
connecting Mr. Fontenot to the crimes against Mrs. Haraway, a cumulative evaluation of the
evidence not presented to the jury including: the exculpatory statements by the co- defendant,
along with the Brady materials not presented during trial including the alibi testimony, would have
impacted the jury’s deliberation and verdict. Failure to introduce Mr. Ward’s statement resulted
in ineffective assistance of counsel in violation of Mr. Fontenot’s Sixth Amendment rights.
b. Trial Counsel Was Ineffective for Failing to Investigate Evidence of Denice
Haraway Being Stalked and Evidence Establishing a Different Motive for
the Crime.
i.

Defense investigation reports showing Denice Haraway’s fear
of obscene phone calls she received.

The trial court granted limited funds for investigation for Mr. Fontenot’s second trial.
Richard Kerner, who assisted Mr. Wyatt during the investigation for Tommy Ward and worked
for Mr. Butner prior to trial stated that during the course of his investigation, he found an
important witness who would have provided not only an alternate motivation for the abduction
of Mrs. Haraway, but potential alternate suspects as well. Mr. Kerner interviewed Anthony
Johnson, a frequent customer at McAnally’s. Mr. Johnson remembered a conversation he had
with Mrs. Haraway a week before her disappearance.
Johnson is a co-worker with Tommy Ward’s sister, Tricia Wolf in an Ada,
Oklahoma plant. Johnson admitted to this investigator that one week before
Haraway’s disappearance he was in the McAnally’s convenience store when
Haraway asked him where she could buy a gun. Harraway [sic] referenced the
need for a gun with some funny calls she had recently been receiving. Haraway
said she didn’t really know who was making the calls, and that the caller never
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really said anything, just did some heavy breathing on the phone. Johnson
asked Haraway if she had any ex-boyfriends that could be making these calls
and said that Johnson was of the opinion that she knew who was making the
calls but did not seem to want to indicate who it was.
(Dkt.# 123, Ex.# 22)(emphasis added). Defense counsel submitted a subpoena for Mr. Johnson’s
appearance for Mr. Fontenot’s trial, but it was never served. (Ex.# 71). Clearly Mr. Johnson was a
witness that defense counsel sought to present during Mr. Fontenot’s defense-in-chief, but Mr.
Johnson never testified. There was no strategic or tactical reason not to present such evidence
showing that Mrs. Haraway not only received obscene phone calls and that someone was watching
and harassing her over a longer period of time prior to her disappearance, but also demonstrating
her fear of this individual to the degree she inquired about buying a gun. Not only should Mr.
Johnson have testified at trial, but defense counsel should have pursued such leads further. The
failure to do so resulted in ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to call Mr. Johnson as a
witness and for not developing such evidence.
The cumulative effect of this evidence demonstrates actual prejudice. The totality of the
evidence not presented to a jury paints a picture of alternate suspects having motive to harm Mrs.
Haraway. Given the weakness of the prosecution’s case against Mr. Fontenot, the impact of the
unknown and unpresented evidence is immense.
ii.

Register tape showing witnesses who were in McAnally’s in short
proximity to her disappearance

Detective Dennis Smith made numerous requests for people who were in McAnally’s the
night of Denice’s disappearance to contact the APD with information about the time they were in
the store and the purchases made. (Dkt.# 123, Ex.# 27). In response to the APD request, at least
four people contacted the police department to explain what purchases they made and what time
they recalled being in the store. Their names, times, and, on occasion, contact information was
included on the register tape. (Dkt.# 123, Ex.#s 32-38). The State introduced the register tape into
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evidence at both trials and it was available to Mr. Fontenot’s first direct appeal counsel. (J/T at
1160); (States’s Ex.# 16); (N/T 6/9/1988 at 197); (State’s Trial Ex.# 60). That neither defense
counsel, at trial or on appeal, reviewed the entirety of the register tape was ineffective
performance.
Defense counsel’s obligation to evaluate and investigate not only the factual witnesses the
prosecution intended to call at trial, but also the physical evidence supporting the case, is a basic
tenant of providing effective assistance of counsel. “Apart from any formal processes of discovery
that are available, prosecutors and law enforcement officers have in their possession facts that
defense counsel must know. Prosecutors will often reveal facts freely in the hope of inducing a
guilty plea. If defense counsel can secure information known to the prosecutor, it will obviously
facilitate investigation.” ABA Standards for Criminal Justice 4-4.1 Commentary (2d ed. 1982
Supp.). Counsel’s failure to fully evaluate the State’s evidence introduced at trial resulted in
crucial evidence which challenged the State’s theory of the case going undeveloped.
Not only was the testimony as to what the four people witnessed in the store that night
extremely helpful, but the timing of their purchases along with the other transactions establish a
very narrow window in which Mrs. Haraway could have disappeared. (Dkt.# 123, Ex.#s 67 & 68).
The State’s theory rested largely on the testimony of David and Lenny Timmons and Gene
Whelchel to establish the man and woman walking out of McAnally’s were Mr. Ward and Mrs.
Haraway. (P/H at 349, 351, 3680; N/T 6/14/1988 at 26-28). All three men describe seeing only
one man in the truck. (N/T 6/9/1988at 38, 40, 47-48, 51, 59-60). The description they provided
resembled Mr. Ward. (P/H at 341). Had the defense utilized the information gleaned from the
register tape, exculpatory evidence would have been presented to the jury. First, the witnesses
would have narrowed down the window of her disappearance based on Mr. Keyes’ transaction at
8:25 pm and the four purchases immediately after his. Additionally, it lent credence to Mr. Ward’s
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statement of kidnapping Mrs. Haraway with Mr. Ashley.
In the alternative, defense counsel could have used the information presented by Mr.
Haney of a man seen in McAnally’s behind the counter with Mrs. Haraway. The gray primered
truck described by several witnesses was in the McAnally’s parking lot at least thirty minutes
before Mrs. Haraway’s abduction. (Dkt.# 123, Ex.#s 6 & 4). However, this evidence was not
developed by the defense. This evidence considered cumulatively with the records impermissibly
withheld by the State presents a viable defense that the man harassing Mrs. Haraway for months
and weeks leading up to April 28th, was involved in her disappearance. See supra Claim II;
Williams v.Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 399, 120 S. Ct. 1495, 1516, 146 L. Ed. 2d 389, 421 (2000)
(holding that a cumulative review of ineffective assistance of counsel claims requires both
evidence presented at trial and not presented); Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 538, 123 S. Ct.
2527, 2544, 156 L. Ed.2d 471, 495 (2003); Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 393, 125 S. Ct.
2456, 2469, 162 L. Ed. 2d 360, 379 (2005).
Finally, defense counsel could have interviewed Gene Whelchel about the 9:00 pm
transaction. An investigator could have inquired who rang up the purchase, what the purchase was,
and why the crime scene was not immediately closed down upon the arrival of Officer Harvey
Philips and Detective Mike Baskins at approximately 8:55 pm. (Dkt.# 123, Ex.# 41). (dispatch was
logged at 8:50 pm). This line of investigation could establish how vital evidence was lost due to
improper police procedure. (J/T at 1239-1240, 1422-23, 1439, 1441, 1447-48). Defense counsel
could have impeached Mr. Whelchel about the timing of events, inquired more specifically as to
those present in McAnally’s after his initial call, and whether the State’s timing was off given the
details provided on the register tape. Evidence presented at trial showed the police failed to close
the store to process the scene as other customers bought gas and items from the store.( N/T
6/9/1985 at 92-93). Since it is clear the police seized the register tape, their documentation of the
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timing of transactions goes to the thoroughness of their investigation. Solidifying the timing of the
only eyewitness accounts and the immediate actions of the police in response to this evidence was
crucial for the defense. The defense’s failure to pursue this evidence deprived Mr. Fontenot of
numerous means to challenge the State’s case.
It is the defense counsel’s duty to investigate all aspects of the State’s case including the
physical evidence introduced in trial. “The notion that defense counsel must obtain information
that the State has and will use against the defendant is not simply a matter of common sense,” it
is an obligation set forth in the ABA Standards regarding the baseline of representation a defense
attorney must provide his client. Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 387 (2005). Defense counsel
failed to investigate viable leads and build such evidence into a defense he sought to pursue. (Ex.#
16). Further, appellate counsel, likewise, should have pursued this evidence in building a defense
for Mr. Fontenot. (Dkt.# 123, Ex.# 11). It is not enough that the defense reviewed this evidence
in court, but prior to the proceedings.
Defense counsel’s failure to investigate Mr. Fontenot’s case due to limited funding does
not negate his constitutional obligation. See Hinton v. Alabama, 134 S.Ct. 1081, 1088-1089 (2014)
(ineffective assistance of counsel was found when defense counsel failed to ask for further
investigative funds for an expert). This Court must determine the impact of the absence of this
evidence on the totality of his case. “In assessing the reasonableness of an attorney's investigation,
however, a court must consider not only the quantum of evidence already known to counsel, but
also whether the known evidence would lead a reasonable attorney to investigate further.” Wiggins
v. Smith, 539 U.S 510, 527 (2003).
All the evidence mentioned was available to defense counsel prior to trial, but none of it
was presented to the jury. Had it been, there is a reasonable probability of a different result due to
the weakness of the State’s case against Mr. Fontenot. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. The
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prosecution’s case rested on Mr. Fontenot’s confession which did not coincide with any evidence
they presented, including the cause of Mrs. Haraway’s death, the location of her remains, and the
details of how he supposedly killed her. (Dkt.# 123, Ex.#s 18, 45, & 68). Further, the sole
eyewitness at McAnally’s who places Mr. Fontenot at the scene recanted his testimony after the
preliminary hearing and attempted to tell the State the same. (J /T at 1042, 1051-52, 1056-1057);
(Dkt.# 123, Ex.#14). But for defense counsel’s failure to challenge the evidence the State
presented, Mr. Fontenot would not have been convicted of these crimes. The failure to investigate
this evidence deprived Mr. Fontenot of his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of
counsel.
VI.

MR. FONTENOT’S SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO EFFECTIVE
ASSISTANCE OF APPELLATE COUNSEL WAS VIOLATED WHEN HIS
APPELLATE
COUNSEL
FAILED
TO
PRESENT
VIABLE
CONSTITUTIONAL CLAIMS IN MR. FONTENOT’S DIRECT APPEAL
PROCEEDINGS

The claims and factual allegations set forth in Petitioner’s Second Amended Petition also
establish Mr. Fontenot received ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. Under Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) counsel provides ineffective assistance whenever (1) counsel’s
performance is deficient, i.e., that the attorney's performance fell below "an objective standard
of reasonableness," Id. at 688; and (2) those deficiencies were prejudicial, defined as errors that
collective "undermine confidence in the outcome," and thus create a "reasonable probability" of
a different result, Id. at 694. See Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 390 (2005); Wiggins v. Smith,
539 U.S. 510 (2003); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362
(2001).
Mr. Fontenot suffered ineffective assistance of counsel on direct appeal because appellate
counsel failed to raise substantial and cognizable state and federal constitutional issues, and failed
to raise all available grounds, on his direct appeal to the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals.
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There was no strategic or tactical reason for not presenting these claims in Mr. Fontenot’s second
direct appeal brief. Had appellate counsel raised these issues, it is likely that the Oklahoma Court
of Criminal Appeals would have reversed his conviction and ordered a new trial. Because appellate
counsel failed to raise substantial and cognizable constitutional claims Mr. Fontenot was deprived
of appellate review of the constitutional errors inherent in his trial, and the reliability of the
judgment and sentence.
VII.

MR. FONTENOT’S DUE PROCESS RIGHTS WERE VIOLATED DUE TO
POLICE MISCONDUCT WHEN TAKING A FALSE CONFESSION AND
THE PROSECUTION KNOWINLY INTRODUCED FALSE TESTIMONY
DURING HIS TRIAL IN VIOLATION OF THE FIFTH AND
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT TO THE U.S. CONSTITUTION.
a. Police Misconduct in The Interrogations of Mr. Fontenot

On October 19, 1984, at the OSBI office in Ada, Oklahoma, detectives videotaped Mr.
Fontenot’s “confession” to the murder of Denice Haraway. However, before the video machine
was turned on, Agent Gary Rogers and Detective Dennis Smith conducted a one hour and fortyfive-minute interrogation that was not included on the videotape. (P/H. at 960-61; J/T at 2034,
2047). Prior to the interrogation, Detective Smith acknowledged that Mr. Rogers read Mr.
Fontenot his rights, but no Miranda form was ever presented to him, nor did Mr. Fontenot ever
sign a form.( P/H at 956-957); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). Although Mr. Fontenot’s
43

interrogators deny ever having threatened or coerced him, it is indisputable that during the time
prior to turning on the video recorder, the interrogators supplied Mr. Fontenot with the information
that Tommy Ward had confessed to the murder of Mrs. Haraway and inculpated Mr. Fontenot in
44

his confession.

(

P/H at 960). Even though. Mr. Fontenot denied knowing anything about Mrs.

43 

This statement is dubious at best given the other witnesses who admit being pressured to alter their accounts:
Stacy Shelton, Karen Wise, and Jim Moyer.

44  

Mr. Ward’s confession was the product of hours of interrogation. After police repeatedly insisted it was in Mr.

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Haraway’s disappearance, or what Mr. Ward’s confession involved, both interrogators ignored his
denials and continued to tell him he knew about the crimes. (P/H at 961-962). Agent Rogers and
Detective Smith began feeding Mr. Fontenot information about the crime to aid in his confession.
A. Well before his story changed, I think Agent Rogers mentioned to him that we
knew that he and Tommy Ward and Odell Titsworth were at a party on South
Townsend.
Q. Okay.
A. And we knew that they had left the party and where they had gone.
Q. Okay. All right. What else did you tell him, or Agent Rogers tell him?
A. I think that was basically the extent of it and --Q. Was the name Odell Titsworth mentioned prior to Agent Rogers mentioning it?
A. I don’t think so.
(P/H. at 964);( Dkt.# 123, Ex.# 44 at 626). Giving Mr. Fontenot details of Mr. Ward’s confession
45

could have ingrained information in Mr. Fontenot’s mind that became part of his confession.

