From: Commanding General, III Marine Expeditionary Force  
To: File  

Subj: COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE AVIATION MISHAP OF AN F/A-18D FROM MARINE ALL WEATHER FIGHTER ATTACK SQUADRON 242 AND A KC-130J FROM MARINE AERIAL REFUELER TRANSPORT SQUADRON 152 ON 6 DECEMBER 2018 OFF THE COAST OF JAPAN

1. I have reviewed this investigation and determined it is in substantial compliance with reference (a). No further investigation is warranted. This investigation is closed.

2. On behalf of all the Marines and Sailors of III Marine Expeditionary Force, I want to express my deepest sympathies and heartfelt condolences to the families, friends, and colleagues of

3. The Investigating Officer's findings of fact, opinions, and recommendations, as modified by the Commanding General, 1st Marine Aircraft Wing in his endorsement, are approved with the following comments:

   a. The multiple, compounding latent and active failures which resulted in this tragic mishap have been brought to light by this investigation and subsequent endorsement. We must all learn from these failures and not repeat them.

   b. Organizational and resource management decisions by senior leaders of Marine Aircraft Group 12, 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, III Marine Expeditionary Force, and the United States Marine Corps contributed indirectly to this mishap. Marine All Weather Fighter Attack Squadron 242 was forward deployed, fulfilling responsibilities to our Nation's security and obligations to regional stability. However, a chronic history of unconstrained tasking and underresourcing created a culture of complacency within this squadron towards Marine Corps high standards of leadership, professional conduct, and institutional performance. As Marines, we pride ourselves on a “can do” attitude. However, this mishap highlights the significant and insidious risk to safe operations and warfighting proficiency introduced when discipline erodes and expectations of excellence are compromised on the premise of “can do.”

   c. In accomplishing its mission in the dynamic Indo-Pacific area of operations, 1st Marine Aircraft Wing faces significant challenges in manning, maintaining, and training its squadrons. As a Marine Corps, we must do better to ensure every forward-deployed squadron is at the
highest level of combat readiness, with highly trained crews prepared for the trials of conflict and war. I have directed the Commanding General, 1st Marine Aircraft Wing to thoroughly assess his risks to mission and Marines, and to make recommendations aimed at significantly improving safety and performance throughout 1st Marine Aircraft Wing.

4. I want to thank the many people and organizations—friends and allies—who selflessly searched, saved, and recovered our Marines. We owe them a great debt.

5. I specifically concur that the deaths of [redacted] and [redacted] occurred in the line of duty, not due to their own misconduct.

6. The point of contact regarding this investigation is the III Marine Expeditionary Force office of the Staff Judge Advocate at DSN [redacted].

Copy to:
DCA
COMMARFORPAC
CG, 1st MAW
FIRST ENDORSEMENT on Itr 5830 of 24 Jun 19

From: Commanding General, 1st Marine Aircraft Wing
To: Commanding General, III Marine Expeditionary Force

Subj: COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE AVIATION MISHAP OF A F/A-18D FROM MARINE ALL WEATHER FIGHTER ATTACK SQUADRON 242 AND A KC-130J FROM MARINE AERIAL REFUELER TRANSPORT SQUADRON 152 ON 6 DECEMBER 2018 OFF THE COAST OF JAPAN

1. Readdressed and forwarded.

2. First and foremost, we mourn the tragic loss of our Marines. On behalf of the Marines and Sailors of the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing (1st MAW), I wish to express my deepest sympathy and sincere condolences to the families, friends, and loved ones of (b) (3) (A), (b) (6) and (b) (3) (A), (b) (6) and (b) (3) (A), (b) (6) and (b) (3) (A), (b) (6) and (b) (6), (b) (3) (A).

3. In December 2018, the 1st MAW’s Marine Aircraft Group 12, stationed at Iwakuni, Japan, was conducting Unit Level Training. This training was essential for the unit to maintain readiness within the Indo-Pacific area of operations. In the early morning hours of 6 December 2018, off the coast of Japan, two USMC F/A-18D Hornet fighter jets assigned to Marine All Weather Fighter Attack Squadron 242 (VMFA(AW)-242) were conducting low light level (LLL) Night Systems Air-to-Air Refueling (NSAAR) with a USMC KC-130J Hercules cargo plane assigned to Marine Aerial Refueler Transport Squadron 152 (VMGR-152). Proper execution of this mission required a detailed plan and technically proficient aircrews.

4. The KC-130J Hercules, call sign Sumo 41, was piloted by (b) (3) (A), (b) (6) and assisted by weapons system officer (WSO) (b) (3) (A), (b) (6) and USMC. The pilots were assisted by flight crewmen and (b) (3) (A), (b) (6). One F/A-18D Hornet, call sign Profane 12, was piloted by (b) (3) (A), (b) (6) and assisted by (b) (3) (A), (b) (6) and (b) (3) (A), (b) (6) and (b) (3) (A), (b) (6) and USMC. The other F/A-18D Hornet, call sign Profane 11, was piloted by (b) (3) (A), (b) (6) and assisted by WSO (b) (3) (A), (b) (6) and USMC.

5. At approximately 0130 on 6 December 2018, while flying at an altitude of 15,000 feet, Profane 11 and Profane 12 attached to Sumo 41 for aerial refueling. Profane 11 completed refueling and detached echelon right and was flying on the right side of Sumo 41. After Profane 12 completed refueling, its pilot was directed to detach to the left echelon of Sumo 41, which is a nonstandard position. The pilot of Profane 12 was inexperienced at flying in nighttime LLL conditions and had not previously been briefed that he would assume this nonstandard position.
Subj: COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE AVIATION MISHAP OF A F/A-18D FROM MARINE ALL WEATHER FIGHTER ATTACK SQUADRON 242 AND A KC-130J FROM MARINE AERIAL REFUELER TRANSPORT SQUADRON 152 ON 6 DECEMBER 2018 OFF THE COAST OF JAPAN

Evidence suggests that he lost situational awareness, crossed over the top of Sumo 41, and collided with the rear of the tanker.

6. Sumo 41 was damaged to the extent that it was no longer capable of flying and crashed into the sea. Despite extensive search and rescue operations, there were no survivors from Sumo 41. The remains of three of the five crew members have been recovered and identified as of the date of this endorsement. Two and were ejected from Profane 12. was rescued by Japanese maritime self-defense forces and survived. His remains were recovered by Japanese maritime self-defense forces. Profane 11 was not involved in the collision and returned safely to Iwakuni after reporting the collision. Thirty-one aircraft and eleven surface ships from Japanese maritime self-defense forces actively participated in the search and rescue effort. I am profoundly grateful for the assistance and tireless efforts by those who searched for and recovered our Marines.

7. Maintenance records show that all aircraft involved had been properly maintained and were fully functional before the collision. There is no evidence to suggest any aircraft malfunction.

8. Toxicology reports indicated the presence of a schedule IV hypnotic sedative, Zolpidem, also known by the trade name “Ambien,” in the urine of both and . In addition to Zolpidem, ’s toxicology report indicated the presence of diphenhydramine, commonly found in over-the-counter cold medications, in his urine. This suggests that and were not medically fit for flight duties at the time of the mishap. Neither Marine was authorized to take these medications. The toxicology reports for and did not detect the presence of any prohibited substances in their blood or urine. and were medically fit for flight duties at the time of the mishap.

9. During the course of this investigation, the Investigating Officer found evidence of collateral misconduct by other officers of VMFA(AW)-242. As a result, I directed a separate investigation (enclosed as part of this investigation). The investigation brought to light a command climate of general unprofessionalism and misconduct in VMFA(AW)-242. Examples of such unprofessionalism included prescription and over-the-counter drug abuse, excessive alcohol consumption, adultery, orders violations, and failures in following fundamental principles of professional aviation training and operations.

10. Information gathered during the investigations led me to lose trust and confidence in the leadership of VMFA(AW)-242. I relieved the Commanding Officer, the Executive Officer, the Operations Officer, and the Aviation Safety Officer of VMFA(AW)-242.

11. During the course of this investigation, I also learned that the 6 December 2018 mishap was the second mid-air collision in recent years between aircraft in VMFA(AW)-242 and VMGR-152 during LLL NSAAR. Another mid-air collision occurred on 28 April 2016 under very similar circumstances that, in my opinion, was not properly investigated. On 23 January 2019, I
Subj: COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE AVIATION MISHAP OF A F/A-18D FROM MARINE ALL WEATHER FIGHTER ATTACK SQUADRON 242 AND A KC-130J FROM MARINE AERIAL REFUELER TRANSPORT SQUADRON 152 ON 6 DECEMBER 2018 OFF THE COAST OF JAPAN

directed an investigation into the 2016 mishap and the reasons for the failure to complete an administrative investigation. The investigation found that on 28 April 2016 an F/A-18D Hornet impacted and sheared off the refueling hose and drogue of the KC-130J, resulting in minor damage to both aircraft. The report of investigation is enclosed as part of this investigation.

12. I concur with findings of fact, opinions, and recommendations of the Investigating Officer with the exception of recommendation (4). There are insufficient findings to support a showing that the MAG-12 Commanding Officer failed in his duties to effectively lead planning and then fully supervise execution. The sequence of events that led to the fatal aviation mishap resulted from individual decisions and squadron-level procedural failures. Additional planning and supervision by the MAG-12 Commanding Officer would not have been able to prevent the causal factors of the aviation mishap. Also, there is no indication that the MAG-12 Commanding Officer was aware of the significant contributing factors to the aviation mishap, which would have allowed him to take corrective measures to prevent it.

13. I recommend that this investigation be closed.

14. The deaths of ... occurred “in the line of duty and not due to their own misconduct.” The injuries suffered by ... occurred “in the line of duty and not due to his own misconduct.” This investigation will be forwarded to their commanding officers to make appropriate entries in their medical and service records.

15. The findings contained within this investigation show the inherent dangers of conducting naval aviation operations, especially those in low light conditions. They reconfirm our need to constantly evaluate risks, identify unsafe conditions, and ensure established internal controls safeguarding operations are being followed in order to safely execute aviation missions.

T. D. WEIDLEY

Copy to:
CG, III MEF
CO, MAG-12
File
United States Marine Corps
1st Marine Aircraft Wing
Unit 37101
FPO AP 96373-7101

In reply refer to:
5830
IO
24 Jun 19

From: [redacted] USMC
To: Commanding General, 1st Marine Aircraft Wing

Subj: Command Investigation into the Facts and Circumstances Surrounding the Aviation Mishap of a F/A-18D from Marine All Weather Fighter Attack Squadron 242 and a KC-130J from Marine Aerial Refueler Transport Squadron 152 on 6 December 2018 Off the Coast of Japan

Ref: (a) JAGINST 5800.7F (JAGMAN)
(b) 10 U.S.C. 2255
(c) CNAF M-3710.7 of 5 May 2016
(d) WgO 3700.1D (1st MAW SOP for Air Operations) (2015)
(e) SECNAVINST 5100.10K
(f) MCO 5100.29B
(g) DCA WHITE LETTER 2-16
(h) CMC WHITE LETTER 3-16
(i) MCO 3500.27C
(j) NAVMC 3500.14D
(k) NAVMC 3500.50C
(l) F/A-18 ADMIN SOP (Revision 5 of September 2018)
(m) ATP-3.3.4.2 ATP-56 Edition C Version 1 November 2013
(n) ATP-3.3.4.2 US Standards Related Document (SRD)
(o) Air Force Instruction (AIF) 11-2F-16V3 13 July 2016
(p) CSFWPACINST 3500.9G/CSFWLANINST 3500.4G 26 October 2015
(q) OPNAVINST 3750.6S
(r) Drugs.com website accessed 24 May 2019 “Drug interactions between Ambien and Benadryl”

Encl: (1) CG ltr 5830/CG of 10 December 2018
(2) April 2016 Incident Report
(3) [redacted] Aircrew Logbook
(4) [redacted] Flight Equipment Logbook
(5) [redacted] Fleet Replacement Squadron (FRS) Completion Letter of 25 April 2017
(6) [redacted] Syllabus Gradesheet Report
(7) [redacted] Flight Qualifications and Designations of 25 May 2018
(8) [redacted] Replacement Pilot (RP) Performance Review Board (PRB) Report endorsed 3 February 2017
(9) [redacted] Tanking Syllabus Gradesheet Report
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(10) Event Proficiency Night Systems Air-to-Air Refueling (NSAAR) 2202
(11) Autopsy Report of 13 February 2019
(12) Casualty Status Report of 7 February 2019
(13) Toxicology Report of 13 February 2019
(14) Prescription Record
(15) Toxicology Report of 4 January 2019
(16) Outpatient notes of 8 July 2018
(17) Outpatient notes of 5 October 2018
(18) Prescription Record
(19) Smart Watch Data
(20) M.D. Statement of 22 February 2019
(21) VMFA(AW)-242 Flight Schedule and Assorted Training Records
(22) VMFA(AW)-242 Policy Letters
(23) VMFA(AW)-242 WhatsApp Company Grade Officer Chat Group Participants and Conversations
(24) MSCO Naval Flight Record (NAVFLIR) 22 July 2018
(25) VMFA(AW)-242 Flight Hours Per Month Chart
(26) VMFA(AW)-242 Crew Event Proficiency – Pilots Chart
(27) VMFA(AW)-242 Crew Event Proficiency AAR Chart
(28) VMFA(AW)-242 Hotboard of 13 December 2018
(29) VMFA(AW)-242 Flight Schedules from 2-5 December 2018
(30) VMFA(AW)-242 Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) of 1 May 2018
(31) DCA Itr 3500/ASM-32 of 21 February 2017
(33) Disaster Relief Operations from Japanese Ministry of Defense of 11 December 2018 (Japanese)
(34) Disaster Relief Operations from Japanese Ministry of Defense of 11 December 2018 (English)
(37) Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIRSYSCOM) Memo of 30 May 2014
(38) DFIRS Animation of Profâncé 12 on 6 December 2018
(39) Watch Photo
(40) April 2016 AAR Mishap Photo
(41) Japanese Ship Setoyuki Photo
(42) NVCD photo
(43) Inflight cell phone video of NSAAR Formation of October 2016
(44) MSCO Self-Photo
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(45) VMFA(AW)-242 CO Formation Photo 1
(46) VMFA(AW)-242 CO Formation Photo 2
(47) (b) (3) (A), Self-Photo
(48) (b) (3) (A), (b) Self-Photo
(49) (b) (3) (A), (b) Self-Photo 1
(50) (b) (3) (A), Self-Photo 2
(51) (b) (3) (A), Interview of 25 January 2019
(52) (b) (3) (A), Interview of 13 December 2018
(53) (b) (3) (A), Interview of 13 December 2018
(54) (b) (6), Interview of 13 December 2018
(55) (b) (3) (A), Interview of 25 January 2019
(56) (b) (3) (A), Statement
(57) VMFA(AW)-242 WhatsApp Company Grade Officer Chat Group Participants and Conversations
(58) (b) (3) (A), (b) M.D. Statement of 1 March 2019
(59) Light Level Planning Calendar RAAF Tindall, Australia, of 7 July 2017
(60) (b) (3) (A), (b) Statement of 9 March 2019
(61) (b) (3) (A), (b) Email to (b) (3) (A). of 5 February 2019
(62) (b) (3) (A), Interview of 25 January 2019
(63) Urban Dictionary Definition
(64) Urban Dictionary Definition
(65) (b) (3) (A), Interview of 24 January 2019
(66) Oxford English Dictionary Definition
(67) F/A-18D 165416 XRAY
(68) KC-130J 167981 XRAY
(69) (b) (3) (A), (b) M.D., Statement of 6 March 2019
(70) CG 1st MAW Jr 3130/G3 of 17 Nov 00
(71) Screen shot of text with Flight Surgeon, 30 November 2018
(72) VMGR-152 Flight Schedule, Risk Worksheet and Tanker Card for 5 December 2018
(73) VMFA(AW)-225 Flight Schedules
(74) VMFA(AW)-242 Flight Schedules
(75) VMFA(AW)-242 Hotboard of 28 January 2019
(76) Operations Duty Officer Chronology Log of 6 December 2018
(77) DD Form 175-1 of 5 December 2018
(78) JAGMAN Investigation Witness Interview Schedule
(79) (b) (3) (A), (b) and (b) signed privacy act statements of 13 December 2018
(80) (b) (3) (A), (b) and (b)’s drawings from interviews of 13 December 2018
(81) (b) (3) (A), (b)’s Flight Qualifications and Designations letters of 10 July 2018 and Replacement Pilot Training Report of 13 June 2014

3
Subj: COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE AVIATION MISHAP OF A F/A-18D FROM MARINE ALL WEATHER FIGHTER ATTACK SQUADRON 242 AND A KC-130J FROM MARINE AERIAL REFUELER TRANSPORT SQUADRON 152 ON 6 DECEMBER 2018 OFF THE COAST OF JAPAN

(82) [Secret] (b) (3) (A), (b) (6) (a) TACNAV 150.50B (Aviation Training Records)  
(83) ATIS 4321 NATOPS and Instrument Check Reports  
(84) MAWTS-1 F/A-18 Night Vision Goggles Training and F/A-18 NFM-500 Tanker Checklist  
(85) [Secret] (b) (3) (A), (b) (6) FAA Airman Details Report  
(86) [Secret] Rights Acknowledgment and Statement of 19 February 2019  
(87) [Secret] Chronological Record of Medical Care (b) (3) (A), (b) (6)  
(88) [Secret] FAA Airman Details Report  
(89) [Secret] E-mail to (b) (3) (A), (b) (6) 30 January 2019  
(91) [Secret] PMO Records  
(92) [Secret] NAVFLIR of 6 October 2016  
(93) [Secret] e-mail of 13 March 2019  
(94) Warfighter Culture Brief of 19 December 2018  
(95) Light Level Planning Calendar Kadena, Japan of 27-30 April 2016  
(96) P 191741Z SEP 08 COTF QRA FA-18 JHMCS NVCD  
(97) CNAF 3710 Section 8.3.2.1  
(98) CNAF 3710 Section 3.7.1  
(99) Light Level Planning Calendar Iwakuni, Japan of 6 December 2018  
(100) Sumo 41 wreckage photo (external fuel tank)  
(101) Sumo 41 wreckage photo (propeller blade)  
(102) Excerpts from AFI 11-2F-16V3 of 13 July 2016 and CSFWPACINST 3500.9G of 26 October 2015  
(103) Press Release of 28 February 2019, “500th unit delivery”  
(104) Profane 11 NAVFLIR  
(105) Sumo 41 Naval Aircraft Flight Record  
(106) VMFA(AW)-242 BUNO 165416 NALCOMIS OMA AADB Summary Report of 6 December 2016  
(107) [Secret] statement of 23 January 2019  
(108) VMGR-152 BUNO 167981 NALCOMIS OMA AADB Summary Report  
(109) VMGR-152 BUNO 167981 NALCOMIS OMA AADB Summary Report Part A  
(110) MAG-12 Mishap Debris Recovered Brief  
(111) [Secret] Self-Photo  
(112) VMFAT-101 28 November 2018 Flight Schedule  
(113) VMFA-232 28 November 2018 Flight Schedule  
(114) VMFA-314 28 November 2018 Flight Schedule  
(115) Legal Advisor (LA) extension request 5830/SJA of 5 February 2019  
(116) CG extension approval 5830/CG of 5 February 2019  
(117) [Secret] line of duty determinations 5830/IO of 28 February 2019  
(118) CG line of duty endorsement 5830/CG of 28 February 2019
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(119) Paragraph 1.3.4.1.3. of the Marine Corps Task List (MCTL) 2.0 of 1 September 2018
(120) [____] (3) [___] (A), [___] Aviation Safety Officer Designation Letter of 25 May 2019
(121) Rank MOS Report 7523
(122) Rank MOS Report 7525
(123) III MEF Media Release #18-004 of 11 December 2019
(124) [____] (3) [___] (A), [___] email of 2 April 2019
(125) [____] (3) [___] (A), [___] email of 2 April 2019
(126) [____] (3) [___] (A), [___] email of 2 April 2019
(127) [____] (3) [___] (A), [___] email of 2 April 2019
(128) [____] (3) [___] (A), [___] email of 2 April 2019
(129) [____] (3) [___] (A), [___] Interview of 26 March 2019
(130) [____] (3) [___] (A), [___] Interview of 26 March 2019
(131) [____] (3) [___] (A), [___] Interview of 23 January 2019
(132) [____] (3) [___] (A), [___] Interview of 23 January 2019
(133) [____] (3) [___] (A), [___] Interview of 23 January 2019
(134) [____] (3) [___] (A), [___] Interview of 17 January 2019
(135) [____] (3) [___] (A), [___] Interview of 26 January 2019
(136) [____] (3) [___] (A), [___] Interview of 26 March 2019
(137) [____] (3) [___] (A), [___] Interview of 25 January 2019
(138) [____] (3) [___] (A), [___] Interview of 24 January 2019
(139) [____] (3) [___] (A), [___] Interview of 16 January 2019
(140) [____] (3) [___] (A), [___] Interview of 17 January 2019
(141) [____] (3) [___] (A), [___] Interview of 24 January 2019
(142) [____] (3) [___] (A), [___] Interview of 24 January 2019
(143) Relevant Portions from the Fuku Air Traffic Control Transcription captured on 6 December 2018
(144) LA extension request 5830/SJA and CG approval 5830/CG of 23 April 2019
(145) MAG-31 Risk Management Practices Table
(146) HQMC Safety Division Strategy for Aircrew/Flight Excellence (SAFE) Swiss Cheese model of 24 August 2018
(147) [____] (3) [___] (A), [___] Interview of 24 January 2019
(148) [____] (3) [___] (A), [___] Interview of 23 January 2019
(149) [____] (3) [___] (A), [___] ltr 5830/IO of 6 May 2019
(150) [____] (3) [___] (A), [___] ltr 5830/IO of 12 May 2019
(151) CG ltr 5830/CG of 5 June 2019
(152) IO extension request 5830/SJA of 14 June 2019 and CG approval 5830/CG of 18 June 2019
(153) Sumo 41 Voice Data Recorder Transcription of 6 December 2018
(154) Sumo 41 Audio Recording CVR_H2 and CVR_H4 of 6 December 2018
(155) Select Personnel Casualty Reports of Sumo 41 as of 19 June 2019
(156) Sumo 41 Flight Data Recording of 6 December 2018
Subj: COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE AVIATION MISHAP OF A F/A-18D FROM MARINE ALL WEATHER FIGHTER ATTACK SQUADRON 242 AND A KC-130J FROM MARINE AERIAL REFUELER TRANSPORT SQUADRON 152 ON 6 DECEMBER 2018 OFF THE COAST OF JAPAN

Preliminary Statement

1. This report completes an investigation in accordance with reference (a) and enclosures (1), (115), (116), (144), (151) and (152) to determine the facts and circumstances surrounding the aviation mishap between a F/A-18D and a KC-130J resulting in the death of six Marines and the loss of two aircraft on 6 December 2018 off the coast of mainland Japan.

2. In compliance with reference (a), the Investigating Officer (IO) is not a member of either of the mishap units. In compliance with reference (b), the IO is qualified to conduct this investigation because he is an expert in aviation operations, aerial refueling, risk management, and flight leadership. The IO is an aerial refueling instructor, a former squadron commander, and has flown over 4000 flight hours.

3. Deputy Staff Judge Advocate (SJA), 1st Marine Aircraft Wing (1st MAW), was appointed as the Legal Advisor and provided legal guidance during the course of this investigation. The IO also consulted the 1st MAW SJA, when drafting this report.

4. Three requests for extension were submitted by the investigating officer and approved by the Commanding General, 1st MAW. [Encl. (115-116), (144), (152)]

5. Command Structure: Marine All-Weather Fighter Attack Squadron 242 (VMFA(AW)-242) and Marine Aerial Refueler Transport Squadron 152 (VMGR-152) are subordinate squadrons under Marine Aircraft Group 12 (MAG-12). MAG-12 is one of three MAGs under 1st MAW. VMGR-152, VMFA(AW)-242, and MAG-12 are permanently based at Marine Corps Air Station Iwakuni (MCAS-I) in Iwakuni, Japan.

6. All reasonably available and relevant evidence was collected and reviewed. The Legal Advisor and the IO reported to MCAS-I on 11 December 2018 to begin conducting the investigation. Witnesses provided sworn statements with a court reporter present. Transcripts of the interviews were prepared by certified court reporters from the Legal Services Support Section (LSSS) Pacific, Marine Corps Installations Pacific (MCIPAC). The transcripts are provided as enclosures to this report.

7. The flight data recorder from the F/A-18D was recovered. The retrieved data is contained on a compact disk attached as enclosure (38). The KC-130J cockpit voice data recorder and flight data recorderwas recovered on 15 June 2019. The KC-130J data is included in enclosures (153-154), and (156).

8. All times are listed in Japan Standard Time (JST).

9. The findings of fact (FF) are organized by subject area in the following order:
Subj: COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE AVIATION MISHAP OF A F/A-18D FROM MARINE ALL WEATHER FIGHTER ATTACK SQUADRON 242 AND A KC-130J FROM MARINE AERIAL REFUELER TRANSPORT SQUADRON 152 ON 6 DECEMBER 2018 OFF THE COAST OF JAPAN

A. Identity of the United States Service Members involved in the mishap;
B. Mishap Flight: Execution, Search and Rescue, Scheduling, and Briefing;
C. MP1 Background and Training;
D. MP2 Background and Training;
E. VMFA(AW)-242 Organizational Climate;
G. Night Vision Goggle utilization during nighttime AAR;
H. April 2016 Class C mishap parallels to the December 2018 Class A mishap;
I. Sumo 41 Cockpit Voice Recorder Transcription Excerpts; and
J. Identification of recovered remains.

Executive Summary

1. In the early morning hours of 6 December 2018, two United States Marine Corps (USMC) F/A-18D Hornet fighter jets assigned to VMFA(AW)-242, and one USMC KC-130J Hercules turbo-prop cargo plane assigned to VMGR-152, were conducting low light level (LLL) Night Systems Air-to-Air Refueling (NSAAR) as part of Unit Level Training (ULT) at an altitude of 15,000 feet. At approximately 0145, one of the two F/A-18D Hornets collided with the USMC KC-130J Hercules.

2. The F/A-18D Hornet [bureau number (BUNO) 165416], whose call sign was Profane 12, was piloted by [(b) (3) (A), (b) (6)] USMC, and assisted by weapons system officer (WSO) [(b) (3) (A), (b) (6)] USMC. The KC-130J Hercules (BUNO 167981), whose call sign was Sumo 41, was piloted by [(b) (3) (A), (b) (6)] USMC. The pilots on the KC-130J Hercules were assisted by enlisted flight crewmen [(b) (3) (A), (b) (6)] and [(b) (3) (A), (b) (6)] USMC. The other F/A-18D Hornet, whose call sign was Profane 11, was not involved in the collision. It was piloted by [(b) (3) (A), (b) (6)] USMC, and assisted by WSO [(b) (3) (A), (b) (6)] USMC. Profane 11 was in visual formation during the collision.

3. Evidence suggests that after Profane 12 completed NSAAR and detached from Sumo 41, its pilot likely lost situational awareness and impacted the empennage (rear portion) of Sumo 41.
Subj: COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE AVIATION MISHAP OF A F/A-18D FROM MARINE ALL WEATHER FIGHTER ATTACK SQUADRON 242 AND A KC-130J FROM MARINE AERIAL REFUELER TRANSPORT SQUADRON 152 ON 6 DECEMBER 2018 OFF THE COAST OF JAPAN

The impact damaged both aircraft to such an extent that they were no longer capable of flying. Both pilots in Profane 12 immediately ejected and Profane 12 fell to the sea. The pilot did not survive the mishap and his body was recovered by Japanese authorities. Sumo 41 survived the crash without significant physical injuries. The pilots and crew of Sumo 41 fell to the sea.

5. There is no evidence to suggest that either aircraft experienced any malfunctions prior to the collision. Evidence shows that both aircraft had been properly maintained and were fully functional before the collision.

6. In addition to Zolpidem, the toxicology report also indicated the presence of diphenhydramine, commonly found in over-the-counter cold medications, in his urine. This suggests that and were not medically fit for flight duties at the time of the mishap. and toxicology reports did not detect the presence of any prohibited substances in their blood or urine, and both Marines were fit for flight duties at the time of the mishap.

7. Toxicology reports indicated the presence of a schedule IV hypnotic sedative, Zolpidem, also known by the trade name “Ambien,” in the urine of both and . In addition to Zolpidem, the toxicology report also indicated the presence of diphenhydramine, commonly found in over-the-counter cold medications, in his urine. This suggests that and were not medically fit for flight duties at the time of the mishap.

8. During the course of this investigation, the IO found evidence of collateral misconduct by other officers of VMFA(AW)-242. As a result, the Commanding General (CG) of the 1st MAW directed a separate command investigation. The investigation found a command climate of general unprofessionalism and misconduct pervaded VMFA(AW)-242. Examples of such unprofessionalism by some of the officers of VMFA(AW)-242 include prescription drug and alcohol abuse, conduct unbecoming an officer, sexually explicit call signs, orders violations, and failures in following fundamental principles about professional aviation training and operations. See enclosure (149).

9. The 6 December 2018 mishap is the second mid-air collision between aircraft in VMFA(AW)-242 and VMGR-152 during LLL NSAAR. A similar mid-air collision occurred on 28 April 2016 under very similar circumstances. A command investigation was not initiated following the 2016 mishap. On 23 January 2019, the Commanding General (CG) of 1st MAW directed a command investigation into the April 2016 mishap to determine whether the mishap was reported correctly, and whether any corrective action was taken by the units involved. See enclosure (150).

Findings of Fact

A. Identity of the United States Service Members involved in the mishap
Subj: COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE AVIATION MISHAP OF A F/A-18D FROM MARINE ALL WEATHER FIGHTER ATTACK SQUADRON 242 AND A KC-130J FROM MARINE AERIAL REFUELER TRANSPORT SQUADRON 152 ON 6 DECEMBER 2018 OFF THE COAST OF JAPAN

a. Deceased Personnel from VMGR-152

1. 7557 USMC was the co-pilot for Sumo 41, a KC-130J Hercules (BUNO 167981), assigned to VMGR-152, MAG-12, 1st MAW, died in the line of duty while performing his assigned military duties. [Encl. (68), (72), (117), (118)]

2. 7557 USMC was the Aircraft Commander for Sumo 41, a KC-130J Hercules (BUNO 167981), assigned to VMGR-152, MAG-12, 1st MAW, died in the line of duty while performing his assigned military duties. [Encl. (68), (72), (117), (118)]

3. 6276 USMC was a Crewmaster for Sumo 41, a KC-130J Hercules (BUNO 167981), assigned to VMGR-152, MAG-12, 1st MAW, died in the line of duty while performing his assigned military duties. [Encl. (68), (72), (117), (118)]

4. 6276 USMC was a Crewmaster for Sumo 41, a KC-130J Hercules (BUNO 167981), assigned to VMGR-152, MAG-12, 1st MAW, died in the line of duty while performing his assigned military duties. [Encl. (68), (72), (117), (118)]

b. Command Personnel from VMFA(AW)-242

6. USMC [hereinafter referred to as the “Mishap Squadron Commanding Officer” (MSCO)] was the Commanding Officer of VMFA(AW)-242 at the time of the mishap. [Encl. (51)]

7. USMC [hereinafter referred to as the “Mishap Squadron Executive Officer” (MSXO)] was the Executive Officer of VMFA(AW)-242 at the time of the mishap. [Encl. (136)]

8. USMC [hereinafter referred to as the “Mishap Squadron Operations Officer” (MSOPSO)] was the Operations Officer of VMFA(AW)-242 at the time of the mishap. [Encl. (55)]

9. USMC [hereinafter referred to as the “Mishap Squadron Aviation Safety Officer” (MSASO)] was the Aviation Safety Officer of VMFA(AW)-242 at the time of the mishap. [Encl. (129)]
c. Mishap Aircrews from VMFA(AW)-242

10. **USMC** [hereinafter referred to as “Mishap Pilot One” (MP1)] was serving as the Aircraft Commander of Profane 11. He was the F/A-18D formation leader, and assigned to VMFA(AW)-242 at the time of the mishap. The formation leader is responsible for the safe and orderly conduct of the formation. [Encl. (21), (52), (74), (79)]

11. **USMC** [hereinafter referred to as “Mishap Weapons System Officer One” (MWSO1)] was serving as the Mishap Weapons System Officer of Profane 11 and assigned to VMFA(AW)-242 at the time of the mishap. [Encl. (21), (53), (74), (79)]

12. **7523 USMC** [hereinafter referred to as “Mishap Pilot Two” (MP2)] was the pilot and Aircraft Commander of Profane 12 (BUNO 165416) assigned to VMFA(AW)-242 at the time of the mishap. [Encl. (21), (67), (74), (79)]

13. **USMC** [hereinafter referred to as “Mishap Weapons System Officer Two” (MWSO2)] was serving as the Mishap Weapons System Officer of Profane 12 (BUNO 165416) assigned to VMFA(AW)-242 at the time of the mishap [Encl. (21), (67), (74), (79)]

B. Mishap Flight: Execution, Search and Rescue, Scheduling, and Briefing

a. Execution

14. The Naval Aviation Logistics Command Management Information System (NALCOMIS) Organizational Maintenance Activity (OMA) Automated Aircraft Discrepancy Book (AADB) Summary Report for 165416 (Profane 12) shows that MP2 inspected and accepted the aircraft at 2333 on 5 December 2018. The report shows the aircraft was safe for flight. [Encl. (106)]

15. NALCOMIS OMA AADB Summary Report for BUNO 167981 (Sumo 41) shows that **inspected and accepted the aircraft at 2350 on 5 December 2018. The aircraft was certified as “safe for flight.” [Encl. (108), (109)]

16. At 0001 on 6 December 2018, Profane 11 and Profane 12 started their auxiliary power units (APUs). [Encl. (52)]

17. At approximately 0030, Sumo 41 departed from MCAS-I. [Encl. (105)]

18. Profane 11 and Profane 12 had a scheduled take-off for 0015 on 6 December 2018. [Encl. (29)]

19. At 0051, Profane 11 and Profane 12 took-off from MCAS-I. [Encl. (104)]
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20. At 0059, Profane 11 checked in with Fuko Control\(^1\) passing 13,300 feet for 15,000 feet. [Encl. (143)]

21. At 0102, Profane 11 contacted Fuko Control and was cleared to switch frequency to 300.2. [Encl. (143)]

22. At 0104, Profane 11 contacted Fuko Control level at flight level 27,00 feet (FL270). [Encl. (143)]

23. At 0110, Profane 11 contacted Fuko Control to cancel radar services and request local altimeter setting. [Encl. (143)]

24. Profane 11 contacted Sumo 41 to establish communications and coordinate aerial refueling. Sumo 41 responded. [Encl. (52), (153)]

25. Sumo 41 selected external lights to covert\(^2\) with Profane 11 and Profane 12 about 0.5 mile in trail and joining.\(^3\) [Encl. (52), (153)]

26. The moon was below the horizon between 0100 and 0530, which indicates LLL conditions. [Encl. (99)]

27. MP1, MWSO1, and MWSO2 were wearing ANVS-11 night vision goggles (NVGs). MP1 believes MP2 was also wearing ANVS-11 NVGs. [Encl. (52)]

28. [Redacted]

29. Profane 11 and Profane 12 were operating without external lights on during the aerial refueling. [Encl. (52)]

30. The F/A-18 air-to-air refueling (AAR) probe light is white in color. The probe light is not compatible with NVGs, because it causes the NVGs to be overloaded with light from the probe

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\(^1\) The Fukuoka Area Control Center manages Japan air traffic in the Fukuoka (region of Japan) airspace.

\(^2\) Covert lighting is invisible to the naked eye.

\(^3\) References (m) and (n), referred to collectively at the “ATP-56” go into detail about covert lighting and night vision goggle (NVG) use during night Helicopter Aerial Refueling (HAAR). Night Fixed Wing Air-to-Air Refueling (FWAAR) is conducted with only with overt lighting, or lights visible to the naked eye, by all other nations and services except USMC TACAIR. The selection of covert (infrared) lights by the KC-130 crew during fighter jet refueling operations is a common practice though not codified in governing directives.
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light. The probe light can only be turned off if all external lights are turned off via a master switch. [Encl. (52)]

31. Profane 11 and Profane 12 joined on Sumo 41. [Encl. (53), (153)]

32. VMFA(AW)-242 Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) for flight operations states on page 16: “Once refueling is complete, receivers will normally be cleared to the Echelon Right position. When all receivers are established in Echelon right and cleared to depart, the flight lead will climb and accelerate at a reduced power setting to at least 1,000 feet above the tanker altitude. The flight lead will then initiate a level or climbing maneuver away from the tanker to establish lateral de-confliction.” [Encl. (30)]

33. Profane 11 requested non-standard echelon left formation for Profane 12 after aerial refueling with Sumo 41. [Encl. (52-54), (153)]

34. Sumo 41 granted Profane 11’s request for non-standard echelon left formation for Profane 12 post-AAR. [Encl. (52-54), (153)]

35. Profane 11 received fuel transfer from the right side hose. [Encl. (52-54), (153)]

36. Profane 12 received fuel transfer from the left side hose. [Encl. (52-54), (153)]

37. Profane 11 ceased fuel transfer first and formed up with Sumo 41 in the echelon right position. [Encl. (52-54), (153)]

38. Profane 11 was asked by Sumo 41 to provide their BUNO number, and Profane 11 provided their BUNO number. [Encl. (52-54), (153)]

39. At approximately 0128, Profane 12 started receiving fuel when the aircraft was at 15,000 feet and 245 knots (kts). [Encl. (32)]

40. At approximately 0142, Profane 12 ceased fuel transfer. [Encl. (32)]

41. There were no flight control, engine, or subsystem failures recorded prior to 0144 for Profane 12. [Encl. (32)]

42. Profane 11 directed Profane 12 to the non-standard left echelon position. [Encl. (52-54)]

43. Sumo 41 first directed Profane 12 to the right (standard) echelon position, and then Profane 12 requested left (non-standard) echelon position. Sumo 41 approved Profane 12’s request and re-directed Profane 12 to the left (non-standard) echelon position. [Encl. (52-54), (153)]
44. At 0143, Profane 12 was in stabilized flight at an altitude of approximately 15,000 feet above mean sea level (MSL), 236 nautical miles per hour calibrated airspeed (KCAS), and on a heading of 250° to 260° magnetic. [Encl. (38)]

45. MP2 was cross-controlling his aircraft with steady and increasing pressure on the right rudder with increasing left wing down to maintain ground track placing the aircraft in a slipped condition. [Encl. (38)]

46. Profane 12 was asked by Sumo 41 to provide their BUNO number, and Profane 12 provided their BUNO number. [Encl. (52-54), (153)]

47. Seconds before the collision, MWSO1 said “hey, what’s he [Profane 12] doing?” [Encl. (52-53)]

48. Without direction from Sumo 41, Profane 12 crossed over Sumo 41 from the left to the right side, then abruptly corrected back towards Sumo 41 and impacted the rear of Sumo 41 in the vicinity of the right side rear jump door. [Encl. (38), (52-54), (80), (153), (156)]

49. At 0144, Profane 12 experienced an uncommanded pitch and roll. Both aircrew of Profane 12 ejected from the aircraft. [Encl. (32), (52-54)]

50. Sumo 41 was last observed by MP1 and MWSO1 in a nose low wings level attitude, on fire, and entering the cloud tops at about 2,000 feet MSL. [Encl. (52-53)]

51. Sumo 41 impacted the surface of the water approximately 143 kilometers southeast of Kochi, Japan. [Encl. (19), (33), (100), (101), (143)]

b. Search and Rescue

52. At 0147, Profane 11 contacted Fuko Control to report an emergency. [Encl. (143)]

53. At 0150, Profane 11 contacted Fuko Control and passed the crash location as N32 38.6268 E134 38.1244. [Encl. (143)]

54. At 0152, the VMFA(AW)-242 Operations Duty Officer (ODO) received a telephone call from the Air Force Rescue Coordination Center (AFRCC) at Langley Air Force Base (AFB), Virginia (VA), that an emergency beacon had been activated at 0147. [Encl. (76)]

55. At 0153, Profane 11 contacted Fuko Control and asked the question “Looking for confirmation that search and rescue has been notified?” [Encl. (143)]

56. At 0158, the ODO received a telephone call from the AFRCC that a second emergency beacon had been activated. [Encl. (76)]
57. At 0203, Profane 11 was contacted by Fuko Control to confirm which aircraft were in the water. Profane 11 responded with “Profane 12 is in the water. Sumo 41 is in the water.” [Encl. (143)]

58. At 0207, Profane 11 was contacted by Fuko Control asking “to confirm there was a collision between Profane 12 and Sumo 41?” To which Profane 11 responded “Affirmative.” [Encl. (143)]

59. At 0213, Profane 11 contacted Fuko Control asking for an “update and search and rescue assets.” To which Fuko control responded with “say again” and then “search and rescue should be coming.” [Encl. (143)]

60. At 0227, Profane 11 contacted Fuko Control asking for “status of search and rescue.” [Encl. (143)]

61. At 0241, Profane 11 attempted to contact Profane 12 on 121.5 with no audible response. [Encl. (143)]

62. At 0243, Profane 11 attempted to contact Sumo 41 on 121.5 with no audible response. [Encl. (143)]

63. At 0248, Fuko Control contacted Profane 11 requesting Profane 11’s fuel status to which Profane 11 responded with “15 minutes.” [Encl. (143)]

64. At 0251, Fuko Control contacted Profane 11 requesting survivor location to which Profane 11 responded with “Negative. Searching at 10,000.” [Encl. (143)]

65. At 0252, Profane 11 contacted Fuko Control advising that they observe a “strobe beacon in the water.” [Encl. (143)]

66. At 0254, Profane 11 contacted Fuko Control with a latitude and longitude of a possible survivor. [Encl. (143)]

67. At 0256, Profane 11 contacted Fuko Control and provided the beacon location as N32 37.78 E135 03.16. [Encl. (143)]

68. Fuko Control contacted Profane 11 asking if Profane 11 had observed a parachute or life raft to which Profane 11 responded “negative.” [Encl. (143)]

69. At 0311, Profane 11 contacted Fuko Control at flight level (FL) 260 (26,000 feet) requesting to return to Iwakuni direct. [Encl. (143)]

70. At 0312, Fuko Control contacted Profane 11 with squawk 1735, radar contact and cleared Profane 11 direct to MCAS-I at FL330. [Encl. (143)]
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71. At 0314, Fuko Control contacted Profane 11 with clearance to FL360. [Encl. (143)]

72. At 0321, Fuko Control contacted Profane 11 with clearance to change to frequency 227.2. [Encl. (143)]

73. At 0345, Profane 11 landed back at MCAS-I. [Encl. (104)]

74. At 0330, a search and rescue (SAR) operation request was made to the Japanese Central Air Defense Force. Thirty-one aircraft and eleven surface ships from the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force and the Japan Air Self-Defense Force actively participated in the SAR effort. [Encl. (34)]

75. At approximately 0142, the Japanese Ministry of Defense reported that collision occurred. [Encl. (34)]

76. MWS02 was in his life raft and reported being very cold and shivering. MWS02 was not wearing an anti-exposure suit. [Encl. (54)]

77. It took approximately 4 hours to locate and rescue MWS02. [Encl. (34), (54)]

78. At 0543, MWS02, was recovered by a Japanese military SH-60 helicopter and transported to Komatsushima, Japan. [Encl. (34)]

79. At 0611, the VMFA(AW)-242 ODO was notified that MWS02 was recovered. [Encl. (76)]

80. MWS02 reported that he banged the left side of his face against the canopy during the mishap but was otherwise uninjured. [Encl. (55)]

81. At 1046, a patrol boat from the Japan Coast Guard spotted a survivor [later identified as MP2] in need of assistance. [Encl. (34)]

82. At 1046, a Japanese SH-60 helicopter from Air Corps 24 proceeded to the site. [Encl. (34)]

83. At 1120, an airborne E-767 from the Japanese Airborne Warning and Control Group started activities such as communication relaying. [Encl. (34)]

84. At 1127, a SH-60 from the Japanese Air Corps 24 started rescue operations for the survivor. [Encl. (34)]

4 CNAF 3710.7 states: “Flight personnel have the option to wear the provided anti-exposure suits as a personal decision whenever they deem circumstances merit their use.” [Encl. (98)]
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85. At 1128, one UH-60 from the Japanese Hamamatsu Air Rescue was launched from its base
to the crash site for search and rescue operations. [Encl. (34)]

86. At 1205, a Japanese Defense Force Ship, the Setoyuki, started rescue operations for the
survivor. [Encl. (34), (41)]

87. At 1222, MP2 was brought onboard the Setoyuki. He was then transported via the Japanese
SH-60 helicopter to Komatsushima Base and then transported to a civilian hospital in Japan.
[Encl. (34)]

88. At 1442, MP2 arrived at the civilian hospital. [Encl. (34)]

89. On 6 December 2018, MP2 was wearing a Garmin Fenix 3 smartwatch. The data from the
watch indicated that MP2’s heart was beating at an average of 86 beats per minute until
approximately 1130. [Encl. (19), (39)]

90. On 6 December 2018, MP2’s Garmin smart watch indicates that MP2 was alive on the
surface of the ocean from approximately 0145 until approximately 1130 (nine hours and 45
minutes) in 68 degree Fahrenheit water. [Encl. (19), (39)]

91. At 2300, the Marine Corps announced that MP2 was deceased. [Encl. (12), (34)]

92. An autopsy report of MP2 shows multiple abrasions and contusions, subarachnoid
hemorrhage (brain bleeding), and explains the remains exhibited signs of drowning. Toxicology
reports were negative. [Encl. (11)]

93. The mishap debris field was a 21 mile by 11 mile area located 162 miles from MCAS
Iwakuni. [Encl. (110)]

94. United States, Japanese, and Australian joint and combined forces continued search, rescue,
and recovery efforts for the crew of Sumo 41 until 11 December 2018. [Encl. (123)]

95. No aircrew with VMFA(AW)-242 were wearing anti-exposure suits. [Encl. (4), (52-54)]

96. None of the witnesses interviewed from VMFA(AW)-242 have worn or observed others to
wear anti-exposure suits while assigned to flight duties at VMFA(AW)-242. [Encl. (51-55),
(65), (129-133), (135-142), (147-148)]

5 CNAF 3710.7 states: “Actual determination as to when anti-exposure suits must be worn by
flight personnel shall be determined by the CO or OIC.” [Encl. (98)]
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97. Marine Corps Task (MCT) 1.3.4.1.3 is to provide aerial Search and Rescue (SAR) services to tactical fixed wing aircraft or as requested by adjacent commands or the local community. [Encl. (119)]

98. The 1st MAW has no organic SAR capability. In 2000, the Commanding General of the 1st MAW determined that Japanese SAR assets provide adequate coverage for MAG-12 and removed MCAS-I SAR capabilities. [Encl. (70)]

99. The MAG-12 CO’s understanding is that when the Japanese Defense Force is conducting operations, Japanese forces are able to launch SAR within 15 minutes of notification. His further understanding is that when the Japanese Defense Force is not conducting operations, the Japanese SAR assets are on a recall status that may take more than two hours. [Encl. (62)]

100. There was no additional coordination for SAR with the Japanese Defense Force for the MAG-12 ULT. [Encl. (62)]

101. The 1st MAW does not have a Memorandum of Understanding with Japan regarding search and rescue roles and responsibilities. [Encl. (70), (62)]

c. Mishap Flight Scheduling

102. Daily flight schedules should be published and distributed no later than 12 hours prior to first takeoff time, or 1600 local time the working day prior, whichever is earlier. [Ref. (l) para. 1002]

103. At 1920 on 4 December 2018, MWSO2 distributed the 5 December 2018 VMFA(AW)-242 flight schedule via group chat on the messaging software “WhatsApp.” [Encl. (57), p. 283]

104. The 1st MAW SOP for Flight Operations states “[f]lights will be described in sufficient detail to clearly define the mission and any special mission requirements, the type of training to be conducted, and the responsibilities of each aircrew member.” [Ref. (d)]

105. The 5 December 2018 VMGR-152 flight schedule indicated Fixed Wing Air-to-Air Refueling (FWAAR) and Night Vision Imaging Systems (NVIS) for Sumo 41. [Encl. (72)]

106. The 5 December 2018 VMFA(AW)-242 flight schedule does not include the 2202 Training and Readiness (T&R) code for Night System Air-to-Air Refueling (NSAAR) or any other reference to NSAAR. [Encl. (21), (29)]

107. [b] (3) (A), (b) (6) [b] a senior pilot and division leader with VMFA(AW)-242, said that at some time between 2100 and 2200 on 5 December 2018 he received a call from VMGR-152 regarding aerial refueling. [Encl. (147)].
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108. [redacted], said aerial refueling was not on the flight schedule for 5 December 2018. He said he relayed the information to MP1 that VMGR-152 was offering aerial refueling on 6 December 2018. [Encl. (147)]

109. MP1, however, said that around 2100 on 5 December 2018, he received a call from Maj Brophy, aircraft commander for Sumo-41, who was offering aerial refueling on 6 December 2018. MP1 said aerial refueling was not previously on the 6 December 2018 flight schedule. [Encl. (52)]

110. The Operations Duty Officer (ODO) for VMFA(AW)-242 on 5 December 2018 from 1600 to 2400 was [redacted], USMC, who was a new join pilot with no qualifications. [Encl. (23), (148)]

111. The ODO states he answered a phone call from VMGR-152 and handed the phone to MP1. [Encl. (23), (148)]

112. [redacted] did not inform the ODO of the change in the flight schedule. [Encl. (147), (148)]

113. MP1 did not inform the ODO of the change in the flight schedule. [Encl. (52), (148)]

114. The 5 December 2018 VMFA(AW)-242 flight schedule does not include a red pen change to add the “2202” T&R NSAAR code. [Encl. (21), (29)]

115. The 5 December 2018 VMFA(AW)-242 flight schedule does not include a red pen change to add the tanker notes. [Encl. (21), (29)]

116. ODO turnover occurred sometime after 2200 after the ODO gave VMFA(AW)-242 aircrew the weather and airspace preflight brief. [Encl. (148)]

117. [redacted], USMC, ODO at the time of the mishap, stated in response to if a schedule change was made: “I don't think I put anything on the flight schedules, Sir. It didn't click for me until later that it wasn't on there.” [Encl. (131)]

118. The F/A-18 Administrative Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) mandates “changes to the signed flight schedule require personal approval of the squadron Commanding Officer (CO) or Executive Officer (XO).” [Ref. (1)]

119. The 1st MAW SOP for Flight Operations further restricts changes to the flight schedule by mandating that “the Squadron Commander shall personally approve all changes to the flight schedule. Every change to the flight schedule shall receive the same scrutiny and review as the original schedule.” [Ref. (d), para. 1301]
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120. The Mishap Squadron Commanding Officer (MSCO) was not notified of the flight schedule change prior to the mishap flight. [Encl. (51)]

121. The MSCO did not approve the change to the 5 December 2018 flight schedule (the addition of NSAAR). [Encl. (51)]

122. At approximately 2100 on 5 December 2018, MP1 told the Mishap Squadron Executive Officer (MSXO), “we’ve got tankers tonight,” as they passed in the hallway at the VMFA(AW)-242 squadron building. [Encl. (136)]

123. The MSXO assumed, in error, that the approval process for the schedule change had already occurred. [Encl. (136)]

124. At approximately 2200 on 5 December 2018, MSXO checked on the ODO at the ODO desk. [Encl. (136)]

125. MSXO did not ask the ODO about the flight schedule change, and did not review the ODO flight schedule at that time. [Encl. (136)]

d. Mishap Flight Briefing

126. The 1st MAW SOP for Flight Operations directs that “[t]he aviation-series of Naval Tactics Techniques and Procedures (NTTP) manual briefing guide(s) shall be utilized for all briefs. Locally generated briefing guides that incorporate all NATOPS and NTTP requirements may be utilized.” [Ref. (d), para. 2103].

127. At approximately 2300 on 5 December 2018, the VMFA(AW)-242 mishap flight briefing started and lasted approximately 10 minutes. [Encl. (52)]

128. Per the flight schedule, the mishap flight was a “familiarization mission” whose purpose is to “maintain proficiency and familiarity with flight characteristics, limitations and operating procedures.” [Ref (k), para. 2.7.1., Encl. (21)]

129. As the flight leader for the mishap flight, MP1 gave the brief to the VMFA(AW)-242 aircrews. MP1 stated that he started the preflight brief approximately 30 minutes late because he had been talking to [b][3] (A), (b) on the phone about the Sumo 41 NSAAR. MP1 said that he had not know about the NSAAR before he spoke to [b][3] (A), (b) at approximately 2200 on 5 December 2018. [Encl. (52)]

130. MP1 stated that he used a briefing guide and the information he passed was “leveraged largely off SOPs, and did go through the NS (night systems) training rules to an extent.” [Encl. (52-53)]
The VMFA(AW)-242 mishap flight briefing did not discuss the use of anti-exposure suits. [Encl. (52)]

TheNaval Air Training and Operating Procedures Standardization (NATOPS) Program’s General Flight and Operating Instructions Manual requires taking the following steps to determine whether use of an anti-exposure suit is required: “(1) Consult with Operations to determine likely alert-to-rescue time. Allow for rescue of all aircrew. (2) Determine the coldest water temperature (rounding down) of which you will be flying. (3) Choose the body fat range that most closely resembles you, underestimating rather than overestimating. (4) Determine functional exposure limit by matching the water temperature row with the type of individual exposure protection available.” [Ref (c), figure 8.1]

The VMFA(AW)-242 weather brief for 5 December 2018 does not include weather information for the ITRA-south [the operating area for the mishap flight]. [Encl. (77)]

The NATOPS Program’s General Flight and Operating Instructions Manual states that “Naval Aviators shall be thoroughly familiar with weather conditions for the area in which flight is contemplated.” [Ref (c), para. 4.8.3.1]

C. MP1 Background and Training

On 8 August 2012, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) issued a commercial pilot certificate to MP1. [Encl. (85)]

MP1 was promoted to Capt on 1 November 2012. He has since failed to promote to Major. [Encl. (121)]

MP1 finished the F/A-18 Fleet Replacement Squadron (FRS) training in June 2014. He ranked 76 of 97 replacement pilots placing him in the (lower) 29th percentile. [Encl. (81)]

MP1 finished the F/A-18 FRS in June 2014 with two unsatisfactory events: Unsafe Basic Airwork and Low Situational Awareness. [Encl. (81)]

MP1’s performance at the FRS was described as “below average.” [Encl. (81)]

MP1’s performance at the FRS was described as “inconsistent” and that he “struggled when the scripted flight did not go as planned.” [Encl. (81)]

MP1’s Carrier Qualification (CQ) requirement was waived “due to the requirements of CAT I pilots in the Operational Squadrons.” [Encl. (81)]

On 10 July 2018, VMFA(AW)-242 granted MP1 the following designations and qualifications: Operations Duty Officer, Night Systems, Air Combat Maneuvering, Low Altitude
Tactics, Section Leader, Low Altitude Tactics Instructor, Division Leader, Forward Air Controller (Airborne), Mission Commander, and Fighter Attack Instructor. [Encl. (81)]

143. As of 13 December 2018, MP1 had flown 33 hours in the previous 90 days, which is more than any other pilot in VMFA(AW)-242. [Encl. (28)]

D. MP2 Background and Training

144. MP2 held a current NATOPS and Instrument qualification in the F/A-18A-D. As of April 2018 he had 430.07 total flight hours and 54.3 total actual instrument hours. [Encl. (83)]

145. MP2 held a Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) single engine land Commercial Pilot certificate issued on 15 June 2016 with an instrument rating. [Encl. (88)]

146. MP2 completed pilot training with the Fleet Replacement Squadron (FRS) Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 101 (VMFAT-101) on 25 April 2017. He ranked 133 out of 139 pilot graduates. He did not carrier qualify due to a field disqualification because of “headwork.” His carrier qualification was waived. His performance was documented as below average but that he displayed a positive attitude, was well-respected and was an extremely hard-working Marine Officer. [Encl. (5), (31)].

147. MP2 had four unsatisfactory events at VMFAT-101, including failure to follow correct procedures, below average performance, slow to conduct Immediate Action Procedures, and below average system knowledge. [Encl. (8)]

148. On 3 February 2017, the FRS convened a Performance Review Board (PRB) to review the performance of MP2. [Encl. (8)]

149. MP2 completed primary flight training with a 53.5 Naval Standard Score (NSS) in the 63rd percentile. [Encl. (8)]

150. MP2 completed intermediate training with a 36.2 NSS in the lower 8th percentile. [Encl. (8)]

151. MP2 completed advanced training with a 35.6 NSS in the lower 7th percentile. [Encl. (8)]

152. MP2 completed the required day and night air-to-air refueling (AAR) events at the FRS. [Encl. (5), (6), (9)]

153. As of 5 December 2018, MP2 had flown 13.1 hours in the previous 90 days. [Encl. (28), (82)]
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154. As of 5 December 2018, MP2 had flown 47 hours less than the minimum required 60 hours to be “in the green” in Marine Sierra Hotel Aviation Readiness Program (M-SHARP). [Encl. (28)]

155. M-SHARP is the “training management system for scheduling and logging T&R Events, comparing logged data to community readiness metrics, and formatting readiness data within T&R Program Manual guidance.” [Ref. (j), para 1.02.5]

156. The Marine Corps F/A-18 T&R Manual states that in order to gain proficiency in air-to-air refueling (AAR) T&R code 2201, pilots must “[p]erform all AAR procedures to include: tanker rendezvous, observation position, astern position, refueling procedures, and tanker departure. Six contacts required for completion.” [Ref. (k)]

157. On 21 June 2017,\(\textbf{(b)}\)\(\textbf{(3)}\)\(\textbf{(A)}\),\(\textbf{(b)}\)\(\textbf{(6)}\) USMC, certified that MP2 was qualified\(^6\) under AAR T&R code 2201 (Day air-to-air refueling) with one contact.\(^7\) [Encl. (21), (60)]

158. MP2 would have needed six total contacts to qualify under T&R code 2201. [Ref. (k)]

159. On 21 Jun 2017, MP2 did not complete his initial AAR T&R code 2201, because he only completed one contact. [Encl. (21), (60)]

160. The Marine Corps F/A-18 T&R Manual states “[n]o other T&R events requiring night vision device (NVD) usage may be executed by aircrew until they have completed all events in the night systems (NS) stage.” Once completing all events in the NS stage, a pilot will be certified as “Night Systems Qualified.” [Ref. (k), para. 2.7.4]

161. There are 6 events in the NS stage. [Ref. (k), para. 2.7.4]

162. On 7 July 2017,\(\textbf{(b)}\)\(\textbf{(3)}\)\(\textbf{(A)}\),\(\textbf{(b)}\)\(\textbf{(6)}\) certified that MP2 was qualified under NSAAR T&R code 2202 (Night air-to-air refueling) with one contact. [Encl. (21), (60)]

163. MP2 would have needed 6 total contact to qualify under T&R code 2202. [Ref. (k)]

164. On 7 July 2017, MP2 did not complete his initial NSAAR T&R code 2202, because he only completed one contact. [Encl. (21), (60)]

\(^6\) Qualified is define by NAVMC 3500 as a status assigned to aircrew based on demonstration of proficiency in a specific skill. [ref. (k)]

\(^7\) A “contact” is a successful connection between an aircraft’s refueling probe and a refueling tanker aircraft’s drogue (basket).
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165. On 14 July 2017, USMC, certified that MP2 was Night Systems Qualified (NSQ). [Encl. (3), (21), (82)]

166. MP2 did not have the necessary prerequisites to attempt NSAAR T&R code 2202 on 7 July 2017, because he was not NSQ until 14 July 2017. [Encl. (7), Ref. (k)]

167. MP2 was not NSAAR T&R code 2202 qualified on the night of the mishap. [Encl. (3), (10), (21), (60)]

168. Before the mishap on 6 December 2018, MP2 had only attempted one NSAAR T&R code 2202 contact while attached to VMFA(AW)-242. [Encl. (3), (21)]

169. stated “… if [MP2] demonstrated proficiency in plugging on the tanker, I probably decided to focus the remaining range/flight/scheduled time on other important training objectives. Conducting night intercepts, for example, may have been one of training aspects I elected to prioritize over making repeated contact with the tanker basket.” [Encl. (60)]

170. stated “[t]he material readiness condition of the hornet fleet, resulting in limited flight hour availability, paired with the perceived pressure to maintain operational readiness most likely contributed to this decision making process [to truncate training by doing only one plug in lieu of six].” [Encl. (60)]

171. Proficiency as defined by NAVMC 3500.50 is a measure of achievement of a specific skill. In this case six contacts would be required to measure that achievement. [Ref. (k)]

172. M-SHARP is the training management system for scheduling and logging T&R Events, comparing logged data to community readiness metrics, and formatting readiness data within T&R Program Manual guidance. M-SHARP also indicates a pilot’s proficiency in T&R Events. During the course of this investigation, it was discovered that M-SHARP was erroneously updating pilot proficiency for NSAAR T&R code 2202 when a pilot conducted day RQD-6109 (day or night strategic aerial refueling) and RQD-6111 (day or night strategic aerial refueling) events. This is referred to as “chaining.” [Ref. (j), Encl. (3), (10), (21), (61), (150)]

173. After a pilot successfully demonstrates a particular skill, that pilot will remain proficient in that skill for a particular length of time. This is referred to as the “proficiency period.” The proficiency period for NSAAR T&R code 2202 is 365 days. [Ref. (k)]

174. After the 365th day, a pilot must complete six contacts to regain proficiency and be NSAAR T&R code 2202 qualified. [Ref. (k)]

175. M-SHARP erroneously updated MP2’s proficiency period for NSAAR T&R code 2202 nine times between 7 July 2017 and 3 August 2018 through chaining events of RQD-6109 and RQD-6111. [Encl. (3), (10), (21)]
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176. An M-SHARP produced VMFA(AW)-242 crew proficiency tracker showed MP2 as current (green) on NSAAR T&R code 2202 on 5 December 2018, even though MP2 had not conducted NSAAR in 517 days. [Encl. (26), (27), (150)]

177. Five hundred seventeen (517) days elapsed from MP2’s previous NSAAR T&R code 2202 and the mishap flight. [Encl. (3)]

178. The mishap flight was MP2’s first exposure to a night tanker since his initial training in July 2017. [Encl. (3)]

179. MP2’s single contact between the probe and drogue on 7 July 2017 was his only NSAAR T&R code 2202 contact in the Fleet Marine Force (FMF) prior to the mishap. [Encl. (3), (21)]

180. On 7 July 2017, MP2 flew an incomplete NSAAR T&R code 2202 under high light level (HLL) conditions with 96% illumination. [Encl. (21), (59)].

