Hypersonic Weapons: Background and Issues
for Congress
Updated September 17, 2019

Congressional Research Service
https://crsreports.congress.gov
R45811

 SUMMARY

Hypersonic Weapons: Background and Issues
for Congress

R45811
September 17, 2019
Kelley M. Sayler

Analyst in Advanced
The United States has actively pursued the development of hypersonic weapons—
Technology and Global
maneuvering weapons that fly at speeds of at least Mach 5—as a part of its conventional
Security
prompt global strike program since the early 2000s. In recent years, the United States
has focused such efforts on developing hypersonic glide vehicles, which are launched
from a rocket before gliding to a target, and hypersonic cruise missiles, which are
powered by high-speed, air-breathing engines during flight. As current Commander of
U.S. Strategic Command General John Hyten has stated, these weapons could enable “responsive, long-range,
strike options against distant, defended, and/or time-critical threats [such as road-mobile missiles] when other
forces are unavailable, denied access, or not preferred.” Critics, on the other hand, contend that hypersonic
weapons lack defined mission requirements, contribute little to U.S. military capability, and are unnecessary for
deterrence.

Funding for hypersonic weapons has been relatively restrained in the past; however, both the Pentagon and
Congress have shown a growing interest in pursuing the development and near-term deployment of hypersonic
systems. This is due, in part, to the growing interest in these technologies in Russia and China, both of which have
a number of hypersonic weapons programs and are expected to field an operational hypersonic glide vehicle—
potentially armed with nuclear warheads—as early as 2020. The United States, in contrast to Russia and China, is
not currently considering or developing hypersonic weapons for use with a nuclear warhead. As a result, U.S.
hypersonic weapons will likely require greater accuracy and will be more technically challenging to develop than
nuclear-armed Chinese and Russian systems.
The Pentagon’s FY2020 budget request for all hypersonic-related research is $2.6 billion, including $157.4
million for hypersonic defense programs. At present, the Department of Defense (DOD) has not established any
programs of record for hypersonic weapons, suggesting that it may not have approved either requirements for the
systems or long-term funding plans. Indeed, as Assistant Director for Hypersonics (Office of the Under Secretary
of Defense for Research and Engineering) Mike White has stated, DOD has not yet made a decision to acquire
hypersonic weapons and is instead developing prototypes to assist in the evaluation of potential weapon system
concepts and mission sets.
As Congress reviews the Pentagon’s plans for U.S. hypersonic weapons programs, it might consider questions
about the rationale for hypersonic weapons, their expected costs, and their implications for strategic stability and
arms control. Potential questions include the following:







What mission(s) will hypersonic weapons be used for? Are hypersonic weapons the most costeffective means of executing these potential missions? How will they be incorporated into joint
operational doctrine and concepts?
Given the lack of defined mission requirements for hypersonic weapons, how should Congress
evaluate funding requests for hypersonic weapons programs or the balance of funding requests
for hypersonic weapons programs, enabling technologies, and supporting test infrastructure? Is an
acceleration of research on hypersonic weapons, enabling technologies, or hypersonic missile
defense options both necessary and technologically feasible?
How, if at all, will the fielding of hypersonic weapons affect strategic stability?
Is there a need for risk-mitigation measures, such as expanding New START, negotiating new
multilateral arms control agreements, or undertaking transparency and confidence-building
activities?

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Contents
Introduction ..................................................................................................................................... 1
Background ..................................................................................................................................... 2
United States ............................................................................................................................. 4
Programs ............................................................................................................................. 4
Infrastructure ....................................................................................................................... 9
Russia ........................................................................................................................................ 9
Programs ........................................................................................................................... 10
Infrastructure ..................................................................................................................... 12
China ....................................................................................................................................... 12
Programs ........................................................................................................................... 13
Infrastructure ..................................................................................................................... 13
Issues for Congress ........................................................................................................................ 15
Mission Requirements ............................................................................................................. 15
Funding Considerations .......................................................................................................... 16
Strategic Stability .................................................................................................................... 16
Arms Control........................................................................................................................... 17

Figures
Figure 1. Terrestrial-Based Detection of Ballistic Missiles vs. Hypersonic Glide Vehicles............ 3
Figure 2. Artist Rendering of Avangard.......................................................................................... 11
Figure 3. Lingyun-1 Hypersonic Cruise Missile Prototype ........................................................... 14

Tables
Table 1. Summary of U.S. Hypersonic Weapons Programs ............................................................ 7
Table A-1. DOD Hypersonic Ground Test Facilities ..................................................................... 19
Table A-2. DOD Open-Air Ranges................................................................................................ 20
Table A-3. DOD Mobile Assets ..................................................................................................... 20
Table A-4. NASA Research-Related Facilities .............................................................................. 21
Table A-5. Department of Energy Research-Related Facilities ..................................................... 21
Table A-6. Industry/Academic Research-Related Facilities .......................................................... 21

Appendixes
Appendix. U.S. Hypersonic Testing Infrastructure ....................................................................... 19

Contacts
Author Information........................................................................................................................ 22

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Hypersonic Weapons: Background and Issues for Congress

Introduction
The United States has actively pursued the development of hypersonic weapons as a part of its
conventional prompt global strike (CPGS) program since the early 2000s.1 In recent years, it has
focused such efforts on hypersonic glide vehicles and hypersonic cruise missiles with shorter and
intermediate ranges for use in regional conflicts. Although funding for these programs has been
relatively restrained in the past, both the Pentagon and Congress have shown a growing interest in
pursuing the development and near-term deployment of hypersonic systems. This is due, in part,
to the growing interest in these technologies in Russia and China, leading to a heightened focus in
the United States on the strategic threat posed by hypersonic flight. Open-source reporting
indicates that both China and Russia have conducted numerous successful tests of hypersonic
glide vehicles, and both are expected to field an operational capability as early as 2020.
Experts disagree on the potential impact of competitor hypersonic weapons on both strategic
stability and the U.S. military’s competitive advantage. Nevertheless, current Under Secretary of
Defense for Research and Engineering (USD R&E) Michael Griffin has testified to Congress that
the United States does not “have systems which can hold [China and Russia] at risk in a
corresponding manner, and we don’t have defenses against [their] systems.”2 Although the John
S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019 (FY2019 NDAA, P.L. 115232) accelerated the development of hypersonic weapons, which USD R&E identifies as a
priority research and development area, the United States is unlikely to field an operational
system before 2022. However, the United States, in contrast to Russia and China, is not currently
considering or developing hypersonic weapons for use with a nuclear warhead. As a result, U.S.
hypersonic weapons will likely require greater accuracy and will be more technically challenging
to develop than nuclear-armed Chinese and Russian systems.
In addition to accelerating development of hypersonic weapons, Section 247 of the FY2019
NDAA required that the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Director of the Defense
Intelligence Agency, produce a classified assessment of U.S. and adversary hypersonic weapons
programs, to include the following elements:
(1) An evaluation of spending by the United States and adversaries on such technology.
(2) An evaluation of the quantity and quality of research on such technology.
(3) An evaluation of the test infrastructure and workforce supporting such technology.
(4) An assessment of the technological progress of the United States and adversaries on
such technology.
(5) Descriptions of timelines for operational deployment of such technology.
(6) An assessment of the intent or willingness of adversaries to use such technology. 3

This report was delivered to Congress in July 2019. Similarly, Section 1689 of the FY2019
NDAA requires the Director of the Missile Defense Agency to produce a report on “how
hypersonic missile defense can be accelerated to meet emerging hypersonic threats.”4 The
1

For details, see CRS Report R41464, Conventional Prompt Global Strike and Long-Range Ballistic Missiles:
Background and Issues, by Amy F. Woolf.
2 U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Armed Services, “Testimony of Michael Griffin,” Hearing on New
Technologies to Meet Emerging Threats, April 18, 2018, https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/1840_04-18-18.pdf.
3 P.L. 115-232, Section 2, Division A, Title II, §247.
4 P.L. 115-232, Section 2, Division A, Title XVI, §1689.

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findings of these reports could hold implications for congressional authorizations, appropriations,
and oversight.
The following report reviews the hypersonic weapons programs in the United States, Russia, and
China, providing information on the programs and infrastructure in each nation, based on
unclassified sources. It also provides a brief summary of the state of global hypersonic weapons
research development. It concludes with a discussion of the issues that Congress might address as
it considers DOD’s funding requests for U.S. hypersonic technology programs.

Background
Several countries are developing hypersonic weapons, which fly at speeds of at least Mach 5 (five
times the speed of sound), but none have yet introduced them into their operational military
forces.5 There are two primary categories of hypersonic weapons



Hypersonic glide vehicles (HGV) are launched from a rocket before gliding to a
target.
Hypersonic cruise missiles are powered by high-speed, air-breathing engines, or
“scramjets,” after acquiring their target.

