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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
AUSTIN DIVISION
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff.
v.
MICHAEL EZEAGBOR,
Defendant.

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CRIMINAL NO. A-19-CR-111 LY

[SENTENCING: October 18, 2019]

GOVERNMENT’S MEMORANDUM IN AID OF SENTENCING
The United States, by and through its attorneys, the United States Attorneys for the
Western District of Texas and the District of Columbia, hereby submits the following
memorandum to assist the Court in issuing an appropriate sentence in this case. For the reasons
set forth herein, the government recommends that the Court sentence the defendant to the low end
of the applicable guideline range. The government further recommends that the Court sentence
the defendant to 10 years of supervised release with conditions including that the defendant
undergo sex offender treatment (as recommended by the United States Probation Office), the
defendant’s computer and internet usage be limited and monitored, and the defendant’s direct
contact with minors be limited and supervised.

I.

BACKGROUND
On May 30, 2019, the defendant pled guilty to one count of Possession of Child

Pornography, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4), before U.S. Magistrate Judge Andrew Austin
in the Western District of Texas. The case had been transferred to the Western District of Texas

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on May 13, 2019 from the District of Columbia. During the plea hearing, the defendant admitted
the following facts, as set forth in the written Statement of Offense, to be true.
The Tor Network
Tor is a computer network which anonymizes Internet activity by routing a user’s
communications through a global network of relay computers (or proxies), thus effectively
masking the internet-protocol (“IP”) address of the user. An “IP address” is a unique numeric
address (used by computers on the internet) that is assigned to properly direct internet traffic. A
publically visible IP address can allow for the identification of the user and his/her location.
To access the Tor network, a user has to install freely available Tor software, which relays only
the IP address of the last relay computer (the “exit node”), as opposed to the user’s actual IP
address. There is no practical method to trace a user’s actual IP address back through those Tor
relay computers.
The Tor network makes it possible for a user to operate a special type of website, called
“hidden services,” which uses a web address that is comprised of a series of 16 algorithm-generated
characters (such as “asdlk8fs9dflku7f”) followed by the suffix “.onion.” Websites, including
hidden services, have system administrator(s) (also called the “admin(s)”) who are responsible for
overseeing and operating these websites.
Bitcoin
Bitcoin (“BTC”) is one type of virtual currency that is circulated over the Internet. BTC is
not issued by any government, bank, or company but rather is controlled through computer
software. Generally, BTC is sent and received using a BTC “address,” which is like a bank account
number and is represented by a case-sensitive string of numbers and letters. Each BTC address is
controlled through the use of a unique private key, a cryptographic equivalent of a password. Users
can operate multiple BTC addresses at any given time, with the possibility of using a unique BTC
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address for every transaction.
BTC fluctuates in value. Around March 5, 2018, one BTC was worth approximately
$11,573.00. A typical user purchases BTC from a BTC virtual-currency exchange, which is a
business that allows customers to trade virtual currencies for conventional money (e.g., U.S.
dollars, euros, etc.). Little to no personally identifiable information about the sender or recipient
is transmitted in a BTC transaction itself. However, virtual currency exchanges are required by
U.S. law to collect identifying information of their customers and verify their clients’ identities.
To send BTC to another address, the sender transmits a transaction announcement,
cryptographically signed with the sender’s private key, across the BTC network. Once the sender’s
transaction announcement is verified, the transaction is added to the blockchain. The blockchain
is a decentralized, public ledger that logs every BTC transaction. In some instances, blockchain
analysis can reveal whether multiple BTC addresses are controlled by the same individual or entity.
For example, analyzing the data underlying BTC transactions allowed for the creation of large
databases that grouped BTC transactions into “clusters.” This analysis allowed for the
identification of BTC addresses that were involved in transacting with the same addresses.
THE WEBSITE
“The Website” was a website dedicated to the advertisement and distribution of child
pornography that operated as a hidden service on the Tor network until March of 2018 when it was
seized by law enforcement. The Website was used to host and distribute video files depicting child
pornography that could be downloaded by site users. The Website was not intended to be used to
upload pornography of adults, as evidenced on the upload page on The Website which clearly
stated: “Do not upload adult porn.” The Website server had over 250,000 unique video files, which
totaled approximately eight terabytes of data.
Any user could create a free account on The Website by creating a username and password.
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Only after the user registered an account could the user browse previews of videos available for
download and post text to The Website. To download videos from the site, users used “points,”
which were allocated to users by The Website. A registered user could earn points from The
Website in several ways: (1) uploading videos depicting child pornography; (2) referring new users