181. MP2 had never attempted a night low light level (LLL) NSAAR T&R code 2202 contact before the mishap. [Encl. (21), (59), (99)]

182. On the night of the mishap, MP2 was neither qualified nor proficient in NSAAR T&R code 2202. [Encl. (10), (21), (59), (60)]

183. MP2 was NSQ and AAR T&R code 2201 proficient on 6 December 2018. He therefore met the prerequisites to attempt an initial NSAAR T&R code 2202 on 6 December 2018. [Encl. (10), (21), (59-60)]

184. On 25 January 2019, the MSOPSO was interviewed. He could not provide any detailed information about MP2’s NS experience other than MP2 was trained and qualified to “fly on night vision goggles at night.” [Encl. (55)]

185. During his interview MSOPSO said he knew MP2 had been to the night tanker before, “[b]ecause I was in the squadron while we were down in southern frontier in pitch black (summer of 2018), and [MP2] flew at night and went to the tanker.” [Encl. (55)]

186. MP2 did not conduct NSAAR during the summer of 2018. [Encl. (3), (10)]

187. The Operations Department of VMFA(AW)-242 relied on M-SHARP to validate their flight schedules. [Encl. (55), (130)]

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8 The “probe” is the F/A-18 refueling probe which the F/A-18 pilot maneuvers into the KC-130 drogue often referred to as the “basket.” The KC-130 maintains a stable flight path to which the F/A-18 joins to effect fuel transfer. [Ref. (m), (n)]
E. VMFA(AW)-242 Organizational Climate

a. Wrongful Prescription and Over-the-Counter Drug Use

189. The NATOPS General Flight and Operating Instructions Manual states “[t]he use of stimulants and/or sedatives shall only be authorized following the commanding officer’s consultation with the wing commander or equivalent, and the flight surgeon. The flight surgeon, furthermore, shall have consulted with his/her supervisor in the aeromedical chain of command.” [Ref. (c), para 8.3.3]

190. The NATOPS General Flight and Operating Instructions Manual states “[t]aking drugs prescribed by competent medical authority shall be considered sufficient cause for recommendation of grounding unless their use is specifically approved by a flight surgeon, or a waiver for specific drug use has been granted... Consideration shall be given to the removal of ground support personnel from critical duties, for the duration of the drug effects, if appropriate.” [Ref. (c), para 8.3.3]

191. The NATOPS General Flight and Operating Instructions Manual states “[m]edicines such as antihistamines, antibiotics, narcotic pain relievers, etc., obtained by prescription for short term use to treat a self-limited condition shall be discarded if all are not used during the period of medication. Unused quantities of performance maintenance drugs (amphetamines or sleeping pills) shall be returned to the flight surgeon or medical clinic for purposes of strict accountability.” [Ref. (c), para 8.3.3]

192. The NATOPS General Flight and Operating Instructions Manual states “[b]ecause of the possibility of adverse side effects and unpredictable reactions, the use of over-the-counter drugs by flight personnel is prohibited unless specifically approved by a flight surgeon.” [Ref. (c), para 8.3.3]

193. The CG of 1st MAW did not authorize the use of prescription sleep aids. [Encl. (23), (51-55), (57), (62), (69), (71)]

194. The CO of MAG-12 did not authorize the use of prescription sleep aids. [Encl. (23), (51-55), (57), (62), (71)]

195. The MSCO did not authorize the use of the prescription sleep aids. [Encl. (23), (51-55), (57), (71)]

The term “organizational climate” is loosely defined as the shared perceptions employees have about their organization and can include attitudes and norms that emerge about topics such as safety. This can affect how a particular unit works and trains. [See Encl. (93), and (94)]
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196. The post-mishap toxicology report of MP1 shows that Zolpidem\(^{10}\) (a prescription sleep aid) was detected in his urine taken at 0415 on 6 December 2018. [Encl. (13), (86)]

197. When interviewed on 13 December 2018, MP1 denied taking any prescription medications. [Encl. (52)]

198. On 31 May 2018, a U. S. Navy (USN), Flight Surgeon for VMFA(AW)-242 in May 2018, prescribed Ambien to MP1 for a short time use as a sleep aid during a period when MP1 was not scheduled to fly. [Encl. (14), (58), (87)]

199. MP1’s Ambien prescription expired on 4 June 2018 at which time any remaining medication should have been discarded in accordance with reference (c). [Encl. (14), (58), (87)]

200. The post-mishap toxicology report of MWSO2 shows that Zolpidem phenyl-4-carboxylic acid was detected in his urine taken on 6 December 2018. [Encl. (15)]

201. On 6 July 2018, USN, prescribed Zolpidem to MWSO2. [Encl. (16), (20)]

202. On 13 July 2018, the prescription of Zolpidem to MWSO2 expired. [Encl. (16), (20)]

203. stated that after 13 July 2018, all remaining medication should have been discarded in accordance with reference (c). [Encl. (16-18), (20)]

204. The post-mishap toxicology report of MWSO2 shows that Diphenhydramine\(^{11}\) was detected in his urine taken on 6 December 2018. [Encl. (15)]

205. USN, Flight Surgeon, VMFA(AW)-242 said that MWSO2 was last prescribed medication on 29 October 2018. said that MWSO2, “should have discontinued using all medications weeks prior to the mishap.” [Encl. (16-18), (69)]

206. said that MWSO2 “did not have any active prescriptions and I was not aware of any over the counter (OTC) medication in use at the time of the mishap.” [Encl. (16-18), (69)]

\(^{10}\) Zolpidem is sold by the trade name “Ambien.” [Ref (r)]

\(^{11}\) Using diphenhydramine together with Zolpidem may increase side effects such as dizziness, drowsiness, confusion, and difficulty concentrating. Some people may also experience impairment in thinking, judgment, and motor coordination. [Ref (r)]
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207. During his interview on 13 December 2018, MWSO2 was asked “Were you on any prescription medication?” MWSO2 replied, “No. Pretty normal. You know, to the standard, I just drank a little coffee. That was it.” [Encl. (54)]

208. MWSO2 texted the VMFA(AW)-242 Flight Surgeon, “The skipper said he authorized everyone’s [sic] for downers, and possibly uppers.” [Encl. (71)]

209. MWSO2 responded to MWSO2, “I’m sure you know by now but the CG did not authorize go/no-go pills for this ULT thing…” [Encl. (71)]

210. MWSO2 responded to MWSO2, “I didn’t know a CG approval was required. How about Ambien?” [Encl. (71)]

211. On 6 March 2019, said, “I did not prescribe Go/No-Go pills for use during the exercise [at the time of the mishap] to VMFA(AW)-242 aircrew.” [Encl. (71)]

212. refused to issue Ambien to all personnel during the MAG Unit Level Training (ULT). [Encl. (23), (51), (52), (53), (54), (55), (57), (71)]

213. The MSCO stated, “...the use of Ambien is prevalent throughout all of aviation. If you ask the guys coming from OIR [Operation Inherent Resolve] right now, they know whether or not -- how many of their guys are flying six and a half hour [sorties] over Syria right now, all their night shift guys are doing this... And they’re doing the opposite too. They’re using their go-pills too.” The MSCO then explained that the 1st MAW CG denied the request to use Go/No-Go pills and “so we complied. At least I thought we did.” [Encl. (51)]

214. On 26 March 2019, VMFA(AW)-242’s Pilot Training Officer (PTO) USMC, stated, “[if I was flying those night events, and I had a prescription for Ambien, I would have taken Ambien.” [Encl. (130)]

215. That, after clarification, the PTO stated, “I 100% believe that I would have taken Ambien.” [Encl. (130)]

216. a VMFA(AW)-242 WSO, could not correctly describe the approval process for the use of Ambien and further conjectured in error that the MSCO would have approval authority if the flight surgeon was ok with it. [Encl. (65)]

217. VMFA(AW)-242 maintains several WhatsApp chat groups, including an all officers chat group, and a company grade officers chat group. [Encl. (57), (65)]

218. On 3 December 2018, in the all officers chat group, says, “Some aircrew have asked me for go and/or no-go pills.” [Encl. (23)]
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219. On 3 December 2018, in the all officers chat group, says, “Per General NATOPS, ‘The use of stimulants and/or sedatives shall only be authorized following the commanding officer’s consultations with the wing commander or equivalent, and the flight surgeon. The flight surgeon, further shall have consulted with his/her supervisor in the aeromedical chain of command.’” [Encl. (23)]

220. On 3 December 2018, in the all officers chat group, MSOPSO says, “Wing CG said hard no to performance enhancement. Sorry dudes.” [Encl. (23)]

221. On 3 December 2018, in the company grade officer chat group, MWSO2 says, “Everyone shoot doc a message and ask for Ambien, he’s playing hard ball issuing it out.” [Encl. (57)]

222. On 3 December 2018, in the company grade officer chat group, says, “Well that dude is not a bro. Quoting Natops in a chat...” [Encl. (57)]

223. On 3 December 2018, in the company grade officer chat group, MWSO2 says, “That is very un dude.” [Encl. (57)]

224. On 3 December 2018, in the company grade officer chat group, the Mishap Squadron Aviation Safety Officer (MSASO) says, “Talked to him about it today...MAG-12 Flight Surgeon is quoting the CG’s directive about ‘no performance enhancing...’ for the exercise.” [Encl. (57)]

225. On 3 December 2018, in the company grade officer chat group, MWSO2 says, “We can get Ambien for a flight to the states but not for this ULT nonsense...” [Encl. (57)]

226. On 3 December 2018, in the company grade officer chat group, MWSO1 says, “Did you ask about the modafinil or just ambo?” [Encl. (57)]

227. On 3 December 2018, in the company grade officer chat group, MP1 says, “Modafinil is shit anyways.” He then says “Dextroamphetamine is legit.” [Encl. (57)]

228. On 3 December 2018, in the company grade officer chat group, MWSO1 says, “Can we get that?” [Encl. (57)]

229. On 3 December 2018, in the company grade officer chat group, MP1 says, “Think they stopped passing out dex [dextroamphetamine] DoD wide now.” [Encl. (57)]

230. On 3 December 2018, in the company grade officer chat group, MWSO2 says, “All I want is Ambo so I can pass out with two screaming kids running around this tiny ass apartment...” [Encl. (57)]

231. On 3 December 2018, in the all officers chat group, says, “FYI: melatonin is a minimum 24hrs grounding.” [Encl. (23)]
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232. On 4 December 2018, in the company grade officer chat group, MSASO says, “FYI: melatonin is a minimum 24hrs grounding.” And “Foiled again [MWSO2’s callsign]!” [Encl. (57)]

233. On 4 December 2018, in the company grade officer chat group, USMC, says “Hahaha this Doc is ridiculous.” [Encl. (57)]

234. On 4 December 2018, in the company grade officer chat group, MWSO2 says, “Yah this is some nonsense…” [Encl. (57)]

235. On 4 December 2018, in the company grade officer chat group, MSASO says, “#hingedoc.” [Encl. (57)]

236. On 4 December 2018, in the company grade officer chat group, says, “We should demonstrate our willingness to comply with docs bullshit by placing some caffeine pills and melatonin gummies on top of the ODO desk. We can put a “up” and “down” sign next to the appropriate bottle.” [Encl. (57)]

237. On 4 December 2018, in the company grade officer chat group, MSASO replies, “I just had the exact same thoughts…” He then added “[e]xcept…we should get a picture of it on HIS desk.” [Encl. (57)]

b. Normalization of Deviance

238. The MSCO’s Commanding Officer’s Policy Statement on Safety and Force Preservation dated 25 May 2018 states “…respect rules and procedures…” [Encl. (22)]

239. The MSCO’s Policy Statement on Substance Abuse dated 25 May 2018 states that “substance abuse…will not be tolerated.” [Encl. (22)]

240. The MSCO’s Policy Statement on Hazing dated 25 May 2018 states, “Hazing is any conduct whereby a military member... causes another military member... to be exposed to any activity which is humiliating, demeaning, or harmful…” [Encl. (22)]

241. The MSCO’s self-photo profile picture on Whatsapp is available for view by all squadron officers. [Encl. (23), (44)]

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12 In 1996 Diane Vaughan defined the social normalization of deviance as when “people within the organization become so much accustomed to a deviation that they don’t consider it as deviant, despite the fact that they far exceed their own rules for the elementary safety.” [Encl. (90)]
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242. The MSCO’s self-photo profile picture on Whatsapp shows him in flight with his oxygen mask off and his visor up. Photo was taken by the MSCO while he was in flight. [Encl. (23), (24), (44)]

243. CNAF 3710.7 states: “Oxygen [mask on and fastened] shall be used by all occupants from takeoff to landing.” [Encl. (98)]

244. The MSCO shared photos taken in flight while in formation and during the conduct of AAR with all squadron officers on Whatsapp. [Encl. (23), (45), (46)]

245. MSOPSO’s self-photo profile picture on Whatsapp is available for view by all squadron officers. [Encl. (23)]

246. MSOPSO’s self-photo profile picture on Whatsapp is taken in flight with his mask off and a modified boom microphone configuration. [Encl. (23), (47)]

247. CNAF 3710.7 states: “Ejection without the oxygen mask or visor [fully] connected to the helmet may result in significant injury or death.” [Encl. (98)]

248. MP1’s self-photo profile picture on Whatsapp is taken in flight with mask off with both hand off the controls. [Encl. (48)]

249. shared a self-photo taken in flight with mask off reading a book entitled “The Great Santini” with both hands off the controls. [Encl. (49)]

250. shared a self-photo taken in flight with mask off grooming his mustache with a switchblade comb with both hands off the controls. [Encl. (50)]

251. USMC, a pilot with VMFA(AW)-242, shared a self-photo taken in flight includes non-issued flight equipment and both hands off the aircraft controls while in flight. [Encl. (111).]

252. A video of clip of NSAAR taken through a night vision device was extracted from personal telephone with metadata date from 6 October 2016. [Encl. (43)]

253. Naval Flight Record (NAVFLIR) dated 6 October 2016 includes a night flight. [Encl. (92)]

254. The following callsigns are in use at VMFA(AW)-242: and [Encl. (63-64), (78), (131-132), (150)]

255. USMC, a pilot with VMFA(AW)-242, is referred to by the MSCO and other members of VMFA(AW)-242 as [Encl. (23), (57), (78)]
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256. (b) (3) (A) is a junior member of the squadron on his first fleet tour. [Encl. (78), (132)]

257. (b) (3) (A) is referred to as (b) (3) (A), 15 times in writing on the two WhatsApp chats. [Encl. (23), (57)]

258. The first definition in Urban Dictionary defines (b) (3) (A) as a euphemism for the sex act of (b) (3) (A). [Encl. (64)]

259. The all officer WhatsApp chat group includes the comment “Happy almost birthday from (b) (3) (A), (b) (6) USMC, a pilot with VMFA(AW)-242, to (b) (3) (A), on 7 July 2018. [Encl.(23)]

260. (b) (3) (A), (b) (6) USMC, is a first tour WSO serving as the MSCO’s adjutant. [Encl. (78), (107)]

261. (b) (3) (A), is referred to as (b) (3) (A) by the MSCO and squadron members. [Encl. (78), (107)]

262. (b) (3) (A), was referred to as (b) (3) (A), 56 times in two separate WhatsApp chat groups, that are visible by all officers of VMFA(AW)-242. [Encl. (23), (57)]

263. The Oxford English Dictionary defines (b) (3) (A) as a slang noun meaning a person employed to stimulate a male pornographic actor’s gentle erection. [Encl. (66)]
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270. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

271. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

272. On 26 July 2018, in the company grade officer chat group, MWS02 says, “I’m a back seat driver.” [Encl. (57)]

273. On 26 July 2018, in the company grade officer chat group, MP1 replies, “At least somebody can drive....... too soon?” [Encl. (57)]

274. MSASO has visibility of, membership in, and participated in the company grade chat group. [Encl. (57)]

275. ASO duties include development, implementation, and execution of a proactive Aviation Safety Program in order to identify and eliminate or control hazards. [Ref. (q)]

276. The ASO has a duty to advise and has direct access to the commander and the Director of Safety and Standardization (DSS) on all matters pertaining to the organization’s aviation safety program. [Ref. (q)]


a. MAG-12 Unit Level Training (ULT) Participation

277. MSOPSO and PTO developed the crew assignments for VMFA(AW)-242 for the ULT that occurred in December 2018. [Encl. (55), (130)]

278. MSOPSO and PTO divided the squadron into three cells/shifting in order to achieve a 24 hour cycle. A day cell, a mid-day cell, and a night cell. [Encl. (55), (130)]

279. MSOPSO said, “I broke up quals, capabilities, personal assessment of capabilities, and made sure that there was an equal share in accordance with the Commander’s intent in order to have his primaries on the first cell and secondaries on the second cell, meaning day and mid-crew. He wanted to have overlap with his secondaries.” [Encl. (55)]

280. MSCO’s guidance was to assign officers to the night cell who would have minimal administrative responsibilities and whose absence during normal working hours would have minimal effect on the squadron. [Encl. (51), (55), (130)]
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281. MSCO, MSOPSO, and PTO did not assign a field grade officer to the night cell. [Encl. (51), (55), (130)]

282. VMFA(AW)-242 has seven field grade officers assigned to the squadron but did not have any field grade officers assigned to the mishap night cell. [Encl. (55)]

283. MSOPSO did not see a problem with not having field grade officers assigned to the night cell. [Encl. (55)]

284. MSOPSO considered the night cell to “be an elevated risk time,” which “was mitigated with a very senior instructor [MP1].” [Encl. (55)]

285. MSOPSO chose MP1 as the lead mission commander of the night cell. [Encl. (55)]

286. MSOPSO “hand-selected” MP1 to lead the night cell. [Encl. (55)]

287. MSOPSO had “full faith and confidence in his [MP1] ability to execute during that time of night.” [Encl. (55)]

288. MSOPSO stated “approval of flight schedule changes would be the top five…That would be CO, XO, OPSO, AMO, and in special circumstances the DOSS [Director of Safety and Standardization].” [Encl. (55)]

289. The VMFA(AW)-242 DOSS at the time of the mishap was USMC. [Encl. (55)]

290. No members of “the top five” were assigned to the night cell the night of the mishap. [Encl. (55)]

291. PTO said, “[w]e don’t have an actual weekly schedule that we publish. It was being prepared by the flight officers and the [schedule officers]. And then, I was helping where I could in terms of crew select pool. The [MSOPSO] and I sat down prior to the event when we finally had an idea of what we were supposed to do. And we sat down and were the ones that kind of came up with the walk-through with crews, the crew allocation through, and sat down at his white board and spent an hour kind of going through putting different Marines everywhere.” [Encl. (130)]

13 CNAF 3710.7 states: “Since an individual may frequently be the poorest judge of personal fitness, commanding officers shall ensure that flight personnel are adequately observed and appropriate temporary grounding action is taken when necessary.” [Encl. (97)]

14 CNAF 3710.7 states: “The pilot in command is responsible for the safe, orderly flight of the aircraft and well-being of the crew. The pilot in command may also be the mission commander or formation leader when so designated.” [Encl. (97)]
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292. MSCO, MSXO, MSOPSO, MSASO and PTO all claim to have no knowledge of MSWO2’s driving privilege suspension or the associated challenges with his commute to and from work as a member of the third (night) cell. [Encl. (124-128)]

293. MSOPSO attended two MAG-12 planning conferences for the MAG ULT. [Encl. (55)]

294. The second of the two MAG-12 planning conferences was on Wednesday, 28 November 2018. [Encl. (55)]

295. MSOPSO said, “I left the Wednesday’s meeting with such confusion that I felt like I had reached exhaustion.” [Encl. (55)]

296. MSOPSO stated, “At that meeting, there was a tanker assigned to that VUL. But that VUL significantly changed throughout the execution of the ULT.” [Encl. (55)]

297. On 26 January 2019, USMC, the VMFA(AW)-242 mishap schedule writer said, “So things had been changing to an extent and I was not surprised to hear that there was a tanker present even though I had not scheduled one.” [Encl. (135)]

298. USMC, the Officer in Charge (OIC) Marine Aviation Training Systems Site (MATSS) Iwakuni, said, “I think there was a lot of confusion in the exercise at the squadron level versus the MAG level there [at VMFA(AW)-242].” [Encl. (139)]

299. USMC, Operations Officer (OPSO), VMGR-152, went to planning meetings routinely at MAG-12. [Encl. (140)]

300. OPSO, VMGR-152, attended the meetings where the OPSO, MAG-12, was present, or when a friction point was being addressed. [Encl. (140)]

301. OPSO, VMGR-152, was not surprised that AAR was being conducted during the mishap flight. [Encl. (140)]

302. OPSO, VMGR-152, expected the AAR mission and had it scheduled for the night of the mishap. [Encl. (140)]

303. OPSO, VMGR-152 said of 5 December 2018, “The plan had changed dramatically that day due to the national day of mourning for George H. W. Bush. We were planning on flying pre-established flows through the whole exercise. We had flown those flows from the squadron level on Monday and Tuesday completely, and it was a huge confidence builder for our squadron. Generated 37 sorties over the course of two days, which was amazing. It was awesome stuff and we were so fired up. And then we got told that we could not fly air-to-air refueling sorties on

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15 VUL stands for “vulnerability window” which means the time period an aircraft plans on being on station.
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Wednesday and our schedule got changed due to the national day of mourning. And we were only allowed to fly assault transport sorties into Pohang that day; however, we were clear to resume air-to-air refueling operations after midnight on the night into morning of the fifth into the sixth on Wednesday.” [Encl. (140)]

304. [b] (3) (A), (b) [b] the VMGR-152 schedule writer and Flight Duty Officer (FDO), when asked if she believed NSAAR to be planned for the mishap event by the KC-130 crews responded with: “I was expecting that.” [Encl. (134)]

305. VMGR-152 had field grade officers assigned to the mishap flight. [Encl. (72)]

306. OPSO, VMGR-152 conducted a squadron level MAG ULT confirmation brief on 30 November 2018. [Encl. (140)]


307. At VMFA(AW)-242 the objective for flights hours per pilot per 90 days is 60 hours or more. [Encl. (28)]

308. As of 13 December 2018 not one pilot at VMFA(AW)-242 had met the minimum flight hours requirement in the last 30, 60, or 90 days. [Encl. (28)]

309. As of 28 January 2019, the average total flight time for the last 90 days for all pilots at VMFA(AW)-242 was 10.4 hours. [Encl. (75)]

310. [b] (3) (A), (b) [b] USMC, a pilot in VMFA(AW)-242, stated, “I’ve only got about 20 hours in this last six months. Without looking at our records right now, but I know most of our air crew are in the same situation right now, sir.” [Encl. (133)]

311. VMFA(AW)-242 flew 28% below Marine Corps average F/A-18 flight hours in FY2018. [Encl. (25)]

312. VMFA(AW)-242 flew 51% below Marine Corps average F/A-18 flight hours in FY2019 to date as of January 2019. [Encl. (25)]

313. On 13 December 2018, in response to questions about time critical risk management, MP1 stated “I have determined that based on ORM, I am the long pole in the tent with 1.4 [hours] in 30 [days]; I haven't tanked in 30 days. Again, I go back to my experience level, with that I have probably gone to the tanker, and during those times - or excuse me -- probably might tanked 400/500 times, and the fair majority of those coming at the hours that we were going flying. I felt comfortable.” [Encl. (52)]
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314. On 13 December 2018, in response to questions about currency and time critical risk
management MP1 stated “I was the least current in the [mishap] flight. I had 1.4 hours in 30
days. [MP2], I believe, it was over 10, I think it’s 11 point something. And then as far as the
WSO's currency, I don't recall off the top of my head as my primary concern was the pilot
currency.” [Encl. (52)]

315. On 13 December 2018, in response to questions about currency and risk management MP1
stated “There is no currency that we really honor in the [fighter] community for a 2202, other
than being night current.” [Encl. (52)]

316. On 7 July 2017, MP2 flew his initial NSAAR T&R code 2202. [Encl. (21)]

317. On 7 July 2017, VMFA(AW)-242 flight schedule includes times of moonrise and moonset,
low light level time period, and illumination percentage. [Encl. (21)]

318. On 5 December 2018, VMFA(AW)-242 flight schedule does not include times of moonrise
and moonset, low light level time period, or illumination percentage. [Encl. (21)]

319. On 7 July 2017, VMFA(AW)-242 flight schedule includes a review by the VMFA(AW)-
242 safety department. [Encl. (21)]

320. On 7 July 2017, VMFA(AW)-242 flight schedule includes review by the VMFA(AW)-242
operations department. [Encl. (21)]

321. On 7 July 2017, VMFA(AW)-242 flight schedule includes review by the VMFA(AW)-242
maintenance department. [Encl. (21)]

322. On 5 December 2018, VMFA(AW)-242 flight schedule does not include review by the
VMFA(AW)-242 safety department. [Encl. (21), (129)]

323. On 5 December 2018, VMFA(AW)-242 flight schedule does not include review by the
VMFA(AW)-242 operations department. [Encl. (21), (129)]

324. On 5 December 2018, VMFA(AW)-242 flight schedule does not include review by the
VMFA(AW)-242 maintenance department. [Encl. (21), (129)]

325. On 7 July 2017, VMFA(AW)-242 flight schedule includes NSAAR T&R code 2202.
[Encl. (21)]

326. On 5 December 2018, VMFA(AW)-242 flight schedule does not include NSAAR T&R
code 2202. [Encl. (21)]

327. On 7 July 2017, VMFA(AW)-242 flight schedule includes tanker notes. [Encl. (21)]
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328. On 5 December 2018, VMFA(AW)-242 flight schedule does not include tanker notes. [Encl. (21)]

329. On 7 July 2017, VMFA(AW)-242 flight schedule includes a Naval Aviation Training and Operations Standardization (NATOPS) Question of the Day (QOD). [Encl. (21)]

330. On 5 December 2018, VMFA(AW)-242 flight schedule does not include a Naval Aviation Training and Operations Standardization (NATOPS) Question of the Day (QOD). [Encl. (21)]


332. On 5 December 2018, VMFA(AW)-242 flight schedule does not include an Emergency Question of the Day (EQOD). [Encl. (21)]

333. The following MAG-11 fighter squadrons: VMFAT-101, VMFA-232 and VMFA(AW)-225, flight schedules include review and signatures by their respective safety, operations, and maintenance divisions, and by their Commanding Officers. [Encl. (73), (112), (113)]

334. The MAG-11 squadron, VMFA-314, flight schedules include only the Commanding Officer’s signature. [Encl. (114)]

335. MAG-31’s flight schedules are signed by only the Commanding Officer. [Encl. (145)]

336. MAG-31’s flight schedules are, however, accompanied with ORM worksheets signed by the OPSO, DOSS, and CO. [Encl. (145)]

337. MSCO’s previous assignment was as a Marine Weapons and Tactics Squadron – One Instructor who was tasked with providing the highest level of Risk Management training and certifications in the Marine Corps. [Encl. (51)]

338. On 25 January 2019 the MSCO was interviewed and asked to describe the ORM process. He could not describe the ORM process or how ORM was integrated into his flight schedule production process. [Encl. (51)]

339. The MSXO was not assigned in writing the responsibility for execution of the safety program as required by reference (f). [Ref. (f), Encl. (89)]

340. When interviewed on 26 March 2019, the MSXO stated, “I’m the head of the safety program.” [Encl. (136)]

341. When interviewed on 26 March 2019, the MSXO was asked, “in your time as the XO for about four to five months before the mishap, how often was the flight schedule brought to you for review before the commanding officer saw it?” MSXO responded “Not often, sir. Minimal.
Mostly when the schedule writer would do his normal walk and then he'd take it to the CO.” [Encl. (136)]

342. MSASO was designated in writing on 25 May 2018 as the Squadron’s Aviation Safety Officer. [Encl. (120)]

343. MSASO was promoted to the rank of Captain in February 2011, and has not been selected for promotion to Major multiple times. [Encl. (122)]

344. When interviewed on 25 January 2019, the MSOPSO explained “Approval of flight schedule changes would be the top five. It doesn't matter what crew it's coming from. That would be CO, XO, OPSO, AMO. And in special circumstances, the DOSS, I suppose.” [Encl. (55)]

345. MSOPSO’s previous assignment was as Marine Weapons and Tactics Squadron – One Instructor pilot tasked with providing the highest level of Night Systems Instructor training and certifications in the Marine Corps. [Encl. (55)]

346. When interviewed on 25 January 2019 and asked about Night Vision Cueing and Display (NVCD)\textsuperscript{16} training, MSOPSO explained “[s]o no dedicated syllabus for it. It was just, Hey, here’s this new piece of gear.” [Encl. (55)]

347. MSOPSO was not familiar with the term “eye box” in his interview. [Encl. (55)]

348. MSOPSO described the diopter adjustment on the AN/AVS-9 as providing no benefit. [Encl. (55)]

349. MSOPSO said he would have approved the schedule change for MP2 to go the tanker if MP1 had called him. [Encl. (55)]

350. On 24 January 2019, USMC, a senior WSO and a Top Gun graduate in VMFA(AW)-242, when asked about anti-exposure suit wear in the context of this mishap, replied, “68 degree water, no.” When asked at night? He replied, “[n]o.” When asked even if it was in the context of this mishap, so 2 a.m., 200 miles offshore you would also not be wearing a dry suit? He replied, “[n]o. 68 degree water, I wouldn't wear it. They're a huge pain. Do you know what I mean?” [Encl. (138)]

\textsuperscript{16} The Night Vision Cueing and Display (NVCD) is an additional capability to the Joint Helmet Mounted Cueing System (JHMCS) allowing the cueing of weapons and sensors at night while also providing the JHMCS standard “head up display” data over the eye in addition to camera video recording of the pilot’s viewpoint. The NVCD is designed to allow near day time tactics at night.
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351. In response to the question from how long would take from when a pilot initiated ejection 162 nautical miles (nm) from MCAS-I until a SAR vehicle (helicopter) would be overhead to effect a recovery of a downed crewman, USMC, a senior pilot in VMFA(AW)-242 and the squadron DOSS until November 2018, stated, “I think it's 60 minutes.”17 [Encl. (141)]

352. On 24 January 2019, when asked the question “How did you participate in the ULT? What was your role?” USMC, a senior pilot and the Assistant OPSO in VMFA(AW)-242, responded “I was just a pilot. Aircrew, in it.” [Encl. (142)]

353. The HQMC Safety Division Strategy for Aircrew/Flight Excellence (SAFE) Swiss Cheese model of 24 August 2018 is used for risk analysis and risk management. The model depicts many layers of defense between hazards and accidents. When there are flaws (holes) in each layer (slices) that align, accidents can occur. [Encl. (146)]

c. VMGR-152 Flight Operations, Training, Scheduling, Human Factors Monitoring, and Risk Management Practices

354. CO, VMGR-152 reviews all the information on the flight schedule. [Encl. (137)]

355. CO, VMGR-152 is “the last, the final sanity check” for the flight schedule. [Encl. (137)]

356. VMGR-152 flight schedules are reviewed and signed by air crew training where proficiency of air crew is verified and appropriate personnel (i.e. instructors) are assigned to the mission. [Encl. (72), (137)]

357. VMGR-152 flight schedules are reviewed and signed by DOSS, which utilizes M-SHARP as well as an organic tracker. [Encl. (72), (137)]

358. VMGR-152 flight schedules are reviewed and signed by the OPSO. [Encl. (72), (137)]

359. VMGR-152 flight schedules are reviewed and signed by the aviation maintenance officer (AMO). [Encl. (72), (137)]

360. VMGR-152 flight schedules include a risk assessment worksheet. [Encl. (72)]

G. Night Vision Goggle utilization during nighttime AAR

361. The VMFA(AW)-242 mishap aircrews were using the NVCD, ANVS-11 (model number) night vision goggles. [Encl. (52)]

17 From ejection to recovery of MWSO2 took about four hours. [Encl. (34), (54)]
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362. [b] (3) (A) [Encl. (35-36), (96)]

363. [b] (3) (A) [Encl. (36)]

364. [b] (3) (A) [Encl. (36)]

365. [b] (3) (A) [Encl. (35-36), (42), (96)]

366. [b] (3) (A) [Encl. (36)]

367. [b] (3) (A) [Encl. (35-37), (52), (55), (103)]

368. [b] (3) (A) [Encl. (102)]

**II. April 2016 Class C mishap parallels to the December 2018 Class A mishap**

369. During the course of this investigation it was discovered a midair collision occurred under similar conditions in 2016. [Encl. (132)]

370. A separate investigation was conducted. The investigation showed that on 28 April 2016 there was a Class C aviation mishap between a F/A-18D from VMFA(AW)-242 and a KC-130J from VMGR-152. [Encl. (150)]

371. The cause of the midair collision was the mishap pilot’s (hereinafter referred to as “MP2016”) flight control inputs, which caused the mishap aircraft to turn into the mishap tanker (MT2016), make contact with the fuel drogue, and shear off a portion of the MT2016 hose and the fuel drogue. [Encl. (40), (150)]

372. The investigation showed that there were failures in VMFA(AW)-242’s mission planning, operational risk management, and risk assessment that contributed to the Class C aviation mishap. The investigation also demonstrated that there were improper baselining of event codes and erroneous chaining of event codes for the MP2016 prior to the mishap flight. [Encl. (150)]

373. The investigation showed that the leadership of MAG-12, VMFA(AW)-242, and VMGR-152 undervalued the cost estimates of the damage from the aviation mishap. [Encl. (150)]
374. There was a delay in convening the Aviation Mishap board (AMB), which was eventually convened on 16 June 2016. [Encl. (150)]

375. Prior to the 2019 command investigation (Encl. 150), there was no administrative investigation into the 28 April 2016 Class C mishap as required by JAGINST 5800.7F and OPNAVINST 3750.6S. [Encl. (150)]

376. The F/A-18 mission in 2016 was flying in the vicinity of Kadena Air Force Base (AFB) Okinawa, Japan. The light level for Kadena AFB on 28 April 2016 was low light level (LLL)(no moon). [Encl. (95), (150)]

377. The light level for MCAS Iwakuni on 5 December 2018 was LLL. [Encl. (72)]

378. MP2 and MP2016 were both conducting LLL NSAAR for the first time. [Encl. (21), (150)]

379. MP2 and MP2016 were not scheduled for NSAAR T&R code 2202 during their respective mishaps. [Encl. (21), (150)]

380. The mishap flight schedules from 2016 and 2018 did not include review by operations officers, safety officers or maintenance representatives. [Encl. (21), (150)]

381. The mishap flight schedules from 2016 and 2018 exclude flight notes with tanker details. [Encl. (21), (150)]

382. The mishap flight schedules from 2016 and 2018 exclude NQOD and EQOD. [Encl. (21), (150)]

383. The mishap flight schedules from 2016 and 2018 lack solar lunar data. [Encl. (21), (150)]

384. The mishap flight schedules from 2016 and 2018 did not use a Risk Assessment Worksheet (RAW). [Encl. (21), (52-54), (150)]

385. Both MP2 and MP2016 erroneously showed “green” for NSAAR T&R code2202 in M-SHARP during scheduling validation due to chaining error. [Encl. (21), (150)]

386. MP2 and MP2016 attempted to arrive and/or depart in the KC-130J in a non-standard manner. [Encl. (52-54), (150)]

387. MP2 and MP2016 conducted fuel transfer while wearing night vision goggles. [Encl. (52-54), (150)]
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388. MP2016’s F/A-18 came within approximately 5-10 feet from colliding with the KC-130 tanker refueler. MP2’s F/A-18 collided with the rear of the KC-130 that it was refueling from. [Encl. (56)]

I. **Sumo 41 Cockpit Voice Recorder Transcript Excerpts**


390. Recorder elapsed time 01:07:11 Tanker Common: Sumo 41, “That is approved as requested.” [Encl. (153)]


393. Recorder elapsed time 01:07:19 Sumo 41 intercom: “11 is moving to the right – echelon.” [Encl. (153)]

394. Recorder elapsed time 01:07:27 Tanker Common: Sumo 41, “And... 11, you have a bu no for me?” [Encl. (153)]


397. Recorder elapsed time 01:07:41 Sumo 41 intercom: “and...11 is stable right echelon.” [Encl. (153)]


399. Recorder elapsed time 01:08:23 Tanker Common: Sumo 41, “Profane 12 looks like you are complete approved to echelon right.” [Encl. (153)]

400. Recorder elapsed time 01:08:29 Sumo 41 intercom: “uh, oh, was it intentional?” [Encl. (153)]

401. Recorder elapsed time 01:08:31 Tanker Common: Profane 12, “request echelon left if able.” [Encl. (153)]

402. Recorder elapsed time 01:08:34 Tanker Common: Sumo 41, “That’s approved. And, uh, what are you guys up to tonight?” [Encl. (153)]
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405. Recorder elapsed time 01:08:42 Tanker Common: Sumo 41, “Hey, uh, you guys coming back at all?” [Encl. (153)]

406. Recorder elapsed time 01:08:44 Tanker Common: Profane 11, “Uh, we are thinking about it. Whatta ya think? You guys got enough gas for us?” [Encl. (153)]


409. Recorder elapsed time 01:08:53 Sumo 41 intercom: “12 moving to the left echelon.” [Encl. (153)]

410. Recorder elapsed time 01:08:54 Tanker Common: Profane 11, “We are gonna go blow the burners a little.” [Encl. (153)]


412. Recorder elapsed time 01:08:59 Tanker Common: Profane 12, “yeah, uh Profane 12, side number 11, buno 165416.” [Encl. (153)]


414. Recorder elapsed time 01:09:12 Sumo 41 intercom: “What the hell do these guys....” [Encl. (153)]

415. Recorder elapsed time 01:09:16 Tanker Common: Profane 11, “If you guys will go ahead and start a left turn the middle of the area we will give you a little show on the way out.” [Encl. (153)]


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418. Recorder elapsed time 01:09:23 – 01:09:55 Sumo 41 intercom “are they gonna fucking burn by both of us on each side? Dude I was about to ask like can they do something cool like we used to? Nobody does that shit anymore. Never. I fucking like it guys. Excited. [TCAS: Traffic. Traffic.] Whata you say a left turn to, uh back towards ah, actually this is perfect. 12 is crossing over the top from left to right. Oh.. sheeitt….what they gonna do? Visual on one. There you go [b] (3) “ [Encl. (153)]

419. Recorder elapsed time 01:10:00 Sumo 41 intercom: wind noise and non-descript hollering. [Encl. (153), (156)]

J. Identification of recovered remains

420. On 14 June 2019 the Armed Forces Medical Examiner reported that an analysis of recovered remains from Sumo 41 recovery operations yielded a positive identification of [b] (3) [Encl. (155)]

421. On 16 June 2019 the Armed Forces Medical Examiner reported that an analysis of recovered remains from Sumo 41 recovery operations yielded a positive identification of [b] (3) [A] [Encl. (155)]

422. On 16 June 2019 the Armed Forces Medical Examiner reported that an analysis of recovered remains from Sumo 41 recovery operations yielded a positive identification of [b] [Encl. (155)]

423. As of 19 June 2019 the Armed Forces Medical Examiner has not been able to identify the remains of either [b] (6) [b] or [b] (3) [A]. The Armed Forces Medical Examiner has indicated the likelihood of identifying [b] (6) [b] and [b] (3) [A] is extremely low. [Encl. (155)]

Opinions

A. Line of Duty Determinations

1. MP2 died in the line of duty (LOD) not due to his own misconduct. [FF. (14-101)]

2. MWSO2’s injuries occurred in the LOD not due to his own misconduct. [FF. (14-101)]

B. Causal Factor

3. On 6 December 2018, at approximately 0142, Profane 12 completed NSAAR and detached from Sumo 41. MP2 subsequently lost situational awareness and impacted the empennage (rear portion) of Sumo 41. MP2’s flight control inputs caused the mishap aircraft to collide with stabilized formation leader, Sumo 41. The collision damaged the KC-130J elevator control surfaces to the point that Sumo 41 was uncontrollable. Sumo 41 pitched nose down and
impact the water at high speed. The collision also damaged the F/A-18D to the point that Profane 12 was uncontrollable and the crew ejected. [FF. (14-101)]

C. Significant Contributing Factors

4. There were several contributing factors that led to MP2 being placed in the situation where he lost situational awareness and collided with the tail section of Sumo 41. Specifically, there were four significant contributing factors that led to MP2’s loss of situational awareness and impact into Sumo 41: (1) MP2’s lack of proficiency with NSAAR; (2) inadequate supervision by VMFA(AW)-242; (3) MP2’s consistent below average performance; and (4) the unprofessional command climate at VMFA(AW)-242.

a. MP2’s Lack of Proficiency with NSAAR. The primary contributing link to the chain of events that led to the tragic mishap was the fact that MP2 was not qualified or current to perform a NSAAR T&R code 2202 event (nighttime aerial refueling) on 6 December 2018. The mishap flight was MP2’s first exposure to a night tanker since his initial training on 7 July 2017. A series of failures, on multiple levels, led to MP2 attempting a NSAAR T&R code 2202 event on 6 December 2018.

(1) Insufficient Contacts for Initial NSAAR T&R 2202 Code. Prior to the mishap, MP2 and his instructor incorrectly certified that MP2 completed NSAAR T&R code 2202 event. Completion of NSAAR T&R code 2202 code requires six nighttime contacts with the fuel drogue. However, MP2 only completed one out of six nighttime contacts with the fuel drogue, which was insufficient to receive qualification and proficiency for the initial NSAAR T&R 2202 code.

(2) Insufficient Contacts for Initial AAR T&R 2201 Code. AAR T&R 2201 code is a prerequisite for NSAAR T&R 2202 code. After MP2’s initial AAR T&R code 2201 event, MP2 and his instructor incorrectly certified that MP2 completed his initial AAR T&R code 2201 event. Completion of AAR T&R code 2201 requires six daytime contacts with the fuel drogue. However, MP2 only completed one out of six daytime contacts with the fuel drogue, which was insufficient to receive qualification and proficiency for the initial AAR T&R 2201 code.

(3) Erroneous Chaining of M-SHARP. Then, M-SHARP erroneously updated MP2’s proficiency period for NSAAR T&R code 2202 nine times between 7 July 2017 and 3 August 2018 through chaining events of RQD-6109 and RQD-6111. Because of erroneous chaining, M-SHARP showed that MP2 was qualified for NSAAR despite not having conducted NSAAR for 517 days (the proficiency period is 365 days).

(4) Less than the Minimum Flight Hours. As of 5 December 2018, MP2 had only flown 13.1 hours in the previous 90 days. 13.1 flight hours is 47 flight hours less than the minimum required 60 flight hours to be “in the green” in M-SHARP.
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(5) VMFA(AW)-242 leadership subsequently failed to identify that MP2 was not NSAAR T&R code 2202 qualified on 5 December 2018 because MP2 only completed one out of six requisite daytime contacts with the fuel drogue for AAR T&R 2201 code and one out of six requisite nighttime contacts with the fuel drogue for NSAAR T&R 2202 code. MP2 did not report that he was not NSAAR T&R code 2202 qualified on 5 December 2018 after the schedule change that added the aerial refueling mission to the flight schedule. Five hundred seventeen (517) days elapsed from MP2’s previous NSAAR T&R code 2202 event and the mishap flight. To compound this tragic situation, and despite all of MP2’s qualification and proficiency issues, during the NSAAR MP1 placed MP2 in a non-standard departure pattern/formation egress from Sumo 41 in the moments leading up to the mishap. Taken together, the chain of events that led to MP2 being called upon to perform a LLL refueling evolution for which he was unqualified and not proficient, significantly contributed to this mishap. [FF. (14), (102-188)]

b. Inadequate Supervision. The second contributing link to the chain of events was the inadequate supervision by multiple levels of leadership within VMFA(AW)-242. During the Unit Level Training (ULT), there was inadequate supervision by MP1, MWSO2, MSXO, MSOPSO, and the MSCO.

(1) Background – Lack of Experience and Seniority. During ULT, VMFA(AW)-242 divided its officers into three cells in order to conduct twenty-four hour operations (a day cell, a mid-day cell, and a night cell). MP1, MP2, MWSO1, and MWSO2 were all captains. In fact, all officers on the night cell were captains. VMFA(AW)-242 had seven field grade officers assigned to the squadron during ULT, but there was no field grade officer assigned to the night cell. Consequently, no senior leadership was scheduled to supervise the most dangerous operational period – the night cell. No senior leadership authorized the last minute schedule change (adding the NSAAR), supervised the subsequent ad hoc planning to accommodate the schedule change, or observed the mishap flight-brief (a brief that lasted only 10 minutes). On the night of the mishap, the MSXO passed MP1 in the hallway as MSXO was securing for the evening. MP1 told him about the NSAAR, but the MSXO did not inquire into the schedule change or attend the preflight brief. The MSXO only replied "roger" when told about the NSAAR. The unsupervised, abbreviated flight brief did not cover operational risk management (ORM), use of anti-exposure suits, weather conditions, or discuss any of MP2’s qualifications. MP1 did not prepare MP2 for a non-standard formation and did not allow him time to prepare for the NSAAR T&R code 2202 event. MP1 failed to obtain the VMFA(AW)-242 Commanding Officer’s signature for the change in the flight schedule and authorization to conduct NSAAR T&R code 2202. Both MP1 and MWSO2 (the two most senior captains present on 5 December 2018) were experiencing sleep and fatigue issues during ULT. These sleep and fatigue issues were a result of being assigned to the night shift and other human factors. Both MP1 and MWSO2 were wrongfully using prescription medication, which in turn, impacted their decision making ability. Because of MP2’s previous performance issues and lack of proficiency for NSAAR T&R code 2202, VMFA(AW)-242’s leadership should have paid close attention to his training, especially for a LLL NSAAR. VMFA(AW)-242 leadership’s failure to adequately
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supervise its junior officers is a contributing factor to the mishap. [FF. (32-34), (41-42), (102-134), (277-306)]

(2) MP1 failed his supervisory responsibilities. MP1 should have familiarized himself with MP2’s proficiency, qualifications, and experience in the conduct of NSAAR. As the third cell lead planner and section leader, MP1 knew the time and location of the mission in advance. From that information, MP1 should have checked the lunar light level, sea surface temperature, and SAR response timeline. MP1 directed the inexperienced MP2 to conduct a LLL NSAAR with inadequate time to prepare. MP1 failed at multiple levels: (1) to conduct a thorough and comprehensive pre-flight brief; (2) to apply personalized risk assessment that incorporated MP2’s qualifications and proficiency, real-time planning factors such as light levels and weather, and prerequisites for each coded event on the flight schedule; (3) to use experience-appropriate aeronautical decision making (with a bias towards safety); and, ultimately, (4) to make the appropriate decision not to execute an unscheduled NSAAR because it was not authorized by the MSCO on the daily flight schedule. [FF. (10), (26-188), (307-336)]

(3) MWS02 failed his crew responsibilities. MWS02 had neither a valid prescription nor permission to use any medications before or during the time of the mishap. However, his toxicology report found traces of two substances in his urine after the mishap. The interaction between the two substances are known to have side effects that would impact MWS02’s mental alertness and cognitive abilities. Had the flight surgeon known that MWS02 was taking those substances, he would have grounded MWS02. MWS02 demonstrated a substantial departure from the level of professionalism and integrity expected of a Marine Corps officer. [FF. (189-195), (200-212)]

(4) MSOPSO failed his fundamental responsibilities as the training manager, chief instructor pilot, and director of flight operations. Given MSOPSO’s training, qualifications, and experience, he should have known the capabilities and limitations of the pilots within his squadron. MSOPSO should have taken appropriate action to ensure safe flight operations in his squadron. MSOPSO failed to inform VMFA(AW)-242 leadership and aircrews that there was a NSAAR scheduled for 6 December 2018. Because tanker support was coordinated and VMGR-152 accurately reflected the request for night aerial refueling on their flight schedule, some form of coordination took place between VMGR-152 and VMFA(AW)-242 prior to the mission brief on 5 December 2018. [FF. (245-246), (269), (277-306)]

(5) MSCO failed his supervisory responsibilities. Between 2017 and 2018, MSCO reduced organizational scrutiny of the flight schedule and streamlined the flight schedule approval process at VMFA(AW)-242. After assuming command, MSCO also eliminated important data from the flight schedule. While these changes and deletions did not directly violate any governing directive and fell within the discretion of the commanding officer, they did contribute to the mishap. The MSCO’s decision to simplify the flight schedule approval process created a cavalier attitude among the squadron’s leadership with respect to flight schedule scrutiny and ad hoc changes. On 5 December 2018, this simplification enabled MP1 to approve
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a flight schedule change with no input from the MSCO, MSXO, or the MSOPSO. The simplification of the flight schedule caused confusion amongst the members of VMFA(AW)-242. Several officers interviewed for this investigation, to include the MSOPSO, were unable to correctly identify who had authority to change the flight schedule. [FF. (238-298)]

c. MP2’s Consistent Below Average Performance. The third contributing link to the chain of events was MP2’s consistent below average performance as a Naval Aviator. In short, MP2 was a struggling Naval Aviator with below average performance at flight school and the Fleet Replacement Squadron (FRS) Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 101 (VMFAT-101). Though his performance was below average, he displayed a positive attitude, was well-respected by his peers, and he was considered to be an extremely hard working Marine officer. Despite these positive attributes, he ranked 133 out of 139 pilot graduates. MP2 failed the prerequisites needed to attempt carrier qualification (CQ). Then, MP2’s CQ was later waived while at the FRS. MP2 had four unsatisfactory events at FRS, including (1) failure to follow correct procedures, (2) below average performance, (3) slow to conduct Immediate Action Procedures, and (4) below average system knowledge. MP2 completed pilot training with the FRS on 25 April 2017. Following FRS, MP2 was the subject of a performance review board and was required to complete significant remedial training. Upon completion of the remedial training, MP2 transferred to VMFA(AW)-242 at MCAS-I. MP2’s consistent below average flight performance and capabilities as a Naval Aviator were contributing factors to the mishap. [FF. (144-188)]

d. Unprofessional Command Climate at VMFA(AW)-242. The final contributing link to the chain of events that led to the 6 December 2018 mishap was the command climate of VMFA(AW)-242. The MSCO, MSXO, MSOPSO, and other field grade officers fostered a squadron environment of gross unprofessionalism. VMFA(AW)-242’s squadron culture created pervasive normalization of deviance. There was a broad disregard of basic flight operations orders and directives. The conduct of the officers of VMFA(AW)-242 fell below the professionalism expected of Marine Corps officers. Evidence discovered after the mishap uncovered that VMFA(AW)-242 officers engaged in conduct that included: prescription drug seeking behavior, the wrongful use of prescription and over-the-counter drugs, excessive alcohol consumption, adultery, sexually explicit call signs, orders violations, and failures in following fundamental principles of professional aviation training and operations. The squadron command climate created nonchalant attitudes towards safety and standardization, which contributed to the mishap by fostering an atmosphere where ad hoc, unscheduled flight schedule changes were not properly authorized, planned for, and executed. The pre-flight brief of 5 December 2018 was truncated to a point of irrelevance. Overall, VMFA(AW)-242’s planning and preparation for the 2018 MAG ULT was conducted in a confused and dangerous fashion with an almost willful disregard for basic risk management practices. [FF. (189-276)]
D. Additional Contributing Factors

5. Inappropriate Distribution of Flight Schedules. The use of the messaging application “WhatsApp” is not an appropriate means to distribute information regarding squadron operations such as the flight schedule. [FF. (103)]

6. Lack of Organic SAR Capabilities. The lack of organic search and rescue (SAR) at MCAS-I is problematic. If MCAS-I had organic SAR capabilities they could have been integrated into the flight mission for a more immediate response following the mishap. [FF. (52-101)]

7. The addition of un-briefed, unnecessary, and non-standard tanker arrivals and departures elevates risk and does not have an associated benefit to training and readiness capabilities. They are, therefore, unnecessary risks and conducted solely for the purposes of thrill and entertainment. [FF. (399-419)]

E. Possible Contributing Factors

8. Use of NCVD, ANVS-11. Headquarters Marine Corps Aviation’s failure to recognize and mitigate the risk of TACAIR NSAAR (with goggles down in close formation) set the preconditions for this mishap. This known risk was compounded by the MP2’s lack of experience with night vision goggles and the LLL. While not causal, the utilization and fielding of the NCVD, ANVS-11 during tactical refueling operations creates an unnecessary risk due to the structural limitations and the performance of this device in LLL conditions. While a direct link of causation is not identified with total certainty, the reduced performance of the NCVD, ANVS-11 in LLL conditions as compared to the ANVS-9 (the device upon which these NSAAR practices were developed) merits both concern and action. The conditions during the mishap were LLL. Finally, the VMFA(AW)-242 aircrews interviewed lacked knowledge of this material limiting factor created by the reduced collection surface of the smaller NCVD, ANVS-11 tubes. [FF. (26-27), (361-368)]

9. A Missing Mishap Investigation. If the mishap that occurred in 2016 had been investigated as required, remedial measures could have been properly implemented to prevent future similar mishaps, like this one. [Encl. (369-388)]

Recommendations

1. Appropriate administrative and/or disciplinary action be taken against and for their collective failures to lead,
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train, supervise, set the example, and ensure the safety of others in the conduct of flight operations.

3. Appropriate administrative action be taken against (b) (3) (A), (b) (6) for violating the T&R by erroneously certifying MP2 as both AAR T&R code 2201 and NSAAR T&R code 2202 qualified without meeting the criteria of six daytime contacts and six nighttime contacts.

4. Appropriate administrative action be taken against (b) (3) (A), (b) (6) MAG-12 Commanding Officer, for failures to effectively lead planning and then fully supervise execution in order to assure the safety of all concerned.

5. 1st MAW conducts annual full spectrum SAR exercises with all available host nations and joint assets to ensure that capabilities, capacities, limitations, and lines of communication are well known and current.

6. 1st MAW develops a Memorandum of Understanding with the Government of Japan to define roles and responsibilities associated with SAR operations.

7. 1st MAW requests the Deputy Commandant Aviation (DCA) create organic SAR capability for MCAS-1 to ensure Marines are protected while training.

8. 1st MAW requests the DCA reevaluate the current policy allowing the conduct of TACAIR NSAAR with night vision goggles down.

9. 1st MAW requests the DCA develop an aviation community specific Risk Assessment Worksheet (RAW) and an associated Marine Corps Order that directs the use of the RAW.

10. 1st MAW requests the DCA conduct fleet-wide Aerial Refueling standardization and professionalism training.

11. 1st MAW requests Naval Air Systems Command with the Commander Operational Test & Evaluation Force to reevaluate the NVCD (ANVS-11) and provide detailed fleet information about the limitations of this system.

12. 1st MAW requests the Commanding General, Training and Education Command, conduct a one-time review of M-SHARP chaining integrity for all T/M/S and T&R manuals.
From: Commanding General, 1st Marine Aircraft Wing  
To: [Redacted] USMC  
Subj: COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE AVIATION MISHAP OF A F/A-18D FROM MARINE ALL-WEATHER FIGHTER ATTACK SQUADRON 242 AND A KC-130J FROM MARINE AERIAL REFUELER TRANSPORT SQUADRON 152 ON 6 DECEMBER 2018 OFF THE COAST OF JAPAN  
Ref: (a) 10 U.S.C. §§ 2254-2255  
(b) JAGINST 5800.7F  

1. This letter appoints you to inquire into the facts and circumstances surrounding the aviation mishap involving a F/A-18D from Marine All-Weather Fighter Attack Squadron 242 (VMFA(AW)-242) and a KC-130J from Marine Aerial Refueler Transport Squadron 152 (VMGR-152) off the coast of Japan on 6 December 2018. This Command Investigation is convened to investigate the circumstances surrounding a Class A mishap in compliance with 10 U.S.C. §§ 2254-2255. Reference (a) pertains.

2. You are directed to investigate the aviation mishap, the resulting damage to the aircraft, and any other military property so affected, and the injury or death of any servicemember. In accordance with reference (a), if the evidence surrounding the mishap is sufficient for your investigation to come to an opinion (or opinions) as to the cause or causes of the mishap, the final report of the mishap investigation shall set forth the opinion (or opinions) of the investigator as to the cause or causes of the mishap. If the evidence surrounding the mishap is not sufficient for your investigation to come to an opinion as to the cause or causes of the mishap, then the final report of the mishap investigation shall include a description of those factors, if any, which, in the opinion of the investigator, substantially contributed to or caused the mishap. Reference (a) pertains.

3. Provide a recommendation regarding a line of duty/misconduct determination for each injured or deceased servicemember. Additionally, investigate the search and rescue operation conducted immediately following the mishap and the subsequent recovery operation.

4. Investigate any fault, neglect, or responsibility thereof, and recommend appropriate administrative or disciplinary action. Report your findings of fact, opinions, and recommendations in writing, via letter form, within 60 days from the date of this appointment order, unless an extension of time is granted. If you have not previously done so, read Chapter II of reference (b) in its entirety before beginning your investigation. Reference (b) pertains.

5. This investigation is your primary duty and takes precedence over your regularly assigned duties until complete. You are directed to consult with a member of the Armed Forces or an
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officer or employee of the Department of Defense who possesses knowledge and expertise relevant to aviation mishap investigations.

6. Other investigative team members may be added to provide necessary expertise or administrative support, as required. [b] [3] [A], [b] [6] USMC, a judge advocate, is hereby appointed as Legal Advisor. You are directed to seek legal advice from him. You shall seek legal advice from the Staff Judge Advocate, 1st Marine Aircraft Wing prior to signing the mishap report.

7. During the conduct of this investigation, you are to observe the requirements of the Privacy Act, Article 31(b) of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, and paragraphs 0209, Parts E and F, and Appendix A-2-n of reference (b).

8. Note that there is a concurrent aviation mishap safety investigation into this incident. A JAGMAN investigation in accordance with reference (b) is considered collateral to the safety investigation. You are directed to ensure your investigation does not violate the privileged nature of the safety investigation. Specifically, you are prohibited from using privileged statements provided in conjunction with the aviation mishap safety investigation. No witness will be questioned regarding information provided to the aviation mishap safety investigation under the promise of confidentiality. Finally, you may not use the opinions, analysis, or conclusions of the aviation mishap safety investigation, or any subsequent endorsements thereof.

9. By copy of this appointing order, all staff sections and subordinate commanders are directed to furnish all necessary assistance.

10. The point of contact for this matter is 1st Marine Aircraft Wing Staff Judge Advocate, (b) [3] [A], (b) [6] [A], (b) [9] [A], and 315-645-4004.

Copy to:
CG, III MEF
CO, MAG-12
CO, VMFA 242
CO, VMGR-152
SJA, 1st MAW
File
**General Information**

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<td>This is an Aviation, Non-Injury, Non-Alcohol related incident. While conducting a night Air-to-Air refueling mission in the Tiger airspace, the F/A-18 aircrew heard a loud bang and noticed that the refueling hose was wrapped around their wing tip and no longer attached to the tanker. The aircrew successfully diverted into Kadena Air Base. The incident and the divert were conducted over water. This report has been reviewed by [b] (3) [A], [b] (6) VMFA(AW)-242 CO.</td>
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## Log Book for 12/1/2015 - 12/31/2018

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**REMOVAL DATE:** 01 JAN 2019

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FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
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**Total Grades**

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Overall Comments:
Front cockpit intro and flight in VMC conditions complete. Good work on the SID and RTB. Good understanding of required mission data input.

Last Modified By: (b) (3) (A), (b) on 4/13/2016 3:08:18 PM
**SYLLABUS EVENT GRADESHEET**

1/17/2019 10:45:52 AM

SYLL PHASE/ EVENT: PLT 1 TXN/ SFAM 102

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Total Grades 0 0 3 2 0 0 3

Overall Comments:
Initialize Hold Short engines off. WX 800/2. T-01 MOUSE, RTB via HI TACAN RWY 24R to roll and go 80 kts/4 board. Exit pattern for ATLAS to overhead. Practice T&Gs in the visual pattern and intro crosswind component on RWY 24L carrier box, then full stop on 24R. Good job with all checklist requirements, INS mission data entry, and solid flying for 2nd simulator event.

Last Modified By: (b) (3) (A), (b) on 4/15/2016 11:20:53 AM
SYLLABUS EVENT GRADESHEET

SYLL PHASE/ EVENT: PLT 1 TXN/ SFAM 103

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**Total Grades**

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Overall Comments:
Night/IMC instrument flight complete. Flew the LAKEE departure/ADUDE transition, then direct LOOTS for 1 turn in holding followed by a TACAN approach with ILS backup to a low approach, then enter GCA box pattern for a normal PAR to a T&G, and a PAR on the standby HUD to a full stop landing. No time for an ASR approach due to a miscommunication where he climbed to 14000 feet instead of 4K' on the first GCA box.

This was a solid one below for headwork for the first half of the flight. Instrument scan needs a lot of work. Airspeed was all over the place on the SID. When cleared to 16K' inbound from ADUDE to LOOTS, descended to 12.8K' before realizing his mistake. Totally messed up the 1 turn in holding and called commencing 3 miles before the IAF.

On the plus side, solid TACAN approach, PAR and PAR on stand-by HUD. Good job with all required PCL checklist items.