Unlike ballistic missiles, hypersonic weapons do not follow a ballistic trajectory and can
maneuver en route to their destination. As current Commander of U.S. Strategic Command
General John Hyten has stated, hypersonic weapons could enable “responsive, long-range, strike
options against distant, defended, and/or time-critical threats [such as road-mobile missiles] when
other forces are unavailable, denied access, or not preferred.”6 Conventional hypersonic weapons
use only kinetic energy—energy derived from motion—to destroy unhardened targets or,
potentially, underground facilities.7
Hypersonic weapons could challenge detection and defense due to their speed, maneuverability,
and low altitude of flight.8 For example, terrestrial-based radar cannot detect hypersonic weapons
until late in the weapon’s flight.9 Figure 1 depicts the differences in terrestrial-based radar
detection timelines for ballistic missiles versus hypersonic glide vehicles.

5

The United States, Russia, China, Australia, India, France, and Germany are developing hypersonic weapons
technology. See Richard H. Speier et al., Hypersonic Missile Proliferation: Hindering the Spread of a New Class of
Weapons, RAND Corporation, 2017, https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR2137.html.
6 U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Armed Services, “Testimony of John E. Hyten,” Hearing on United States
Strategic Command and United States Northern Command, February 26, 2019, https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/
imo/media/doc/Hyten_02-26-19.pdf.
7 Richard H. Speier et al., Hypersonic Missile Proliferation: Hindering the Spread of a New Class of Weapons, p. 13.
8 See Department of Defense, 2019 Missile Defense Review, https://media.defense.gov/2019/Jan/17/2002080666/-1/-1/
1/2019-MISSILE-DEFENSE-REVIEW.PDF.
9 Richard H. Speier et al., Hypersonic Missile Proliferation: Hindering the Spread of a New Class of Weapons.

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Figure 1.Terrestrial-Based Detection of Ballistic Missiles vs.
Hypersonic Glide Vehicles

Source: CRS image based on an image in “Gliding missiles that fly faster than Mach 5 are coming,” The
Economist, April 6, 2019, https://www.economist.com/science-and-technology/2019/04/06/gliding-missiles-that-flyfaster-than-mach-5-are-coming.

This delayed detection compresses the timeline for decision-makers assessing their response
options and for a defensive system to intercept the attacking weapon—potentially permitting only
a single intercept attempt.10
Furthermore, U.S. defense officials have stated that both terrestrial- and current space-based
sensor architectures are insufficient to detect and track hypersonic weapons, with USD R&E
Griffin noting that “hypersonic targets are 10 to 20 times dimmer than what the U.S. normally
tracks by satellites in geostationary orbit.”11 Some analysts have suggested that space-based
sensor layers—integrated with tracking and fire-control systems to direct high-performance
interceptors or directed energy weapons—could theoretically present viable options for defending
against hypersonic weapons in the future.12 Indeed, the 2019 Missile Defense Review notes that
“such sensors take advantage of the large area viewable from space for improved tracking and
potentially targeting of advanced threats, including HGVs and hypersonic cruise missiles.”13
Other analysts have questioned the affordability, technological feasibility, and/or utility of widearea hypersonic weapons defense.14 As physicist and nuclear expert James Acton explains, “pointdefense systems, and particularly [Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense (THAAD)], could very
plausibly be adapted to deal with hypersonic missiles. The disadvantage of those systems is that
they can only defend small areas. To defend the whole of the continental United States, you

Bradley Perrett et al., “U.S. Navy sees Chinese HGV as part of Wider Threat,” Aviation Week, January 27, 2014.
David Vergun, “DOD Scaling Up Effort to Develop Hypersonics,” DoD News, December 13, 2018,
https://dod.defense.gov/News/Article/Article/1712954/dod-scaling-up-effort-to-develop-hypersonics/; see also
“Testimony of Michael Griffin”; and “Testimony of John E. Hyten.”
12 “Testimony of Michael Griffin”; and “Testimony of John E. Hyten.”
13 Department of Defense, 2019 Missile Defense Review, p. XVI, https://media.defense.gov/2019/Jan/17/2002080666/1/-1/1/2019-MISSILE-DEFENSE-REVIEW.PDF.
14 See James M. Acton, “Hypersonic Weapons Explainer,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, April 2, 2018,
https://carnegieendowment.org/2018/04/02/hypersonic-weapons-explainer-pub-75957; and Margot van Loon,
“Hypersonic Weapons: A Primer.”
10
11

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would need an unaffordable number of THAAD batteries.”15 In addition, some analysts have
argued that the United States’ current command and control architecture would be incapable of
“processing data quickly enough to respond to and neutralize an incoming hypersonic threat.”16
(A broader discussion of hypersonic weapons defense is outside the scope of this report.)

United States
The Department of Defense (DOD) is currently developing hypersonic weapons under the Navy’s
Conventional Prompt Strike program, which is intended to provide the U.S. military with the
ability to strike hardened or time-sensitive targets with conventional warheads, as well as through
several Air Force, Army, and DARPA programs.17 Those who support these development efforts
argue that hypersonic weapons could enhance deterrence, as well as provide the U.S. military
with an ability to defeat capabilities such as advanced air and missile defense systems that form
the foundation of U.S. competitors’ anti-access/area denial strategies.18 In recognition of this, the
2018 National Defense Strategy identifies hypersonic weapons as one of the key technologies
“[ensuring the United States] will be able to fight and win the wars of the future.”19

Programs
Unlike China and Russia, the United States is not currently developing hypersonic weapons for
use with a nuclear warhead. As a result, U.S. hypersonic weapons will likely require greater
accuracy and will be more technically challenging to develop than nuclear-armed Chinese and
Russian systems. Indeed, according to one expert, “a nuclear-armed glider would be effective if it
were 10 or even 100 times less accurate [than a conventionally-armed glider]” due to nuclear
blast effects.20
According to open-source reporting, the United States has a number of major offensive
hypersonic weapons and hypersonic technology programs in development, including the
following (see Table 1):



U.S. Navy—Intermediate Range Conventional Prompt Strike Weapon (IR CPS);
U.S. Army—Land-Based Hypersonic Missile (also known as the Long Range
Hypersonic Weapon);

Acton, “Hypersonic Weapons Explainer.”
Margot van Loon, “Hypersonic Weapons: A Primer” in Defense Technology Program Brief: Hypersonic Weapons,
American Foreign Policy Council, May 17, 2019. Some analysts have suggested that future command and control
systems may require autonomous functionality to manage the speed and unpredictability of hypersonic weapons. See
John L. Dolan, Richard K. Gallagher, and David L. Mann, “Hypersonic Weapons Are Literally Unstoppable (As in
America Can’t Stop Them),” Real Clear Defense, April 23, 2019, https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2019/04/
23/hypersonic_weapons__a_threat_to_national_security_114358.html.
17 For a full history of U.S. hypersonic weapons programs, see CRS Report R41464, Conventional Prompt Global
Strike and Long-Range Ballistic Missiles: Background and Issues, by Amy F. Woolf.
18 Roger Zakheim and Tom Karako, “China’s Hypersonic Missile Advances and U.S. Defense Responses,” Remarks at
the Hudson Institute, March 19, 2019. See also Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2020 Budget Estimates, Army
Justification Book of Research, Development, Test and Evaluation, Volume II, Budget Activity 4, p. 580.
19 Department of Defense, “Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of The United States of America,” p. 3,
https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2018-National-Defense-Strategy-Summary.pdf.
20 James M. Acton, “China’s Advanced Weapons,” Testimony to the U.S. China Economic and Security Review
Commission, February 23, 2017, https://carnegieendowment.org/2017/02/23/china-s-advanced-weapons-pub-68095.
15
16

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






U.S. Air Force—Hypersonic Conventional Strike Weapon (HCSW, pronounced
“hacksaw”);
U.S. Air Force—AGM-183A Air-launched Rapid Response Weapon (ARRW,
pronounced “arrow”);
DARPA—Tactical Boost Glide (TBG);
DARPA—Advanced Full-Range Engine (AFRE);
DARPA—Operational Fires (OpFires); and
DARPA—Hypersonic Air-breathing Weapon Concept (HAWC, pronounced
“hawk”).

These programs are intended to produce operational prototypes, as there are currently no
programs of record for hypersonic weapons.21 Accordingly, funding for U.S. hypersonic weapons
programs is found in the Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation accounts, rather than in
Procurement.