to The Website; (3) paying for a “VIP” account, which lasted for six months, entitled a user to
unlimited downloads, and was priced at 0.03 BTC (approximately $327.60 as of March 1, 2018);
or (4) paying for points incrementally (i.e., .02 BTC for 230 points). Points were not transferable
to any other website or application. Once a customer sent BTC to The Website, the BTC could not
be refunded or redirected. The points obtained by the payment of BTC could only be used for
downloading videos.
Certain persons joined the conspiracy to distribute child pornography by uploading videos
to The Website. Those co-conspirators who uploaded videos of child pornography to The Website
for “points” also earned additional “points” each time a customer of the site downloaded that
particular video from The Website. Thus, the co-conspirators had a shared goal as part of the
conspiracy – increasing the number of unique videos on The Website to drive additional traffic to
it, which in turn led to greater downloads and more points for the co-conspirators. When uploading
videos, the co-conspirators would use explicit file names highlighting the content as showing the
sexual exploitation of minors and would add tags that customers could search for, such as PTHC,
2yo, etc. In order to prevent duplicate videos from being uploaded, The Website operated a digital
hash-value check of videos the co-conspirators uploaded in order to compare the video to other
videos previously uploaded to the site. The Website did not allow a co-conspirator to upload a
video whose hash value matched something previously uploaded to the site.
During the course of the investigation, law enforcement agents in Washington, D.C.
accessed The Website on multiple occasions, including on or about September 28, 2017, February
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8, 2018, and February 22, 2018, observed its functionality by browsing the listings on The Website,
and conducted undercover purchases by downloading child pornography video files from The
Website. These downloaded child pornography video files included pre-pubescent children,
infants, and toddlers engaged in sexually explicit conduct. Each video available for download
from The Website had a title, a description (if added by the co-conspirator), “tags” with further
descriptions of the video enabling a user to more easily locate a particular category of video using
The Website’s search function, and a preview thumbnail image that contained approximately
sixteen unique still images from the video.
On or about March 5, 2018, South Korean law enforcement executed a search warrant at
the residence of the administrator of The Website in South Korea. Pursuant to the search, South
Korean law enforcement seized The Website’s server and associated electronic storage media.
South Korean law enforcement then provided to U.S. law enforcement a forensic image of the
server. U.S. law enforcement subsequently obtained a federal search warrant to review this
forensic image.
IDENTIFICATION OF THE DEFENDANT (a/k/a MIKEXP1)
A review of the forensic image of the server revealed a transfer of approximately 0.1 BTC
(worth about $38.00) on January 29, 2016 from a BTC address to The Website’s BTC address
starting with 1BwB. Subpoena returns from a virtual-currency exchange in the United States
(“BTC Exchange”) revealed that the source of this BTC transfer was from BTC Exchange Account
number starting with 528a (“Subject BTC Exchange Account”). The defendant, EZEAGBOR,
made that payment to The Website.
Law enforcement’s review of the forensic image of the server revealed that The Website
created the BTC address starting with 1BwB for a user account in the name of mikexp1. A review
of mikexp1’s account revealed that between approximately January 28, 2016 and February 19,
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2016, mikexp1 downloaded approximately 42 videos from The Website with video file names and
descriptions indicative of child pornography. Additionally, from approximately November 25,
2015 to January 25, 2016, mikexp1 uploaded approximately 10 videos of child pornography to The
Website. The defendant, EZEAGBOR, downloaded those approximately 42 videos and uploaded
those approximately 10 videos, all of child pornography, to The Website.
The videos possessed and uploaded to The Website by the defendant under the moniker
mikeexp1 includes video file scara2_00172.avi with file description “Girl.” The video is almost
fourteen minutes long. The video starts with a message which reads, “13 red my cap so hot” and
contains a collage of photographs depicting a clothed female child, approximately ten to thirteen
years old, sitting in front of a web camera. The child initially exposes her right breast to the camera
and then removes her pants. The child appears to move the camera to face her pubic area and uses
her fingers to masturbate her genitalia. Towards the end of the video, the child continues to
masturbate herself by using her fingers and also inserts a crayon into her vagina.
Another video possessed and uploaded to The Website by the defendant under the moniker
mikeexp1 includes video file scara2_00151.avi with file description “Girl.” The video is five
minutes and thirty seconds and depicts a nude female child, approximately seven to ten years old.
The child is posing in front of a web camera and switches between several sexually suggestive
poses, including posing on her hands and knees while she positions her buttocks towards the
camera and uses her hands to spread apart her buttocks to expose her genitalia. During the video,
the child also sits in a chair facing the camera and spreads her legs to provide a close up view of
her pubic area as she uses her fingers to expose her genitalia
Subpoena returns from the BTC Exchange revealed that the Subject BTC Exchange
Account (which sent BTC to The Website) was created on or about November 18, 2013 with the
following know-your-customer data:
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-