Last Modified By: (b) (3) (A), (b) on 4/20/2016 10:59:04 AM
# SYLLABUS EVENT GRADESHEET

1/17/2019 10:45:52 AM

## SYLL PHASE/ EVENT: PLT 1 TXN/ SFAM 104

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**Total Grades:** 0 0 3 2 0 0 3

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**Overall Comments:**

Good event for FLIGHT LINE ENG's off, WX 800/2 tops 6K. Ground/Start EPS: APU FIRE, RT OIL PSI ZERO, HUNG START RT; RATS, X-Bleed start the left, ENG FIRE LT, NWS then BRAKE FAILURE on taxi.

T/O 24L, Good ABORT for DUAL BLEED WARNING @ 108 KTS, good ABORT for MECH @ 154 KTS.

T01 RODEN P5 T03, VEC HI TAC NZY 36, touch and go, cleared WX, Depart and re-enter for the overhead 36, touch and go 36, TWR downwind full stop 36, taxi back with a partial shutdown.

RP gave the wrong BOLDFACE for LATS AIRBORN and on the SID early turned the HDNG 300* well prior to intercepting the 300* radial.

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Last Modified By: (b) (3) (A) on 4/21/2016 4:47:06 PM

Enclosure 6
**SYLLABUS EVENT GRADESHEET**

**SYLL PHASE/EVENT: PLT 1 TXN/ SFAM 105**  
Grade: 2.80

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Overall Comments:
SFAM 105 Complete. Average

Duplicate Gradesheet

Last Modified By: (b) (3) (A), (b) (6) on 7/27/2016 3:39:21 PM
SYLLABUS EVENT GRADESHEET

1/17/2019 10:45:52 AM

SYLL PHASE/EVENT: PLT 1 TXN/ SFAM 106
Grade: 3.00

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Total Grades

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Overall Comments:

Low average SFAM hop for (b) (3) (A), (b) (6). Well prepared for the brief. Good systems and procedures knowledge.

Lost 15 minutes at the beginning of the event to sim reboot and throttle rigging.

Ground ops - Twice moved FLAPS w/o coordination with P/C. Also doing a few things out of the PCL order which delayed getting to the CAS checks and releasing the P/C. Response to fuel system malfunctions OK.

T/O, abort decision and SW SID - Good decision to continue with CAUT DEGD above 100 knots. Able to reset SDC airborne. SID OK.

Good response to airborne fuel system malfunctions.

Hi TACAN RWY 24 at NUC. No ATIS, No request for MA instructions or FAF call until pimped. Big overshoot of inbound at BIREE. Weak scan - once back on course, drifted right until 0.4 NM. Then made heading correction back to left and held that correction until 0.1 left. Did not follow climb out instructions of "After completion of this approach, climb runway heading to 2,500 feet, then turn left to 180 and continue to climb until VMC on top. Report VMC on top." Leveled off at 2450 and turned to 180, until pimped.

Good recognition of Runaway R ENG. Got headed to NUC from P-6 and started to work the procedures. Brought base into the loop and got engine secured. Single engine procedures out of order and not properly followed. Discussed X-Bleed to get gear down, but then attempted to re-start vice X-Bleed. Then configured with FULL Flaps vice HALF and did not catch it on landing checks. Had to pimp. Then got to GW adjust. Not great planning for getting to NUC. Ended up 18 NM East for long straight in. Still at 4,100 feet at 5 DME. Very steep approach visual approach, but got...
Ended up 18 NM East for long straight in. Still at 4,100 feet at 5 DME. Very steep approach visual approach, but got it down to GS by about 1 NM from TD. Good arrested landing. Did not coordinate with NUC or question A-Gear status. A/C control was OK, but positioning and timeliness could have been better.

Bingo profile - Set up on 3 NM final to NKX to get as much of the bingo completed as possible in the shortened period. After MA, could have turned tighter to get NJK on the nose. By the time NUC was on the nose, the jet was above 12K and 350 Kts. A bit rough controlling A/S / mach in the climb. Froze the sim at the start of the descent.

Overall A/C control, instrument scan, instrument flight are not where we want at this event.
**SYLLABUS EVENT GRADESHEET**

1/17/2019 10:45:52 AM

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6)

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### SYLL PHASE/ EVENT: PLT 1 TXN/ SFAM 107

**Grade: 3.00**

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**Total Grades**

| 0 | 0 | 0 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 3 |

**Overall Comments:**
This was an average sim for (b) (3) (A), (b) (6)

All objectives met. Good working knowledge & application of normal & emergency procedures. Good airwork, headwork, & s/a.

Last Modified By: (b) (3) (A), (b) (6) on 6/20/2016 1:52:33 PM
## SYLLABUS EVENT GRADESHEET

1/17/2019 10:45:52 AM

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**Total Grades**

| 0 | 0 | 0 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 3 |

**Overall Comments:**
Good event for T01, P6, HI TAC 24 NUC. Marshal ENG’s off. RT ATS VALVE FAILED on start, EXT TANK, TK PRESS HI.

Good ABORT for DUAL BLEED WARNING @ 132kts.
Cabin pressurization failure, abbreviated combat checks, OBOGS DEGD, EXT TXFR and investigated Cruise Check from 30K then 40K.

Cockpit white smoke (TAC fire, would not fully clear, RP Jett Canopy), divert NUC for a GCA, in close received a LT BLEED WARNING (light went out after LT throttle off), executed SINGLE ENG checklist in accordance with NATOPS, hook skip, trapped long field gear NUC 24.

Discussed; HYPOXIA, COCKPIT TEMP HI, CABIN CAUTION LIGHT, WINDSHIELD HOT, AV AIR HOT and CK ECS CAUTION LIGHT.

Last Modified By: (b) (3) (A), (b) on 4/28/2016 4:00:09 PM

Enclosure 6
### SYLL PHASE/ EVENT: PLT 1 TXN/ SFAM 109

**Grade:** 3.40

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**Total Grades:** | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 2 | 0 | 3 |

**Overall Comments:** Good event with... A07 R2507N/S A22, Divert NJK. FCS CH 1 CB popped @ lift-off. Investigated multiple combinations of FCS channel failures. Investigated Gain Oride flaps auto/half and full. Investigated DEL/MECH turns/reversals, climbs/descents, clean/dirty. Investigated Mech after dirty configuration CAS. 2 Out of control, 3 Spins, 2 Unusual ATT. Investigated RT LEF Barn Door UP (Short Shaft). TEF failure divert to NJK, completed the full controllability check.

RP observed POSSUM’s event with a compound LEF failure combined with left PLANNING LINK failure for a fly-in arrest.

Last Modified By: on 5/5/2016 12:32:02 PM
### SYLLABUS EVENT GRADESHEET

1/17/2019 10:45:52 AM

**SYLL PHASE/EVENT: PLT 1 TXN/SFAM 110**

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**Total Grades**: 0 0 0 0 5 0 3

**Overall Comments:**
Intro to hydraulic system EPs and complex emergencies complete. Solid instrument flying on the SEAWOLF departure, practice TACAN approach to RWY 36 at NZY, and on the emergency divert from P-5 to North Island. Ground EP was brake failure out of the chocks. Handled correctly. Abort decision was a HYD 2A caution. Handled well. An RLS demo and practiced day aerobatics in preparation for FFAM 101 in P-5. The hyd/complex emergency was SDC/IFEI comm lost, followed by HYD 2A/1B and a L AMAD PR caution. Did not know how to clear the blinking IFEI with the SDC reset. The emergency was handled IAW NATOPS and using good judgment (turned off the left generator but did not shut down the engine in response to the L AMAD PR caution, so did not end up in a situation where he would have put himself in HYD 2A only situation). Be careful of doing some violent maneuvering to get slowed down on the extended centerline of the duty runway.

Last Modified By: (b) (3) (A), (b) on 5/4/2016 11:37:54 AM

Enclosure 6
SYLLABUS EVENT GRADESHEET

SYLL PHASE/ EVENT: PLT 1 TXN/ SFAM 111

Grade: 4.00

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Overall Comments:
Good event for (b) (3) (A), (b) (6), both in brief reviewing systems and flight conduct. T01 MOUSE NAOPA T03. Flight Line ENG OFF. Using the SLW function to build the NAOPA AREA. Completed G-Warm and the ACRO portion of the FAM 101 followed by HI TAC 24R NKX, LOW APP, depart ATLAS for the break 24R, 80 KT R & G, TWR downwind, 1X T & G, full stop 24R, LINE/ Shutdown.
SAFE TO FLY

Last Modified By: (b) (3) (A), (b) (6) on 5/5/2016 12:53:26 PM

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6)
**SYLLABUS EVENT GRADESHEET**

SYLL PHASE/EVENT: PLT 1 TXN/FFAM 101

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Total Grades: 0 0 3 2 0 0 3

Overall Comments:
Nice flight for [b] (3) (A), (b) (6) today. FFAM 101. Executed the conduct per the card.

Ground Ops:  [b] (3) (A), (b) (6)

- Keep staying busy. Try to keep the PC moving and finding time to accomplish everything we need to. No major issues, there was just some time where we could have been doing things and weren't.
- Be hard on yourself with tail pipe courtesy. Tendency was to not gain enough speed prior to the turn and then keep the power up throughout the turn. Don't make this a habit. Get enough speed to turn, then bring the throttles back and then execute the turn.

No major issues on the departure or en-route to the area. If you need to slow things down because you are getting a little behind the jet, don't be afraid to pull a little bit of power.

Following the hi work, executed T+Gs at KNUC. No major issues, and everything was safe. All day [b] (3) (A), (b) (6) was doing a nice job walking the throttles. Keep it up. No lens at KNUC or KNKX.

Following T+Gs brought it back home for the overhead. No major issues. Work hard to conserve your fuel. Use FPAS. Once you are level, set max range and then use your pilot relief modes.

Overall real nice flight. No major issues noted. Keep it up.

Welcome to the Hornet!
[b] (3) (A), (b) (6)
SYLLABUS EVENT GRADESHEET

SYLL PHASE/EVENT: PLT 1 TXN/ FFAM 102  Grade: 2.60

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Overall Comments:
FFAM 102 **PASS/COMPLETE**

Route:
Stereo route I15/I33
KNKX-KNYL-KNKX

Last Modified By: (b) (3) (A), (b) (6) on 5/10/2016 6:42:12 PM
**SYLLABUS EVENT GRADESHEET**

1/17/2019 10:45:52 AM

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Overall Comments:

**FFAM 103 **PASS/COMPLETE**

Route:
Stereo route I13/I33 KNKX-KNYL-KNKX

BRIEF:
Standard. Informed RP to have performance data for both 400 single CL and 402 double tanks.

GROUND OPS:
RP slow with start up and still needs to refine checklist. Use downtime to get other tasks done i.e ATIS/Clearance. Do not start taxi without first having NWS selected and whenever the parking break is set paddle off NWS.

Have proper DDI set up during taxi and takeoff checks. Do not need to rush yourself in marshal and get out of your habit patterns. Take your time and ensure everything is set up properly.

DEPARTURE:
Double check comm set up prior to take off. Initially had wrong departure frequency. Started off well and then scan began to drop out. Rapid level off at 11k and ended up being 100ft high. Back yourself up and make an easy transition. Climbing above to 11k did well with setting 350 and nose attitude but again scan dropped and accelerated to 380 in the climb. Level and immediately set your best range A/S. Check the FPAS or reference alpha.
ENROUTE:
No major issues. +/-40 ft enroute to BZA but do not accept that. If assigned 230 maintain 230 and use pilot relief modes as needed. Heading to KNYL get ATIS sooner rather than later.

DESCENT/APPRAOHCH:
Fast on descent. Set 250 and work on maintaining that. Slightly non-standard RV to final due to multiple aircraft also shooting approaches. Overall average TCN 21R into NYL. Pay attention to missed approach instructions. Assigned RWY HDG at 700ft and ballooned up to 800ft. Vectored around for an ASR 21R. Average. Proceed visually 1nm out. No need to have them control you to the in close position if you have the field in sight. IP took controls for departure just to quickly get to altitude and start heading make home to make land time.

RTB:
Direct LOOTS at FL220 for a PAR Full Stop KNKX. No issues. Keep in mind you start high at 5k on the PAR. Get to 2600ft quickly and then reset for a normal O/S glidescope to final.

Good experience for RP to see the pits and hot seat. No issues.

Overall, average. Press.

Last Modified By: on 6/28/2016 12:45:32 PM
SYLLABUS EVENT GRADESHEET

SYLL PHASE/EVENT: PLT 1 TXN/ FFAM 104

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Total Grades: 0 0 0 4 1 0 3

Overall Comments:
Solid Hop for Safe for FFAM 105.
Completed in Kane E MOA, VFR.

ADMIN:
Asked student to brief Admin - Correct on all procedures and above average flow and content for FRS pilot.

EXECUTION:
Completed all required events.

DEBRIEF:
Discussed only "other" from the flight regarding uses/awareness of the BINGO bug. 2x in flight acknowledged the BINGO bug caution but did not immediately fix the problem. BINGO caution came on twice (each time before he addressed the BINGO bug. Discussed that cautions/warnings must be taken care of immediately to avoid complacency in the cockpit.
SYLLABUS EVENT GRADESHEET

SYLL PHASE/EVENT: PLT 1 TXN/FFAM 105

Grade: 3.00

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Overall Comments:
FFAM 105 **PASS/COMPLETE**
ROUTE OF FLIGHT: KNKX - W291 NAOPA - KNKX

Delayed take off time due to weather.

(b) (3) (A), (b) started off in A/C 165. Normal start with no issues line to hold short. On Take off the gear would not retract.
RP kept the A/C below 250 and continued flying the SID. (b) (3) (A), (b) coordinated with the the ODO and ATC. RP climbed to above 6k ft and orbited near MOUSE in order to dump fuel to landing weight. RP picked up radar vectors for a visual straight in to KNKX. Normal landing. Taxied back for shut down.

(b) (3) (A), (b) then quickly got into A/C 215 for a normal start up. Uneventful from line to the area. RP worked the W291 NAOPA and coordinated with two other FAM Solos for airspace de-confliction. Normal ops in the area. RTB via WIZKY for the overhead at KNKX. 3 T&Gs and 1 Full Stop.

Last Modified By: (b) (3) (A), (b) on 2/1/2017 12:56:16 PM
# SYLLABUS EVENT GRADESHEET

## SYLL PHASE/ EVENT: PLT 1 TXN/ FFAM 107

**Grade: 3.60**

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### Overall Comments:

**FFAM 107 **PASS/COMPLETE**

- KNKX - KNTD - KNKX
- 1.5hrs
- Radar Vectors to TCN NTD
- 2x PAR NKX
- 5 T&G NKX

Brief:

Solid brief. No issues. Set up comm in advance. Put frequencies in presets you are not going to use to reduce pilot loading in flight. Recommend taking a finger light. At this stage in the game conduct your preflight with the PCL in hand.

Ground:

Get radios on quicker after the generators come online. RP did not get bleed air knob all the back to on. Be expeditious getting the checklist complete but do not miss items. RP forgot to call "clear canopy"

Conduct:

RP did well keeping his nav aids and waypoints ahead of the jet in order to maintain a better situational awareness. Initially altitude and airspeed fluctuated but as the flight went on these came under more control. Continue to strive for +/- 50ft. Coming in for the approach at KNTD get slowed to 250 kts earlier. Keep that airspeed under control, at one point RP got down to 200kts.

Knock out the landing checklist as soon as the gear is down and locked. RTB went smooth no issues. 1st PAR RP ended...
Knock out the landing checklist as soon as the gear is down and locked. RTB went smooth no issues. 1st PAR RP ended up high on glidescope the entire way. Remember to push 5 degrees nose down to arrive at 2100’ft on glidescope. 2nd PAR went better and ended with a tower downwind. Continue to go to school on each pass and make corrections. No Lens but still hit each of your checkpoints and make corrections to get there. Improving trends from each pass.

Taxied too slow coming back into the line. Keep the scan up to know your GS. No issues on shutdown.

Press.
# SYLLABUS EVENT GRADESHEET

1/17/2019 10:45:52 AM

## SYLL PHASE/EVENT: PLT 1 TXN/ SFAM 114

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**Overall Comments:**
SFAM 114 Instrument Check **PASS/COMPLETE**
KNKX - KNUC - KNZY
1x Turn in Holding
1x HI-TCN to KNUC
1x PAR KNUC
1x Standby Instrument No Gyro ASR KNUC
Divert to KNZY for visual RWY36

**Last Modified By:** (b) (3) (A), on 2/1/2017 9:56:19 AM

(b) (6)
**SYLLABUS EVENT GRADESHEET**

**SYLL PHASE/EVENT: PLT 1 TXN/SAWI 101**

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**Overall Comments:**
SAWI 101 **PASS/COMPLETE**

Initial brief with Mr. Leitner. No Issues.

Conducted thorough walkthrough of combat checks. RP is reminded to use technique to his advantage but back himself up with the checklist.

On Radar departure fly the same ground track as lead, ensure that you do not cut the corners of the SID. Continue to practice short range radar technique. Be smooth and don't rush through it.

Use the radar to your advantage to have proper bearing line joining on lead for the B&Rs and TCN RVs. RP is reminded to be hard on himself to maintain a good scan of altitude and airspeed. Establish yourself on bearing line and make smooth corrections to drive it in.

Press.
Slappy

Last Modified By: [b] (3) (A), (b) (6) on 5/25/2016 2:34:04 PM (6)
**SYLL PHASE/ EVENT: PLT 1 TXN/ SAWI 102**

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**Total Grades**: 0 0 4 3 0 0 1

Overall Comments:
SAWI 102 **PASS/COMPLETE**

Initial brief with (b) (3) (A). No issues.
RP Practiced short range radar mechanics. Continued to work on B&Rs and TCN RVs. RP is reminded to use the radar to his advantage for joins and TCN RVs. Solid discussion about stern conversions.
Press.

Last Modified By: (b) (3) (A), (b) (6) on 7/27/2016 3:41:20 PM
**SYLLABUS EVENT GRADE SHEET**

1/17/2019 10:45:52 AM

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**Total Grades**: 0 0 5 2 0 0 1

**Overall Comments:**
SAWI 103 **PASS/COMPLETE**

**BRIEF:**
RP was prepared for brief and went over briefing items accordingly. Good discussion about how the radar operates and what the symbology means.

**GROUND:**
RP started with the jet already running on the hold short. Practiced going through the combat checklist. Comm check in and taxi out to the runway.

**DEPARTURE:**
T-01M flying radar trail off lead. WX set from 300ft-4000k to emphasize the use of the radar to build your SA even when lead is not visible. Good discussion about remaining within 1nm of lead in order to alleviate any hiccups with ATC.

**CONDUCT:**
RP conducted weapons check on the way towards Mouse and joined on lead to begin feet wet/dry checks. Executed G-warm and began setting up for stern conversions. RP Practiced 3 stern conversions. Actual knowledge of the timeline and hitting the wickets were good but airspeed dropped out of RP’s scan. This lead to having to drastically wrap up the turn in close.

Set up for practice joining on a tanker. C-130 was placed in orbit and RP worked through the radar mech in order to correlate the target and execute a successful join. Discussion real time was had about how the new geometry caused...
correlate the target and execute a successful join. Discussion real time was had about how the new geometry caused an increase in complexity to work the stern conversions. Emphasis was placed on getting yourself to a known. Working to arrive on bearing line and follow the ABCs of a successful join.

Last maneuver included a TCN RZ. Similar angular issues as with the tanker join.

DEBRIEF:
RP gained a better understanding of stern mechanics after seeing it play out in real time. Good discussion about solving those angular problems on tanker joins and TCN RZ by working yourself out to bearing line and envisioning ahead of where you need to be vice where the tanker/lead is currently at. Press.

Last Modified By: [b] (3) (A), (b) (6) on 7/19/2016 6:46:55 AM
SYLLABUS EVENT GRADESHEET

1/17/2019 10:45:52 AM

SYLL PHASE/EVENT: PLT 1 TXN/FFRM 101

Grade: 2.20

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Overall Comments:
Start Up: Flew a Bravo, briefed how to do fuel BIT, briefed it again in the jet. Taxiing out of the line, we still had a fuel advisory.

Initial Join: Went blind on initial join, get your radar out in front of you and start to use that to help get SA. If you go blind, call it and listen to ATC to see where they are vectoring your lead or telling lead to climb.

Tac Turns / basic form keeping: Trend was today to be sucked or acute (out of position) and just settle for that. There should be two things going on. 1) you're either in position and keeping yourself there, or 2) you're out of position, realize it, and FIX IT!!! way to many times today the IP had to say, "you're sucked" followed by no correction then "If you're out of position, work to get back into position". You need to lead your corrections, so if you are sucked, add power, but take power off to end up in position. Do not just take off power when you are finally in position or you'll go acute, which we saw today.

B&Rs: first was decent, second was decent as well, don't get spit out on the cross under. Remember to keep your closure under control and bring your jet in close and then do a controlled cross under. third: fuselage misalignment will be a player here. Get your fuselages aligned early so you can work on the ABCs.

Final Join: Joined from ATC spread to the north or left side as we were RTB to Miramar. Post Mouse, started a join from ATC spread and IP had to give a "Watch your closure", which caused a hockey stop and a very un comfortable site picture for both lead and IP in the back seat. Remember, NEVER is it ok to put lead under your LEX when you are joining on him. Maintain site at all costs.

Finally, think ahead of the jet. Just because you are flying form doesn't mean you just sit there and stare at lead and let him fly you around blindly. You will need to update your systems in a timely manner. When lead asks you a question, don't pause for 5 seconds. Later in division, if I'm -3 and you're -2 and you wait 5 seconds to answer lead, I'm going to jump in and talk.

Chair fly your form and what you are going to do with your jet. You'll get the form with practice. Remember, later on, this is stuff you don't even need to think about as you have much more complex tactics to execute.
let him fly you around blindly. You will need to update your systems in a timely manner. When lead asks you a question, don't pause for 5 seconds. Later in division, if I'm -3 and you're -2 and you wait 5 seconds to answer lead, I'm going to jump in and talk.

Chair fly your form and what you are going to do with your jet. You'll get the form with practice. Remember, later on, this is stuff you don't even need to think about as you have much more complex tactics to execute.
## SYLLABUS EVENT GRADESHEET

**SYLL PHASE/EVENT: PLT 1 TXN/ SFAM 112**

**Grade: 4.00**

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**Total Grades**:  0 0 0 0 5 0 3

**Overall Comments**:
Good event for [b) (3) (A)] both in brief with system’s review and flight conduct. T01 RODEN P5 T03. Ground/Start EPS: HOT START, RATS, ENG FIRE LEFT. HI SPD abort for LT Bleeds @ 143 KTS. Airborne EPS: L GEN, OBOGS, LT OIL PSI LO, repaired or removed these malfunctions. 1X OOC/SPIN. HYD 1B, RTB. In route received RT AMAD PR, discussion with base, dumped fuel, DIVERT to NZY, declared an EMER with appropriate com. RP elected to keep RT ENG running, trap NZY 36. RP needs to use base more when dealing with EMER’s.

**Last Modified By**: [b) (3) (A), (b)] on 6/1/2016 1:07:51 PM
SYLLABUS EVENT GRADESHEET

SYLL PHASE/ EVENT: PLT 1 TXN/ SFAM 113

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Total Grades                                                          | 0  | 1  | 0  | 0  | 4  | 0  | * |          |

Overall Comments:

Improper execution of boldface items x3

BLUF: missed or misread boldface steps on three separate emergency scenarios during his NATOPS simulator check today.

Brief / Debrief:

Very receptive and great attitude entire time. Struggled with recreating TOLD numbers. Discussed assumptions in the Bingo profile and using the correct charts. Also saw the numbers for sea level cruise vs full-up profile execution on shorter legs and how simplicity may be worth 50lbs of fuel. Discussed real life scenarios of the ability to go to a divert if you are below “SOP” fuel for that divert if that is the best way to get the jet safely on deck and making the decision early. Also did not know about the form F to get specific aircraft weights – Just thought you always start with 26,000# and add tanks, CATMs and fuel, etc...

On deck startup:
0 Oil R – good catch.

Hung start R – good catch, however discussed importance of PCL usage to verify and appropriately execute follow on startups/procedures.

R ATS – late catch, but good procedures.

RGEN (resettable) at R Engine start. – good system knowledge knowing the GEN wasn’t working – but reach down and reset – fixes 99% of hornet issues.

Good discussion on Cautions that are unfamiliar (IFF4), and how to use PCL, ODO, Flight lead, PC to assist.

LGEN (resettable) on the runway immediately following takeoff clearance - You can try a quick reset, but nice job clearing the runway if you choose to troubleshoot. Good comm with tower, especially since traffic is in the overhead looking to land soon.

LADDER light at 75 knots – good low speed abort and procedures. Brake failure on the abort as well, handled timely. However remember to use ebrakes lightly as we did pop one tire. Good control throughout the stop while looking to land soon.
However remember to use ebrakes lightly as we did pop one tire. Good control throughout the stop while remembering the long field gear. Discussed bringing in line speed scan to verify the urgency of ebrake usage. Nice work not letting tower talk you into clearing the runway, but holding strong to the decision to get a tow.

Takeoff try take 2, Windshield hot Caution at 130kts – good decision to keep flying away. Upon rotation, hits a flock of birds - Engine R stall with loss of thrust on the R on the climb out, good job not going to idle, checking half flaps and getting the gear up. Initially will fly away and have airspeed and altitude increase. 5 seconds later, L engine flameout and airspeed declines and altitude sinks – don’t forget about your last step - emergency jettison. Also, despite stem power, don’t keep pulling back the nose if airspeed is severely decreasing. Safe ejection – good final decision of that scenario.

Takeoff try take 3 – no emergencies. Will go through 2k and 4k level offs during the SID by 100-150 feet. OCF – good knowledge and procedures. Discussed the importance of altitude scan and how they may change my decision to go right to 35 alpha. Very low and slow – yes, right to 35. At 21,000’ and 150kts, probably not right to 35 alpha.

In the NAOPA, single ship 5k fuel received a R Bleed Air Warning light that would not extinguish. Executes – Idle, R Bld off, e02, descend blw 10 and heads to San Clemente with the warning light remaining illuminated. (Does not turn engine off). Talks to Beaver and Base, but tells base that bold face is complete and declares an emergency. A minute later and once again brings out the book, reads that the throttle should be off and states that boldface is complete. Upon the 3rd read he realizes the engine should be off and shuts down the motor approximately 3 minutes after initial indications. He realizes he needs to emergency extend the gear and brings the left throttle back to idle for a bit to slow down and emergency extends the gear and gets 3 down and half flaps (I am surprised the jet did not go into MECH during the prolonged sub 85 setting and hyd demands). He sets up for a straight into San Clemente and does not realize his hook is not extended for the arrestment due to a red hook warning light. His initial game plan with 3,600# is to keep it on deck. He will fly and uneventful apch for a planned fly in engagement, and miss both short field and long field gear resulting in an ejection at the end of the runway with about 109 knots left on the jet.

Discussed the default game plan needs to be going around and staying on deck being secondary game plan that you should have a very good reason for. Discussed that CRM can come from anywhere including tower, other airplanes, beaver control – not just ODO. Discussed all of the runway you give up on a fly in engagement if your plan was to keep it on deck. Discussed importance of knowing boldface, methodically going through landing checks and processing what the jet is showing you.

Reset and uneventful takeoff from NUC to NAOPA. Middle of NAOPA receives FCS and FLAPS OFF Cautions. All channels and both servos of the TEF were X’d out but does not pull up FCS page until ODO questions what issues he has. Proce
## SYLLABUS EVENT GRADESHEET

### SYLL PHASE/EVENT: PLT 1 TXN/ SFAM 113

**Grade: 4.00**

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### Overall Comments:

NATOPS CHECK(2)

Overall still not the strongest performance for (b) (3) (A), (b) (6) but improvements have been made since the first go.

Ground:

RP got a Hot Start. LGEN Caution, and Launch Bar caution. RP noticed these quick enough and took the proper actions for the situation.

On Take off RP missed improper nozzle swing resulting in a loss of thrust. RP continued the takeoff and once airborne noticed the issue and began the steps for Loss of thrust on takeoff. Bold Face was conducted correctly and RP successfully kept the aircraft airborne.

Flight:

Situation developed and aircraft eventually went into MECH. RP declared an emergency and diverting to North Island intending to take a trap. RP began procedures for arrestment landing and that is when RP received the dumps stuck to open. Keep any extra base comm to a minimum and just be concise with what you tell base.

RPs hook skip gameplan was to keep it on the deck and take the long field gear if necessary. Always be ready to back up and validate your decision. Set the emergency brakes before you touchdown. Retard the throttle to idle sooner, left them mid range down the runway with a "stay on deck" game plan. Discussion about how 1/2 flaps give you a better flyaway performance.

Still room for improvement for (b) (3) (A), (b) (6) but progress is being made. Continue to stay in the books and practice chairflying different scenarios. A gradual increase of NATOPS knowledge will follow you throughout your career but build a strong foundation here at 101.
Build a strong foundation here at 101.
SYLLABUS EVENT GRADESHEET

SYLL PHASE/ EVENT: PLT 1 TXN/ FFRM 102

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Overall Comments:
FFRM 102

Parade position maneuvers
TAC Form from fighter wing and spread
2x300 B&Rs
1x250 B&R
1x TCN RV
RTB VFR for Overhead

Solid Brief/Debrief. Good discussion about FPAS. No Issues

Conduct:

RP needs to visualize the 45 degree bearing line. 5NM out and fly to that for the join. As it was RP was flying towards lead aircraft and then stepping it out to bearing line.

B&Rs showed improving trends but overall there has been drastic altitude changes while coming in for the join. That itself is not ok. RP was aware of these altitude changes and kept everything safe but it shows a clear breakdown in scan. Continue to be hard on yourself for those mission cross check times and continue to work on getting practice sims.

At night there is no need to get so close on the join up to begin the crossunder. Just a close comfortable position and then work it under.

Enclosure 6
Press.

Last Modified By: [37x718] on 8/16/2016 1:52:47 PM
SYLLABUS EVENT GRADESHEET

1/17/2019 10:45:52 AM

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Overall Comments:
FFRM-103 Day Division **PASS/COMPLETE**

When troubleshooting RP needs to keep base and lead informed of the situation. No reason to have anyone in the dark.

Initial join was safe and under control but also slow. Keep that 50 knots of closure until within .5nm. If lead gets vectored to mouse early use that cut to collapse the distance.

B&Rs:
1 - Started off ok, on altitude and bearing. Sucked in the middle to in close.
2 - Sucked all the way. Do not give up on the join. Work it into bearing line and then begin the cross under.
3 - Started acute and got sucked into the middle. Improving trends from the last two but keep the aircraft on proper bearing the entire duration. Use rudder to help maintain your closure and bearing.

TCN RV - No issues. Improving trend on the join. Join was a bit slow. Keep up the closure but keep it under control and on bearing.

Last Modified By: (b) (3) (A), on 8/3/2016 9:36:03 AM

(b) (6)
ENLISTED EVENT GRADESHEET

SYLL PHASE/ EVENT: PLT 1 TXN/ FFRM 104

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Overall Comments:
FFRM 104 Division Tac Form **PASS/COMPLETE**

When in marshal be professional and keep your aircraft in line with leads jet. RP was parked aft by a couple of feet from the rest of the formation.

Initial join was safe and under control but took too long. Use the 50 knots of closure until .5nm to your advantage and the cut the corners to collapse the distance.

Conduct:
Overall the tac form went smooth. During fluid four, as wing, pull harder towards the inside of the turn to arrive at proper position on lead as they roll out. Keep the spacing a little further out and stepped down.

TCN RV - a little sucked all the way and the closure was not where it should be. Keep an ear out over the radio to build your SA. As it was dash 3 was collapsing the distance.

RP lead section approach back to KNKX. RP is reminded to practice the comm flow at home and as lead to back everything up a few miles as not to get jammed up. Remember the PAR starts you off high. Make the aggressive correction early to get down on glide slope and intercept a normal profile.

Press.

Last Modified By: [b] (3) (A), [b] (6) on 6/17/2016 1:50:01 PM

Enclosure 6
**SYLLABUS EVENT GRADESHEET**

SYLL PHASE/EVENT: PLT 1 TXN/ FFRM 105

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Overall Comments:
FFRM-105
Night Division
NXW-291-NXK
RTB Section GCA
Night Bouncing.

Brief:
Solid Brief. No issues.

Admin:
When the flight lead asks a question make sure you give them a response. Even if you are taking care of other things just give them a quick "2" so that they know you heard them. Continued to be a trend throughout the flight with either not responding or being too slow to respond in the case of fuel/G checks.
Maintain that inside/outside scan to help you when there isn't a clear horizon. Know that lead will be at a known altitude and airspeed and won't deviate too much from that. Use those knowns to lessen the amount of variables to solve for.

Initial join was safe and expeditious. When taking the lead during a lead change pull up a little further acute with enough energy to quickly take the lead. During the RTB comm got a little messy but RP missed a call to switch back to tac 17 from tac 18. Keep aware of the situation and when in doubt ask.

Conduct:
Initial Tac right RP did an in-place turn. Lead provided a reference heading it should have been apparent that an...
Initial Tac right RP did an in-place turn. Lead provided a reference heading it should have been apparent that an in-place turn would not work. Practice that good headwork to determine situations like that before they become an issue and again if in doubt just ask for clarification. At the completion of the turn RP was widely separated from the rest of the formation and did not call out blind immediately. This is a big other for the flight as it was briefed clearly what should be done in the case of lost sight. Flight lead began to coordinate a rejoin instructing RP to fly to the northeast corner and orbit. RP made another headwork mistake and flew to the northwest corner. Besides the obvious of turning in the wrong direction noticing the A/A TCN was increasing vice decrementing should have keyed RP that something was amiss.

Flight eventually got rejoined and began the tac form maneuvers. RP did an average job of correcting and remaining in position with improving trends as the flight went on. 1st B&R RP started off with good closure but was sucked and got stagnant in the middle. Continue to work that inside/outside scan in order to keep the join coming. 2nd B&R RP kept the closure coming but at .4nm got stagnant again. As the fuselages become aligned and your jet gets closer and closer to lead it will require more power vice angles to keep the closure going. Altitude started to deviate due to lack of horizon but it is that exact situation where RP needs to trust his instruments.

TCN RZ. Call "visual" as soon as you see lead. Coming in on bearing line altitude began to get unstable again at the .2-.3nm position. If this happens just need to re-cage your brain, loosen up and take a deep breath to release the tension and make that join smoother.

RTB for a section GCA no issues.

Overall not the strongest performance for . Chairfly the mission beforehand and strive to see the errors quicker in order to fine tune the corrections. Continue to put in the effort and learn from previous mistakes in order to perform better in the future.

Last Modified By: on 7/22/2016 11:45:26 AM
### SYLLABUS EVENT GRADE SHEET

**SYLL PHASE/EVENT: PLT 1 TXN/SAWI 104**

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**Overall Comments:**

SAWI 104 **PASS/COMPLETE**

no issues brief/debrief.

RP practiced working the stern conversion gates with some discussion about comm. Each drill got progressively better as the flight went on. Continue to work those gates and use the SA page to your advantage.

Press.

Last Modified By: on 7/26/2016 6:24:54 PM
**SYLLABUS EVENT GRADESHEET**

1/17/2019 10:45:52 AM

**SYLL PHASE/EVENT: PLT 1 TXN/SAWI 105**  
Grade: 3.00

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Overall Comments:  
OVERALL, GOOD SIM FOR (b) (3) (A), (b) (6) CONDUCTED SEVEN SETS, BOGEY UNAWARE X 3, AWARE X 2 , HOS X 2.

GOOD MECH ON GETING INITIAL RADAR LOCK, CONTINUE TO WORK ON SMOOTHING OUT COM, U G W 9 / SRRM / NOTCH MECH. GOOD LEARNING CURVE, PRESS.

Last Modified By: (b) (3) (A), (b) on 6/14/2016 2:30:30 PM
# SYLLABUS EVENT GRADESHEET

**SYLL PHASE/EVENT: PLT 1 TXN/ SAWI 106**  
Grade: 3.00

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Overall Comments:  
SAWI 106 **PASS/COMPLETE**

Good brief about radar mechanics and how to set and switch between track files. Meld and sort mechanics when you have two targets vice a single.

Sim conduct went smooth with multiple runs. Improving trends on each run.

Press.

Last Modified By: (b) (3) (A), (b) (6) on 7/26/2016 6:25:29 PM
SYLL PHASE/ EVENT: PLT 1 TXN/ FAWI 101  
Grade: 2.86

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| Total Grades | 0 | 0 | 2 | 4 | 1 | 0 | 1 | |

Overall Comments:
FAWI 101 **PASS/COMPLETE**

Brief:

Solid Brief. No issues. Good discussion about how to BIT the RDR and the SENS BIT. Understanding when radar mech is complete.
SA page can be a huge tool to help during the stern conversions.

Conduct:

Section Go was poorly executed by RP. Slow to get the jet to AB and as it was leads jet remained ahead for the entire run down the runway. Once airborne settled into parade position no issues. Reminder that if ever the situation arises where your jet takes off before leads aircraft you must resist the urge to push the stick down.

Clean and dry checks are from the wing line and below.

Overall ATC spread going out to the area needed a lot of work. RP was fighting to stay in position but was making too drastic of corrections resulting in being all over the place. RP is reminded to use the pilot relief modes to his advantage and think about what leads aircraft is doing. Know when leads jet is flying and fly to that same point i.e waypoints. Make small corrections and see how that works vice making huge movements with the stick and power corrections. When pushed to spread make an aggressive move to get there quickly.

Altitude was an issue during this flight. You have numerous systems working for you to make maintaining altitude easier. Remember in ATC spread you have +/- 50 of leads altitude. Double check your altimeter setting and take a look at lead to see where his aircraft is in relation to the horizon. Constantly scan and make the corrections.

2x Hostile aware runs
1x Bogey Unaware (basic stern conversion)
1st run went well. Timeline worked out and the mechanics came into place to set up a successful merge. 2nd run took RP longer to find and sort the target resulting in being behind timeline. Was able to still execute the notch correctly and on time but miscalculated the turn in and was unable to get a lock on the target. RP is reminded to adjust the scan azimuth during this turn in as the target would be higher and closer than expected. 3rd run was standard stern conversion to follow a FENCE in and join up for RTB.

Still had the same issues returning as coming out but there were improving trends as the flight went on.

Do no get slow in while in the pattern.

Press.
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Still had the same issues returning as coming out but there were improving trends as the flight went on.

Do no get slow in while in the pattern.

Press.
SYLLABUS EVENT GRADESHEET

1/17/2019 10:45:52 AM

SYLL PHASE/ EVENT: PLT 1 TXN/ FAWI 102

Grade: 3.14

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Total Grades | 0 | 0 | 1 | 4 | 2 | 0 | 1 |

Overall Comments:
FAWI-102
21 JUN 2016
T/O: 2030 LND: 2145
W291 P5 N/S

A lot of headwork issues and scan break downs. There were improving trends throughout the flight but there needed to be a stronger show at this stage.

Brief:
No issues.

Start-Up/Taxi:
Expeditious on getting the aircraft started and going. APU online 30min prior to takeoff. As it was RP started 1 min earlier and while that may not seem like a big deal it is a reflection upon oneself and their adherence to that discipline. If the FCS IBIT does not go through remember to double check that your hands and feet are off the stick and rudders. Attempt the initializer BIT after clearing the BLINs. Get both the hard and soft RADALT bits going sooner next time. Careful when closing the canopy do not allow it to stop in motion as it can be difficult on the frame. Strong reminder that the throttles need to be at idle and spooling down before you begin a turn. There were too many occasions when RP put the throttle above 75% and was also not quick enough about getting the throttles to idle and checking that they were indeed spooling down.

Give proper callsign to the agency. RP was SHTR-21 but told ground SHTR-20 for taxi. Have the landing/taxi light on as you need it but refrain from blinding other aircraft if possible.
Departure:
Stayed in GUNACQ too long. As soon as you get a lock switch it to AIM-120. If VMC no need for a tied call. No greater than 25kts of excess closure at night. A few times RP got well higher than that. Practice proper lead changes.

Conduct:
Poor G-Warm. Hold 4gs Initially and then touch 6Gs and come back to 4. Preload any frequencies to save yourself time or mistakes from switching mid flight. 1st run was Bogey unaware stern conversion. Took a bit long to gain radar SA and didn't heat up the target enough once coming to the in close position. Work on proper Tally comm. If you do not have CATM on the aircraft do not shoot AIM-9 as this could lead to poor habits down the road. Call visual as soon as you have the other aircraft in sight. Both Hostile Aware runs went relatively smooth, continue to be faster on the SRR and continue to work on the tally and kill comm.

RTB:
RP started to get task saturated and did not use the radar to complete the final RZ. Work through everything you have learned at this point to get help yourself out. A/S started to get excessive but RP caught it. Shouldn't get that excessive in the first place. There was a point were RP slowed to near 200kts. Be aware that this is very dangerous and should not happen again.

No major issues coming back to KNKX for the 4 sec break. Use your position to your advantage to maintain SA. Three separate occasions RP got slow in the pattern. While RP corrected these without any say from the IP it should not happen in the first place. When landing do not do a brake check until 100knots or below.

Do not taxi too fast in the line and chairfly proper shutdown technique.

Overall, below average event. Student maintained a positive attitude throughout the event and was very receptive in the debrief.
SYLLABUS EVENT GRADESHEET

SYLL PHASE/ EVENT: PLT 1 TXN/ FAWI 103   Grade: 3.29

Event Type Pre Req Met Student Can Log On Track Date Status Actual Date Gradesheet Type Instructor Signature Reviewed
FLIGHT True All Data Complete 6/16/2016 NORMAL (b) (3) (A), (b) (6) True False 0

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Overall Comments:
FAWI 103 **PASS/COMPLETE**

Overall not bad but not the best flight for (b) (3) (A), (b) (6)

Brief:

Solid brief and most of what the flight is about was known but there still can be a lot cleaned up on the actual air-to-air and weapon engagement parameters.

Conduct:

When sitting in marshal let lead know you are up and ready. Do not remain silent. Initial join off the 10sec go started off great. Once RP go in close he let himself get stagnant. Continue to make the joins safe but expeditious. When conducting BDA and ready to take the lead pull up abeam to leads aircraft first.

Overall ATC spread was not working out. Still making too big of corrections to stay in position. Make smaller corrections and see how that works out for you and continue to fine tune your position. Tac Form started off poor but improved as the flight progressed.

Continue to practice comm. Tally comm was poor. Chairfly and study these items so during the flight it is a non issue.

Don't shoot bogeys and do not shoot the AIM-9 if you do not have tone. When you are visual and go into the merge, Continue to follow through with the merge.
RTB still had some issues with positioning but overall worked out better than earlier in the flight.

Continue to be hard on yourself and set high standards for yourself to work on these issues.

Press.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6)

Last Modified By: on 8/3/2016 9:25:11 AM
# SYLLABUS EVENT GRADESHEET

1/17/2019 10:45:52 AM

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## SYLL PHASE/ EVENT: PLT 1 TXN/ FAWI 104

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**Overall Comments:**

Last Modified: (Not Saved Yet)
SYLLABUS EVENT GRADESHEET

SYLL PHASE/EVENT: PLT 1 TXN/ SFAM W/ U  Grade: 3.00

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Total Grades | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |

Overall Comments:
Average to slightly below hop.
Review of fuel, AMAD and engine EPs.
Good abort.
SID: Went direct RODIN from SEAWOLF.
EPs were done OK but very slowly, the rust was evident. On AMAD PR, forgot GEN on at restart.
Get ATIS before talking to Approach.
When making an arrested landing always have a hook skip plan.
No problems with single engine TACAN to NZY.

Last Modified By: (b) (3) (A), (b) on 3/27/2017 1:38:22 PM
SYLLABUS EVENT GRADESHEET

1/17/2019 10:45:52 AM

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6)

SYLL PHASE/ EVENT: PLT 1 TXN/ SFAM W/ U  Grade: 2.00

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<td>2- below average EP warmup</td>
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Overall Comments:
CI "Hog" Wild.

Consistent trend of rushing decisions; not listening to base, SOCAL or final controller instructions; not thinking ahead of the jet nor referencing NATOPS; and poor airwork.

Brief - No issues. I didn't press him too much for knowledge. Amongst others, specifically discussed Abort decisions, FCS issues, FLAPS OFF (specifically TEF failures), and INS Fail + CSC Fail.

Scenario - Instrument Round Robin to NYL for an approach and then back to NKX. 400 OVC, 1 Mile vis all over.

Takeoff - Flaps Off caution popped at 100 KTS on the roll. CI intent was for him to abort, but he took it airborne. Declared an emergency, and then completely disregarded SOCAL instructions regarding headings and altitudes for traffic. RAC really wanted to head west to W-291 to adjust weight, and he did so.

- Stayed IMC despite being briefed (and cleared) that VMC on top at 10k. Was pimped by CI to climb to VMC for troubleshooting.
- Contacted base, but did not allow base to contribute to decision making. CI could have volunteered base suggestion, but RAC was insistent on getting things moving with Beaver clearance to NZY and switch to SOCAL.
- No discussion or internal decision making for alternate airfields (better Wx/longer runway)
- Never asked for Wx at NZY nor Wx at any potential alternates. Got word from SOCAL during descent that NZY was 400' 3/4 mile vis, landing PAR RWY 29.

Page 1 of 2

Enclosure 6
-RAC insisted on RWY 36 PAR NZY.

- Never discussed nor considered jettison of externals (only had a CL and AIM9's, so not likely to have gained much, but the point is the option never came up with base).

- Dumped down to an arbitrary weight. Asked for trap NZY. Did not provide accurate landing weight, nor speed (said 175 Kts, 33K, when actual approach speed more like 215 Kts and ~30K). Never brought up checklist page to verify weight. Despite being dirty and seeing onspeed of ~215 Kts, kept insisting approach speed would be 175Kts.

- Never checked PCL for E-28 limitations. Despite discussing in brief that a TEF off condition might preclude short field arrestment, RAC went for the short field arrestment.

- Never conveyed to SOCAL nor Final Controller that approach speeds would be significantly faster than normal. This caused overshoots on final. RAC had RWY 36 TACAN final bearing selected, and pretty much disregarded final approach heading correction instructions inside of 3-4 miles. Unsurprisingly, this caused RAC to breakout lined up left of runway and without the ability to safely land. Go around followed.

- RAC had received and acknowledged missed approach instructions on final, but was unprepared to execute upon go around ("Climbing right turn to 2k, intercept NZY R-208 to SKATE and Hold). Upon MA, told by PAR controller to execute missed approach procedure and contact SOCAL. Didn't have Skate, R-208 radial or any reference to Skate, and didn't attempt to go to Skate, nor convey to SOCAL an inability to do so. Instead, climbed straight ahead, and encroached on Lindbergh, got instructed by SOCAL to avoid Lindbergh (too late) and then picked his own heading of 170 for a downwind leg. Fuel state now 4.2

- On downwind, told to go to Skate and hold. RAC requested a 10 mile final for RWY 36 PAR NZY. When given a vector of 270 in order to setup for a left two-seventy hook onto a ~10 mile final, RAC just kept turning right to 360 (and now well inside of 10 NM).

- CI froze sim at this point to explain intent of doing a 270 for a 10 mile final.

- SOCAL new query for arrestment speed and weight = "33K/175Kts"

- Long final, on glideslope, but disregarded Final Controller heading instructions inside of 3NM because RAC was again flying the final heading off of the TACAN. This again had RAC lined up well left of runway, but he made a big play and got the jet on deck. Arresting gear stopped the jet despite weight and speed anomalies.

- End of this scenario---------------------------------

Setup back at Miramar with the same Wx. CI intent to show INS fail + CSC (frozen Standby attitude in the HUD). On first attempt, RAC aborted at 140 KTS on the INS failure. Good procedures, and probably not a bad decision given the 400' ceiling. Next attempt, INS failure at 160 KTS, so committed to fly.

- RAC did a good job of transition to the Stby ARI, declared an emergency, but again insisted on heading and altitude at his discretion. Granted he declared an emergency, but there was no real reason not to at least attempt altitude and/or heading control...or ask for no gyro vectors as you sort it out.

- Go on top, discussed the indications, cross checks, etc.

- CI indicated intent was to continue and shoot a standby instrument approach. Fuel set to 4.0.

- RAC did consider and explore alternate airfields. Was told NZY VFR (3000/3NM, RWY 29, Winds 270/10). RAC elected PAR NZY. Did not get ATIS. Similar to previous scenario. RAC had plenty of time
**SYLLABUS EVENT GRADESHEET**

1/17/2019 10:45:52 AM

SYLL PHASE/ EVENT: PLT 1 TXN/ FAM W/ U | Grade: N/A

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SYLL PHASE/EVENT: PLT 1 A/ G/ SSTK 101

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Total Grades: 0 0 0 5 2 0 1

Overall Comments:
SSTK 101 COMPLETE.

CONTINUE TO WORK ON SCAN AND WATCH A/S AND LIFT VECTOR PLACEMENT. TOWARDS THE END OF THE SIM THE SCAN STARTED TO SEEM TO COME TOGETHER. PRESS

Last Modified By: (D) (3) (A), (b) on 6/28/2016 4:01:06 PM
**SYLLABUS EVENT GRADESHEET**

1/17/2019 10:45:52 AM

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**Total Grades**

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**Overall Comments:**

Average CTW SSTK hop for (b) (3) (A), (b) (6). Well prepared for the brief.

Inconsistent pattern work and scan. Roll in / roll out technique was fair for line up. Setting and holding AOA was inconsistent. On some runs the pull down was too close to the tgt requiring a reset of AOA. Scan in the dive is weak particularly on targeting. A/S and altitude control and SA was OK. Inconsistent pattern work and RIP tech caused several runs to be no drops or called off by CI.

All runs 30 degree CTW.

CCIP X 5 - Runs generally had decent release parameters, but had little or no correction to get the cross to the tgt and some releases were well L or R.

AUTO Designated X 5 - Line up and ASL corrections are a work in progress.

AUTO designate and slew - Challenging, but progressing.

Saw AUTO and CCIP X wind releases.

Some SE not 5 G through 15 degrees.

Last Modified By: (b) (3) (A), on 7/6/2016 2:06:55 PM

Enclosure 6
**SYLLABUS EVENT GRADESHEET**

1/17/2019 10:45:52 AM

**SYLL PHASE/EVENT: PLT 1 A/ G/ SSTK 103**

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**Total Grades**

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Overall Comments:

SSTK 103 COMPLETE.

**Brief:**
Check the Target Attack Planning Guide for standard Z diagrams that have already been calculated for certain loadout. Discussion that you cant fire the laser with the gun and the difference between In Range and In Zone.

Discussion about how to check the slant range for your 9k checks.

**Debrief:**
When flying the pattern use your target locator line to determine 45 degrees off and take a snapshot outside to develop a sight picture. RP initially flew too large of a pattern and once RP started referencing the Tgt Locator line the pattern tightened up.

Intro to the bunt strafe and why it is the preferred option. RP's trigger squeeze was too short. Make sure to get the full 2sec off.

Over all slightly below average hop for pattern work tended to fly out of the range space without recognition. Initially submitted grade sheet with no comments below average for headwork. RP got progressively better as event went on. Press.

Last Modified By: (b) (3) (A), (b) on 7/22/2016 12:43:50 PM
**SYLLABUS EVENT GRADESHEET**

**SYLL PHASE/ EVENT: PLT 1 A/ G/ SSTK 104**  
Grade: 3.29

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**Total Grades** | 0 | 0 | 0 | 5 | 2 | 0 | 1 | 

Overall Comments:  
SSTK 104 COMPLETE

flew the complete take off, transit, circle the wagons and then RTB.

Last Modified By: (b) (3) (A), (b) (6)  on 8/4/2016 10:53:46 AM
SYLLABUS EVENT GRADESHEET

SYLL PHASE/ EVENT: PLT 1 A/ G/ FSTK 101

Grade: 3.29

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Overall Comments:
FSTK 101 *PASS/COMPLETE*
7 JULY 2016
A/C: 350
T/O: 1016  LND: 1116
R2510 ST

Ground:
Initially started in A/C 251 but transferred to A/C 350 due to RDR MUX Fail. When Troubleshooting continue to work through the checklist. Try not to be so fixated on the problem.
Put LPOD to STBY prior to taxi.
During T/O Checks RP Said "Harness as you like it" vice "8 points, Secure."

10 seconds goes by fast as dash 4 off the runway. Be slightly faster on the 10 sec go as dash 4. RP was safe and conservative but it is ok to speed things up slightly to make it within that 10 sec window. As it was it turned into about 20sec go. When executing the join up go ahead and cut the corner in a turn to save time and fuel.

Conduct:
Can complete all of SAPDART with the exception of arming up prior to entering the area. Use that transit time to get everything sorted before the spacer pass.
Can be a bit looser on the spacer pass. Don't forget to note the winds at the target.

TACADMIN discussed in debrief and debriefed the tapes. Overall moderately within parameters but the safe escapes tended to be weak pulls. Improving trends on each pass with the last few being highlights. Key points to work on...
tended to be weak pulls. Improving trends on each pass with the last few being highlights. Key points to work on include pulling at least 3Gs during your roll in to increase that tracking time. Unload earlier in order to roll out with the ASL on or closer to the target. Do not forget to slew the target but this got better later in the runs. Remember to slew the target first and then line up the ASL.

On the safe escape get to 5Gs within 2 secs and maintain. Pickle Pause Pull.

OTR. Visualize where each aircraft should be and that will help you out with where to look. Use SRR mechanics to help acquire your wingmen.

Coming back home try to fly a tighter formation as -4. Fly form off lead but continue to keep -2 and -3 in your scan. Treat the break as an In Place turn. Fly your jet during the break and towards the end of the roll out look out for lead aircraft. As it was got slight nose high on break due to RP looking out too early at interval.

Last Modified By: on 7/26/2016 6:18:48 PM
SYLLABUS EVENT GRADESHEET

SYLL PHASE/ EVENT: PLT 1 A/ G/ FSTK 102

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Total Grades: 0 0 0 5 2 0 1

Overall Comments:
FSTK 102
8 JUL 2016
T/O: 1104 LND:1210
R2510 ST

Event flexed to a single launch for RP. No issues on start up or transit to and from the area.

Conduct:
When checking in late to a range keep an ear out on the comm to make sure you do not step on anyone.

RP flew a total of 11 passes with 5 No Drops.
1 - 248/11
2 - ND (TDC Not to HUD)
3 - ND (~)
4 - ND (~)
5 - ND (~)
6 - 45/12
7 - 33/10
8 - 42/7
9 - ND (Switch Pig)
10 - 16/6
11 - 33/10
Overall RP needs to do his checklist. That would have saved all the no drops. When in doubt fall back on the checklist.
**SYLLABUS EVENT GRADESHEET**

1/17/2019 10:45:52 AM

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**SYLL PHASE/EVENT: PLT 1 A/ G/ FSTK 103**

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Total Grades: 0 0 1 4 2 0 1

**Overall Comments:**
FSTK 103. Complete.

Solid brief. No issues. Make sure to take a snapshot outside when rolling into the pattern. The numbers are there to help you develop a sight picture to roll in on targets in the real world. Make sure to nail your safe escape maneuvers in order to not invalidate your run. Discussion on ordnance preflight and nordo RTB Procedures.

Debrief:
When being detached for a straight in call clear when away from the formation. If already below or close to 250 knots no need to use the speed brake. Discussion about calling out Bingo. Started RTB 200# below BINGO without a comm call to lead. Different levels of fuel could lead to a different gameplan.

Coming into the range autocollapse the distance from ATC spread.

Hits recorded in the email.

Last Modified By: (b) (3) (A), (b) (6) on 8/3/2016 1:43:54 PM

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Enclosure 6
SYLLABUS EVENT GRADESHEET

SYLL PHASE/ EVENT: PLT 1 A/ G/ SLAT 101

Grade: 3.43

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Total Grades: 0 0 0 4 3 0 1

Overall Comments:
SLAT 101 Complete.

Briefed with CI. No Issues.

Conduct - VR1266 Route. Standard admin no issues. If RADALT goes off continue to verbalize and put some G on the aircraft to pull up.
Coming over superstitious mountains make sure to have your radar up and keep an eye out for civilian traffic and doubly so for glider pilots.
Discussion about 10% rule.

Main debrief focused on getting off the route and executing the RTB. Chairfly the comm beforehand and walk through exactly how you are going to get home.

Demo of the Single Hornet Approach using the A/G radar. Keep in mind the Null zone and hold down the TDC to slew. Press.

Last Modified By: (b) (3) (A), (b) on 7/22/2016 12:46:39 PM
SYLLABUS EVENT GRADESHEET

SYLL PHASE/EVENT: PLT 1 A/ G/ FLAT 101

Grade: 3.29

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Total Grades: 0 0 1 3 3 0 1

Overall Comments:

FLAT 101
VR1266
T/O: 1515 LND:1625
Two roll ins on Mine Tgt Near Point H
2 T&G 1 Full Stop

Brief:
No Issues, clean up on proper terminology for actions. Make sure to have proper models and check that all markers are good to be used.

1 Safety of flight. As RP was setting up SAPDART in preparation for the roll in IP had to call Pull Up to avoid terrain.

Prior to Take off. RP read back the clearance incorrectly. Said the radial but not the DME for BZA. Forgot to set up the AA waypoint and complete the Air-to-air set up. Wait until you are right on the runway to drop Mark 1. Want it as accurate as possible.

Two altitude busts on the RT. Told to level off at 10k and touched 9800’ and again told to cross Atlas at or about 5k but RP was descending to 3k. IP had to take corrective action. Do as TWR tells you. RP did not break at the #s and stepped on the SHUTR91’s comm call.

TacAdmin:
Getting onto the route RP was not ready to begin the route. Did not have AutoSeq set up or the ToT. If you need more time just back yourself up earlier and do a spin before getting onto the route. RP was briefed that on each point be...
just back yourself up earlier and do a spin before getting onto the route. RP was briefed that on each point he was to state heading to the next point, distance, and fuel. RP did not do so.

While on the route the bingo for 7500 went off and RP did not check for CTR line transfer. If you feel you are task loaded climb to cope. On each ridgeline crossing RP did not state "Good R, _____ Terrain"

Biggest recommendation is to chairfly events more and do it with another person.

Overall. Well below average for admin getting on the route and a potential safety while conduction SAPDART checks prior to the roll in.

I effv

Last Modified By: [b] [3] [A], [b] on 7/22/2016 11:37:26 AM
## SYLLABUS EVENT GRADESHEET

### SYLL PHASE/EVENT: PLT 1 A/ G/ SLAT 102

**Grade:** 3.43

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**Total Grades:** 0 0 0 4 3 0 1

**Overall Comments:**
SLAT102
AFT4
0930-1100

Brief: No Issues
Conduct:
Don't need to be so fast repeating back the instructions. Repeat the comm in a smooth, clear manner and make sure you understand yourself what is to be done.
Pull Velocity vector to the degree required. Aim for +/- 1 degree.
Don't say "Good R" without actually having it in the HUD.
Don't confuse SOJ for TOJ, only happened once, no issues after this one.

Press.

Last Modified By: (b) (3) (A), (b) on 7/20/2016 11:45:22 AM

Enclosure 6
**SYLLABUS EVENT GRADESHEET**

1/17/2019 10:45:52 AM

**SYLL PHASE/EVENT: PLT 1 A/ G/ SLAT 103**

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Overall Comments:

SLAT 103

Brief: RP needs to clean up the respective boldface for maneuvers.

Conduct:

Only alibis for fence in comm would be the radar or radalt inop. Proper comm for lat checks should be "SH-03 Lat checks complete, Good R, 270' set"

Avoid any extraneous comm.

Do not need to roger up check turns or hard turns. Use small descent rule of thumb to your advantage. If you have the max 10 degrees nose low, use it. Flights are very fuel intensive so it is important to be as fuel efficient as possible getting set up.

Know the maximum elevation for the range you will be working in. Going to the R2301 they read you a mouthful of restrictions. Have the In-flight guide out and just read what you have to make things easier.

RP tended to be slightly low on recoveries. Anticipate your gates coming up and hit them as soon as your altitudes come up.

Chairfly comm for SACT maneuvers.

Last Modified By: (b) (3) (A), (b) (6) on 8/3/2016 1:28:44 PM
### SYLLABUS EVENT GRADESHEET

**SYLL PHASE/EVENT: PLT 1 A/ G/ SSTK 105**  
**Grade: 3.43**

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**Overall Comments:**

Average hop.  
Intro to LALD bomb and strafe patterns.  
Sixteen runs completed using offset, oblique and bunt strafe patterns.  
Keep that airspeed in your scan.

**Last Modified By:** (b) (3) (A), (b) on 7/22/2016 1:59:47 PM
SYLLABUS EVENT GRADESHEET

SYLL PHASE/EVENT: PLT 1 A/ G/ SLAT 104

Grade: 3.43

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Overall Comments:
SLAT104
Sim LD: (b) (3) (A), (b) (6)
Console: (b) (3) (A), (b) (6)
Briefed with (b) (3) (A), (b) (6). No issues

Conduct:
Formation keeping was poor. RP needs to have a better scan and work to get himself in position. The more time you are in position the more fuel you have to play with to actually conduct LAT. When executing TAC turns you do not need to elevate if you are in position.

When conducting the vertical maneuvers in the low altitude environment RP would have a tendency to fly around 280-270' while executing the comm. Need to be able to talk and also keep the scan up on where the aircraft is.

RP had weak break turns. Need to pull more.

A/S control on bottom of DRR tended to lean towards the fast side. Keep the scan going.

Quicker reversals on the 2D/3D weave. Look outside the aircraft and have that GeoRef and realize that pulling towards the abeam may not be as big of a turn and on the 3D weave you need to start your reversal earlier based on the geometry.
Biggest items for RP to work on are the SACT Maneuvers and maintaining tac formation. Overall not that best sim for RP. Continue to chairfly and work on the scan and improvements will be made.
SYLLABUS EVENT GRADESHEET

1/17/2019 10:45:52 AM

SYLL PHASE/EVENT: PLT 1 A/G/ FLAT 102

Grade: 3.29

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Overall Comments:
FLAT 102 COMPLETE
02 AUG 16


Admin:
Start up was fine but can still be improved. Recommend getting clearance while doing FCS IBIT vice waiting for final checkers. RP loaded fills on jmps prior to flight but still check and make sure the loads are inputted correctly. Do the ALR BIT earlier. RP waited until marshal.