U.S. Navy
In a June 2018 memorandum, DOD announced that the Navy would lead the development of a
common glide vehicle for use across the services. The common glide vehicle is being adapted
from a Mach 6 Army prototype warhead, the Alternate Re-Entry System, which was successfully
tested in 2011 and 2017.22 Once development is complete, “Sandia National Laboratories, the
designer of the original concept, then will build the common glide vehicles…. Booster systems
are being developed separately.”23
According to news reports, the Navy’s Intermediate Range Conventional Prompt Strike Weapon
is expected to pair the common glide vehicle with a submarine-launched booster system.24 The
Navy is requesting $593 million for IR CPS in FY2020 and $5.2 billion across the five-year
Future Years Defense Program (FYDP) with the goal of “demonstrating component and
subsystem technology maturity with risk reduction initiatives highlighted by flight tests.”25 The
Navy plans to conduct flight tests of IR CPS in 2020 and 2022 and to continue prototyping
through January 2024.

Steve Trimble, “New Long-Term Pentagon Plan Boosts Hypersonics, But Only Prototypes,” Aviation Week, March
15, 2019, https://aviationweek.com/defense/new-long-term-pentagon-plan-boosts-hypersonics-only-prototypes.
22 Steve Trimble and Guy Norris, “Sandia’s Swerve Could Lead to First-gen Hypersonic Production Line,” Aviation
Week, October 11, 2018, http://aviationweek.com/air-dominance/sandia-s-swerve-could-lead-first-gen-hypersonicproduction-line; and Sydney J. Freedberg Jr., “Army Warhead Is Key To Joint Hypersonics,” Breaking Defense,
August 22, 2018, https://breakingdefense.com/2018/08/army-warhead-is-key-to-joint-hypersonics/.
23 Trimble and Norris, “Sandia’s Swerve.”
24 Ibid. Vice Admiral Terry Benedict, former director of the Navy Strategic Systems Program, has stated that IR CPS
will be deployed on both Ohio- and Virginia-class submarines. See Jason Sherman and Lee Hudson, “Navy reveals
plans to put hypersonic strike weapons on submarines,” Inside Defense, November 8, 2017, https://insidedefense.com/
inside-missile-defense/navy-reveals-plans-put-hypersonic-strike-weapons-submarines.
25 See CRS In Focus IF10831, Defense Primer: Future Years Defense Program (FYDP), by Brendan W. McGarry and
Heidi M. Peters; see also Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2020 Budget Estimates, Navy Justification Book of
Research, Development, Test and Evaluation, Volume II, Budget Activity 4, pp. 1327-1340,
https://www.secnav.navy.mil/fmc/fmb/Documents/20pres/RDTEN_BA4_Book.pdf.
21

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U.S. Army
The Army’s Land-Based Hypersonic Missile program is expected to pair the common glide
vehicle with a two-stage ground-launched booster system. The system is intended to have a range
of 1,400 miles and “provide the Army with a prototype strategic attack weapon system to defeat
A2/AD capabilities, suppress adversary Long Range Fires, and engage other high payoff/time
sensitive targets.”26 The Army is requesting $228 million for the program in FY2020 and $1.2
billion across the FYDP. It plans to conduct flight tests for the Land-Based Hypersonic Missile in
2023.27

U.S. Air Force
The Hypersonic Conventional Strike Weapon is expected to pair the common glide vehicle with a
solid-rocket-powered GPS-guided system launched from a B-52.28 The Air Force is requesting
$290 million for HCSW in FY2020 to develop proof-of-concept prototype vehicles and “inform
decisions concerning HCSW acquisition and production.”29 The Air Force is scheduled to
complete critical design review in FY2020.30
Similarly, the Air-launched Rapid Response Weapon is expected to develop an air-launched
hypersonic glide vehicle prototype capable of travelling at speeds up to Mach 20 at a range of
approximately 575 miles.31 Despite testing delays due to technical challenges, ARRW completed
a successful flight test in June 2019 and is expected to complete flight tests in FY2022.32 The Air
Force has requested $286 million for ARRW in FY2020 and $735 million across the FYDP.33
Like HCSW, ARRW is a project under the Air Force’s Hypersonics Prototyping Program
Element, which is intended to demonstrate concepts “to [enable] leadership to make informed
strategy and resource decisions … for future programs.”34

26

Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2020 Budget Estimates, Army Justification Book of Research,
Development, Test and Evaluation, Volume II, Budget Activity 4, pp. 579-584, https://www.asafm.army.mil/
documents/BudgetMaterial/fy2020/rdte_ba4.pdf; and Sydney J. Freedberg Jr., “Army Sets 2023 Hypersonic Flight
Test; Strategic Cannon Advances,” Breaking Defense, March 19, 2019, https://breakingdefense.com/2019/03/armysets-2023-hypersonic-flight-test-strategic-cannon-advances/.
27 Ibid.
28 Guy Norris, “B-52 Readied for Intense Hypersonic Weapons Test and Deployment Role,” Aviation Week, August 29,
2018, http://aviationweek.com/defense/b-52-readied-intense-hypersonic-weapons-test-and-deployment-role.
29 Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2020 Budget Estimates, Air Force Justification Book of Research,
Development, Test and Evaluation, Volume II, pp. 123-127, https://www.saffm.hq.af.mil/Portals/84/documents/FY20/
RDTE/FY20_PB_RDTE_Vol-II.PDF?ver=2019-03-18-153506-683.
30 Ibid. Cal Pringle, “US Air Force flight tests hypersonic missile on B-52 bomber,” Defense News, June 13, 2019,
https://www.defensenews.com/industry/techwatch/2019/06/13/us-air-force-flight-tests-hypersonic-missile-on-b-52bomber/.
31 Stephen Trimble, “Lockheed Martin claims both USAF hypersonic programmes,” Flight Global, August 7, 2018,
https://www.flightglobal.com/news/articles/lockheed-martin-claims-both-usaf-hypersonic-programm-450968/.
32 Lee Hudson and Steve Trimble, “Top U.S. Hypersonic Weapon Program Facing New Schedule Pressure,” Aviation
Week, January 11, 2019, http://aviationweek.com/defense/top-us-hypersonic-weapon-program-facing-new-schedulepressure.
33 Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2020 Budget Estimates, Air Force Justification Book of Research,
Development, Test and Evaluation, Volume II, pp. 117-122.
34 Ibid., p. 115.

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DARPA
DARPA, in partnership with the Air Force, continues to test Tactical Boost Glide, a wedge-shaped
hypersonic glide vehicle capable of Mach 7+ flight that “aims to develop and demonstrate
technologies to enable future air-launched, tactical-range hypersonic boost glide systems.”35 TBG
will “also consider traceability, compatibility, and integration with the Navy Vertical Launch
System” and will transition to both the Air Force and the Navy. DARPA has requested $162
million for TBG in FY2020.36
DARPA’s Operational Fires reportedly seeks to leverage TBG technologies to develop a groundlaunched system that will enable “advanced tactical weapons to penetrate modern enemy air
defenses and rapidly and precisely engage critical time sensitive targets.” DARPA requested $50
million for OpFires in FY2020 and intends to transition the program to the Army.37
In the longer term, DARPA, with Air Force support, is continuing work on the Hypersonic Airbreathing Weapon Concept, which “seeks to develop and demonstrate critical technologies to
enable an effective and affordable air-launched hypersonic cruise missile.”38 DARPA has
requested $10 million to develop HAWC in FY2020. DARPA is reportedly halfway through the
first phase of development for the Advanced Full-Range Engine, a prototype engine capable of
enabling Mach 5+ flight for reusable aircraft.39 DARPA has requested $40.7 million for AFRE in
FY2020 and intends to transition the program to the Air Force.40
Table 1. Summary of U.S. Hypersonic Weapons Programs
Title
Conventional Prompt
Strike Weapon (IR CPS)
Land-Based Hypersonic
Missile

FY2019
($ in millions)
11.25

0

PB2020
($ in millions)

Schedule

593.12

Underwater launch tests
and continued
prototyping through 2024

228

Flight tests through 2023

Hypersonic Conventional
Strike Weapon (HCSW)

289.628

290

Critical design review
through 2020

AGM-183A Air-launched
Rapid Response Weapon
(ARRW)