The confession included several facts that could not be corroborated with any evidence.
According to his confession, Mr. Fontenot attended a party with his co-defendant, Tommy Ward,
46

and Odell Titsworth. (Dkt.# 123, Ex.#s 19 & 69). The three men drove to McAnally’s in Mr.
Titsworth’s truck, where they abducted Denice Haraway and subsequently took her out behind a
power plant in Ada. The three men took turns raping the victim before transporting her in Mr.
Titsworth’s truck to a house off of a country road near the power plant. At the house, Mrs. Haraway

Ward’s self-interest to admit to the murder of Denice Haraway, even after he denied any involvement, he told police
that he had a dream about the murder. Mr. Ward’s description of the dream was considered a confession by police, but
was not corroborated by any credible evidence.
45 

False confessions occurred in 13% of the 1,730 known exonerations in this country. See
https://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/about.aspx .

46

It is interesting that police disclosed the videotaped confession to Mr. Butner, but failed to include the polygraphed and
handwritten statement where Mr. Fontenot detailed being at a party and people he was present with.

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was stabbed to death, and burned. (Dkt.# 123, Ex.# 69, at 1-21). Mr. Fontenot did not know Mr.
Titsworth prior to being shown his picture and presenting Mr. Titsworth to Mr. Fontenot’s jail cell.
(P/H at 968, 994-995).
After investigating these claims, police knew that nothing in Mr. Fontenot’s confession
could be verified. First, the police eliminated Mr. Titsworth as a suspect due to his broken arm on
the night in question. Furthermore, neither Mr. Titsworth nor his family owned a truck like the
one described in Karl’s statement. (P/H at 965). Further, the medical examiner’s report established
that Mrs. Haraway was not stabbed, but died from a single gunshot wound to the head. (Dkt.#
123, Ex.# 46, at 1, 3, 12, 40). Mrs. Haraway’s body was found a county over from where Mr.
Fontenot had said it would be found. Finally, the house Mr. Fontenot claimed had been burned
with Mrs. Haraway’s body inside had in fact been burned a year before the murder occurred. (P/H
at 977). These discrepancies, along with the fact that the details of Mr. Fontenot’s confession
changed several times before the police recorded it, leaves questions about how such a confession
could be made, much less considered reliable.(P/H at 973-74, 1372, 1420-1421). Most
importantly, Mr. Fontenot recanted his confession shortly after giving it -- but that evidence was
withheld from his defense attorney. ( Dkt.# 123, Ex.# 44, at 626).
Police interrogations, by their very nature are coercive. However, police are trained to
investigate a case before interrogating suspects to ensure only the strongest suspects are
subjected to the process. As noted by counsel for Mr. Fontenot:
There are three important decision points in the interrogation process to analyze
when trying to understand the causes of a false confession. The first decision point
is the police decision to classify someone as a suspect. This is important because
police only interrogate individuals whom they first classify as suspects; police
interview witnesses and victims. There is a big difference between interrogation and
interviewing: unlike interviewing, an interrogation is accusatory, involves the
application of specialized psychological interrogation techniques, and the ultimate
purpose of an interrogation is to get an incriminating statement from someone whom
police believe to be guilty of the crime. False confessions only occur when police
misclassify an innocent suspect as guilty and then subject him to a custodial
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interrogation. This is one reason why interrogation training manuals implore
detectives to adequately investigate their cases before subjecting any potential
47
suspect to an accusatorial interrogation.
The second important decision point in the process occurs when the police
interrogate the suspect. As mentioned above, the goal of police interrogation is to
elicit a voluntary incriminating statement from the suspect by moving him from
denial to admission. To accomplish this, police use psychologically persuasive,
manipulative and deceptive interrogation techniques. As described in detail in the
previous section, police interrogators use these techniques to accuse the suspect of
committing a crime, persuade him that he is caught and that the case evidence
overwhelmingly establishes his guilt, and then induce him to confess by suggesting
it is the best course of action for him. Properly trained police interrogators do
not use physically or psychologically coercive techniques because they may
result in involuntary and/or unreliable incriminating statements, admissions
and/or confessions.
To understand how and why police-induced false confessions occur, one must first
understand how interrogation is intended to influence and manipulate a suspect’s
perceptions, reasoning and decision-making. Police interrogation is designed for
the guilty, not the innocent. Police are trained only to interrogate suspects
48
whom they believe to be guilty, and the purpose of interrogation of suspects
unlike the interviewing of witnesses or victims is to elicit an incriminating
statement, admission and/or confession that confirms the interrogator’s belief
in the suspect’s guilt and assists the state in prosecuting the suspect. Because
police expect the suspect to deny his guilt, interrogation is intended to break down
the suspect’s resistance and move him to admission. As discussed above, police typically
achieve this by accusing a suspect of committing the crime, attacking the suspect’s alibi,
cutting off a suspect’s denials and confronting the suspect with seemingly irrefutable
(whether real or non-existent) evidence of his guilt. The point of these techniques is to break
down a suspect’s confidence in his denials by convincing him that he is caught, that no one
will believe his assertions of innocence, and that objective evidence of his guilt is so
overwhelming that it will inevitably lead to his arrest and conviction regardless of what he
says or does during interrogation.
47 

Fred Inbau, John Reid and Joseph Buckley (1986). CRIMINAL INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS, Third
Edition (Baltimore, MD: Williams & Wilkins) at 3 (“Prior to the interrogation, and preferably before any contact with
the suspect, become thoroughly familiar with all the known facts and circumstances of the case.”). See also Fred
Inbau, John Reid, Joseph Buckley and Brian Jayne (2013). CRIMINAL INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS,
5th Edition (Burlington, MA: Jones & Bartlett Learning) at 18 (“One basic principle to which there must be full
adherence is that the interrogation of suspects should follow, and not precede, an investigation conducted to the full
extent permissible by the allowable time and circumstances of the particular case. The authors suggest, therefore, that
a good guideline to follow is “investigate before you interrogate.”).
48

See also Fred Inbau, John Reid, Joseph Buckley and Brian Jayne (2013). CRIMINAL INTERROGATION AND
CONFESSIONS, 5th Edition (Burlington, MA: Jones & Bartlett Learning) at 187 (“These nine steps are presented in
the context of the interrogation of suspects whose guilt seems definite or reasonably certain”). For empirical support
for this observation, see Richard A. Leo (2008). POLICE INTERROGATION AND AMERICAN JUSTICE (Harvard
University Press).

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(Dkt.# 123, Ex.# 19, at 11) (emphasis added).
Here, Detective Smith admitted Mr. Fontenot was unknown to the police prior to his
arrest.( P/H at 948). He had never been involved in any crimes or interrogated prior to the events
of October 19, 1984. (J/T at 1607-1608). The only reason Mr. Fontenot was arrested and subjected
to this interrogation is because Mr. Ward mentioned him during his interrogation the day before
based on a suspect lead provided by Jeff Miller. Prior to being arrested, no other individual
provided any inculpatory evidence connecting Mr. Fontenot to Mrs. Haraway other than Mr.
Ward. Law enforcement is trained to conduct a thorough investigation into the suspects prior to
commencing the interrogation to ensure the evidence given is valid. (Dkt.# 123, Ex.# 19).
The purpose of evaluating the fit between a suspect's post-admission narrative and
the underlying crime facts and derivative crime evidence is to test the suspect's
actual knowledge of the crime. If the suspect's post-admission narrative
corroborates details only the police know, leads to new or previously
undiscovered evidence of guilt, explains apparent crime fact anomalies and is
corroborated by independent facts and evidence, then the suspect's postadmission narrative objectively demonstrates that he possesses the actual
knowledge that would be known only by the true perpetrator and therefore is
strong evidence of guilt.
(Dkt.# 123, Ex.# 19, at 15-16).
No investigation was done into the possibility of Mr. Fontenot being involved other than
police taking as true Mr. Ward’s confession the prior day. Such lax police investigation before
the interrogations led to the corrupted investigation which followed in the days and weeks after
these confessions where nothing either defendant said could be verified.
If the suspect is innocent, the detective can use the suspect's post-admission
narrative to establish his lack of knowledge and thus demonstrate his likely or
certain innocence. Whereas a guilty suspect can corroborate his admission
because of his actual knowledge of the crime, the innocent suspect cannot. The
more information the interrogator seeks, the more frequently and clearly an
innocent suspect will demonstrate his ignorance of the crime. His answers will
turn out either to be wrong, to defy evaluation, or to be of no value for
discriminating between guilt and innocence. Assuming that neither the
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investigator nor the media have contaminated the suspect by transferring
information about the crime facts, or that the extent of contamination is known, the
likelihood that his answers will be correct should be no better than chance. Absent
contamination, the only time an innocent person will contribute correct information
is when he makes an unlucky guess. The likelihood of an unlucky guess diminishes
as the number of possible answers to an investigator's questions grows large. If,
however, his answers about missing evidence are proven wrong, he cannot supply
verifiable information that should be known to the perpetrator, and he inaccurately
describes verifiable crime facts, then the post-admission narrative provides
evidence of innocence.
Id. at 19-20 (emphasis added.). At every turn, law enforcement uncovered absolutely no evidence
from the “confession.” Mr. Fontenot described Mr. Titsworth as 5’10” to 5’11’ and weighing
approximately 140-150 pounds. He said his hair length was just below his ears and Mr. Titsworth
had no distinguishing marks or tattoos. (J/T at 2074-75). In actuality, Mr. Titsworth’s hair fell to
mid-waist, he weighed 170 lbs. and had sleeve tattoos from his shoulders to his wrists, tattoos
along his back, stomach and both legs. Further, the Ada police broke Mr. Titsworth’s arm during
his arrest two days prior to Mrs. Haraway’s disappearance. (P/H at 792-793, 795797, 838). When
Mr. Fontenot was shown pictures of Mr. Titsworth, he was unable to identify him. (P/H at 968,
994-995).
Police interrogated Mr. Titsworth along with seizing his mother’s truck. After the police
searched the truck and after Mr. Titsworth’s repeated denials and verification of his broken arm,
they realized neither he nor his property had anything to do with the crime. (P/H. at 520, 522). Police
repeatedly tried to locate Mrs. Haraway’s remains at the power plant and surrounding areas with
no success despite seventy-five to eighty people being involved in the search. (P/H at 599-600);
(N/T 6/10/1988 at 83-85, 89-90).
During the preliminary hearing, defense counsel asked Detective Baskins if he was able
to corroborate any parts of Mr. Fontenot’s confession.
Q. Has he told you anything that you have been able to ascertain is the truth?
You personally?
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A. No.
Q. No fact in his statement, you have been able to prove right or wrong have you?
A. No.
Q. To the best of your knowledge, Detective Baskins, has any statement that Karl
Fontenot made to you been – any fact, at all, been proven true or false? Any fact?
A. To me personally, no.
Q. Now, what about Tommy Ward? Any fact that Tommy Ward has told you, have
you proven or disproven any fact that he’s told you?
A. The ones he’s told me personally, disproved.
Q. So the ones he’s told you personally and the facts about this case and the
statements he’s made, no facts have you been able to prove. Is that right?
A. That he’s made to me personally?
Q. Yes, sir.
A. That’s correct.

(P/H at 546-547). Detective Baskins attempted to locate the crime scene based on the claims in
Mr. Ward’s and Mr. Fontenot’s confessions. He received a series of telephone calls from Agent
Rogers and Detective Smith on possible locations based on the “evidence” given in the
confessions. However, after numerous searches, only animal bones were recovered.( N/T
6/10/1988, at 169). In the totality of their investigation, the police lacked any physical evidence or
eyewitness accounts to support Mr. Fontenot’s confession. Id. at 178-179.
Due to the inability of law enforcement to support his confession with any meaningful
evidence, they resorted to several improper actions to garner viable evidence from Mr. Fontenot.
After the confession, but before he was arraigned, Detectives Smith and Baskins took a sack of
human bones to his cell to coerce Mr. Fontenot to tell them the whereabouts of the victim’s
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body.( N/T. 6/10/1988 at 172) (emphasis added). Police showed Mr. Fontenot a human skull
stating that they had found Mrs. Haraway, and wanted to find the rest of her remains so that her
family could proceed with giving her a Christian burial. (P/H at 537, 559, 981-82). These bones
were obtained from a science lab at East Central University in Ada and used improperly as a tool
to intimidate Mr. Fontenot. (P/H at 975-76).
Although this tactic was used after a confession had already been obtained, it is illustrative
of the coercion surrounding Mr. Fontenot’s confession and the desperation of the police. The
actions of the Ada Police and OSBI agents involved in the interrogations of Mr. Fontenot engaged
in police misconduct in violation of known police procedure and Mr. Fontenot’s constitutional
rights.

B.

Mr. Fontenot’s Confession Is False and Unreliable.