Do issues on transit. Have a plan if something goes amiss getting into the area. Arrived and range was still being occupied so we canceled and proceeded VFR and held outside the range until it was open. Continue to have a high SA during these situations as multiple aircraft were leaving the range while we were getting in.

Transit back to KNKX from the range was no issue. Try not to make LA CTR angry with your requests even if they did not acknowledge your call. When doing the simulated single engine approach remember to keep your RPM up during high loads on the aircraft. RP had throttle set around 73-75%. Back things up during the visual straight in. RP held too much airspeed coming in and that compressed the final portion and involved big corrections. Do not want to be putting so much undue strain on the aircraft system in the event of a real single engine approach. Slow down to 250 earlier.

TACADMIN:
RP tended to have slight climbs on turns. Strive to keep the velocity vector on to just peaking about the horizon to avoid being 100ft high at the conclusion of maneuvers. More aggressive with your check turns.
Need to trust the #s on the vertical maneuvers and again be more aggressive. RP would roll out ~3 degrees lower (i.e rolling out at 17 vice 20 degrees) than what is called for and nose would tend to creep upwards while traversing downhill. RP was demoed a maneuver to show how the vertical maneuvers should feel and to increase the ratchet pulls as you hit each gate.

Continue to work on threat maneuvers. There was an improving trend. Overall for the tacadmin today RP needs to develop a faster spoke scan. RP would nail airspeed but be climbing slightly in altitude and vice versa.

Debrief:
Important discussion about the 7500 bug in regards to tank 4 transfer and fixed a severe misconception RP had in regards to that check. No other outstanding issues.

1 Below average for lack of NATOPS knowledge in regards to 7.5 Fuel check. This should not be something that learn this far along in the syllabus. If you have questions ask.
**SYLLABUS EVENT GRADESHEET**

1/17/2019 10:45:52 AM

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Overall Comments:
FLAT 103 COMPLETE
5 AUG
R-2510

Brief:
Below average brief for RP. Lack of materials (SLAP Data, BASH) Incorrect brief of NOTAMS (KNJK arresting gears), Lack of acknowledge regarding the operating area (MSA, obstructions, correct comm freqs). Don't let this occur again. One below.

Admin:
Initial join up after breaking through layer RP did not call visual. 1 safety of flight during initial BDA. RP was too tight and had wing overlap with lead.
ATC is 1.0nm abeam, be there and do not be sucked. RP should look back towards lead slightly. On the RTB RP bracketed too far out on the BDA and gained 20kts of airspeed when in the lead. Do not detach yourself for the individual PAR. No issues with PAR to full stop.

TACADMIN:
Conducted tape debrief for specifics on maneuvers.

Match lead on the way down for G warm. No nose slices on the break turns but they were all weak pulls. Max perform the aircraft and work on that for next flight.
Tended to have slight ballooning on most turns but improving trend throughout flight. Strive to make the turns as level
Vertical maneuvers overall went average. Have more of a loaded roll on the gun jinks. Should be one continuous maneuver. During SACT maneuvers tendency to pull too hot and then too cold into the abeam. Improving trend with each maneuver. More lateral stick for 3D maneuvers will help RP but stick mechanics got better.
SYLLABUS EVENT GRADESHEET

SYLL PHASE/EVENT: PLT 1 A/ G/ FLAT 104

Grade: 3.57

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Overall Comments:
FLAT 104 **PASS/COMPLETE**
8 AUG 16
R-2510 ST/LL

Brief:
No Issues.

ADMIN:
When in marshal make sure to match lead and line up the aircraft correctly. Technique is to line up the actual pilot’s head vice the nose landing gear. Have more A/S when you take the lead on a BDA. On the transit out to the area RP Started out too far acute on LD in spread, notice those trends earlier and make corrections to end up on position.

No Issues during RTB. Speed up the taxi slightly when on deck.

TACADMIN:

Conducted Tape Debrief.

RP comfort level was initially 400-500ft but worked it down to the 320-400ft area. Velocity vector was slightly high on most turns. Not excessive and no nose slices but continue to strive for those level turns. Vertical maneuvers for the most part went well. On a few RP had slightly late gate corrections in the middle. Nothing unsafe just performing the jet at 830’ft on a 15 for 8 vice 880-900ft.
TacForm was standard. Watch out for climbing on a 2D weave and resist the urge to lower the nose to fix it in a turn. More pull on a 3D weave but don't bleed down energy.

Overall this flight went well for RP. Definite improvement since the start of the phase. Press.
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**Overall Comments**: SSTK 106 section pop up attacks complete. Flew as wingman on 3 30/30 LALD, 4 Marine Method LALD and 5 shift attack runs. Overall solid work in the patterns, pops, tracking and delivery technique. Good SA on all runs. Handled a HYD 2A/1B EP IAW NATOPS.

Last Modified By: (b) (3) (A), (b) on 8/1/2016 12:40:28 PM
**SYLLABUS EVENT GRADESHEET**

1/17/2019 10:45:52 AM

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**Total Grades**

| 0 | 0 | 0 | 4 | 3 | 0 | 1 | |

Overall Comments:

FSTK104 **PASS/COMPLETE**

17 AUG
R-2510

Brief: No issues.

Admin: APU start was 20sec late. Make sure the brightness is turned up prior to turning on the DDIs. Say what clearance you are requesting i.e "SH-11 A03 on request etc." vice just saying "CLR on request ready to copy". Avoid telling clearance to stby.

More prudent punching out the master caution. Focus on staying exactly on center taxi line as well as runway centerline when lining up for takeoff.

On the RTB if RP is going to use a course line for the runway set 243 as opposed to 240. When dirtying up immediately set 8.1. Do not offset at a high speed on the rollout. On the shutdown forgot to set bingo bug back to 7500.

TACADMIN: When doing the tgt recce offset more to a side so that you will have a clear view of the tgt to make sure the area is clear. Issue with ordnance not coming off rails. Continued to do roll-ins and troubleshoot with no success. Overall roll-ins were average with improving trends.

Debrief: No issues.

Last Modified By: (6) (3) (A) (b) on 8/24/2016 12:37:07 PM

Enclosure 6
**SYLLABUS EVENT GRADESHEET**

1/17/2019 10:45:52 AM

**SYLL PHASE/ EVENT: PLT 1 A/ G/ FSTK 105**

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**Total Grades**

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**Overall Comments:**

FSTK105 **PASS/COMPLETE**

18 AUG 2016

R-2510 ST

Brief: Standard. Minor discrepancies between Z on he board and KBC. No issues,

ADMIN: No issues starting up and getting out the line. Departure and transit as standard. Minor mistakes in hand signals for the BDA. Debriefed on deck. RTB standard. Discussion about proper fuel checks during the flight in order to prevent any issues from occurring.

TACADMIN: Conducted tape debrief. Overall RP worked shallow on the dives but there was improving trend as the flight went on. Have a quick unload and snappy reversal to allow yourself more tracking time. Be diligent about flying your parameters but make adjustments as necessary since wing is not on the same parameters as lead. Discussion about how to fix shallow dive angles earlier.

Debrief:

RP practiced debrief using the BATTSEAT format.

Overall not the strongest flight for RP in certain areas but good improvement in others. Lessons learned for RP include how to fix dive angles and manipulate the offset angle to RPs advantage. Good discussion and learning point about the fuel system/checks and good experience for RP to conduct his own debrief.

*Press*
SYLLABUS EVENT GRADE SHEET

SYLL PHASE/EVENT: PLT 1 A/ G/ FSTK 106
Grade: 3.14

Event Type Pre Reqs Met Student Can Log On Track Date Status Actual Date Gradesheet Type Instructor Signature Reviewed
FLIGHT True All Data Complete 7/21/2016 NORMAL (6) (A), (b) True False

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Overall Comments:
FSTK 106 Complete

Brief: No Issues
Standard admin on the way out to the area. RP can be quicker joining up and executing the crossunder.

Range conduct. No Issues

Biggest other was the off target RZ. RP picked up dash 4 and called "1 in sight" thinking it was lead. RP waited until a comm call was made and realized his error. Called blind and climbed up to altitude. Eventually couldn't locate remainder of flight and began to get own clearance back home when dash 3 was able to join on RP. Rest of RTB was no issue. Debriefed OTR.

2 below for OTR:
As -2 off target, RP initially tried to join on -4 who was still in the strafe pattern and had to be corrected by -3 IP. Subsequently tried to join on next flight that was incoming to the 2507. Lead had to point out that was not the correct flight to join on and then lead directed to fly toward loots and that he was slowing to 275 knots. RP could not fly to loots - instead he flew a heading that pointed him 30-40 deg to the south of Loots and at 400+ kts. -3 ran him down and even at 415 kts still did not have closure on him. Overall 2 below for complete breakdown of SA and inability to follow simple direction from flight lead.

Last Modified By: (b) (3) (A) on 8/1/2016 2:26:54 PM
(b) (6)
## SYLLABUS EVENT GRADESHEET

**Event Type**: PLT 1 A/ G/ SFAM 115  
**Grade**: N/A

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- **Status**: Not Scheduled
- **Gradesheet Type**: NORMAL
- **Signature**: False
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**Overall Comments:**

Last Modified: (Not Saved Yet)
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#### SYLL PHASE/ EVENT: PLT 1 A/ G/ SSTK 107

**Grade**: 3.43

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**Total Grades**: 0 0 0 4 3 0 1

**Overall Comments**: COMPLETE

OVERALL WELL PREPARED, GOOD MECH, DISCUSSED RADAR TO TGT, LPOD TO TGT, RADAR TRANS LPOD TO TGT, AND KEY APPLICATION POINTS OF THE LPOD TO INCLUDE: MODES, BDA, FLAGS, AND TGT POINTS.

PRESS

Last Modified By: (b) (3) (A), (b) on 8/17/2016 9:46:16 AM
## SYLLABUS EVENT GRADESHEET

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**Grade:** 3.43

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**Overall Comments:**
Good brief and flight conduct, Full combat checklist on deck and airborne, SWOLF 7, NUC TGTS. Completed all required flight conduct of FLIR/LST/GBU's & LMAV. 3X LST, 8X GBU 12's-6X Self LAS Continuous and Delay, 2X JTAC LAS Continuous and Delay and 4X LMAV.

Last Modified By: (b) (3) (A), (b) on 8/17/2016 9:54:03 AM

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6)
SYLLABUS EVENT GRADESHEET

SYLL PHASE/EVENT: PLT 1 A/G/ FSTK 107  
Grade: 3.86

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Total Grades: 0 0 0 1 6 0 1

Overall Comments:
Overall, solid flight getting back into the jet after some time off.

Brief – Good Brief

Admin – No Issues

Tac Admin – No Issues

Conduct - W291 P5 to work simulated sensor runs as aircraft did not have a LPOD. Improving trend on JLASE comm.

Lesson Learned – Recognizing at night that it is an instrument scan when delivering weapons, and that you must rely more on instruments then outside visual cues. Proper LGB crank and concise JLASE comm. Continue to build off the experience that your received during this hop.

Press.

Last Modified By: (b) (3) (A), (b) (6) on 12/14/2016 8:06:59 AM
**SYLLABUS EVENT GRADESHEET**

1/17/2019 10:45:52 AM

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**Overall Comments:**

FSTK108 **PASS/COMPLETE**
19 AUG 2016
R-2510

Brief: Standard

Admin: RP a little slow taxiing out the line. Remember double bubble requires a bit more power to get moving. JDAM on deck set up went as per checklist.

Standard Departure, transit, RTB

TACADMIN: Set up and employment as per checklist. Continue to narrate the validation checklist. No issues

Debrief: Standard.

Press.

Last Modified By: (b) (3) (A), (b) (6) on 11/3/2016 4:24:04 PM

Enclosure 6
**SYLLABUS EVENT GRADESHEET**

1/17/2019 10:45:52 AM

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Overall Comments:
FSTK 110
23 AUG 2016
R-2508


ADMIN:
Overall RPs scan was slow. Could focus on one thing but other items would drop out of scan. Keep the scan moving and do not fixate on parameter at a time. On the way to the range flew slightly faster than FPAS recommended. Fine tune and modulate the throttles to conserve as much fuel as possible. Know how to sanity check your fuel to make sure the wypt or FPAS isn't malfunctioning.

On the RTB RP did a better job at flying FPAS. Manage your descents to maximum range. Discussion about losing sight on interval coming in for the overhead back at home field. Bingo bug should never be heard going off. Monitor your fuel and after Joker/Bingo set the bug to a fuel state that makes sense.

TACADMIN:
RP trended to overshooting the ASL and running a bit behind on the A/G timeline. Continue to tighten up those parameters. Getting better at high altitude roll-ins will come with experience. Do not stay in map mode on the A/G radar. EXP 1 does not do anything for you. With a good wypt go to EXP 2 and let the picture build until you go to EXP 3. Watch out for slewing too much in the radar display.

Remained flexible in the area due to traffic and weather. Roll-ins weren't the greatest but RP ended on a high note.
with the final roll-in at T Plant.

Debrief: Standard. Discussed learning points and ways to improve for future events.

Overall one below for Admin but steady progress was being made and RP should see improvement on subsequent flights. Press.

Last Modified By: on 12/22/2016 10:14:20 AM

(b) (3) (A)
### SYLLABUS EVENT GRADESHEET

#### SYLL PHASE/EVENT: PLT 1 A/ G/ FSTK 111

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**Overall Grades:**

**Grade:** 3.29

**Overall Comments:**

FSTK 111  
23 AUG 2016  
R-2508

Brief: Standard. Few errors on KBC. Nothing major but RP should double check to make sure everything is correct.

**ADMIN:**

On the transit toward the working area RP was sucked in ATC spread and making a lot of corrections to stay in position. Make corrections but also manage your fuel. Do not be at MIL while climbing during a BDA. On the RTB RP improved the ATC position keeping. No issues from range to full stop.

**TACADMIN:**

Discussion with RP about the proper TACSOP procedures for comm check in. Overall tacform for the area was standard. RP still should take advantage of any excess airspeed and angles to facilitate the join up back to DCS for the next tgt. RP had * in the radar channel, reminder that resetting the gens on deck you need to redo the tacadmin checklist.

Final off target rendezvous took a little long to complete. See above points.

Important discussion and debrief about the proper use of APG-73. One below for sensor usage.

Overall not a bad flight as a wingman for (b) (3) (A), (b). He simply pulled a standard CAT I and was worrying about questions of the day and what side of the formation to be on when his instructor was specifically briefing him on what to expect. Important to keep an eye on how things are changing around you.
to do with the APG-73. Pay Attention in the brief, especially when the instructor takes time to anchor on something chances are it might be important. You will do hundreds of flights like this one, in which you did the exact same thing the day before, so you've got it suitcased... those are usually the ones that come back to get you when something (like flying with an APG-73 instead of a APG-65 on your FSTK-110) comes back to throw everything off the rails.

Jahmar, made a valiant attempt to slew the cursors on the target in the MAP mode without ever successfully getting the radar into EXP 2/3 very cognizant of the A/G Timeline, was visually tally target every time, and was in the right position. This is one time that having the elbow cameras was more beneficial than a direct feed, since I was able to view his exact buttonology (or lack thereof) and it also worked him away from a SOD since I could see the reflection of his head on the DDI and the time he spent checking the formation explains why he was never out of position. Overall, good wingman procedures (if nothing else follow your lead, he is supposed to get you there), poor sensor usage (what happens when I'm bent gadget and press you the tac lead?), and okay admin.

Press!

Last Modified By: on 9/6/2016 8:39:24 AM
# SYLLABUS EVENT GRADESHEET

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### Overall Comments:
Average CAS intro hop for [b) (3) (A), (b) (6)]. Well prepared for the brief.

Admin and tac admin OK. Overall good comms with DASC and JTAC. CAS pg usage and mission set up were no problem. Positioning to push on time is a work in progress. Weapons deliveries were fair with inconsistent release parameters. Run info is: AOA/FPA, Release FPA / A/S / Alt / G.

Run 1 - CAS Pg intro - Set up good. Coached push OK. A/S control to tgt was weak. Scan and tgt acquisition were slow. Late RIP to very steep and abort.

Run 2 - Re-cock of run 1 - Better IP to tgt. OK RIP. No slew attempted so BOC. -32 / 457 / 7414 / 1.3. ASL fair. +4 sec of TOT.

Run 3 - Good to RIP. Pull down with VV on tgt - 0 AOA. Right to dive toss after slew. Diamond and ASL good. -30 / 504 / 6453 Below NLT / 1.9. Kill the tgt - 6 sec of TOT.

Run 4 - Good set up. Poor positioning for push. Push with440 reqd. Good RIP. -29 / 515 / 8029 / 1.1. Good diamond and ASL. Kill -5 sec of TOT.

Run 5 - OK to push. Got over IP too early with 260 reqd and not enough time to reset. Rolexed the TOT. OK start. Late offset from Invader. Not a good designation, ASL OK. -27 / 515 / 6925 / 1.5.

Run 6 - OK set up. Poor position for push - only 430 reqd. Had DSG well off the tgt to NE. Pimped to undsg and dsg. Had to rolex. Postry was better - 6 AOA at -30 / -30 / 525 / 7258 / 1.1. Good diamond and ASL. Kill -6 sec of TOT.

---

Enclosure 6
Had to rolex. Re-try was better. 6 AOA at -30, -30 / 525 / 7258 / 1.1. Good diamond and ASL. Kill -6 sec of TOT.

Best weapon delivery except for fast.

Run 7 - Visual talk on. Good tgt acquisition. -33 / 485 / 6150 / 1.5. Kill.

Overall most of the standard mistakes on the first try.

Last Modified By: [b] (3) (A), on 8/31/2016 1:55:51 PM
(b) (6)
## SYLL ABUS EVENT GRADESHEET

### SYLL PHASE/ EVENT: PLT 1 A/ G/ SSTK 112

**Grade: 3.86**

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Overall Comments:
SSTK 112 - LOW/MED Threat CAS
29 AUG 2016

Brief: Good knowledge

Admin: Make sure you sweep the cockpit so you're not holding in the stack with your gear down. Get the target area WPT up for steering.

TacAdmin: DASC/JCAS Check-In: just do the check in in order MNPOPCA, this is what the FAC/JTAC expects. Work on your holding airwork to make sure the aircraft is a stable platform and not going past the holding IPs into the target area. Recommend for the CAS page RP only lines 4 + 6 and the TOT. Line 1 for the IP if you have time; all other lines are ancillary.

Always Save-Undes-Use-use. This hindered RP on a few set ups. Continue to build habit patterns of expendables coming into and off target. Keep doing SRR mech coming off target and back into the holding stack. Be harder on SAPDART checks, RP forgot to set wpt 47 on initial set up. Make sure you are fully set up prior to the IP inbound. Reduce as many variables as possible before going in for the attack.

1st Attack T1 BOT
Read back from WPT 12... make sure you're reading back from WPT 47 per the TACSOP. Don't forget your course line to define the FAH for you on the HSI. Forgot to ARM up, so we rolled the TOT. Speaking of TOT, make sure the Zulu Hour is correct. 2 exposures/1 release.
Back to the basics for the roll-ins... RIPing at 2.4 DME isn't going to work. Talked about how to use the GREQ on the HSI to work your timing problem. 2 exposures/1 release

3rd Attack T1 BOT
Don't forget SAVE/UNDES/USE, otherwise your data won't go into WPT 47, and your GSPD won't show up.

4th Attack T1 BOT Gun
Don't forget to set your altitude bugs per the Z diagram, they will save your life one day. You own all altitudes inside the IP-Tgt line and your FAH, unless given an ACA, so once inside the IP, get down to your RIP altitude for the Gun Z.

ATM checks: Do them so you don't switch pig.

Debrief: Solid discussion about learning points. RP instructed on how to conduct a CAS debrief and board set up.
## SYLLABUS EVENT GRADESHEET

1/17/2019 10:45:52 AM

**SYLL PHASE/EVENT: PLT 1 A/ G/ SSTK 113**

**Grade: 3.86**

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**Overall Comments:**

SSTK 113 High Threat CAS
30 AUG 2016

**Brief:** Hit the books a bit more.

**Conduct:**

When entering into the area. Have all your LAT checks complete minus hearing tone and resetting the radalt. Just get used to seeing the flashing B in the HUD. For everything in CAS it is about solving as many variables as possible ahead of time so that when it comes to the execution your bucket is not already full and RP can focus on attacking the target. Go through your checklists, solve for any geometry ahead of time and do not let yourself get pushed into a bad situation.

Discussion in flight and debrief about how to improve timing. When everything is set then you can proceed with amplifying remarks. Can always ask questions and make requests to the controller in order to best set yourself up for success. Continue to build the habit of expendables coming into and off target.

**Debrief:** Standard
SYLLABUS EVENT GRADESHEET

SYLL PHASE/ EVENT: PLT 1 A/ G/ FSTK 112  Grade: N/ A

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Overall Comments:

Last Modified: (Not Saved Yet)
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Grade: 3.86

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Overall Comments:
FSTK 113
25 AUG 2016
R-2508

Brief: Standard

ADMIN: RP carried too much excess airspeed during the initial join. If the join-up is going to take a while then let it take a while. Better to be smooth and stable than have an unsafe situation develop. Transit to and from the range was standard. When making big turns while in ATC spread play out the angles better and be mindful of what lead is doing with his jet. Remain within 1 NM but no need for any drastic maneuvers. Overall default abeam position was slightly acute.

TACADMIN:
Confusion on final BDA. Remember how the flight was briefed and overall flow concerning the checkout and RTB out of the area. If RP is in a situation where he ends up in trail of lead on his 6 o’clock position. Make a more drastic cut out towards the abeam so lead can also get eyes on your aircraft.

RP tended to track across the horizon too much. Not only be at the correct RIP position but have the jet in a good position as well to avoid tracking the nose so far across the horizon. Overall the roll-ins were inconsistent and slightly below average for RP. Important discussion about doing the SAPDART checklist justice and having better roll-in mechanics. Do not spend so much time slewing the target that it drives you out of parameters. Sensor work from RP needs work. If you have a good picture on the radar return and your designation is slightly off make a small slew to fine-tune the placement but avoid making big and repeated slews. Need to let the picture build.
fine tune the placement but avoid making big and repeated slews. Need to let the picture build.

Overall the Sensor portion for Form, Sensor, Comm was below average for RP. Nothing that can't be fixed but continue to strive for improvement.

Debrief: Conducted tape debrief.

Last Modified By: [b] (3) (A), [b] (6) on 2/1/2017 3:02:39 PM
**SYLLABUS EVENT GRADESHEET**

1/17/2019 10:45:52 AM

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**Grade: 3.86**

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Overall Comments:
FSTK114  
30 SEP 2016  
R-2508  

SCAR-AR Intro

**Brief:** Standard

Admin: Standard getting out the area. Lead would experience some initial comm troubles with RP picking up the comm lead. Eventually sorted prior to entering the working area.

Tac Admin:

Overall flow would be to conduct multiple runs on the ammo dump and H-Dam targets.

**Ammo Dump**

1st Run. Bomb on Target SIM 1xMk82 on 6-digit grid provided by lead. Good run in with sim good effects on target.

2nd Run. Following 1st run RP would enter holding above the target for a talk on to the next target from lead. RP correlated and became visual target for another run with sim good effects on target.

3rd Run. Another talk on to a small bridge just north of ammo dump. Good job from the RP of owning up to not seeing the target and calling lead on to what he does see. RP would eventually call visual and set up for the roll-in. On the roll-in RP would lose visual and abort the run.

4th Run. Immediate reattack on previous target. RP maintained visual for successful run in.

Transition to H-Dam

1st Run. Sim 1xGBU-12 on the dam itself. RP compressed himself slightly on the timeline but still managed to get a sim ordnance away.

2nd Run Sim 1xMk82 for a talk on to a parking lot south of previous target. Good roll-in.

At this RP is bingo and flight executes the RTB home. No issues and good discussion about fuel management on the way home.

**Enclosure 6**
the target and talking lead on to what he does see. RP would eventually call visual and set up for the roll-in. On the roll-in RP would lose visual and abort the run.

4th Run. Immediate reattack on previous target. RP maintained visual for successful run in.

Transition to H-Dam

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At this RP is bingo and flight executes the RTB home. No issues and good discussion about fuel management on the way home.

Press.
SYLLABUS EVENT GRADESHEET

SYLL PHASE/ EVENT: PLT 1 A/ G/ FSTK 115
Grade: 3.86

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Overall Comments:
FSTK 115 CAS
27 SEP 2016
R-2510

Light division out to R-2510. FAC(A) provided by T34. Worked Guam / Johnson with all runs on the Shade Tree target area.

Brief:
Standard

Admin:
Hot seat in A/C 271. RP was expeditious getting jet up and ready for takeoff but don’t forget to grab ATIS. On the initial join use the angles to your advantage but once it turns into a runner make sure you have the airspeed to complete the join. Keep rudder trim in your scan and adjust to profile the jet better.

Anticipate what lead is going to do. Have appropriate waypoints up and put yourself in a good position. Got acute when lead turned from JLI to head towards the R-2510. On the RTB continue to step out your nav aids to what makes sense.

TACADMIN:
Have better SA towards staying within the range.

Debriefed:

Mission Planning/ Holding (9-Line)
2) System Entry
3) Pre-Ingress/Geometry holding
4) Push (Focus on attack)
5) Roll-In
6) Off Target

Runs:
1st Run - No drop - Pushed late and did not adjust to ASL when slewing target. Good tally of target, however.
2nd Run - Dropped 4 Mk76s but slewed away from actual target back to bullseye (debriefed). Also, incorrect IP set in CAS page. Instructor input to correct.
3rd Run - Dropped 2 Mk76s on correct target ~ 50. Still some instructor pimping to make the geometry work for the attack.

Overall RP received a lot of coaching but improving trend throughout flight. Good system knowledge and receptive in debrief to the inputs.

Press
SYLLABUS EVENT GRADESHEET

1/17/2019 10:45:52 AM

SYLL PHASE/EVENT: PLT 1 A/ G/ SSTK 119

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**Grade: 3.86**

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**Total Grades**

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Overall Comments:
Brief: Well prepared.

Admin - Had trouble entering precise waypoint. Had to coach through how to do it. Getting too far away from your assigned IP (B-15) during CAS Holding. 17 miles away is not acceptable.

Conduct:

1 - LGB Self lase. Entered coordinates backwards (north/easting). Actually read that back to the FAC. Good push and timing. Unable to capture target due to being slightly hidden by vertical wall. If that happens, say target area captured, then it is up to the FAC to decide if he wants you to release. On this run, capture came just after missing release cue. However, no in call was ever given.

2 - LGB self lase - Good timing. No in call again. No clearance given, but said one away? No drop.

3 - LGB Self lase - Reattack. Good, but cranked wrong direction and egressed wrong direction.

4 - LJDAM Rel NAV - Good run with some coaching. Good hits and timing.

5 - LJDAM relnav on his own. Improper validation and weapon set up procedures for rel nav. Rushed the delivery. Good hits.

6 - LJDAM with LST Fac Lase - good run. Weapon missed, but procedures were good.
Transition to admin for RTB. Fence out! Make sure the dispenser is OFF and jettison knob is set back to safe. He actually landed with Dispenser on and Jett knob in stores.

Stay in the books!
**SYLLABUS EVENT GRADESHEET**

1/17/2019 10:45:52 AM

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**Total Grades** | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 6 | 0 | 1 |          |

**Overall Comments:**
Good hop. Well prepared. Overall good urban CAS procedures, targeting and weapons deliveries in Bakersfield. Good check in com and admin/TAC admin set up. Good sensor talk on procedures, target recognition and coordination with the JTAC. Good set up, procedures and delivery of GBU 12’s and AGM 64E’s.

Run 1 - GBU 12 Bomb NEAR TGT, On Time, JTAC LAS, Missed the TGT due to BAD LASER COMM, NO LASER ON CALL, also No IP Inbound Call. Reload for a do-over.
Run 2 - GBU 12 BOT 3’L on Convoy.
Run 3 - GBU 12 BOT +/-10”, SELF LAS. Almost lased the wrong code until CI intervention. Direct hit on Tank.
Run 4 - AGM 64E BOT. All good and direct hit on Helo.
Run 5 - AGM 64E BOT. All good and direct hit on Vessel.
Run 6 - GUN. Sensor search for Sniper’s. Quickly located TGT’s, killing TGT’s.

Last Modified By: (b) (3) (A), (b) on 9/6/2016 2:26:00 PM

Enclosure 6
### SYLL PHASE/ EVENT: PLT 1 A/ G/ FSTK 116

**Grade: 3.86**

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| Total Grades                       | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 6 | 0 | 1 |          |

**Overall Comments:**

FSTK116
28 SEP 2016
R-2510 ST

Low threat CAS. Light Division out to Shade Tree.

Brief: Standard


Tac Admin:
Overall gameplan RP will hold in stack to receive 9-Line and then remain overhead target for follow on talk on.

1st Run. 7 secs late. Direct Hit on target. Remember to push with a tactical airspeed to help make your timing valid from the IP. RP would then enter holding above target.

2nd Run. Initial talk on with a description of what RP sees. Remember to start big to small when describing features. You want to have a high degree of confidence in your correlation. No LPOD for this flight but that or the use of kinematics on deck will help to increase your degree of confidence.

RP called tally the target and began to set up for the run in. RP would initially drive out to 5-6 miles and then begin a turn in. Debriefed this at the conclusion. The goal is to hold at your TIP and turn into your RIP from that point. As it was RP still made things work with a direct hit on the target.
3rd Run. RP got slightly turned around with the cardinal directions in relation to the target. Don't make assumptions when it comes to your target, always strive for that high degree of confidence. Eventually got it sorted and correlated. Still drove out slightly for the run in but not as much. Direct hit on target.

6xMk76s dropped. RP would then transition to holding above the target at a higher altitude to observe Capt Rystrom's talk ons.

Conclusion of all the runs the join up and RTB were expedient. No issues on the way home.

Overall solid flight for RP with main lessons learned being to make sure you are at your tactical airspeed when pushing past the IP and to turn in from your TIP to your RIP vice driving out and turning back in.

Press.
SYLLABUS EVENT GRADESHEET

1/17/2019 10:45:52 AM

SYLL PHASE/EVENT: PLT 1 A/ G/ SFTN 102
Grade: N/ A

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Overall Comments:
Intro to HARM employment, PB/TOO/SP modes complete. Good task and system management.

Good job with all HARM mission data input but at the end of the missions RP was tasked to shoot a HARM at a pop up threat unknown location and could not remember how to set it up and later on given another threat at a known location took a bit of time remembering how to set that mission up.

Covered all required flight conduct modes of release with weapons impacting intended targets plus Slapshot and Snipper.

Last Modified By: (b) (3) (A), (b) (6) on 9/19/2016 11:37:10 AM

Enclosure 6
**SYLLABUS EVENT GRADESHEET**

1/17/2019 10:45:52 AM

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6)

### SYLL PHASE/ EVENT: PLT 1 A/ G/ SSTK 115

**Grade: N/ A**

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**Overall Comments:**

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SYLLABUS EVENT GRADESHEET

SYLL PHASE/EVENT: PLT 1 A/ G/ FSTK 117

Grade: 4.00

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Overall Comments:
FSTK117
29 SEP 2016
R-2510 ST

High Threat CAS. Light Division out to Shade Tree.

Brief: Standard

Admin: Other for today is RP was briefed to take off 15 min later from main body. RP did not do so. Did not negatively affect the overall mission but caused some flexibility to be conducted. Execute what is briefed. No issues getting out to the area.

Tac Admin: RP holding between Guam / Johnson for all runs to be conducted on ST. Conducted tape debrief.

1st Run. RP executing pre-briefed 9-Line. RP pushed late and while executing the pop mechanics could not visually acquire target and would no drop. On the push in RP spent too much time looking for target vice making sure all the pop mechanics were properly met. Was overall shallow and slow.

2nd Run. RP pushed on time but did not have the proper tactical airspeed set. Would be 13sec late to target. Drop of 2xMk76 ~60m off target. Improvement from first run but again slow scan from RP due to spending too much time trying to visually acquire target.

3rd Run. RP pushed on time. Overall 6 sec late. Dropped 4xMk76s for good effects on target ~20-30m. Better overall scanning and technique.

Enclosure 6
improvement on this final run and a pick up in scan from RP.

Took a bit to complete the return to force but once all aircraft were visual and joined up no issue on the RTB.

Overall good learning points for RP. Continue to keep the scan building and execute the proper pop mechanics. If unable to contact target call contact the bullseye to get a quick adjustment from the FAC. Compartmentalize each aspect of the flight from holding in the stack down to the final RIP. Execute per parameters and do everything you can to achieve that high degree of confidence in your correlation.

Not the strongest flight for RP but there were improving trends on each run. Press.
**SYLLABUS EVENT GRADESHEET**

1/17/2019 10:45:52 AM

### SYLL PHASE/EVENT: PLT 1 A/ G/ SSTK 110

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**Overall Comments:**

Last Modified: (Not Saved Yet)
## SYLLabus Event Gradesheet

**Event Phase/Event:** PLT 1 A/ G/ FSFT 103

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| 3. Tac Admin                  | P | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | 4 | ○ | ○ |
| 4. Mission Execution          | P | ○ | ○ | ○ | 3 | ● | ○ | ○ |
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| 6. Training Rules Adherence   | P | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | 3 | ● | ○ | ○ |
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| 8. Other                      | P | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | 7 | ○ | 1 |

**Total Grades:** 0 0 0 0 7 0 1

**Overall Comments:**
Incomplete due to being single ship and only conducting A/G portion. Just like his classmate, [b](3) (A), [b] (3), did an excellent job staying focused with all the flex that took place. Had to transit to 2301 CW in the weather the entire time which prevented any time to adjust to the goggles. Due to the slide in our launch time, we were able to enter the range but not allowed to drop ordnance. [b](3) pattern was flown extremely well and was above average even if considered off the goggles during the day time. Considering he had only a couple of minutes to adjust to the goggles, this was above average performance.

Event is incomplete but can be considered complete for the A/G portion. However, because [b] (3) did not actually get to drop any ordnance, consideration for redoing the entire event should be given so as to give him opportunity.

Last Modified By: [b] (3) (A), [b] (6) on 9/21/2016 10:16:09 AM
**SYLLABUS EVENT GRADESHEET**

1/17/2019 10:45:52 AM

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**SYLL PHASE/ EVENT: PLT 1 A/ G/ FSTK 109**

Grade: 4.00

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**Total Grades**

| Total Grades | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 7 | 0 | 1 |          |

Overall Comments:

Overall, solid flight for (b) (3) (A), (b)

Brief – Good Brief

Admin – Get the proper comm check in complete. If you think there is an issue let lead know. Other than that no issues

Tac Admin – No Issues

Conduct - Good recognition to take your own aborts due to not meeting parameter for weps delivery. Good ASL placement, had descent hits during the hop. RP was able to deliver all 6 MK76’s.

Lesson Learned – Recognizing at night that it is an instrument scan when delivering weapons, and that you must rely more on instruments then outside visual cues when conducting the weapons pattern. Continue to build off the experience that you received during this hop.

Press.

Last Modified By: (b) (3) (A), (b) on 10/12/2016 4:03:00 PM
# SYLLABUS EVENT GRADE SHEET

1/17/2019 10:45:52 AM

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## SYLL PHASE/ EVENT: PLT 1 A/ G/ SSFT 103

Grade: 3.86

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Overall Comments:
NVG Intro

Brief: Standard

Conduct:
2x Stern conversions in the R-2510 followed by multiple runs on the ST TGT. Good learning and exposure throughout event.

Press.

Last Modified By: (b) (3) (A), (b) on 2/1/2017 1:00:16 PM

Enclosure 6
## SYLLABUS EVENT GRADESHEET

1/17/2019 10:45:52 AM

### SYLL PHASE/ EVENT: PLT 1 A/ G/ SFAM 115

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**Overall Comments:**

Last Modified: (Not Saved Yet)
SYLLABUS EVENT GRADESHEET

SYLL PHASE/ EVENT: PLT 1 A/ G/ FIFR 102

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Overall Comments:

Last Modified: (Not Saved Yet)
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SYLL PHASE/ EVENT: PLT 1 A/ G/ FIFR 103  
Grade: N/ A

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1/17/2019 10:45:52 AM

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Last Modified: (Not Saved Yet)
SYLLABUS EVENT GRADESHEET

1/17/2019 10:45:52 AM

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SYLL PHASE/ EVENT: PLT 1 A/ G/ SLAT W/ U

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1/17/2019 10:45:52 AM

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**Overall Comments:**

FBFM 101
13 OCT 2016
W-291 P6/7

**Brief:** Standard

**Admin:** Standard

**Conduct:** Intro for RP on the advance handling characteristics of the hornet. A lot of show & tell, Demo/do maneuvers to expose RP to the handling characteristics of the aircraft while in the offensive/defensive regime. Improving trend on each maneuver with a lot of good experience for the RP. No issues on the RTB.

**Debrief:** Standard. RP is advised to chair fly the maneuvers as they are still fresh in order to develop upon the training received.

**Press.**

Last Modified By: (b) (3) (A), (b) (6) on 11/2/2016 2:38:10 PM
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**Grade: 0.00**

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**Overall Comments:**

Last Modified By: 10/17/2016 1:15:10 PM
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**Overall Comments:**

FOCF 101
17 OCT 2016
W-291 P6/7

**Brief:** Standard
**Conduct:** 2nd Go of hot seat out to the W-291 for OCF

**Admin:** Solid. Don't miss tank 1 during fuel checks, be quicker to climb at 350 in order to save fuel. No issues on the RTB.

**TacAdmin:** Standard down the card.
- Accelerated Flight Radome check
- Vertical Departures
- Spins

Overall good recovery procedures from RP.

**Debrief:** Standard

No issues, press. -

Last Modified By: on 2/1/2017 9:51:19 AM

Enclosure 6
**SYLL PHASE/ EVENT: PLT 1 A/ A/ SBFM 101**

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**Overall Comments:**
Overall, solid intro to BFM.

**Brief:** Standard
**Admin:** No issues
**Tac Admin:** No issues

**Conduct:**
Still a lot of learning and refinement to be done but great work getting to PADS quickly each time. This saves a lot of fuel and allows you to get more sets in. Early on your AWE, remember to look for the sight pictures of TA and LOS rate. Continue to work on sight picture from the defensive position and LV placement.

**Lessons Learned for RP:**
Capture Rate band during AWE, utilize good deck mech / LV placement when transitioning to a one circle fight. This continues all the way down to the deck.

**Press.**

Last Modified on 2/1/2017 4:58:36 PM
## SYLLABUS EVENT GRADESHEET

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**Grade:** N/ A

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**Overall Comments:**

Last Modified: (Not Saved Yet)
### SYLLABUS EVENT GRADESHEET

**SYLL PHASE/EVENT: PLT 1 A/ A/ FBFM 102**

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**Overall Comments:**

FBFM 102
18 OCT 2016
1v1 PADS setup / OFF BFM
W-291 P6/7

**Brief:** Standard

**Admin:**

No issues during start up or taxi out. Walked late due to jet not being ready. When checking in with lead let them know if you do not have clearance. IFF was in off during take off and RP had wypt 0 selected vice M9 for the departure. On the departure don't cut the corner of the TCN. Fly the same departure as lead.

Verbalize the fuel transfer checks are complete. During the fence out/RTB help yourself out by gaining a radar lock and using the basic rules to join up. Use your position to your advantage. Coming in for the overhead the radalt went off and RP reset it but took too much of a cut away from lead to do so. Need to look good coming in for the break.

**Tacadmin:**

Briefed having 2/3 for the 'speed & angels' call but still need to have all the parameters met once the fox2/fights on call is made. Have the proper radar mode set up when turning in for the sets.

SSDx3 as target
SSDx3 as shooter
High Work sight picturex2 Offensive with an extra being an IP demo.
High Work sight picture x2 Def
Guns weave x1

Continue to develop a proper sight picture for the attack window entry and use the TLE to help develop what the sight picture is.

Overall RP needs to be more aggressive on the unload/capture mech and watch bleeding too much airspeed.

Average flight. Press.

Last Modified By: [User] on 2/1/2017 1:20:12 PM
**SYLLABUS EVENT GRADESHEET**

1/17/2019 10:45:52 AM

### SYLL PHASE/ EVENT: PLT 1 A/ A/ FBFM 103

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### Overall Comments:

FBFM 103
19 OCT 2016
1v1 Offensive BFM
W291-P4

**Brief:** Standard

**Admin:**

Started APU 30 secs early. No issues getting jet started and out to marshal. During transit make sure to bit the radar to make sure it is fully up. Check in with negative expendables if you don't have any. During RTB make your life easier and get a radar lock on Lead to ease the join up. As it was RP overshot lead and worked it back in. Nothing unsafe but not as good as it could have been.

**Tacadmin:**

SSDx3 Target
SSDx3 Shooter
9k Offensive Set x2
6k Off Set x1
3k Off Set x1

**SSD:**

[Description of SSD equipment or performance metrics]

Page 1 of 2

Enclosure 6
Pulled too much as a tgt driving the shooter a bit close forcing him to have to dig into the turn more. On RPs defensive maneuver executed too late, start slightly earlier to avoid the tracking of the bandits bullets. If going to do wingtip on make sure to go full wingtip on and pull.

9k Sets:
1 - Delay your turn in slightly after 'check it L/R 50' call to help with closure. Early on attack window entry. Overall not great. IP will demo the next set up.
2 - Took this one all the way to the deck. AWE was better. Ok alignment going downhill but still gave up some angles. Be sure to be on your 1 circle numbers and taking the appropriate shots coming down hill. Mech to help with this was debriefed.

6k Set:
RP Still working on refining the AWE. Defender was able to pull RP forward on his canopy and the opportunity to reverse could have occurred. Training Rule deck bust. Acknowledged by RP

3k Set:
RP Short-mic'd himself on Fox2 call. Just be sure to annunciate it and if the bandit looks like he isn't maneuvering go ahead and call it again. Again RP held way too much airspeed coming downhill. Debriefed.

Would have been above average BFM event except for the rejoin. Focus on the admin and tacadmin!

- Pablo

Last Modified By: [b] (3) (A). [b] on 2/1/2017 9:49:56 AM

Enclosure 6
### SYLL PHASE/ EVENT: PLT 1 A/ A/ FBFM 104

**Grade: 3.57**

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**Total Grades**: 0 0 0 3 4 0 1

Overall Comments:

**FBFM 104**
**Offensive Solo**
**20 OCT 2016**
**W-291 P5**

**Brief**: Standard

Admin: On the initial join and both the battle damage checks bring it in to a tighter formation. As it was RP was flying slightly loose. Set up the voice callsigns in jmps prior to the flight so you do not have to set it up while in the jet. On the full stop at knkx wait for lead to call 3 down and locked first, as it was RP jumped ahead a bit. Standard admin rest of flight.

TacAdmin:

5 total sets completed with a tape debrief.

Formation keeping could be tighter. On the initial set up for the 9k RP had to be pimped to flow out to 2nm vice 1nm. Can save fuel and time if formation was set up immediately.

9k set: Valid fox2 with a good AWE. When the bandit redefines RP needs to pull up slightly and then go down hill. Continue to max perform the aircraft. RP had too much speed going downhill. RP recognized and began a deck save but settled below the deck and called his own KIO.
6k set: Ok AWE. RP maintained the offensive position and took follow on shots while going downhill. RP still carried too much airspeed going downhill and made a successful deck transition but in doing so gave up angles to the bandit and would eventually lead to being gunned by the bandit. Continue to watch the deck but put your aircraft in a better energy state when going downhill. Do not sacrifice the offensive position to take shots.

3k set: Initial set RP was flying 60 deg AOT, need to be 40. Energy management was better going downhill. When taking follow shots downhill bias towards using the aim-120. RP crushed the deck and called his own KIO. Second 3k set had a better set up and RP did better with energy management going downhill.

Total of 3 deck busts. All recognized by RP. A lot of good learning points and conducted a tape debrief.

Press.
## SYLLABUS EVENT GRADESHEET

**SYLL PHASE/ EVENT: PLT 1 A/ A/ FBFM 105**  
Grade: 3.29

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**Overall Comments:**

FBFM 105  
Defensive BFM  
21 OCT 2016  
W-291 P5

**Brief:** Standard

**Admin:** Standard. Departure RP did not wait a full 10sec before following lead on the departure. Use ATC hold to your advantage to minimize throttle movement on the way home to save on fuel.

**TacAdmin:**

1st SSD RP was ~900ft on the shooter pass. 2nd Pass RP worked it back out to 1200ft. Not a safety of flight but a TR violation.

1st 9k set RP did well on the capture timing and mech. ok energy management going downhill. Transition to the deck save a bit earlier as it was RP initiated but would eventually settle ~100ft below the deck.

6k set. Overall trend of a slight climb during the defensive break turn. Continue to move your scan inside and outside. On RPs ditch mechanics should feed in opposite rudder to stop your LV placement and continue to max perform in the descent. RP did well maintaining sight but as a technique if you see your nose 45 deg nose low unload and ditch again to keep up with the timing for the reversal.
Standard and good mech going downhill. Continue to watch the deck and remember the floor is now higher.

Conducted a tape debrief and discussion about how to validate the gun shots. Press
## SYLLabus Event Gradesheet

**SYLL PHASE/EVENT: PLT 1 A/ A/ FBFM 106**  
**Grade: 3.71**

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**Overall Comments:**

FBFM 106  
Defensive Solo  
26 Oct  
W-291 P5  

**Brief: Standard**

Admin: Overall solid job. During the RTB RP has too much of a 'U' shape when collapsing in from ATC spread. Nothing unsafe and the join was fine but in an effort to increase fuel efficiency take a 5-10 degree cut and let the angles work out in your favor to decrease the range while minimizing throttle movements.

TacAdmin: Solid tacadmin overall Timely PADS set up and BDA went well. On the initial check in remember to reply with "2" to the comm calls. As it was RP replied "Shooter 08" initially but corrected himself on subsequent calls.

Conduct:

2x sets of SSD. Decent gun solution with RP averaging ~1200 ft. Good recognition of errors in range, plane of motion and lead with early corrections as both the shooter and target.

9k set: RP needs a little more pull on the break turn. Slight climb on the initial pull. On the second break turn RP had too much of an altitude loss. Remember that you are bleeding down your airspeed and this will require a reduction in angle of bank in order to maintain altitude. Giving up that altitude in the break just gives that advantage to the attacker. Ditch occurred slightly early but ok lift vector placement with timely reversals. Hard Deck was set at 6k and RP would call his own knock it off for a deck bust.
6k set: Improving trend throughout entire set, mostly so with lift vector placement. Ditch still slightly early but reversals were again timely. RP would call his own knock it off for a deck bust.

3k set: RP too late imitate ditch mechanics and IP would call for the ditch. Sensor nose becomes a factor quicker on the 3k sets. Ditched all the way down to the deck with RP having late reversals down the deck. RP would call his own knock it off for an FCS caution that would reset. No deck busts from RP.

Debrief: 1st of 2nd back to back flights. Would have a quick conduct debrief while refueling with a more in-depth with tapes following the 2nd flight.

Key learning points for RP would include recognizing when target aspect is changing and sensor nose is becoming a factor to avoid initiating the ditch too early. Better mechanics on the defensive break to avoid unnecessary climbs and descends. Quicker scan and better judgement when approaching the hard deck in order to avoid further deck busts.
SYLLABUS EVENT GRADE SHEET

SYLL PHASE/EVENT: PLT 1 A/ A/ FBFM 107 Grade: 3.71

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Total Grades: 0 0 0 2 5 0 1

Overall Comments:
FBFM 107
OFF/DEF Combo
26 Oct
W-291 P5

Brief: Standard

Admin: Standard. RP would forget to reset Take off trim prior to going back through final checks. Final checkers would catch it in the line.

TacAdmin: Standard.

Conduct:
2x SSD. Sight picture still slight far with RP averaging about ~1300ft.

9k defensive set: Better defensive break turns but still slightly early on the ditch mechanics. Solid work going down hill with better reversal timing on the deck.

9k offensive set: Early attack window entry but solid work following downhill. RP would start to get slightly neutral while down on the deck. Remember to call out 'left to left' 'high / low' calls.

6k offensive: Improving trend on the attack window entry and initial follow on the first ditch was good but second follow was late. Solid work down on the deck.
3k defensive: Quick set up due to fuel with only one turn downhill before knock it off for Bingo. RP would have a deck bust.

Debrief: Conducted tape debrief for both flights. Learning points for RP would be to check the FCS page to note the current G-LIM of the aircraft prior to maneuvers. Unload for just a bit longer in order to build up more airspeed and have more energy on the jet to work with. Sight picture showed an improving trend as the flight went on but continue to adjust nose position as the deck becomes more of a factor.
SYLLABUS EVENT GRADE SHEET

1/17/2019 10:45:52 AM

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6)

SYLL PHASE/ EVENT: PLT 1 A/ A/ FBFM 108  
Grade: 3.29

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Total Grades: 0 0 1 3 3 0 1

Overall Comments:
FBFM 108
High Aspect BFM

Brief: Standard. Clean up a bit on the enemy wez numbers. Miles vice ft.

Admin: Standard. After you knock it off for Bingo be as fuel efficient as possible and immediately point towards home. Do the T/O trim prior to running the IBIT. If you have no GPS on the jet just immediately go to NAV mode

TacAdmin: On the items check RP would roger up 'Chaff' vice actually saying "Flares".
Quicker to get set up for PADS. Need to be a fuel efficient as possible. After each set reset the G.

Conduct:
2x SSD. RPs second run as the shooter was a close. ~700 ft. On the 3rd run RP would be too late in his maneuver to acquire a guns solution.

Roller: RP would receive coaching from IP on better roller mechanics. Continue to assess and pull for shots.

Butterfly sets: Overall learning point for RP is energy management and setting up the initial merge for the airspeed and geometry that you want. Again continue to assess for times to either take shots or maintain your energy state. On the 1st set RP would elect to go high. Be more willing the take shots. Continue to practice the mech for queuing up the appropriate radar mode and weapon selection.

2nd set. RP will go low with the bandit going high. RP would correctly assess he had a shot opportunity and maneuver
to take the shot but used the incorrect comm cal based on his set up. RP would call a 'fox2' when it was actually a 'fox3'.

After the shot move quickly to set up for a follow on merge. You want to always be controlling the fight. Second merge would see a low to high merge with RP reversing 1 circles for a follow on shot opportunity.

3rd set would be an Abeam start. Bandit would stack the merge against me. Do not let the bandit aircraft bully you into any merges you don't want. Continue to set your own angle and geometry to drive the fight.

Overall learning points for RP. More aggressive bunt when going through your merges to build airspeed on the jet. That airspeed will lead to a increase in energy that will be useful in subsequent merges. Set your airspeed early during the start of the sets to arrive at the merge with an energy state that makes sense for your gameplan. Use your early turn options. Better energy management and lift vector placement will go a long way.
SYLLABUS EVENT GRADESHEET

SYLL PHASE/EVENT: PLT 1 A/ A/ FBFM 109

Grade: 3.86

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**Total Grades**

| 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 6 | 0 | 1 |

**Overall Comments:**
FBFM 109
HABFM Solo
W-291 P1/2

**Brief:** Standard

**Admin:** While out over the area doing a weather recce be closer in the Tac Wing position. As it was RP was still roughly in an atc cruise position. On the ground when finished with refueling RP would refer to Ground as "base".

**TacAdmin:** Solid work.

**Conduct:**
2x SSD. Would skip the maneuvering set due to weather and another section RTB beneath. As shooter RP would be 1300ft / 1300ft / 1600ft respectively. On the far side so continue to safely work in the sight picture to achieve that guns solution at a closer distance.

Weather in the area would force a low war with a ceiling of 20k and a hard deck of 5k. Conducted a tape debrief of each set.

Key learning points from each set. Nose high oblique is not the greatest option as it does not fully give any of the benefits of going pure nose high. Prioritize boresight for your radar modes. Assess your own energy state as well as the bandits energy state in order to determine what type of flow (1C / 2C) is best to set. Always look to find when is a time to either take a shot or continue maintaining your energy. Even after a shot is taken continue to set up for the follow on merges.
Debrief: Thorough debrief of the tapes as well as learning points for RP. Overall RP developed a better sight picture of the geometry of HABFM. Improving trend of gaining a deeper understanding of when take those energy excursions and what is the best flow to set that will work in your advantage.

Press,
SYLLABUS EVENT GRADESHEET

1/17/2019 10:45:52 AM

SYLL PHASE/EVENT: PLT 1 A/ A/ SFWT 101

Grade: 3.00

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Overall Comments:
SFWT 101
4 NOV
AFT 3

Comments to follow.

Last Modified By: (b) (3) (A), (b) on 12/6/2016 1:42:28 PM
(b)
### SYLLABUS EVENT GRADESHEET

1/17/2019 10:45:52 AM

#### SYLL PHASE/ EVENT: PLT 1 A/ A/ SFWT 102

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**Grade**: 3.57

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**Overall Comments:**
SFWT 102
7 NOV

Conduct: Executed (1) Bogey run and (2) Hostile runs. On the bogey run, set your geometry early so that you can assess the bogey’s awareness level. Radar mechanics are coming along; briefed the differences between the simulator and the aircraft, big takeaway is slow everything down in the aircraft. Debriefed proper labeling of groups on the VID call. For the hostile runs, do not forget to execute different tactics based on whether or not the bandit is targeting you. Instructor debriefed additional techniques and procedures to tighten everything up. Execute the tactics as they are taught to you and everything will fall into place. Discussed the wording from the TACSOP in regard to when you are permitted to come out of your block. Nice SA recognizing the aggressive move to set geometry with block awareness. Remember that being smooth leads to people being calm which make us more lethal and tactically effective.

Blocks, Radar, HDG, In. This will keep you safe.

Press.

Last Modified By: $(b) (3) (A), (b)$ on 2/8/2017 3:29:25 PM

Enclosure 6
SYLL PHASE/ EVENT: PLT 1 A/ A/ SFWT 103

Grade: 3.71

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Total Grades: 0 0 0 2 5 0 1

Overall Comments:
SFWT 103
7 NOV

Conduct: Executed (3) runs with (1) bogey and (2) hostile. On the first run, Work to create a little more separation as the shooter turning in and it will solve problems for taking a shot after lead makes the ID. On the second and third run, similar trends noted on both. RP devoting a lot of time scanning lead for formation which is good; however, start to work the mission crosscheck time a little more and you may notice SA building on your sensors earlier. Think about what lead is doing with his jet during the intercept so that you can anticipate necessary corrections to stay in position. Nice job gaining tally on the last two runs. IP's debriefed additional techniques and procedures in depth. Take on board the lessons learned from today and apply them to your follow on events.

Press

Last Modified By: (b) (3) (A), (b) (6) on 2/8/2017 3:27:58 PM (6)
SYLLABUS EVENT GRADESHEET

1/17/2019 10:45:52 AM

SYLL PHASE/ EVENT: PLT 1 A/ A/ FFWT 101 Grade: 3.29

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Overall Comments:
FFWT 101 PASS/COMPLETE

Comments to follow

Last Modified By: (b) (3) (A), (b) (6) on 12/5/2016 1:33:52 PM

Enclosure 6
**SYLLABUS EVENT GRADESHEET**

1/17/2019 10:45:52 AM

**SYLL PHASE/ EVENT: PLT 1 A/ A/ FFWT 102**

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**Overall Comments:**

**FFWT 102 PASS/COMPLETE**

**TRs:** One block bust by 200', IP called it out, correction made, no safety issue

**Brief:** Good knowledge, keep it up.

**Admin:** no issues.

**Tac Admin:** Nice job with Comm checks. Got WAY SUCKED on expendables checks... how's lead gonna see em when we're way back there? Missed check in on PRI... pay attention. For tac-turns, no need to call deconfliction (hi/lo) if an acceptable trend already exists.

**Execution Take Aways:**

For post merge flow, LISTEN TO YOUR LEAD. We turned 50 degrees AWAY from called heading... let's stay together and execute SRR.

Calculate your notch heading PRECISELY EVERY TIME. A cold notch is an INEFFECTIVE notch...

For post-notch RADAR setup: QA this prior to pitch-in, especially BRA and altitude.

Otherwise, formation keeping is coming along nicely, we found 3/4 merges, 3/4 tallies, and took 3/4 post notch shots.

**AND PAY ATTENTION TO YOUR BLOCK.**

Last Modified By: (b) (3) (A), (b) (6) on 12/9/2016 4:47:38 PM

Enclosure 6
## SYLLABUS EVENT GRADESHEET

### SYLL PHASE/ EVENT: PLT 1 A/ A/ FFWT 103

**Grade: 3.86**

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**Total Grades**: 0 0 0 1 6 0 1

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**Overall Comments:**

**FFWT 103 - PASS/COMPLETE**

**W291 - P3/4**

Conducted tape debrief

**Admin:**

Standard brief. RP knew what an F-14 is. If troubleshooting in the line let lead know about the issue early on.

**TacAdmin:** Keep working on formation keeping. Environmentals were difficult due to sun angle but if that is the case put yourself on the side of the formation where it is best to see lead. On the first run during the VID, RP would turn in early following a blind call which would put RP ahead of lead coming to the merge. If this happens, we have perfect shooter eyeball split. You need to have SA to this so you know and can make the merge to ID the threat. Continue to work on radar mech and check to make sure the appropriate radar set is correct.

2nd VID worked out better than the first and overall each run improved upon the last. Reminder to check AOA indicator brightness when taking off during the day but landing at night. No issues on the RTB
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**Grade**: N/ A

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1/17/2019 10:45:52 AM

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Grade: N/A

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Overall Comments:

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## SYLLABUS EVENT GRADESHEET

1/17/2019 10:45:52 AM

### SYLL PHASE/ EVENT: PLT 1 A/ A/ SFWT 104

**Grade: 3.43**

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**Overall Comments:**

SFWT 104
8 NOV

Debrief complete

Last Modified By: (b) (3) (A), (b) (6) on 11/23/2016 8:10:43 AM

Enclosure 6
### SYLL PHASE/ EVENT: PLT 1 A/ A/ SFWT 105

**Grade: 3.57**

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**Total Grades**

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**Overall Comments:**

SFWT 105

Well prepared for brief.  DCA in the R-2301W.  Blackout control.

5 runs total, 1xbogey, 4xHostile.

Tac Admin - no issues.

Run 1 - Bogey.  Don't notch with lead.  Execute the tactic as briefed.  Need to take a shooter split.  No shot at the merge.  Radar work was descent up to the notch, then it was driven down into the dirt.  Late to correct this issue, so no pre-merge radar SA.  Late to go WACQ.  Need to call no shot if no shot available.

Run 2 - SG Hostile - Good loft, just start earlier.  Good notch mech, elevation too low again.  Got a late STT at the merge so no shots.  Too close to flight lead for this merge (.3).  Went blind at the merge.  Need to keep sight.

Run 3 SGHvy Hostile - Good crank.  Initially a little cold for the notch, then good update.  Pre-,merge Radar SA and shot.  also visual tally at the merge.  Good run.

Run 4 - SG Hostile NTM - Good shots and crank.  Good notch with updates, but ended up hot at the end.  Go WACQ on the in form the notch.  Eyeballs out, gain a tally.  Late radar and Aim-9 lock so no pre-merge shot.  Good tally.

Run 5 - SGHvy Hostile NTM - Good shots and crank.  Good notch.  Late radar and Aim-9 lock so no pre-merge shot.  Good tally.
FORM, sensors, comm. Your best sensor approaching the merge is your eyeball. Make WACQ work for you. HOTAS your wav to the merge. But keep sight! Priority is VMS! Radar mode and weapon is forever linked from this point.

Last Modified By: * on 11/10/2016 12:03:57 PM

Enclosure 6
### SYLLABUS EVENT GRADESHEET

**SYLL PHASE/ EVENT: PLT 1 A/ A/ SFWT 106**

**Grade: 3.86**

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**Total Grades**

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**Overall Comments:**

SFWT 106  
9 NOV  
AFT 3

**Overall average for (3) (A), (6) Trends:**

- Not consistently bracketing threat altitude in meld and out of the notch.
- Cleaning radar contacts off of the scope unnecessarily.
- Taking invalid shots.

**Overall improving trend throughout sim. Press.**

Last Modified By: (3) (A), (6) on 11/21/2016 10:34:14 AM
**SYLLABUS EVENT GRADESHEET**

1/17/2019 10:45:52 AM

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**Total Grades**

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Overall Comments:

**FFWT 104 - PASS/COMPLETE**

W-291 P1/2 + MISR E

Conducted tape debrief

Admin:

Standard Brief, good job on RP stating maneuvering target mech. No issues on start up to take off. Smooth and efficient join by RP and no issues heading out to the area. Discussion in the debrief about how RP can work a little less hard maintaining ATC spread by using the appropriate pilot relief modes. No issues on the RTB.

TacAdmin:

RP was able to maintain sight throughout the event today. Formation keeping in the notch tended to be less than ideal but workable. Debriefed techniques and ways to fix that. Maintain/Regain mech needs to happen faster. Push button 5 is your friend.

Employ weapons in the proper radar mode. Discussion in debrief about RWS vice TWS. Continue to QA radar mech for taking shots to assess validity.

Keep practicing radar mech, it is improving but still overall poor.

Last Modified By: (b) (3) (A), (b) (6) on 2/1/2017 1:22:47 PM
**SYLLABUS EVENT GRADE SHEET**

**SYLL PHASE/ EVENT: PLT 1 A/ A/ FFWT 105**

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**Total Grades:** 0 0 0 1 6 0 1

**Overall Comments:**
FFWT 105 - PASS/COMPLETE
W291 - P3/4

Conducted tape debrief

Admin:
No issues getting out of line. Smooth and efficient join and transit out to working area. Slightly nonstandard vectors coming back home for the overhead, RP would have been best positioned on the outside of the formation vice remaining on the inside, as it was no issues on the RTB.