219.23

286

Flight tests through 2022

“Tactical Boost Glide (TBG) Program Information,” DARPA, https://www.darpa.mil/program/tactical-boost-glide;
and Guy Norris, “U.S. Air Force Plans Road Map to Operational Hypersonics,” Aviation Week, July 27, 2017,
https://aviationweek.com/defense/us-air-force-plans-road-map-operational-hypersonics.
36 Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2020 Budget Estimates, Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency,
Defense-Wide Justification Book 1 of 5, p. 163, https://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/
fy2020/budget_justification/pdfs/03_RDT_and_E/RDTE_Vol1_DARPA_MasterJustificationBook_PB_2020.pdf.
37 Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2020 Budget Estimates, Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency,
Defense-Wide Justification Book 1 of 5, p. 107, https://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/
fy2020/budget_justification/pdfs/03_RDT_and_E/RDTE_Vol1_DARPA_MasterJustificationBook_PB_2020.pdf.
38 “Hypersonic Air-breathing Weapon Concept (HAWC) Program Information,” DARPA, https://www.darpa.mil/
program/hypersonic-air-breathing-weapon-concept.
39 Trimble and Norris, “Sandia’s Swerve.”
40 Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2020 Budget Estimates, Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency,
Defense-Wide Justification Book 1 of 5, p. 164.
35

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Title
Tactical Boost Glide
(TBG)

FY2019
($ in millions)
147

PB2020
($ in millions)
162

Schedule
Flight tests through 2020;
additional testing and
flight test planning
through 2020

Advanced Full-Range
Engine (AFRE)

51.288

40.741

Testing through 2020

Operational Fires
(OpFires)

40

50

Complete integrated
system trade studies and
propulsion system critical
design review in 2020;
develop initial flight test
plan in 2020

Hypersonic Air-breathing
Weapon Concept
(HAWC)

14.3

10

Complete flight tests and
final program reviews in
2020

Source: Program information taken from U.S. Navy, Army, Air Force, and DARPA FY2020 Justification Books,
available at https://comptroller.defense.gov/Budget-Materials/.

Hypersonic Missile Defenses
DOD is also investing in counter-hypersonic weapons capabilities, although USD R&E Michael
Griffin has stated that the United States will not have a defensive capability against hypersonic
weapons until the mid-2020s, at the earliest.41 In September 2018, the Missile Defense Agency
(MDA)—which in 2017 established a Hypersonic Defense Program pursuant to Section 1687 of
the FY2017 NDAA (P.L. 114-840)—commissioned 21 white papers to explore hypersonic missile
defense options, including interceptor missiles, hypervelocity projectiles, laser guns, and
electronic attack systems.42 MDA is in the process of evaluating proposals for a space-based (lowEarth orbit) sensor layer that could theoretically extend the range at which incoming missiles
could be detected and tracked—a critical requirement for hypersonic missile defense, according
to USD Griffin.43 MDA requested $157.4 million for hypersonic defense in FY2020.44 In
addition, DARPA is working on a program called Glide Breaker, which “will develop critical
component technologies to support a lightweight vehicle designed for precise

“Media Availability With Deputy Secretary Shanahan and Under Secretary of Defense Griffin at NDIA Hypersonics
Senior Executive Series,” U.S. Department of Defense, December 13, 2018, https://dod.defense.gov/News/Transcripts/
Transcript-View/Article/1713396/media-availability-with-deputy-secretary-shanahan-and-under-secretary-of-defens/.
42 P.L. 114-840, Section 2, Division A, Title XVI, §1687; and Hudson and Trimble, “Top U.S. Hypersonic Weapon
Program”; Steve Trimble, “A Hypersonic Sputnik?,” p. 21.
43 “Media Availability With Deputy Secretary Shanahan and Under Secretary of Defense Griffin.” Experts disagree on
the cost and technological feasibility of space-based missile defense. See Sandra Erwin, “Next steps for the Pentagon’s
new space sensors for missile defense,” Space News, January 21, 2019, https://spacenews.com/next-steps-for-thepentagons-new-space-sensors-for-missile-defense/.
44 Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2020 Budget Estimates, Missile Defense Agency, Defense-Wide Budget
Justification Book Volume 2a of 5, p. 615.
41

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engagement of hypersonic threats at very long range.”45 DARPA requested $10 million for Glide
Breaker in FY2020.46

Infrastructure
According to a study mandated by the FY2013 National Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 112239) and conducted by the Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA),47 the United States had 48
critical hypersonic test facilities and mobile assets in 2014 needed for the maturation of
hypersonic technologies for defense systems development through 2030. These specialized
facilities, which simulate the unique conditions experienced in hypersonic flight (e.g., speed,
pressure, heating), included 10 DOD hypersonic ground test facilities, 11 DOD open-air ranges,
11 DOD mobile assets, 9 NASA facilities, 2 Department of Energy facilities, and 5 industry or
academic facilities.48 In its 2014 evaluation of U.S. hypersonic test and evaluation infrastructure,
IDA noted that “no current U.S. facility can provide full-scale, time-dependent, coupled
aerodynamic and thermal-loading environments for flight durations necessary to evaluate
these characteristics above Mach 8.” Since the 2014 study report was published, the University of
Notre Dame has opened a Mach 6 hypersonic wind tunnel and at least one hypersonic testing
facility has been inactivated. Development of Mach 8 and Mach 10 wind tunnels at Purdue
University and the University of Notre Dame, respectively, is ongoing.49 (For a list of U.S.
hypersonic test assets and their capabilities, see the Appendix.)
In addition, the United States uses the Royal Australian Air Force Woomera Test Range in
Australia and the Andøya Rocket Range in Norway for flight testing.50 In January 2019, the Navy
announced plans to reactivate its Launch Test Complex at China Lake, CA, to improve air launch
and underwater testing capabilities for the conventional prompt strike program.51

Russia
Although Russia has conducted research on hypersonic weapons technology since the 1980s, it
accelerated its efforts in response to U.S. missile defense deployments in both the United States
and Europe, and in response to the U.S. withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty in
2001.52 Detailing Russia’s concerns, President Putin stated that “the US is permitting constant,
45

Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2020 Budget Estimates, Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency,
Defense-Wide Justification Book 1 of 5, p. 211.
46 Ibid.
47 P.L. 112-239, Section 2, Division A, Title X, §1071.
48 These conditions additionally require the development of specialized materials such as metals and ceramics. All
information related to hypersonic weapon test and evaluation infrastructure is taken directly from (U//FOUO) Paul F.
Piscopo et al., (U) Study on the Ability of the U.S. Test and Evaluation Infrastructure to Effectively and Efficiently
Mature Hypersonic Technologies for Defense Systems Development: Summary Analysis and Assessment, Institute for
Defense Analyses, September 2014. Permission to use this material has been granted by the Office of Science and
Technology Policy.
49 Oriana Pawlyk, “Air Force Expanding Hypersonic Technology Testing at Two Indiana Universities,” Military.com,
April 23, 2019, https://www.military.com/daily-news/2019/04/23/air-force-expanding-hypersonic-technology-testingtwo-indiana-universities.html.
50 (U//FOUO) Paul F. Piscopo et al., (U) Study on the Ability of the U.S. Test and Evaluation Infrastructure.
51 “Update: US Navy to develop China Lake to support CPS weapon testing,” Jane’s, February 12, 2019,
https://janes.ihs.com/Janes/Display/FG_1644858-JMR.
52 United Nations Office of Disarmament Affairs, Hypersonic Weapons: A Challenge and Opportunity for Strategic
Arms Control, February 2019, https://www.un.org/disarmament/publications/more/hypersonic-weapons-a-challenge-

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uncontrolled growth of the number of anti-ballistic missiles, improving their quality, and creating
new missile launching areas. If we do not do something, eventually this will result in the
complete devaluation of Russia’s nuclear potential. Meaning that all of our missiles could simply
be intercepted.”53 Russia thus seeks hypersonic weapons, which can maneuver as they approach
their targets, as an assured means of penetrating U.S. missile defenses and restoring its sense of
strategic stability.54

