THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

September 16, 2019
The Honorable Je1rnld Nadler
Chainnan
Committee on the Jndiciary
United States House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515
Dear Chairman Nadler:
I write concerning the subpoena issued by the Committee on the Judiciary (the
"Committee") to Corey Lewandowski on August 14, 2019. The subpoena directs Mr.
Lewandowski to testify before the Committee on Tuesday, September 17, 2019. I understand that
the Committee seeks to question Mr. Lewandowski about events that are described in the Report
prepared by Special Counsel Robert S. Mueller, III ("Report"), including Mr. Lewandowski's
communications with the President and with senior advisers to the President. As explained below,
Mr. Lewandowski's conversations with the President and with senior advisers to the President are
protected from disclosure by long-settled principles protecting Executive Branch confidentiality
interests and, as a result, the White House has directed Mr. Lewandowski not to provide
infonnation about such communications beyond the information provided in the portions of the
Report that have already been disclosed to the Committee.
It is a well-established legal principle, rooted in the constitutional separation of powers,
that the President's communications seeking advice or inf01mation in connection with the
discharge of his duties are highly confidential and not ordinarily subject to disclosure. As the
Supreme Court explained over forty years ago, "[a] President and those who assist him must be
free to explore alternatives in the process of shaping policies and making decisions and to do so in
a way many would be unwilling to express except privately." United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S.
683, 708 (1974).
The protections for such Presidential comm1mications include all
communications relating to the President's performance of his official duties and responsibilities.
See Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, 433 U.S. 425, 449 (1977) (Executive Branch
confidentiality interests cover "communications in performance of a President's responsibilities")
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). This position is consistent with governing
Supreme Court precedent and the long-standing practice of administrations from both parties. See,
e.g., Assertion ofExec. Privilege with Respect to Clemency Decision, 23 Op. O.L.C. 1, 1-2 (1996)
( citing United States v. Nixon to explain the Presidential communications privilege).
The confidentiality interests protecting Presidential communications are not limited solely
to communications between the President and his advisers within the Executive Branch. Rather,
a President must frequently consult with individuals outside of the Executive Branch, and it is well
settled that those communications are also subject to protection. As the Office of Legal Counsel

 The Honorable Jerrold Nadler
Page2
has explained, under long-standing precedent, the fact that "communications involve individuals
outside the Executive Branch does not undermine the President's confidentiality interests."
Assertion ofExecutive Privilege Concerning the Dismissal and Replacement of US. Attorneys, 31
Op. O.L.C. 1, 5 (2007); see also Letter from Pat A. Cipollone, Counsel to the President, to Elijah
E. Cummings, Chairman, Committee on Oversight and Government Refonn (June 3, 2019)
( communications between an individual outside the Executive Branch and the President or senior
White House advisers are protected from disclosure).
In addition, the same confidentiality interests extend beyond communications in which the
President himself is involved. As the Office of Legal Counsel has explained, "in order for the
President and his advisers to make an infonned decision, presidential aides must sometimes solicit
information from individuals outside the White House and the Executive Branch." Id.
Accordingly, communications between a President's senior advisers and individuals outside the
Executive Branch relating to information or advice that will infonn the discharge of the President's
responsibilities are equally protected from disclosure. See also In re Sealed Case, 121 F.3d 729,
752 (D.C. Cir. 1997) ("Given the need to provide sufficient elbow room for [senior White House]
advisers to obtain information from all knowledgeable sources, the privilege must apply both to
communications which these advisers solicited and received from others as well as those they
authored themselves.").
The Committee has argued that any interest the Executive Branch has in protecting the
confidentiality of presidential communications has been waived for matters discussed in the
Report. To the contrary, while it is true that the President decided to pe1mit disclosure of portions
of the Report that would otherwise be protected by executive privilege, such a disclosure is not a
waiver of any privilege or protection with respect to additional information on the same subject
matters not contained in the Report. Allowing those who have had confidential conversations with
the President to appear before Congress to answer additional questions relating to their
communications with the President and with the President's senior advisers would create profound
separation of powers concerns and would t!U'eaten the ability of future Presidents to protect the
confidentiality of advice they receive and the communications their advisers have with others in
order to advise the President.
Thus, in light of the long-settled principles discussed above, and in order to protect the
prerogatives of the Office of President, the White House has directed Mr. Lewandowski not to
discuss the substance of any conversations he had with the President or senior Presidential advisers
about official govermnent matters, unless the info1mation is expressly contained in the Report.
We are adhering to the well-established lines protecting the confidentiality of presidential
communications to ensure that future Presidents can effectively execute the responsibilities of the
Office of President.
We also understand the Connnittee may question Mr. Lewandowski about discussions he
had with the President-elect during the presidential transition. Discussions during this period may
relate to decisions the President-elect would be making once he assumed office. Accordingly, Mr.
Lewandowski's responses to specific questions relating to this period may implicate deliberative
process privilege and other Executive Branch confidentiality interests.

 The Honorable Jerrold Nadler
Page 3
In order to preserve the President's ability to assert executive privilege over the infonnation
discussed above, and to protect the prerogatives of the Office of President, a member ofmy office
will attend the hearing on September 17 and will advise, as necessary, with regard to specific
questions that implicate privileged matters.
Please do not hesitate to contact me or Mike Purpura if you have any questions or would
like to discuss this matter further.

t A. Cipollone
Counsel to the President
cc:

The Honorable Doug Collins, Ranking Member