TacAdmin:
RP was able to maintain sight throughout the entire event and follow lead to the merge. Continue to work on the radar mechanics. RP is taking shots on timeline but still working on gaining radar SA coming to the merge. Smooth and methodical with the radar and if necessary go through your maintain/regain mech. QA your shots for validity.

Lessons learned for RP. Form, sensor, comm works as shown today. RP wasn't always able to regain radar SA but by following lead and maintaining visual mutual support RP was in position coming to the merge. Patient with the radar and if necessary quickly write down the AIC calls to help with regain mech.

Last Modified By: (b) (3) (A), (b) (6) on 1/19/2017 2:37:30 PM
**SYLLABUS EVENT GRADESHEET**

1/17/2019 10:45:52 AM

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**SYLL PHASE/ EVENT: PLT 1 A/ A/ FBFM 110**  
**Grade: 3.29**

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**Total Grades**  
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Overall Comments:
FBFM 110  
SEM  
2 Nov

Brief: Event in FWT the BFM knowledge is still applicable. Good job brushing up the principles of SEM and HA but not let the basic knowledge (i.e training rules) fall out of your study habits.

Admin: No issues starting up and getting out the line. Standard join up out the area. RTB as a section.

Conduct: Conduct (3) SEM sets. Good job on RP for maintaining sight of lead throughout the evolution. Late on gaining initial tally during the start of sets but would maintain tally/visual from then on. Understand it has been a while since the last BFM flight but there needs to be a higher level of aggression from RP overall. RP is getting out of plane/ out of phase for all passes minus the last where lead and RP would be in the same piece of sky going the same direction for too long. The lack of aggressiveness comes from maintaining sight at the sacrifice of not max performing the jet. Yes, maintain sight, but fighting your best 1v1 BFM is just as important.

Last Modified By: (b) (3) (A), (b) on 2/2/2017 7:19:42 AM
SYLLABUS EVENT GRADESHEET

SYLL PHASE/EVENT: PLT 1 A/ A/ FFWT 106

Grade: 3.71

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Total Grades

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Overall Comments:
FFWT 106 - PASS/COMPLETE
14 DEC 2016
W291 P1/2

Decent work today. Unsatisfactory performance in the brief, slightly above average performance in the airplane to balance out for an overall average event. Do not let your guard down with pre-flight preparation.

Conducted tape debrief.

Admin:
Overall solid. Hit on RP for the brief to clean up the BFM knowledge -- could not clearly define training rules WRT the soft-deck. Took about 4 tries and input from the student WSO in the event to get it figured out.

TacAdmin:
Overall solid. No need to be so close during the expendables check. As it was RP was at a .2 and slightly sucked. Keep it within a .5 and maintain abeam.

Conduct:
BFM principles never go away. Continue to engage the offensive/defensive axioms. Need to always honor the bandits sensor nose and ditch when the situation calls for it. Debriefed a set where lead and -2 were not OOPL/OOPH and a timely ditch would have been necessary.
Overall good job on RP for maintaining high SA throughout the event but do not sacrifice aggressiveness. Need to still fight your best 1v1 BFM at all times. RP took 3 AIM-9X shots with valid parameters but be careful to QA that lead is not within your HUD FOV.

Learning points for RP:
BFM principles and knowledge need to always be fresh in your mind. Take the extra second to be sure that lead is outside your HUD FOV.
Maintain high SA but also be very aggressive in the fight and enact on the BFM principles that you have learned.

Last Modified By: [b (3) (A), (b) (6)] on 2/2/2017 7:18:51 AM

(b) (6)
**SYLLABUS EVENT GRADESHEET**

1/17/2019 10:45:52 AM

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**Total Grades**: 0 0 0 2 5 0 1

**Overall Comments:**

SFWT 107
9 NOV
AFT 3

You were really slow to recognize the maneuvers but got progressively better throughout, which is par for the sim. Vc is the first cue followed by ASE circle shrinking, steering dot moving out of the ASE circle and suppression of IN LAR. Work on maintain / regain mech. Thinking about progressively opening your radar scan volume by going from STT to TWS scan raid to TWS in increments no larger than 10sec. Scan for the PreMEM or RMEM cue that you’ve lost radar SA. If you have, admit it on aux “clean single group.” Go through regain mech by undesignating the ghost trackfile, and pressing PB5 until it says RWS. This will get you a brick more often than not.

Last Modified By: [b] (3) (A), (b) (6) on 11/23/2016 8:19:40 AM

Enclosure 6
**SYLLABUS EVENT GRADESHEET**

1/17/2019 10:45:52 AM

**SYLL PHASE/ EVENT: PLT 1 A/ A/ SFWT 108**  
**Grade: 3.71**

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**Total Grades**

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**Overall Comments:**

SFWT 108  
10 NOV  
AFT 3

**Comments to follow.**

You HAVE to have better SA approaching the merge. Execute the tactics appropriately and that will help you maintain training rules and safe deconfliction. Lack of radar mech/SA and not being co-altitude at MDR led to Jayden pitching in from the notch co-altitude with the digi bandits and literally flying through their formation with zero SA.

We stopped the sim and talked about it. Subsequent runs were much improved in regards to basic radar mechanics. No further training rule violations. All other runs were average.

- Pablo

Last Modified By: (b) (3) (A), on 2/1/2017 9:48:09 AM

(b) (6)
SYLLABUS EVENT GRADESHEET

1/17/2019 10:45:52 AM

SYLL PHASE/EVENT: PLT 1 A/ A/ FFWT 107
Grade: 3.71

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Total Grades: 0 0 0 2 5 0 1

Overall Comments:
FFWT 107 - PASS/COMPLETE
W291 P1/2

Unable to conduct tape debrief.

Admin:
No issues on start up or getting to the area. On the RTB, RP waited a little too long to rejoin into cruise position from ATC spread. Usually once hitting sierra is time to start collapsing it in.

TacAdmin:
Overall RP was able to maintain sight through out the entire event. Focus on being a thinking a wingman, RP has done enough events to know what each run should look like and know what looks right and what doesn’t. With that being said RP would turn right based on a comm call when the more apt maneuver would be to turn left. Debriefed and lesson learned for RP.

First run RP would call clean and lead would meld in and take shots. RP had radar SA but would put himself into a weird place with the radar. Reminder to work smooth and steady with the radar and if something is not right just go back to RWS and/or hit reset. Improvement on each run when it came to radar mech and SA with RP taking shots coming to the merge. Improving at these scenarios just comes with chair flying through scenarios and being methodical with the radar.

Last Modified By: (b) (3) (A), (b) on 2/1/2017 2:37:34 PM
Enclosure 6
SYLLABUS EVENT GRADESHEET

1/17/2019 10:45:52 AM

SYLL PHASE/EVENT: PLT 1 A/ A/ FFWT 108

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Grade: 3.86

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Total Grades: 0 0 0 2 4 1 1

Overall Comments:
FFWT 108 - PASS/COMPLETE
W291 P1/2

Conducted tape debrief.

Admin:
No issues on start up or take off. Transiting out to the area RP remain too close to lead (around .6) after being told to take ATC spread. Be quicker to get out to position. On the RTB RP would call his own underrun on the final join. While the call was timely and maneuver safe, it should have not developed to that point in the first place. Debriefed as to why that is important and lesson learned for RP. One below for admin.

TacAdmin:
Forgot to switch radar channel. 1 SOF/TR where RP was 8nm from bandit and would notch and descend through a bandit block. Debriefed.

Overall 3 runs conducted with an improving trend on radar mech for RP. Tally of bandits 2/3 times coming to the merge. Remember to use expendables coming to the merge and to make your turn ins tighter to increase the chance of finding radar SA coming to the merge. QA your radar and make sure you are not taking locks on RMEM and to validate your shots prior to trigger squeeze.
Below average flight for the rejoin post knock it off. Otherwise slightly below average for overall SA and radar mechanics.
## SYLLABUS EVENT GRADESHEET

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**Grade:** N/ A

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### Total Grades

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**Overall Comments:**

Last Modified: (Not Saved Yet)
Overall Comments:
SFWT 110
17 NOV 2016

ADMIN: No issues, initialized in the P6/7.

TACADMIN: No issues.

Conduct: Executed (4) total runs with various presentations from the bandits. Introducing the new timeline with emphasis on stick and rudder mechanics, radar mechanics, communication, and overall timeline awareness. Overall, improving trend from each run. On the initial picture, remember the techniques that you can utilize if you are not picking up any contacts on your radar. Keep in mind that the timeline is more compressed as compared to previous events and execute accordingly. Do not lose track of your airspeed and G control when executing the out maneuver (debriefed exactly what to target and techniques to get there). Work to get every piece of the shot communication out so that you can build SA for all players. Before you pitch in, ensure that your radar is set up exactly how you want it. Debriefed more in depth for the specific runs and tactics to execute based on what the bandits are doing.

Lessons learned: Airspeed, G, and geometry management in the out maneuvers. Techniques to build more radar SA. Set up your radar for success before you need it.

Blocks, Radar, In.
# SYLLABUS EVENT GRADESHEET

SYLL PHASE/EVENT: PLT 1 A/ A/ SFWT 111  
Grade: 3.57

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| Total Grades | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 4 | 0 | 1 |          |

Overall Comments:
SFWT 111 Self Escort Strike
4 JAN 2017

Combined the class and brief mostly as one due to no opportunity for a dedicated planning day.

BDS debrief.

Conduct:

Conducted a total of two runs.

Run 1 - RP would quickly fall behind lead and become blind. From this point RP would spend a majority of the run playing catch up. RP able to make it to the target on time but no validation of JDAM was conducted. Remember use the SA page for A/A and HSI for A/G. Coming off target and heading back north RP would be slow to bracket and create some weird geometry coming to the merge. RP would follow lead to the merge and be able to get shots off with lead getting the kills.

Run 2 - A lot of improvement for RP on this run. RP was able to maintain VMS throughout the run. Continue to work on the radar mech and not have it in a nebulus zone.

Learning points for RP: Form, sensor, comms. Work hard to maintain formation and when that is under control you are able to involve yourself more in the fight.
SYLLABUS EVENT GRADESHEET

SYLL PHASE/ EVENT: PLT 1 A/ A/ SFWT 112

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Total Grades: 0 0 0 0 7 0 1

Overall Comments:
SFWT 112
Launch & Leave
23 NOV
AFT 2

Brief: Conducted group brief with (b) (3) (A), (b) at the squadron. No issues.

Conduct:
RP would start out airborne in the northern area of the P6/7. A total of 5 runs would be conducted.

1st Run:
Single Group Hostile - Decent adherence to timeline throughout the run. If confident in correlation decrementing the bar scan can help develop a brick sooner in order to help with the quick timeline adherence. Use the SA page at 40nm to help with correlation. 40nm will give you better fidelity towards the picture calls. Continue to clean up and improve the radar mech.

2nd Run:
-Single Group Hostile - RP would get slow during both the outs but would correct the airspeed. Keep the airspeed in your scan and modulate pull to prevent this. Keep the happy medium of airspeed. Pull too much you get slow, going too fast you will arc. Both of which are disadvantageous. Support your missile shots in TWS. On the turn back in make sure to manage your airspeed and take back altitude. Improve your shot comm by saying who it is you are shooting.

3rd Run:
3rd Run:
Single Group Hostile (Staggerback) - Initial loft shot will be invalid for slow airspeed. Improving trend throughout the run and the radar mech was improving. Slight confusion on staggerback techniques but will debrief and clarify.

4th Run:
Single Group Hostile (Staggerback) - Arcing too much on the outs. Continue to keep your scan on your aircraft's energy state. Continue to take back altitude every chance you can get. Picture call isn't always immediately a threat group.

5th Run:
IPs choice. Single Group Hostile (Staggerback) with RP acting as dash 2 and maintaining the sanitization set. IP will talk though RP on the mechanics.

Overall not too bad for RP. Improving trends throughout the event. Lessons learned for RP include keeping in mind the energy state of the aircraft and keeping it in the happy medium. Continue to take back altitude any chance you can and to make sure the radar is properly set prior to turning back into the fight.

Press.
### SYLLABUS EVENT GRADESHEET

**SYLL PHASE/EVENT:** PLT 1 A/ A/ SFWT 113  
**Grade:** 3.93

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#### Total Grades

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**Overall Comments:**
SFWT 113 PASS/COMPLETE

Well prepared for brief.

4 runs total. Skate, short skate flow. Sar-2 threat.

Tac Admin - no issues.

1. Good sort and shot. Cold ops, execute the comm as briefed. On reattack, look low to surface. Got sucked on  

Enclosure 6
Good sort and shot. Cold ops, execute the comm as briefed. On reattack, look low to surface. Got sucked on re-attack. SRR on abort, set mate.

2 - Good sort, shot. Work on proper radar set up on cold ops. delayed turn in on re-attack, which will eventually lead to blind on the next out. High mid-air potential here based on geometry and altitude changes@! Lead will execute an aggressive turn away to avoid impact. On the re-attack prior, had radar SA to an uncalled group at 3K', but didn't call it. that's the reason you are sanitizing low!!

3 - Stack, good sort and shot. Kept sight entire run. Staggerback, pull 3D cata till about 5nm, then pure. Found merge and cleaned it up. good work.

4 - Forgot husky call. super important for lead. Radar mech on short skate poor. Radar in the dirt. Delouse computer generated 3/4 given. Lead called clean. will meld into notional 3/4, de-meld after realizing friendlies, meld into threat group and kill. Good job. Recommend meld off the BRAA call that lead just received though.

Last Modified By: on 12/2/2016 10:17:31 AM
## SYLL PHASE/ EVENT: PLT 1 A/ A/ SFWT 114

**Grade:** N/ A

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**Overall Comments:**

Last Modified: (Not Saved Yet)
SYLLABUS EVENT GRADESHEET

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Total Grades | 0 | 0 | 0 | 4 | 3 | 0 | 1 |

Overall Comments:
FFWT110 - PASS/COMPLETE
R-2301W H + DOME
Red Air provide by 401

Brief: Standard

Admin:
RP is working to maintain position on the transit out to and from the area. Specifically returning from the area RP was flying a bit sucked. Work to get into position and then use pilot relief modes to ease the situation.

TacAdmin:
RP maintained sight throughout the entire event. Tended to end up sucked during the initial run ins. Be sure to set your power at mil and if anything lean towards being slightly acute. Shots tended to come off near the late side on timeline due to compressed working area, continue to work the radar mech. Good job being correlated and shooting the correct bandit minus the final notchback.

Unable to conduct tape debrief. Conducted a thorough debrief at the TCTS facility.

Lessons learned for RP: Work to maintain a better position with lead. Good job maintaining sight but do not settle for being sucked. Keep up the good correlation but work to improve the radar mech in order to get shots off sooner on timeline. Work to remove admin issues on the transits. Overall average flight for RP.
### SYLLABUS EVENT GRADESHEET

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**Total Grades**

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Overall Comments:

FFWT-111 PASS/COMPLETE
20 DEC 2016
W291 - P6/7

Brief: Standard

Admin:

TacAdmin:
Continue to clean up shot comm.

Conduct:

3 runs conducted.

Overall decent for RP. Good job generating your own BRAA from the SA page on the staggerback but also do not be afraid to ask for a BRAA from AIC. Biggest note is VMS breakdown on final run. It is difficult to be a wingman on a re-attack. Set up your radar and then focus on flying form to maintain position. As it was RP ended up suck on the pitch in and during the turn out RP did not wait long enough for a correction and then ended up acute. Use Link16 to your advantage, it will make rejoining a lot simpler.
Form needs improvement, nice job not losing sight, but you need to be in better positions.
## SYLLABUS EVENT GRADESHEET

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**Grade:** 3.86  
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**Signature:** True  
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### SKILL

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**Overall Comments:**  
FFWT-112 DCA 4vX PASS/COMPLETE  
21 DEC 2016  
W291 P6/7

**Brief:** Standard

**Admin:** Overall solid for RP. Good job hanging on during the RTB back through the weather.

**TacAdmin:** Remember to float to the correct side when setting up for runs. Overall solid work for RP maintaining sight and taking valid shots.

**Conduct:**  
Completed three runs with RP as -2. RP was able to maintain sight and achieve radar SA coming to the merge and maintaining solid geometry during the outs. Continue to work and improve on Form, Sensors, Comm.

**Press:**

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**Last Modified By:** (b) (3) (A), (b)  
on 2/1/2017 2:16:11 PM
SYLLABUS EVENT GRADESHEET

1/17/2019 10:45:52 AM

SYLL PHASE/EVENT: PLT 1 A/ A/ FFWT 113

Grade: 4.00

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Overall Comments:
FFWT 113 4vX DCA
22 DEC 2016
W291 P6/7

Brief: Standard
Conducted tape debrief.

Admin:
RP waited too long to call initial jet down. Would delay take off. Due to weather and RP having a high fuel state lead would elect to return as singles, kissing off RP to remain in the area to create spacing. No issues on the RTB.

TacAdmin:
Overall standard.

Conduct:
RP will maintain sight throughout the entire evolution and remain for the most part in position. Able to correlate and take shots based on the targeting. Lead would make a 'shot trashed' call and RP would be able to maintain radar SA and keep the element on timeline. On a separate occasion lead would call clean during a reattack and RP would able to meld in and take shots.

Good job on RP on profiling the jet and managing the fuel. Would conclude the VUL with RP having 1000lbs + more fuel than lead.
Debrief:
Overview on how to properly validate shots and discussion about cursor placement for the low looker when the decks are set high.

Overall solid flight for RP. One Above.

Press.

Last Modified By: [b] [3] [A], [b] on 2/1/2017 2:35:50 PM
[b] [6]
### SYLLABUS EVENT GRADESHEET

**SYLL PHASE/ EVENT: PLT 1 A/ A/ FFWT 114 AI**

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**Overall Comments:**

Last Modified: (Not Saved Yet)
SYLLABUS EVENT GRADESHEET

SYLL PHASE/ EVENT: PLT 1 A/ A/ SFWT 109

Grade: 3.86

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Overall Comments:
SFWT 109 PASS/COMPLETE

Overall average event. Need to be more methodical with radar mechanics. Continuously strive to be in position. Biggest other was shooting flight lead during the notchback. Notchback is a visual maneuver. It is imperative that you stay visual when you are pitching in so you don't shoot your lead. Debriefed thoroughly. Press.

Last Modified By: (b) (3) (A), (b) (6) on 12/12/2016 1:17:42 PM
SYLLBUS EVENT GRADESHEET

SYLL PHASE/ EVENT: PLT 1 A/ A/ FFWT 109  Grade: 4.00

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Overall Comments:
FFWT 109 Self Escort Strike
5 JAN 2017
W291 P6/7

Brief: Did a thorough brief the day prior with (b) (3) (A), (b) (6). Brief today was mainly focused on how to achieve mission success.

Admin:
RP would fumble slightly the initial admin check in. Gave alibis on initial check vice waiting for proper time.

TacAdmin:
RP would also fumble the hand signals slightly on the initial BDA. On the way back RP would miss the BDA hand signal and so would take slightly longer to get it done.

Conduct:

Conducted tape debrief.

RP was able to maintain sight the entire time and take shots when directed. Biggest learning point is double checking the JDAM validation. Good job on taking shots when directed to do so as well as being quick with the meld and follow on shots when lead called clean. Work on being to be more proactive with the formation keeping. You know what lead is going to do per the gameplan so make sure the jet is in a proper position to get there. This will help make the formation keeping tighter.
RP would RTB as a single, no issues.
**SYLLABUS EVENT GRADESHEET**

**1/17/2019 10:45:52 AM**

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**Grade: 3.31**

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**Total Grades**

| 0 | 0 | 0 | 11 | 5 | 0 | 0 |

**Overall Comments:**

SCQL 101

10 JAN 2017

Started airborne. Not necessarily a need to give strike a courtesy call and no need for a courtesy call when switching to marshal. Keep your comms as brief as possible. Make your big timing corrections early, and be setup on the radial, at the correct speed, and ready to commence at least 10 miles prior. Don’t want to rush and burn a lot of fuel speeding up to make your timing. RP would turn about 40 degrees into the radial vice a max of 30. Keep this in mind.
speeding up to make your timing. RP would turn about 40 degrees into the radial vice a max of 30. Keep this in mind as that will cut into spacing. Make sure you get a good HAILR check.

Keep your HUD repeater up on the left display, and do everything else on the right. RP would keep the checklist page up for too long. Have it up prior to marshal and get everything you need from it prior to commencing. At ten miles you need to be at 1200 feet. It is not acceptable to be slightly high, RP would stay at about 1350. Be hard on yourself and maintain the exact parameters. RADALT to the HUD. Uncage the velocity vector to get a better idea of your crosswind drift.

On deck, make sure you check your BLINS prior to saluting or turning on your lights. The climb to 1200 feet needs to be more controlled. RP was fast, and overshot altitude on most climb outs. Pay attention to fuel. Even in the sim, go through the motions and don't taxi to the catapult if you are below hold down. When in tension, don't throttle back until signaled to do so.

Overall, RP had a definite improving trend throughout the sim. Keep working on the comms. Make sure timing is precise. Altitudes and airspeeds need to be spot on, BAW on precision approaches was very poor. Always keep your RADALT set below you. and keep your bingo bug set appropriately.

Last Modified By: on 1/30/2017 10:33:01 AM

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6)
## SYLLABUS EVENT GRADE SHEET

### SYLL PHASE/EVENT: PLT 1 CQ/ SCQL 102

**Grade: 3.29**

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**Total Grades** | 0 | 0 | 0 | 12 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 0

**Overall Comments:**
SCQL 102
12 JAN 2017

**Brief:** Standard
Started airborne about 50 miles from the ship. Checked in with Marshall no issues. When assigned your altitude get to it a bit quicker. As it was RP remained high for a too long before pushing over. Good job with the timing problem, would push about 2 seconds early. Good job modulating your throttles to arrive on time but do not forget you want to be at 300 GS at the expected DME. RP was not excessively fast but around 270kts when commencing.

Flew multiple Mode II and Mode III approaches. Good job having your radar out in front and catching that low loitering traffic. no issues. Make sure you are keeping up displays that make sense. Good job on recognizing the soft CAT shot and going through the appropriate procedures and making a safe ejection.

Press.
SYLLABUS EVENT GRADESHEET

1/17/2019 10:45:52 AM

SYLL PHASE/ EVENT: PLT 1 CQ/ SCQL 103

Grade: 3.53

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Total Grades: 0 0 0 7 8 0 0

Overall Comments:
SCQL103 PASS/COMPLETE

Initialized in the W-291 to get established in the marshal stack. RP commenced approach time 30secs late with a rolex to push 1 min later. HAILR checklist did not get completed until landing checklists

Continued approach to an arrested landing below max trap weight. Executed a CAT shot to enter the bolter/wave off pattern. Remember that approach may not necessarily be passing on any failures to paddles so ensure that you are directive and if you still have the failure when you call the ball, add it to your ball call. Continued with multiple degraded ICLS approaches and TCN approaches. Smooth basic air work here. Do not go fishing for centerline.
Degraded ICLS approaches and TCN approaches. Smooth basic air work here. Do not go fishing for centerline.

Good use of EP for soft cat shot. Due to the sim was unable to adequately show a red launch bar light but was able to talk through the issue real time.

Lessons learned for RP. Make your push time. smooth and steady basic air work. Press.

Last Modified By: on 1/30/2017 10:53:50 AM
**SYLLABUS EVENT GRADESHEET**

1/17/2019 10:45:52 AM

**SYLL PHASE/EVENT: PLT 1 CQ/ SCQL 104**  
**Grade: 3.78**

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**Total Grades** | 0 | 0 | 0 | 4 | 14 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Overall Comments:
SCQL104 PASS/COMPLETE

Initialized airborne to get established in the marshal stack. HAIL-R checklists complete and RP was 14 seconds early commencing. If you are outside the +/- 10sec make sure to let marshal know. A little slow to reset to 2000fpm passing platform and RP dipped below 1200 briefly before becoming stabilized. No issues remaining approach and RP would land 100lbs below max trap weight.

Continued into the bolter waveoff pattern with multiple degraded approaches. Ball flying in the sim isn’t accurate but continue to make meaningful corrections. PASS # 2 RP went CLARA low in close RESULTING IN A RAMPSTRIKE (-3ft Hook/Ramp). DO NOT LET BALL DROP BELOW DATUMS EVEN IN THE SIM. If flying a TCN only approach make sure to keep the course line up. RP would get an ADC failure, discussed how to handle and how it would be a divert scenario but due to sim issues would clear to continue.

Good job executing the bold face for brake failure on deck and good work executing Emer cat flyway with a soft cat shot and a stalled right engine. RP would be able to fly the aircraft away.

Nice work on the bingo profile turning the aircraft first before accelerating. Watch the small deviations on airspeed as that can cost you fuel. Good system set up for feet dry checks and getting ready for the PAR at KNZY. No other issues on the bingo.

Overall - BAW needs to improve on CV-1 approach and letting the ball fall out CLARA low is a below average deviation even for the sim.

Press.
## SYLLABUS EVENT GRADESHEET

### SYLL PHASE/EVENT: PLT 1 CQ/ SCQL 105  
Grade: 3.57

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Overall Comments:

received a SOD today on his CQ-105 sim for procedural knowledge, headwork, and failure to execute boldface for a right engine fire.

Brief: No issues

Marshal: Initiated students 40nm South of the ship. Marshal radial was 175 so students were basically in the Marshal stack at 15K. RP initiates a decent and is told to level off until he is away from the Marshal stack. RP flies directly over the Marshal radial and tries to initiate second decent and is told a second time to get away from the stack before descending. RP then proceeds 12 degrees cold of the stack, starts a decent, and then turns back toward the stack while still descending. The last 3,000 feet of altitude loss RP was on the Marshal radial proceeding outbound.

Approach: Because of the previous paragraph, RP needs 550 knots to make it to the fix on time. Rather than requesting a new push time, RP elects to commence at over 400 knots and never gets below 250 until configuring. The check turn toward final bearing is not made until 14nm. RP will chase lineup all the way down on the approach which leads to a very scary pass. Biggest learning point here is to slow down if you are behind the jet, fess up, and ask Marshal/Approach for a new push time or to discontinue the approach (headwork).

ADDED TO GRADESHEET 01 FEB: RP Commenced approach with Bingo Bug set at 4.6 (hold down). Max trap was approximately 6.5. Secured dumps manually at approximately 7.0. Debriefed RP extensively on the importance of backing yourself up with the Bingo Bug.

First Pass: RP will get to a slightly high lined up left start. Fly through down on a lineup correction. Gets two power calls prior to the red cell disappearing. Technique waveoff. This is a trend. On the previous sim I had with him, RP went Clara low resulting in a ramp strike and was debriefed accordingly. We are not teaching ball flying in the sim but being comfortable with such an extreme deviation on the low side is a concerning trend.

EP: Second time in the bolter-waveoff pattern RP will receive indications of a right engine fire. Does not execute boldface. Pulls right engine to idle and asks approach for the hornet rep. Hornet rep asks RP what he has. "I have right engine fire indications, no secondaries, right throttle is currently at idle (roughly 45 seconds after initial indications). Hornet rep asks RP to confirm whether he has executed the boldface. RP then executes boldface procedures.

Debrief: was very receptive in the debrief and acknowledges that he made very bad decisions today. He wants to improve and did not make a single excuse for his performance. Recommend two ET sims to perfect Case III procedures and demonstrate the ability to make better decisions at the ship.

Respectfully,

-Suspect
SYLLABUS EVENT GRADESHEET

SYLL PHASE/EVENT: PLT 1 CQ/ SCQL 106
Grade: 3.82

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Overall Grades: 0 0 1 1 15 0 0

Overall Comments: SCQL 106 **PASS/COMPLETE**

Started on deck for a Case III departure. Nice work catching the mismatched nozzle position on the catapult. RP would spend too much time troubleshooting ACLS issues. Good work asking for a new push time. Would push early but within the +/- 10sec window. Good job flying the approach. Late to recognize a failed RADALT but would do so and ask for a...
the +/- 10sec window. Good job flying the approach. Late to recognize a failed RADALT but would do so and ask for a new altitude to trouble shoot. Started high and kept it high on the ILS for the trap.

Caught the brake fail and executed to the correct steps for the E Cat flyaway. Getting an AV hot on the ball call is not necessary to report to paddles as it could only create confusion, just go ahead and land and troubleshoot afterwards. Good CRM handling the Left AMAD PR and comm work with talking to beaver control. Remember to use FPAS when flying the profile.

Press

Last Modified By: [b] (3) (A), (b) on 5/3/2017 1:37:28 PM

(6)
### SYLLABUS EVENT GRADESHEET

**SYLL PHASE/ EVENT: PLT 1 CQ/ SCQL 107**

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**Overall Comments:**
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Grade: N/A

Page 1 of 2

Enclosure 6
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Overall Comments:

Last Modified: (Not Saved Yet)
From: Commanding Officer
To: /7523 USMC

Subj: FLIGHT QUALIFICATIONS AND DESIGNATIONS

Ref: (a) NAVMC DIR 3500.50C
    (b) NAVMC DIR 3500.14D
    (c) CNAF-M 3710.7
    (d) F/A-18 ADMIN SOP REV 4

1. Having fulfilled the requirements set forth in the references, you are hereby granted the following qualifications and designations:

   Operations Duty Officer
   Night Systems
   Air Combat Maneuvering

   9 June 17
   1 August 17
   19 February 18

Copy to:
ATJ
NATOPS
SYLLABUS EVENT GRADESHEET

SYLL PHASE/EVENT: PLT 1 TXN/ FSFT 101
Grade: 3.17

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**SKILL**

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**Total Grades**: 0 0 0 5 1 0 2

Overall Comments:
FSFT 101
Day Tanking
PASS/COMPLETE

Brief: Standard

Ground:

RP is reminded to look professional in marshal. As it was the aircraft were not exactly aligned. First guy to marshal sets the standard and should have their butt over the yellow line when the parking break is set. All other aircraft should match.

Departure/Join-up: Departed as a 4-ship. Standard

Conduct:

RV with tanker went as briefed. RP in SH-23 was first student to begin tanking. Positive learning trend throughout. No necessary after a missed approached to drop back as far as RP did. If you miss the plug just drop back a few feet, stabilize and try again. Lead informed RP and a positive correction was made. Multiple dry plugs with the final being a wet plug for 500lbs. Departed as a single VFR to KNJK. No Issues getting to the airfield or on deck.

End of Day evolution.
***RECOMMEND CALLSIGN REVIEW TO CHANGE CALLSIGN FROM (b) (3) (A), (b) (6) AS HE IS THE ONLY PERSON I HAVE EVER SEEN STICK THE ENTIRE NOSE CONE INTO THE REFUELING BASKET.***

Last Modified By: [b] (3) (A), [b] (6) on 8/4/2016 3:16:47 PM
**SYLLABUS EVENT GRADESHEET**

1/29/2019 9:56:50 AM

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**SYLL PHASE/ EVENT: PLT 1 TXN/ FSFT 102**

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**Grade: 3.17**

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**Total Grades**

| 0 | 0 | 0 | 5 | 1 | 0 | 2 |          |

**Overall Comments:**

FSFT 102
Night Tanking
PASS/COMPLETE

**Brief:** Standard

**Ground:**

No issues with hot refueling or departure out of KNJK back to the MOA.

**Conduct:**

RP arrived in the MOA and called visual contact with the tanker. Cleared into left observation. RP caught a pass and was able to join up during twilight so there were still a lot of visual cues. Keep in mind for joining at night that when in doubt slow things down to figure out your situation and always fall back on the ABCs of joining and closure.

RP performed multiple dry plugs with improving trend. No wet tank due to Raider33 having a transfer issue and unable to balance its fuel. RP cleared to detach for RTB to Miramar. RP picked up an IFR clearance while still in the area and heading back to Miramar. No Issues. Debriefed about the possibility of leaving the MOA VFR and picking up clearance with LA CTR.

Don't put your nose in the basket.

---

Enclosure 9
End of night evolution.

***RECOMMEND CALLSIGN REVIEW TO CHANGE CALLSIGN FROM [REDACTED] "AS HE IS THE ONLY PERSON I HAVE EVER SEEN STICK THE ENTIRE NOSE CONE INTO THE REFUELING BASKET.***

Last Modified By: [REDACTED] on 8/4/2016 3:17:17 PM

[REDACTED]
## Event Proficiency Audit Report

For [D] (3) (A), (b) (6) as of 01/28/2019 0811 UTC +09:00

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UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
February 13, 2019

VIA ENCRYPTED EMAIL:

United States Marine Corps
1st Marine Aircraft Wing
Attn: [Redacted]
Unit 37101
FPO AP 96373-7101

Dear [Redacted]:

As requested, attached is a complete copy of the Autopsy Examination Report of Capt. Jahmar F. Resilard.

I understand this report will be used as part of a Death Review. If you have any questions regarding the report provided or require interpretation of the findings, please do not hesitate to call me at (302) 346-8648. You may also contact our office via email at the following address: usarmy.dover.medcom-afmes.mbx.operations@mail.mil.

As this is a copy of the report, there is no need to return it to our office. However, if the next-of-kin desires a copy of this report please have them contact the Armed Forces Medical Examiner System directly. Work products generated by the Armed Forces Medical Examiner System may only be released through our office. If you need any further assistance, please do not hesitate to contact me.

Sincerely,

[Redacted]

Armed Forces Medical Examiner
Casualty Status Report

Report Date: 02/07/2019

SSN | Name | Death Date
--- | --- | ---
(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) | (b) (3) (A), (b) (6) | 12/6/2018

SERVICE MEMBER INFORMATION:

Branch: Marine Corps | Component: Regular
Birth Date: (b) (3) (A), (b) (6) | Gender: Male | Race: (b) (3) (A), (b) (6)
Rank: (b) (3) (A), (b) (6) | Pay Grade: O-3 | Duty Status: Present For Duty
Retirement Date: | DOD CAS GRP CD: Non-hostile, Deceased, Accident
Personnel Category: Obligated/Voluntary Service | Personnel Affiliation: Active Duty
RC Training Type: | TDRL/PDRL Date:
Unit: VMFA (AW)-242, MAG-12, 1st MAW, MCAS Iwakuni, JA

CASUALTY INFORMATION:

Casualty Status: Deceased | Casualty Category: Accident
Incident Date: 12/6/2018 | Incident Place: North Pacific Ocean
Death Date: 12/6/2018 | Death Place: North Pacific Ocean,
Treatment Facility Type:

Vehicle Class: FIXED WING AIRCRAFT | Vehicle Type: F/A-18A/C Hornet
Role in Vehicle: Pilot | Vehicle Owner: US Government

DCIPS CAUSE OF DEATH:

CIRCUMSTANCES:

Determination Pending: Result of an aircraft mishap.
Mishap pilot’s Watch: Garmin Fenix 3 HR
Enabled with Wifi and GLONASS
~0142 ejection
~0218 pilot starts data
1046 spotted
~1130 heart stops
1220 recovered
~0142 ejection
~0218 pilot starts data
1046 spotted
~1130 heart stops
1220 recovered
### UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS

**MARINE ALL WEATHER FIGHTER ATTACK SQUADRON 242**

**Marine Aircraft Group 32**
Marine Corps Air Station Iwakuni, Japan
1st Marine Aircraft Wing MARFORPAC
Unit 27310 FPC-AP 96310-7310

**Wednesday, December 5, 2018 (18339)**

This flight schedule constitutes official orders. All domestic tactical air reconnaissance missions will be conducted (AWM MCD 35600.2C).

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<td>1L7</td>
<td>P-507 (1450-1535)</td>
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**FLIGHT NOTES:**
1. PPR TIME 1315-1505.
2. PPR TIME 1515-1620.
3. NO FIGHT BELOW 7,000 MSL.
4. ITA-5 IS DUE REGARDE AFTER 2345. NO FLIGHT ABOVE FL 390.
5. USE 35 WP CODE FOR RUO-55. (14HN GBU-12)
6. CHANGE WP CODE TO 90.

**GENERAL NOTES:**
1. 0700 MAINTENANCE MEETING.
2. 0700 QUIR AT MAG-12 CONFERENCE ROOM.
3. 0715 FUT WALK.
4. 1500 QUIR AT MAG-12 CONFERENCE ROOM.
5. 1500 RITE CREW MAINTENANCE MEETING.

**REQUARED ORDNANCE:**
A - 2X TANKS
B - LPUAD
C - CATM-9X K2
D - CATM-129 X2
E - LAU-112
F - BRU-55
G - AGM-84C / GBU-33 INERT X2

**CELEBRATING 75 YEARS OF DEATH FROM THE DARKNESS**
**UNIVERSAL STATES MARINE CORPS**
**MARINE ALL WEATHER FIGHTER ATTACK SQUADRON 242**
**Marine Aircraft Group 12**
**Marine Corps Air Station Iwakuni, Japan**
**1st Marine Air Wing MARFORPAC**
**Unit 35310/1920 LPOD 1920**
**Friday, July 7, 2017 (17187)**

**THIS FLIGHT SCHEDULE CONSTITUTES OFFICIAL ORDERS**
**ALL DOMESTIC TACTICAL AIR RECONNAISSANCE MISSIONS WILL BE CONDUCTED IAW MCO 3800.2B**

**ENCLOSURE 21**

| Sunrise | 0709 |
| Sunrise | 0709 |
| Sunset | 1834 |
| Moonrise | 1707 |
| Moonset | 0517 |
| % Humidity | 96% |
| EENT | 1923 |
| LLL Period | 0508-0608 |
| Period | 1923-0619 |
| Std Hours | 0000-2359 |

**SCHEDULED FLIGHT EVENTS**

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**SAFETY: X**

**OPERATIONS: X**

**MAINTENANCE: X**

**FLIGHT NOTES:**
1. EVENT 2 PROVIDE RED AIR FOR EVENT 1.
2. ECM RECREATED PROVIDE BY SIMON F.
3. ASISO V-34. POC AIR OFFICER CAPT "CHICO" KESREDY, AU: 049-896-8870 OR KESREDYDY@GMAIL.COM.
4. FLIGHT LEADS DECONFLICT AIRSPACE.
5. LEVEL LAYS ONLY.

**GENERAL NOTES:**
1. 0730 DAY CREW MAINTENANCE MEETING AND FOAD WALK.
2. 1530 AMB MEETING IN CORNER TRAILER. MAJ WARMAN, CAPTS DAVIS, SAASO, WILSON AND IT REALY ATTEND.
3. 1700 MAINTENANCE MEETING IN MAINTENANCE CONTROL. MAJ PAULIN AND ALL TRAINING NCIS ATTEND.
4. 1730 NIGHT CREW MAINTENANCE MEETING.

**ORDNANCE:**
- A: 2 TANKS
- B: LPOD
- C: CATM-9X
- D: CATM-120
- E: 50 CHAFF
- F: 4 X MLTR
- G: 12 x ME-75
- H: 20MM

**SYSTEMS:**
- 1: ADR REQUIRED
- 2: MIDS REQUIRED
- 3: CVPS REQUIRED
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Event Proficiency Audit Report for Capt RESILARD, JAHMAR as of 01/28/2019 0811 UTC +09:00

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### F/A-18 AVIATION TRAINING FORM

**NAVMC 3500.50B, F/A-18 T&R MANUAL (26 JUN 2012)**

**AAR-2201: DAY AAR**

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<td>c) Execute safe rendezvous procedures.</td>
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<tr>
<td>e) From a stabilized position, successfully engage the basket expeditiously.</td>
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<td>f) Respond quickly and safely to all communications and communication out signals from the tanker aircraft.</td>
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**REMARKS**

Conduct two ship red air in support of larger Australian force exercise. Conducted pre-mission tanking on an RAAF KC-30. Conducted one plug.

**Tanking:**

Good job being smooth and expeditious getting into the basket. It helped with managing the timeline for the LFE. Work on not sliding so far back from the hose as it will only take up more time slowly sliding forward. Once you have more experience you will be able to position yourself closer to the hose and start from there.

**Instructor Comments:** Real nice job on the tanker. Always remember to remain calm when behind the basket. Everyone gets the “tanker blues” at some point, so don’t ever let a bad day on the tanker effect your confidence. For this evolution, real nice job being safe and expeditious.

---

7/19/2017

**Instructor Sign**

X

**Signed by**

Instructor

X

---

**DND - Not applicable or not observed.**

**UNSAT** - Unsafe or complete lack of ability and/or knowledge. Requires substantial input from the instructor for safe execution and/or mission accomplishment.

1 - Safe but limited proficiency. Requires frequent input from the instructor.

2 - Correct. Recognizes and corrects errors. Requires occasional input from the instructor.

3 - Correct. Efficient, skillful, and without hesitation. Requires minimal input from the instructor.

4* - Unusually high degree of ability. Requires no input from the instructor.

*Mandatory comments in remarks section for items scored at this level.
### F/A-18 AVIATION TRAINING FORM

**NAVMC 3500.50B, F/A-18 T&R MANUAL (26 JUN 2012)**

**AAR-2202: NIGHT AAR**

**STUDENT:** *(b) (3) (A), (b) *(6)*  
**FLIGHT POSITION:** Dash 2  
**CREW POSITION:** Pilot

**INSTRUCTOR:** *(b) (3) (A), (b) *(6)*  
**DATE:** 7 JUL 2017

**PASS:** X  
**INCOMPLETE:** ☐  
**REPLY:** ☐

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<td>Tanking: Good work being smooth and expeditious on the right tanking. Would drop back a little too far prior to getting into position behind the basket but this will improve with experience. Good procedures and comm.</td>
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**REMARKS**

Conducting night A/A and A/G events in the R-225. Mid mission tanking provided by C-130. 1 night plug.

---

**INSTRUCTOR SIGNATURE:** *(b) (3) (A), (b) *(6)*

**SIGNED BY:** *(b) (3) (A), (b) *(6)*

---

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3 - Correct. Efficient, skillful, and without hesitation. Requires minimal input from the instructor.

4* - Unusually high degree of ability. Requires no input from the instructor.

*Mandatory comments in remarks section for items scored at this level.*

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**AAR-2202: NIGHT AAR**

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**Enclosure 21**
2.5.12 **Sortie Requirements.** Sortie requirements state the minimum number of passes, engagements, or maneuvers required to demonstrate proficiency. T&R event requirements are written to allow completion on one sortie. Squadrons who cannot complete all stated requirements in one sortie (e.g., CV squadrons or squadrons limited by range access and regulations) may complete the requirements of an event in multiple sorties as long as the completion sorties are flown in succession and within normal currency windows defined by unit SOP. If an aircrew’s currency expires (e.g., a warm-up flight is required), or the event requirements cannot be completed on the next scheduled sortie, the event shall be re-flown in its entirety.

2.5.13 **Performance Standards.** Performance standards are listed for each T&R event description. These are training standards for individual aircrew performance and should be utilized by the evaluator as a guideline to determine the satisfactory completion of each event. If the aircrew did not successfully attain the performance standards, the training code shall not be logged as a completed flight.

2.5.14 **T&R Chaining.** Event chaining allows for the completion of more complex or advanced events using the same skill to update proficiency status of events. Only events in a sequence entailing demonstration of equivalent skills shall be chained. Refer to the Aviation T&R Program Manual Chapter 2 for detailed guidance on conditional chaining. For the purposes of this T&R, any flight event will chain FAM-2102, and any event flown with the aid of NVGs will chain NS-2402. Simulators will not chain flights.

2.5.15 **FA-18 Tactical T&R Refresher.** The FA-18 Tactical T&R Refresher syllabus shall be completed in tactical squadrons. Aircrew should fly all R-coded events. However, the Refresher aircrew need not fly every event within a stage to be re-qualified in that stage. The commanding officer may tailor the Refresher syllabus to fit the experience level of the aircrew per the Aviation T&R Program Manual. When all of the R-coded events within a stage are successfully completed, all remaining events in that stage that are proficient or delinquent are updated. This assumes that the Refresher aircrew had completed all events in the stage during his previous tour. If the Refresher aircrew did not previously complete events in a stage of training, those events must be completed in addition to R-coded events. Experienced aircrew (completed at least one fleet tour in an operational unit) who have not flown for an extended period of time, but not long enough to require FRS Refresher training, shall be assigned to the Refresher POI. When an individual assigned to the Basic POI has attained individual CSP in all Core Skills, that individual shall be reassigned to the Refresher POI.

2.5.16 **FA-18 FRS Training.**

- FA-18 FRS training is provided at a designated FRS (VMFAT-101 or VFA-106).
- Pilot FRS training standards is the FRS approved FA-18A/C/D pilot syllabi. WSO FRS training is provided only at VMFAT-101.
- WSO training standards is the VMFAT-101 sanctioned FA-18D WSO syllabi.
- The FRS Pilot training syllabi is not updated in conjunction with this manual and is not included herein.
- Basic/Transition/Conversion (CAT I/II) aircrew will be assigned to fly the entire FRS Basic (CAT I) training syllabus at a designated FRS training squadron.

2.5.17 **FRS Refresher Syllabi.**

- Pilots who have not flown the FA-18 in 366 days or greater but less than 485 days will complete a Safe-for-Solo (CAT V) syllabus at a designated FRS training squadron.
- Aircrew who have not flown the FA-18 in 486 days or greater but less than 730 days will complete a Modified FRS Refresher (CAT IV) syllabus at a designated FRS training squadron.
- Aircrew who have not flown the FA-18 in 731 days or greater will complete the comprehensive FRS Refresher syllabus (CAT III) at a designated FRS training squadron.

2.6 **CORE PHASE.**

**General.** This phase contains basic Core training essential to wartime employment of the unit platform/system. This phase should provide aircrew with the skills required to complete 3000 phase missions. This phase should be completed prior to beginning the 3000 phase events if practicable.

**Ground/Academic Training.** Aircrew must be current per NATOPS flight manual and USMC FA-18 ADMIN SOP. Aircrew shall review the USMC FA-18 ADMIN SOP, TACSOP, local addendums and local range manuals. Aircrew shall complete all FAM academic codes prior to completion of this phase of training. In addition to all academic codes applicable to this phase of training, the following administrative and academic tasks will be accomplished prior to completing the 2000 phase T&R codes.
Demonstrate proficiency in maintaining aircraft control throughout FA-18 envelope.
Maintain proper formation and visual mutual support.
Demonstrate proficiency in basic radar mechanics.
Arrive at a valid rear quarter weapons envelope with 0 to +100 KTS VC.
Take valid shots.

Prerequisite. 2101

Ordnance. CATM-9X

Range Requirements. AA

2.7.2 AIR-TO-AIR REFUELING (AAR)

Purpose. To gain and maintain proficiency and familiarity with AAR operations.

General. Operations shall be conducted in accordance with the Air Refueling NATOPS Manual. Squadrons may conduct AAR as a part of other ferry or tactical missions.

Ground/Academic Training. Squadrons shall complete the AAR stage briefs before conducting any AAR flight per the NATOPS Flight Manual, Air-to-Air Refueling Manual and local SOPs.

AAR Overview

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<tr>
<th>EVENT</th>
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<th>REFLY</th>
<th>POI</th>
<th>CONDITION</th>
<th>DEVICE</th>
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<td>NS</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>1+</td>
<td>NIGHT AERIAL REFUELING</td>
</tr>
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</table>

AAR-2201 1.3 365  B.R  D A 1+ FA-18A/C/D

Goal. Become proficient in day aerial refueling.

Requirement. Perform all AAR procedures to include tanker rendezvous, observation position, astern position, refueling procedures, and tanker departure. **Six contacts required for completion.** If proficient, one contact required for completion.

Performance Standards
Adhere to Air-to-Air Refueling Manual.
Execute safe rendezvous procedures.
Use proper communications procedures.
From a stabilized position, successfully engage the basket expeditiously.
Respond quickly and safely to all communications and communication out signals from the tanker aircraft.

Prerequisite. 2102

Range Requirements. AAR

External Syllabus Support. One compatible tactical or strategic tanker.

AAR-2202 1.3 365  B,R,M  NS A 1+ FA-18A/C/D

Goal. Become proficient in night aerial refueling.

Requirement. Perform all AAR procedures to include: tanker rendezvous, observation position, astern position, refueling procedures, and tanker departure. **Six contacts required for completion.** If proficient, one contact required for completion.

Performance Standards
Adhere to Air-to-Air Refueling Manual.
Execute safe rendezvous procedures.
Use proper communications procedures.
From a stabilized position, successfully engage the basket expeditiously.
Respond quickly and safely to all communications and communication out signals from the tanker aircraft.
Requirement. To maintain proficiency as a division leader a pilot shall brief, lead, and debrief the designated event in accordance with the mission performance standards for that event.

**RQD-6105** 0.0 365 B,R,M (NS) A 6+ FA-18A/C/D

**Goal.** Track mission commander proficiency.

Requirement. To maintain proficiency as a mission commander aircrew shall brief, lead, and debrief the designated event in accordance with the mission performance standards for that event.

**RQD-6106** 1.3 * B,R (NS) A 1 FA-18A/C/D

**Goal.** Provide air-to-air JHMCS introductory flight exposure.

Requirement. Conduct an air-to-air sortie and gain proficiency in the use of JHMCS.

**Prerequisite.** 2506

**RQD-6107** 0.0 * B,R (NS) A 1 FA-18A/C/D

**Goal.** Provide air-to-ground JHMCS introductory flight exposure.

Requirement. Conduct an air-to-ground sortie and gain proficiency in the use of JHMCS.

**Prerequisite.** 2309

**RQD-6108** 0.0 * B,R NS A 1FA-18A/C/D

**Goal.** Provide JHMCS NVCD introductory flight exposure.

Requirement. Conduct a night systems sortie utilizing the JHMCS NVCD system.

**Prerequisite.** 2309, 2405

**RQD-6109** 0.0 545 B,R,M (NS) A 1+ FA-18A/C/D

**Goal.** Track proficiency in day or night strategic aerial refueling.

Requirement. Two day contacts or two night contacts required for completion.

**External Syllabus Support.** KC-10 tanker or similar.

**Prerequisite.** 2201

**SROD-6110** 1.0 1095 B,R,M S 1 TOFT

**Goal.** Introduce and demonstrate techniques and procedures associated with the Functional Check Flight (FCF).

Requirement. Simulator shall be used under the supervision of a designated FCF pilot. All portions of the FCF checklist shall be reviewed during the simulator period.

**RQD-6111** 0.0 545 B,R,M (NS) A 1+ FA-18A/C/D

**Goal.** Track proficiency in day or night strategic aerial refueling on a KC-135.

Requirement. Two day contacts or two night contacts required for completion.

**External Syllabus Support.** KC-135.

**Prerequisite.** 2201

2.15.4 QUALIFICATION EVENTS (QUAL)

**Purpose.** To track training codes associated with qualifications.

**General.** Once the flight to attain the qualification is complete, a letter from the squadron commanding officer awarding the qualification shall be placed in the NATOPS jacket and APR.
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Over the past 75 years, the Bats have a long history of success in both peace and war. From Iwo Jima to Da Nang, Al Asad to Iwakuni—our predecessors have established a legacy of excellence. We are now the only permanently forward deployed USMC F/A-18 squadron and bear a unique burden to be ready to "fight and win tonight." We will never have all the people or parts we desire. We won't be afforded a long reset period. Inspired by our forefathers and with steeled resolve, we will overcome our challenges by protecting the force, knowing the plan, and hitting our targets.

**Protect the Force.** We are charged with protecting our people, jets, and warfighting capability from the enemy and from all who threaten it. Our resources are constrained. Whether or not it’s our Marines and Sailors, our jets, our parts, or our enablers—replacements will not be timely. Whether flying, fixing, or on liberty—you are obligated to protect each other from lurking threats. If it doesn’t look right, feel right, smell right—speak up and fix it.

- **Be a hard target**—know the enemy and respect him. The enemy isn’t dumb. He will seek every advantage and knows our weaknesses. He’s watching and listening—we will red team everything.

- **Respect the danger that surrounds you**—don’t do the enemy’s job. This is a dangerous business. Not following procedures or not adhering to standards will lead to fratricide. Debrief and learn.

**Know the Plan.** We are here for two key reasons: to deter aggression and to aggressively fight if deterrence fails. As we are the first Marines to the fight—and resources will be constrained—we must master our contingency tasking and share our knowledge with the UDP squadrons. We will be the resident experts.

- **Our wartime mission takes precedence over all else.** We’re defending our homeland, our allies, and families here with us. That being said, we will “Render unto Caesar that which is Caesar’s” and pay the taxes orders require.

- **Tailor sortie/training events to the wartime mission.** Tie the tactical to the operational when practical.

**Hit Your Target.** Execute with precision, aggressiveness, and resolve. Whether or not it’s conducting a maintenance action, completing a checklist, or gunning a Flanker—**do your job!** Know your role and how it fits—master your skill and stay focused. We will rapidly pivot from peace to war—you are in your prep time.

- **Plan for Margin.** There are no perfect people, systems, or weapons—back each other up.

- **Be spiritually ready to fight hurt**—Chaos, confusion, and casualties will happen in battle.

- **Be mentally ready to kill**—that’s our business, our cause is just.

As we celebrate **75 years of combat excellence**—be always faithful to our legacy. Be ready, be the difference.

Mors ex Tenebris,

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6)

Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps
Commanding

PROTECT THE FORCE — KNOW THE PLAN — HIT YOUR TARGET
Protect the Force. Force Protection is one of six warfighting functions of the United States Marine Corps. We are charged with protecting our people, jets, and warfighting capability from the enemy and from all who threaten it.

- Be a hard target—respect the enemy. He won’t fight fair—expect it.
- Don’t do the enemy’s job—respect the danger surrounding you. No one ever plans to be in a mishap.
- Mitigate all danger—respect rules and procedures. These are designed to protect you from yourself.

Identify and Mitigate Threats. This is an inherently dangerous job. We are trained to kill the enemy and he will try to kill you—but flying and fixing aircraft can be lethal without the enemy’s involvement. We must train to mitigate both the “Red” and the “Blue” threat.

- Red Threat: How the enemy can hurt us. Intelligence helps us identify and understand the “Red Threat.”
- Blue Threat: How we can hurt ourselves or how the environment / situation can hurt us. Safety helps us identify and understand the “Blue Threat.”

Employ Tactically. No matter what the mission, Marines always have an offensive mindset. We will give the enemy no quarter—while exploiting the enemy’s weaknesses smartly.

- There is no tactical plan that is inherently unsafe. If the plan only accounts for the “Red” and not the “Blue” threat—it’s a bad plan; it’s NOT tactical.

- Be aggressive, but preserve options/decision space. Don’t paint yourself into a corner, leave yourself an “exit available.” Respect timelines, weather and fuel. Respect maintenance procedures, supervision, and policy. This applies to everything we do, from fighting the enemy to having fun on liberty.

Debrief and Learn. Honest mistakes are going to happen—although nobody wants them to. Our procedures and layers of oversight are built with this fundamental human fact in mind. Despite all of that, things get missed. When it does we must learn. Don’t hide your near misses—debrief and share.

- The “close calls” or the “near misses” are free. We will have numerous forums to highlight our errors and to share and learn. This is never to embarrass anyone—it’s to save someone’s life.

- A true professional admits errors, debriefs, learns, and teaches. Park your pride and debrief.

Mors ex Tenebris,

Enclosure 22
VMFA(AW)-242

UNIT, PERSONAL AND FAMILY READINESS

POLICY STATEMENT

(25 May 2018)

PROTECT THE FORCE – KNOW THE PLAN – HIT YOUR TARGET

Protect the Force. Our families sustain us—we defend them every day. They are vital to our ability to keep balanced and to be at our best.

- Be balanced—spend real time with your family. This job is vital, but fleeting—your family is for life.

- Don’t neglect the homefront. You are your own family readiness officer first.

- The chain of command is here to support you. I require you to be focused on the mission. If you’ve got stressors that are taking away from being at your best—ask for help.

Know the Plan. When we take the fight to the enemy there won’t be much time for paperwork. The fight will demand 100% of your attention. MCO 1754.9A provides key guidance.

- Official Communication: Our families will receive information while protecting OPSEC and PII.

- Readiness and deployment support: Empowering our families to be self-sufficient during crisis.

- Information and referral: Our program will push information and pull what’s necessary.

- Volunteer management: Our squadron has a wealth of experience—those willing to help are value added.

- NEO paperwork must be current. Have an emergency plan, stores, and money ready to go.

- Keep your family care plan up to date. While an inspectable item, the real issue is making sure you’ve covered the bases necessary to deploy rapidly.

Build and Sustain the Team. We will have fun together. Social events won’t always be mandatory for the Marines, and never for the spouses—participate as you desire. My real purpose in bringing families together is to facilitate the support network necessary to sustain the families when the squadron deploys. Everyone will need some help at some point. When you do, the Bat Family will be there!

Mors ex Tenebris,

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6)

Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps

Commanding

PROTECT THE FORCE – KNOW THE PLAN – HIT YOUR TARGET
VMFA(AW)-242
EQUAL OPPORTUNITY, EQUAL EMPLOYMENT
AND SEXUAL HARASSMENT POLICY STATEMENT
(25 May 2018)

PROTECT THE FORCE – KNOW THE PLAN – HIT YOUR TARGET

Protect the Force. We are charged with protecting our people, jets, and warfighting capability from the enemy and from all who threaten it. Discrimination of any type erodes our ability to fight as a team—it’s a force protection issue.

- “Discrimination in any form is adverse to mission accomplishment and will not be tolerated.”
- Discrimination degrades our unit effectiveness and ability to fight.

Tradition. We all belong to a sacred warfighting organization, feared and respected throughout the world—we are United States Marines. We are privileged to wear our Nation’s uniform and serve in any clime and place—ready to defend our homeland, our Allies, and to be the Nation’s sharpest sword when called.

- Every Marine and Sailor in the Bats—no matter what his or her background—is on OUR team.
- There can be no victory without an effective team.
- There is no excuse for a hostile work environment—our hostility is reserved for the enemy.

Opportunity. “The Marine Corps will provide equal opportunity for all military members without regard to race, color, religion, sex, age, national origin or sexual orientation, consistent with the law, regulations, and requirements for physical and mental abilities.”

- “Sexual Harassment is a form of discrimination that involves unwelcome sexual advances, request for sexual favors, and other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature.”
- “Equal Opportunity is everyone’s responsibility. Anyone who witnesses an act of discrimination has a responsibility to address, correct or report the inappropriate behavior immediately.”

Resolution/Reporting. If you suspect discrimination has occurred/is occurring. Address the issue immediately and use the chain of command, without fear of reprisal. Any member attempting to take reprisal action will be held accountable. I encourage the use of the Informal Resolution System.

- Contact the Squadron or MAG EOA/EOR to discuss options for making a formal complaint.

Mors ex Tenebris,

(b) (6)

Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps
Commanding

PROTECT THE FORCE – KNOW THE PLAN – HIT YOUR TARGET
Protect the Force. We are charged with protecting our people, jets, and warfighting capability from the enemy and from all who threaten it. Sexual Assault is not only a crime—it’s a force protection issue.

"Sexual assault is a crime that is incompatible with our core values of honor, courage, and commitment. It is an affront to the basic American principles we so bravely defend. Sexual assault goes against everything we claim to be as Marines. It is a crime."

-Sexual Assault degrades our unit effectiveness and ability to fight.

Sexual Assault Defined. Sexual assault is: “Intentional sexual contact, characterized by use of force, threats, intimidation, or abuse of authority or when the victim does not or cannot consent. Sexual assault includes rape, forcible sodomy (oral or anal sex), and other unwanted sexual contact that is aggravated, abusive, or wrongful (including unwanted and inappropriate sexual contact), or attempts to commit these acts."

Prevention. Every Marine is charged with intervening when required. Engaged leadership and bystander intervention are essential.

-NO one is too junior to intervene. If it looks wrong, feels wrong—step in.

Keep our honor clean. We do not inflict casualties on our own force.

Response. All Marines and Sailors that are victims of sexual assault are entitled to be treated with dignity, fairness, and respect and will have access to appropriate assistance.

-Contact the Squadron UVA for questions on reporting options (restricted and unrestricted). UVA’s have confidentiality and have been trained to help all Marines and Sailors get assistance.

-The chain of command will take appropriate measures to protect the victim from retaliation, reprisal, ostracism, and maltreatment in unrestricted reports.

Mors ex Tenebris,

Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps
Commanding
VMFA(AW)-242
HAZING
POLICY STATEMENT
(25 May 2018)

PROTECT THE FORCE – KNOW THE PLAN – HIT YOUR TARGET

Protect the Force. We are charged with protecting our people, jets, and warfighting capability from the enemy and from all who threaten it. Hazing is not only a moral issue—it’s a force protection issue.

- Hazing is unlawful, prohibited, and will not be tolerated.
- Hazing degrades our unit effectiveness and ability to fight.

Hazing Defined. Hazing “is any conduct whereby a military member or members, regardless of Service or rank, without proper authority causes another military member or members, regardless of Service or rank, to suffer or be exposed to any activity which is cruel, abusive, humiliating, oppressive, demeaning, or harmful. Soliciting or coercing another to perpetrate any such activity is also considered hazing. Hazing need not involve physical contact among or between military members; it can be verbal or psychological in nature. Actual or implied consent to acts of hazing does not eliminate culpability of the perpetrator.”

Tradition. There are no legitimate “traditions” that are exempt from the Marine Corps policy on hazing.

- Keep our honor clean. Our most important tradition is fighting and winning wars. Any supposed “tradition” that harms our unit effectiveness or harms another Marine is not consistent with our true heritage.

- No better friend, no worse enemy. We take care of our own and respect each other.

Reporting. All Marines and Sailors must report all allegations of hazing immediately to your chain of command. All allegations of hazing will be processed IAW MCO 1700.28B.

- Engaged leadership and bystander intervention are essential. If it looks wrong, feels wrong—step in. NO one is too junior to intervene.

- The chain of command will protect those reporting allegations of hazing. ANY reprisal against a victim or witness will not be tolerated.

- For further information, contact the MAG-12 Equal Opportunity Representative (EOR, 315-255-3902) or 1st MAW Equal Opportunity Advisor (EOA, 315-636-2532).

Mors ex Tenebris,
(b) (3) (A), (b) (6)

Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps
Commanding

PROTECT THE FORCE – KNOW THE PLAN – HIT YOUR TARGET

Enclosure 22
Protect the Force. We are charged with protecting our people, jets, and warfighting capability from the enemy and from all who threaten it. Suicide threatens our ability to fight—it’s a force protection issue.