Based on the detective’s own admissions, there is no reliable information provided in Mr.
Fontenot’s confession. Police did not learn one detail as to what occurred to Mrs. Haraway on the
night of April 28, 1984, that they did not already know. No new leads were developed, or
witnesses found. Every attempt by the Ada police and OSBI to substantiate Mr. Fontenot’s
confession resulted in dead ends. Instead of acknowledging that Mr. Fontenot did not know
anything about the case, police and the prosecution continued to blindly pursue a defendant with
no involvement in these crimes.
Dr. Richard Leo, a renowned psychologist who studies interrogations and confessions has
reviewed the evidence in Mr. Fontenot’s case concerning the validity and reliability of Mr.
Fontenot’s confession:
In my professional opinion, Karl Fontenot’s confession statement to abducting, raping,
murdering, and burning the body of Denice Haraway with Tommy Ward and Odell Titsworth
contains numerous and substantial indicia of unreliability and no – zero – corresponding indicia
of reliability. Karl Fontenot’s confession statement possesses all of the hallmarks of a false and
unreliable confession in spades. In the thousands of confessions I have analyzed in the last three
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decades, I have rarely seen a post-admission narrative that is so thoroughly contradicted by the
underlying crime facts, that fails so completely to demonstrate the lack of any personal
knowledge of the crime facts, and that contains so many alleged crime scene details that were
not merely erroneous but physically impossible and provably false. In my professional opinion,
Karl Fontenot’s confession statement is almost certainly, if not certainly, false.
The numerous and substantial indicia of unreliability include:
1) Karl Fontenot’s confession statement contains the wrong method of killing:
Fontenot confessed that Haraway was stabbed to death when, in fact, she was
murdered by a single gunshot to the head. There is no evidence that Fontenot ever
owned a gun. Significantly, Fontenot’s confession statement did not mention that
Haraway (whose body had not been discovered until more than a year after the
murder) had been shot in the head or even that a gun was involved in the crime.
Additionally, there is no evidence that Haraway was ever stabbed nor is there any
evidence that she was raped or that her body was burned, contrary to Fontenot’s
confession statement.
2) In Fontenot’s confession statement, the body had been burned in an abandoned
house near the power plant and then Titsworth, Ward and Fontenot burned down
the house. Not only is there no evidence that Haraway’s body was burned, but the
abandoned house had been torn down and burned in June 1983 – 10 months before
the murder of Denice Haraway in April 1984 – and so did not exist at the time of
the crime. It was therefore physically impossible for Fontenot, Ward and Titsworth
to have burned down the house in April 1984 because it no longer existed at that
time. Nor had there been any fire reported on that property on April 28, 1984.
3) Fontenot’s confession statement claims that Odell Titsworth physically forced
Haraway to get into a pick-up truck, carried Haraway, raped her, stabbed her, and
set her on fire. Because Titsworth‘s arm had been broken by the Ada Police
Department on April 26, 1984 (two days before the murder of Denice Haraway on
April 28, 1984), he had a very painful spiral fracture that would have made it
impossible for him to have physically forced Haraway to get into a truck and
thereafter carry Haraway and put her over a fence, much less rape, stab or set her
on fire. Indeed, Titsworth was eventually cleared of the crime altogether, making
his presence in Fontenot’s confession statement a major red flag for a false
confession. Fontenot makes no mention of Titsworth’s injury in his confession.
4) Remarkably, Fontenot could neither correctly describe nor even identify
Titsworth. Fontenot described Titsworth as 5’10-5”11, 140-150 lbs., with black hair
below his ears, and as having no tattoos or distinguishing marks. In fact, Titsworth was 170
lbs., had hair down to the middle of his waist, and was covered in visible tattoos on both
arms and both legs. Obviously, Fontenot did not know who Odell Titsworth was. Not
surprisingly, Fontenot could not identify pictures of Titsworth shown to him by police nor
could he identify Titsworth in person when Titsworth was brought to Fontenot’s jail cell
and standing right in front of him, though Titsworth would have been easily recognizable
to anyone who had ever seen him up close because of his numerous visible tattoos. In
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addition, Fontenot’s confession statement claimed that Odell Titsworth’s pick-up truck had
been used to kidnap and transport Denice Haraway to the crime scene, but Titsworth did
not own a pick-up truck. A pickup truck owned by Titsworth’s mother was searched and
no evidence was found implicating Fontenot or Titsworth.

5) As occurs in so many false confessions to murder, Fontenot could not identify
the location of the crime or lead police to Denice Haraway’s body, which was found
over a year after Fontenot’s confession statement in a different county in a
completely different direction than his confession states.
6) Fontenot’s confession statement contains an erroneous description of the time
of the day in which the crime occurred. Fontenot’s confession statement stated that
it was almost dark when Denice Haraway had been kidnapped, but that would have
occurred around 8:30 p.m. when it had already been dark for some time.
49

7) As in so many multiple false confession cases, Fontenot’s confession
statement to the murder of Denice Haraway contradicts, on numerous details,
Tommy Ward’s statement a day earlier, which itself led to Fontenot’s arrest and
interrogation. The two confession statements contradict one another regarding the
number of perpetrators who allegedly raped Denice Haraway (even though there is
no evidence that she was even raped); whether she was stabbed by her assailant(s)
(even though there is no evidence that she was stabbed) as well as the number and
location the alleged stab wounds; whether she was able to temporarily break free
of her assailant(s); how she died; when she died; and where the assailant(s) disposed
of her body.
8) Other than Tommy Ward’s discredited, factually false confession, there is no
evidence at all linking Karl Fontenot to the murder of Denice Haraway. Only one
witness identified him as being present at McAnally’s on April 28, 1984, when
Donna Denice Haraway left the store. That witness, who underwent hypnosis prior
to the preliminary hearing, recanted his identification of Fontenot at trial.
Additionally, Fontenot did not match the eyewitness descriptions that led to the
composite picture posted by Ada police following Ms. Haraway’s disappearance.

Without the assistance of information related to him by Agent Rogers and Detective Smith,
nothing Mr. Fontenot said was reliable. Knowing how susceptible Mr. Fontenot was to
suggestion in an interrogation makes it understandable why he would agree with information
given to him by the police.

49 

See Steven Drizin and Richard A. Leo (2004). “The Problem of False Confessions in the Post-DNA world. North Carolina
Law Review, 82, 891-1007. 

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Mr. Fontenot was particularly susceptible to making a false confession. The Supreme
Court recognizes that a suspect’s mental incapacities could render a confession involuntary if
obtained because of “persistent and protracted questioning,” and furthermore that “the use of a
confession obtained under such circumstances is a denial of due process and the judgment of
conviction must be reversed.” Ward v. Texas, 316 U.S. 547, 555 (1942).
A psychological evaluation of Mr. Fontenot performed by Dr. Joel Dreyer, M.D. around
the time of trial indicates that he has “an abnormally low intelligence” and, at the time of the
interrogation, was “suffering from Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder,” related to guilt associated
50

with the death of his mother. These psychological infirmities made Karl particularly vulnerable
51

to police coercion. In Dr. Dreyer’s medical opinion, Mr. Fontenot’s guilt over his mother’s death
is ultimately responsible for his willingness to accept blame for the murder of the victim in this
case. According to Dr. Dreyer, “[Fontenot] believes in his own mind in some talion law, an eye
for an eye, a tooth for a tooth, that even though he never met Denice Haraway and had never been
at McAnally’s East Confectionery, that he was willing to take the rap for her murder and willing
to repeat….the story given to him from the dream of Tommy Ward.” See (Dkt.# 123, Ex.#s 63 &
64, at 3).
Additionally, Dr. Sandra Petrick, a psychiatrist at Eastern State Hospital, evaluated Mr.
Fontenot in order to determine his competency to stand trial. Dr. Petrick determined that Mr.
Fontenot had great difficulty in understanding legal terminology along with the adversarial
nature of criminal proceedings.( N/T 6/13/1988 at 30-31, 36). Of particular importance is Dr.

50  

In 1984, Mr. Fontenot witnessed the death of his mother as she was hit by a car while walking across a 4-lane
highway in order to join Mr. Fontenot inside of a restaurant. Mr. Fontenot was inside the restaurant attempting to
make a phone call for assistance with their broken-down vehicle.

51 

Richard A. Leo (2008). POLICE INTERROGATION AND AMERICAN JUSTICE (Harvard University Press).

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Petrick’s opinion from her report that “[Fontenot] did not understand the implications of his
confession.” Specifically, he referred to his confession as a “confessment” and said he did not
know he was admitting that he did something. (N/T 6/13/1988 at 33).
Under the standard outlined in Crawford v. State, 840 P.2d 627 (Ok 1992), and Malloy
v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964), Mr. Fontenot’s confession was neither the product of free, nor
unconstrained choice.
In addition, as discussed above, there were several factors present in this case that
elevated the risk of eliciting a false and unreliable confession from Mr. Fontenot.
These included Mr. Fontenot’s abnormally low I.Q., which suggests he would have
been highly suggestible, compliant and easily manipulated into making or agreeing
to a false confession; and the interrogation pressure and high-end inducements he
describes occurring during the largely unrecorded interrogation, that if he had been
capable of repairing the car, or making the phone call more quickly, his mother
never would’ve felt the need to come help him inside the restaurant, and would
therefore, be alive.
In addition to these mental instabilities, Mr. Fontenot lived in poverty from birth to
adolescence with an alcoholic father, and then with strangers who picked him up
off the street after his mother’s death, which, as substantial social science research
52
has demonstrated, are known to lead to false and unreliable confessions.
(Dkt.# 123, Ex.# 19). Because Mr. Fontenot’s psychological conditions rendered him incapable
of reasoning the way a mentally healthy interrogation subject would have, his ability to
voluntarily provide a statement to police in the face of their insistence on his guilt, should not be
considered trustworthy.

C. The Pontotoc County District Attorney Office Knowingly Admitted False
Testimony during Mr. Fontenot’s Trial.

The prosecution, as a representative of the people, must zealously prosecute cases while also

52

Richard A. Leo (2008). POLICE INTERROGATION AND AMERICAN JUSTICE (Harvard University Press).

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upholding justice. See Berger v. U.S, 295 U.S. 78 (1935). In that endeavor, the prosecution must not
present evidence it knows to be false but must ensure that the record is corrected when a prosecutor
learns the evidence is false. See Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959). The reason is to ensure a fair
verdict from the factfinder, whether judge or jury; one worthy of reliability and finality. “A lie is a lie,
no matter what its subject, and, if it is in any way relevant to the case, the district attorney has the
responsibility and duty to correct what he knows to be false and elicit the truth. . . . That the district
attorney's silence was not the result of guile or a desire to prejudice matters little, for its impact was the
same, preventing, as it did, a trial that could in any real sense be termed fair.’ ” Id. at 269-270. The
district attorney’s obligation is to ensure the evidence presented has indicia of reliability. The source of
that evidence is irrelevant if the evidence is wrong, even if that evidence is a confession.
The ABA Standards for Criminal Justice advise prosecutors to ensure the
evidence presented at trial is worthy of reliability and credibility.
Standard 3-5.6 Presentation of Evidence
(a) A prosecutor should not knowingly offer false evidence, whether by documents,
tangible evidence, or the testimony of witnesses, or fail to seek withdrawal
thereof upon discovery of its falsity.
ABA Standards for Criminal Justice (Prosecution Function) 3-5.6; Mooney v. Holohan, 294
U.S. 103, 112 (1935)( It is a requirement that cannot be deemed to be satisfied by mere notice
and hearing if a State has contrived a conviction through the pretense of a trial which in truth is
but used as a means of depriving a defendant of liberty through a deliberate deception of court
and jury by the presentation of testimony known to be perjured. Such a contrivance by a State
to procure the conviction and imprisonment of a defendant is as inconsistent with the
rudimentary demands of justice as is the obtaining of a like result by intimidation).
After Agent Rogers presented the prosecutorial to Mr. Peterson, he was obligated to vet
the case and determine whether charges should be brought and what those charges should be.
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The absence of any corroboration for Mr. Fontenot’s confession should have alerted him of the
serious flaws in this case. Instead, Mr. Peterson continued to pursue charges against Mr.
Fontenot in the absence of evidence. Even after his sole eyewitness to Mr. Fontenot’s
involvement recanted his testimony after the preliminary hearing, he continued to move
forward knowing that evidence against Mr. Fontenot rested largely on his guilt by association
with Mr. Ward. ( N/T 6/9/1988 at 24-26); (Dkt.# 123, Ex.# 14). The sole evidence the State
presented was Mr. Fontenot’s false confession knowing it was not substantiated in any way.
The State’s continued presentation of Mr. Fontenot’s confession, in the absence of any
corroboration, when all the evidence presented conflicted with that confession was not only a
violation of the prosecution’s professional obligation, but violated Mr. Fontenot’s constitutional
rights. Mr. Fontenot’s confession failed to inform law enforcement where Mrs. Haraway’s
remains were located, or what might have happened to her. Instead, a year and a half after the
confession, her remains were found in a completely different location with a cause of death
different from what Mr. Fontenot described in his confession. (Dkt.# 123, Ex.#s 17, 46). The
discovery of Mrs. Haraway’s remains betray any shred of validity Mr. Fontenot’s confession
retained. However, instead of dismissing the case, Mr. Peterson remained staunch. “When asked
if the discovery of the body would affect Ward’s and Fontenot’s conviction, Peterson said, ‘Why
would it? We convicted them without a body and now we have one.’” (Dkt.# 123, Ex. # 70).
The State’s comments, in a vacuum, would seem innocuous, but given the extent to which
the undisclosed evidence provided a viable defense for Mr. Fontenot, presented alternate
suspects, and revealed other key pieces of evidence, it shows the lengths the state went to present
false evidence under the guise of a valid “confession” “[D]eliberate deception of a court and
jurors by the presentation of known false evidence is incompatible with rudimentary demands of
justice.” Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 153 (1972) (internal quotations omitted). The
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actions of the State resulted in the presentation of evidence the police knew to be false at the
preliminary hearing. It is unconscionable that a prosecutor, with numerous years of experience,
failed to grasp the importance of a confession of a defendant with no connection to the victim,
or the case.
Further, as discussed supra, the State also utilized the statement of the jailhouse
snitch, Terri Holland (McCartney), and denied any deal had taken place in exchange for her
testimony. This is extremely probative in light of the new evidence presented which includes
the affidavit of her husband and court documents proving otherwise.
VIII.

THE EVIDENCE WAS INSUFFICIENT TO CONVICT MR. FONTENOT
BECAUSE THE STATE FAILED TO SHOW THE EXISTENCE OF THE
CORPUS DELICTI OF THE CHARGED CRIMES OUTSIDE OF THE
CONFESSION AND FAILED TO ESTABLISH THE TRUSTWORTHINESS
OF THE CONFESSION IN VIOLATION OF THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT.