registered in the name of MICHAEL EZEAGBOR;
with EZEAGBOR’s true date of birth in 1996;
with EZEAGBOR’s true address in Texas;
using EZEAGBOR’s true Social Security number;
EZEAGBOR’s true phone number; and
an email address of michaelezeagbor@[X].com.

The defendant, EZEAGBOR, created that Subject BTC Exchange Account and funded it from his
bank account as described below.
Subpoena

returns

from

Yahoo

revealed

that

the

email

address

of

michaelezeagbor@[X].com was created on February 3, 2008 and also is registered to “Mr. Michael
Ezeagbor” with the same telephone number that the defendant provided when he created the
Subject BTC Exchange Account. The Yahoo account also provided a postal code of 78660, which
is the same postal code provided by the defendant when he created the Subject BTC Exchange
Account on January 29, 2016.
The Subject BTC Exchange Account was funded by an A+ Federal Credit Union
(“A+FCU”) checking account ending in 7569 and a A+FCU debit card ending in 2098. Subpoena
returns revealed that both of these payment methods were listed in the defendant’s name. The
subpoena returns further revealed that the defendant opened the account ending in 7569 in 2012.
The defendant provided the same date of birth, social security number, home address, and email
address when he opened this A+FCU bank account that he had provided to the BTC Exchange
when he opened the Subject BTC Exchange Account. Additionally, subsequent law enforcement
investigation identified counter security footage from A+FCU on December 4, 2017, which shows
an individual resembling the defendant’s driver’s license photograph accessing his account.
ARREST OF THE DEFENDANT
On January 9, 2019, the defendant was arrested by law enforcement at his residence in the
Western District of Texas. At the time of his arrest, the defendant waived his rights and admitted

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to accessing The Website and downloading child pornography using the name “mikexp1.” Law
enforcement also executed a search warrant at the defendant’s residence and seized several
electronic devices, including computers, data storage devices, and a mobile phone.
A subsequent forensic analysis on the devices seized from the defendant’s residence
identified approximately 190 images and approximately 14 videos depicting child pornography.
The National Center for Missing and Exploited Children (NCMEC) determined that at least 56
images and 2 videos of child pornography depicted at least 8 known child victims.
CONCLUSION
The defendant knowingly possessed one or more computers and electronic devices that
contained one or more images and videos of child pornography in digital format, and knowingly
possessed said child pornography. These visual depictions of child pornography had been shipped
and transported in interstate and foreign commerce and using a means and facility of interstate and
foreign commerce, including by computer, and/or were produced using materials that had been
shipped and transported in and affecting interstate and foreign commerce, including by computer.
The production of these visual depictions involved the use of one or more minors engaging in
sexually explicit conduct. The visual depictions of child pornography were of one or more children
under the age of eighteen (18) years engaging in such sexually explicit conduct. Specifically:


One or more images and videos of child pornography possessed by the defendant
involved a “prepubescent minor…who had not attained 12 years of age.” See U.S.S.G.
2G2.2(b)(2).



The 10 videos the defendant uploaded to The Website were distributed for the “receipt
of a thing of value, but not for pecuniary gain,” see U.S.S.G. 2G2.2(b)(3)(B), to wit:
the defendant received points that he could only redeem on The Website for
downloading additional videos depicting child pornography;
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

In total the defendant possessed approximately 190 images and approximately 65
videos depicting child pornography. Accordingly, the offense involved “600 or more
images.” See U.S.S.G. 2G2.2(b)(7)(D); see also Application Note 4(B)(ii) (“each
video…shall be considered to have 75 images.”)

II.

SENTENCING CALCULATION
A.

Statutory Penalties

The offense of Possession of Child Pornography, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §
2252A(a)(5)(B) carries a maximum sentence of 20 years of imprisonment pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §
2252A(b)(2) if any image involved in the offense involved a prepubescent minor or a minor who
had not attained 12 years of age, a fine of not more than $250,000 pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3571(b),
and a term of supervised release – after any period of incarceration – of not less than 5 years or life
pursuant to 18 US.C. § 3583(k). In addition, there is a mandatory special assessment for each
felony conviction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3013(a)(2)(A).
B.

Guidelines Range

The government agrees with the calculation of the defendant’s Guidelines sentencing range
contained in the pre-sentence report (“PSR”). The base offense level is 18, pursuant to U.S.S.G. §
2G2.2. See PSR ¶ 19. The government agrees with the PSR that several specific offense
characteristics apply: the material involved prepubescent minors or minors under the age of 12
(+2); the defendant knowingly engaged in distribution for something of value (+5); the offense
involved the use of a computer (+2); and the offense involved more than 600 images (+5). See
PSR ¶ 20-23. There are no additional adjustments that apply. Accordingly, the defendant’s
adjusted offense level is 32. See PSR ¶ 27.
The defendant is entitled to a two-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility pursuant
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to U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(a). See PSR ¶ 29. The government hereby moves to decrease the defendant’s
offense level by an additional level pursuant to § 3E1.1(b) because he timely notified the authorities
of his intention to enter a guilty plea and thus permitted the government and the Court to preserve
resources. See PSR ¶ 30. As a result, the defendant’s total offense level is 29. See PSR ¶ 31.
The government agrees with the PSR that the defendant has a criminal history score of zero
and is in Criminal History Category I. See PSR ¶ 35.
With an offense level of 29 and a Criminal History Category I, the defendant’s Guidelines
sentencing range is 87 months to 108 months. See PSR ¶ 51.
The defendant has no objections to the PSR’s guidelines calculation.

III.

GOVERNMENT’S RECOMMENDATION
A.

