Case 3:19-cv-00066-DB Document 127 Filed 09/24/19 Page 1 of 15 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS EL PASO DIVISION EL PASO COUNTY, TEXAS 500 E. San Antonio El Paso, TX 79901 and BORDER NETWORK FOR HUMAN RIGHTS 2115 N. Piedras St El Paso, TX 79930, Plaintiffs, v. DONALD J. TRUMP, in his official capacity as President of the United States of America 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW Washington, D.C. 20500, MARK T. ESPER, in his official capacity as Acting Secretary of Defense 1000 Defense Pentagon Washington, D.C. 20301, KEVIN McALEENAN, in his official capacity as Acting Secretary of Homeland Security 245 Murray Lane, SW, Mail Stop 0485 Washington, DC 20528-0485, TODD T. SEMONITE, in his official capacity as Commanding General United States Army Corps of Engineers 441 G Street, NW Washington, DC 20314-1000, DAVID BERNHARDT, in his official capacity as Acting Secretary of the Interior 1849 C Street, NW Washington, DC 20240, Defendants. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) Civil Action No. 3:19-cv-66-DB SUPPLEMENTAL REPLY BRIEF IN LIGHT OF NOTICE OF DECISION BY THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE TO AUTHORIZE BORDER BARRIER PROJECTS PURSUANT TO 10 U.S.C. § 2808 Case 3:19-cv-00066-DB Document 127 Filed 09/24/19 Page 2 of 15 TABLE OF CONTENTS Page ARGUMENT ................................................................................................................................. 1 I. DOD’S RECENT ACTIONS CONFIRM PLAINTIFFS’ ARTICLE III STANDING TO CHALLENGE THE PROCLAMATION AND DOD’S § 2808 SPENDING ................................................................................................ 1 II. PLAINTIFFS HAVE A CAUSE OF ACTION TO ENJOIN § 2808 CONSTRUCTION ................................................................................................. 4 III. DEFENDANTS’ § 2808 SPENDING IS UNLAWFUL ....................................... 6 IV. AN INJUNCTION OF § 2808 CONSTRUCTION IS WARRANTED ................ 7 CONCLUSION .............................................................................................................................. 7 i Case 3:19-cv-00066-DB Document 127 Filed 09/24/19 Page 3 of 15 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Page(s) Cases Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico, ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S. 592 (1982) .................................................................................................................... 3 Armstrong v. Exceptional Child Ctr., 135 S. Ct. 1378 (2015) ............................................................................................................ 4, 5 Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154 (1997) .................................................................................................................... 6 Chiles v. Thornburgh, 865 F.2d 1197 (11th Cir. 1989) .................................................................................................. 1 City of Hartford v. Towns of Glastonbury, 561 F.2d 1032 (2d Cir. 1976) ..................................................................................................... 1 City of Oakland v. Lynch, 798 F.3d 1159 (9th Cir. 2015) .................................................................................................... 1 City of Olmsted Falls v. FAA, 292 F.3d 261 (D.C. Cir. 2002) ................................................................................................ 1, 3 City of Sausalito v. O’Neill, 386 F.3d 1186 (9th Cir. 2004) ................................................................................................ 1, 2 Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998) .................................................................................................................... 1 Cooper v. Tex. Alcoholic Beverage Comm’n, 820 F.3d 730 (5th Cir. 2016) ...................................................................................................... 2 Dalton v. Specter, 511 U.S. 462 (1994) .................................................................................................................... 5 Dep’t of Commerce v. New York, 139 S. Ct. 2551 (2019) ................................................................................................................ 1 Gladstone Realtors v. Vill. of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91 (1979) ...................................................................................................................... 