Exclusionary rules relating to criminal confessions find their basis in a single
premise, insulation of the adversary system of jurisprudence from introduction of
false and unreliable evidence. Such false testimony, when undetected, can only
result in a fraud upon society -- conviction of the innocent and freedom for the
guilty.
Note, Voluntary False Confessions: A Neglected Area in Criminal Administration,
28 Ind.L.J. 374 (1953).
Despite vast inconsistencies between Mr. Fontenot's confession and the evidence, the
prosecution tried desperately to force the evidence to fit Mr. Fontenot's story; claiming in essence
that it would be inconceivable for any person to confess to crimes he had not committed. In closing
argument, the prosecutor contended:
I ask, you, ladies and gentlemen, when you are deciding who to believe and who
not to believe I ask you to consider, first of all, is it reasonable to believe that you
could convince a man in fifteen minutes to confess to a crime like this? Now, we
are not talking about any crime here, we are not talking cutting tires or whatever.
We are talking robbery, kidnapping and murder. Could you confess, get a man to
confess to that, especially a murder so heinous and brutal and cruel where he his
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saying - could you get a man to say, well, she was screaming help and crying and
begging and there wasn't no one there to help her, we weren't going for what she
was saying. Could you get someone to say that if they really hadn't done that? In
fifteen minutes?
I don't care how stupid, stupidity is not a lack of morality. A stupid person would
still know he was saying bad things about himself. Could you get a man to do that?
(N/T 6/14/1988 at 73-74).
Yet, false confessions are not new to legal history. As stated in Smith v. United States,
348 U.S. 147, 153, 75 S.Ct. 194, 197 (1954), the "experience of the courts, the police and the
medical profession recounts a number of false confessions voluntarily made." See also Note,
Corroboration of Confessions in the Theft by Receiving Context: Is Proof of Theft Enough, 44
Ark.L.R. 805 (1991); Ayling, Corroborating Confessions: An Empirical Analysis of
Legal Safeguard Against False Confessions, 1984 Wisconsin L.R. 1121; Note, Voluntary
False Confessions, supra, 28 Ind.L.J. 374 (1953).
Among the reasons legal scholars and courts cite for false confessions are psychological
factors including two substantiated by the evidence in this case: guilt feelings over unrelated acts
and a desire for notoriety. Ayling, Corroborating Confessions, supra at 1158-59; Voluntary False
Confessions, supra, at 379-382.
Psychiatrist Joel Dreyer, who examined Mr. Fontenot before retrial, found that Mr.
Fontenot felt extreme personal guilt over the death of his mother who just a few years before his
confession died in an auto-pedestrian accident as she crossed a four-lane highway to find him. A
teenage Mr. Fontenot watched helplessly as his mother came to find him and was hit and killed
53

by a car. ( N/T 6/13/1988 at 193-94). Dr. Dreyer's testimony was that “he [Mr. Fontenot] felt

53 

Dr. Dreyer related that Mr. Fontenot's mother bad been involved in a minor traffic accident and had sent Karl across
the highway to telephone for assistance, but “[h]e didn't have any money when he got there and be couldn't figure out
how to call the police . . . So he had taken so long talking to the people in that little restaurant, that finally his mother
crossed that four-lane highway to find out what he was doing.”( N/T 6/13/1988 at 193-94).

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responsible for her death and feels he should take the responsibility for this other person's death,
for the death of his mother...” (N/T 6/13/1988 at 193-94).
Dr. Dreyer also noted Mr. Fontenot:
... saw this as an opportunity to be important, to have notoriety, to have a claim, to
be written up, to be in the papers, to have friends, to have people interested in him.
And so he did like a lot of people do, all the way from the Son of Sam to other
people who go and say, 'I'm the Son of Sam.' but only one was the Son of Sam.
Those other hundred and eleven couldn't have all been the Son of Sam. He is like
those hundred and eleven people, willing to gain some claim (sic), because he is
not bright and because he was just wandering the street.
54

(N/T 6/13/1988 at 199).

Other evidence showed Mr. Fontenot sought attention and often made false claims.
Gordon Calhoun, who testified for the State that Mr. Fontenot claimed to know something about
Haraway's disappearance, agreed Mr. Fontenot “kind of likes spinning yarns and, that is how he
got his attention." (N/T 6/9/1988 at 145-146, 149). Mr. Calhoun did not believe Mr. Fontenot's
claims about Mrs. Haraway's disappearance. Id. at 151. He agreed Mr. Fontenot "would downright
lie to you if he thought it would get your attention." Id. at 154.
The development of legal safeguards to ensure the reliability of confessions relates
directly to the very real experiences of the judiciary with false confessors to crimes, even to
crimes that never occurred. The fact that Mr. Fontenot confessed to a crime does not make his
confession a reliable one, for false confessions to real crimes are just as likely as those to
imaginary ones. See Corroboration of Confessions, supra, at 832. The goal of the legal

54

Dr. Dreyer testified: “ . . . he was a vagrant, he was like a bum in a way, I mean be was wandering the streets. First
of all his dad bad left him six years before his mother left him and his dad left him to go somewhere and he hadn't
had contact with him since. His dad was a proverbial ubiguitous [sic] alcoholic and his mom then, of course, died in
this pedestrian auto accident. And so he is just wandering the streets and doing some pot and drinking some booze
and talking to some people and doing what he has to do, primarily drinking from time to time, not doing too much
with his life and wandering the streets, not knowing what this world is going to hold for him and feeling responsible
for his mother's death and thinking death for himself and suicide.” (N/T 6/13/1988 at 199).

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safeguards for confessions is not just to protect the confessor from unjust imprisonment, but to
ensure that society is protected from the actual wrongdoer. Voluntary False Confessions, supra,
at 374.
A.

The State's Failure to Sufficiently Prove the Corpus Delicti of the Charged
Crimes Independent of the Confession Requires Reversal.

The State, before extracting confessions from Mr. Ward and Mr. Fontenot, had little
accurate information about what happened to Mrs. Haraway. She had been missing for six months
and the State presumed she had been the victim of foul play despite its inability to locate her
remains or to properly secure the scene of Mrs. Haraway's disappearance. The State's evidence
before Mr. Ward's October 18, 1984, confession, consisted of a description of varying pickup
trucks, a composite drawing of the man with whom Mrs. Haraway had been seen leaving
McAnally's, and descriptions of two men who had aroused the suspicion of a clerk at a completely
55

different convenience store shortly before Mrs. Haraway's disappearance. Although police
denied they had a clothing description before the confessions, evidence showed that APD
Detectives Smith and Baskins were given the description of a blouse a day or two after she
disappeared - the same description that was incorporated first into Mr. Ward's and then
into Mr. Fontenot's confessions six months later. (N/T 6/10/1988 at 144); (N/T 6/13/1988 at
116)(emphasis added).
In State ex.rel. Peterson v. Ward, 707 P.2d 1217 (Okl.Cr.1985), the Oklahoma Court of
Criminal Appeals stated:
It is a fundamental rule of law in this jurisdiction, and most others, that “no criminal
conviction can be based upon a defendant's extrajudicial confession or admission,
although otherwise admissible, unless there is other evidence tending to establish
the corpus delicti.” We have defined corpus delicti “as the substantial and
fundamental fact or facts necessary to the commission of a crime, and means when
55

This is the evidence made available to Mr. Fontenot’s defense counsel. As discussed previously, the police had much
more evidence at their disposal that they ignored.

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applied to any particular offense, the actual commission by someone of particular
offense charged.”
Id., 707 P.2d at 1219; see also Opper v. U.S., 348 U.S. 84 (1954).
Here, the State failed to sufficiently show independent evidence of the corpus delicti of
the charged crimes of kidnapping and first-degree murder in order to admit of Mr. Fontenot's
confessions into evidence.
The elements of kidnapping given to the jury were: 1) unlawful; 2) forcible seizure and
confinement; 3) of another; 4) with intent to confine secretly; 5) against the person's will. (O.R.II,
at 161) The evidence showed Mrs. Haraway calmly left the convenience store accompanied by a
man with his arm around her waist. She said nothing to a bystander entering the store as she was
leaving. She indicated no distress and the customer was in the store about ten minutes before he
realized the clerk was gone. Although the State claimed circumstantial evidence showed it was
out of character for Mrs. Haraway to leave the store unattended and disappear, the objective
evidence was that she left the store with a man without protest to available rescuers. The evidence
outside of Mr. Fontenot's confession failed to show Mrs. Haraway was taken unlawfully, by force
or against her will, and thus the corpus delicti of the crime of kidnapping was not established
outside the confession.
Ordinarily, the discovery of Mrs. Haraway's remains with a bullet hole in the skull would
suffice to show the corpus delicti of murder. See Goforth v. State, 644 P.2d 114 (Ok. 1982) (the
corpus delicti of a murder may be shown by evidence that a body was found under circumstances
indicating a violent death). The only evidence indicating a violent death caused by the acts of
another in this case was a bullet hole in the skull. However, the medical examiner testified that he
could not determine whether the bullet wound was inflicted before or after Mrs. Haraway's death.
(N/T 6/9/1988 at 132). When Mr. Fontenot sought a new trial while awaiting a decision on appeal
after the 1985 trial, the State contended the bullet was not the cause of death, but was merely a
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post-mortem injury:
The State maintains its trial theory that Denice Haraway died due to extensive stab
wounds. Moreover, the skeletal remains would not adequately reflect stab wounds
to an individual's body. As the remains were found approximately 1-1/2 years after
her death, the areas of the stab wounds were long ago decomposed. This is not to
say that the incised-type injuries to the ribs could not be evidence of animal activity.
It would be highly unlikely that a body exposed to the elements for any length of
time would not exhibit some type of animal activity. Further, the evidence of a
gunshot wound to the head does not dispel the State's theory of death. In a
newspaper clipping attached to the defendant's appeal brief, it is stated that a man
came across the skeletal remains while hunting in the woods. It is not unreasonable
to theorize that the bullet wound to the skull came from a hunter's bullet.
(F-85-769, Brief of Appellee in Response to Mr. Fontenot's Motion for New Trial on Newly
Discovered Evidence, at 5).
The State failed to show the corpus delicti of murder, because, as the State previously
argued, and the medical examiner's testimony substantiates, the evidence failed to show an
unnatural cause of death. No stab wounds were found, and the evidence of the gunshot wound
would not definitively be determined to be the cause of death. (N/T 6/9/1988 at 130). In a case
on-point with Mr. Fontenot's, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals reversed and dismissed a
first-degree murder conviction where there was no evidence of stabbing as the cause of death even
though the defendant had confessed to stabbing the victim (and, unlike Mr. Fontenot had
accurately told the police where the body was located). Thornburgh v. State, 815 P.2d 186 (Ok.
1991). The State's failure to independently show the corpus delicti of murder in this case likewise
requires reversal of Mr. Fontenot’s conviction. In order to find that the gunshot wound adequately
established the corpus delicti of murder, one must find Mr. Fontenot's confession materially false
and insufficiently corroborated by independent evidence to support his convictions. In order to
find that the stabbing adequately established the corpus delicti of murder, one must disregard all
independent evidence and rely solely on Mr. Fontenot's confession.
B.

The State Failed to Establish Through "Substantial Independent Evidence"
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the Trustworthiness of Mr. Fontenot's Confession; The Confession Was
Patently Unreliable and Thus Inadmissible
Even if this Court determines the evidence was sufficient to show the corpus delicti of the
crimes alleged, Mr. Fontenot's confession lacked any independent indicia of reliability or
trustworthiness. The United States Supreme Court, in Opper v. United States, 348 U.S. 84, 75 S.Ct.
158 (1954), stated:
It is necessary, therefore, to require the Government to introduce substantial
independent evidence which would tend to establish the trustworthiness of the
statement. Thus, the independent evidence serves a dual function. It tends to make
the admission reliable, thus corroborating it while also establishing independently
the other necessary elements of the offense.
348 U.S. at 93, 75 S.Ct. at 164, adopted by Oklahoma in Jones v. State, 555 P.2d 63, 68 (Ok.
1976). The Opper standard requires a confession actually have some resemblance to the known
facts of the crime to show that the confession is trustworthy.
In Williamson v. State, 812 P.2d 384 (Ok. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S.Ct. 1592 (1992), the
Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals found that “factual errors and omissions” do not necessarily
render a confession unreliable. The OCCA recited the discrepancies in the Williamson confession as:
Specifically, these errors and omissions are that the decedent had a washcloth in her
mouth and not her panties, and that a lid to a catsup bottle and not a coke bottle was
discovered inside her rectum, and that no mention was made of the ligature, the writing
on the wall or the presence of another person.

Id. at 397. Relying on the language in Opper that it was “sufficient if the corroboration supports
the essential facts admitted sufficiently to justify a jury inference of their truth,” the Oklahoma
Court of Criminal Appeals found that the essential facts of the murder described by Williamson
were sufficiently consistent with the physical evidence found at the crime scene, despite the
minor inconsistencies described above. Id., quoting Opper, 348 U.S. at 93, 75 S.Ct. at 164.
Here, the chasm between Mr. Fontenot's confession and the known facts of the case are
hardly minor. The State alleged the kidnapping was accomplished by force or fear, yet the
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witnesses seeing Mrs. Haraway leave the convenience store saw no weapon or any apparent
distress or signs of struggle. The prosecution alleged the murder was committed by repeated
stabbing and by gunshot, yet they could offer no independent evidence that a stabbing had
occurred and no evidence linking Mr. Fontenot or his codefendant to a firearm. The confession
said Mrs. Haraway was stabbed; she had a bullet hole in her skull. The confession is replete with
other factual errors, not the least of which include Mr. Fontenot' s naming of Mr. Titsworth. The
police proved irrefutably Mr. Titsworth had not been involved.
The other contradictions between the evidence and the confession are the location of the
body in another county rather than where Mr. Fontenot claimed; the evidence of death from a
gunshot wound, which the State even contended was post-mortem, while no evidence supported
Mr. Fontenot's claim of stabbing the victim; no evidence of rape described by Mr. Fontenot; and
evidence that the body was not burned, which was contrary to Mr. Fontenot's story.
The only "facts" in the confessions supported by independent evidence were those known
to the police and public before the confessions. Mr. Fontenot correctly described using an oldermodel pickup truck, which had been widely publicized as the perpetrator's vehicle. Mr. Fontenot
knew about how much money had been taken from the convenience store in the alleged robbery,
an amount that was published within days of Mrs. Haraway's disappearance. The blouse
description was given to police by Mr. Ward the day before Mr. Fontenot was interrogated, but
also had been given to investigating officers long before their interviews with either Ward or Mr.
Fontenot. Even this description is disputed by the evidence subsequently discovered at the site
where Mrs. Haraway's remains were found.
As detailed in Petitioner’s Response Brief, the following portions of Mr. Fontenot's
confession and subsequent statements were factually disproved, primarily by the State's own
evidence at trial.
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Mr. Fontenot's Statement
October 19, 1984

Evidence
June 7-14, 1988

1. Mr. Fontenot knew Odell Titsworth and was 1. Mr. Fontenot had never seen Odell Titsworth
at a party with Titsworth and Tommy Ward on until police brought Mr. Titsworth to his cell
the evening of April 28, 1984. (Ex.# 69 at 690). after the confession; Mr. Fontenot could not
identify Mr. Titsworth in a photographic lineup
or in person. (N/T 6/13/1988 at 86-88).