Application of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines

In United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005), the Supreme Court held that the
mandatory application of the United States Sentencing Guidelines violates the Sixth Amendment
principles articulated in Blakely v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004). As a consequence, the
Court invalidated the statutory provision that made the Guidelines mandatory, 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(b)(1). Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 756.
In post-Booker cases, the Supreme Court has stated that a district court should begin all
sentencing proceedings by correctly calculating the applicable Guidelines range. See United States
v. Gall, 552 U.S. 38, 49 (2007) (“As a matter of administration and to secure nationwide
consistency, the Guidelines should be the starting point and the initial benchmark.”). After giving
both parties an opportunity to argue for an appropriate sentence, the district court should then
consider all of the applicable factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). Id. These factors include
“the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant”
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(18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1)); the need for the sentence imposed to reflect the seriousness of the
offense, to provide just punishment for the offense, to afford adequate deterrence to criminal
conduct, to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant, and to provide the defendant
with needed correctional treatment (18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)); the kinds of sentences available (18
U.S.C. § 3553(a)(3)); the Sentencing Guidelines and related Sentencing Commission policy
statements (18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(4) and (a)(5)); the need to avoid unwarranted sentencing
disparities (18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6)); and the need to provide restitution to any victims of the
offense (18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(7)).
Notably, the United States Sentencing Commission conducted a hearing on the child
pornography sentencing guidelines on February 15, 2012.

Department of Justice (DOJ)

employees James Fottrell and Steve DeBrota, and former DOJ employee Francey Hakes provided
the following testimony regarding how technological advances were exacerbating the threats
posed by child pornography offenses:
In the last ten years, we have seen a sharp increase in the severity and
depravity of child pornography offenses, fueled in large part by swiftly
advancing technological changes which permit offenders to easily store
large numbers of images of child sexual abuse, to create safe havens online
where they can communicate and bond with other individuals who
encourage and promote the sexual exploitation of children, and to utilize
sophisticated methods to evade detection by law enforcement. This
increase is reflected in the changes in the content of the images over time,
as infants and toddlers are now regularly victimized by child pornography
offenders and the victims are forced into more brutal and degrading sexual
activity.
Additionally, the technological changes that continue to make it easier for
offenders to commit these crimes are reflected in the number of defendants
prosecuted in federal court for child pornography offenses, which has
increased every year for over ten years.
We are also seeing the crime change with respect to the technical complexity
and sophistication of the offenders who exploit the developments in both
software and hardware. Storage capacity on hard drives and external media
has exploded at the same time that prices for such equipment have dropped,
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making it feasible for individuals cheaply to store millions of image and
video files. Internet speeds have skyrocketed, allowing users to download a
video in a matter of seconds that, just a few years ago, would have taken
hours. At the same time, smart phones and the development of faster
wireless networks have turned phones into a viable and portable alternative
method to distribute and collect child pornography. New platforms are
being constantly developed to allow individuals to chat, network, and share
files. Child pornography offenders are early adopters of these platforms,
co-opting them to further their criminal purpose and to create virtual
communities that exist outside the bounds of normal society and that
embrace and promote the sexual exploitation of children. Finally, offenders
are exploiting the development of new technologies, such as evidence
eliminating software, encryption, and methods to conceal their Internet
activities, to evade detection by law enforcement. The result of these
changes is clear: we are seeing more and more offenders, engaged in more
sophisticated criminal conduct, exploiting a larger number of children in a
more depraved way.
See https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/amendment-process/public-hearings-andmeetings/20120215/Testimony_15_Hakes_DeBrota_Fottrell.pdf (emphasis added).
Moreover, on November 13, 2013, Acting Assistant Attorney General Mythili Raman
testified before the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs provided
the following testimony regarding the unique threat posed by cryptocurrency, including as to child
pornography offenses:
As virtual currency has grown, it has attracted illicit users along with
legitimate ones. Our experience has shown that some criminals have
exploited virtual currency systems because of the ability of those systems
to conduct transfers quickly, securely, and often with a perceived higher
level of anonymity than that afforded by traditional financial services. The
irreversibility of many virtual currency transactions additionally appeals to
a variety of individuals seeking to engage in illicit activity, as does their
ability to send funds cross-border.
Cyber criminals were among the first illicit groups to take widespread
advantage of virtual currency. We have seen that many players in the cyber
underground rely on virtual currency to conduct financial transactions.
Early users of virtual currency also included criminals involved in the
trafficking of child pornography, credit card fraud, identity theft, and highyield investment schemes. As virtual currency became more widespread
and criminals became increasingly computer savvy, other criminal groups
moved to capitalize on virtual currency, as well. There are now public
examples of virtual currency being used by nearly every type of criminal
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imaginable.
It is not surprising that criminals are drawn to services that allow users to
conduct financial transactions while remaining largely anonymous. And,
indeed, some of the criminal activity occurs through online black markets,
many of which operate as Tor hidden services. Tor hidden services are sites
accessible only through Tor, an anonymizing network that masks users’
Internet traffic by routing it through a series of volunteer servers, called
“nodes,” across the globe. Online black markets capitalize on Tor’s
anonymizing features to offer a wide selection of illicit goods and services,
ranging from pornographic images of children to dangerous narcotics to
stolen credit card information.
See https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/acting-assistant-attorney-general-mythili-raman-testifiessenate-committee-homeland (emphasis added).
B.