1 Iowa ex rel. Miller v. Block, 771 F.2d 347 (8th Cir. 1985) ...................................................................................................... 2 Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007) .................................................................................................................... 3 ii Case 3:19-cv-00066-DB Document 127 Filed 09/24/19 Page 4 of 15 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES (Continued) Page(s) Match-E-Be-Nash-She-Wish Band of Pottawatomi Indians v. Patchak, 567 U.S. 209 (2012) .................................................................................................................... 6 Ne. Fla. Chapter of Associated Gen. Contractors of Am. v. City of Jacksonville, 508 U.S. 656 (1993) .................................................................................................................... 4 Pennsylvania v. Kleppe, 533 F.2d 668 (D.C. Cir. 1976) .................................................................................................... 2 Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) .................................................................................................................... 4 Teton Historic Aviation Found. v. DOD, 785 F.3d 719 (D.C. Cir. 2015) .................................................................................................... 4 Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134 (5th Cir. 2015) .................................................................................................. 1, 7 Trump v. Sierra Club, 2019 WL 3369425 (U.S. July 26, 2019) ..................................................................................... 5 Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Devel. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977) .................................................................................................................... 4 Weyerhauser Co. v. FWS, 139 S. Ct. 361 (2018) .................................................................................................................. 5 Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 502 U.S. 437 (1992) .................................................................................................................... 2 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952) .................................................................................................................... 5 Statutes 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) ............................................................................................................................ 4 10 U.S.C. § 2801(c)(4).................................................................................................................... 7 10 U.S.C. § 2808 ............................................................................................................................. 6 Consolidated Appropriations Act, § 739 ........................................................................................ 5 Other Authorities Hart & Wechsler, The Federal Courts and the Federal System 284 (7th ed. 2015) ....................... 3 iii Case 3:19-cv-00066-DB Document 127 Filed 09/24/19 Page 5 of 15 ARGUMENT I. DOD’S RECENT ACTIONS CONFIRM PLAINTIFFS’ ARTICLE III STANDING TO CHALLENGE THE PROCLAMATION AND DOD’S § 2808 SPENDING A city or county has standing to sue where it shows a “harm to its own economic interests.” 1 City of Olmsted Falls v. FAA, 292 F.3d 261, 268 (D.C. Cir. 2002). 2 Such harm can include the city or county’s lost opportunity for an economic “benefit.” Clinton v. City of N.Y., 524 U.S. 417, 431 (1998). 3 In City of Sausalito v. O’Neill, 386 F.3d 1186 (9th Cir. 2004), for instance, Sausalito sued to enjoin the government from redeveloping a “former military base near Sausalito.” Id. at 1194. The court held that the city had Article III standing, because the development project “would result in a detrimental increase in traffic and crowds in downtown Sausalito,” and cause “aesthetic damage [that] will erode its tax revenue.” Id. at 1198-99; see City of Olmsted Falls, 292 F.3d at 268 (city sufficiently “alleged harm to its own economic interests based on the environmental impacts of the approved project”). El Paso County has standing under the foregoing principles. First, it has lost the economic benefit of an expected $20 million construction project at Fort Bliss, the “lifeblood of the El Paso economy.” ECF No. 55-26, ¶ 15; Pls. Supp. Br. 3; Govt. Supp. Br. 4 (admitting that the Fort Bliss 1 Because Defendants make no new arguments concerning Border Network For Human Rights’ standing, Govt. Supp. Br. 7, or El Paso County’s standing based on reputational injury, Plaintiffs rest on their previous submissions on those issues. Pls. Opening Br. 11-13, 16-19. 