2. Mr. Fontenot described Mr. Titsworth as 5
feet 10 to 11 inches tall, weighing around 140 to
150 pounds, with black hair just below his ears
and having no tattoos or distinguishing marks
about him. Mr. Fontenot's description of Mr.
Titsworth was markedly incorrect. (Ex.# 69 at
689).

2. In April 1984, Odell Titsworth had hair down
to the middle of his waist, weighed 175 pounds,
and had very noticeable tattoos covering both
harms from the wrists to the shoulders, inside
and out, on his back, his stomach, and up and
down both legs. On April 28, 1984, his arm was
in a cast, having been broken by the Ada Police
Department on April 26, 1984. (P/H at 792-796,
795-97, 838);(N/T 6/13/1988 at 81-82); (N/T
6/10/1988 at 184-85);(N/T 6/14/1988 at 88-89).

3. Odell Titsworth was a participant in robbing,
kidnapping, raping and stabbing Mrs. Haraway.
The lock-blade knife and the pickup truck used
in the commission of the crimes belonged to Mr.
Titsworth. (Ex.# 69 at 664, 676-678).

3. The police eliminated Odell Titsworth from
being in any way involved in the Mr. Haraway
case. Mr. Titsworth's truck was searched and no
evidence relating to this case was found. The
State presented evidence to show that Mr. Ward
owned a lockblade Buck knife, but the actual
weapon was never recovered. (N/T 6/10/1988 at
23-24).

4. After the party, the trio "went out from north of 4. Ada has two McAnally' s convenience stores,
one north, and one east. N/T 6/9/1988 at 91
town." (Ex.# 69 at 664).
Haraway disappeared from the McAnally's in
east Ada.

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5. Mr. Titsworth went into McAnally's and
brought Mrs. Haraway out to the pickup truck
while Mr. Fontenot and Ward waited outside by
the gas pumps. Mr. Fontenot and Mr. Ward got
into the truck after Mrs. Haraway was forced in.
(Ex.# 69 at 664)

5. Eyewitnesses at the convenience store when
Mrs. Haraway left saw only one man with Mrs.
Haraway and no others standing outside the
truck. This man's description did not remotely
match Odell Titsworth.( N/T 6/9/1988 at 34-68).

6. Four people drove away in the pickup to the 6. Eyewitnesses at McAnally's saw only one
power plant (west of McAnally's). (Ex.# 69 at man with Mrs. Haraway, no other person around
664-665)
or near the pickup and no other person in the
store. Mary Scroggins reported seeing a gray
pickup with three persons in it speeding toward
the power plant on night of Mrs. Haraway's
disappearance, but could identify any of them.
(N/T 6/9/1988 at 80).

7. It was "almost dark" twenty minutes
after the rapes began. (Ex.# 69 at 673).

7. Mr. Whechel testified it was dark when he
arrived at the McAnally's at 8:30 p.m. and saw
Mrs. Haraway leaving. (N/T 6/9/1988 at 64).

8. Mr. Titsworth stabbed Mrs. Haraway to death, 8. There was no evidence of stabbing and no
stabbing her in the chest "[h]ard enough to get indication of nick marks or broken ribs that
the full blade in. (Ex.# 69 at 682).
would signify a stabbing.( N/T 6/8/1988 at 134).
Further, the State's evidence showed the only
apparent cause of death was a gunshot wound
and Mr. Fontenot never mentioned a gun in his
confession or in subsequent statements.

9. Mrs. Haraway was placed in a rotted out hole
in the floor of a house behind the power plant,
gasoline poured on her and the house set afire.
(Ex.# 688).

9. The house located near the power station had
been completely torn down to its concrete
foundation and burned by its owner in June of
1983, ten months before Mrs. Haraway
disappeared. There was no fire reported on the
owner's property on April 28, 1984. Mrs.
Haraway's remains were found in a brushy
countryside area near Gerty, Oklahoma. Her
body had not been burned. (N/T 6/14/1988 at
136).

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On January 20, 1986, physical evidence was discovered substantially disproving Mr.
Fontenot's confession. A farmer setting traps near Gerty, Oklahoma, east of Ada in adjacent
Hughes County, found what appeared to be a human skull. A subsequent search of the area
uncovered human remains that were identified as those of Mrs. Haraway. The medical examiner
56

found no evidence indicating Mrs. Haraway had been stabbed, but a bullet hole was found in the
back of the skull. Mr. Fontenot had never mentioned the use of a firearm in his confessions. The
body had not been burned. (N/T 6/13/1988 at 136).
The State contended the blouse description in the confession was corroborated by the
evidence that Mrs. Haraway had such a blouse and testimony describing her clothing before she
disappeared. But this "corroboration" must be viewed considering evidence that police had
previously been given the description of this blouse; the suggestive interrogation techniques used
with Mr. Ward and most likely with Mr. Fontenot; and the evidence of red and gold earrings
and the back of a red and white shirt found near Mrs. Haraway's remains (State's Trial
Exhibits #s 19, 20, 22F)(emphasis added).
The State had no real theory of this case and certainly no evidence until obtaining the
confessions of Mr. Ward and Mr. Fontenot. Rather than showing the reliability of Mr. Fontenot's
statement, the State's evidence showed its unreliability and untrustworthiness. Uncorroborated and
untrustworthy confessions are not competent evidence. Opper, 348 U.S. at 93, 75 S. Ct.
at 164.

56

The testimony was that since the only remains of Mrs. Haraway were skeletonized, it would have been possible
for her to have been stabbed, and the bones not reflect it. See Thornburgh v. State, 815 P.2d 186 (Ok. 1991).

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C.

No Rational Trier of Fact Could Find Mr. Fontenot's Guilt Beyond a
Reasonable Doubt on the Evidence at Trial, even if the Confession is Deemed
Properly Admitted

At the close of the State's case, Mr. Fontenot moved for a directed verdict of acquittal
because of insufficient corroboration of the confession and the failure of the State to prove each
element of the charged crimes beyond a reasonable doubt. The motion was overruled.(N/T
6/13/1988 at 127). The motion was renewed after the defense case and was overruled.( N/T
6/14/1988 at 11).
Outside of the false confession, no evidence linked Mr. Fontenot to Mrs. Haraway's
disappearance. At trial, not one witness identified Mr. Fontenot as being at McAnally's on April
28, 1984. Although Ms. Wise and Mr. Moyer identified his co-defendant Mr. Ward, neither could
identify Mr. Fontenot as Mr. Ward's companion. Both saw a man in the courtroom at the
preliminary hearing who was more familiar to them as that man than Mr. Fontenot. (N/T 6/8/1988
at 194-95, 197-99);( N/T 6/9/1988 at 26).
Likewise, the police had no physical evidence placing Mr. Fontenot at McAnally's on April
28, 1984. Significantly, the crime scene at McAnally's went unpreserved despite the presence of
an Ada police officer and detective shortly after Mrs. Haraway' s disappearance. (N/T 6/9/1988
at 92-93). Fingerprints from the counter, cash register and the glass doors of McAnally's, as well
as a still-burning cigarette (Mrs. Haraway did not smoke) were destroyed because the manager
wanted to clean up the store. (N/T 6/9/1988 at 92-93). Police investigated numerous individuals
who looked like the composites and at least 28 pickup trucks like those reported seen at J.P. 's and
McAnally's in the six months between Mrs. Haraway's disappearance and Mr. Fontenot's arrest,
but they found nothing. (N/T 6/14/1988 at 30-33).

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Likewise, there was no evidence of Mr. Fontenot in the area where Mrs. Haraway's
remains were found.
Detective Smith testified:
Q. . . . there is absolutely no physical evidence whatsoever to tell us what happened
at the scene, nothing, right? I mean, you can't tell who did what, when and where
or anything. Is that correct?
A. Well, to me the strongest evidence is the confession.
Q. Okay. Fine. Okay. Other than the statements of Karl Fontenot, okay, as to what
transpired at the scene, do you have any other physical evidence?
A. From the scene?
Q. Yes. And we - The Jury has already seen the remains of Donna Denice Haraway.
Okay. All right. But, at the scene, I'm talking about what was said, what happened,
you have no other, you have no physical evidence. All we have is, according to you,
Karl's statement. Right?
A. And the body.

(N/T 6/10/1988 at 106-107). Compare this with OSBI Agent Gary Roger's testimony at Mr.
Fontenot's first trial, before the body was found:
Q. Aside from these two statements [Ward's and Fontenot's] do you have any proof,
separate from these statements, that Donna Denice Haraway was kidnapped, raped
or murdered? Aside from these statements?
A. We have proof that she has not been seen or heard from in a year and a half.
Q. All right. So, basically if we say -- if we take the statements aside, the only thing
you can prove is Donna Haraway is gone?
A. That's correct.
(J/T 86-769 Tr. 2048-85).
Federal constitutional law requires as a matter of due process that any criminal conviction
stand only upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt as to each and every essential element of the
crime or crimes charged. U.S. Const. Amend XIV; Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct.
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2781 (1979); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 90 S.Ct. 1068 (1970). Speculation and guesswork are
fundamentally antagonistic to the constitutional requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt,
and a conviction cannot stand where the evidence establishes no more than speculation or
suspicion. Hager v. State, 612 P.2d 1369 (Ok. 1980). Yet, the mere issuance of an instruction
charging the jury with its duty to find proof beyond a reasonable doubt is not enough. As the
United States Supreme Court stated in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. at 316-17, 99 S.Ct. at 2788:
The Winship doctrine requires more than simply a trial ritual. A doctrine establishing
so fundamental a substantive constitutional standard must also require that the
factfinder will rationally apply that standard to the facts in evidence. A 'reasonable
doubt,' at a minimum, is one based upon 'reason.' Yet a properly instructed jury may
occasionally convict even when it can be said that no rational trier of fact could find
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, . . . .
The U.S. and Oklahoma Constitution’s guarantee that no person shall be deprived of liberty
or life without due process of the law, encompassing the right to be free from convictions except
upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of guilt. Fourteenth Amendment; Okla.Const. Art.II, §7;
Young v. State, 89 OK. 395, 208 P.2d 1141 (1949). The federal and state constitutions are in accord
on the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt and on the test to be applied when
examining the record for absence or existence of such proof. The test for determining whether
proof is sufficient to support a criminal conviction is whether, in the light most favorable to the
State, a rational trier of fact could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, supra;
Spuehler v. State, 709 P.2d 202 (Ok. 1985).
In the light most favorable to the State, the evidence at trial established beyond a reasonable
doubt that Mrs. Haraway disappeared on April 28, 1984, and was found dead on January 20, 1986.
Beyond these basic facts, the evidence introduced to establish the cause of death, criminal agency
and the identity of the person responsible for her death was unreliable, contradictory,
uncorroborated, or simply nonexistent. None of the eyewitnesses identified Mr. Fontenot as the

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man who left the store with Mrs. Haraway, and they saw only one man with her in the truck as
they left. None of the physical evidence, including the body, linked Mr. Fontenot to Mrs.
Haraway's disappearance or death. At best, the evidence established Mrs. Haraway died from a
gunshot wound to the head or was struck by a stray bullet after she died from unknown causes. In
either case, there was no independent evidence tending to suggest she was raped, stabbed or
burned, or ever taken to any location other than where her remains were found.
No rational juror who was able to set aside the tragedy of Mrs. Haraway's death could find
beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Fontenot should be convicted on his own words. Given the
uncontroverted evidence of Mr. Fontenot's mental and psychological impairments, the material
discrepancies between the physical evidence and the story Mr. Fontenot told the police; the
absence of evidence to corroborate his version of the events; and the circumstances surrounding
his coerced confession, no reasonable juror would have convicted Mr. Fontenot.
IX.

THE STATE'S INJECTION OF INADMISSIBLE HEARSAY FROM THE
EXTRAJUDICIAL CONFESSION OF MR. WARD IN MR. FONTENOT'S
TRIAL
VIOLATED
HIS
CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHT
OF
CONFRONTATION

In its opinion reversing Mr. Fontenot's previous convictions for these crimes, the Oklahoma
Court of Criminal Appeals (OCCA) held it was reversible error for the trial court to admit the
inculpatory statements of the non-testifying co-defendant at the joint trial of Mr. Fontenot and Mr.
Ward. Fontenot v. State, 742 P.2d 31, 32 (Ok. 1987). The OCCA found Mr. Fontenot's Sixth
Amendment right to confront the witnesses against him was damaged beyond repair by the
admission of the non-testifying co-defendant's statement. Id. Further, the appellate court found that
Mr. Ward's statement "did not have sufficient indicia of reliability as it relates to Mr. Fontenot to
overcome the presumption of unreliability to permit its direct admission .... " Id.; see also Lee v.
Illinois, 476 U.S. 530, 106 S.Ct. 2056 (1986).
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Yet, at retrial the State injected key portions of the codefendant's extrajudicial statements
into the evidence presented at trial for the purpose of corroborating Mr. Fontenot's confession.
The State then inferred and argued Mr. Fontenot's guilt from this inadmissible evidence. Mr.
Fontenot was not given the opportunity to confront Mr. Ward to test the truthfulness of his
extrajudicial statements. The denial of the fundamental right of confrontation, the prejudicial
weight of the particular portions of the co-defendant's statements used by the State, and the
weakness of the State's case without the improper corroboration of Mr. Fontenot's statement
require reversal of these convictions. U.S. Const., amends. VI and XIV, Okla. Const., Art. II, §7,
Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415, 420, 85 S.Ct. 1074, 1077 (1965).
The State did not introduce the entirety of Mr. Ward's statements, which includes Mr.
Ward’s preliminary hearing testimony -- but injected cherry-picked inculpatory information
gathered from his statements. Most prejudicial was the hearsay testimony of Detective Smith,
who stated that Mr. Ward's description of a blouse purportedly worn by Mrs. Haraway matched
the description given in Mr. Fontenot's confession, and placed the two together at the crime
scene. From Detective Smith and OSBI Agent Gary Rogers, the jury learned Mr. Ward confessed
and described details of the crime in a similar fashion to Mr. Fontenot.
Both Detective Smith and Agent Rogers were specifically admonished not to repeat
anything told him by Mr. Fontenot's co-defendant. (N/T 6/10/1988 at 52); (N/T 6/13/1988 at 1920). Nonetheless, Detective Smith made the following statements:

Q. [Defense Counsel] You had a description of the blouse prior to interviewing Karl
Fontenot?
A. [Smith] From Tommy Ward.
(N/T 6/10/1988 at 116) (emphasis added). Defense counsel did not invite the reference to Mr.
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examination was not to establish from whom Detective Smith learned the blouse description, but
57

that he had been given a similar blouse description by Richard Holkum within days of Mrs.
Haraway's disappearance.
The importance - and prejudice - of Mr. Ward's extrajudicial statements
regarding the blouse was elicited by the State on re-direct examination:
Q. And I believe you started to testify it was more important for another reason
and that was because it matched Tommy Ward's description.
A. Yes, it did. The two descriptions of the blouse were very close and that is what
made it important. If one of them said, well, she had a light-colored blouse with
flowers on it and the other one had said, well, she had a striped blouse on, then the
importance of the blouse would not be an issue. But, they both described the
blouse nearly identically, close enough that you knew, or we would know that
they had seen it. We didn't place the importance on it until later, much later after
they were arrested, in fact.
Id. at 132 (emphasis added). Other hearsay testimony improperly admitted told jurors Mr. Ward
confessed, implicated Mr. Fontenot, and gave similar details about the crime as had Mr.
Fontenot. Detective Smith's additional references to the plurality of confessions and their
content inculpated Mr. Fontenot:
Q. What did Agent Rogers tell him exactly or you tell him exactly in order for him
[Fontenot] to stop denying that he was involved?
A. What he said was: “Karl, we have already talked to Tommy and we have a
confession from him.”
Q. Okay. And did you go on and tell him that we knew that he was involved, we
wanted him to tell the truth and give you a statement?
A. That is ... usually what we tell people that we are interrogating, yes.
Id. at 104; and
Q. [Butner] The pickup was in Ada and was driven by Tommy Ward .... and Karl
Fontenot. You never saw that personally?
57 

See supra at 87-90 detailing the totality of Mr. Holkum’s statements to Detective Smith and that the exculpatory
evidence was withheld from defense counsel.

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A. No, Tommy Ward said that.
Id. at 146; and
Q. [Butner]: Detective Smith, I'm not talking about the confessions. I'm asking you,
would, in fact, the ease with which an article of clothing came off a body due to
animal activity, wouldn't that have some effect as to how long it lasted, if you know
or have an opinion?
A. Well, in the confessions they said the clothes were taken off and it was my
opinion that they weren't even on.
Id. at 153.
Agent Rogers, purportedly testifying about the actions taken as a result of Mr. Ward's
confession, injected information showing correlations with Mr. Fontenot's confession. After he
was admonished not to state anything told him by Mr. Ward, (N/T 6/13/1988 at 19-20), he
related that during his conversation with Mr. Ward, Agent Rogers had directed Detective Baskin
to search a power plant located off Richardson Loop west of Ada for Mrs. Haraway's remains.
Another call directed Detective Baskin to a burned-out house and a third directed him even
further west from the power station to Sandy Creek to locate "a concrete citron or bunker, ...
basically a large hole in the ground that had concrete walls." (Tr. At 20-21). This testimony
assured jurors that Mr. Ward's statements corroborated those of Mr. Fontenot concerning crimes
at the power plant and attempts to dispose of the body.
The testimony of Detective Smith and Agent Rogers about portions of Mr. Ward's
extrajudicial statements was hearsay and offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted, i.e.,
that the confessions of Mr. Fontenot and Mr. Ward corroborated each other, and that the only
explanation for this was their guilt. The prosecution succeeded in doing indirectly what the
OCCA had rule it could not do directly - using Mr. Ward's confession to inculpate Mr. Fontenot
in this crime.
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It is well settled that the hearsay rule does not preclude testimony to show that a statement
was made or that certain actions resulted from a conversation with a third person. Greer v. State,
763 P.2d 106 (Ok. 1988); Thompson v. State, 705 P.2d 188 (Ok. 1985); Godwin v.
State, 625 P.2d 1262 (Ok. 1981). Garcia v. State, 639 P.2d 88 (Ok. 1981); Dunagan v. State, 734
P. 2d 291 (Ok. 1987). However, in Washington v. State, 568 P.2d 301 (Ok. 1977), the Oklahoma

Court of Criminal Appeals held that the State cannot circumvent the hearsay rule and effectively
place into evidence the inculpatory substance of a conversation with a third party through the ruse
of relating the information in terms of the actions resulting from the conversation. In Washington,
supra, 568 P.2d at 311 a police officer had spoken with a young boy who was a witness to a
crime. The police officer testified that after his conversation with the boy, he directed his
investigation at the defendant. The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals stated:
The recitation of the preceding cases makes it apparent that it is permissible for an
officer to testify that he received information from a third party which led to the
defendant's arrest; provided, however, that the information received shows that the
arrest was for a crime other than the one charged or provided that the information
received was just a description of the criminal and not an extrajudicial identification
of the defendant as the perpetrator of the crime charged.
Id. In Washington, had the officer repeated the boy's statement that the defendant had committed
the crime, this would have been inadmissible hearsay. The court found evidence is
no less inadmissible hearsay when the jury is made aware of the substance of the third-party
statement through indirect testimony.
The same is true here. The prosecution elicited sufficient testimony to tie together the
statements of Mr. Fontenot and Mr. Ward as if they contained the same inculpatory information,
i.e., that Mr. Ward, too, claimed Mr. Fontenot was guilty of the offenses charged. Detective
Smith's testimony that Mr. Ward had given a description of the blouse "very close" to Mr.
Fontenot's was a clear signal to the jury that Mr. Ward's confession corroborated that of Mr.

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Fontenot and inculpated Mr. Fontenot. (N/T 6/10/1988 at 132). The prosecution drew direct
inferences of Mr. Fontenot's guilt through this testimony. Detective Smith testified:
The two descriptions of the blouse were very close and that is what made it
important. If one of them said, well, she had a light-colored blouse with flowers on
it and the other one had said, well, she had a striped blouse on, then the importance
of the blouse would not be an issue. But, they both described the blouse nearly
identically, close enough that you knew, or we would know that they had seen
it.
(N/T 6/10/1988 at 132) (emphasis added). Prosecutor Ross contended in closing argument:
Mr. Butner, Mr. Smith, Mr. Rogers, Mr. Gridner (sic), have all agreed that it would
be impossible for someone to make up that description of the blouse. Doubly
impossible for two, and that leaves us with only one alternative, and that is that this
Defendant was there, just like he confessed he was.
(N/T 6/14/1988 at 79).
Significantly, had the prosecution presented Mr. Ward as a witness to testify concerning
his statements and had Mr. Fontenot been afforded his constitutionally guaranteed right of
confrontation, this evidence could have been tested. After Mr. Fontenot's conviction, Mr. Ward
was tried again for the same crimes and testified. His testimony revealed the following:

Q. Did anybody tell you what the Haraway girl was supposed to be wearing when
she disappeared?
A. Yes, sir. Dennis Smith did.
Q. What did he tell you?

A. Well, they told me that she either had a white blouse with blue roses on it or a
red and white striped shirt.

Q. And did he tell you which one to select or to –
A. No.
Q. -- put in your statement?
A. No, I just took a guess. And at that time, when I guessed, saying the white shirt
with blue roses, he kept on trying to - which I thought that he was trying to get me
to change my mind and say a white shirt with red stripes -- a white -- yea, a white
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shirt with red stripes on it.
Q. What did you think would happen when they checked this all out and found out
the things you were telling them weren't true?

A. Like I said before, I thought that they would run me out for lying to them.
(Ward-90-17 Tr. at 139-140).
The introduction of portions of Mr. Ward's statements circumvented the Court's ruling in
Fontenot v. State, 742 P.2d 31, 32 (Ok. 1987), where the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals
found the introduction of Mr. Ward's confession violated Mr. Fontenot's constitutional right to
confront his accusers. Had Mr. Ward testified about his confession, Mr. Fontenot could have
cross-examined him about his repudiations of that statement. He could have cross examined him
on the preliminary hearing testimony he had given exculpating Mr. Fontenot. The State used the
most damning portions of Mr. Ward's confession to show similarities to Mr. Fontenot's statement
and convince the jury to reach the conclusion both were guilty.
Before Detective Smith's testimony, defense counsel objected to any reference to
statements made by Mr. Ward and Detective Smith. Police were warned by the trial court not to
repeat anything they had heard from Mr. Ward. (N/T 6/10/1988 at 52). Before cross-examination,
defense counsel requested Detective Smith be admonished again. Id. at 94-95. The same was done
with Agent Rogers. (N/T 6/13/1988 at 19-20). As these admonitions repeatedly were ignored,
additional objections would have exacerbated the damage by calling attention to the prejudicial
hearsay. Defense counsel was left in the untenable position of focusing the jury's attention on the
issue of the matching descriptions by objecting. Although generally a contemporaneous objection
is necessary to preserve error, 12 O.S. 1981, §2104(A)(l), the Evidence Code provides for review
of "plain errors affecting substantial rights" when no objection is made. 12 O.S. 1991, §2104(D).
Defense counsel did everything he could reasonably do to prevent the errors from occurring ahead

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of time, and all attorneys, relevant witnesses, and the trial court were clearly on notice of his
objections to any testimony relating to the substance of Mr. Ward's extrajudicial statements.
Mr. Fontenot's objections to the admission of Ward's statements and the admonitions
specifically warning witnesses not to relate Mr. Ward's statements preserved this error. The denial
of Mr. Fontenot's constitutional right of confrontation was "plain error" and affected "substantial
rights," and thus is subject to review. 12 O.S., 1991, §2104(D); McCall
v. State, 539 P.2d 418 (Ok. 1975). As the United States Supreme Court has said:
This case cannot be characterized as one where the prejudice in the denial of the
right of cross-examination constituted a mere minor lapse. The alleged statements
[extrajudicial confession of separately tried, nontestifying accomplice] clearly bore
on a fundamental part of the State's case against petitioner.
Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415, 420 (1965)
The denial of Mr. Fontenot's constitutional right of confrontation was fundamental error
leading to conviction and not subject to waiver. Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 74-75 (1985).
The prejudice of ignoring the appellate court’s holding in Fontenot v. State, 742 P.2d 31, 32 (Ok.
1987), is that the only arguable evidence of guilt independent of Mr. Fontenot's confession was
the blouse description. Absent Mr. Ward's live testimony, this "evidence" was already greatly
weakened by the fact that no such blouse material was found with the remains; that the police
insisted on denying they had been given a similar blouse description long in advance of the
confessions despite the fact they clearly had; and that a different shirt found with the remains in
fact matched the earrings Mrs. Haraway wore. These problematic facts demonstrate why it was
so important for the State to inject Mr. Ward's extrajudicial statements concerning the blouse as
"corroboration" at every opportunity, as well as the impact Mr. Ward's statements must have had
on the jury. The "corroborative" value of Ward's statements and the impact they must have had
on Mr. Fontenot's jury would have been greatly diminished, if not destroyed, by Mr. Ward's live

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testimony - which we now know would have disputed the veracity of his description and
explained how he came to give that description. Mr. Ward's explanation at his retrial was
consistent with statements he made to his attorney long in advance of the discovery of Mrs.
Haraway's remains and consistent with the existence of a red and white striped shirt having been
found with her remains, while no evidence of the described blouse was found. Mr. Ward
58

ultimately received a life sentence while Mr. Fontenot was sentenced to death for convictions of
the same crimes.
X.

MR. FONTENOT’S FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT DUE PROCESS
RIGHT WAS VIOALTED DUE TO THE POLICE MISCONDUCT THAT
PERMEATED THE INVESTIGATION INTO MRS. HARAWAY’S
DISAPPERANCE
a. The Ada Police Department’s Complete Lack of Training to Handle
Major Crimes Resulted in an Incompetent Police Investigation.

The Ada Police Department (APD) is the sole law enforcement agency responsible for
investigating crimes in the City of Ada. As such, officers are required to be trained on the
preservation of evidence, witness interviewing, report drafting and other investigative procedures
to ensure the proper handling of criminal activity within their jurisdiction. Because they are the
only agency investigating major crimes in Ada, their failure to follow proper protocol resulted in
the ineffective evaluation and collection of evidence. At the time of Mrs. Haraway’s abduction
and through the investigation of her case, the APD lacked the requisite training to properly
secure potential evidence and evaluate the evidence collected in the case.
The only substantial training in investigative techniques by the lead APD detective,
Dennis Smith, was inadequate on-the-job training. Detective Smith testified police officers were

58

Mr. Fontenot’s death sentence was overturned on his second direct appeal. He was later resentenced to life imprisonment
without the possibility of parole.

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“intuitively investigators” and got investigative experience through investigating traffic stops
and domestic abuse cases, (Dkt.# 123, Ex.# 53, at 10, 12), and that personally, he “received onthe-job training, which was probably the most beneficial.” (Dkt.# 123, Ex.# 53, at 12). Prior to
Mrs. Haraway’s abduction, Detective Smith had only been involved with two homicide
investigations in his numerous years on the police force. Id. at 126. One of them remained
59

unsolved during the investigation of the Haraway case.

OSBI’s involvement in the Haraway case came only at the request of the local police
agency, APD. (Dkt.# 123, Ex.# 43, prosecutorial bates 3). While OSBI’s documentation of the
investigation does show more thorough reporting than the APD, there are still questions
concerning the Haraway investigation that remain unclear. It is evident both agencies received
numerous witness reports in close proximity to the crime providing information of alternate
suspects and former boyfriends who many have had a hand in Mrs. Haraway’s disappearance.
APD’s and OSBI’s inability to pursue such leads, vet the information, and make reasonable
investigative decisions is clear from the actions of both agencies in this case.
b. The Ada Police Department’s Primary Function Was To Investigate The
Disappearance of Denice Haraway and They Failed That Role Because
They Did Not Collect Information from Readily Available Witnesses
Starting from the first call to emergency services, the police failed to properly preserve
the crime scene, evaluate evidence, and follow investigative leads. When law enforcement fails in this
endeavor, it places the district attorney in a precarious position of evaluating evidence without a full
understanding of crucial facts of the crime. See Brady v. Dill, 187 F.3d 104, 114 (1st Cir. 1999) (A
valuable role and standard police function is to provide information to the prosecutor and the courts).
Detectives in this case failed to properly preserve evidence creating a ripple effect limiting the

59

The second homicide investigation involved Debbie Carter’s murder which occurred in 1983. Ronald Williamson
and Dennis Fritz were convicted of that murder, then later exonerated.