Basis for the Government’s Recommendation

The government submits that a sentence at the low end of the guidelines is appropriate and
warranted in this case and specifically recommends a period of supervised release of 10 years
based on the factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). The recommended sentence is sufficient, but not
greater than necessary, to accomplish the purposes of sentencing.
1.

Nature and Circumstances of the Offense

The defendant specifically sought out and actively participated in an online safe haven that
fostered the mutual encouragement and promotion of the sexual exploitation of children. In
addition, the defendant laundered funds in a sophisticated manner to support a prolific child
pornography website.

Consistent with the Justice Department testimony noted above, the

defendant’s use of cryptocurrency and technologically-advanced online black markets made
tracking his activities exponentially more difficult to discover by law enforcement and
demonstrates the growing threat posed by such technology in the child exploitation realm. Of
specific concern to the government, the defendant not only downloaded these graphic and
disturbing videos, but he contributed to the growing marketplace by uploading videos depicting

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the sexual abuse of children to The Website.
It goes without saying that child pornography causes real and lasting harm in our society.
It is not just about images and videos; it is about real children who are at best being treated as
sexualized objects and at worst being horrifically and repeatedly sexually abused. Individuals—
like the defendant—who promote child pornography offenses are part of the illicit market for child
pornography, which continually re-victimizes the children in already-existing images and videos.
As the Supreme Court recognized in the seminal case of New York v. Ferber:
The use of children as subjects of pornographic materials is very harmful to
both the children and the society as a whole. It has been found that sexually
exploited children are unable to develop healthy relationships in later life,
have sexual dysfunctions, and have a tendency to become sexual abusers as
adults.
Pornography poses an even greater threat to the child victim than does
sexual abuse or prostitution. Because the child’s actions are reduced to a
recording, the pornography may haunt him in future years, long after the
original misdeed took place.
458 U.S. 747, 758-60 nn. 9 & 10 (1982). The Court continued, “[a] child who has posed for a
camera must go through life knowing that the recording is circulating within the mass distribution
system for child pornography . . . . It is the fear of exposure and the tension of keeping the act
secret that seem to have the most profound emotion repercussions.” Id. at 759 n.10. Victims must
cope, every day, with wondering whether someone they have come in contact with has seen the
pictures or videos of their abuse.
Several of the victims and the parents of victims whose images the defendant possessed
submitted victim impact statements, which were provided to defense counsel and probation on July
16, 2019. The victim impact statements share a common theme: the victims must cope, every day,
with wondering whether someone they have come in contact with has seen the pictures or videos
of their abuse. They are revictimized – continuously exploited – by each consumer of child