- We need every Marine and Sailor in the fight. Suicide is a real and present danger to our force.

- No one is immune; no one unaffected. The strongest among us can experience despair and loneliness. A suicide in the squadron would devastate our warfighting ability. Asking for help is NOT a sign of weakness.

Recognize, Ask, Care, Escort. Assume nothing—take no chances.

- If you even slightly suspect one or our Marines or Sailors might be thinking of suicide, stay with the Marine and get help immediately.

- Be a hard target, help your fellow Marine. Listen when someone is struggling. Don’t be the Marine who says “I thought something was wrong, but...” Drop what you’re doing and step into the breach.

Treatment and Prevention. The chain of command is here to support you.

- Chaplains are well equipped and maintain 100% confidentiality—ask for a Chaplain, no questions asked.

- Call the DStRESS hotline (098-970-7734 / 1-877-476-7734 / 315-645-7734 www.dstressline.com)

- Call the Military OneSource hotline (1-800-342-9647 or www.militaryonesource.mil)

- Call the National Suicide Prevention Lifeline (1-800-273-TALK)

You Are Vital to Our Success. Each Marine or Sailor in this command is here for a specific purpose. We need each other in order to maintain our forward presence and fight at a moment’s notice. Whether you fly, fix or file—I need you in the fight!

Mors ex Tenebris,

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6)

Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps
Commanding

PROTECT THE FORCE – KNOW THE PLAN – HIT YOUR TARGET
PROTECT THE FORCE — KNOW THE PLAN — HIT YOUR TARGET

Protect the Force. We are charged with protecting our people, jets, and warfighting capability from the enemy and from all who threaten it. Substance abuse threatens our ability to fight—it’s a force protection issue.

- Use of illegal drugs (or the abuse of legal drugs and alcohol) impairs our judgment and puts our Marines’ and Sailors’ health at risk.

- Substance abuse degrades our unit effectiveness and ability to fight—it will not be tolerated.

Tradition. We all belong to a sacred warfighting organization, feared and respected throughout the world—we are United States Marines. We are privileged to wear our Nation’s uniform and serve in any clime and place—ready to defend our homeland, our Allies, and to be the Nation’s sharpest sword when called.

- Impaired Marines at best slow down our ability to fix and fly jets. At worst, we make casualties for the enemy. Be a hard target—don’t do the enemy’s job for him.

- The Marine Corps was born in a bar—Tun Tavern—on 10 November 1775. Responsible use of alcohol is undoubtedly a part of the culture, but no one should feel pressured to drink—ever.

- Marines fight and win the Nation’s wars. For 75 years the Bats have stood for excellence—from Espiritu Santo, to Iwo Jima, to Da Nang, to Al Asad, to Iwakuni today. Have fun—and we will—but be ready.

Treatment and Prevention. Some Marines and Sailors will struggle with alcohol. Help them out before they make a bad decision or harm the force.

- If you need help or know someone that does—contact the SACO or the Chaplain.

- Urinalysis and alcohol screening are enduring events and should deter Marines and Sailors, but are no substitute for knowing for and caring for our Marines.

Never Drive, Fix, or Fly Impaired. If you know you’re not free from the effects of alcohol—pick up the phone and admit it. The command will support you, no training event is worth the risk. Everyone gets a mulligan, but know this: flying or performing maintenance drunk will be a zero tolerance event.

Mors ex Tenebris,

[Signature]

Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps
Commanding
Welcome back

Source file: Spencer/Applications/group.net.whatsapp.WhatsApp.shared/ChatStorage.sqlite : 0xF3F339 (Table: ZWAMESSAGE, ZWAGROUPMEMBER, Size: 33865728 bytes)

Excellent

Source file: Spencer/Applications/group.net.whatsapp.WhatsApp.shared/ChatStorage.sqlite : 0xF3F181 (Table: ZWAMESSAGE, ZWAGROUPMEMBER, Size: 33865728 bytes)

10 Marines on a C-130 from Kadena to Iwakuni taxiing now.

Source file: Spencer/Applications/group.net.whatsapp.WhatsApp.shared/ChatStorage.sqlite : 0xF4222D (Table: ZWAMESSAGE, ZWAGROUPMEMBER, Size: 33865728 bytes)

Rescue det Marines SOD Iwakuni

Source file: Spencer/Applications/group.net.whatsapp.WhatsApp.shared/ChatStorage.sqlite : 0xF46B77 (Table: ZWAMESSAGE, ZWAGROUPMEMBER, Size: 33865728 bytes)

Copy, thanks

Source file: Spencer/Applications/group.net.whatsapp.WhatsApp.shared/ChatStorage.sqlite : 0xF46928 (Table: ZWAMESSAGE, ZWAGROUPMEMBER, Size: 33865728 bytes)

Looking for WSO volunteers for XC going to Osan from 12-14 Dec. LFE flying on 13, SEM on 14th.

Source file: Spencer/Applications/group.net.whatsapp.WhatsApp.shared/ChatStorage.sqlite : 0xF7069B (Table: ZWAMESSAGE, ZWAGROUPMEMBER, Size: 33865728 bytes)

Some aircrew have asked me for go and/or no-go pills.

Source file: Spencer/Applications/group.net.whatsapp.WhatsApp.shared/ChatStorage.sqlite : 0xF758C1 (Table: ZWAMESSAGE, ZWAGROUPMEMBER, Size: 33865728 bytes)

Per General NATOPS, "The use of stimulants and/or sedatives shall only be authorized following the commanding officer's consultation with the wing commander or equivalent, and the flight surgeon. The flight surgeon, further, shall have consulted with his/her supervisor in the aeromedical chain of command."

Source file: Spencer/Applications/group.net.whatsapp.WhatsApp.shared/ChatStorage.sqlite : 0xF7570F (Table: ZWAMESSAGE, ZWAGROUPMEMBER, Size: 33865728 bytes)

QRF landed

Source file: Spencer/Applications/group.net.whatsapp.WhatsApp.shared/ChatStorage.sqlite : 0xF75683 (Table: ZWAMESSAGE, ZWAGROUPMEMBER, Size: 33865728 bytes)

Wing CG said hard no to performance enhancement. Sorry dudes.

Source file: Spencer/Applications/group.net.whatsapp.WhatsApp.shared/ChatStorage.sqlite : 0xF75683 (Table: ZWAMESSAGE, ZWAGROUPMEMBER, Size: 33865728 bytes)

Attachments:

I think this is all we got boys...
https://mmg-fna.whatsapp.net/d/f/AkFksqo3c059gG8j7wpqiXtwLIVINGyfAFHsMzZZpLAS.encyclopedia.com/67ab4f2e2ed52cc.jpg

Source file: Spencer/Applications/group.net.whatsapp.WhatsApp.shared/ChatStorage.sqlite : 0xF87FB8 (Table: ZWAMESSAGE, ZWAGROUPMEMBER, ZWAMEDIAITEM, Size: 33865728 bytes)

Spencer/Applications/group.net.whatsapp.WhatsApp.shared/Message/Media/16714872682-1473210235@g.us/a/0/a0796260-7296-45ee-b72f-7ab4f2e2ed52cc.jpg : (Size: 22770 bytes)
FYI: melatonin is minimum 24hrs grounding.

Requesting 8 x GBU-12 for tomorrow.

Maintenance is looking for any available pilot who can turn a jet.

Tokushima personnel, if it comes to it for transportation there are three rental car companies near the civilian terminal

Budget:
- Nissan:
- Nippon:

Two taxi phone numbers from the airport info site:

THE FOLLOWING 340 PAGES OF THIS ENCLOSURE HAVE BEEN REMOVED DUE TO BEING COMPLETELY REDACTED UNDER B(6),B(7)(C)
# Aircraft Data (Record Type 7B)

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**Remarks**

\( \text{(NAME / GRADE / LOCAL USE)} \)

- A
- B
- C
- D
- E
- F
- G
- H

\( \text{NATOPS} \)

- A
- B
- C
- D
- E

\( \text{MEDICAL} \)

- A
- B
- C
- D
- E

\( \text{INSTR} \)

- A
- B
- C
- D
- E

\( \text{WATER} \)

- A
- B
- C
- D
- E

\( \text{PHYSIOLOGY} \)

- A
- B
- C
- D
- E

\( \text{A/C OR MSN CMDR SIGNATURE / GRADE} \)

- (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) (i) (j) (k) (l) (m) (n) (o) (p) (q) (r) (s) (t) (u) (v) (w) (x) (y) (z)
Crew Flight Hours per Month

Enclosure 25

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VMFA(AW)-242 CREW PROFICIENCY
PILOT / WSO
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### Event Proficiency VMFA (AW)-242 - FA-18D Pilot

12/13/2018 1628 UTC+09:00

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Enclosure 26
### Permanent

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**UNCLASSIFIED/FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY**

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Enclosure 26
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VMFA(AW)-242 HOTBOARD (30/60/90)
VMFA (AW) - 242 SCHEDULES
CHANGE 1

Endorsement 29
UNited States Marine Corps
Marine all Weather Fighter Attack Squadron 242
Marine Aircraft Group 12
1st Marine Aircraft Wing
Unit 37310
FPO. AP 96216-7310

From: Commanding Officer, Marine all Weather Fighter Attack Squadron 242
To: Distribution List A

Subj: STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES FOR MARINE all WEATHER FIGHTER ATTACK SQUADRON 242 FLIGHT OPERATIONS

Ref: (a) CNAF-M 3710.7
(b) NAVMC 3500.30C (FA-18 Training and Readiness Manual)
(c) MCO 3710.8, USMC NATOPS Program
(d) 1st MAW Standard Operating Procedures for Air Operations
(e) F/A-18 A-D NATOPS Flight Manual
(f) USMC FA-18 Admin SOP
(g) FA-18 TACSOP
(h) Marine Aircraft Group 12 (MAG-12) In-flight Guide
(i) MCASO 3710.3X (MCAS Iwakuni Air Operations Manual)

Encl: (1) Functional Check Flight Exam
(2) Tablet Contents and Set-up

1. Situation. References (a) through (i) do not cover all facets of squadron operations, therefore, this SOP will serve as a guide to achieve squadron standardization. This SOP will cover topics regarding aircrew responsibilities from mission planning through post-flight debrief as well as Operations Duty Officer (ODO) responsibilities during the execution of the daily flight schedule.

2. Mission. The Commanding Officer, VMFA(AW)-242, publishes this order to amplify procedures contained in references (a) through (i) and prescribes additional procedures, where necessary, to conform to local requirements and facilitate fleet operational training.

3. Execution

a. Commander’s Intent and Concept of Operations.

(1) Commander’s Intent. To maximize operational training and standardization while adhering to established standards and procedures governing flight operations and safety.

(2) Concept of Operations.

(a) All aircrew operating VMFA(AW)-242 aircraft are responsible for knowledge of and compliance with the instructions set forth in this order.

Enclosure 30
Subj: STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES FOR MARINE ALL WEATHER FIGHTER ATTACK SQUADRON 242 FLIGHT OPERATIONS

(b) The following definitions apply to this order:

1. Shall: Used when application of a procedure is mandatory.

2. Should: Used when application of a procedure is recommended.

3. May and Need not: Used when application of a procedure is optional.

(3) This order does not cover every possible situation nor does it relieve personnel of the responsibility to exercise sound judgment during flight operations. Should a conflict arise between this order and any of the references listed, the most restrictive guidance shall take precedence.

(4) Operational Risk Management (ORM) is a framework for decision-making. Its goal is to minimize losses and preserve assets while maximizing mission success. In the operational environment, this is accomplished by continuously applying ORM control measures outlined in this SOP and references (a) through (i). As a result, this document is an integral part of VMFA(AW)-242’s ORM program and shall be incorporated into every phase of flight from pre-mission planning through post-flight debriefs.

(5) Deviations from this order:

(a) Flight leads may deviate from this order as circumstances dictate for safety of flight and mission accomplishment.

(b) Flight leads are responsible for ensuring all deviations are thoroughly briefed and understood by all flight members and that such deviations comply with ORM guidelines and higher directives.

4. Administration and Logistics. Recommendations concerning flight operations and administration are invited. Recommendations should be forwarded to the VMFA(AW)-242 Director of Safety and Standardization (DOSS) for consideration at the next Standardization Board meeting.

5. Command and Signal

a. Command. This order is applicable to all VMFA(AW)-242 flight operations and shall be adhered to by all squadron and augment aircrew.

b. Signal. This order is effective the date signed.
Subj: STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES FOR MARINE ALL WEATHER FIGHTER ATTACK SQUADRON 242 FLIGHT OPERATIONS

Copy to:
Safety
Distribution List A

THE FOLLOWING 25 PAGES OF THIS ENCLOSURE HAVE BEEN REMOVED DUE TO BEING COMPLETELY REDACTED UNDER (b)(2)
From: Deputy Commandant for Aviation
To: Commanding Officer, Marine Fighter Attack Training Squadron 101

Subj: DEFER CAT I CARRIER QUALIFICATION TO INCREASE PRODUCTION

1. In order to reduce the USMC F/A-18 CAT I production deficit HQMC Aviation directs VMFAT-101 to defer all, but 15 CAT I students carrier qualification phase during each FY through FY19.

2. Due to low USMC F/A-18 readiness at VMFAT-101, late CNATRA production, and USMC accession shortfalls; USMC F/A-18 production is forecasted to be behind by 32 pilots in FY 18.

3. This deferment will reduce the CAT I syllabus by 22 sorties and 22.9 hours. The current 1000 level F/A-18 Training and Readiness syllabus provides 108.1 hours of flight training for CAT I students. This reduction in training time and hours will transfer some risk to the fleet squadrons due to the experience not gained from carrier based aviation.

4. Naval Aviation Production Analysts (NAPP), USMC Training and Education Command (ASB), MMOA-2 and HQMC Aviation have collaborated to determine that this is a feasible course of action to temporarily increase production.

5. This increase in production will provide necessary pilot inventory for a 7523 PMOS community that is at 48% of the target inventory for Company grade officers. Production is expected to increase by four to eight CAT Is per FY of this deferment.

6. HQMC AVN will continue to monitor USMC F/A-18 CAT I production and will cease this deferment at the end of FY19 if inventory and production problems have been solved.

7. VMFAT-101 will coordinate with Training and Education Command (ASB) identifying by name those aviators that received a carrier qualification deferral. This letter will be placed in both the aviation training jacket and NATOPS jacket of each individual deferred.

8. Point of contact for this request is [b] [3] (A), (b) [6] at [b] [3] (A), DSN [b] [3] (A), or [b] [3] (A), (b) [6] [b] [3] (A), (b) [6]
Data Summary:

The data was provided to ASIST team from (b) (3) (A), (b) (6) on 17 December 2018. The file was examined for validity. Data records showed valid structure and the data appeared consistent. The start of the DFIRS data is GMT time: 16:11:26 and end of DFIRS data is at GMT time: 16:44:19.

The data indicates that aircraft started receiving fuel (indicated by fuel increasing) at approximately 16:38:32 when the aircraft was at 245 knots and 15,000 feet at coordinates: 134.60998382, 32.497558224. The DFIRS data indicates that the aircraft likely disconnected from the tanker at approximately 16:42:30-16:44:06. The DFIRS has some fuel related signals that can be examined more closely to determine more precisely when fuel tanking was completed. Fuel stops increasing at approximately 16:42:27.

There were not flight control, engine or subsystem failure recorded prior to an excursion that appears at time 16:44:17. Aircraft experienced an uncommanded roll and pitch transient. First, evaluation suggests the aircraft may have been hit from the bottom.

MSP codes recorded once at the end were:

C01, C02, C03, C04, 44, 70, 34C, 34E, 339, 340, 47, 95, 23E, 718, 768

CAUTIONS at end of data set:

CAUTIONS: L STALL, R STALL, LADDER,
Release Authority is Japanese Ministry of Defense
REPORT OF TEST RESULTS

REPORT NO: NAWCWDCL/RTR-2008/011

JOINT HELMET MOUNTED CUEING SYSTEM (JHMCS)
MINI-QUADEYE™ INTEGRATED TEST AND EVALUATION

By

21 March 2008

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NIGHT VISION CUEING AND DISPLAY
OPERATIONAL UTILITY EVALUATION

FINAL REPORT

AUGUST 2013

THE FOLLOWING 39 PAGES OF THIS ENCLOSURE HAVE BEEN REMOVED DUE TO BEING COMPLETELY REDACTED UNDER (b)(3)
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

From: Assistant Commander for Acquisition (AIR-1.0)
To: Program Manager, Aircrew Systems (PMA202)

(b) ORD CAF USN 308-93-III-A for JHMCS, Nov 2002.
(c) NVCD CPD, AFROCM 09-09-03, Sep 2009.
(d) 191724Z SEP 08 Quick Reaction Assessment of the JHMCS NVCD Onboard the FA-18.
(e) H5E OT Report.

Encl: (1) JHMCS NVCD ASR PowerPoint Presentation, 7 April 2014

Subj: COMPLETION OF OPERATIONAL TEST FOR THE JOINT HELMET MOUNTED CUEING SYSTEM (JHMCS) NIGHT VISION CUEING AND DISPLAY (NVCD)

1. The JHMCS NVCD system was subject to two phases of operational test: a Quick Reaction Assessment (QRA) from July – August 2008, and an OT period in conjunction with the F/A-18 H5E software upgrade from October 2008 – May 2009. The test requirements for the operational test periods came from the F/A-18E/F H5E TEMP, reference (a), and were traced to the JHMCS Operational Requirements Document (ORD), reference (b). The NVCD Capabilities Production Document (CPD), reference (c) was developed after the OT periods were complete. The QRA and OT reports, references (d) and (e) respectively, showed that the JHMCS NVCD system met the TEMP KPP thresholds and demonstrated the ability to bring JHMCS capability to night operations and satisfy the fleet’s needs for operating JHMCS at night.

2. Based on the conclusions in these reports, no additional operational testing is required to further validate the JHMCS NVCD system’s capability. All OT objectives were achieved during the Air Force led ACAT III phase of the program. The JHMCS NVCD program may proceed with the test strategy presented in the Acquisition Strategy Review brief, enclosure (1), as an ACAT IVT program with OT considered complete.

Enclosure 37
Aviation Mishap F/A-18D
VMFA(AW)-242 and VMGR-152
6 Dec 18
CI Enclosures 38+43
Today is Friday the 25th of January 2019. We are in Iwakuni, Japan. The time is roughly 1207, local time.

I am from 1st Marine Aircraft Wing. I'm assisted by Staff Judge Advocate, and . Our next witness is .

, can you please state your full name for the record, spelling your last name.

: And , how would you like me to refer to you during this interview?

: You can call me anything you want, sir.

: Okay.

: That's good.

: All right. Okay. , you can call me or sir at any time as well, and you can ask me to pause as we go through.

: What is your MOS?

: 7525.

: What is a 7525?
It is a Weapon Systems Operator F-18.

So you're a Hornet back seater?

I am.

How long have you been doing that?


Two thousand and one. So about 18 years. Roughly, how many hours do you have on the hornet?

Twenty-seven hundred.

About 2,700 hours in the F-18. What are your key qualifications and designations in the F-18?

Weapons and Tactics Instructor; some of -- I used to be a Forward Air Controller Airborne Instructor, not current in that; Tech-AI; FLC; Division Lead Mission Commander; Section Lead FAC-A, TAC-A; pretty much everything.

So it'd suffice to say you feel like you're well qualified to be a weapons systems operator and a officer in the F-18?

Yes, sir.

Do you feel like you are also well qualified to be a commanding officer in 242?

Yes, sir.
What are some things that make you feel well qualified to be the CO of 242, in addition to the qualifications and designations you just listed?

Background in previous assignments, experience.

Tell me about some key assignments that prepared you for this command.

I was a MAWTS-1 Instructor, I got a chance to see, you know, and also be the director of safety and standardization MAWTS-1. I got to see every type, model, and series up close and personal. I got to see the best of all communities. I got to see what each squadron, on fleet support, how each F-18 squadron operated and see how the best practices and the worst. I got to train with some of the best students out there and some of the finest, you know, pilots and WIZO's. And then really, frankly, from every [inaudible] series, I got to see the duty experts up close and personal. So that was one of them. Staff assignment wise, how that runs as squadron, you know, that's one thing but the key assignments in squadrons I think are essential. So I happen to have been out here in Iwakuni, Japan MAG-12 from I think 2008 to 2011. I was the Assistant Operations Officer. I was the WIZO Training Officer.
I was the Operations Officer for 242 and Assistant Aircraft Maintenance Officer, so I knew a lot about how this squadron, you know, the challenges they would face here, or at least I thought I would know and I thought I'd be best prepared. So I put this down number one because with my experience here in Iwakuni before, that was on the front side of its PCS year, I did not come over with the squadron then. I came over just shortly. It was on my FAP tour then with the 1st Marine Regiment, but came over, you know, had been in the squadron at Miramar and deployed to Iraq and the rest of my FAP tour they PCS'd over here. So three years previous here in Iwakuni. I worked at headquarters Marine Corps Aviation.

What did you do in the hallway?

I worked in U.S. programs and I was the aide-de-camp to Deputy Commandant for Aviation, So I had worked at MAWTS, I had worked at the hallway, a lot of key staff positions, I think, within the squadron. So I may be qualified, I think, but as you know, there's always things that
you don't know and we will always wish we could add a little bit more experience.

[Redacted]: So you mentioned you were the DOSS at MAWTS-1, I assume at the time-frame that would've been under [ph] perhaps, did -- were you also an ASO?

[Redacted]: No. Never an ASO.

[Redacted]: Did you ever attend ASO school?

[Redacted]: Did not attend ASO school. I did attend the Senior Aviation Variance, the commanders course --

[Redacted]: The ASC perhaps, the one week course?

[Redacted]: I did. It was two weeks, but I found --

[Redacted]: When did you do that? As part of your workups to being skipper?

[Redacted]: Yes, I did. Before I PCS'd over here. I think it was around -- I think it was -- Easter time.

[Redacted]: March of '18?

[Redacted]: Yes, sir -- March of '17.

[Redacted]: March of '17. Oh, that's right, because you came out April.

Okay. Did you ever attend CRM school, CRMI school, also in Pensacola?
: No. Never attended that.

: Okay. Did you ever attend any formal ORM or CRM training that is like they teach at the safety school?

: Not at safety school. Of course we did a lot of that that actually taught tactical risk management as part of the curriculum at WTI.

: At TRM? Tell me a little bit about that.

: So it was a two to three-day course, it varied. It started at three, I think, we paired it down to two. It was designed to take the tacticians, because I think people noticed back in the, you know, post OYF we had a real peak of mishaps. And there was a belief that within the squadrons you had tactical aviators and you had safety guys and then there was this attempt to say "hey, there's no.

There's not supposed be any barrier between these two" that there aren't tactical guys that aren't inherently safe. And so that was, I think, got started as . But the idea was to say, I say glamorizing safety is probably the wrong way but that is essentially what they are trying to do. Say like, listen, this is not something that you need to shy away from, this is actually something you need to embrace. And so it was a module that went through basically, you know, mishaps. It went through,
you know, squadron aviation culture. It went through how to be a training officer and really, kind of, bring along all the different levels of talent that you have; how to give the commander the best advice possible, you know; and how to build training plans that addressed, you know, all these different, kind of, typical aviation personalities.

And so it also, kind of, brought in some outside folks to say, you know, there's a ski, like an extreme sports guy that came in and talked to us. It was like a [inaudible], that was an F-14 commander to talk about some things that he experienced and let's see, [ph] would come in and talk. And so we had ethics folks, we had, you know, probably some of the best guys that do the safety surveys talk about how to use those. So it was fairly effective, I think. And everybody went through that all-type model series. Practically speaking, it was not as popular amongst the instructors there because you lose a model, you lose time, you lose training time. But the command and leadership felt like it was very, very important to keep that narrative going.

My personal opinion was, is that, now while it was important, it was that the culture has shifted significantly in my career time. I would say that, you know, early on, early 2000's there certainly was these two camps. I certainly saw it morph, you
know, over time. And so the leadership, what they remembered, you know, when they were young captains was significantly different from, you know, when I was, you know, department head. There really weren't a lot of these off the reservation, kind of, rogue aviator folks. You know, really most people were -- had inculcated the concept of ORM in their daily approach to life. In fact, if anything, they kind of took it almost to the other extreme.

Almost always, people were padding their fuels and what not. So it's not uncommon now to see somebody land out here with 4,000 pounds of fuel. You know, back in the day, you'd been savage for something like that. You know, the on deck fuel, you know, being 2.5 or 2.0 depending on the runway conditions, where you are, even Beaufort 1.5, right? Using every bit of those dead dinosaurs to train was always an important thing.

I think you'll see young guys who are on the opposite extreme of that. You know, when you look at, hey, what's your fuel?" or "what's your weather requirements to have diverters?" and stuff like that, they almost instinctively add to them as a matter of course. You know, so there is a very interesting ying yang, you know, over my career that I've seen. But in general, I think, the ideas really kept on. So TRM in it's importance, I don't know -- I think they're just calling it risk mitigation now, but they really
highlighted on "hey, there's a blue threat out there too."

Now, there's a red threat that we focus on quite a bit, we talked about threat west weapons systems and we talked about maximum ranges and, you know, effective altitudes and so on and so forth but we'll just go to the end degree about how we're going to mitigate the enemy threats. But hey, you know, you're a risk to yourself too, right? You're a risk to, like I said, to just the straight up mishap angle. It's always a dangerous business; take-offs, landings. All of those things, but also, you know, like hey you're thinking about where your missiles can go and think about, you know, the sweep coming off a target. You're sitting there as the bar cap and, you know, what's -- how is it going to look on your radar scope? You know, you can shoot him down too.

So really taking on all of these, hey, blue threats and mitigating them as well and emphasizing in the course of the tactical, the WTI's, either there are no plans that are inherently unsafe. You know, there's not a safety plan and a tactical plan, it's like, hey there is no tactical plan that doesn't incorporate the blue threat as well. So in my safety policy and everything else you see, all that stuff highlighted, you know, it's all pulled over from that formal instruction. So I'd, you know, I've received that at WTI as well as a student and then I help teach it.
So in your teaching, how did you define a hazard?

Well defined, a hazard is anything that would be no effect, safe, you know, for your flight operations. Something that could adversely affect.

And how did you define a risk?

I can't remember exactly the perfect definition. But it's something that --

No, in your own words.

-- you know, lost -- anything that could cause a -- something to go wrong. You know, we talk all the time and they involve our briefs: Risk to mission or risk to force. So anything that's going to -- any barrier that's going to keep you from either accomplishing the mission or any barrier that's going to potentially harm your force or the force you're supporting.

So what's the difference between a hazard and a risk? It sounds like you said the same thing.

Yeah, they sound pretty much the same. I guess, identified hazards that are specific to the operations, I guess. I don't remember, to be honest with you, exactly the same --

Okay. Did the TRM program or instruction
you taught, did it include what I might know as the ORM process?

| 11 |  | (b) (3) (A), (b) (6) | : | It did. In fact, that was one of the modules. |
|  |  |  | (b) (3) (A), (b) (6) | : | Okay. Do you remember, since you taught that, as an instructor, do you remember how many steps there are in the ORM process? |
|  |  | (b) (3) (A), (b) (6) | : | No. |
|  |  | (b) (3) (A), (b) (6) | : | Do you remember -- |
|  |  | (b) (3) (A), (b) (6) | : | -- seven steps, I think. |
|  |  | (b) (3) (A), (b) (6) | : | Okay. Do you recall the key components, like the general thesis of the ORM concept? |
|  |  | (b) (3) (A), (b) (6) | : | I mean the first step is to assess hazards and then to basically to identify, you know, what could go wrong? What are the potential things that are out there? And then, okay, you come up with -- all right, you know, how do they apply to us? And what are some mitigations that we can -- how can we mitigate them and you know, come up with formal assessments and, you know, basically develop courses of action and get to acceptable standard to where the risks don't, you know, we don't accept any unnecessary risk and we've done our level best to make sure that we have accounted for, you know, all of the issues that there are. |
|  |  | (b) (3) (A), (b) (6) | : | So as a person who once taught that |
course and was also the operations officer at 242, how do you incorporate what you just described into your operations process, your scheduling process?

Well, I would say a lot of this is baked into the calculus of just how we think now. Like I mentioned before, we do have a formal review process. Our schedule for instance, it goes from, you know, the flight up -- first there's ops and maintenance meetings routinely and they look at what's the aircraft availability. We look at where we are on our training block and training plan and what available assets that we need and we look at the MSHARK for the currency to see what, you know, and basically proficiency to see what areas we need to address and we step all the way through those the formal way and we come up with the flows for the week and the fly windows and we make sure that we don't have an insurmountable task ahead. Level all that.

So on a daily basis that's up on the board, we have this, kind of, a website, I think, that has that stuff too. It's sharepoint, but it kind of shows what the ops calendar is and stuff and so it can be a mood to target a bit but there's a standard plan and they're based on what we think we know and then we take from there and go to the daily flight schedule. You know, the schedule writer himself looks at what the flight officer and the training
officers have, kind of, messaged from Ops O guidance and my guidance and it then comes up with the flows for those days and puts the crew pairings together and, you know, gets the ranges together, all the support assets, all that stuff and, you know, puts it into the schedule.

And then that gets reviewed first in, you know, local operations pit. The training officer comes up and sees if he sees anything wrong with that. I've tried to, kind of, encourage him as having done that job before, if you're always in the weeds you're never -- you're not doing the back there, you know, going over tapes like you should be. So there's a piece there.

The operations officer, you know, this gets shown down to maintenance at some point, you know, before or after ops. Usually ops sees this thing just about last, but it's reviewed by maintenance [inaudible], it's reviewed by operations officer and then it's finally reviewed by DOSS, and then it comes to me. And the skeds writer comes up and he has a binder with it in there. There's a lot of supporting documents but it's basically, the people on the schedule is the primary. I review it in detail, I take a look at what I know, human factors wise for folks. You know, if there are, you know, based on when we do the human factors councils and whatnot and consider the things that the skeds writers might not
be privy to. But for the most part, it's looking at basic turn
times and making sure that they don't put any errors on there.

One of the things that I did learn from my time in
maintenance and as an operations officer was that the daily flight
schedules, essentially the coordinating, you know, order for the
entire squadron is what people have. It's the daily, you know,
guidance and such priorities and let's everybody know what they're
supposed to do and when they're supposed to do it.

You know, so we take the timeliness of the delivery of the
schedule to be very serious and then of course what's on there to be
very, very serious. I spend a lot of time just looking at it line
by line and our schedule has not been very robust either so it's
easy to look at line by line and think about what they're doing and
when they're doing it and who's doing it. Now behind that, all the
supporting documents are proficiency; currency; the hotboards; or
how much have they flown; what have they done, you know; what are
they red in, meaning that they've expired in said name code be it
core, mission, and then; hey, what are they actually proficient in?

And something our skeds writers weren't doing a really
good job of was paying attention to necessarily how to, you know,
how to get to green on some of these people and these crews easier.
So, you know, I was helping him with that, right? Look at, look at
this -- he swapped these two guys right here and look boom, you've got a new proficient crew in whatever med it's going to be versus, you know, just knocking out another code so -- we're working on playing money ball as much as we can with our limited assets.

So that's it, in a nutshell, but it's several people look at the schedule throughout the course of the day and all that's [inaudible]. There is a -- we did not use a daily since I've been in command up until I was, you know, ordered to do this in December. Did not routinely use what I would consider the, you know, the ORM formal ORM worksheet. Why? Because in my career, I had found them to be completely ineffective and when I went to the ASC course it was a lot of people up, it was about 50/50 so did not use them because we were doing basically all those things in the course of the discussion of each line but, you know, somebody said "hey, why don't you use one?" So I said "Okay. We'll put it in there." Same thing on signatures on the flight schedule. I'm the only guy that signs the flight schedule, up until recently. Why? Because I'm the only person that's ultimately accountable for this so I mirrored many other squadrons that do the same thing. In fact, I just went to MAG-31 and every single squadron in MAG-31 schedule looked exactly like ours did, one signature. But gave me a lawful order here a couple weeks ago that said put the Safety Skid, Safety
AAMO, and Ops O on there so we have them all on there up to date. At the time of the mishap, we did not. Don't know if that answers that question or not, sir.

[3] (2) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Thanks, [3] (2) (3) (A), (b) (6). So in the context of the process you just described, why did you choose [3] (2) (3) (A), (b) (6) for the mission he was on?

[3] (2) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Well, I will just take a quick, you know, I'll answer that this way. This is a -- in the context of an exercise that was originally planned to be Vigilant Ace and then morphed into something that became MAG-ULT, MAG-12 Unit Level Training, of which the flows, which I won't go into how they were derived for the classification purposes, but the flows were essentially mandated to us from higher headquarters. So we had to come up with a plan to cover down on 24 hour operations. When we looked at how we're going to do crew pairings and we looked at how we were going to cover down on, I broke the flight, the day, with the help of my operations officer into three parts, three crews. Why? When I was last deployed to combat with the bats that's what we did. And [inaudible] how we did 24 hour operations, we said, hey, I don't want to do two day/night crew just a straight up 12 hour on/off. I want to stagger to give ourselves more flexibility throughout the day. So we essentially built a ten hour stagger, if
you will, and really trying to focus more on an eight hour fly
window for individuals, you know, to give them more time to adjust.
So that was our going game plan. Not on our training plan to fly in
the [inaudible]. Again, I view that as a frag that we were supposed
to comply with.

So how do we come up with that, with [b] (3) (A), (b) (6) [redacted] to
flying there? What -- I was very cognizant of the fact that they
fly in during that time of day, so you know to identify, you know,
hazards. If a hazard is flying during the [inaudible], you know, so
all right, how do we mitigate that? Well who doesn't have kids, you
know, so that's a big piece of this is he was one of my Captain
pilots that did not have children. You notice that my CAT-1's, you
know, we're the ODO's during this period. Why? Because they didn't
feel like they had the requisite experience at this point,
especially with their even lower flight hours to fly during this
exercise. So they were put on the shelf. Oh. And we didn't have a
limitless amount, we're well below the TO of pilots, so if you take
away a few people, next thing you know, there's only so many people
left. You got to think about key staff function, where the battle
rhythm meetings are going to go, the daily commanders update brief
was at 07:00 and afternoon one was, I think, at 15:30, I can't
remember exactly that one, and I know that one was at 07:00. But,
anyway, so, we had to be available to send the right representatives to those things and practically speaking we still had to have staff function to run the squadron. So not a lot of meetings going on during that time. So as a result, I think you see the staff function during the, you know, the midnight crew.

I think, I don't know what we actually called the third shift but he was, kind of, a natural to fit in there. The other thing is, [b] (3) (A), (b) (6) has been in the fleet for, you know, a year and a half at this point; he's in a section lead work-up; as far as proficiency within the squadron, he had more than, I would say, the average folks did, at least that was my perception.

And I did that somewhat based on my amount of time with him. So I had flown with him personally in the same aircraft on the 20th of November, not long prior to this we did aerial refueling, we went out and did some rehearsal of our wartime mission as part of an [inaudible] in the [inaudible] same range where the mishap would occur. I had flown with him on the road as part of his section lead workup and the other airplane with [b] (3) (A), (b) (6) now, so flight lead down to Okinawa over four something called [b] (3) (A) [ph]. Is it a CAS Frago we had, so out of Kadena, and we did stuff in the CTA and then out over the W-174. So I had seen these guys fly day and night, you know, within a [inaudible] on time, 45 days, whatever
that is.

We judged that he was good enough to be section lead workup. So I'd seen a lot of these guys and I had no issues with his, you know, the way he handled himself. I felt like he was mature; felt like he was a professional; felt like he prepared; and, you know, really the final thing there was, hey, he had out of everybody the most time, kind of, in the squadron to handle something like that as a DASH-2 pilot and it's like one of those, he had no kids around to distract him.

[O][3][A], [b][6] (A), (b) (6): So why'd you pick [b][3][A], (b) (6) to be in his back seat?

[O][3][A], (b) (6): Well, ran out of -- I won't say, you know -- again, some of this is how who's left over. Only had, I think 14 WIZO's to start with. You start putting a lot of more senior ammo, myself, [inaudible], DOSS turned XO, DOSS turned XO would have been on that mission had he not been on PTAD.

[O][3][A], (b) (6): Where was he PTAD?

[O][3][A], (b) (6): He was --

[O][3][A], (b) (6): Is that [b][3][A]? [sic]

[O][3][A], (b) (6): What's that? [b][3][A]. Yeah, (b) (6)

[b][3][A], (b) (6).

[O][3][A], (b) (6): [b][3][A], (b) (6), thank you. He was PTAD?
It was kind of --
Like Marine Corps business?
It was like a, kind of, like a leadership development thing that -- maybe that's the wrong term to use -- he probably technically was on leave.
Okay.
But it was, kind of, like a training, kind of, thing. It was a leadership development --
It was a scheduled event? It had been scheduled --
Scheduled, scheduled for some time.
-- for some time. So you had approved his absence in whatever context, months or weeks before the ULT became apparent?
I did. Before we even knew we were going to have to execute it. You know, our SA at that time was, hey Vigilant Ace is canceled based on what national command authority wanted to see happen. I didn't think that our leadership would basically say "we don't care what the president thinks, we're going to execute anyway." That's really what the perception was. Everybody was like, roger that, you know it's I guess a lawful
order. And so we did everything we could to pivot back in and get there.

[b] [3] [A], [b] [6]: Your nonverbals indicate a little bit of frustration with the fact that after the Vigilant Ace was canceled, you guys were asked to execute on the same schedule and I've heard that from others too. How would you articulate that? Was there confusion about the purpose and a confusion about the plan?

[b] [3] [A], [b] [6]: Massive confusion about both. And, in fact, the Thursday -- let's see, the Wednesday prior, I finally said "Ops O, what are we doing?"

[b] [3] [A], [b] [6]: To the MAG or squadron Ops O?

[b] [3] [A], [b] [6]: First to the squadron, and he was very frustrated. He had been in a number of these meetings and, I mean, he is a blue chip guy too. [b] [3] [A], [b] [6] is as fine as they come, recruited to come out here, very few people will come out here of quality, to be honest with you. But, that aren't, kind of, forced. He came out here because he, kind of, believed in in, kind of, changing, trying to change things. And he's one who was very inclined for action and try to get things done, and so he worked it pretty hard. What the flows were going to be like, they were all over the place. MAG's plans officer had turned over, so it went from [b] [3] [A], [b] [6] [ph] to [b] [3] [A], [b] [6] [ph]. In close
proximity to this, or just prior to this, what was going to be MAG-ULT nobody knew. Nobody knew, none of the squadron guys, none of the commanders knew, frankly, right up until execution.

So on the Wednesday prior, I finally called over to the boss and I said, "I heard that they were having a coronation meeting" I said, "Sir, I would like come and attend this, because right now I can't understand what it is that our tasking is really going to be. And I don't know what it is that we are going to do and I don't think I can effectively --" I think I even used the term "--mitigate the risks without, kind of, understanding what it is that we are being tasked for." Is this an OPlan rehearsal? Is this a personal task, trainer on the following skill sets? Is this sorority generation? You know, what is the tasking going to be? And he said to me "Oh that's good information. Come on over to this meeting, you're welcome to anything there."

The staff when I showed up was a little surprised to see me there and I think, you know, they're a little frustrated because I think they felt like my staff hadn't communicated with me but it became really apparent that we had massive holes in the plan. I mean, there were no slides presented, there were no flows discussed.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): Were you provided JTARS outside of like a typical ATO cycle?
No. We were provided -- basically, nothing but what the flow -- flight flow should be.

And by flow you mean like a one slide Powerpoint with the gant chart that showed like a long horizontal line that --

Gant chart, exactly.

-- with your squadrons name on it to takeoff and land?

Takeoffs and lands and locations and ranges. And a lot of those integrated assets, you know, in each one of these spots, you know, so looking at them in [inaudible] well what are the missions supposed to be for here? A lot of the times it was "well, you guys are just going to figure that out on the squadron level."

So then what's the purpose of the exercise?

Great question, sir. I don't think we ever established that to be honest with you. So after that, there was not a whole -- was going to be open or not for operations? It was not known whether or not it would be on the Wednesday prior. The wing obviously had great interest in making that happen. We obviously want to get in there, there is a
well-intended and well-intentions policy to try to maximize our [inaudible] operations, support that completely. My prior job was plans officer, as the MAG-12 Plans Officer before I became the commander, sir. Everything that's involved in, you know -- which we won't go into detail -- is part of that branch out. So again, I want to maximize what we're doing over there too. But there's a lot of limitations to this and a lot of limitations to taking, you know, certain flows and applying them like worst case scenario, kind of flows, and applying them to daily training operations.

A number of violations of the F-18 admin SOP were basically presented as a result of this.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): So your higher headquarters directed you to exceed the 6.5 hour flight hour window?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): They exceeded -- well, I don't know one hundred percent that to be true. It was close to that. The real one was the amount of sororities. So it would be like four sororities in a day, you know, not being beyond what we're supposed to.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): Who has the waiver authority for that?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): Unclear based on the SOP.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): Did the MAG CO provide you a signed waiver for anything outside of that?
Once he -- well once that was brought to his attention, he said "we're not going to exceed anything in the fourth sorority bit." But we're still --

Were there F-18 crews on the MAG staff familiar with the F-18 admin SOP?

Yes.

That should have been familiar with those restrictions preparing those flows?

Yes. Definitely.

And how many days before execution did you come to be aware of this direction coming down that exceeded the safety SOP's?

Two or three.

Like Thursday or Friday?

Like Thursday or Friday.

Okay.

Probably Thursday. So we were going to have a confirmation brief on Thursday.

Okay.

And the confirmation brief was a little more admiring of the problem, I would say, from the previous day. It was a bunch of guys around circled talking about "hey, well
is still off. We're still working it." Those kinds of things. It wasn't like you would expect "hey, here's the slides, here's the -- how we're stepping through, hey, this is our mission, this is our," you know, like we do for everything that we go and execute. Every DFT, you know expected to provide that for the --

: So I'm trying to focus on things that you can control and things you can't. And I fully understand and appreciate the fact that this was, frankly, a half baked bag of trash as far as the plan goes.

: Yes, sir.

: And that's not okay. And I'm going to address that in my report, but to take it back to the things that you can control.

: Yes, sir.

: Why'd you pick ?

: Oh that's right. Yes, about that. I mean, frankly, he was -- it's experience based. He's been in the fleet a couple years, you know, he's been on every deployment that we've done, you know --

: But you said that you picked because he didn't have children. What about and children?

: So definitely has
that my babysit for, but you know when I looked at -- so is off down in Yamasukura, we had that during the same time. We had to send a -- so I, frankly, was pretty much out of guys to put in there. You know, looking back over it, is gone doing his PTP prep, so I couldn't throw him on but he had a too. Just not a lot left, so it was basically peer group and based on what his ground job was and yeah, so three of the four didn't have kids there but the fourth I couldn't do anything about.

: So you did the best you could with the crews.

: I did.

: Okay.

: But, sir, you know, looking back on it I'm like, you know, those -- probably was very hard for him to adjust.

: Yeah. Did -- was there ever discussion about the use of Ambien or no-go pills -- go pills?

: Yes. There was.

: Tell me a little bit about that.

: So the Thursday prior, as we did our confirmation brief here. Air quotes with my hands, sir. This
came up from COVMFA it'll be 225.

: Your adjacent fighter commander?

: Adjacent fighter commander, [ph], tremendous respect for her, great teammates and did a lot of stuff right. And then very supportive of us before and after and during. So he probably said, "hey, you know, these flows are beyond our normal operations -- 24 hour operations is abnormal for us. I'm going to ask -- request permission for performance enhancing drugs in order to make it through these flows." And he said, "would you support that idea?" and I said "Absolutely, that makes sense, I wish I would have thought of that, I did not think of it." So I said I would like to be included on that request.

And so he routed up, he talked to it with, like it was all very positive and then that goes downrange and then it get's returned. And it's very clear when it was rejected. So we got very clear information that --

: So you had the perception that yourself and your adjacent commander thought it was reasonable and you took it to your higher headquarters and was accepted as something that he would forward to the wing.

: Yes, sir.
Okay. And was reasonably supportive, he didn't say absolutely not, I guess, immediately. And then it's your perception that was forwarded to the Wing Commanding General, General Weidley. General Weidley said no and then it's communicated back down as a no.

Yes, sir. And it was discussed amongst the northern squadron level. Made it clear that, hey this is not -- this has been asked for and heads have been rejected and, frankly, I had a misunderstanding of the policy right up to that point in terms of, you know, go versus no-go pills. And I think this has changed a little bit over the years, you know, that, you know, at first I thought, hey the general had to say yes to go pills, [inaudible] know everything is in the same category, you know, Ambien to be included.

Now, I'll say this as a sidenote, that the use of Ambien is prevalent throughout all of aviation. If you ask the guys coming from OIR right now, they know whether or not -- how many of their guys are flying six and a half hour sororities over Syria right now, all their night shift guys are doing this. And they're doing the opposite too. They're using their go-pills too.

I don't think that there was -- I think I was surprised. I was surprised by the commanding generals response to that, but,
again, it's lawful authority to say yes or no to this and so we complied. At least I thought we did.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): Do you think that decision could have in any way contributed to the mishap? Do you think if you guys would have had Ambien perhaps or may have been better rested, potentially? Would you care to speculate?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): I would speculate that, I would say yes. I don't know what caused the loss of -- weird things about being a squad commander through a mishap is how everybody's -- you know everything and then you know nothing. Now suddenly, everybody can tell you about anything that occurred. So I only have in my mind what I think has happened here but somebody didn't fly formation off of a plan they're supposed to fly formation on, or they really want to wear sacred trust. Now what led to that, I don't know. Whether or not he is inattention or his fatigue factor were causal factors, I'm sure you gentlemen will look into and determine. That very well could be a factor here, was that he was not adequately rested.

What we did to try to get him on path was we identified these crews, we did a brief on Thursday prior -- I think it was Thursday or the, yeah, it was Thursday -- Opso put together a good thing. He talked about, hey, the combat capabilities, and that's
another thing that we did is. We balanced our crews, we looked at, you know, what qualifications we had and tried to balance them out, because really this is what we were going to try to go downrange with if we had to. Their idea was, we're going to pivot this in to take it in if we have to [inaudible]. I was going to go, and so that we were prepared to execute every possible mission and all these cells with minimum adjusting of schedules.

So by the time this gets to Wednesday, I mean, these guys have had, you know, six days of prep time. Now that's not always easy to adjust your schedule, that's for sure. But that's about as much lead time as we had, we gave it to them.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : So what field grade officer did you put on the night crew to supervise the night crew? The late shift. Did you have a -- what Lieutenant Colonel or Major?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Oh, I didn't have any -- I don't think I had any Majors on that pit or Lieutenant Colonel's. I did have -- (b) (3) (A), (b) (6) would have been there, had he not been gone. He was assigned to that shift, if you will. But I didn't have any field grade in that particular --

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : So the only field grade officer you had assigned to that shift was on leave?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Correct, sir.
Okay.

You know, the shifts though, again, are [inaudible] my XO at the time, right, is on the next shift over. So we're trying to maximize, again, we're staggering these throughout the day.

So how late is your XO? How late is your XO able to remain on -- in squadron spaces and not violate his crew rest for the next day?

Yeah, 12. He can basically be able to stay there for the 12 hours and I can go back and probably produce probably have that document. I can show you what the crew, the bits is, but the non-availability of the senior leadership was, you know, not a lot of the day. You know, it was not like 12 hours or something like that. But admittedly, it was during this time.

Do you think that your XO would have been there for [ph] and flight brief? Would he had been -- would he have been able to stay late enough to observe their flight brief or do you think they were briefing?

Just what's your instinct? I have the records. I'm just curious what your preparation is.

Yeah. I think he would've been around for their flight prep period for sure. I don't know a
hundred percent. Now, that day, this is --

That's part of it, because that day was non-standard, right?

That day was non-standard. That day was the \text{(b) (6)} day. And so in the whole irony of this [inaudible]. The irony of all irony is we went from not being able to operate in \text{(b) (6)} at all to the only place we can operate on the 5th of December is operations in and out of \text{(b) (6)}. So if I only got turned on that we would land there, National Day of Mourning for President George H. W. Bush was mandated by the POTUS to be observed and we decided what we could and could not listen to, again. And this was like, well, let's keep this exercise going and just do the on Pan stuff. No local flying. In fact, that evening, MAG Commander mandated that we did not have APU's on, until after midnight. So the auxiliary power didn't start the airplane up until after midnight in order to fully adhere what the, you know, wings guidance on that would be.

Which was just a few hours before the actual mishap.

It was. It was the start of this. Yes, absolutely, sir. So, yeah, it is a factor. And the XO and AAMO, so we were very vigilant about taking a look at what we
thought was the bigger hazard to our flight operations that day, which was flying in and out of a field of which is shorter than our F-18 SOP states. You know, 8,000 feet is our normal. This is 7,000 feet at [D (6), (b) (1) (B)]. We were going to mitigate that by putting in M-31 here. It was not installed in time due to a multitude of evactions. So we're hyper focused on all right.

What is our, what are we going to do for fuel? What are we going to do for landing weight? What are we going to be allowed for ordnance operations there? What crew pairings are we going to put into this field situation? You know, so that is taking up pretty much over, cognitive abilities that are going into that day. Again, we've already done a couple days of operations at this point. So that gets probably wire brushed to the end degree.

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6) : Sir, were your shifts already set though, before you had to work the problem? [b] (6), (b) (1) (B)

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6) : Well, yes. We set the shifts on the, again, the Thursday prior. We're trying to, again, we're trying to adjust the [inaudible].

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6) : But to your point, the on again, off again with regard to [b] (6), (b) (1) (B) took away from your unit capacity to manage flight operations normally, because you had distracted attention basically on [b] (6), (b) (1) (B)
Yes, sir.

And it took away from your ability to supervise over here. Would that be a fair assessment?

I think that's fair.

[Inaudible.]

Yeah, I would get this -- you know, we looked at, okay. We definitely looked at [inaudible] deliberately and said, okay, what will we do with this? And our answer was, we will dumb down basically what we're doing during these times to [inaudible] so you'll see on my schedule that evening, was a -- basically doing an all weather intercept. They -- one of the simplest things that we do. Two airplanes go down to the training range, no integration with outside agencies. One spot, and just looking at each other and establish blocks and very, very simple.

So you're getting into the schedule now. So were you surprised -- when you were notified of the mishap, were you surprised to learn that they were conducting aerial refueling?

In my mind, I did not remember it being there, but I thought, you know, again, this is the context of the MAG exercise. Okay. It did not surprise me that a tanker was put into this problem, because, you know -- let's take a quick
example --

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : I'm familiar with the O Plan. So, I'm familiar with the flows in general. So I think what you're saying is, another way of what you're saying is that you're not surprised that your crews were shifted to a different part of the plan, to basically support C-130 training by serving as a surrogate for perhaps another platform.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Yes, sir. And I looked at this as, hey, you know, what role does the MAG operations center play view this very much as like launch aboard change type of authority? You know, so like.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Like a tact.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : A tact. Exactly, sir. That's exactly what they're trying to be, is a tact forward and so it did not surprise me that something like that would change. And I think that's an important context that A, there's a standalone flight schedule and I'm not in any way suggesting that we don't ORM everything that's on the signed flight schedule. What I am saying, looking at it in the context of an exercise is different. There is somebody who has overarching authority that's higher than the squadron commander in these instances and is probably going to make changes. The wing SOP and others really doesn't account for it
because the contextualism or -- it's not contextualized properly into that exercise mindset. You know, if we were sitting out there and, you know, the exercise that you go to and an asset appears, you know, that wasn't on the schedule. That's not the flight lead making a [inaudible] the schedule change, it is, you know, the command control making a within their purview launch aboard change decision.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): So is it your perception that through the MAG flow, affectively ordered your crews to go to the tanker?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): Yes, sir. It is.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): So is it your perception in that same context that if your crews would have refused to go to the tanker, they would have been basically saying no to? Not to get in the context of refusing a lawful order, but they would have been say no to higher headquarters?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): Yes, sir. Just like, I perceived flying during the time, is not necessarily an optional thing. Now, you know, I did -- I can and did personally stop things that week that I did not feel comfortable executing. I was the very first mission commander out the gate the first day and I took that on because I thought it was important, responsibilities of a squadron
commander is to lead from the front and show what could be done. The other thing is, I wanted to -- I knew the weather was very tough that first Monday and I knew that it involved a lot of assets and I knew our guys hadn't flown that much. And so I wanted to make sure I was up close and personal with all those decisions. And I canceled the first one.

[Def] [Def] [Def] [Def]: So did you get -- so we all know that air refueling was not on your daily flight schedule which you signed, so therefore it was not deliberately ORM because it couldn't have been because it wasn't on the flight schedule. And there wasn't a tanker note on the schedule, so -- and we also know that [Def] learned that he was going to go conduct air refueling when the tanker crew called your ODO. So now, we have what I would call a change to the flight schedule. Though directed from MAG through the MGR to your ready room, would you -- would it have been normal for [Def] to call you at home at say 2100 and get your permission to execute that, or would you expect him to execute that air refueling without seeking approval from the commanding officer for a squadron flight schedule change?

[Def]: I've thought a lot about this in anticipation for this question. Fairly, and honestly, I would not have viewed that as a bona fide schedule change before.
Tell me why.

I would view this as a, in fact, I would've said great. I mean we're getting no tactical training, nothing that moves the needle whatsoever out of this particular block of time other than flying two jets through burning dead dinosaurs through that time of day. Getting out there and actually hitting something that refreshes the code and builds a practical skill would be good.

So the code that he refreshed would be the 2202 night tanker code in the Hornet?

It would. 2202.

Does that sound right? So how do you know that was current and proficient and going to the night tanker?

I had -- well I remember that he done it during Australia.

He went to the night tanker in Australia?

He did.

Were you in the cock pit with him?

I was not, but I remember it. I think it was somewhere like on the beginning of, it was either the 2nd or the 6th of August. I was in the tanker with him -- so, you
know, he was, he would've been proficient to do this though because I knew for a fact that he had gone to the day tanker. I had gone with him on the 20th of November in the same airplane so he had the prerequisite and he was night current which I had flown with him, again, in the previous month. So he was completely legal to do this. And that's how -- he was unked, for instance, and hadn't tanked in Australia he wouldn't be current. He would have still met all the wickets to go that night.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Even if it was his first trip to the tanker? The night tanker?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Not if it was his first trip ever.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : What if it was his first trip ever? What would be different?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Well, actually -- if it was his first trip ever, he probably would have recently gone through probably his NS syllabus as well. Really the only requirement is to go up to the night tanker. Assuming that he went to the day tanker.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Okay.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : That's really all it is on the T&R prerequisite, I believe 2201 and then 2202.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Okay.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : So I mean, obviously first time
somebody does something you always treat it a little bit differently. You are trying to --

[0] (3) (A), (b) (6) : Is that what you call an initial X? Do you guys use that term in Hornet land?

[0] (3) (A), (b) (6) : We would use our 18 attain code.

[0] (3) (A), (b) (6) : Or evaluating --

[0] (3) (A), (b) (6) : And every attain is always evaluated.

[0] (3) (A), (b) (6) : And by evaluated, does that mean a grade sheet is generated?

[0] (3) (A), (b) (6) : Should be a grade sheet generated for each one of these?

[0] (3) (A), (b) (6) : Does that also mean there's more deliberate planning and briefing about the special considerations associated with that?

[0] (3) (A), (b) (6) : To be completed.

[0] (3) (A), (b) (6) : So do you believe that happened on either the 2nd or the 6th of August in Australia?

[0] (3) (A), (b) (6) : Well, that wouldn't have been the first time he had been to the tanker in Australia.

[0] (3) (A), (b) (6) : When do you think he went to the first night tanker?
Oh, probably a year or more before that.

What's the reflight currency for the night tanker?

365 days.

What happens when you go outside of that with regard to a grade sheet and an evaluation and a brief?

Technically speaking, you should go back and get a new -- and get a grade sheet for anything you're "unq" on. I would say we're not -- probably culturally, we don't do that as much. Two thousand level codes. Once people are through, like, what used to be the Combat Wingman Syllabus, you know, once they're through the, kind of, CAT-1 period.

But by the book, you should.

Okay. So my records indicate that I can find no record of him going to the night tanker, other than him going in the FRS in July of 2017, which is a night unaided tanker for which he has a 2202 and a grade sheet.

Okay.

I can't find any night tanker codes in August, nor can I find any grade sheets in August.

Okay.
Now, I'm not saying he didn't go in August. I'm not calling you a liar. Okay? I'm just telling you I don't have a grade sheet for that. I don't have a 2202.

The only 2202 anywhere on MSHARP for him is in July of 2017, which would have been night unaided. So part of my job is to see how much training he has had.

[Non verbal response]

Okay. And as best I can tell, the night of the mishap was the first time he ever went to the night tanker with goggles on his face.

A lot of people have told me that he went in August because everybody went in August. It's not in MSHARP and I don't have a grade sheet.

Okay.

So if you have the opportunity to get with your guys and dig through that and let me know.

I'll dig through it.

I asked your Opso, the last guy I talked to, and I asked him some pretty tough questions about this because I understand. I'm a former squadron commander; former operations officer much like yourself. I'm just a few years ahead of you. And I know that trust and confidence we put in those folks to bring you
flight schedules that's right. But, the way I'm looking at it, quite frankly, is that yes, (b) (3) (A), (b) could have gone to the tanker that night with a 2202 "X" or "at" or whatever symbol you use, and a tanker code, and it being his initial qualification, which (b) (3) was okay to do that with him, right? But I'm not seeing the diligence associated with an initial code. So that's --

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): Certainly.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): -- what I'm getting at.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): Well, I would -- it was not my SA that this was an initial code by a long stretch. And if he hadn't completed a 2000 level code like that, then he wouldn't have -- shouldn't have been in the section lead syllabus yet. So my SA was that he was done with that. So I guess we had to go back and look at the records and determine that.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): Okay.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): Which I will do so.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): All right.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): That I -- I did not experience -- I did not think that he was the new guy --

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): That's the genesis of the email exchange we had.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): Okay.
So I asked you to email records on that because I figured you'd have it T-ed up. And I've done my research. And then, I got yours and yours is different than mine. So again, these aren't fancy lawyer tricks. I'm not trying to trick you into anything. I'm just being very transparent with you. I cannot document that had ever been to the tanker at night with goggles on his face. And I'm just curious, if you have any personal experience.

Did you fly with him, or were you in a flight?

Not that I remember. Now, we were supposed to go on that same blue crew night time. So I flew with him quite a lot at night time down in -- I don't know how many hours -- but down in blue crew night over the -- Halloween night. So that's what I remember that, but --

So October of 18, so just a few months before the mishap.

Yeah. October 18 and I think the first two days of November.

Okay.

And so we flew night operations during that. And I really saw no issues that led me to believe that he had any kind of issues maintaining altitude, time, flying
formation, or anything else on the goggles.

We did daytime tanking. They were supposed to go at night. We canceled the night tanker, basically, because we didn't need it as much. It was in a -- I don't want to waste -- I knew how they were on sorties and everything else, and I didn't want to waste them based on that, hey, we can put them out on the 174. You know, I thought a lot about that. I was like, boy, if we had gone there, maybe we could have gotten a couple more swings at the bat. But, I think, if you look at it from what I know, he had no problems tanking. You know, he tanked; he got gas. You know, somewhere post-AR is the, I think, the issue, from what my SA is. And so how that breakdown in formation occurred post-tanking is what the crux of the matter is. And I, for one, am really looking forward to finding out what happened.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): Okay. And I'd be happy to discuss that with you candidly outside the interview.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): Yes, sir.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): And what I'm asking you is to provide me documentation of his night currency at the tanker, when you can.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): Yes, sir. Will do.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): Thank you. Just take a look and see what you have in your records. Please don't go and make anything up.
Of course not.

But just go look through and see what you got.

Okay. You said earlier that you have got 2700 hours or so in the hornet. And I would assume you've got 1000 hours or so in the goggles?

Probably sir. I'm not sure, to be honest with you.

A couple hundred? A lot?

A lot. A lot.

More than most?

A lot.

And that's why you're the CO. And of those hours, roughly, how much with the 11 and how much with the 9?

Much more with the 9's. The 11's came out while I was at MAWTS-1, and there weren't a lot of them around. But at once I discovered the 11's, I did gravitate towards them. I was comfortable wearing them. They seemed lighter to me. And of course, you get the injected video of the [inaudible] cueing system, which is a massive, you know, kind of force enabler for us. Good for SA.

What kind of transition training did you
personally experience going from the ANVS-9 to ANVS-11?

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6) [b]: We received a brief on, basically, the capabilities from the AMPSO.

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6) [b]: What are some of the key limitations? I'm familiar with the capabilities. What are some limitations with the ANVS-11 compared to the ANVS-9?

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6) [b]: Well, just that the overall visual acuity -- not as good. Obviously, you don't have the ability to do the diopter adjustment. So if you have any kind of weird stuff going on, you know, you're not 20/20 vision, you're never going to improve or align each eye. So there is that.

Of course there is one battery instead of two, but you get your -- it's powered by the --

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6) [b]: Is there any difference in performance in highlight level and lowlight conditions between the 9 and the 11 that you recall from your briefs?

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6) [b]: I'm sure the 11 is degraded. I don't remember specifically, but probably not as good in lowlight level.

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6) [b]: Why would you think the 11's not as good as the 9 in lowlight level?

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6) [b]: It seemed like the 11 in general
has a lot of -- I don't remember that. I just remember there was some kind of strange thing with -- it made some compromises to make the injected video, I think, and to get a little lighter. But I have never personally noticed a lot of difference with it flying with them. And so that could be because I just got comfortable with the 11's. But I really like the 11's. And I also think, like, when you look at being able to see the PPLI's, for instance, you're able to see if it's the precise participant locator information is over in the Line 16 network. Now you can see that in the JHMCS. So your wingman, you see him. Like where they are in the helmet, which helps you find them faster. You know, so there's a lot of benefits to that. You know, in a sense of you being able to cue your weapons, or be able to look down and see, you know, a target at night and say, All right, I want to --

: How do they help you maintain your formation with the tanker once you're established in the stern and in the basket?