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investigative avenues detectives could consider and develop further.
The Court has admonished police behavior that relies on flimsy information. When
witnesses are readily available for interviews, physical evidence is available, and medical
diagnosis is forthcoming, yet the police do not conduct appropriate interviews, inspect the
evidence for signs of the crime, or wait for preliminary reports from the medical technician, the
Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals has concluded the police failed to conduct an investigation. See
Cortez v. McCauley, 478 F.3d 1108, 1117-18 (10th Cir. 2007).
The investigation of reported crime is the statutory and jurisdictional province of
various local, state, and federal law enforcement agencies (Sullivan, 1977). The
specific agencies responding to a criminal complaint, and ultimately in charge,
depend on which laws have been reported to be broken and where. Whichever
agency takes charge of a criminal complaint, they have the legal authority to
respond to the scene, interview witnesses and suspects, collect evidence, and make
arrests.
Any responding law enforcement agency also has a professional duty of care. This
refers to the professional and legal obligation to be competent custodians of any
victims that are encountered; any criminal investigations that are initiated; any
evidence that supports or refutes allegations of criminal activity against accused
suspects; and any suspects that they take into custody (see Bopp and Schultz, 1972;
Gross, 1924; Hansen and Culley, 1973; Kappeler, 2006; SATF, 2009; and Savino
and Turvey, 2011). Very often this duty of care is a matter of explicit statute and
agency policy, wherein law enforcement officers are not allowed to turn a blind eye
to crime and must respond to protect life and property. Very often it is also made
part of the formal oath they take when being sworn in. If an agency, or its officers
and investigators, do not hold or perceive a professional duty of care to their
community, then they are not fit to serve it (Gross, 1924); let alone respond to
criminal complaints and assume the responsibilities associated with the collection
and testing of physical evidence.
The primary responsibilities of law enforcement, when responding to a criminal
complaint, include (adapted from basic criminal investigation and crime scene
processing guidelines found in Gross, 1924; O'Connell and Soderman, 1936; Rau,
2000; Snyder, 1944; Wade, 1999; and Weston and Wells, 1974):
i.
ii.
iii.
iv.
v.
vi.
vii.

Protect themselves; call for back-up when needed.
Establish who is involved.
Ensure that everyone involved is safe.
Get medical assistance for those that need it.
Determine what happened.
Establish who made the complaint and what it is about.
Identify any witnesses.
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viii. Seek out, identify, collect, and protect any physical evidence.
ix. Ensure the objective forensic examination of all relevant evidence.
x.
Determine whether or not a crime has taken place.
xi. Identify any legitimate criminal suspects.
xii. Establish whether probable cause exists for an arrest.
xiii. Arrest any criminal perpetrators.
These tactical issues also reflect an ethical responsibility. Investigators may not
assume what happened based on the statements of one party. They may not assume
that any crime has actually occurred until the facts have been established by a
thorough investigation. They must be sufficiently educated to understand what the
elements of each crime are and what probable cause is. They must also impartially
place the cuffs on anyone they determine has broken the law. For example, as
explained in Bryden and Lengnick (1997; pp. 1230- 1231):
As with all crimes, the police decide whether a reported rape
actually occurred, and attempt to determine who committed it. If
they want the case to go forward, they "found" the complaint and
transmit the file to the prosecutor's office ... The police must
investigate, a task that cannot easily be combined with offering the
emotional support that the victim needs. The detective presumably
wishes to avoid an injustice to a wrongly accused individual. In
addition, for reasons of professional pride, he does his best to avoid
looking naive by falling for a story that turns out to be false.
Meeting these responsibilities is best accomplished with a thorough, diligent, and
comprehensive investigation. By comprehensive investigation, the examiner means
a detailed review of the complainant and their statements; the careful consideration
of witness and suspect statements; and the diligent collection and examination of
any physical evidence. All of this must be attended prior to making final
determinations regarding whether a crime has been committed and whether
probable cause exists to arrest any suspects. See generally Bopp and Schultz (1972);
Gross (1924); Kappeler (2006); Leonard (1969); O'Connell and Soderman (1936);
Sullivan (1977); Savino and Turvey (20 11 ); and Weston and
Wells (1974).
(Dkt.# 123, Ex.# 20, at 2-3). The investigation conducted by the APD and OSBI failed to follow
even the basic duty of care owed in the disappearance and murder of Mrs. Haraway. Such
disregard at the beginning of the investigation allowed valuable information to be destroyed or
completely ignored, including potentially exculpatory evidence for Mr. Fontenot.
When Mr. Whelchel contacted APD at approximately 8:50 p.m. on April 28th, 1984, Ada
Police Officer Harvey Philips responded first shortly followed by Detective Baskins.(N/T
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6/9/1988 at 86, 91). Upon Officer Phillips arrival, he neglected to close the store to preserve the
scene, “because there were several people that had already been in the store and I don't know
how many had been there before they got there.” Id. at 93. When Detective Baskins arrived, he
observed “there was Sergeant Phillips, who was the sergeant on duty at the time. He was there,
the manager of the store was there, and there were a couple of other people there, there was a
60

lady there and some children.”

(

N/T 6/10/1988 at 156). Clearly, the crime scene had not been

secured for the police to properly evaluate the evidence.
Both officers acknowledge that a cigarette in the ashtray, a beer on the counter, and Mrs.
Haraway’s purse were not properly preserved as evidence. Id.; (J/T at 1239-1240, 1422-23, 1439,
1441, 1447-48). This allowed for evidence to be mishandled, misplaced, or destroyed entirely.
Consequently, valuable information that could have led to the actual perpetrator was lost forever.
( N/T 6/9/1988 at 87-93, 102-103); (N/T 6/10/1988 at 155-157).
The failure to preserve this evidence deprived the defense of viable evidence, but equally
important, it limited what evidence the police possessed to determine what happened to Mrs.
Haraway. J.D. Watts, the store clerk who was on duty prior to Mrs. Haraway’s shift returned to
the store at the behest of Mr. Atkeson, the store manager. When he arrived, he noted the
following:
When I arrived at McAnally's later that night I recall seeing a lot of police, more
than I could count. I recall seeing Ada police, Pontotoc County Sheriff's
Deputies and Oklahoma Highway Patrolman. Inside the store, I recall seeing
police officers standing at the counter and looking at the register tape. I
remember hearing one of those officers saying that the last purchase made on
the register tape was a tallboy can of beer.
(Dkt.# 123, Ex.# 15). (emphasis added). Not only did the APD not properly secure the scene, their

60 

As a continuing pattern of non-disclosure, the APD never turned over or made known the list of people who were
in McAnally’s that evening, what they witnessed, or if they also saw a grey truck.

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allowance of numerous other officers inside the store demonstrates a blatant disregard for proper
police procedure. Further, the failure for all of these officers to document their involvement in the
investigation continues to show a failure to properly record the investigation and those taking part
in it.
Detective Baskins collected the McAnally’s register tape while at the store, receiving
telephone calls from customers that very evening. As presented earlier, Officer Richard Holkum,
John McKinnis, Gary Haney and Guy Keys all provided information crucial to the investigation
of Mrs. Haraway’s abduction, but were disregarded. These witnesses explain seeing a pickup truck
believed possibly to be involved at the scene thirty minutes before Mrs. Haraway’s disappearance.
(Dkt.# 123, Ex.#s 5, 6). Mr. McKinnis provided evidence showing a man in the store behind the
counter with Mrs. Haraway. (Dkt.# 123, Ex.# 5). However, not only did the APD and OSBI never
document their interviews, they never followed up on these leads. Police found no signs of forced
entry, a physical confrontation or any obvious signs of violence. (J/T at 1087-1088, 115-116-,
1135, 1139, 1143). With no indication of violence, the possibility that Mrs. Haraway may have
been familiar with her abductor was clearly a possibility based not only on Mr. McKinnis’
interview, but also the harassing telephone calls made repeatedly to Mrs. Haraway while she was
on duty. This was all evidence the police received by their own request. They sought out witnesses
who made purchases in the store; those witnesses responded. They asked family members about
anything odd involving Mrs. Haraway; they gave numerous reports of harassing behavior from an
unknown assailant. Either these leads were blatantly ignored by APD and OSBI whose duty it was
to accurately investigate the case, or they lacked training, which created an inability to recognize
the obvious evidentiary value of that evidence. Whatever the excuse, the failings of the Ada Police
Department and the OSBI to collect, preserve and evaluate the evidence generated in the hours
following Mrs. Haraway’s disappearance violated Mr. Fontenot’s right to a fair trial with a reliable
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result.
The Ada Police Department investigators turned a blind eye to many important pieces of
evidence, relying instead on witness statements that fit their theory of the case while disregarding
much stronger evidence of alternate suspects. This caused the police department to only look at
limited facts and witness statements as opposed to getting all the facts and statements from
witnesses and letting that define the scope of the investigation. “[A]n officer may not choose to
ignore information that has been offered to him or her…Nor may the officer conduct an
investigation in a biased fashion or elect not to obtain easily discoverable facts.” Kingsland v.
City of Miami, 369 F.3d 1210, 1219 (11th Cir. 2004). This reliance on limited information is the
type of investigation which resulted in a misguided investigation. See generally Kyles v. Whitley,
514 U.S. at 445.

c. Police Misconduct Involving Witness Interviews Resulted in Descriptions
of the Suspects That Have No Relevance to The Disappearance of Mrs.
Haraway
The police created a profile of two suspects within four hours of Ms. Haraway’s
disappearance without a proper evaluation of the facts in the case. (Dkt.# 123, Ex.# 41). The
police then focused on Karen Wise’s description of two men, even though she was not present at
McAnally’s. Ms. Wise worked at J.P.’s, another convenience store down the road from
McAnally’s, and did notice four patrons that evening who made her feel uncomfortable. ( N/T 6/
8/1988 at 163); (Dkt.# 123, Ex.# 13). However, at no time during the evening of April 28, 1984,
did Ms. Wise visit McAnally’s where Ms. Haraway worked. It is unclear how the police learned
of the four men in J.P.’s or why they focused on Ms. Wise’s account as the basis of the two
suspects, that later became two composites, when Ms. Wise saw four men in her store that night.
Id. Ms. Wise admitted police pressure caused her to change her account to conform with evidence
with no connection to the crime. Id.
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This pattern of pressuring witnesses to change their statements to match the police’s
hypothesis was a common theme and caused truthful information to get lost in the process. James
Moyer, the sole eyewitness placing Mr. Fontenot in McAnally’s, recounted his attempts to alert
the State of his uncertainty of his identification only to be told he too was incorrect. (Dkt.# 123,
Ex. 14). Stacey Shelton went to Detective Baskins to explain how she knew about the party held
at Gordon Calhoun’s apartment was correct because she was there. (Ward Vol. 10 p. 93-195);
(Dkt.# 123, Ex. #12). Instead of investigating her account, she was disregarded as a complication
to the State’s case. Id. Such improper handling of witnesses includes Mr. Fontenot himself, who
gave a false confession after being told not only that his alibi was wrong, but that Mr. Ward had
implicated him in the crime with Odell Titsworth. Such action by the police handling this case
demonstrates a disregard not only for the proper development of factual information in a criminal
investigation, but a blatant abuse of power for those witnesses who do voice concerns.
d. Law Enforcement Failed to Investigate Leads from other Jurisdictions
Throughout the investigation into Mrs. Haraway’s disappearance, both the Ada Police
Department and the OSBI interviewed numerous people regarding alternate suspects, potential leads,
and other vital information related to the case. Maintaining proper documentation of these various
contacts and their substantive interviews was paramount to discern what happened. However, the report
writing and records keeping by both the OSBI and APD was flawed throughout the investigation of
this case. Contained within OSBI reports are numerous leads for alternate suspects fitting the composite
sketch description with little to no documentation as to what happened to these potential leads. It is
unclear why certain suspects were or were not interviewed, or why a person was eliminated as a suspect.
For example, agents interviewed Jerry East and several of his family members to ascertain
whether he was in Ada around the time of Mrs. Haraway’s disappearance. (Dkt.# 123, Ex.# 29, at
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1104-1106). The report states Mr. East was arrested for burglary in Ada in May 1983 and was on
probation at the time Mrs. Haraway disappeared. Id. When asked his whereabouts on April 28th,
he claimed he was with his sister and her family at the lake. Id. The Agent’s notes on the interview
states, “EAST is very poor in remembering times and dates. EAST matches the description of the
number two suspect in the Haraway disappearance being fair complexed [sic] with blond hair and
green eyes. EAST also has a small amount of acne around his face.
However, EAST’s hair is cut, left long in the back and the front in the middle of the ear. It is light
blond in color.” Id. OSBI continued to investigate Mr. East as a potential suspect before dropping
the investigation for no clear reason provided in any reports. This pattern continues for numerous
other potential suspects.
Police from Beaumont, Texas, contacted the OSBI concerning three Caucasian men
arrested for attempting to steal a woman’s purse from her car and then attempting to run over the
owners when they were caught.
On June 29, 1984, Detective Barrow, Beaumount Police Department . . . advised
Deputy Insp., Roberts his department had taking into custody on June 28, 1984 at
1935 hours a while male who resembled one of the suspects in the composite. The
suspect and the two other individuals attempted to steal a purse from a car, but the
owners caught the subjects. Subjects then attempted to run over the owners. The
subjects were in a ‘70’s blue Chevrolet pickup with primer spots, bearing Oklahoma
License ATF1975, which was impounded by Beaumount P.D. Before Det. Barrow
could check the pick-up for evidence the pick-up and subjects were released.
(Dkt.# 123, Ex.# 44, OSBI 0125). The full names and dates of birth were provided for all three
suspects: Denver Russell Davis, Daryl Patrick Robins, and Christopher Lynn Hammock. Id.
Photographs of these three men were provided along with their criminal histories which included
61

robbery, burglary, larceny, dangerous drugs, and assault. (Dkt.# 123, Ex.# 29, p. 1149-1160).