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pornography. As one of the victims wrote in her Victim Impact Statement:
Every time someone views this trash, they are once again making me re-live the
most horrific part of my childhood. I can never truly heal because the perpetrators
and stalkers never allow me to do so. Anyone viewing these videos/pictures is just
as guilty for causing me or any other exploited child undue harm, unneeded stress
and insecurity in a time when we need to feel safe and have a chance to
heal/recover.
Additionally, in the words of a mother of one of the victims:
Every time a deranged pervert posts and reposts these graphic images of our sons,
our nightmare occurs again and again. For I know that someone is deriving sick
sexual pleasure from viewing pictures of my sons being raped. Every time that
another pervert gets caught with m sons’ images, the nightmare occurs all over
again, again, and again. Unfortunately, with this, the healing process will never be
complete. These pornographic images will always hang over my children’s heads
and follow them throughout life like a dark cloud. This nightmare could end if
these perverts were to stop sharing these photographs but they do not. Instead, they
continue to exploit my sons’ rapes and abuses by sharing these photographs with
other like minded perverts while obtaining their own sexual gratification. The more
these photographs are disseminated throughout the Internet the greater the chance
that my sons friends and acquaintances could find out about their abuse, victimizing
my sons over and over again. I know my sons deserve better than to live under
these shadows of fear, undeserved guilt, shame, and self-loathing.
Accordingly, the defendant participated in and fueled this exploitative industry, as evident
by both his downloads and uploads of videos depicting child pornography to The Website.
Although the defendant has pled guilty to possessing videos of child pornography, his conduct
depicts an individual who was not only a possessor, but one who trafficked in videos of children
being sexually abused.
2.

History and Characteristics of the Defendant

In most criminal cases, a defendant will appear for sentencing and offer mitigating
evidence, asking the Court to consider the defendant’s sometimes less obvious, but positive
attributes.

In child-exploitation related crimes, however, a defendant’s good qualities are

frequently the easiest to see. Defendants appear to be like any other law-abiding citizen—they
work, worship, and have the support of their families. Their crimes against children, and the
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reasons they commit them, have been hidden from colleagues, friends, and loved ones. Despite
that fact, the perpetrator’s private crime is a horrific one, and offenders must be held accountable
for the damage they have done.
Here, the defendant has no criminal record. He indicated relatively soon after he was
charged a desire to accept responsibility and plead guilty in this case. He has been diagnosed with
Autism, Anxiety, and Depression and continues with mental health treatment presently. PSR ¶ 43.
However, the government has already taken these mitigating mental health factors into account
when the government extended a plea to Possession of Child Pornography in lieu of Conspiracy to
Distribute Child Pornography and is recommending a sentence at the low end of the guidelines.
3.

Punishment, Deterrence, Protection, and Correction

A sentencing court “shall impose a sentenced sufficient, but not greater than necessary” to
comply with the need for a sentence: “(A) to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote
respect for the law, and to provide just punishment for the offense; (B) to afford adequate
deterrence to criminal conduct; (C) to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant; and
(d) to provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational training, medical care, or other
correctional treatment in the most effective manner.” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2).
The government’s recommended sentence is sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to
provide just punishment for the defendant’s offenses. The defendant’s possession and distribution
of child pornography videos and resulting promotion of a child exploitation scheme harmed society
at large and specifically, child victims, and thus warrants a sentence of imprisonment. Moreover,
a term of supervised release with conditions including sex offender assessment and treatment is
important to ensuring that the defendant receives the continuing treatment and support that will
ensure he does not commit any additional crimes in the future.

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4.

Available Sentences And Supervised Release Conditions

The defendant should be sentenced to a term of incarceration. The defendant is in Zone D
of the Guidelines, and thus a probationary sentence would be a departure from the Guidelines.
PSR ¶ 56.
In addition, the Court should impose a term of supervised release, and the government
recommends a term of 10 years. Supervised release is critical because it will subject the defendant
to ongoing monitoring and ensure that he does not revert back to his criminal conduct when he
finds himself facing a life challenge or obstacle.
The conditions of supervised release should include the following conditions, which are
conditions imposed in similar child exploitation cases and conditions:
(1)

The defendant must submit to searches of his person, property, house, residence,
vehicle, papers, computers, other electronic communications or data storage
devices or media, and effects, at any time, with or without a warrant, by law
enforcement or probation officer with reasonable suspicion concerning unlawful
conduct or a violation of a condition of supervision.