: Well, they're --

: So what's the proximity to tanker?

: There I think you're seeing -- now you're rendering more your traditional kind of -- you know, it just helps you to see the silhouette of the airplane. I mean, you can
see the plane better than actually seeing and, like, interpreting formation lights, which is, I think, different for people.

So tanking aided is like ops normal. Out of all the people I've flown with, I've almost never seen anybody -- except for, I mean, years ago that preferred to tank unaided. Most of those were brand new folks that just hadn't built up a comfort level. But almost every experienced person I have ever seen prefers goggles for non-goggles. So those ANVS-9's and 11's.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): What's the benefit of tanking aided as opposed to tanking unaided? What's the benefit?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): I think the benefit is you actually see more actual detail and it's closer experience to day tanking, the experience. I mean, again, you're looking at checkpoints and you're seeing -- of course, you're looking through a sensor; it's still a sensor -- but you're looking at the other airplane proper. At, you know, night tanking, you're not seeing really anything but the formation lights itself.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): Night unaided tanking?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): Night unaided tanking. And now you're required to kind of interpret those, you know, those lights, which is not as natural for some folks. So, I mean, there's a sense that, you know, there's a big -- I'm not saying that we don't look
at 's with, you know, as an important sensor that's your --

: Do you know what other attack air communities tank aided in the U.S.?

: Well, I mean, other than, like harrier guys?

: Yeah.

: Well, I know they do. It's become -- I mean, brought this up just this morning. I was surprised to hear --

: Okay. So you and talked since I talked to . So you are are aware that I told that no one else in the DoD tanks aided except for Marine Attack Air, which is hornets and harriers.

: Which I'm shocked at.

: I have the references over here. I'll show you when we're done.

: Yeah. I believe it. And I think that the only reason that the F-35 guys don't is because, basically, they just -- they're -- the way their system is set up right now. That's been a cultural discussion.

: Okay.

: But as far as the Navy not doing
it, I'm kind of surprised at that. The Air Force, the reason that I'm sure that they don't do it is because their strap tanking is fundamentally different than perb and drogue. Number one and number two, their tankers don't have covert lighting. So if you don't have the ability to -- and if our tankers couldn't do that, then tanking aided would be a significantly different experience. So if you can get rid of all those --

: Well, you're almost as old as me, so you may already remember going to the old C-130 --

: I do.

: -- where they tape up the lights before they took off. Then, you'd go find them and you'd ask them to turn the lights on. They'd say, dude, they're on. I just got duct tape over them. So I think we kind of ended up there in part because the old tankers were effectively preflight set to covert, is what I think its true. I'm telling you what I think. But I think that led us to this direction to some extent.

: Yeah. I mean it was pretty normal to see the covert lighting tanking so --

: Yeah.

: -- I was not uncomfortable with that at all.
What do you know about search and rescue capabilities here in Iwakuni before the mishap. If you could try to put yourself before the mishap.

We had the benefit of knowing, somewhat, about the VMFA-115 mishap that took place in almost two years prior. I think on the same day, same range.

We knew that the coordination effort there, you know, that the Americans kind of got in the Japanese way a little bit. And we got into a strange, kind of, like, information dooloop with them. So we knew enough that, hey, the Base Operations Center will be our principle liaison to Japanese SAR. We knew that the U.S. 2's, that the helicopters would be available to us. We knew that their P3's would be out there.

But we also were very much aware that we did not have American SAR assets anywhere within a reasonable response. We knew this was going to be a Japanese-led effort. And basically, we were going to count on them, other than our own initial, you know, reports and ability to see people with our own sensors.

So what did you think the response time was at 2:00 a.m. from Iwakuni to the center of the intersouth where you scheduled your crews to go?

Where I expected it to be was like
a 30 minute response time. I think that the --

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) You said "30 minute response time," so

100 mile an hour helicopter, so 50 miles away. So you thought

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) and would only be about 50 miles from Iwakuni?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) About 50 minutes.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) Fifty minutes?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) Yes, sir. Yeah. I didn't think

that they would be -- it would take --

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) You said 5-0, right?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) Yes.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) About an hour? Okay.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) About an hour.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) About an hour away.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) I thought they would be in the

water for no longer than -- that they'd be able to be out there, you

know, response to take off, 30 minutes and get out there and find

them in that amount of time.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) Okay. So you're surprised to learn that

it took several hours for, using (b) (3) (A), (b) (6) as an example before he was

recovered.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) Yeah. I was surprised that -- I

now found out that it's a two-hour response time, which we did not
know.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): So that goes to the exercise. So I believe the alert disposition of the search and rescue crews varies based on normal flying hours in the middle of the night. And during the preparation for the MAG ULT, did your higher headquarters ever provide you with any updated information about SAR response and capabilities during your third shift fly window that you could use to identify risk and mitigate them.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): No. Definitely not. And something I should have thought of, you know. And I did not, you know, that didn't even -- we were kind of, like, I can't think that they're doing everything all the time. Of course they were going to have degraded operations during hours when things are not normally flying. So, I mean, this should have been something I thought of too. But, no. It definitely did not come from higher headquarters. And I think we're all surprised.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): I'm not criticizing you. So don't --

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): Oh, sir, a lot of this is, you know --

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): I know it's tough.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): -- I look back and think -- I'm
not coming back at you at that. I'm, like, more at myself. You know, maybe I should have thought of that, and things like that.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): Well, I mean, we -- let me take a little out of that blow, right. We depend upon station to have the airfield open and the tower manned and the fuel trucks and all that other stuff, right?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): Yes, sir.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): So those are higher headquarters' responsibilities.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): And it is interesting, our relationship, on those front support agencies versus kind of other services. I mean, going down to Australia, there base was completely tied in with everything. That when the fighters were up that they, I mean, they had their medical folks were on alert, you know, waiting for anything to happen. And Marine Corps doesn't do that. I mean, the base guys are the base guys, and the operators are the operators. So, interesting.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): So what does OPNAV 3710 say about anti-exposure suits? Are you familiar?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): I am, sir. And it leaves a lot to subordinate discretion.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): And in general, what does it say?
Well, in general, it gives some guidelines in terms of exposure times and puts a lot on me to basically decide it. You know, the old version was, you know, below 60 degrees. You know, basically scored on commanders as mandatory below being 50 and you know, air temperature 32 degrees. I issue the squadron a policy. It basically said 60 degrees was our, you know. Anytime it reached the water temperature there, that we would put them on.

Looking at this now with the times and everything else, you know, I'm taking a hard look at just every time we're over the water at night, just wearing them during the winter month? We lose nothing. They're better than these typhoon one yesterday. There are better suits than these.

You remember the white ones?

I do remember the white ones. They used to choke the crap out of you.

So culturally, people don't want to do something different, so I understand that. And getting into airplanes with anything constraining you is tough. But the gear is better.

So do you have any idea what your personal -- and I'm asking you for your personal body type; you personally make your own decision. How long do you think you might
survive in 68 degrees of water if you're fully immersed in 68 degrees in water. Not in your raft, just floating in the ocean at 68 degrees.

: I'm not sure how long. I know it would be several hours, but it wouldn't be pleasant.

Do you think you would have several hours of useful consciousness, and then you'd have a few more hours that you would be alive, do you think?

: I think so. I think I would be somewhere probably in the 6 to 8 hour window.

: Okay.

: That would be my perception. I don't know --

That's reasonable. And I ask that -- again, this is to kind of, you know, we make a lot of decisions in the back of our mind. And so, I empathize with your position about not coming down on guys and forcing them to wear dry suits if you had a perception that it only takes a couple of hours to find you, and you can live for a couple of hours longer than that. So I think that's what you're communicating. That's what I'm hearing.

: It is, sir. It is.

: Okay. So do you have any reason why --
any explanations as to why didn't call you at home and wake you up and say sir, is it cool if we go to the tanker?

: I believe that -- I'm not sure why he didn't call me. I would have said yes, without hesitation, over this. I would have just said make sure you brief it, which to my best knowledge that he did. And I think his perception, again, was one of exercise versus individual squadron changes. I think he would have viewed this as a -- I'm not sure 100 percent; I haven't talked to him specifically about this -- but I think he would have viewed this as a, not so much as a schedule change, but as a directed additional mission skill. You know, core skill being injected into mission.

: Like a FRAG from the TAC?

: Like a FRAG from the TAC. And therefore, not looking at it as, hey, I'm changing what we're doing, you know. In retrospect, you know, I would have liked to have, you know, probably looked at that deliberately. With that being said, I think had he called me, I would have said, great, we're getting some training.

And, you know, as for, you know, maybe that goes to our mindset a little bit too. But I did not think that we were dangerously -- that we had reached to that low of proficiency that
we couldn't go accept fuel from a resource in which we had done several times in the previous two months with guys that had been in the fleet for a couple of years. But obviously what happened, happened. And like I said, that's on me.

Have you ever heard of anything like this happening before?

I've never heard of a no kidding, bona fide, aviation tanker collision to a hornet and KC-130. I'm sure that something like this has happened. I do -- I am aware of the mishap that occurred off of Okinawa probably two and a half years prior.

Two and a half years? Like in 2015, or so?

It was before [ph] took command. And so that would have been two years before May. And I think it was somewhere that spring.

Well, what happened? Was a hornet and harrier collided?

No. It was a tanker. It was a SUMO [inaudible] VMGR-152 and KC-130J. And it was post-AAR, and it was a section of 242 bats and they, somehow, lost SA to where the tanker position was post-AAR. And they crossed flight paths and
ended up snagging, I believe, the right hose with the LAO-7.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): Which is the wingtip of the hornet?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): It is the wingtip of the hornet.

And somehow -- and apparently, yawed the aircraft and tore the hose off and brought it back to Kadena. And very interesting change of command. You know, nothing is mentioned for a while, I think. I don't think anybody reports it.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): So you think it happened and that -- so you said [ph] wasn't the CO?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): He wasn't.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): So that would be [b] (3) (A), (b) (6) was the CO perhaps?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): He was.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): So [b] (3) (A), (b) (6) was the CO of the bats in maybe April 2016; had a midair collision with a C-130, but it wasn't investigated until after the change of command when [b] (3) (A), (b) (6) [ph] took over the squadron?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): That is correct. That is my --

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): I'm asking you that because I think you were at the MAG soon after that, right?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): About a year later I think I got to the MAG.
Oh, you weren't here to --

So I wasn't here for a year later, but I heard about it. It was not -- usually every hornet thing, I mean, I worked in the hallway at the time, so everything related to a hornet, there's a small group of us who would talk about it constantly. And it was -- this was one of those things that was almost under the woodwork. I mean under the -- can I say it? I don't know.

Under the rug? Under the radar?

It was under the radar. I mean, it wasn't really talked about or brought up. And somehow, I sniffed it out. Now, is working it up at DNV-98 at the time. We were down at the Commander's Course. I believe we figured this out in advance.

So if you were working in the hallway when that happened, and the attack air guys in the hallway weren't tracking it, what capability did Headquarters Marine Corps Aviation have to implement controls and policy changes and material solutions that are, you know, basically to address it if they didn't know about it?

Well, I think eventually they found out about it. But it was -- I mean, because they did an SIR.
And while they reported it, I think it's a [inaudible] because I think there's no --

[Enclosure 51 (b) (3) (A), (b) (6)]: Okay.

[Enclosure 51 (b) (3) (A), (b) (6)]: -- didn't qualify. But it was --

I would have expected to get a lot -- I think I got it from the MAWTS guys actually. I think I was talking to some MAWTS guys down at -- where was I? MDTC maybe? Beaufort? I had gone down for some training. And I think it sniffed up out of there, and I got it printed off. In fact, that is where it came from. [Enclosure 51 (b) (3) (A), (b) (6)] at the MAWTS-1 F-18 Division.

So then, we started talking about it and like, holy cow. So I -- and I, you know, [Enclosure 51 (b) (3) (A), (b) (6)] and [Enclosure 51 (b) (3) (A), (b) (6)] before all the chain of command had talked about this specific thing. And we were all surprised that how none of us had heard about it yet. And it was --

[Enclosure 51 (b) (3) (A), (b) (6)]: What policy changes were implemented by your predecessors to address that near-miss in 2016?

[Enclosure 51 (b) (3) (A), (b) (6)]: Well, I think what really happened was the MSHARP, you know, so you garbage in/garbage out. There was a lot of stuff that had been, I think, base-lined and done. So that was a first --

[Enclosure 51 (b) (3) (A), (b) (6)]: When you say "base-line," do you mean
administrative entry of a T&R code into MSHARP that could produce erroneous results and --

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): I do.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): -- goon up the validation, basically?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): That is exactly right, sir.

That's better than I could have said it. So my perception is that's what occurred there, and that the -- it was a section lead and an instruction kind of situation. It was the first time that that individual, apparently, had ever been to a tanker. It was that night. Very clearly not the way the T&R has it to be. There was also multiple mission things going on that evening. Apparently it was CAS, close air support, that they were providing. Again, I wasn't there at the time, but having read the SIR a few, you know, years ago -- and I guess I should be careful of what I say about that.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): In retrospect, can you see how an outsider would see these two incidents as strikingly similar?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): Oh, absolutely, sir. I mean, I am -- and as a guy who has talked about this and tankered this so [inaudible] in everything else. So just absolutely floored. Absolutely floored that this would happen.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): Yeah.
You know, not something that I thought was high percentage. I had failed people for tanker stuff and division-lead workups in Australia. I was like, that is not the way we join; that is not the way you stay; we don't do the non-standard joins. We all know that. So if this had been a very -- a point of emphasis, so I was a little shocked to find out that something like this has happened.

In my mind, though, it's like not the type of person that I'd say that was going to go above and beyond. And so something that -- he was not a super aggressive individual. He was competent. He was good. But he was not like the rogue person that you'd think of that's just going to blow off orders and directives, number one. So I was shocked.

Is there anything that we haven't touched on that you'd like to add?

[Non verbal response.]

We've been going for a while. We can even take a break if you want to come back?

I feel good, sir. I don't know much else I have to say, other than, you know, when a great tragedy happens, I'm very interested in finding out the final details of exactly what occurred. I think the low -- in aggregate, we need to
look at -- people have talked about low flight hours and, you know, tactical hard deck. And trying to tie aviation readiness to, you know, what it's true cost is. And, you know, I never thought that I would be on the other end of that. I'm kind of trying to prove that case with the loss of life like we've had. Especially some close friends of mine. One of my, you know, me and [inaudible]. And then, of course, [inaudible], my [inaudible] officer. You know, very, very tough to have to deal with that up close and personal. I think the inspections that we have, we need to look at what we do for those, and when we have them. Our wing maintenance inspection, which did not go well. Took apart, as a matter of practice, two of the air planes. It took us a long time to put them back together. You know, those are lost --

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): So it was a negative -- it did not achieve the intended benefit? It was actually a negative?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): It was a negative. Now, hey, inspections happen. We got to have them otherwise other things go wrong. In the process of that inspection, we come to find out that we had, you know, SRCs -- can't remember what that stands for exactly, but basically keeping track of what's in what plane.

We discovered that, Oh my goodness, you know, we have our administrative procedures here are backwards. We need to fix this.
So we do the hard thing and take airplanes out of flying status to go through these line by line and make sure that we don't overfly anything and all the components are 100 percent. And books are where they're supposed to be in each plane.

Well, when you do that stuff to be diligent and to adhere to the orders, you have lost opportunity flight time. And that was a potential factor. I've kind of raked myself over the coals in bed about [inaudible] Now, I don't know what else I could have done, but, frankly, that articulating a little bit harder, that ain't -- this is -- we're approaching at a lower proficiency level here. Our tasking should probably be reduced. Looking at the summer training det, and really the sequential approach to how you handle a forward deployed unit, we need to really deliberately look at -- and this is, I think, beyond the scope here, but looking -- it's really my charge to get to healthy and make a systemic healthy approach for every person that ends up here in command of an organization here. And everybody who operates here -- you have to have periods of, you know, where you go places to train, to adhere to the T&R, and do it right the first time. You can't drop a bomb from here, you know, so you want to train your Marines, shoot. All those things that you have, the full motion simulators have enough force or we have to go to CONUS to do those things. So really getting that right, healthy
approach is essential for us. And so we went to Australia this summer, and we did not receive the fly in supports of, you know, the visdu's that we're supposed to have. We received two over a more than 2 month deployed period. In my view, that was about a sixth of the requirement. And so as a result, you know, we did not fly as much as we should have. We had a time maintaining our aircraft. Our main body -- we got our last -- this just goes to show you the state of lifting in the theatre -- we go our last pallet back from pitch black on the 23rd of January. And so it deployed some time in July.

So this is the kind of situation that we find ourselves in. It's overcommitted and under-resourced. Now, the only thing we could do is, fairly, in the "what we could control," is say, let's do a little bit less. And be deliberate about what that less is that we do until we can get back up to a certain level of health. And that is essentially the case that I'm making now.

But I assure that just because I think it's contextual for this as all of that contributes into low -- dangerously low -- flight areas as you said an hour ago, the mounted hot board and where people are. You know, I think, okay, I could have probably whipped the ponies a little harder with maintenance at times.

My thought was that we were going to hurt somebody in the
maintenance department by putting undue pressure on people to get airplanes up when they don't have the right capacity to do it. So, you know, there's that side. That was very much weighing on me.

In retrospect, you know, wow. You know, maybe I should have pressed them a little harder so we could have gotten a little more flight time out of this. But obviously, no, sure, we're going to transpack a plane that had a major problem if we didn't be very deliberate about that. So that's a lot in there, but I try to be very -- I probably gave you too much editorial that's in there, sir.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6)  This is your opportunity and you can always email me or make a written statement at any time as well.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6)  Thank you, sir.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6)  Judge, is there anything that you need to clarify?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6)  No, sir.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6)  You sure?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6)  Yes, sir.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6)  Well, (b) (3), I mean, you know, obviously we're as upset about this as you are. We are committed to getting to the bottom of it, you know. And I know your officers and others might feel like, you know, the Wing's out here looking for somebody to blame, and that's not what I'm doing. And I've had some really
tough conversations with people, my rank and higher, that it'd gone
down the same line. So nobody is getting off. And we are going to
figure out what we can do better, and I'll tell you -- I'm personally committed to it. Okay?

[The witness was sworn and departed.]
Okay. My name is [b](3)(A),(b)(6). I have been assigned to conduct a command investigation into the facts and circumstances surrounding an aviation accident of a C-130 and F-18.

I am here today with [b](3)(A),(b)(6), and just to give him the opportunity to discuss with us what happened. And without further ado, I am assisted by [b](3)(A),(b)(6), SJA.

And [b](3)(A),(b)(6), I would like you to kind of start in the middle of the day for the flight event. You know, whatever you're comfortable, whatever the natural time is. Maybe when you reported for duty, or start with a brief time like that. And just kind of tell me about your day. And then, we'll climax with the cathartic event and recovery. Okay?

[b](3)(A),(b)(6): Sir, if it's okay, I'd like to start earlier than that.

[b](3)(A),(b)(6): Just whenever you would like.

[b](3)(A),(b)(6): I would like to start Thursday prior to the mishap.

[b](3)(A),(b)(6): Okay. That would be great. What was that date Thursday before?

[b](3)(A),(b)(6): It would have been the, I think -- I forget how many days are in November, but it would have been the last day of November I believe.


[b](3)(A),(b)(6): Yes, sir.
All right. I'm listening.

So that is when a determination that MAG ULT and the timeline had come out as far as the windows. Our squadron elected to break us down into three shifts. I believe it was around a 1600, kind of all aircrew meeting in the ready room. He gave us the shifts. Myself and were going to be the senior guys on our shift. He was currently on leave, so I, in fact, became the senior guy on the shift that was about 2200 to 0800 in the morning.

I have done a combat deployment. I've got a fair amount of time flying during those hours and felt fairly comfortable with that. But, I knew my shift really hadn't so my immediate reaction was to pull them aside and then, kind of, talk to them about trying to circadian rhythm and how to set this up.

Fast forward into the next day, we had a 0900 Friday morning OTC meeting. It was all hands. We all had to get there, so Friday I was out for -- you know, Thursday night/Friday morning was out for our first day to transition into the circadian rhythm. I asked what the plan was on Wednesday night and into Thursday morning for the flight schedule. I was told, hey, we're looking for CMRR briefing; if you got an idea, send it. So my idea was to --

C-M-R-R?

Yes, sir. So basically how we track our proficiency in our core T&R syllabus.

Okay. So it's like your MSHARP report?

What is the acronym for CMRR?
It's been a while since I've been an officer. I couldn't actually tell you.

Okay. But like your readiness percentage?

Yes, sir.

Okay. And it's based on specific facets of --

In trip codes --

Absolutely.

Okay. So you're looking to increase readiness, I think, is what you're saying?

Yes, sir.

To demonstrate quantifiable increase in training readiness by getting your CMRR up?

Yes, sir.

Okay.

And that was --

I think we spell it CRP, so I think I'm tracking now.

Okay.

All right. Thank you.

Not a problem, sir. So I'd discuss that with the Opso. And we had a rare opportunity to be flying during that time of the night to fly in the seaside ATCA, which is overheard [ph]. Which is something that we could use for urban CAS at night, which is kind of limited in this area. So that was my
immediate reaction because that airfield closes at 2100. So we just wanted the airspace that a couple of guys hadn't really seen, so I was like, let's go do that because that fit our timelines.

So that's my plan Friday. Saturday/Sunday trying to do the standard transition. Struggled a little bit with that. Come into work Sunday night. Circadian rhythm-wise, the transition.

[Ramping into the night page [inaudible].

Yes, sir. Personally struggled with that a little bit, and then show up to work Sunday night. I believe I came in at about 2000 and was there until 0600 the next morning. At that point in time, we were on to fly at 2215, I think, was the tentative flow for Wednesday night/Thursday morning.

Monday, I come in -- and I come in at about 2100, that will kind of be a 2030 to 2100 will be a theme up until this night. On Monday night, I am told that we have shifted an hour and a half left, now with a 2100 takeoff time. So that is Wednesday we move into planning, so this affects my plan. Okay, I got to come in a little bit earlier on Tuesday evening. And, kind of, passing this floor plan that portion of the game.

Tuesday, still starting to sleep fairly well, getting adjusted to the shift. I'll get the word that Wednesday night has now shifted to a 0001 local start time, and we can't even go ANV's on before that. To my knowledge, at the time, I believed it was a Japanese holiday and they were quiet hours. I do not know at this moment if that is accurate. I've heard two or three different things as to why that truly was. But now, everybody's been coming
in -- you know, we've shifted left, everybody starts coming in a little bit earlier so everybody's sleep pattern starts shifting a little bit more. From there, we'll go, okay, let's go home early, try to go to sleep, and then come in no later than -- or no earlier than 2030/2045 kind of deal. So just because we now know that we're going to be 0001 local start, we are taking off -- I think the planned takeoff was 0030 -- and I'll talk about that night that -- how things went later -- and we were supposed to fly until 0415 in the morning.

So all that play into, just kinda, it's a pickup game with the CAS, night CAS/urban CAS drops out, so my plan goes away because now that airspace closes at midnight. So now we can't even start up before midnight, lose that airspace -- what I've been putting my planning into is gone. Not a huge factor, but just kind of, okay, what are we going to do in place? And I turn to Ops and Ops just kind of looks at me and goes, I don't know; yeah. So I was like, okay.

Yeah. Figure it out, right?

Absolutely. So from that, it's been a lot of changes enclose. So go home, have the great day of sleep of Wednesday. Probably wake up -- and this is the day that I go into work leading into the mishap now. Go into work. I get there at -- I woke up at 1845. Probably been asleep for maybe eight and a half, nine hours. Maybe intermittently waking up in the middle of the day once or twice, then I hit the head. I got in to work 2030 to 2045. I don't remember exactly, but I walk into the ready room to a
phonecall from Major Burphy. He is on the other line. He is --

(b) (3) (A). (b) (6) : Major Burphy is who? What's his billet?
(b) (3) (A). (b) (6) : He is the AOpso from 152. He is the aircrew
from 152.

(b) (3) (A). (b) (6) : Okay.
(b) (3) (A). (b) (6) : He tells me that he's in SUMO 4-1. He's
flying that night, looking to give some gas, wanting to go home
early kind of deal. I was like, okay. So I didn't know at the time
--

(b) (3) (A). (b) (6) : Were you previously scheduled for night
air refueling, or was that an add?
(b) (3) (A). (b) (6) : That was an add.
(b) (3) (A). (b) (6) : Okay.
(b) (3) (A). (b) (6) : So if somebody in ops knew it, they didn't
make the schedule, and I did not know about.
(b) (3) (A). (b) (6) : Okay.
(b) (3) (A). (b) (6) : Until I had that phone call. We talked about
it briefly. He said he was going to send over a CORDCARD, I said
great. He sends a CORDCARD, and I say we'll see you out there.
(b) (3) (A). (b) (6) : A CORDCARD is just like an AR card right?
(b) (3) (A). (b) (6) : Absolutely.
(b) (3) (A). (b) (6) : ARCP? ARCT? Time? Place?
(b) (3) (A). (b) (6) : Yes, sir. There were "if" basics that we had
discussed on the phone, was who was going to be in the Sierra 15 in
the intersouth, so that is the northwest corner. And he told me at
the time that he was going to be at 17,000 feet. And then 299-2
announced in there setting -- which if we're using that airspace, we typically go with a local, but non-factor. As long as we talk about what else in their setting we're using, that we're on the same page, and I'm happy to do whatever the tankers say.

He sends over the CORDCARD. I print out five copies of the CORDCARD, one for every member of the flight as well as the ODO. From there, we go into our brief. Our brief was, we didn't go into the vault from that aspect, it wasn't standardized. We will go into the ready room. The scheduled brief time comes and goes, and we start probably 30 minutes before our intended walk-time to do this brief.

Can you help me -- so you normally brief -- what, two hours before takeoff?

Correct, sir. We briefed an hour and a half an hour prior.

Okay. So I just want to make sure this is right: So the schedule takeoff was 0030? I haven't seen any of the flight schedule or anything.

I believe so, sir.

And you estimate that you started briefing about 2300?

Yes, sir.

Instead of 2230 approximately.

Yes, sir.

Okay.

Reason being that, for that, I had an hour
block of time. Typically, I'll fill an hour with an admin-attack-admin execution. This mission said everything's falling apart from what I planned, I went with admin; that's it. So I didn't need the remaining time, by my own assessment.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6)  Okay.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6)  So what it turned into was, I have a book in my bag that I keep out to brief admin. I break it out. I go through everything.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6)  Like a pocket techman or an ATOPS?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6)  Absolutely. But ours isn't our Attack SOP, there's an appendix -- I think Appendix B is the briefing guide. So I've got a card of that basically that I've been through. Just finished FAI six/seven months ago, fire attack instructor. And then so my admin brief was down to five or seven minutes. My brief that night was ballpark 10 minutes. Leveraged largely off SOPs, and did go through the NS training rules to an extent. Hindsight being 20/20, I wish I had gone into it in a lot more depth. But, that was what it was. At the end of it, I made it very clear, hey, we're going to go out; we're going to receive gas from the tanker; and, we're going to come back to the line. And I will make a determination if we have time to go back out or not.

Based on the introduction of the tanker and 's crew day, were factors in that. So if there was unforeseen -- (b) (3) (A), (d) (6) so, the intent -- the real intent of our mission set that night was to hot load the aircraft when we landed. The real intent of the mission really had nothing to do with us flying, other than to get Enclosure 52
flight time.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): So I want to say back to you what I think you just told me. Is it: You guys were literally just taking off; going to the working area; find the tanker; grab a squirt; repunch your vice night AR code; and then come back at some reasonable schedule; land; and do a hot load?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): Yes, sir. And take back off. And the take back off part was the crucial piece of that that I was willing to drop, but I've since, you know, heard the command's philosophy on it was that we don't treat it the same if you're just going back to line to shut down as you would if you were trying to [inaudible] and employ that ordinance. So that was really what our mission was, more so the hot loading. And nobody really knew about the AR from VMFA-242's perspective -- to my knowledge -- until I got there. As the senior guy on the shift, I felt that decision was left up to me to determine whether I felt comfortable doing that.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): Was the AR refueling code on the flight schedule?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): No, it was not, sir. As far as flight time goes, we did talk -- we did discuss currency briefly. I was the least current in the flight. I had 1.4 hours in 30 days. I believe, it was over 10, I think it's 11 point something. And then as far as the WIZO's currency, I don't recall off the top of my head as my primary concern was the pilot currency. There is no currency that we really honor in the attacker community for a 2202, other than being night current.
And a "2202" is a night fam?

A "2202" is night AR, nonstrap. So non aided KC-135.

Okay.

From that, so I have determined that based on ORM, I am the long pole in the tent with 1.4 in 30; I haven't tanked in 30 days. Again, I go back to my experience level, with that I have probably gone to the tanker, and during those times -- or excuse me -- probably night tanked 400/500 times, and the fair majority of those coming at the hours that we were going flying. I felt comfortable. So from there we walk. My last kind of, hey, be careful, was [ph]. He was a friend of mine, almost two years to the day he had perished in the intersouth. I just kind of remembered -- or reminded everybody of that. That hit me as we walked. So that was my way of saying, hey, keep your head on a swivel, you know, stuff happens.

Walk is standard. Start the jets. I'll immediately start troubleshooting my jet. We'll have a flight control system issue. It'll be -- it's basically a switchy valve that's failing based on the indications that I've got in the cockpit. I will have it -- I will shut down; I'll be off comms for a little while. Out of service, I'm back up, so that would cause a slight delay.

Again, we had the 0030 local takeoff. And then from there, the other piece of the information that dropped out was we were not going to do our final checks. So SUMO harrier had final checks as well. We weren't going to do it on the line that night.
They wanted us to do them over by the pits. I didn't see a reason for that, but we wound up honoring that. And that will actually drive us away and take more time, so our takeoff -- our walk time was not accurate.

Now, our walk time didn't really necessarily matter because we couldn't turn our APUs on before 0001 local anyways. So based on what we were doing in that start time, we were going to miss the 0030 local. I think we took off, to be exact, I think it was 0051, so 21 minutes after our scheduled departure time is our actual takeoff time.

Fairly standard on the departure. We'll goggle after passing 500 feet. I will hear, DASH-2, Goggle. Per the brief, you've been cleared out to ATC spread, so he's a nautical mile upbeam on altitude as we climb up. We'll get stepped up. I believe our --

[inaudible] with combat spread. I'm not familiar with ATC spread.

So basically admin spread.

Staying within one mile?

Absolutely. .8 to 1.0 during the day. New Attack SOP revision, it doesn't change for the night.

That way you don't have to go to non-standard formation?

Yes, sir.

Okay.

So no issues with that. He's right in
position. I know it's night; it's been awhile, necessarily, since I've flown at night. I don't think the squadron had flown in nights in, right around, 30 days. So he may have been on a cross-country and done it. But, anyways, I'll give him as much sugar as I can over the aux radio. So I'm giving him my headings, my altitudes, airspeed exactly. If I'm deviating from, you know, what I had briefed, the 300 knots to 10,000 feet, 350 knots I'm climbing up from that. More than 4 or 5 knots fast or slow, I'm letting you know.

He's in position the whole way up. We'll actually penetrate a small layer. He will lose sight. Going through that, he never tightens up. I don't know if he saw under the goggles or not. I'll give him a direct command of, hey, 170 on the hang; stay where you're at, don't take the cut away. And then I'll shift three degrees left. I'm watching the harrier attack in, and we punch through, and he's right in position after about 1,000 foot cloud layer.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): So let me pause you there so you can give me a little F-18 training. These jets have MIS or something. Do you have an electronic representation of who's position on your AHS, do you decide from what you know from harrier attack nav.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): We do not because MITS was not functioning that night. So the harrier attack in and turnover time was what I used to make that determination, and that could be done safely.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): Yeah. No worries. Okay.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): We'll step up to -- I believe we get an
intermittent of 15,000, but ultimately 127,000 feet, flight level 270. We'll check into the intersouth; he'll be one nautical mile on my right-hand side. It'd be at 27,000 feet. We'll cancel 3 miles prior to seagull, which is the entry point. And then, once we hit seagull, we will talk to -- we'll just put that we're there out on the pry-freq, so area comm. We'll immediately get responded, SUMO 4-1. And this is where a slight difference from the CORDCARD happens, but it's -- I don't assess it to be a factor. He gives, hey, SUMO 4-1, I'm at 15,000 feet, when his CORDCARD had said 17,000 feet. At that point, I looked down at the clock. I believe it was 0108, or somewhere there about local. And I set an ARTC. It may have been a little bit later then, because I was sitting at 0135 local ARTC.

So this one may help if I draw it out on the board.

Yeah. We can definitely do that, or draw it on paper might be even better.

Okay.

And you can do both, but we prefer --

Sure.

And while you're doing that, I want to ask you about weather. So you punched through a layer going up --

Yes, sir.

-- and the tanker is at 15, any weather between say 10 and 27,000 feet in the working area?

Yes, sir. So there is a -- I would call it a "broke into overcast" layer from 10 to 12,000, and that is it.
Okay. So it's clear above 12?

Yes, sir.

Okay.

Lux was a -- it was a little lux night. I forget it off the top of my head, but we had talked to that as well. So intersouth is kind of a little bit on an angle, but it's basically a large box. Seagull is about here, and then the Sierra 15 track kind of runs something along those lines.

And that's an established tanker track?

I'm not familiar with their established tanker tracks, but once he told me inside the Sierra 15, I expected left-hand turns, and probably 15 to 20 nautical mile legs.

Okay. It's standard?

Yes, sir.

So we'll approach seagull. We are heading 1-7-0. I've got my radar net down pretty far. I know now that he's at 15, so my scan was a little bit above him. I'll drop it down and I'll never get SUMO. My assessment that he was probably somewhere here heading to the east based on time and space and how this works out again.

So I elect to stay at 27,000 feet, and we proceed. And there are other layers to this and it eventually does go further south, the airspace that we're talking about at this night. I will go all the way to the souther most of the northern portion of this airspace, and then I'll do an in-place turn at 275 miles. I tell hey, I'm going to be at 275 knots, 27,000 feet,
and I'm going to be at a 30 degree angle of bank turn. That's not standard. Just giving him, again, a little bit more. He's flying decent form, but just, you know, again, I wasn't going to do it --

[button] (3) (A). (b) (6): It might, to my knowledge from an attack form, is an in-place turn is when both aircraft execute 180 degree turn, right?

[button] (3) (A). (b) (6): Yes, sir.

[button] (3) (A). (b) (6): You come out the back side on the opposite side, right?

[button] (3) (A). (b) (6): Yes, sir.

[button] (3) (A). (b) (6): You end up, kind of, like --

[button] (3) (A). (b) (6): You do cross the extended flight path of the aircraft. Absolutely.

[button] (3) (A). (b) (6): Okay.

[button] (3) (A). (b) (6): The only thing the reason I said the 30 degrees angle of bank and it's 275 knots is because the standard for us is mil power G to maintain. Or 7a roughly. So and I would --

[button] (3) (A). (b) (6): So it's like a big kind of a big floatie admin kind of turn?

[button] (3) (A). (b) (6): Yes, sir. And that night, I didn't need to do that. So I was, just, like, hey, I'm going to be at 30 degrees angle of bank vice, you know, honking on the "G".

[button] (3) (A). (b) (6): Tracking.

[button] (3) (A). (b) (6): So we'll proceed back to the north. I'll get radar SA of the tanker at, about, 40 nautical miles. I'll call it BRAA, I don't really hear anything. I don't necessarily expect him
to --

: And "BRAA" is bearing, range, altitude, and aspect?

: Yes, sir.

: Okay.

: So from there, I tell -- I direct the flight down to 18,000 feet. **will establish communications** with the tanker as we are starting down. Somewhere around 20 to -- excuse me, 22 to 20-ish thousand feet, the tanker will clear us down to 14,000 feet. He is aware that I have radar SA to him. So we never stop at 18. We continue down.

: Can I ask you a little bit about comms? Sorry to interrupt so much.

: Yes, sir.

: So you have two radios and one radar, right?

: We do, sir.

: Okay. And so you got one radio is on -- what are you doing with the comm 1?

: Comm 1 is on area comm at this point. We have not been directed to the tanker [inaudible] freq. So that's where that is. And then we have our aux freq, which is inner flight communications.

: Okay. And that's comm 2 or is that --

: That's comm 2, sir.

: Okay. Got it.
If we were in the link and we had MIDS, we'd also have Voice A, potentially Voice B.

Yeah. That's what I want to make sure I understand.

Yes, sir.

Okay. Thank you. Because that's what I'm not familiar with. So on what radio does use to communicate with the tanker, and on what frequency?

Primary radio.

He's on area comm?

He is on area comm.

Okay. So you're talking to the tanker on area comm?

Initially. They do push us to tanker pry.

Okay. All right. Keep -- I just really want to understand if you have four radios or two going. That's what I want to make sure I was straight on.

Just two, sir.

Okay. Cool. So has talked to the tanker. You've directed a descent down to, think you said, 18?

Eighteen was our intermediary to stay above the tanker. Once the tanker feels comfortable, we have SA which I will provide. And tell him basically where we are and where he is. And tell him we are 35 miles apart at this point. He let's us go all the way down to 14.

Okay.
We get down to 14 and I will start a right-hand turn to the East. And my assessment is the tanker is starting his left-hand turn back to the west right here on this track.

I get visual of the tanker just inside 33-ish, 30 miles.

What is his lighting configuration and what is yours?

He is -- we are all over at that point.

Okay.

Very, very bright.

I just wonder how you saw him at 30 miles. That's pretty good.

And I'm sorry. Something else I kind of left out was, so we had -- I was ANVS-11 so NVCDs, so the only difference is -- you guys have the ANVS-9s; is that correct?

Yeah. I'm a 9 guy. Yeah.

And that's what I started out with, sir, as well.

Is this a quad eye? What's an 11?

So an 11 is --

Big tubes?

They're not that big, sir. The only real difference in them is that they amplify light a little bit more. And they also do JHMCS symbology through the actual goggles.

Okay. Do you wear JHMCS?
I was wearing JHMCS. Mine was not functioning, so I did not have JHMCS symbology.

Okay.

I do not -- I cannot speak to everybody else in the flights, but I know my WIZO was on NVCDs as well. ANVS-11s. And I know was on ANVS-11s. And I believe was on ANVS-11s. And as far as the functionality of their JHMCS, I don't know.

Okay.

So at this point inside of 30 to 25 miles-ish, I kind of look at the tanker and make an assessment. I believe he's off altitude. So I look at DASH-2 and I query, hey, does -- I call out the visual and get his eyes on the tanker, Does he look like he's off altitude to you? Yes.

Okay. So I go over pry myself and I query, hey, SUMO, just confirm 15,000 feet; 2-9-9-2-7. I don't tell him that he looks off altitude to me, but that's a way to just kind of drive his focus into his own cockpit, hey, if I'm off.

Turns out he wasn't. I don't know if I had a false horizon for a second or both of us did or just the light angle looked weird, but actually, no kidding, what I saw on mine was that we have T-T box around whatever we have a radar contact. It was below my horizon bar. So I will drop the flight down to, instead of 14,000 feet, we are going to have a 13-5 until I am comfortable with the tankers at 15,000 feet.
From there, I assess he is at about 12 nautical miles.

: So you were at 18. I copy that you went down to 18. I didn't copy you going from 18 to 14.

: Yes, sir.

: So you talked to SUMO and SUMO cleared you down 14.

: So that happens as I start this right-turn.

: I think you said that, I just didn't pick up on it.

: No, of course.

TC: Sorry to interrupt you. Could you just label that; put what your altitude was and that was when you made your turn.

: Okay. So this is a descending turn and we are still probably at about 17k.

: And you can use fighter symbology so you can do your little things like that and stuff, if you want.

: Yes, sir. Apologies. So we're still dropping down. I am level at 14,000 feet here as the tanker is approximately there. That is when I get my -- the distance here is probably 22 nautical miles. So somewhere -- I'm going to put approximate. That's to my knowledge.

: Yeah.

: And then I will basically -- that is where I --

: So the tanker is at 15?

: He is, sir.
Can you label that? And you're at about --

-- 14k.

Okay.

Yes, sir.

Okay. Great.

This is when I'll have my first query of DASH-2 if he looks off altitude. He says yes. I'll take the flight a step further. My arrows aren't going to match up. I wasn't necessarily planning this out all that well.

It's all right. It's just to help us communicate. That's good.

I'll drop it down to 13-5 just to -- as an extra safety factor here. As you can see, this turns into a 180-out join. The arrows are not representative of what takes place. He's probably -- he's definitely going this direction. We're probably closer back here. I early turn at about 12-ish miles to start the join; 180-out to 190-out join.

And you're going 300, the tanker is going 250, something like that?

I was probably still going 275. I might have picked up a little bit in the descent, sir, so maybe 280 to 290. But I was still slow.

What was your air refueling and your speed and all that; 230? Do you remember?
That night specifically, it sticks out because it was a squadron number. We were 242 knots.

Okay.

So he's tracking. We get to the join. The join is probably 150 [inaudible] to about 3 miles. At about two, I remember seeing 80 [inaudible]. So in my assessment, it's actually a slow join. I'm extremely conservative.

You're doing a 6 o'clock rendezvous, right? At about 150 knots in closure is kind of what you're telling me?

It's kind of how it turns out. That was not really my intent. It was --

It all seems to work out that way, though, right?

Yes, sir.

You're always wasting gas running down the tanker.

And I did not pick the throttles up. So I saw that this point was coming and just waited and used geometry.

But this portion -- what my idea was --

Let's get you a new piece of paper.

Okay. And again, the join -- in my mind -- be a huge factor, but just to explain it. So the tanker is here. I'm here. I'll just draw us together. Start my turns. Something like that.
Yeah.

And as it was, based on the position, I'll draw it in red. My assessment is -- with this arrow is -- this is where we're at. So we're just a little bit aft of that. A little bit slow on the join.

Again, based on where we are in time and space, I know in another 3 to 4 miles he is going to make that turn just based on the border. I'll let the geometry play out and join. And vice heating it up or using left-hand.

So the [inaudible] comms make the join at .5 undirected. SUMO 4-1 will go overt on their own. To me, that means I'm dealing with a senior crew. Like, they've tanked before enough to know that at about a half mile, that's when my goggles are going to get ballooned out by their lights. I probably wouldn't have directed them for another two-tenths, probably down to a .3, but I was okay with it. And I didn't say anything about that at that point.

My wingman's flying form off me. I'm still overt and there was no issues noted at that point. We'll press in. He'll clear me to stern a little early. I get to about .2, so as far as up to position off of him --

We got all the paper you need to use.

All right. Do you want number 2 on this?

Yeah.

From this perspective -- I'm not an artist by any stretch of the imagination. Sorry.

I'm somewhere in this realm vice being in this realm when
he clears me to start. I feel comfortable with it. Clears Profane 1-1 right as Profane 1-2 left -- he does not clear him at left stern yet. So I go right of stern. I can you tell the observers definitely saw me because almost immediately as I was here, he will clear Profane 1-2 a stern left. So we're sterneted --

: And that's why you said there was precontact, right? So you probe out, nose is cold, switch is safe, and you're like six feet off the basket to figure out the basket.

: Yes, sir.

: It's where you're going to be.

: Yes, sir. Six to ten feet off the basket.

Yes, sir. Precontact went away. The reason it went away was because if you have radio cut out, it sounds like contact. So now it's just -- excuse me, I almost misspoke -- the stern. From that position, again, ANVS-9's amplify light a lot -- or excuse me. ANVS-11's amplify light a lot more than the ANVS-9's. The only way I can shut up my IFR probe refueling light is with my pinky switch, which kills all my lights.

So I like to go midnight on the tanker because I can't see the basket. Once I do that, I'm still having trouble seeing the basket so I start driving it up a little bit. My assessment was that I was probably 60 feet from the basket. In reality, I was 80 to 100 feet, so my SA was probably about 20 feet off. I attributed that to depth perception, slight issue with the goggles, as I'm sure you've seen that as well, sir.

: Yeah.
Driving in. Standard from there. I'll hesitate in position probably 5 to 6 feet behind the basket. At that point, I'll be immediately cleared contact. No issues. Plug. Start fueling.

On the left side, my attention has gone to what I'm doing. From perspective, he goes right into the basket and starts refueling as well. Nonissues.

As we are tracking through the track, I will complete AR about here. Yes. So I know my DASH-2 is still in the basket. We're at about this plate in time and space. And I see what's coming up as far as how we are going to depart the tanker.

So at that point, I'll direct him to go to echelon left, non-standard. It's a deviation. I'm aware of that, but I don't want to put my wingman on the outside of the formation. Now, I say I directed him to do that. He still requests it with the tanker. The tanker owns that decision. So the tanker will initially clear him echelon right. won't request echelon left. And they will clear him echelon left.

From there, we make this 90-degree turn to go North along the airspace. Again, this is probably not really drawn to scale. We are up along this border, but we are tracking North. From there, we start to talk about how we are going to depart the tanker. And I'm talking about that with the tanker.

Let me -- so you're done -- everybody's got gas, you put the probes away, you got the radar back on?
(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): I do. I'm sorry, that's a good point. I do go overt again.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): So you switch out?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): Yes, sir.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): Radar's back on?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): Yes, sir.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): Okay.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): My DASH-2 will also go overt. His lights do come back on. The tanker, however, remains covert throughout the entire mishap.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): Okay. And I want to understand where you guys, respective to the tanker right now, are you on one side and he's on one side?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): Correct, sir. So I'll go echelon right.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): [inaudible] by that. Okay. We have overt. We got a blacked out -- we got a covert tanker in the middle and an overt hornet on the [inaudible] refueling complete?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): Yes, sir.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): Okay.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): Can you just mark on -- draw an "X" where you were and draw a triangle where he was.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): You want an "X" -- Profane 1. And I apologize for the positions.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): Not to scale.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): And we're forward of that. So that should
actually be -- I'm forward of this line. And then he is --

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) 

: So that you can be observed from the cockpit of the Herc?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) 

: That is what I always thought. So the APC 56c, that is actually not correct anymore if there is somebody to observe you in the back. So I was taught that as well; if I can't see the pilot, I'm wrong.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) 

: Yeah.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) 

: But they want us a little further aft. And now, this got me into a whole discussion of, well, echelon left, by book definition, is actually one plane length, 60 degree bearing light at low. Well, that doesn't make sense if I'm bringing a division to a tanker. So I'm not going to put a guy -- especially if you have right hose/left hose -- I'm not going to put a guy at co-altitude with the guy in the basket when this guy has no aft. He can't go any direction. So you always elevate him there.

I understand that so that's a deviation. That's a flight lead decision. In this case, my flight lead decision was based on airspace. So that's why I wanted him on the left. Unbeknownst to him, my game plan was -- and I had this discussion with SUMO 4-1. I know, based on the conversation with (b) (3) (A), (b) (6), I'm trying to take as much gas from these guys as I can. Allow them to go on about their day as rapidly as possible.

So my game plan is to come off the tanker -- and I had briefed (b) (3) (A), (b) (6) how we were going to do that. My -- we were going to go to 15,500 feet; select AB; get to 300 knots. And I
even went as far as to say 30 degrees nose high to 18,000 feet. At 18,000 feet, this is where I was separating the flight. I didn't tell him that, but I said, I want you to go 90 degrees left; I'm going to go 90 degrees right. So now we're 3,000 feet above the tanker. We're going away from each other. And then, I will give an altitude separation after that.

From there, game plan was to go up and down as fast as possible burning gas on the north and south side so we can take another 8,000 aside from --

(b)(3)(A)(b)(6): It's a tough job, but somebody has got to do it.

(b)(3)(A)(b)(6): Yes, sir. Yeah. It was literally just to burn gas to go back to the tanker. And I'm still trying to make a 0245 land time for (b)(3)(A)(b)(6) crew day so we can still have the option to do another flight. So time was more of a concern than fuel at that point.

(b)(3)(A)(b)(6): And when did you brief that?

(b)(3)(A)(b)(6): When did I brief what the game plan was?


(b)(3)(A)(b)(6): I only ever briefed the departure plan. Where did I brief that was probably as soon as I heard him come off the tanker.

(b)(3)(A)(b)(6): Okay. So not before the mission? Like, during the mission you guys were just talking while you were doing the refueling?

Okay.

-- everything as far as the timing of it was because we took off late. I don't want to say it's a pickup game because we had talked about some of the options as far as, Hey, we can do this as a 3-hour sortie and just do the hot reload on the backside; hey, if this takes long, we can have less than an hour and we're not going to go all the way back out here. We're going to go use the GCA box for the rest of our flight time.

But that was a decision that I would make while we were getting gas and doing the hot reload on the backside. I didn't feel that I necessarily owed that to them then.

Yeah. That's normal.

So on Diagram 1, can you just mark with an "X" on the track where you were refueling. And then, kind of where we are at in this discussion.

So I'll give you a red "X" for me as where I come off.

That's your completed refueling?

Yeah. And then I'll give you where I believe is complete with a red triangle. I think it's -- and again, this turn, the track -- realize that it's more of a square here. So he's -- we've just finished a left-hand turn. He comes out. Get's cleared echelon right by SUMO 4-1. Requests echelon left on my request. Goes echelon left. It was cleared echelon left by SUMO 4-1, and then goes echelon --

Perfect. Thank you.
Not a problem.

So we're up against, you can see, this corner. This is where this is heading. I elect to have -- I have now briefed on how we are going to leave the tanker. He is going to be echelon left. I'll be echelon right. 15-5. Burner 300 knots. 30 degrees nose high; 18-90-90.

And he didn't have any questions with it, to my knowledge. And then because we're in this corner, the next thing that happens is that I will request from SUMO 4-1 to put us in the center of the airspace. Or at least come 90 degrees left.

I'm comfortable being tied up against the board -- because you don't want to launch out like that.

Yes, sir.

Yeah. I got it.

So I want him to turn more towards the center of the airspace.

Punch out like that?

Yes, sir. But I think I request 2-7-0. So and just based on this airspace -- it's not as pronounced as your pen was -- but it's something along those lines. I'm comfortable with where I am up along the border. I know it's there. I don't necessarily want my wingman there. I don't want to have him -- give him as much airspace as possible.

In that turn of that turn, he agrees to it. I start
coming left. In that turn, I look down and I see my assessment of And he is slightly sucked position of echelon left. He is on the left-hand side of that.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6)

: So is inside the turn?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6)

: Yes, sir. So IFR turned into he's welded wings, more or less. He is not elevated and he looks a little low. And he looks sucked, like, he looks a little aft. He goes undirected by myself. We've got some comm going. I'm still talking to the tanker about what time I think the next ARTC will go? I don't remember that conversation. I know it happened, but I don't remember what was said. He then says, alright, Profane 1-1, go with BUNO. Profane 1-1, Aircraft 0-9, BUNO 1-6-4-9-9-6, off the top of my head. I knew it at the time and was able to rattle it off.

I hear -- and this is where I know we'll have stories differ. It's I hear Profane 1-2 -- probably about 4 or 5 seconds in between -- Profane 1-2, go with BUNO. At that time, he starts, in my mind, to roll out -- SUMO 4-1.

So this takes some explaining as to the inside cockpit of the hornet. So my BUNO is basically on a 45 from my knee, probably 8 to 10 inches above. So it requires me to look down to see the BUNO of the actual aircraft. At the same time, in my mind, SUMO 4-1 rolls out. I roll out straight and level. I don't ever hear the BUNO come back. I try to go there. I know says he said it. I don't remember hearing it.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6)

: Did the WIZO normally make that call, or the pilot?
So it is not standout in our squadron. In my former squadron it was. The pilot owned the BUNO call. I can hypothesize to the reason of that. Because if the pilot can't make the BUNO call -- yeah, okay. It's time to pay attention. What's going on? Why can't he make the BUNO call. Is he behind? Is he -- you know, that's one of the few ways that you can tell what's going through a pilot's head on the tanker.

The next thing I remember is going, "What the fuck is DASH-2 doing?" And as I look in --

is your WIZO?

He's Profane 1-1 WIZO, sir. As I look in, I see -- most notably -- the form light along the nose of the F-18 basically pointed down and I see -- and I apologize for talking with my hand -- coming in my direction. And now he has crossed from my assessment of the left side of the Herc to right side of the Herc.

Under the Herc? Or --

Based on my assessment -- and again, I'm in a 200 foot elevated position.

So you're 200 feet above --

-- the Herc, off his right wing. Starboard side. And at this point, I'm slightly acute. My best thoughts on why I'm slightly acute is, we've rolled out. I'm distracted. I was on the turn away so my throttles are higher than they normally would be to maintain that airspeed. I don't think I ever retarded them
because I was looking in at that point in time.

Based on what [redacted] had said, I looked back and I see a wing flash back to the left. It's not extreme so -- pardon the hands -- it's not a 45 degree flash. It's probably 20 to 30 degrees back to the left. And that happened so fast.

I think I key the mic, but I can't be certain. I think I started to key the mic when I first noticed what he was doing. And it just -- from the time that he looked like he was within 6 to 10 feet of the tanker with a right wing down [inaudible] towards me to the time he reversed back to the left -- it seems like forever when I'm sitting with you now, but I know that it literally was a depression of my comm 2.

[black]: Can we get another piece of paper?
[black]: Yes, sir.
[black]: So let me draw it first, okay?
[black]: Yes, sir.
[black]: So just bear with me. I'm going to draw just a little bit smaller tanker.

So [black] is drawing a tanker right now.

So based on what you just told me, can you show me where you were and kind of where you think he was.

[black]: Yes, sir. I'll do my own aircraft in black and then his in red. Now, at this point when we notice it, I'm slightly acute. So I'm probably about the front of this wing line. Elevated, at this point, 150 to 200 feet. I can't be certain.

[black]: And the AR refueling altitude was 15,000?
Yes.

So you're at, like, 15,200?

That's fair, sir.

Okay.

And then as I look back, I see the nose -- I can't even depict it without drawing on the Herc.

Yeah. Do it; draw on the Herc.

I see his nose of his aircraft below at about there. So if you imagine the base of the ramp door being about there, he's feet away from that. I assess him to be --

So you see, like, the strip lights on the ramp?

Yes, sir.

Can you write "below" right there, just so we know.

And you say "feet," so we're talking less than 10 feet?

Correct. And then I will see -- I see the pivot of the light. It's really what catches my attention at me.

And you're expecting him to be here?

Absolutely, sir.

Okay.

So that's why both my WIZO and I query it. He queries it first because the last time I looked was right after they had asked me my BUNO, and to my awareness, he was sucked but in this general vicinity. He was on the left side of the tanker at that
point of time, in my mind.

[35] (A). (b) (6): So can you make a small mark and just kind of show what you think his relative track might have been with the tanker? So he basically went from here to here kind of spread?


[35] (A). (b) (6): Maybe a little one of these?

[35] (A). (b) (6): Yes, sir. So somehow -- and I've tried to piece this together -- I can't. And I'm thinking about it -- that's another one. How did he either get over or under the hose to get there without hitting the hose? That doesn't make sense to me either.

And I'm being as honest with you as I can, like, it's -- there's some of this stuff that I just can't answer. I just don't know it.

[35] (A). (b) (6): He may have it at the OSO, you know.

[35] (A). (b) (6): Yes, sir. But he winds up in this position. I'll see the flash towards me or "what the fuck is DASH-2 doing?" Look to key the mic. Honestly, I don't even know what the heck I would have said. If I directed him to underrun -- underrun what? He's in a position where, is he going to underrun me? Is he going to underrun the tanker? I mean, the only thing --

[35] (A). (b) (6): Everybody -- you and the tanker are straight and level right now?


[35] (A). (b) (6): And the tanker is rolled out within how many seconds? Ten seconds? Thirty seconds?
Less than ten. He hit a roll --

The tanker just recently rolled out?

Yes, sir.

And was inside the turn?

Yes, sir. To my SA, he was inside the turn.

And I know that story varies between the aircrew involved but I -- and I actually spoke last night. And I said, What was your SA of me here? And he said, You were in a 20 to 30 degree angle of bank turn. I was like, brother, I was straight and level. So --

It's dark.

I know. And that part sucks. And so then we'll see the impact. Piecing things together, I assess it to be -- I don't actually see the no kidding impact, but what I see is the hornet go from this position, wings left, what appears to be a flare here and here.

So you're marking those with astrics?

Because like a typical flare. And in real-time, I didn't know what they were. I thought it was the initial impact and, you know, some kind of fire breaking out.

Within 2 to 3 seconds, you have got a fire on the Herc. It looks like it's emanating from here, but it is engulfed there. It has a left -- or port -- component to it. But that's what's going on.

And you marked that with red circles?

Sorry. Thank you. Yeah. I marked that with
the red circles, just kind of showing you where that fire -- to me, it looks like it's emulating and what is consumed by it.

After we recovered, I assessed that these asterisks are the ejection sequence. He goes from -- in my mind, he goes from low to high here. Clips a left wing. And if you actually have a C-130, there's a star -- the emblem on the actual side of it that's at that point. I would think it was in the vicinity of that, but higher on the Herc. And carried continued through the aircraft and ejects on the other side.

So you believe he impacted on the starboard side of the aircraft and drew it straight through to portside?

Correct.

Okay.

Basically just between the [inaudible] of this area?

Yes, sir. At this point, back to my own aircraft, gives the "Climb. Climb. Climb." He's already behind. I'm at max AB. I'm select 30 to 35 degrees nose up. I know I'm slow. I don't want to stall out the aircraft. I'm not trying to bulls eye nose high here.

That gets you 18,000 feet. And I know I'm still climbing, but that's not my concern. I come out of AB probably in the ball park of 290 knots/280 knots. I start a left-hand turn over SUMO 4-1.

I don't -- at this point, I no longer ever see Profane 1-2
again. I don't know where that jet went. My goggles are completely bloomed out. I can't see anything but the fire and the aircraft. And it's like I don't have goggles on -- even though I'm looking through them. They're bloomed out.

The C-130 falls in a wings level attitude, potentially a slight left component to that. Not noticeable roll. I know that the lare was at 12,000 feet. I watch the fire enter the lare. I watch the clouds basically light up as the fire goes through them. That -- from initial explosion to clouds takes approximately ten seconds. So it looks almost controlled to me. I know that it's probably not. I'm not hearing anything on the radio. I'm sorry -- impact to when I assessed that the fire went out or impact at the water, I do not hear another radio transmission from SUMO 4-1 or, obviously, Profane 1-2.

From enter of the clouds, the light -- I can still see from the clouds until I can no longer see the light is probably another 15 seconds. Personal opinion is that that is when they actually impacted the water. Meaning that if that was the case, to go 5,000 feet took 10 seconds; 10,000 feet took 15 seconds. It would be a continuous nose over from that point.

Anything you want me to revisit there, sir, before I go to the egress portion of this? Excuse me -- the on-scene commander portion of this.

[...]: So we'll just finish this out. On Diagram 1, can you just mark where you think that the impact happened with a red square?
Absolutely. Again, we were here. We start at this turn. It's probably in this vicinity.

Okay. Can you mark the large square and just label that -- you said that was the Sierra? Can you just draw an arrow to this and just name it?

So this is the intersouth.

Can you name the entry point?

Seagull. And you're looking at this as the Sierra 15.

Can you just draw an arrow and just show which way is North?

Do you want it down here?

And I'm sorry for all this, but this will, you know --

No. Absolutely, sir.

Thirty years from now, someone is going to be looking at that.

That's North.

On Diagram 2, can you again just put which way is North?

Roughly.

So okay. Yeah. North would be more so that way.

And if you could just draw on here, what is your call sign or plate number [inaudible] is this the tanker?
It is. That's SUMO. I've drawn us together.

That's fine.

And this will be Profane. Okay. And I can give you Profane. "PE" is the way we do that. Profane 1-1's position is that one.

Just label that No. 3 on the bottom and go ahead and circle it.

And then four. And then I'll give you Profane 1-2 echelon left to -- we have the strip lights basically at the door. And I assess that to be the SUMO ramp -- base of the ramp.

And you're on Profane --

-- 1-1.

And then for all of this, can you just initial at the bottom and then just date it?

Absolutely.

Thank you.

Not a problem.

Before we get into the SAR stuff, any maintenance stuff -- like, did any, like, any electrical failures, comm failures, any reports from your wingman or his WIZO that, like, My hub was flashing off and on. Or anything like that you might recall?

Nothing there, sir, from them. We had a known I&S drift issue with our aircraft. It probably -- it wasn't known prior to us getting in it, but --

The gear check?
Yes, sir.

Okay.

Which we took into consideration with the SAR effort.

Does your jet have a GPS updated?

It does. That night it did not. That was the problem.

GPS was inop?

Yes, sir.

So MDS is inop; GPS was inops?

Yes, sir. So I say that and when we got back to the field three hours after takeoff, we had less than a half a mile of nautical mile drift. So the system was pretty tight without the aiding of GPS. That was not really a factor. And based on the information we gave, we recovered both aircrew known to be on the surface of the water in less than 12 hours.

So the -- I'm sorry. Do you have any more questions? I had no known issues to their aircraft.

Yeah. I just want to ask a quick maintenance border blank, you know.

Yes, sir.

You know, if there is anything that you would know of that could have distracted your DASH-2 or caused, like, flight control malfunction?

So there is a known issue with ANVS-11's. If you have the JHMCS symbology available to you, it has been known to
completely invert itself. I've seen it three times. Never in this squadron. But when I was in OAR over in Iraq, it happened to me three different times. I've talked about that with most of the ready room here. I've told them, kind of, my -- the way I combated it.

We have an event marker in the center of the stick that blanks out in the JHMCS symbology. And the one time that didn't work for me, you just come up here and turn off your, basically, your JHMCS. And your NVCDs symbology would go with that as well.

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6): And the jet still had a hud you can see, or no?

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6): Yes, sir. But if that were to roll on you, you're going to have things projecting over top of each other.

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6): Yeah. And can't read it.