2 See Gladstone Realtors v. Vill. of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 110-11 (1979) (“A significant reduction in property values directly injures a municipality by diminishing its tax base”); City of Oakland v. Lynch, 798 F.3d 1159, 1164 (9th Cir. 2015) (“Oakland’s expected loss of tax revenue satisfies the requirements of Article III.”); Chiles v. Thornburgh, 865 F.2d 1197, 1209 (11th Cir. 1989) (“There can be no doubt that Dade County has standing” based on “economic detriment”); cf. Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134, 152 (5th Cir. 2015) (states had standing to challenge rule that had “a major effect on the states’ fiscs”). 3 See City of Hartford v. Towns of Glastonbury, 561 F.2d 1032, 1037-38 (2d Cir. 1976) (city had standing to challenge agency’s allocation of funds that city was eligible to receive); cf. Dep’t of Commerce v. New York, 139 S. Ct. 2551, 2565 (2019) (state had standing where it could “lose out on federal funds”). 1 Case 3:19-cv-00066-DB Document 127 Filed 09/24/19 Page 6 of 15 project has been “deferred”). Under “basic law[s] of economics,” Cooper v. Tex. Alcoholic Beverage Comm’n, 820 F.3d 730, 738 (5th Cir. 2016), that project would have created jobs, fostered growth, and boosted “tax revenue,” City of Sausalito, 386 F.3d at 1198-99; see Pls. Supp. Br. 4. Second, El Paso County will experience increased traffic and congestion due to wall construction in the County’s nearby vicinity. Pls. Opening Br. 14; ECF No. 55-26, ¶ 17-18. That construction will undermine the County’s “regional economy,” ECF No. 55-25, ¶ 13, and “ability to compete for business investment and tourism,” ECF No. 55-26, ¶ 18—precisely the sort of economic injuries that courts found sufficient in City of Sausalito and City of Olmsted Falls. Citing Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 502 U.S. 437 (1992), Defendants contend that the County must show “a direct injury in the form of a loss of specific tax revenues.” 502 U.S. at 448. But Wyoming held that loss of specific tax revenues was sufficient to show economic injury—not that it was always necessary. Id. Numerous circuit-level decisions postdating Wyoming have upheld municipal standing even absent proof of specific lost tax revenues. See supra at 1 & n.1. And the two cases Defendants cite to suggest that the County’s economic harm is a mere “generalized grievance” involved alleged injuries far more diffuse and attenuated than the County’s injury here, which flows from the loss of a specific $20 million project in the County, and specific wall construction in the County’s vicinity. Iowa ex rel. Miller v. Block, 771 F.2d 347, 353 (8th Cir. 1985) (state alleged that “but for the Secretary’s implementation of [certain] disaster relief programs, agricultural production will suffer, which will dislocate agriculturally-based industries, forcing unemployment up and state tax revenues down”); Pennsylvania v. Kleppe, 533 F.2d 668, 671-72 & n.14 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (state alleged in “sketchy and uncertain” terms that without federal assistance in rebuilding hurricane-damaged businesses, the state would lose “tax revenues”). 2 Case 3:19-cv-00066-DB Document 127 Filed 09/24/19 Page 7 of 15 Defendants also mischaracterize Plaintiffs’ argument as “a parens patriae claim on behalf of residents potentially impacted by the deferral of funding from Fort Bliss.” Govt. Supp. Br. 6. But this is not a parens patriae case where a public entity asserts “[q]uasi-sovereign interests . . . in the well-being of its populace.” Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico, ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S. 592, 602 (1982). El Paso is instead asserting its own proprietary interests—namely, budgetary harm because of lost tax, tourism, and commercial-development dollars. See City of Olmsted Falls, 292 F.3d at 268 (distinguishing claims “alleg[ing] harm to [the city’s] own economic interests” from parens patriae claims). Even if the County’s claim were viewed under the parens patriae lens, moreover, it could still proceed. Defendants do not dispute that a county may assert a parens patriae claim to vindicate the “economic . . . well-being” of “its residents in general.” Snapp, 458 U.S. at 607. Rather, they argue only that parens patriae claims are never “permitted against the federal government.” Govt. Supp. Br. 6. But while a state or county is arguably forbidden from suing the federal government parens patriae to “protect [its] citizens [against] the operation of federal statutes,” nothing forbids it from suing to “assert its rights under federal law.” Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 520 n.17 (2007); Hart & Wechsler, The Federal Courts and the Federal System 284 (7th ed. 2015) (Massachusetts “recognized a state’s standing to sue to require the federal government to comply with a federal statute”). At the very least, then, the County’s National Emergencies Act (NEA) and Administrative Procedure Act (APA) claims are cognizable, because they assert the County’s “rights under th[ose] Act[s].” Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 520 n.17. Finally, Defendants argue that the County cannot show traceability or redressability, because even if DOD were enjoined “from expending $20 million on border barrier projects,” “the Court cannot require DOD to spend that discretionary lump-sum appropriation in the County.” 3 Case 3:19-cv-00066-DB Document 127 Filed 09/24/19 Page 8 of 15 Govt. Supp. Br. 7. But where a plaintiff’s injury is its lost opportunity to “obtain a benefit,” the plaintiff need not show “that he [will] obtain the benefit” if the court rules in its favor. Ne. Fla. Chapter of Associated Gen. Contractors of Am. v. City of Jacksonville, 508 U.S. 656, 666 (1993). 4 Said otherwise, “Article III does not demand a demonstration that victory in court will without doubt cure the identified injury.” Teton Historic Aviation Found. v. DOD, 785 F.3d 719, 727 (D.C. Cir. 2015). The plaintiff must only show that its injury is “likely to be redressed by a favorable decision.” Vill. of Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 262. Here, enjoining § 2808 wall construction would restore the County’s opportunity to benefit from the planned project at Fort Bliss. And it is likely that DOD will readopt that project. After all, the merits of the Fort Bliss project have not changed; its cancellation stemmed solely from the President’s desire to use that money for a wall. II. PLAINTIFFS HAVE A CAUSE OF ACTION TO ENJOIN § 2808 CONSTRUCTION Plaintiffs have two independent causes of action to enjoin Defendants from spending § 2808 funds on a border wall. Pls. Supp. Br. 6-7. First is the equitable right to “sue to enjoin unconstitutional actions by . . . federal officers.” Armstrong v. Exceptional Child Ctr., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1378, 1384 (2015). Second is the APA. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2). As to Plaintiffs’ equitable right of action, Defendants contend that “Plaintiffs identify no history or tradition where courts of equity have entertained lawsuits to enforce purported violations of the Appropriations Clause that allegedly cause indirect harm to a local economy.” Govt. Supp. Br. 8. But Defendants define the relevant historical tradition at an absurdly narrow level of 4 See Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 281 n.14 (1978) (where injury stemmed from inability “to compete” for admission, plaintiff had standing even without proof “that he would have been admitted in the absence” of the challenged action); Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 261-62 (1977) (where injury stemmed from a “barrier to constructing [certain] housing,” plaintiff had standing to challenge barrier even though “[a]n injunction would not, of course, guarantee that [plaintiff’s project] will be built”). 