(2)

The defendant must undergo and comply with sex offender evaluation and
treatment. This may include the use of polygraph testing as part of the therapeutic
process.

(3)

The defendant’s use of the Internet, computers, and any other Internet-capable
devices will be restricted and monitored.

(4)

The defendant will not have direct contact with minors without the written approval
of probation. This also entails both an employment/volunteer restriction and
residential restriction, in that the defendant shall not be employed in any capacity,
or participate in any volunteer activity, which may cause him to come in direct
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and/or unsupervised contact with children for more than momentary duration
without advanced approval by the United States Probation Office, and the defendant
shall have all residences pre-approved by the United States Probation Office.
Specifically, the defendant shall not live in a residence where minor children also
reside without the permission of the United States Probation Office.
As it relates to the above conditions, first, the defendant will be required by statute to
register as a sex offender as a result of his conviction in this case. Second, the defendant’s crimes
stem from his online communications. Thus, the defendant’s use of the Internet to commit his
crimes justifies monitoring his future use. Third, the defendant’s collection and distribution of
child pornography material justifies monitoring his direct contact with any minors and supports
the imposition of sex offender evaluation and continued sex offender treatment.
5.

Avoiding Unwarranted Sentencing Disparity

One of the statutory factors to consider at sentencing is the need to avoid unwarranted
disparity. Indeed, avoiding such uncertainty and disparity was one of the purposes for the creation
of the Sentencing Guidelines. No similarly situated defendants have been sentenced in this matter
in this Court. In the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, two users of The
Website have been sentenced, but these defendants were not uploaders to the site. One pled guilty
to Money Laundering (due to evidentiary issues associated with that specific case) and was
sentenced to 18 months incarceration, and the other pled guilty to Receipt of Child Pornography
(second offense) and was sentenced to 15 years incarceration. It should be noted that neither of
these users uploaded illicit content to The Website in contrast to the defendant here, who was both
a user and distributor on the site. However, it is without dispute that the defendant here indicated
early on that he accepted responsibility and wished to plead guilty. Accordingly, the government’s
recommendation, at the low end of a guideline sentence, is appropriate based on the factors
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presented in this case.
6.

Restitution and Victim Impact Statements for the Victims

The government has been in communication with the victims’ lawyers and defense counsel.
At the time of this filing, the victim identified in the “At School” series (known as ‘Violet”) has
requested restitution. It is the government’s understanding that the parties are in the process of
negotiating a restitution amount for “Violet.” This amount will be subsequently included in any
Judgement and Commitment Order by the Court at the time of sentencing. The government
acknowledges and is appreciative of the defendant’s willingness to cooperate with his restitution
obligations without the need for protracted litigation in Court.

IV.

CONCLUSION
WHEREFORE, based on the facts of this case, the information contained in the Presentence

Investigation Report, and the foregoing, the government recommends that the Court sentence the
defendant to a term of imprisonment at the low end of the applicable guideline range, to be
followed by 10 years of supervised release, with the standard and recommended conditions of
supervision.
Respectfully submitted,
JESSIE K. LIU
United States Attorney
District of Columbia

/s/ Lindsay Jill Suttenberg

By:

__________________________________
LINDSAY JILL SUTTENBERG
Assistant United States Attorney

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JOHN F. BASH
United States Attorney
Western District of Texas

/s/ Matthew Devlin
__________________________________
MATTHEW DEVLIN
Assistant United States Attorney

By:

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on September 11, 2019, I electronically filed the foregoing with the
Clerk of Court using the CM/ECF system which will send notification of such filing to the
following:
David M.C. Peterson, Esq.
Assistant Federal Public Defender
504 Lavaca Street, Suite 960
Austin, Texas 78701
(512) 916-5025
Fax (512) 916-5035
California Bar No. 254498
Attorney for Defendant

/s/ Matthew Devlin
__________________________________
MATTHEW DEVLIN
Assistant United States Attorney

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