Programs
Russia is pursuing two hypersonic weapons programs—the Avangard and the 3M22 Tsirkon (or
Zircon)—and has reportedly fielded the Kh-47M2 Kinzhal (“Dagger”), a maneuvering airlaunched ballistic missile.55
Avangard (Figure 2) is a hypersonic glide vehicle launched from an intercontinental ballistic
missile (ICBM), giving it “effectively ‘unlimited’ range.”56 Reports indicate that Avangard has
been tested in a launch of the SS-19 Stiletto ICBM, though Russia reportedly plans to eventually
launch the vehicle from the Sarmat ICBM. This missile is still in development, although it may be
deployed by 2021.57 Avangard features onboard countermeasures and will reportedly carry a
nuclear warhead. It was successfully tested twice in 2016 and once in December 2018, reportedly
reaching speeds of Mach 20; however, an October 2017 test resulted in failure.58 Following the
2018 test, Russian President Vladimir Putin stated that Avangard would be deployed in 2019;59
however, U.S. intelligence reports have suggested that it is unlikely to be operational before 2020,
with Pentagon spokesman Eric Pahon noting that “we’ve seen more grandiose claims of success
than actual proof.”60

and-opportunity-for-strategic-arms-control/.
53 Vladimir Putin, “Presidential Address to the Federal Assembly,” March 1, 2018, http://en.kremlin.ru/events/
president/news/56957.
54 In this instance, “strategic stability” refers to a “bilateral nuclear relationship of mutual vulnerability.” See Tong
Zhao, “Conventional Challenges to Strategic Stability: Chinese Perceptions of Hypersonic Technology and the Security
Dilemma,” Carnegie-Tsinghua Center for Global Policy, July 23, 2018, https://carnegietsinghua.org/2018/07/23/
conventional-challenges-to-strategic-stability-chinese-perceptions-of-hypersonic-technology-and-security-dilemmapub-76894.
55 Although the Kinzhal is a maneuvering air-launched ballistic missile rather than a hypersonic glide vehicle or
hypersonic cruise missile, it is often included in reporting of Russia’s hypersonic weapons program. For this reason—
and because it poses defensive challenges that are similar to other hypersonic weapons—it is included here for
reference.
56 Steve Trimble, “A Hypersonic Sputnik?,” Aviation Week, January 14-27, 2019, p. 20.
57 Ibid. Sarmat could reportedly accommodate at least three Avangard vehicles. See Malcolm Claus, “Russia unveils
new strategic delivery systems,” Jane’s, https://janes.ihs.com/Janes/Display/FG_899127-JIR.
58 Steve Trimble, “A Hypersonic Sputnik?,” Aviation Week, January 14-27, 2019, p. 20.
59 Bill Chappell, “Russia Will Deploy New Hypersonic Missile Systems In 2019, Putin Says,” NPR, December 27,
2018, https://www.npr.org/2018/12/27/680467756/russia-will-deploy-new-hypersonic-missile-systems-in-2019-putinsays.
60 Amanda Macias, “US intelligence reports: Russia’s new hypersonic weapon will likely be ready for war by 2020,”
CNBC, May 15, 2018, https://www.cnbc.com/2018/05/15/russia-hypersonic-weapon-likely-ready-for-war-by-2020-usintel.html.

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Figure 2. Artist Rendering of Avangard

Source: https://janes.ihs.com/Janes/Display/FG_899127-JIR.

In addition to Avangard, Russia is developing Tsirkon, a ship-launched hypersonic cruise missile
capable of traveling at speeds of between Mach 6 and Mach 8. Tsirkon is reportedly capable of
striking both ground and naval targets. U.S. intelligence reports indicate that Russia conducted its
most recent successful test of Tsirkon in December 2018 and that the missile will become
operational in 2023.61 According to Russian news sources, Tsirkon has a range of between
approximately 250 and 600 miles and can be fired from the vertical launch systems mounted on
cruisers Admiral Nakhimov and Pyotr Veliky, Project 20380 corvettes, Project 22350 frigates, and
Project 885 Yasen-class submarines, among other platforms.62
In addition, Russia has reportedly fielded Kinzhal, a maneuvering air-launched ballistic missile
modified from the Iskander missile. According to U.S. intelligence reports, Kinzhal was
successfully test fired from a modified MiG-31 fighter (NATO code name: Foxhound) as recently
as July 2018—striking a target at a distance of approximately 500 miles—and is expected by U.S.
intelligence sources to become ready for combat by 2020.63 Russia plans to deploy the missile on
both the MiG-31 and the Su-34 long-range strike fighter.64 Russia is working to mount the missile
on the Tu-22M3 strategic bomber (NATO code name: Backfire), although the slower-moving
bomber may face challenges in “accelerating the weapon into the correct launch parameters.”65
Russian media has reported Kinzhal’s top speed as Mach 10, with a range of up to 1,200 miles
when launched from the MiG-31. The Kinzhal is reportedly capable of maneuverable flight, as
Amanda Macias, “Russia again successfully tests ship-based hypersonic missile—which will likely be ready for
combat by 2022,” CNBC, December 20, 2018, https://www.cnbc.com/2018/12/20/russia-tests-hypersonic-missile-thatcould-be-ready-for-war-by-2022.html; and “Russian Navy to accept latest Tsirkon hypersonic missile for service in
2023—source,” TASS, March 20, 2019, http://tass.com/defense/1049572.
62 “Russia makes over 10 test launches of Tsirkon seaborne hypersonic missile,” TASS, December 21, 2018,
http://tass.com/defense/1037426. See also Russia Military Power: Building a Military to Support Great Power
Aspirations, Defense Intelligence Agency, 2017, p. 79, https://www.dia.mil/portals/27/documents/news/
military%20power%20publications/russia%20military%20power%20report%202017.pdf.
63 Amanda Macias, “Russia’s new hypersonic missile, which can be launched from warplanes, will likely be ready for
combat by 2020,” CNBC, July 13, 2018, https://www.cnbc.com/2018/07/13/russia-new-hypersonic-missile-likelyready-for-war-by-2020.html.
64 Mark B. Schneider, “Moscow’s Development of Hypersonic Missiles … and What It Means” in Defense Technology
Program Brief: Hypersonic Weapons, American Foreign Policy Council, May 17, 2019.
65 Dave Majumdar, “Russia: New Kinzhal Aero-Ballistic Missile Has 3,000 km Range if Fired from Supersonic
Bomber,” The National Interest, July 18, 2018, https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/russia-new-kinzhal-aero-ballisticmissile-has-3000-km-range-if-fired-supersonic-bomber.
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well as of striking both ground and naval targets, and could eventually be fitted with a nuclear
warhead. However, such claims regarding Kinzhal’s performance characteristics have not been
publicly verified by U.S. intelligence agencies, and have been met with skepticism by a number
of analysts.66

Infrastructure
Russia reportedly conducts hypersonic wind tunnel testing at the Central Aero-Hydrodynamic
Institute in Zhukovsky and the Khristianovich Institute of Theoretical and Applied Mechanics in
Novosibirsk, and has tested hypersonic weapons at Dombarovskiy Air Base, the Baykonur
Cosmodrome, and the Kura Range.67

China
According to Tong Zhao, a fellow at the Carnegie-Tsinghua Center for Global Policy, “most
experts argue that the most important reason to prioritize hypersonic technology development [in
China] is the necessity to counter specific security threats from increasingly sophisticated U.S.
military technology, including [hypersonic weapons].”68 In particular, China’s pursuit of
hypersonic weapons, like Russia’s, reflects a concern that U.S. hypersonic weapons could enable
the United States to conduct a preemptive, decapitating strike on China’s nuclear arsenal and
supporting infrastructure. U.S. missile defense deployments could then limit China’s ability to
conduct a retaliatory strike against the United States.69
China has demonstrated a growing interest in Russian advances in hypersonic weapons
technology, conducting flight tests of a hypersonic-glide vehicle (HGV) only days after Russia
tested its own system.70 Furthermore, a January 2017 report found that over half of open-source
Chinese papers on hypersonic weapons include references to Russian weapons programs. 71 This
could indicate that China is increasingly considering hypersonic weapons within a regional
context. Indeed, some analysts believe that China may be planning to mate conventionally armed
HGVs with the DF-21 and DF-26 ballistic missiles in support of an anti-access/area denial
strategy.72 China has reportedly not made a final determination as to whether its hypersonic
weapons will be nuclear- or conventionally armed—or dual-capable.