4 Case 3:19-cv-00066-DB Document 127 Filed 09/24/19 Page 9 of 15 generality. In Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952), for instance, the Court did not ask whether there was a tradition of suits to enforce violations of the President’s war powers that cause harm to steel-mill owners. Rather, the Court has simply looked to the “long history of judicial review of illegal executive action, tracing back to England,” Armstrong, 135 S. Ct. at 1384; where, as here, a plaintiff seeks to enjoin illegal executive acts, he has a cause of action to do so. Defendants also accuse Plaintiffs of “recast[ing]” statutory claims as constitutional ones, in violation of Dalton v. Specter, 511 U.S. 462 (1994). Govt. Supp. Br. 8. But Dalton held only that “all executive actions in excess of statutory authority” were not “ipso facto unconstitutional,” 511 U.S. at 472 (emphasis added), not that an executive action that flouts a statute could never flout the Constitution. Pls. Reply Br. 53-55. Defendants lastly point to the Supreme Court’s stay in Trump v. Sierra Club, 2019 WL 3369425 (U.S. July 26, 2019), but as explained at oral argument, myriad factors distinguish this case from that one, see Oral Arg. Tr. 60-63. As to Plaintiffs’ APA cause of action, Defendants now concede that there is “final agency action.” Govt. Supp. Br. 8. They maintain, however, that DOD’s “decision to authorize” § 2808 projects is “committed to agency discretion by law.” Id. As already explained, Pls. Reply Br. 5758, that “quite narrow[]” exception to APA review does not apply here, Weyerhaeuser Co. v. FWS, 139 S. Ct. 361, 370 (2018)—most obviously because DOD has absolutely no discretion to ignore the Consolidated Appropriations Act’s (CAA) prohibition on border-wall expenditures beyond the $1.375 billion allocated in the CAA itself. See CAA, § 739 (“None of the funds made available in this or any other appropriations Act may be used to increase . . . funding for a . . . project . . . as proposed in the President’s budget request”). Defendants also invoke the “zone of interests” test, Govt. Supp. Br. 8, but that test does not apply where, as here, the government raises a statute as a defense to a constitutional claim. Pls. 5 Case 3:19-cv-00066-DB Document 127 Filed 09/24/19 Page 10 of 15 Supp. Br. 9. Yet even if that test did apply, Plaintiffs would satisfy it. Id. at 9-10. Defendants now insist that the zone of interests test applies “by reference to the particular provision of law upon which the plaintiff relies.” Govt. Supp. Br. 9 (quoting Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 17576 (1997)). But Plaintiffs rely on the CAA and the Appropriations Clause, and Defendants have never argued that Plaintiffs fall outside the CAA’s zone of interests (thereby forfeiting such an argument), and have never explained why a plaintiff that loses the economic benefit of congressionally appropriated funds ($20 million toward Fort Bliss) would not fall within the Appropriations Clause’s zone of interests. Pls. Supp. Br. 9. Defendants’ observation that “Congress did not intend” § 2808 “to protect local governments,” Govt. Supp. Br. 9, is beside the point, because in applying the zone of interests test, the Supreme Court “do[es] not require any indication of congressional purpose to benefit the would-be plaintiff,” Match-E-Be-Nash-SheWish Band of Pottawatomi Indians v. Patchak, 567 U.S. 209, 225 (2012). III. DEFENDANTS’ § 2808 SPENDING IS UNLAWFUL Defendants spill much ink arguing that their § 2808 border wall expenditures comply with that provision. Govt. Supp. Br. 10-14. Even if so, it would not matter for two reasons. First, the Appropriations Clause bars Defendants from spending more than the $1.375 billion allocated in the CAA on the border wall—whether under § 284 or § 2808—because Congress’s appropriation of that amount for the wall impliedly precludes additional spending. Pls. Opening Br. 33-36. And to erase any doubt, Congress passed § 739, which expressly bars such spending. CAA, § 739. Second, the President’s Proclamation—which is a precondition for the exercise of § 2808 authority—exceeds his power under the NEA. Pls. Opening Br. 19-26. Even if this Court were to reach Defendants’ § 2808 arguments, it should reject them for the two reasons Plaintiffs have already provided. First, § 2808 states that the alleged “national emergency” must “require[] use of the armed forces.” 10 U.S.C. § 2808. According to the 6 Case 3:19-cv-00066-DB Document 127 Filed 09/24/19 Page 11 of 15 Proclamation, the alleged national emergency is “the problem of large-scale unlawful migration,” which supposedly necessitates a border wall. ECF No. 55-14. But the “armed forces” are not “require[d]” to stop unlawful immigration and build a border wall. Those are classic law enforcement—not military—activities. Pls. Opening Br. 37-38. Second, § 2808 only authorizes “military construction projects,” which are construction projects carried out with respect to “a base, camp, post, station, yard, center or other activity under the jurisdiction of the Secretary of a military department.” 