61 

The photographs of these three suspects were disclosed in the January 2014 discovery during the state postconviction for the first time.

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For all the vital information provided by the Beaumont Police Department on these three
criminals who fit not only the description, but a truck strikingly similar to the one seen by the
62

only eyewitnesses, nothing was done by either OSBI or the APD to follow-up on this lead.
These men obviously had ties to Oklahoma, including working within the state. (Dkt.# 123, Ex.#s
33 & 44, OSBI 0125). It would have been relatively easy to track the license number to find out
whether these men, or one of them, was involved in Mrs. Haraway’s disappearance. Yet
inexplicably, no further investigation is shown as to what transpired with this information.
Further, OSBI received information regarding two men arrested in Tulsa for attempting to
rob and kidnap a female convenience store clerk in a very similar manner to the description in the
Haraway case. Not only were these two men arrested in August 1984, three months after Mrs.
Haraway’s disappearance, but they also matched the composite description used by police.
During the early morning hours of August 9, 1984, ORVEL REEVES drove a
silver, 1984 Datsun passenger car to a Circle “K” Convenience Store in Tulsa.
DENNIS REEVES entered the store, robbed the female clerk at knife point and
then abducted the clerk from the store. A Tulsa Police Department Patrolman was
sitting across the street from the store and saw DENNIS REEVES walk out of the
store arm and arm with the female clerk. The patrolman became suspicious and
followed the car a short distance, then stopped it. As the patrolman was approaching
the car, the female convenience store clerk alerted the patrolman to the fact that she
had been robbed and abducted. Patrolman then took DENNIS and ORVEL
REEVES into custody.
(Dkt.# 123, Ex.# 29, at 1111). Tulsa County prosecuted and convicted both men for these events
resulting in fifteen-year prison sentences. (Dkt.# 123, Ex.# 30). Because they remained in custody, OSBI
Agent Gary Rogers, or APD Detective Dennis Smith, could have interviewed these men given that the
facts of this robbery/kidnapping mirror those described in Mrs. Haraway’s case. However, no further
follow-up, witness interviews, or police reports provided demonstrate whether anyone developed such

62 

David Timmons described the primered truck he saw as blue in color. (Dkt.# 123, Ex.# 44, OSBI 0851).

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a critical lead in this investigation. These three examples are not anomalies but a consistent pattern of a
lax and incompetent investigation that repeatedly ignored assistance of various jurisdictions. The OSBI
reports disclosed pursuant to the OCCA’s order and those recently released continue to provide
additional alternate suspects and viable leads that were dropped by law enforcement. Given the singular
role that law enforcement plays in investigating criminal activity, the failure of those leading the
investigation into what happened to Denice Haraway utterly failed in their obligation and resulted in
numerous alternate suspects being ignored in favor of “suspects” who not only had alibis, but no motive
for these crimes.

e. Law Enforcement Failed to Properly Preserve Evidence Connected with
The Crime After Mrs. Haraway’s Remains Were Found
Given that law enforcement are the only agencies that may collect physical evidence, the
proper storage and cataloging of that evidence is paramount. However, the OSBI and APD failed
to conduct a proper search of the Gerty crime scene where Denice Haraway’s remains were
discovered. Allen Tatum found the skull while laying traps on his property.( N/T 6/08/1988 at 3738). He then contacted the police who began searching for other bones over the course of a few
days. (N/T 06/08/1988 at 40-44). However, the search conducted by several OSBI agents did not
provide a comprehensive list of what bones were found, the exact location of those bones, what
other items may have been found with the bones, and the area description of where the bones were
uncovered. (Dkt.# 123, Ex.# 44, OSBI 0185-0201, 0203-0204, 0211-0212); (Dkt.# 123, Ex.# 29
at 0932-0933, 0936- 0951, 1124-1145).

The investigative and forensic efforts of law enforcement at the location where
Haraway's remains were found (West of Gerty, off a county road; Monday, January
20th, 1986) were inadequate rising to the level of abandonment. This prevented the
recognition, preservation, collection, and testing specific items of evidence, as well
as an untold volume of evidence that would have been missed. This is based on at
least the following facts and evidence:
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A. The First Officer on site did not secure crime scene or provide for scene integrity
in any reasonable or effective fashion. This is standard practice even when remains
have been in place for extended periods of time, to prevent further evidence loss,
damage, or obliteration (Chisum and Turvey, 2011 ).
• No security tape deployed.
• No security log kept re: personnel/witnesses/ patrons entering and exiting
the scene.
B. It is unclear from the record whether scene was "processed" on 1120/86 or
1121186
C. Scene photos lacked sufficient quantity, quality, context and measurements.
D. Some bones appeared to be improperly piled together for photos, and were then
packaged together in a sack.
E. There is no written investigative or forensic report on who found what or where
at the scene.
F. There is no scene diagram.
G. There was no directed or deliberate forensic excavation for other evidence
concealed by brush or beneath soil.
H. According to a supplemental MEs report, some victim bones and a watch were
found in a rat's nest by a farmer some 30' away from the original site on 1-30-96.
There is no evidence that the watch put under a clear chain of custody or submitted
for forensic analysis (e.g., fingerprinting; now DNA testing).
I. Additionally, there is no evidence that anyone in authority investigated or
confirmed whether the watch or the earrings found with these remains actually
belonged to the victim.
J. The ME's office was not notified; bones were therefore removed without proper
legal authority by the police, the OSBI and the Sheriff's Department.
K. The scene was vacated and left unsecured before investigators returned on
1/24/86: the OSBI, the prosecutor, the sheriff and the ME went out there and found
more bones.
L. In late February of 1986, law enforcement investigators returned to search this
scene with both ECU college students and victim family members. Either group
being involved with formal search efforts at this scene is highly inappropriate.
M. There were, in effect, multiple searches on multiples dates by multiples agencies
with no reports of search activity or chain of custody regarding evidence collected.
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N. Based on a review of the documentation, it is likely that evidence still exists at
that location, to include more bones and perhaps even the victim's engagement ring,
which was not recovered.
(Dkt.# 123, Ex.# 20). Without this information, it was impossible for trial counsel, appellate, or
post- conviction counsel to properly understand exactly what happened to Mrs. Haraway prior to
her death. These difficulties did not only impact the defense, but the ability of the Medical
Examiner’s Office to properly evaluate and identify the remains they were provided. The ME’s
Office investigator noted the poor investigation and evidence collection destroyed any ability of
that office to fully understand what happened to Mrs. Haraway.
1-21-86, 1650 I returned a call to Hughes County District Attorney Bill Peterson
concerning some bones that were found. Mr. Peterson didn’t know anything, about
the discovery but they are thought to be the remains of a missing store clerk -Donna Hariway.[sic] No ME was notified. He stated that the OSBI was notified out
of McAlister.[sic] That some people from the OKC office had come down. OSBI
Lab people out of OKC did photo. The scene and they just had a field day picking
up bones. No diagrams. The OSBI agent out of McAlister never showed up at
the scene. Mr. Peterson believes that the bones are en route to OKC but didn’t
know for sure. The sheriff didn’t know where the bones were but thought that the
OSBI had them. Notified the OSBI in OKC & spoke with Rick Spense. He didn’t
have the bones but thought that the lab man David Dixon had them. I spoke with
the Sheriff Orvall Rose who didn’t know where they were. Finally, the OSBI found
them in their lab and delivered them at 2040 by Ann Reed. Come to find out the bones
were found by a trapper.

(Dkt.# 123, Ex.# 46, at 10) (emphasis added). Because no systematic approach was taken to
properly collect evidence, not all of the viable evidence related to the case was uncovered in the
January 1986 search. Instead, family members, university students, friends of the victim, and
unrelated people found critical evidence and brought it to police during a much larger search
conducted at the end of February that same year. (N/T 6/08/1988, at 82-95). These searches also
occurred without proper evidence collecting practices clearly showing the lack of a proper search
done by police in January 1986. Further, yet other people found evidence missed by the OSBI
and APD. Shelia Desoto and her daughter, Sandi Mantzke found a grey sweatshirt at the Gerty
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crime scene.
Several months after Karl Fontenot and Tommy Ward were convicted of Denice
Haraway's murder, I saw news reports that Denice Haraway's remains had been
found in an isolated location near Gerty, Okla. Those remains were discovered on
Jan 21, 1986.
Several weeks later, mom's sister, Hazel Faulkner, was visiting from Texas. She
was interested in the [sic] the Denice Haraway case. On Friday, March 7, 1986, I
went with my Aunt Hazel Faulkner and my mom, Sheila Desoto, and drove over to
Gerty to look at the site where Denice Haraway's remains had been discovered. We
were there out of curiosity. After viewing the trial, this was just one more fact which
didn't make sense. We were walking around this site when we literally stumbled
over three large flat rocks, which appeared to have been placed carefully over a
large cloth object. We carefully removed the rocks, and found a nearly intact gray
sweatshirt with a hood and a zippered front. We placed this sweatshirt into a paper
sack in order to preserve any possible evidence. We thought this might have been
the sweatshirt worn by Denice Haraway the night she disappeared.
We also took photographs of the sweatshirt and where we found this sweatshirt.
Copies of those photographs are attached. By the time we got to a payphone it was
late on Friday afternoon. We called, but were unable to reach Dennis Smith or Gary
Rodgers. We put the paper bag with the sweatshirt into the trunk of my mom's car
where it stayed all weekend.
On Monday, March 10, 1986, my mom and I personally handed this gray sweatshirt
to Ada Police Chief Gray in his office. Chief Gray told us he would put this
sweatshirt with the other evidence related to the Denice Haraway case, in the
property room. No investigators, including Dennis Smith and Gary Rogers has ever
interviewed me or asked me where or how we found that sweatshirt.
(Dkt.# 123, Ex.# 31).
The problem with the failure to collect, document, and store the evidence related to the
Gerty crime scene and what has transpired to that evidence is that crucial information which
explains what happened on April 28th is lost. Further, records pertaining to the evaluation of this
evidence are also missing. Dr. Fred Jordan, a former Medical Examiner who knew of the
evaluation conducted by Drs. Glass and Balding have explained it was the M.E.’s practice at the
time to photograph all remains given to them along with x-raying any bones. (Dkt.# 123, Ex.# 36)
This was standard practice for the office who handled the bones and evidence brought to them
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from the Gerty crime scene. However, none of this evidence can now be found. Such evidence is
crucial to the understanding of the events that transpired from the time Mrs. Haraway left
McAnally’s on April 28, 1984, until her skeletal remains were discovered almost a year and a half
later. The fact that almost every state agency who investigated, analyzed, or prosecuted this case
have lost the evidence and documentation in this case not only deprives Mr. Fontenot of his ability
to properly prove his innocence, it makes it almost impossible to answer the question, “What
happened?” The inept handling of reports, evidence, and all other vital documentation from this
case clearly falls within a known pattern of police misconduct that the lead detectives and agents
working on this case were known to commit.
The failure to properly train officers with the Ada Police Department to investigate a case
resulted numerous errors. If the police investigating this case had collected available evidence,
investigated leads of other potential suspects, listened to witnesses even if their information was
contrary to APD’s theory of the case, and followed up on the information people were giving them,
it is likely Mr. Fontenot would have never been convicted. Regardless of how “intuitive” a
detective is, the detective is still duty bound to build a case not on gut feeling, but on evidence.
Additionally, the detective is duty bound to consider all available evidence instead of only
considering evidence his intuition tells him is important. Finally, the detective must make all
evidence available to the prosecution, so a proper assessment of discoverable materials can be
timely made pretrial. Based on the numerous constitutional violations that occurred in this case, it
is clear Mr. Fontenot did not receive a fair trial to which he was entitled both under the laws of the
state of Oklahoma and the U.S. Constitution.
CONCLUSION
The United States and Oklahoma Constitution’s guarantee that no person shall be
deprived of liberty or life without due process of the law, encompassing the right to be free
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from convictions except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of guilt. Fourteenth
Amendment; Okla. Const. Art.II, Section 7. The federal and state constitutions are in accord on
the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt and on the test to be applied when
examining the record for absence or existence of such proof. The test for determining whether
proof is sufficient to support a criminal conviction is whether, in the light most favorable to the
State, a rational trier of fact could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia,
443 U.S. 307, 316-17 (1979).
In the light most favorable to the State, the evidence at trial established beyond a
reasonable doubt that Mrs. Haraway disappeared on April 28, 1984, and was found dead on
January 20, 1986. Beyond these basis facts, the evidence introduced to establish the cause of
death, criminal agency and the identity of the person responsible for her death was unreliable,
contradictory, uncorroborated or simply nonexistent. None of the eyewitnesses identified Mr.
Fontenot as the man who left the store with Mrs. Haraway, and they saw only one man with her
in the truck as they left. None of the physical evidence, including the body, linked Mr. Fontenot
to Mrs. Haraway’s disappearance or death. At best, the evidence established Mrs. Haraway died
from a gunshot wound to the head, or was struck by a stray bullet after she died from unknown
causes. In either case, there was no independent evidence suggesting she was raped, stabbed or
burned, or ever taken to any location other than where her remains were found. The Court finds
no rational juror who was able to set aside the tragedy of Mrs. Haraway’s death could find
beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Fontenot should be convicted based solely on his
unsubstantiated confession. Given the uncontroverted evidence of Petitioner’s mental and
psychological impairments; the material discrepancies between the physical evidence and the
story the Petitioner told the police; the absence of evidence to corroborate his version of the
events; and the circumstances surrounding his coerced confession, the Court finds no reasonable
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juror would have convicted the Petitioner.

ACCORDINGLY, this Court finds Petitioner has established the actual innocence gateway removing
the procedural impairments from his Second Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, and all his claims are
deemed exhausted. Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss Second Amended Petition is DENIED. Mr. Fontenot’s
Second Amended Writ of Habeas Corpus is GRANTED and it shall issue, unless within one hundred twenty
(120) days of the entry of this Order the State grants Petitioner a new trial or, in the alternative, orders his
permanent release from custody.

IT IS SO ORDERED this 21st day of August, 2019

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