David Axe, “Is Kinzhal, Russia’s New Hypersonic Missile, a Game Changer?,” The Daily Beast, March 15, 2018,
https://www.thedailybeast.com/is-kinzhal-russias-new-hypersonic-missile-a-game-changer.
67 “Aerodynamics,” Central Aerohydrodynamic Institute, http://tsagi.com/research/aerodynamics/; “Russia announces
successful flight test of Avangard hypersonic glide vehicle,” Jane’s, January 3, 2019, https://janes.ihs.com/Janes/
Display/FG_1451630-JMR; and “Avangard system is tested, said to be fully ready for deployment,” Russian Strategic
Nuclear Forces, December 26, 2018, http://russianforces.org/blog/2018/12/avangard_system_is_tested_said.shtml.
68 Tong Zhao, “Conventional Challenges to Strategic Stability: Chinese Perceptions of Hypersonic Technology and the
Security Dilemma.”
69 Tong Zhao, “Conventional Challenges to Strategic Stability”; and Lora Saalman, “China’s Calculus on Hypersonic
Glide,” August 15, 2017, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, https://www.sipri.org/commentary/topicalbackgrounder/2017/chinas-calculus-hypersonic-glide.
70 Lora Saalman, “China’s Calculus on Hypersonic Glide.”
71 Lora Saalman, “Factoring Russia into the US-China Equation on Hypersonic Glide Vehicles,” SIPRI, January 2017,
https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/Factoring-Russia-into-US-Chinese-equation-hypersonic-glide-vehicles.pdf.
72 Lora Saalman, “China’s Calculus on Hypersonic Glide”; and Malcolm Claus and Andrew Tate, “Chinese hypersonic
programme reflects regional priorities,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, March 12, 2019, https://janes.ihs.com/Janes/Display/
FG_1731069-JIR.
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Programs
China has conducted a number of successful tests of the DF-17, a medium-range ballistic missile
specifically designed to launch HGVs. U.S. intelligence analysts assess that the missile has a
range of approximately 1,000 to 1,500 miles.73 China has also tested the DF-41 intercontinental
ballistic missile, which could be modified to carry a conventional or nuclear HGV, according to a
report by a U.S. Congressional commission. The development of the DF-41 thus “significantly
increases the [Chinese] rocket force’s nuclear threat to the U.S. mainland,” the report states.74
China has tested the DF-ZF HGV (previously referred to as the WU-14) at least nine times since
2014. U.S. defense officials have reportedly identified the range of the DF-ZF as approximately
1,200 miles and have stated that the missile may be capable of performing “extreme maneuvers”
during flight.75 Although unconfirmed by intelligence agencies, some analysts believe the DF-ZF
will be operational as early as 2020.76
According to a China Academy of Aerospace Aerodynamics (CAAA) press release, China also
successfully tested Starry Sky-2 (or Xing Kong-2), a nuclear-capable hypersonic vehicle
prototype, in August 2018.77 Unlike the DF-ZF, Starry Sky-2 is a “waverider” that uses powered
flight after launch and derives lift from its own shockwaves. CAAA claims the vehicle reached
top speeds of Mach 6 and executed a series of in-flight maneuvers before landing. Some reports
indicate that the Starry Sky-2 could be operational by 2025.78 U.S. officials have declined to
comment on the program.79

Infrastructure
China has a robust research and development infrastructure devoted to hypersonic weapons. USD
(R&E) Michael Griffin stated in March 2018 that China has conducted 20 times as many
hypersonic tests as the United States.80 China tested three hypersonic vehicle models (D18-1S,
D18-2S, and D18-3S)—each with different aerodynamic properties—in September 2018.81
Ankit Panda, “Introducing the DF-17: China’s Newly Tested Ballistic Missile Armed with a Hypersonic Glide
Vehicle,” The National Interest, December 28, 2017, https://thediplomat.com/2017/12/introducing-the-df-17-chinasnewly-tested-ballistic-missile-armed-with-a-hypersonic-glide-vehicle/.
74 U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission 2018 Annual Report, p. 235, https://www.uscc.gov/sites/
default/files/annual_reports/2018%20Annual%20Report%20to%20Congress.pdf.
75 “Gliding missiles that fly faster than Mach 5 are coming,” The Economist, April 6, 2019,
https://www.economist.com/science-and-technology/2019/04/06/gliding-missiles-that-fly-faster-than-mach-5-arecoming; and Franz-Stefan Gady, “China Tests New Weapon Capable of Breaching US Missile Defense Systems,” The
Diplomat, April 28, 2016, https://thediplomat.com/2016/04/china-tests-new-weapon-capable-of-breaching-u-s-missiledefense-systems/.
76 U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission 2015 Annual Report, p. 20, https://www.uscc.gov/sites/
default/files/annual_reports/2015%20Annual%20Report%20to%20Congress.PDF.
77 Jessie Yeung, “China claims to have successfully tested its first hypersonic aircraft.
CNN, August 7, 2018, https://www.cnn.com/2018/08/07/china/china-hypersonic-aircraft-intl/index.html. See also
U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission 2018 Annual Report, p. 220, https://www.uscc.gov/sites/
default/files/annual_reports/2018%20Annual%20Report%20to%20Congress.pdf.
78 U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission Report 2015, p. 20.
79 Bill Gertz, “China Reveals Test of New Hypersonic Missile,” The Washington Free Beacon, August 10, 2018,
https://freebeacon.com/national-security/chinas-reveals-test-new-hypersonic-missile/.
80 U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission Report 2015, p. 20.
81 Malcolm Claus and Andrew Tate, “Chinese hypersonic programme reflects regional priorities,” Jane’s Defence
Weekly, March 12, 2019, https://janes.ihs.com/Janes/Display/FG_1731069-JIR.
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Analysts believe that these tests could be designed to help China develop weapons that fly at
variable speeds, including hypersonic speeds. Similarly, China has used the Lingyun Mach 6+
high-speed engine, or “scramjet,” test bed (Figure 3) to research thermal resistant components
and hypersonic cruise missile technologies.82
Figure 3. Lingyun-1 Hypersonic Cruise Missile Prototype

Source: Photo accompanying Drake Long, “China reveals Lingyun-1 hypersonic missile at National Science and
Technology expo,” The Defense Post, May 21, 2018.

According to Jane’s Defence Weekly, “China is also investing heavily in hypersonic ground
testing facilities.”83 CAAA operates the FD-02, FD-03, and FD-07 hypersonic wind tunnels,
which are capable of reaching speeds of Mach 8, Mach 10, and Mach 12, respectively.84 China
also operates the JF-12 hypersonic wind tunnel, which reaches speeds of between Mach 5 and
Mach 9, and the FD-21 hypersonic wind tunnel, which reaches speeds of between Mach 10 and
Mach 15.85 China is expected to have an operational wind tunnel capable of reaching speeds of
Mach 25 by 2020.86 China is known to have tested hypersonic weapons at the Jiuquan Satellite
Launch Center and the Taiyuan Satellite Launch Center.

Jeffrey Lin and P.W. Singer, “China’s hypersonic military projects include spaceplanes and rail guns,” Popular
Mechanics, June 26, 2018, https://www.popsci.com/chinas-hypersonic-work-speeds-up.
83 Tate, “China conducts further tests.”
84 Kelvin Wong, “China claims successful test of hypersonic waverider,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, August 10, 2018,
https://janes.ihs.com/Janes/Display/FG_1002295-JDW.
85 Jeffrey Lin and P.W. Singer, “A look at China’s most exciting hypersonic aerospace programs,” Popular Science,
April 18, 2017, https://www.popsci.com/chinas-hypersonic-technology.
86 Tate, “China conducts further tests.”
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Global Hypersonic Weapons Programs
Although the United States, Russia, and China possess the most advanced hypersonic weapons programs, a
number of other countries—including Australia, India, France, and Germany—are also developing hypersonic
weapons technology. Since 2007, the United States has collaborated with Australia on the Hypersonic
International Flight Research Experimentation (HIFiRE) program to develop hypersonic technologies. The most
recent HIFiRE test, successfully conducted in July 2017, explored the flight dynamics of a Mach 8 hypersonic glide
vehicle, while previous tests explored scramjet engine technologies. In addition to the Woomera Test Range
facilities—one of the largest weapons test facilities in the world—Australia operates seven hypersonic wind
tunnels and is capable of testing speeds of up to Mach 30.
India has similarly collaborated with Russia on the development of BrahMos II, a Mach 7 hypersonic cruise missile.
Although BrahMos II was initially intended to be fielded in 2017, news reports indicate that the program faces
significant delays and is now scheduled to achieve initial operational capability between 2025 and 2028. Reportedly,
India is also developing an indigenous hypersonic cruise missile as part of its Hypersonic Technology
Demonstrator Vehicle program and successfully tested a Mach 6 scramjet in June 2019. India operates
approximately 12 hypersonic wind tunnels and is capable of testing speeds of up to Mach 13.
France also has collaborated and contracted with Russia on the development of hypersonic technology. Although
France has been investing in hypersonic technology research since the 1990s, it has only recently announced its
intent to weaponize the technology. Under the V-max (Experimental Maneuvering Vehicle) program, France plans
to modify its air-to-surface ASN4G supersonic missile for hypersonic flight by 2022. Some analysts believe that the
V-max program is intended to provide France with a strategic nuclear weapon. France operates five hypersonic
wind tunnels and is capable of testing speeds of up to Mach 21.
Germany successfully tested an experimental hypersonic glide vehicle (SHEFEX II) in 2012; however, reports
indicate that Germany may have pulled funding for the program. German defense contractor DLR continues to
research and test hypersonic vehicles as part of the European Union’s ATLAS II project, which seeks to design a
Mach 5-6 vehicle. Germany operates three hypersonic wind tunnels and is capable of testing speeds of up to Mach
11.
Finally, Japan is developing the Hyper Velocity Gliding Projectile (HVGP) to improve the country’s defense of the
Ryukyu Islands. According to Jane’s, Japan invested $122 million in the program in FY2019. It plans to deploy Block
I of the HVGP in FY2026 and Block II in FY2033. The Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency operates three
hypersonic wind tunnels, with two additional facilities at Mitsubishi Heavy Industries and the University of Tokyo.
Other countries—including Iran, Israel, and South Korea—have conducted foundational research on hypersonic
airflows and propulsion systems, but may not be pursuing a hypersonic weapons capability at this time.
Note: For additional information about global hypersonic weapons programs, see Richard H. Speier et al., Hypersonic
Missile Proliferation.