10 U.S.C. § 2801(c)(4). DOD has crafted an elaborate plan involving land transfer and eminent domain to sweep much of the border under its administrative jurisdiction. See Govt. Supp. Br. 11-13. But that does not make the border “a base, camp, post, station, yard, center, or other activity.” 10 U.S.C. § 2801(c)(4); see Pls. Opening Br. 38-40. Neither Defendants’ supplemental brief nor the administrative record explains how it could. IV. AN INJUNCTION OF § 2808 CONSTRUCTION IS WARRANTED If this Court agrees that § 2808 construction is unlawful, it should enjoin DOD from carrying it out. Defendants have no legitimate interest in spending funds that Congress withheld, whereas Plaintiffs are suffering ongoing financial, reputational, and organizational injury because of Defendants’ actions. The injunction should bar all border wall construction, not just DOD’s use of “the $20 million associated with the project at Fort Bliss.” Govt. Supp. Br. 15. For instance, if the Court holds that the Appropriations Clause bars Defendants from spending over $1.375 billion on a wall, then it follows that no wall construction under §§ 2808 or 284 can proceed. Defendants’ restrictive view of this Court’s equitable power ignores Fifth Circuit precedent upholding nationwide injunctions in the immigration realm. See Texas, 809 F.3d at 187-88. CONCLUSION Plaintiffs’ summary-judgment motion and a permanent injunction should be granted. Alternatively, Plaintiffs should be granted a preliminary injunction. 7 Case 3:19-cv-00066-DB Document 127 Filed 09/24/19 Page 12 of 15 Dated: September 24, 2019 Respectfully submitted, /s/ Anton Metlitsky Anton Metlitsky (Pro hac vice) O’MELVENY & MYERS LLP Seven Times Square New York, NY 10036 (212) 326-2000 ametlitsky@omm.com Ephraim McDowell (Pro hac vice) O’MELVENY & MYERS LLP 1625 Eye Street NW Washington, DC 20006 (202) 383-5300 emcdowell@omm.com Kristy Parker (Pro hac vice) Justin Florence (Pro hac vice) Erica Newland (Pro hac vice) THE PROTECT DEMOCRACY PROJECT, INC. 2020 Pennsylvania Avenue., NW, #163 Washington, DC 20006 Telephone: (202) 579-4582 Facsimile: (929) 777-8428 justin.florence@protectdemocracy.org kristy.parker@protectdemocracy.org erica.newland@protectdemocracy.org Deana K. El-Mallawany (Pro hac vice) THE PROTECT DEMOCRACY PROJECT, INC. 125 Walnut Street, Ste. 202 Watertown, MA 02472 Telephone: (202) 579-4582 Facsimile: (929) 777-8428 deana.elmallawany@protectdemocracy.org Stephanie Llanes (Pro hac vice) THE PROTECT DEMOCRACY PROJECT, INC. 222 Broadway, 19th Floor New York, NY 10038 Telephone: (202) 579-4582 Facsimile: (929) 777-8428 8 Case 3:19-cv-00066-DB Document 127 Filed 09/24/19 Page 13 of 15 stephanie.llanes@protectdemocracy.org David Bookbinder (Pro hac vice) NISKANEN CENTER 820 First Street, NE Washington, DC 20002 Telephone: (301) 751-0611 dbookbinder@niskanencenter.org Richard Mancino (Pro hac vice) Shaimaa M. Hussein (Pro hac vice) Samantha G. Prince (Pro hac vice) WILLKIE FARR & GALLAGHER LLP 787 Seventh Avenue New York, NY 10019 Telephone: (212) 728-8000 Facsimile: (212) 728-8111 RMancino@willkie.com SHussein@willkie.com MDollan willkie.com SPrince@willkie.com Stuart Gerson (Pro hac vice) EPSTEIN BECKER GREEN 1227 25th Street, NW Washington, DC 20037 Telephone: (202) 861-4180 Email: SGerson@ebglaw.com Laurence H. Tribe (Pro hac vice) Carl M. Loeb University Professor and Professor of Constitutional Law HARVARD LAW SCHOOL* 1575 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02138 Telephone: (617) 495-1767 Email: tribe@law.harvard.edu *Affiliation noted for identification purposes only John C. Padalino (Texas State Bar No. 24041638) 401 Congress Avenue, Suite 1540 Austin, Texas 78701 Telephone: (512) 596-2944 9 Case 3:19-cv-00066-DB Document 127 Filed 09/24/19 Page 14 of 15 Facsimile: (512) 596-2944 john@padalinolaw.com Counsel for Plaintiffs 10 Case 3:19-cv-00066-DB Document 127 Filed 09/24/19 Page 15 of 15 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that on this same date, I electronically filed the foregoing document with the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Texas by using the CM/ECF system, which will send notifications of such filing to all CM/ECF counsel of record. Dated: September 24, 2019 /s/ Anton Metlitsky Anton Metlitsky (Pro hac vice) O’MELVENY & MYERS LLP Seven Times Square New York, NY 10036 Telephone: (212) 326-2000 ametlitsky@omm.com 11