Issues for Congress
As Congress reviews the Pentagon’s plans for U.S. hypersonic weapons programs during the
annual authorization and appropriations process, it might consider a number of questions about
the rationale for hypersonic weapons, their expected costs, and their implications for strategic
stability and arms control. This section provides an overview of some of these questions.

Mission Requirements
Although the Department of Defense is funding a number of hypersonic weapons programs, it has
not established any programs of record, suggesting that it may not have approved requirements
for hypersonic weapons or long-term funding plans.87 Indeed, as Assistant Director for
Hypersonics (USD R&E) Mike White has stated, DOD has not yet made a decision to acquire
hypersonic weapons and is instead developing prototypes to “[identify] the most viable
87

Steve Trimble, “New Long-Term Pentagon Plan Boosts Hypersonics.”

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overarching weapon system concepts to choose from and then make a decision based on success
and challenges.”88 As Congress conducts oversight of U.S. hypersonic weapons programs, it may
seek to obtain information about DOD’s evaluation of potential mission sets for hypersonic
weapons, a cost analysis of alternative means of executing these mission sets, and an assessment
of the enabling technologies—such as space-based sensors or autonomous command and control
systems—that may be required to employ or defend against hypersonic weapons.

Funding Considerations
Assistant Director for Hypersonics (USD R&E) Mike White has noted that DOD is prioritizing
offensive programs while it determines “the path forward to get a robust defensive strategy.” This
approach is reflected in DOD’s FY2020 request, which allocates $157.4 million for hypersonic
defense programs—of a total $2.6 billion request for all hypersonic-related research.89 Some
analysts have argued that hypersonic defense programs are underfunded, pointing to the Missile
Defense Agency’s Unfunded Priorities list, which includes the $108 million Hypersonic and
Ballistic Tracking Space Sensor and $720 million for Hypersonic Defense Acceleration.90 These
analysts state that the FY2020 “budget’s pace, level, and location of funding is inadequate to
develop and field space sensors anytime in the foreseeable future.”91 Given the lack of defined
mission requirements for hypersonic weapons, it may be challenging for Congress to evaluate the
balance of funding for hypersonic weapons programs, enabling technologies, supporting test
infrastructure, and hypersonic missile defense.
Furthermore, in its report on DOD’s FY2020 appropriations bill (H.Rept. 116-84), the House
Committee on Appropriations noted its concern “that the rapid growth in hypersonic research has
the potential to result in stove-piped, proprietary systems that duplicate capabilities and increase
costs.” The committee recommended that DOD “develop and implement an integrated science
and technology roadmap for hypersonics” that would coordinate programs across the
Department.92 Similarly, the House Armed Services Committee has recommended that DOD
establish a Joint Hypersonics Transition Office to “[standardize] the technical priorities across the
Department” (see H.Rept. 116-120).93

Strategic Stability
Analysts disagree about the strategic implications of hypersonic weapons. Some have identified
two factors that could hold significant implications for strategic stability: the weapon’s short
time-of-flight—which, in turn, compresses the timeline for response—and its unpredictable flight
88

Ibid.
Aaron Mehta, “Is the Pentagon Moving Quickly Enough on Hypersonic Defense?” Defense News, March 21, 2019,
https://www.defensenews.com/pentagon/2019/03/21/is-the-pentagon-moving-quickly-enough-on-hypersonic-defense/.
90 Ibid. See also Missile Defense Agency Report to Congress: Report on Unfunded Priorities of the Missile Defense
Agency, March 2019, https://insidedefense.com/sites/insidedefense.com/files/documents/2019/mar/03262019_mda.pdf.
91 Space sensors have been termed a “critical capability” for hypersonic defense by Missile Defense Agency director
Samuel Greaves. Thomas Karako and Wes Rumbaugh, “Masterpiece Theater: Missed Opportunities for Missile
Defense in the 2020 Budget,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, March 29, 2019, https://www.csis.org/
analysis/masterpiece-theater-missed-opportunities-missile-defense-2020-budget.
92 “Department of Defense Appropriations Bill, 2020: Report of the Committee on Appropriations together with
Minority Views,” U.S. House of Representatives, May 23, 2019, https://appropriations.house.gov/sites/
democrats.appropriations.house.gov/files/FY2020%20Defense%20Filed%20Report%20-%20HR2968.pdf.
93 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020: Report of the Committee on Armed Services House of
Representatives, U.S. House of Representatives, June 19, 2019.
89

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path—which could generate uncertainty about the weapon’s intended target and therefore
heighten the risk of miscalculation or unintended escalation in the event of a conflict. This risk
could be further compounded in countries that co-locate nuclear and conventional capabilities or
facilities.
Some analysts argue that unintended escalation could occur as a result of warhead ambiguity, or
from the inability to distinguish between a conventionally armed hypersonic weapon and a
nuclear-armed one. However, as a United Nations report notes, “even if a State did know that an
HGV launched toward it was conventionally armed, it may still view such a weapon as strategic
in nature, regardless of how it was perceived by the State firing the weapon, and decide that a
strategic response was warranted.”94 Differences in threat perception and escalation ladders could
thus result in unintended escalation. Such concerns have previously led Congress to restrict
funding for conventional prompt strike programs.95
Other analysts have argued that the strategic implications of hypersonic weapons are minimal.
Pavel Podvig, a senior research fellow at the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research,
has noted that the weapons “don’t … change much in terms of strategic balance and military
capability.”96 This, some analysts argue, is because U.S. competitors such as China and Russia
already possess the ability to strike the United States with intercontinental ballistic missiles,
which, when launched in salvos, could overwhelm U.S. missile defenses.97 Furthermore, these
analysts note that in the case of hypersonic weapons, traditional principles of deterrence hold: “it
is really a stretch to try to imagine any regime in the world that would be so suicidal that it would
even think threating to use—not to mention to actually use—hypersonic weapons against the
United States ... would end well.”98

Arms Control
Some analysts who believe that hypersonic weapons could present a threat to strategic stability or
inspire an arms race have argued that the United States should take measures to mitigate risks or
limit the weapons’ proliferation. Proposed measures include expanding New START, negotiating
new multilateral arms control agreements, and undertaking transparency and confidence-building
measures.99
The New START Treaty, a strategic offensive arms treaty between the United States and Russia,
does not currently cover weapons that fly on a ballistic trajectory for less than 50% of their flight,
as do hypersonic glide vehicles and hypersonic cruise missiles.100 However, Article V of the treaty
94

United Nations Office of Disarmament Affairs, Hypersonic Weapons.
For a history of legislative activity on conventional prompt global strike, see CRS Report R41464, Conventional
Prompt Global Strike and Long-Range Ballistic Missiles: Background and Issues, by Amy F. Woolf.
96 Amy Mackinnon, “Russia’s New Missiles Are Aimed at the U.S.,” Foreign Policy, March 5, 2019,
https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/03/05/russias-new-missiles-are-aimed-at-you-weapons-hypersonic-putin-united-statesinf/.
97 David Axe, “How the U.S. Is Quietly Winning the Hypersonic Arms Race,” The Daily Beast, January 16, 2019,
https://www.thedailybeast.com/how-the-us-is-quietly-winning-the-hypersonic-arms-race. See also Mark B. Schneider,
“Moscow’s Development of Hypersonic Missiles,” p. 14.
98 Jyri Raitasalo, “Hypersonic Weapons are No Game-Changer,” The National Interest, January 5, 2019,
https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/hypersonic-weapons-are-no-game-changer-40632.
99 See United Nations Office of Disarmament Affairs, Hypersonic Weapon; and Richard H. Speier et al., Hypersonic
Missile Proliferation.
100 In some cases, hypersonic glide vehicles may be launched from intercontinental ballistic missiles that are already
covered by New START, as is reported to be the case with Russia’s Avangard HGV. See Rachel S. Cohen,
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states that “when a Party believes that a new kind of strategic offensive arm is emerging, that
Party shall have the right to raise the question of such a strategic offensive arm for consideration
in the Bilateral Consultative Commission (BCC).” Accordingly, some legal experts hold that the
United States could raise the issue in the BCC of negotiating to include hypersonic weapons in
the New START limits.101 However, because New START is due to expire in 2021, unless
extended through 2026, this solution is likely to be temporary.102
As an alternative, some analysts have proposed negotiating a new international arms control
agreement that would institute a moratorium or ban on hypersonic weapon testing. These analysts
argue that a test ban would be a “highly verifiable” and “highly effective” means of preventing a
potential arms race and preserving strategic stability.103 Other analysts have countered that a test
ban would be infeasible, as “no clear technical distinction can be made between hypersonic
missiles and other conventional capabilities that are less prompt, have shorter ranges, and also
have the potential to undermine nuclear deterrence.”104 These analysts have instead proposed
international transparency and confidence-building measures, such as exchanging weapons data;
conducting joint technical studies; “providing advance notices of tests; choosing separate,
distinctive launch locations for tests of hypersonic missiles; and placing restraints on sea-based
tests.”105

“Hypersonic Weapons: Strategic Asset or Tactical Tool?”
101 James Acton notes: “during [New START] negotiations, Russia argued that boost-glide weapons might constitute ‘a
new kind of strategic offensive arm,’ in which case they would trigger bilateral discussions about whether and how
they would be regulated by the treaty—a position [then] rejected by the United States.” James M. Acton, Silver Bullet?:
Asking the Right Questions about Conventional Prompt Global Strike, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,
2013, p. 139, https://carnegieendowment.org/files/cpgs.pdf.
102 CRS Report R41219, The New START Treaty: Central Limits and Key Provisions, by Amy F. Woolf.
103 Mark Gubrud, “Test Ban for Hypersonic Missiles?” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, August 6, 2015,
https://thebulletin.org/roundtable/test-ban-for-hypersonic-missiles/.
104 Tong Zhao, “Test Ban for Hypersonic Missiles?”
105 Rajaram Nagappa, “Test Ban for Hypersonic Missiles?”; see also James M. Acton, Silver Bullet?, pp. 134-138.

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Appendix. U.S. Hypersonic Testing Infrastructure106
Table A-1. DOD Hypersonic Ground Test Facilities
Facility

Capability

Location

Air Force Arnold Engineering and
Development Complex (AEDC) von
Karman Gas Dynamics Facility
Tunnels A/B/C

Tunnel A: 40-inch Mach 1.5-5.5; up
to 290 °F
Tunnel B: 50-inch Mach 6 and 8; up
to 900 °F
Tunnel C: 50-inch Mach 10; up to
1700 °F

Arnold AFB, TN

Air Force AEDC High-Enthalpy
Aerothermal Test Arc-Heated
Facilities H1, H2, H3

Simulate thermal and pressure
environments at speeds of up to
Mach 8

Arnold AFB, TN

Air Force AEDC Tunnel 9

59-inch Mach 7, 8, 10, and 14; up to
2900 °F

White Oak, MD

Air Force AEDC Aerodynamic and
Propulsion Test Unit

Mach 3.1-7.2; up to 1300 °F

Arnold AFB, TN

Air Force AEDC Aeroballistic Range
G

Launches projectiles of up to 8
inches in diameter at speeds of up
to Mach 20

Arnold AFB, TN

Holloman High Speed Test Track

59,971 ft. track; launches
projectiles at speeds of up to Mach
8

Holloman AFB, NM

Air Force Research Laboratory
(AFRL) Cells 18, 22

Mach 3-7

Wright-Patterson AFB, OH

AFRL Laser Hardened Materials
Evaluation Laboratory (LHMEL)

High-temperature materials testing

Wright-Patterson AFB, OH

AFRL Mach 6 High Reynolds
Number (Re) Facility

10-inch Mach 6

Wright-Patterson AFB, OH

Test Resource Management Center
Hypersonic Aeropropulsion Clean
Air Test-bed Facility

Up to Mach 8; up to 4040 °F

Arnold AFB, TN

Source: (U//FOUO) Paul F. Piscopo et al.

106

The following information is derived from the 2014 report (U//FOUO) Paul F. Piscopo et al., (U) Study on the
Ability of the U.S. Test and Evaluation Infrastructure, and therefore, may not be current. Permission to use this material
has been granted by the Office of Science and Technology Policy.

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Table A-2. DOD Open-Air Ranges
Range

Location

Ronald Reagan Ballistic Missile
Defense Test Site

Kwajalein Atoll, Republic of the
Marshall Islands

Pacific Missile Range Facility (PMRF)

Kauai, HI

Western Range, 30th Space Wing

Vandenberg AFB, CA

Naval Air Warfare Center Weapons
(NAWC) Division

Point Mugu and China Lake, CA

White Sands Missile Range (WSMR)

New Mexico

Eastern Range, 45th Space Wing

Cape Canaveral Air Force
Station/Patrick AFB/Kennedy
Space Center, FL

NASA Wallops Flight Facility

Wallops Island, VA

Pacific Spaceport Complex (formerly
Kodiak Launch Complex)

Kodiak Island, AK

NAWC Weapons Division R-2508
Complex

Edwards AFB, CA

Utah Test and Training Range

Utah

Nevada Test and Training Range

Nevada

Source: (U//FOUO) Paul F. Piscopo et al.

Table A-3. DOD Mobile Assets
Asset
Navy Mobile Instrumentation
System
PMRF Mobile At-sea Sensor System
MDA Mobile Instrumentation
System Pacific Collector
MDA Mobile Instrumentation
System Pacific Tracker
Kwajalein Mobile Range Safety
System 2
United States Navy Ship Lorenzen
missile range instrumentation ship
Sea-based X-band Radar
Aircraft Mobile Instrumentation
Systems
Transportable Range Augmentation
and Control System
Re-locatable MPS-36 Radar
Transportable Telemetry System
Source: (U//FOUO) Paul F.
Piscopo et al.

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Table A-4. NASA Research-Related Facilities
Facility

Capability

Location

Ames Research Center (ARC) Arc
Jet Complex

High-temperature materials testing

Mountain View, CA

ARC Hypervelocity Free Flight
Facilities

Launches projectiles at speeds of up
to Mach 23

Mountain View, CA

Langley Research Center (LaRC)
Aerothermodynamics Laboratory

31-inch Mach 10, 20-inch Mach 6,
and 15-inch Mach 6

Hampton, VA

LaRC 8-foot High Temperature
Tunnel

96-inch Mach 5 and Mach 6.5

Hampton, VA

LaRC Scramjet Test Complex

Up to Mach 8 and up to 4740 °F

Hampton, VA

LaRC HyPulse Facility

Currently inactive

Long Island, NY

Glenn Research Center (GRC)
Plumbrook Hypersonic Tunnel
Facility Arc Jet Facility

Mach 5, 6, and 7 and up to 3830 °F

Sandusky, OH

GRC Propulsion Systems
Laboratory 4

Mach 6

Cleveland, OH

GRC 1’ x 1’ Supersonic Wind
Tunnel

12-inch Mach 1.3-6 (10 discrete
airspeeds) and up to 640 °F

Cleveland, OH

Source: (U//FOUO) Paul F. Piscopo et al.

Table A-5. Department of Energy Research-Related Facilities
Facility

Capability

Location

Sandia National Laboratories Solar
Thermal Test Facility

High-temperature materials testing
and aerodynamic heating simulation

Albuquerque, NM

Sandia National Laboratories
Hypersonic Wind Tunnel

18-inch Mach 5, 8, and 14

Albuquerque, NM

Source: (U//FOUO) Paul F. Piscopo et al.

Table A-6. Industry/Academic Research-Related Facilities
Facility
CUBRC Large Energy National
Shock (LENS)-1/-II/-XX Tunnels

Capability

Location

LENS 1: Mach 6-22
LENS II: Mach 2-12
LENS XX: Atmospheric re-entry
simulation

Buffalo, NY

Boeing Polysonic Wind Tunnel

48-inch up to Mach 5

St. Louis, MO

Lockheed Martin High Speed Wind
Tunnel

48-inch Mach .3-5

Dallas, TX

ATK-GASL Test Bay 4

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Boeing/Air Force Office of Scientific
Research Quiet Tunnel at Purdue
University

9.5-inch Mach 6

West Lafayette, IN

University of Notre Dame Quiet
Tunnel

24-inch Mach 6

Notre Dame, IN

Source: (U//FOUO) Paul F. Piscopo et al.

Author Information
Kelley M. Sayler
Analyst in Advanced Technology and Global
Security

Disclaimer
This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS serves as nonpartisan
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under the direction of Congress. Information in a CRS Report should not be relied upon for purposes other
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