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6): Yes, sir. I'm not saying that was a factor in this.

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6): No. No. I got it.

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6): Yes, sir. But there is always the potential. That is a known issue with the ANVS-11.

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6): So somehow your wingman became disoriented? I'll use that term. And somehow it went from where he was supposed to be to aft to low to a cross-under to an attempted correction that resulted in a midair collision?

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6): Yes, sir.

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6): Any radio calls to or from your DASH-2 from when you first saw him in an imperfect position until right before the collision? Did you hear him? Or did the WIZO say
anything? Or --

[(b) (3) (A). (b) (6)]: I don't believe so, sir. I don't think I spoke to my DASH-2. So the conversation -- before the BUNO conversation, the conversation was: Are we going to have time to come back?

And I'm discussing that with SUMO 4-1. And I'm like, We will try. You know, and I haven't told him -- because there was so much comm with the tanker between him and I as far as when we were coming back, I had not told my DASH-2 what the following flow was going to look like just yet. I had an echelon left. That is non-standard, but I had a reason to do it. And that's kind of was what it was.

[(b) (3) (A). (b) (6)]: So you observed all this and you busted out your "On-scene Commander Checklist"?

[(b) (3) (A). (b) (6)]: Yes, sir.

[(b) (3) (A). (b) (6)]: Assumed your new mission?

[(b) (3) (A). (b) (6)]: Yes, sir.

[(b) (3) (A). (b) (6)]: And did a good job in getting your buddies pulled out.

[(b) (3) (A). (b) (6)]: To be perfectly honest with you, sir. I froze for about 20 seconds after impact. I can't tell you if I froze or just watched SUMO go down. We did drop a mark nearly immediately. So a "mark" is we have the ability to basically push a button and it annotates where we are, time and space. We can have up to nine of them in our system. So we'll drop -- our mark one would have been, basically, our takeoff point in the runway. This would have been
Mark 2 -- was the known impact location. Apologies. I don't have that actual information on what it was -- but I can -- myself or can get that to you, if required.

: No. You're good. We got it.

: And then I start a left-hand turn. It's somewhere between 18 to 20,000. That part's a little fuzzy. Again, that's from that 35 degree climb. I don't feel disoriented there. My WIZO does, just because now he's been kicked in the pants twice. So he gets the first jolt from the blower, and then almost immediately, he gets another jolt from me pulling back on the stick. The guy at the controls -- not a big deal. Guy not at the controls -- your brain just did a backflip. I understand why he lost SA for a second as we climb up.

Come out of blower. Start a left-hand turn. He's right there with me at that point, so it was momentary. He breaks out the "On-scene Commander Checklist." I'm still eyes out. That will be kind of a common theme, that I'm eyes out while he's running the under system trying to see what I can see.

We establish a Joker Bingo. Joker was 6.5; BINGO was going to be a 4-5. It's relatively low for where we were at based on that. But bodies are in the water and I knew that I had made it home from there with a 4-2 before. I was okay with that situation. I start communicating with the Fukuoka center. Initially, it's They give us clearance home. They don't really understand what's going on. And at that point, I make a radio call I never thought I'd make in my life. "MAYDAY. MAYDAY. MAYDAY."
You know, basically tell them what's going on.

Still communication struggles with Fukuoka. I'm asking when the SAR assets been launched; if the the SAR assets been launched; if anybody has been notified because I don't have a warm and fuzzy.

-- good idea. Roll White Snake. White Snake is a U.S. controller that monitors that air space. However, this is another thing that is actually on our schedule and I forgot about this in every time I've told this story. But we are restricted below 28,000 feet due to AIC. And we are "due regard" in the airspace. Not a factor, but just worth mentioning.

We'll go to White Snake. We don't assume anyone is going to answer. Somebody does. starts taking to him. Passes to him our radio number to notify -- again, I'm sorry. The impact was at about 0150 local out there.

And we are probably first notifying White Snake at about 0203. So about 13 minutes is when we come up with the idea to talk to them.

In the meantime, and the order is a little fuzzy, but I know we're checking 2-4-3-0. So guard freq. There is zero chance of communication on guard. There is a minimum of one beacon going off, and just clobbering that frequency. Scanner 2820 -- so 2-8-2-.8. We'll roll that and we'll bounce back and forth between there there and 121-5. Part of the way I stayed in the game was, honestly, just making radio calls to SUMO 4-1 and Profane 1-2. I probably made about 100. We did not have confirmation for -- that
the SAR assets had been launched by the time we had to depicted. We're at 27,000 feet up until we reach a 7-0.

At that point in time, I have no notification that any SAR assets launched. I've done all I've can with the radio. We elect to go down below the weather and take a look.

So we drop down below the clouds. I go down to about 9,500 feet. To be perfectly honest with you, sir, I wasn't comfortable going below that. My hands were shaking; my stomach was in knots. We drop down to 9,500 feet. And the first thing I see, I assessed it to be, initially, something that was on fire. And I looked at it and looked under my goggles. Dropped the goggles back down, turned out it was a boat.

There were probably upwards of a dozen to a dozen and a half surface vessel in the vicinity of where this had happened. And we'll do two laps around. And then the next thing that we will pass to the JPRC is a flashing IR, significant light in the water looks like a strobe. I don't know what it was, but this will become Mark 3. And we overfly it the best we can as it disappears under the nose. For whatever reason, out L-Pod was not capable of picking it up.

We pass that as we come back. And it turns out that that was a small vessel that one of the surface ships had launched trying to look for what it was. I can only assume that that many surface vessels being there under the clouds within thirty minutes of that mishap -- they actually saw SUMO break through the clouds. But I don't know if anyone's tracked that or tried to speak to them about
it at all either. But we did pull up the Sea Distress Channel 16 on the sea frequencies and tried to raise any surface vessels down there. We did have one respond. Unfortunately, the response was entirely Japanese. Neither one of us speak Japanese.

We reach a 4.4, so I stay around 100 pounds under my BINGO. I don't request it, but they do give me a standard BINGO profile home. I'm clear to direct Iwakuni at 36,000 feet. Standard climb up, standard come home. And I'll land about 500 pounds below our SOP fuel on the deck, which is 2.5. 2.0 is the hornet SOP. So I'm 400/500 pounds below squadron, but above Hornet SOP.

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6): All right. Well, good job getting the SAR assets rolling and keeping it together and staying on station, you know. I know it was hard for you and hard for your buddy.

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6): Yeah. Our land time was 03 -- I want to say 0340, sir. So we were an hour and 50 minutes after impact. And that's just off the cuff, I apologize. I should have had those numbers for you.

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6): No. That's all right. That's fine. We get all that from calculators and stuff. That's a good description of the flight and the debrief.

[b] (3), any questions about that sequence of events?

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6): None from that night. Did you have any flights up to 72 hours prior --

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6): Negative.


[b] (3) (A), (b) (6): The biggest portion of my 72 hour history was
the circadian rhythm shift.

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6): Okay.

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6): Did -- so let's talk about [b] (3) (A), (b) (6) for a minute.

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6): Yes, sir.

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6): Did -- when did you first see him on the day of the accident -- or I guess, the day before because you flew after midnight. But on Wednesday, when did you first see him on Wednesday? I think -- I'm showing you reported for duty at 2030 on Wednesday.

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6): Yes, sir. Sometime between 2030 and 2045, I showed up. I didn't see him probably until 2115/2130. I give you those windows because I can't be exact.

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6): Yeah. I know. Was he just coming into work or was he coming from downstairs? Or you're not sure?

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6): I don't know.

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6): Okay. Did you -- do you have any knowledge of how he was doing crew rest, crew day? You know, was he going to maintenance meetings that morning, or do you have any information about what his 72 hour sleep, rest, crew rest, crew day cycle?

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6): Other than I asked if he was ready to go in the ORM portion of the brief, no, sir. He said he was good to go and ready to go flying. He was excited. I kind of talked to him about the situation we were in. He was more than happy. He was [inaudible] and collect flight time.
Okay.

I think that's actually what he said. He was like, "I'm all about the flight time, man."

And obviously, I think you've already alluded to it, but you didn't observe anything about him physically or mentally that day? You did your standard ORM. Everybody fit to fly thing.

Yes, sir.

And you got a thumbs up out of that?

Yes, sir.

I think that's all I need today. You're welcome to add anything else that you'd like that you think is germane. It's an open door. So we talked a little bit about -- and I appreciate your candor about going back to Thursday. And I'll use my words, not yours, but it looks like you guys got jerked around a little bit on what you were doing when. It looks like you got asked to go to the tanker, and somebody might have known about it, but you didn't.

Yes, sir.

And that kind of stuff. If you want to talk -- do you want to talk about that? and how that may have affected your ability to brief what you were doing? and prepare for what you were doing? I'm all ears on that.

Yes, sir. So something -- I think I actually said it here today. Just, kind of, somebody had said this was a pickup game. And I take that kind of personal. I consider myself a
professional aviator, you know. We don't typically leave things to chance. With that being said, going to a tanker is admin. That is absolutely admin. I'm not saying that I don't take it seriously. I'm not saying that I don't want -- nobody had any mal intent. We took it as serious. But again, we stepped through it.

The question was asked at one point. What would you do -- when would I have canceled this flight? Or when is the last time that I would have accepted ARTC? I didn't give the response, but I'm thinking about it now. And honestly, with the guys that I'm with in this squadron, I don't need a phone call. I need to know [inaudible] setting, altitude, and the give. If you told me that when I was in this airspace, we could still go to the tanker.

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6) [b] (3) (A), (b) (6) [b] (3) (A), (b) (6) [b] (3) (A), (b) (6): I've done that.

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6) [b] (3) (A), (b) (6): Absolutely.

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6) [b] (3) (A), (b) (6) [b] (3) (A), (b) (6): I've been out doing something completely unrelated and the tanker would be like, hey, you guys want to grab a squirt?

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6): Absolutely, sir. So a tanker of opportunity. So as far as the, you know, the pickup game -- if you want to talk to what a pickup game was, the no flight with no real mission. Like, you know, why are we flying? Why are we doing this?

And I understand the first time you fly from 0200 to 0500 in the morning, you don't necessarily want that to be in combat. But have a mission set. That's my opinion. And maybe that's bad on me, but, I mean, I tried. I went to CAS and, you know, we were going to do an urban night CAS. And now it was just too enclose to
really -- what meets this intent? I have airspace. I have two jets. Well, we're not really current. I don't want to go do air-to-air, do 30 notches at night. You know, that's kind of where I was at with that.

And I was like, well, tanker -- that's straight and level. You know, and that's back to what I said. It's not that I wasn't taking it serious, but it's less risk, in my mind, going to a tanker and really flying formation -- is what we're talking about -- than it is to go and do a 50/60 degrees nose low, 5 G maneuver at night.

So I was far more comfortable with that than I was with the latter.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): So you felt comfortable doing your aerial refueling at night?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): Absolutely.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): That's right there with takeoff and land. I mean, it's --

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): And I felt like I was the long pole in the tent. I thought if anybody was the ORM risk, it was me with 1.4 hours in the last thirty days. And granted, I had a fair amount more of experience than he did to fall back on. But, you know, yeah. It was the decision I made.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): Okay.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): And that goes back to the MAG ULT piece. Just the overall theme was, squadrons, we want you to execute your own plan. But we want to do this -- and it kind of went back and forth.

And I still don't know why we started our aircraft at 0001
local. I assumed it was for the memorial for 41, former President Bush. But I don't know that. And initially, I thought it was a Japanese holiday.

Do you think that had an effect on you that night?

Initially.

Did it compress the timeline a little bit?

I don't think it compressed the timeline, sir. But when I found out the night prior, I was upset. I mean, I didn't have, necessarily, an emotional outburst or anything like that. But it was like --

-- perturbed.

Absolutely. Why -- I was like, why am I going to put all of this effort into this plan? Why at the last minute are we changing something? you know, and the changes -- if it was a change to the timeline, they wanted me to go execute my plan, I would have done it. If it was a change to the timeline and they wanted us to go do admin and go to the tanker, I was comfortable doing that. If it was a change to the timeline and they wanted me to go do some mission set that I was not prepared to do, I wouldn't have been comfortable. That's where I would have drawn the line.

But you were comfortable?

I was comfortable.

Can I ask you a couple of quick physiological questions?
Absolutely.

It's supposed to be in your 72 hour history stuff. Were you under the effect of any medications at the time?

No, sir.

You didn't take --

I did take Advil. I have back pain. Sometimes I spend a lot of time in bed trying to get my cycle right, so my back stiffened up on me a little bit.

Any significant alcohol consumption in the days prior?

Not in the 72 hours. I had zero alcohol in the 72 hours. I did have a few drinks Friday night.

Yeah. No worries. Big caffeine stuff? Did you --

I'm iffy. Look at me now. I have four tins of tobacco. Now, that's slightly elevated over what I typically do. I'm probably a two-tins-a-day kind of guy. But that's not outside the norm for the last four years.

But no prescription medications? Go-pills? No-Go pills?

No, sir. Those were not allowed. That's another probably factor in this.

Are you talking about the Go-pill?

Yes, sir. Not so much the Go-pill. I've had the Go-pill before. I don't feel like it does anything. Some of
the young guys probably haven’t so they might have thought that it was the cure all. But the No-Go pill was not --

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6): Which I think is Ambien?

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6): It is, sir. Which was not offered. And specifically talked to as if that were a "downer" by our medical staff.

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6): So let's go back in time a little bit. Did you guys, three or four days prior -- a week prior -- go, hey, dude, we're ramping into the third shift. You want me to fly through my [inaudible] and get some Ambien [inaudible] my cycle.

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6): It was approached, sir, with our flight doc on Thursday afternoon, or Friday afternoon at the absolute latest. There's an answer on WhatsApp that is basically book definition in quotations. So there was no real urgent need, I guess, is how that was dictated.

I don't know how it worked at higher. I know that Go-pills were absolutely off the table. Just -- and I think that came from the Wing CG. I don't know what his opinion was on the -- and that's again, that may not have come from the Wing CG. But that was my perception.

And then the No-Go's, I think, was shut off at the squadron's flight doc level.

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6): Okay.

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6): Just trying to think. So yeah. I dip. You know, I'm going through a divorce, but I've been doing that since March. Like, it's not really affected me a whole lot from that
aspect. And obviously flying is my release, so --

: It's a tough time.

: It is.

: Do you have kids too?

: Just to understand right now.

: Yeah. Is your separated wife, is she CONUS?

: She is, sir. So that's actually one of the things that makes it a little bit easier. I don't have to deal with it here, day-to-day.

: Yeah.

: Probably how much tobacco did you use that night?

: Probably not that much yet. So I typically use it when I'm not flying.

Now, when I say "not that much," I have a fairly worn pocket and I probably do about a quarter of a tin, maybe a little less, per one. And I probably had two dips.

: So about half a tin?

: Maybe a little less, but yeah.

: Do you normally dip when you're flying on long missions?

: Long missions? Yes. This particular night, I did not.

: Okay.
That's enough from that.

All right, man. Are you good?

Yeah. I just want to help and I want to get to the right answer. And I know, as a guy there that saw it, you saw what I had to say and I can't even tell you without 100 percent, without a doubt what took place. I can tell you to the best ability of what I think happened, but that's all it is.

It sounds like you've -- one thing I've taken away from this is, you've eliminated my in my mind that there was any maintenance issues from either aircraft.

Yes, sir.

Is that a fair statement?

I believe so, sir.

Okay.

Personal opinion, I think this will come back to, at some some level, spatial disorientation. That's just my personal opinion. I can't see how it's anything else.

Well, you've talked to that right. Because we know the [inaudible] and you've talked about how both you and your WIZO on the initial rendezvous misperceived the tankers altitude, right?

And you talked about how the tanker was in covert lighting, so it was kind of like a big black hole out there, right?

Yes, sir. And that's the part that's absolutely on me. The brief, the spatial disorientation. Yes, we went through the training wheels, we talked about it, but I didn't
launch into more detail. That's definitely something of mine.

[redacted]: We're not here to put any blame on you. We're not here to do that so you don't need to say that to me, but I understand how you feel to be responsible. I empathize with that. I've walked that. So I'm really sorry.

[redacted]: Appreciate it, sir. Thanks.

[redacted]: Okay. So I'm in the GAL.

[redacted]: Okay.

[redacted]: "[redacted]."

[redacted]: Yes, sir.

[redacted]: You can contact me at any time if you remember something or you want to add something. You can just send me an email. I'll call you. Just send me an email or whatever. And any conversation you and I have about this incident is in the context of this investigation.

[redacted]: Yes, sir.

[redacted]: So you can -- like, if you remember something, you know what I mean?

[redacted]: Yes, sir.

[redacted]: That seems to happen when we've experienced traumatic events. We kind of block some stuff and then wires start connecting. That's happened to me in my life. I was almost burned alive in the cockpit of Harrier. I started remembering shit like three months later. You know, like, I had a [inaudible] I remember that. You know, so if that happens to come up, you know you can always communicate with me.
Yes, sir.

I'm done if you are, sir.

Yes, sir. Just swear him to his statement.

was sworn, warned, and departed.]
The purpose of this interview, is to learn about the circumstances around the aircraft mishap last week between a hornet and a C-130 based here in Iwakuni. I am assisted by from legal services and Staff Sergeant over there taking care of us as a court reporter.

Just, you know, like we talked about this morning, this investigation is the one that, you know, goes into, kind of the official record and is accessed by the Freedom of Information Act.

What I seek to understand from you is, just, kind of, like, really what you saw, and, just, kind of tell your story. You can start wherever you want. You can start the week before. You can start at the brief time. And whatever order you want. Just, kind of, tell the story. And if I have a specific question -- if it's something minor, I'll interrupt you, like an acronym or whatever. Or if I'm confused, you know, I'll just ask. I'm taking notes here, really, so I can, just, kind of, track your conversation and compare that to the others. But I just seek to confirm the facts and the circumstances surrounding the mishap.

So with that, you can.

Okay. So kind of the big picture frame of reference is that this is part of a five-day, kind of, very little longer exercise. It says five training days to it. It's going to be around-the-clock operations. So we're going to get an in-brief the week prior when generally the flow of it; the timelines, what
crews you're going to be assigned to and attached to, and what time -- what your crew days and your flight windows going to be.

I'm going to take that. Through the weekend I'm going to start adjusting to the sleep cycle. Really, the late shift is basically 8:00 p.m. to 8:00 a.m., roughly. We're going to start adjusting to that. And then, we're not going to fly for, like, the first three days, which I think is pretty wise. It takes about three days or so to get adjusted to a big timezone change.

So Wednesday night is our first flight. We are going to show up, and we are going to brief the squadron with everybody. It's going to be -- the mission is not very tactical. It's one of those administrative demonstration of -- everything unclassified here, right? Everything on an unclass level, sir?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Yeah. Just keep it unclass.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Cool. All right. So were here to demonstrate our ability to do kind of around-the-clock operations. And we're hauling some ordinance on the jet, which we've been practicing the week prior, but this is the first time were going to, kind of, do it as part of the exercise for our crew.

So a lot of the brief focused on that nighttime stuff. And then it was basically just getting the aircraft out to the range and back home safely. So we'll brief there. Then we'll walk on time. We have an odd restriction, which is we have to start any APUs after midnight due to a holiday. Which, typically, we start 30 minutes prior. This is 15 minutes prior. It really would be no factor, but it's just kind of something that's different that day.
So we're going to start our APUs up. Obviously, we're going to have a late takeoff because we're troubleshooting some issues with our flight control system. Troubleshooting goes well. We clear all the systems out. We have two healthy jets for launch, I think, like 30 minutes late, roughly. But we have plenty of range time. And we know the tanker is out there, so gas is not going to be a problem. We take off, no issues. Kind of, this is the initial assessment of how everybody is flying at night. Wingman makes a safe join, a controlled join, and it looks like he is adapting well to the night.

We put on our [inaudible] on the right. We fly out to the area. Per the ATC rep, the JOI-2, it's a standard routing out there. We cancel with Fukuoka control. Kind of another thing that is different that night is the -- we're flying "due regard" because -- we have the airspaces scheduled, but due to, I think, surveillance radar problems out there, which we knew about at that time, and we knew we were going to be due regard.

So we had an altitude cap at 29,000 feet, which we don't normally have. Not going to really play into this early on. I'll get to the post -- or the SAR effort later. So the -- we were in the range. We contact SUMO immediately on the safety flight frequency. They're where we expect them to be, which is the Itierria [ph] area, South 15. They're holding at, I think, 17,000 feet. And they roger up right away.

We tell them we're heavy with gas, so we flew to the south into the Itierria [ph] South 25 range. Get down to the border.
Turn around. Burned up enough gas at that point and we start flying north to get to the tanker.

DASH-2 picks them up from the radar first. Our radar was a little funky, but eventually we pick them up too. And then we'll bring DASH-2 into a TAC wing position for the tanker join. Initially, it'll be on the right, and then it'll step to the left side to join the tanker on the left.

We go up to the tanker. We make -- we have everyone on the radar. We'll put them up visually very early because we're all SUMO and VCDs. Our wingman, I'm not sure if they're VCD's or NVG's, but they are goggled. The C-130 goes -- once we have a visual with him and we're talking about it, he goes covert lighting. And we join up to left echelon. And then he will clear Profane 1-1 to precontact right for Profane 1-2 precontact left.

Profane 1-1 is going to -- once he's cleared for contact, he's going to get in the basket first. I know the major play is to get into the basket. It was -- the Profane 1-1 pilot did, you know, hit the basket pretty much immediately without any big deal. And then, Profane 1-2 also hit the basket on his first try. He made kind of a bigger play to get into the basket, but it wasn't anything significant. He didn't introduce a big sign wave or any of the, kind of, dangerous stuff you see when you have, like, a bad -- when you enter the basket poorly.

So it's safe. He gets on. Profane 1-1 is going to offload the gas. We're going to be satisfied first. We are going to detach. Go to echelon right. Two is going to finish up and he
is going to go to echelon left. We're talking to the tanker at this point, and we're pinned up against buoys [ph] to the northside of this area. It may have been in the northeast kind of corner. And we're going to ask him for a left-hand turn to get us to point towards the center of area. We're talking with him how we're going to depart, which is going to be straight ahead and then a climb away to get above his altitude, and get away from him so we can go train kind of to the south.

At that point, this isn't the turn. In the turn, our wingman -- as we're starting to roll out, I'm looking across and I see -- sir, are you familiar when you kind of see a wingman kind of try to get back into position, you'll see his wings waggle? And he'll try to -- because he's trying to work it back. Especially when somebody gets too acute, or too far forward. And so he starts -- you see him, again, make those corrections. And I see kind of a -- kind of slightly wing high presence. And I'm thinking -- my brain initially registers this because all I can see is a silhouette at this point. I can't distinguish canopy or any features that tell me which direction he's turning necessarily.

So at that point, you'll see him -- as I see him in the turn, I'm thinking, what's he doing. So I look inside at our scale real quick, get oriented, and I look back out. At that point, I can tell that he is -- he has got an angle of bank in. And I can now at this point pick out the canopy features. So I can tell he is -- his slight turner's roll is towards us.

At that point, I'm going to see his -- he is going to drop
back. He is going to drop aft and down slightly. And he is going to start slicing in towards Profane 1-1 and the tanker. At that point, I'm going to --

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): So what side of the tanker is he on right now?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): He is on the portside.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): On the left side?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): Yes, sir. So he is coming across. His nose has come down and aft and right and inside. It looks to me like he is doing a cross-under. And I didn't hear the pilot call for a cross-under, so I'm asking my pilot, hey, what's he doing.

At that point, by the time I realized he is -- it's turning into a dangerous situation, I give a climb call. Unfortunately -- so where our radios worked in the back is we have two toe switches. So we cue the mic by stepping on that toe -- or on that pedal and giving a comm call. So as I see him, basically, falling out of position, I give a climb call -- and I miss the pedal.

And as I do that, starts his climb. And then he is going to -- Profane 1-2 is going to contact the empennage, the rear portion of the C-130. And it's going to -- at that point, there is going to be a bright flash. I'm going to see sparks traveling upwards. And that's the last time I'm going to see Profane 1-2.

As we're climbing at this point, we psyche because Profane 1 pilot takes a slight cut away to get away from the aircraft, and then introduces a pretty steep climb to get away. And when the
canopy reel comes down and I look over, the next thing I see is SUMO 4-1 is on fire from the aft portion. And he is descending through the clouds there. I was in, at this point, a 12,000 foot overcast layer. And I see him descend through the cloud layer there. So that is the last time that I see either of those aircraft. After that, it is just kind of -- you can see see a bright light through -- the cloud layer is about 2,000 feet thick, so it's 10 to 12. You can still see a glow down there for a little bit.

At that point, we're going to establish high, 18,000 feet. Left-hand turns. As I see the impact happen, I drop a mark. We have a system of safe where we -- where our position we're in at that moment. Drop Mark 2. We climb up. And then at that point, it's to kind of get over the shock -- to process what's happening.

I pull out the Incident Commander Checklist. Page 119, go there, pull it up. And at that point, I call Fukuoka control to make a call and let them know that we've had two aircraft down. We had to pass them a lat-long. It takes a minute. Fukuoka control has a hard time processing. They're Japanese controllers. There's a little bit of slow language barrier there. They initially try to clear us back to Iwakuni, but we kind of get their attention finally. Pass them the initial lat-long for this -- for the mishap that occurred.

And then we -- at that point, we keep checking -- we check again with Fukuoka control and make sure they're pulling up the SAR. We are not super confident that they are yet. So we didn't think
White Snake, who is the control agency out there and just procedural control, we didn't think they were going to be available. But just in case -- we didn't hear them roger up when we called them earlier. But just in case, we gave them a call. And sure enough, somebody was listening. So we got in touch with White Snake. Passed them the lat-long for the mark, and then I passed them a phone number for ODO. I asked them to our ODO and get the previous AP plan and roll it on base.

So we'll alternate between Fukuoka control and White Snake as we need to pass information. Which is kind of -- anything we pass to Fukuoka control, we call White Snake to just make sure that the communication is happening there because they were a pretty calming presence. They understood what was going on. They knew how to talk.

We'll roll the back radio up to 282.8 for a standard SAR frequency. We hear beacons on guard. It's crushing it. So 243, we'll alternate it on and off as we need to communicate over our prior radio. It automatically listens so it can be very SA degrading if there's, like, a constant presence. So we will cycle that thing on and off listening for calls. And make calls on the 2828/243/1215.

And then eventually, we'll start -- we have the boatie contact channel, 16. So we start trying to contact vessels. The only person that ever rogers up to that is one guy who speaks Japanese. I couldn't communicate with him. So we try to pass information there.
We get set up -- we're hanging out at 18,000 feet. We don't see any chutes or canopies or anything like that, so we will -- I will pull up our -- we have an F-Pass page which helps us with real-time fuel planning. I pull that thing up and it's telling us that we need to hang out at about 26,000 feet and swig out so we can preserve gas.

So we were able to be eek [ph] out of another 90 minutes of F-1 station time. So we hang out there, at first trying to just acting really as a comm relay. Making sure the SAR assets coming. Making sure the on-scene commander checklist is complete. And, kind of, brainstorming ideas on how we can help the situation, or how we can find the guys. This overcast layer is preventing us from using our lighting pod to find anybody.

So we set a -- we run quick fuel planning numbers. We had done the preflights and we stuck with what we had for preflight, which was 41,000 pounds for going home. So at 65,000, we -- that's when we hit our trip refuel. And our game plan was we were going to drop a lower cloud layer and find -- see what we could find visually.

We climb back up and radio -- we have a hard time with radios below 10,000 feet at that range. So we'll drop down. We'll do a search. We'll find an initial glow. It turns out just to be a ship. We'll pass that mark before we can really resolve it. And then after that, we'll run into pick up -- looks like an IR strobe. We're only able to see it under the NVCD's, not -- we can't see it visually, just by looking under the goggles. So we're thinking this
is an IR strobe. We can't really break out what it is. We are having a hard with the pods, the quality is kind of degraded so it was a hard time picking out any detail.

So we'll go -- we'll descend and we'll go past that. Drop a mark as we go over it. We'll pass that lat-long twice, maybe, to Fukuoka control. We try to do our best there, look and searching visually. We know the winds are out of the west, so we're looking east at the sea down there. I tried to contact the ships to see if they could help us out.

We'll climb up. Once we hit that gas, we'll talk to Fukuoka control. They'll clear us up to 36,000 feet and direct Iwakuni. They really helped us out there. And we make it back here with about 2,000 pounds of gas. And the weather here wasn't super great, but we were able to get visual straight in and land here. We'll pass as we are landing -- or as we finally get in touch with the ODO and get in radio range, they'll let us know -- we'll pass them the three marks that we had. And then he will let us know that we're launching another aircraft. They pulled a crew together to go continue the on-station effort. We will contact those guys. We'll pass them all the information that we had, the marks.

And then we get the word that the first couple of SAR aircraft are already on station. So those guys will launch. We'll go ahead and shut down and go straight to, pretty much debriefing the A and B that they already had put together. So that's from preflight to landing.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : So it was your understanding when you
touched down and you landed and you were speaking to the ODO, the SAR aircraft had [inaudible]

[3.A.6]: Yeah. So they will pass them to that flight going out just to give them a heads up for de-confliction that, hey, there's already potentially four aircraft on station. I don't think they had direct contact with the SAR director yet. But I think the profane flight that got out there later was able to get in touch with them. Sorry, their call sign is "Bat" [inaudible]

[3.A.6]: Okay. Thanks. So you wouldn't mind -- it'd be helpful for us -- I'm going to kind of draw a little diagram here.


[3.A.6]: And get 1,000 words going here. Working on my C-130 drawing skills. They're still slightly raggish. So that's a C-130 dragon hose.

[3.A.6]: Yes, sir.

[3.A.6]: If you could use a pen and kind of draw, you know, like, where you were, where he was, you know, and kind of, like, try to talk us -- talk to us while you're drawing.

[3.A.6]: All right. So Profane 1-1 is going to be established echelon right. After the wing line stepped up, [inaudible] I'm set to pie off that. I can see the top of the C-130. If you could imagine the hornet, if we had crossed over the C-130, we would have cleared it. And we would have contacted the [inaudible]. This is about how high up we were stepped up.

[3.A.6]: And so what was the air refueling
altitudes? What altitude was the tanker at?

: He was at 16, I believe. I don't remember him telling me, but I think it was about 16,000. We were in the mid-teens block.

: Okay. Can you annotate that?

: Sure.

: Just draw it on the C-130 that it was at 16,000.

: And we were heading -- at the time, the [inaudible] put this on here -- so 2-7-0.

: So -- and then this jet would be at approximately -- approximate altitude? We have 16-5, or 16 [inaudible]

: More than 500 feet up. We were probably, I think, we were stepped up slightly. I couldn't tell you a number. If I had to guess --

: Sixteen plus?

: Yes. Sixteen -- whatever his altitude was plus, probably, 50 feet. So 50 to 100 feet. Maybe not 100 feet. That would be significant. So probably about 50 feet.

: Can you write that down there.

: Sure.

: Just label that 1-1?

: Yeah.

: Thanks.

: And can you kind of draw 1-2, kind of,
like, where they were supposed to be; where they started; and, kind
of, like, whatever relative path they took; and, kind of, like, where they hit the 130?

(b) (3) (A). (b) (6): So he is basically mirror us, initially.

(b) (3) (A). (b) (6): Okay.

(b) (3) (A). (b) (6): So he's -- that's where I expected him to be
and that's where he initially was.

So I -- the scale is a little off.

(b) (3) (A). (b) (6): That's okay.

(b) (3) (A). (b) (6): That makes it a little tough. I'm going to
extended this down a little bit.

(b) (3) (A). (b) (6): Yes. You can -- feel free to modify.

(b) (3) (A). (b) (6): The empennage is going to be important here.
So I'm going to -- so what I want to see is no eyesight change;
slight change in size. And then I'm going to see it in the aft; I'm
going to see it descend. That's when I see line-of-sight rates pick
up.

I'm basically drawing -- this is his --

(b) (3) (A). (b) (6): Nose track.

(b) (3) (A). (b) (6): -- nose position. Correct. His nose track.
So it's going to look like this. And then he's going to come
slightly forward and impact right about here. And it's a smoothe --
it's a continuous movement. He keeps getting bigger and then I see
aft line-of-sight rates. And then I see target aspect probably when
he's about here. I can break out that he's got a bite into C-130
essentially.
When you say have a "bite," you mean "heading"?

Slight heading bite, yeah. So it looked like a cross-under initially, if you can imagine what that looks like with the line-of-sight rate aft.

It all looks like he just kind of drifted into an aft, correct?

Yeah. He's going to contact nose to, basically, the upper -- for the stab -- horizontal stab, he's going to contact -- that kind of defeats the logic between the vertical and the left horizontal stab on the topside is where I'm going to see it.

Okay.

And then everybody kind of saw us a little different, but that's what I saw.

Now, that's okay. We just want to hear what you remember.

So that's where the contact occurred. At that point, there's going to be a flash. Goggles are -- I see sparks -- goggles are going to de-gain. There is going to be another big bloom and that's the last time I see Profane 1-2.

When did the echelon left call come in? Was he already at echelon left?

Oh, so echelon left occurred -- so once he was complete here -- he is going to request echelon left. And SUMO is going to say, approved echelon left. And he [inaudible]
So he was already there?

Yeah. He was already there in this turn.

And when you guys talked about that you were going to level out, and then go for a pull tug, do you just get out of the airspace after you're done refueling?

Yeah.

Did they confirm that? Like, [inaudible]

Yeah. So he's going to say [inaudible] and the [inaudible] is like a vertical as far as -- somebody explained it totally different, but it's going to be straight ahead climb. So we always climb away from the tank. And typically we depart high --

Okay.

-- from a tanker. You want to get to the lowest altitude before you make any turns away. In case you don't have -- you probably won't have sight of them. So he is going to say, hey, we are going to depart straight ahead and high.

And you said "he is going to say it"; who said it?

Sorry. Profane 1, the flight lead pilot is going to talk to SUMO 4-1 and say, we're going to depart straight ahead.

Did he do that? Do you remember that?

I heard this conversation happen.

Okay.
Yeah. I'm not doing it -- it's not verbatim. But I remember they talk about, we're going to go forward and climb. SUMO 4-1 is going to roger that up and say, okay, yeah, that's approved. And we talk about managing the airspace when turning the aircraft towards the center.

Okay. At any point, do you hear Profane 1-2, like, confirm that?

Profane 1-2? Profane 1-2. So on the aux radio, on the back radio, the pilot -- Profane 1-1 pilot, Profane 1-2 pilot are coordinating what they're going to do. That they're going to go forward and ahead.

Okay. So you knew your guys are communicating, you heard them communicating?

Yes. Absolutely.

What do you think about -- to the best of your recollection, is the C-130 straight and level, or turning?

He -- my perception is that they were rolling out of a turn -- out of a left-hand turn. So I can't remember if -- this is something that I've had trouble putting together in my head, is if we were actually established wing's level when this occurred, or if this was as we're rolling out.

I'm looking left over my shoulder so I don't know if there is a little bit of illusion there going on, but it feels like we're rolling out of the turn when he starts to fall out of position. When Profane 1-2 falls out of position.

Okay. All right. Good. Can we go back
a little bit? So let's talk about the week before a little bit.

So this happened on Wednesday. When did you learn about this exercise? This -- I wrote that you guys are calling it the "ULT."

Yeah. The ULT. We learned about it the week prior. So they gave an in-brief -- our Opso gave an in-brief to the crews. I can't remember if it was Thursday or Friday, but it would have been on the flight schedule. We had a meeting so that's when we found out -- that's when I got the products and started putting together some range diagrams and things like that.

All right. And when did you -- and you said you didn't fly out Monday or Tuesday?

Correct, sir.

And you -- was there a weekly flight schedule? Did, like, some kind of weekly schedule go out?

We don't really -- so there is a -- the MAG produced flows --

-- flows.

Yes. So I got some flows that were sent to me on SIPR that I had access to look at what was coming in the week.

Did that flow -- how did that flow describe this flight event? And how is that --

So the flows initially -- if there was an update, I never got the update. But the flows that I got, I would get on over the weekend on Monday were that we were going to have three flights that night. And the change to that -- what was
different was the flight schedule had us doing two flights that night, I think, as an ORM needs. Basically, I think they --

[b] (3) (A) (b) (6) : When you say "flights," do you mean for you personally? Like you were going to pit? Go back out?

[b] (3) (A) (b) (6) : Yes, sir. It was going to be a fly -- a hot load pit fly.

[b] (3) (A) (b) (6) : Okay. And were you guys the only section flying that night?

[b] (3) (A) (b) (6) : Yes, sir.

[b] (3) (A) (b) (6) : Okay. And did that flow include your ordinance and your range space and your air refueling mission and everything?

[b] (3) (A) (b) (6) : So the MAG flow included the situated fly windows. And then the -- if tankers were on the flows, they were -- they had your FRAG on it, that's your offload expected for each aircraft, and then it had your ordinances expected. It did not have ranges assigned. Mostly because that was still on kind of a fluid state on whether pending -- pending whether or not we were approved to go to [b] (6), [b] (1) or any of those places. So that was, I think, assigned by -- we knew it was going to be one of a couple places. Itierra [ph] south, Itierra [ph] north. Or if we got it, Tulson [ph] range.

[b] (3) (A) (b) (6) : When did you first see the flight schedule?

[b] (3) (A) (b) (6) : The flight schedule?

[b] (3) (A) (b) (6) : The document signed by your Commanding
Officer authorizing this flight.

[b](3) (A), (b) (6) : I saw it --

[b](3) (A), (b) (6) : Because you're coming to work like at what -- 1800?

[b](3) (A), (b) (6) : I showed up at like 7:30 -- 1930.

[b](3) (A), (b) (6) : 1930. Okay. So you leave the squadron's spaces on Tuesday -- so on Tuesday you come to work about 1930 or so?

[b](3) (A), (b) (6) : A little later. That night they had -- Tuesday was pretty standard day. I left by 8:00 a.m. and I was at work around probably 8/8:30 p.m. so.

[b](3) (A), (b) (6) : Let me make sure I understand that right. So you reported for duty at 2000 on Tuesday?

[b](3) (A), (b) (6) : Tuesday. Yes, sir. About there, 2000.

[b](3) (A), (b) (6) : And then you did ground work all night?

[b](3) (A), (b) (6) : Yeah.

[b](3) (A), (b) (6) : And then you left, sunrise-ish or so -- or sooner after?

[b](3) (A), (b) (6) : Yeah. I left about 0700 on Wednesday morning.

[b](3) (A), (b) (6) : Okay. So Tuesday -- I just gotta write this down, make sure. So you're fully ranked on the night page is what I'm getting at?

[b](3) (A), (b) (6) : Yeah.

[b](3) (A), (b) (6) : Tuesday, you got there 2000. You depart at -- I'll just write down 0800-ish Wednesday, plus or minus, you know, an hour or two. And then on Wednesday -- so when you left for
work at 0800 Wednesday morning, what did you know about what you were doing 12 hours later?

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6) : The schedule is already published. I knew that we were going to go execute this flight. There was no tanker on the schedule, so that was kind of a difference for us. I didn't see them -- I don't remember seeing them on the flows either, so I wasn't surprised we didn't have a tanker. I thought we were going to be operating when -- but we'll get that word when we show up later in the day. I'd have to check the flows -- and I'm thinking, maybe that's something I missed or I forgot there. But yeah.

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6) : No. That's fine. I'm just trying get what's in your mind.

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6) : We're not pointing fingers here.

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6) : I didn't expect the tanker. So that was because I didn't think it was on the flows. I didn't think anybody's flow that night.

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6) : Okay. So the new report for duty on the day of the day of the mishap, Wednesday, at about 1930/2000?

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6) : Yeah. About 1930. I came in a little early to work on ground work stuff. Jumps, really, actually. It was kind of flying related, so. I came into work -- basically, day 5th rolls over that night, so I was coming in to make sure --

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6) : Were you the NAVO?

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6) : Yes, sir.

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6) : That's a special job. Everybody loves a NAVO.
So I was trying to make sure we weren't going to lose our NAV capability in the middle of the night.

So you came in and did the [inaudible]

Yes, sir.

So what time is your flight brief?

We had a brief at -- I think it's 22 -- it was briefed at the schedule brief time.

Whatever it was?

Yeah.

It was about 2230 you said? Or did you say 50?

I think it was 15 on the schedule because we were supposed to have --

2215?

-- 0015 take off. So that drives two hours prior.

Okay. So when did you find out you were going to the tanker then? So you're briefed at 2215. Did you find out at the brief?

No. We found out well before that. So Profane 1-1 -- or basically the ODO came in and said, hey, SUMO 4-1 pilot has called you and wants to coordinate. Profane 1-1 pilot and senior dude in the flight lead takes -- he talks to [ph] and they pass each other's contact information. They give a quick coordination talk. They talk about where they are going to be; what they need; and what kind of off load they're looking for.
Standard stuff you talk to a tanker about. And then he's going to -- I think [ph] is going to send the tanker card to Profane 1-1 pilot. So we're going to get their CORDCARD from them.

How do you know all that?
I was in the ready room.
Okay. So you actually heard this conversation happening, or you were there?
I didn't hear the whole conversation he had, I just know that he was on the phone. I didn't listen to his conversation in detail there.

Got it.

[inaudible]
Okay. And did you -- so you said the flight schedule -- what -- do you remember what training codes were on the flight schedule?
I believe it was a 2202 for the first one, which is just a standard -- that's our -- 2202 is what you -- what we flow when it's a, like, an admin style flight.
Like a FAM?
Yeah. It's a FAM flight. That's exactly what it is, sir. 2101 [inaudible] and this would be your FAM flight. For them to do any other training, we'll up that.

Was it -- do you think that's the only code that was on there?
On the first one. On the second on we're going to have night armed reconnaissance.
Okay. What's the --

3203, I believe.

Okay. And did you actually see the original flight schedule? Or how did you get this information.

Yes, sir. They post it in the ready room. And also, it's [inaudible] so I've got my email right there. So that was passed on through email on NIPR.

Okay. Did you get an ODO brief?

Yeah. We did talk to the ODO. And we talked about the weather news, and what the previous flights had done. How things were going, generally, with the --

What kind of training -- what kind of information -- tell us a little bit about the ODO.

Yeah. We talked about whether -- I forgot what the -- I'm trying to remember specifics. I don't remember any significant [inaudible] sticking out. So it -- we talked about the weather, overcast layers. But generally, it was new VFR, VFC. We talked about the range, whether winds out of the west. And then he talked about -- he just reminded us of the kind of special restriction we had, which was to start the APUs after midnight.

Why do you think that was?

The restriction?

Yeah.

I think it has something to do with either our federal holiday or a Japanese holiday. A lot of times there be noise restrictions where they don't want us to turn engines -- or if
this was a -- I don't really understand where it came from. It was never explained to me why we had it, but it was passed down from, I believe, from the MAG.

: Okay. So did -- I'm sure you've stood ODO a fair amount at your squadron.

: Yes, sir.

: So tell me about the schedule change process at VMFA-242.

: So if we're doing anything like changing air crews -- this -- so if we're changing air crew or any significant changes to the schedule like big changes to times, mission, or if significant changes in location. If we have a bunch of ranges, this won't be a big deal. Usually you have to -- if we have any ranges scheduled, you can use the ranges. But if it's a change in air crew -- absolutely.

Anything that's going to, basically, affect ORM. You got to give it to the CO and get CO approval. If he is unable or not -- or out of hand, we'll go to the XO. I've never had to go past more than the Opso to get approvals to changes. They'll mark down on our corrected flight schedule say like, okay, CO. Or anything like that?

: Okay. And was the air refueling that night -- the air refueling tanker code, was that something that's considered a significant change? Or is that just kind of administrative?

: Yeah. Because they were part of the exercise,
I don't think -- we wouldn't normally consider that a big change to the schedule. So because they were generally operating exercise and we knew tanking would be potentially one of the evolutions that -- it doesn't seem like it would be a significant change.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : And so you were informed about the air refueling. I'm just trying to understand what the communication passed. So the communications passed to the crew was VMGR representative calling the 242 ODO?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Yes, sir.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Hey man, we'd like to tank tonight and per the flow and I'd like to speak with the crew and provide the coordination card.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : I think their crew -- and this is why I would love to go back and see the flows again. I think their crew was like, we're out there, you tank hornets tonight. I think they already knew this was coming. This wasn't like they changed their training at the last minute.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Yeah.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : That was the impression I got. So he calls and says, hey, I'm going to be out there; can I talk to your flight lead so that we are on the same page.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Okay. Great. Any other issues you want to -- or observations or comments about the evening, or leading up to, that you would like to share?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : No, sir.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : ?
None, sir.

So you got off easy because we've already heard the story twice, you know. And you're just kind of confirming the story. And everything kind of lines up, so that's good. So you've got the spelling of my last name. It's just like "[b] (3) (A), (b) (6)." I'm in the GAL.

Okay.

So don't send it to my son. So if you remember something or have a concern, or feel like you left something out or misstated something, you can always contact me and we can do a follow-up interview, and whatever meeting you would like.

Yeah.

So the door is always open to discuss this. We're going to include your diagram in our notes, so I'd like you to initial.

Just initial [inaudible]

[inaudible] we had everybody draw diagrams.

Okay.

Just to -- those are good.

Everybody sees something a little different.

Yeah. That's right because it's kind of, like, what you remember seeing. It's not what happened. It's what you remember happening. And that's okay. It's going to be [inaudible].
(b)(3)(A), (b)(6): Something that's on the diagram that I -- there's something that's a question none of us can -- or that I can't remember. If the other guys know, that would be great. I don't know if their strobes are still out, at this point, when this occurs. Just letting you know. I don't know if that -- the strobes are out.

(b)(3)(A), (b)(6): You don't know --

(b)(3)(A), (b)(6): I don't -- I can't remember if they retracted them. I wasn't paying attention to it specifically because we were already set up here. I was thinking about the [inaudible] -- I was thinking ahead for the air space, so I wasn't really paying attention to whether or not those were out. I figured that was something that we were going to -- that I was trying to remember. We never got a [inaudible] from 1-2. If that affects anything at all. I'm just --

(b)(3)(A), (b)(6): No. That's good. Thanks for sharing that. We'll include that. Depending on the airplane, some of them may have -- I know a KC-10 that's like [inaudible] -- they pull in real fast and the new J's pull in pretty quick. It can happen very quickly.

(b)(3)(A), (b)(6): How long after you had finished refueling before the incident?

(b)(3)(A), (b)(6): If I remember this correctly, because I don't -- I'm having a hard time remembering how this airspace was working at this point, but I remember that we were on the border. And we're done fueling and basically just going into this turn.
So I think it's about a turn you were done fueling?

Correct. Yeah.

Were you starting release and you were in formation before you started turning?

Yes. We were establishing left and right echelon when we had the turn.

Okay.

was sworn and departed.]
conducted an interview of for the purposes of the JAGMAN investigation to the 242 -- 152 mishap that happened last week.

I'm accompanied by . Did I say that right?

: Close, sir. You're good.

: ?

: That's why you go by . And -- and [sic] over here.

So what I'd like to do, -- just give me the next two hours -- or so as much time as you want. We can stop at any time -- and just kind of tell us kind of what happened. You know, just -- the only information that I have about this as of now is what I just got from , so I've deliberately had no other contact. I was in Hawaii when this happened, so I was not at the Wing Headquarters during the recovery or whatever. So I don't know very much about it. You can start wherever you like. If you want to start at the brief, if you want to start the week before the brief, or wherever you're comfortable starting and just kind of take us up through
until you initiated the ejection.

: Okay. Is there any -- obviously, I've never done one of these before. Is there some type of -- exactly what is it that you're looking for?

Is this going to be like you question and then I answer.

: No. This is story time, so just tell me the story.

: Okay.

: Start wherever you want and tell me what you think. I'll ask you a few guided questions as we go along. I may pause you to ask you to clarify something at the time --

: Sure.

: In order to understand, this is --

: All right. I'll just start where I think it makes the most sense, if that's all right?

: Yeah.

: Let me just put my cell phone up. It's a pink cell phone. It was donated to me. I was sitting in salt water for too long. Anyway, we saw the -- you know, obviously you have the radar side of the tanker inside the interior south. We were training down there. It's a training air-space, obviously, to south-east of where we're located. The join was the benign. It was
nothing out of the ordinary. It was the tanker was in the left hand turns. We joined another tanker. They started to rollout. If anything, I thought that we could have probably heated it up a little bit. I felt like we actually went were farther in fueling than normal, but it was nothing that I was concerned about.

I came up to the tanker. So the C-130, obviously, they had the two droves behind it. Soup goes to the right; we go to the left. Pretty uneventful tanking. I was actually pretty impressed that -- again, junior pilot. A lot of junior pilots have usually a decently hard time. We've tanked behind a C-130 before. He was a basket. He moves around a lot. Once you get antsy, it's an easier to stay in, kind of, thing.

I was impressed that we had no issues. We're tanking and then we started a left-hand turn. Again, no problems with on the basket. We're in the left-hand turn. I just remember it being just really dark. We were zero lux that night? The moon was below the horizon, which is really dark. At one point, I took my NVGs and just flipped them up to kind of see what I could see with my bare eyes as we were plugged. Just to kind of see -- the tanker could barely make out the vert stab as we're behind midnight. The tanker was midnight. Obviously, we were midnight -- I flipped them back down. We were on NVCs again. So then as we roll out, we come out
of the basket just a little early. Again, no big issues. I've seen some pilots come out of the basket all the time. Not a huge deal. I didn't -- I was not concerned at all. And it was to the point where -- I mean, you've come out of a basket, sir. You're probe is in and, kind of, the basket starts flailing around if you have enough torque on it. It was just nice and easy out of the back; no issues.

And then, this is where my recollection of the count -- of the account. Obviously, the A and B is privileged, but it's -- this is kind of where I'm beating myself up because it starts to get kind of fuzzy -- the thing that I can't remember is:

I read the BUNO number, the assigned BUNO number and it depends on your TCC inside the cockpit whether or not who is going to read it. A lot of times the pilots will read your BUNO number to the tanker. It just depends.

So this night it was dark. I asked him, "Hey man, do you want to read this?" and he was like, "sure." He read the BUNO number and then that was the last comm call that I can recollect. I remember there being comm, but I can't remember what was said.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): So roughly in space where are you right now?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): So right now, we're left of stern behind the
tanker. That was my essay as I'm reading the buno number.

: Okay. So he asked you to read the BUNO number?

: He didn't ask.

: So again, it's more of a TCC thing.

: TCC is a tactical crew checklist. What is that?

: Sorry. Tactical crew coordination inside the cockpit.

At this point, I'm -- I'm trying to explain this. If you go into the 22, you kind of know how it is. You have a loophole in the jet and the single-seat guys. Obviously, they're not used to having somebody behind them, kind of, helping them out with whatever.

: Yeah.

: So it's my habit pattern to see who's going to read the BUNO number and a lot of times pilots will take pride in -- which they should be. The pilot should own the comms behind the tanker one-hundred percent because they're the ones, you know, driving around behind the tanker they're the ones throwing the probe in the basket, et cetera.

But a lot of times, depending on what's going on, I'll
take just the BUNO number just because it's easy and it takes something away from -- something from he -- now he can focus on something else.

So I remember reading the BUNO number and.

[O (3) (A), (B) (6)]: Did you arrange to do that pre-flight or is that realtime?

[O (3) (A), (B) (6)]: So my habit pattern is to always ask the pilot who's going to read it, but the timing of it is not a habit pattern if that makes sense, sir.

[O (3) (A), (B) (6)]: So that night, did you ask as it was asked?

[O (3) (A), (B) (6)]: Yep. It was, like, almost immediately --

[O (3) (A), (B) (6)]: The tankers, like, rippling noises or whatever he said and you said, [O (3) (A), (B) (6)]: do you want me to take it," and he said "yeah."

[O (3) (A), (B) (6)]: And I already had it written down on my kneeboard card, ready to go like if I had to read it. So I'd read it real quick. I have a tendency to talk too fast on the radio so I don't know if it was too fast or whatever. They didn't ask for it again, so I'm guessing they got it down.

So then, the last thing I remember -- and this is kind of why I beat myself up -- because I just cannot remember -- I can't
remember the comm between us and the tanker and at this point.

: That's fine. Just tell us what you remember.

: The last thing I remember was the position of the tanker. We were stepped up and to the right of the tanker. And I remember looking down at the tanker, and I remember feeling that we had enough lateral de-confliction as well as altitude de-confliction away from the tanker. And then I remember looking over at , which is our lead aircraft at this point. I start to transition my scan. I'm on the goggles the whole time. And then the next thing I remember was my body being slammed up against the inside of the cockpit. There was a flash of orange-yellow light. My immediate response was to reach down and pull the handle. I felt -- I'm sorry -- to include there, what felt like there was a wind on my face almost. And it was -- somebody asked me before, like, how did you know that you needed to eject. I can just tell you that -- that is the most violent thing that I have ever felt in my life and, you know, sir, these things are not meant to feel that amount of violence. It was just an immediate reach.

I pulled the handle. The next thing I see is another flash of orange light, which is obviously the ejection seat going off. At this point, the next thing I remember was dropping down
into the chute. I remember hearing the Herc overhead. It did not sound abnormal. It sounded like a normal C-130 flying overhead to me.

I didn't see ours yet. I didn't see [b](3) shoot -- I'm sorry -- [b](3) was my pilot. I didn't see the [b] jet, which obviously if he's doing what he's supposed to be doing. He's not supposed to -- I'm not supposed to see him at that point anyway. And it was dark, but I had decent visibility. I could make out the cloud layer from what I remember. And I could, I felt like in that position, at that space and time, I would have been able to see if there was something to see, if that makes sense. And I didn't see anything and then from there it's just the whole hitting the water, popping off pen flares, getting in the raft story, which I don't know if you guys even care about that shit.

[b](3) (A), (b) (6): We care, but that's not what we're here to look at. So we don't have to get into that.

Diagrams are helpful for us. If you're willing, would you be willing to, like, draw out the C-130. Something kind of like this. Now that's kind of a C-130 wing line, if you recall.

[b](3) (A), (b) (6): It's kind of hard to explain because I felt like there was a -- I know that you guys are recording everything.

[b](3) (A), (b) (6): Yeah.
Yeah, it's hard to draw too.

Okay.

It was more of a vertical and, like --

Let's talk about that. Which side of the aircraft were you refueling?

We were left to stern. We were on the left side of the aircraft.

Do you remember releasing from the drop casket?

I do.

ATC: As planned, right? Like we're done getting gas or did you fall out?

Like I said, we fell out just a little early and I think --

ATC: Was it your intent to reengage and get more gas were you just going to call it good?

Yeah. We were going to call it good because at that point we only came out 1000 pounds below what we planned. So the whole point of the mission was a proof of concept kind of thing. To go out and fly that late and we knew that we had enough gas to accomplish what we were supposed to accomplish.

Did you discuss that with Captain
-- so you come out of the basket and did you have a conversation with him about that?

: It was so benign, I think. The ICS comm was something like, "Oops."

Like I told him, right. Here's the basket and here's the probe. If the pilot is egregiously pulling this thing away and falls out this thing will snap and start flailing around. If it was something like that, there would have been more of a conversation inside the cockpit, like, "hey man, like, get away, or something. There would have been a conversation. It was -- the basket was here and the probe did just one of these. And in hindsight, you know, we were in a left hand turn. He was a little bit back on the power, probably, in this left hand turn. As we rolled out, he was still probably a little bit back on the power. Which makes -- obviously, all this is hindsight. 20/20 kind of thing. It makes sense now. It was probably still -- didn't correct -- increase a little bit which caused us to just kind of slowly nudge out.

: So for a moment, I just want to go over what you actually remember.

: Yeah.

: So you come out of the refueling. What do you remember happening next?
I remember coming up just reading the -- I remember reading the BUNO. Obviously, the conversation happened inside the cockpit.

So then your eyes were down in your knee board?

Yes, at that point.

Okay.

And then again, the next thing I remember was transitioning my scan to now the Herc and then the position of us being high and to the right of the Herc with enough de-confliction to feel, like, I could transition down my scan to the -- sorry -- our lead; the other aircraft. And then the next thing is the, obviously, the subsequent impact.

So you looked left and that's when you saw the Herc?

I never saw the Herc during the impact.

No, I was saying prior to. So you've read off the BUNO number on your knee board --

Yup, so I look up --

and you said you changed your scan.

Yup. Look up. At this point we're still, what I gage to be left of stern.
So you see the Herc on your right?

Yes.

All right.

And at some point we start to transition over to the right and I feel like we are laterally de-conflicted, as well as de-conflicted from altitude, from the C-130.

So you felt like you were above the Herc?

I felt like -- yeah, I felt like I was. And I --

Did you see it?

Oh yeah. I mean I had the Herc in my goggles. I was looking at it.

Now you're looking out the left side of the aircraft?

Yup.

Now let me ask. When you look out, especially [inaudible]. When you look out the left side of the canopy through your goggles, what part of the Herc do you see? Do you see the rutter, do you see the jump door?

Yes, I see the whole thing. I mean, I got the wing line. I got the vert staves. I got the -- I got everything
that I can see.

O (3) (A), (b) (6): So you're kind of like back here somewhere?

O (3) (A), (b) (6): That's what I felt. The more I question myself, the more I'm trying to figure out. You know, obviously, like, I don't know if you've ever been in a mishap like this, sir; but it's like you just -- you keep beating the living shit out of yourself because you just can't fucking remember.

O (3) (A), (b) (6): Yeah.

O (3) (A), (b) (6): As well as with the loss of life. But -- yeah so -- sorry -- yeah I remember being at least from what -- I don't know if it's right or not, but like I thought that we were on the right side of the aircraft when it happened.

O (3) (A), (b) (6): And by right, you mean starboard?

O (3) (A), (b) (6): Yes, sorry. Yeah, I thought that we were --

O (3) (A), (b) (6): Not correct. Okay. So I'm drawing while you're talking okay, but I'm pointing to the left side of the airplane which is where you refueled.

O (3) (A), (b) (6): Yup.

O (3) (A), (b) (6): And then somehow you made it kind of like over here somewhere maybe?

O (3) (A), (b) (6): I believe that's what happened.
Okay. And do you believe the C-130 was straight and level during this time that your jet went from there to there, or do you believe that it was turning, or is it hard for you to remember?

There was a -- I think there was a left hand turn somewhere after we came out of the drogue. Where that was in time and space is still -- it's hard to remember, but in my essay at this point, which obviously is -- obviously, the essay is not accurate because we hit another aircraft, but it was strait and level.

So my old man, he was a tomcat guy he was a skipper 213 and ended up retiring as a full bird. And he said, you know, he's done a few of these and he told me that, you know, your brain has a weird way of processing things like this and he said, you know, you'll find that as the days go on, you know, you'll start unlocking more information and that's the thing that's really driving me nuts. It's like nothing else is like -- nothing else is unlocked. And I don't know when it happened, I can't -- I went to the hospital and my entire head was swollen on the left side of my face. I took a pretty, I guess, decent blow when it impacted the -- honestly the ride down in the chute was uneventful. So I don't know if that plays into the recollection piece. I would like to think that I
could, you know, we -- aviators always pride ourselves on our
debriefing, you know, and having the essay that was there and being
able to teach to it later. So it's pretty frustrating.

(d) (3) (A), (b) (6)]: Yeah. I understand. Did your dad come
out and see you yet; have you seen your dad?

(d) (3) (A), (b) (6)]: He told me that he was, like, on the way. And
I told him [inaudible]. I don't want you to have to stop everything
that you're doing to focus on me. Obviously, there's other people
in this mess that obviously need this more than I do.

(d) (3) (A), (b) (6)]: Can we back up a little bit?

(d) (3) (A), (b) (6)]: Yes, sir.

(d) (3) (A), (b) (6)]: Let's go back to like a week before.

(d) (3) (A), (b) (6)]: Okay.

(d) (3) (A), (b) (6)]: Would that be all right?

(d) (3) (A), (b) (6)]: Yeah. Absolutely.

(d) (3) (A), (b) (6)]: Let's talk about like squadron operations
and flight schedules and stuff like that. So this is kind of
unusual; right? You're flying early in the morning, you know, the
time of day that we really don't normally fly.

(d) (3) (A), (b) (6)]: Yup.

(d) (3) (A), (b) (6)]: When did you learn that you would be
flying at middle of your [inaudible], you know, morning and noon?
I think it was either the Thursday or Friday prior. I'm not exactly sure. Names were up on the board in OPS. And so, in all honest, we're just kind of going in and seeing where the names were stacking up.

So tell me what you mean by that, "names up on the board." So did the squadron break up into like two; day and night team or --

It was --

-- shift, one, two, three, four?

-- yeah it was like a day and midnight kind of thing.

Okay.

And so we knew that MAG was directing us to do this ULT. We knew that it was coming despite Vigilant Ace being canceled due to the, you know, the sensitivities there with the political nature there in . We, I think, originally had tried to schedule going into , but the units down there, for whatever reason, told us that we couldn't fly in there.

So we were directed and it was that Friday night where I stayed up super late. Something until like 3 or 4 in the morning to try to start working that sleep schedule.

Did you work on Saturday or Sunday or
were those days off?

: Those were days off, sir.

: Okay.

: But still trying to, obviously, stay up late, wake up a little later. I have . They are . I live on a single floor apartment. So, obviously, it's, you know, you want to sleep, but you get up and you have kids.

: I know, I have .

: Yeah. So then I started just working the sleep cycle and it was honestly a pretty uneventful week. It was just a -- we started working at night.

: So what time, roughly, did you report to your work spaces on Monday?

: I think it was something like 7:30 at night. I can't remember. I obviously did the, like, 72 hour A&B thing and I --

: 1930 ish or so?

: Yeah. I think that sounds about accurate.

: And then what do you think you did on Tuesday?

: It was the same thing. It just all blended in. The whole week kind of blended in with each other. So we stayed up
all night, I came home, you know, went to sleep, got up, saw the

, made dinner, put the to sleep, went to work. It's

surprisingly hard to get work done as the Logistical Officer in the
middle of the night. So it was, honestly, kind of useless.

: It was kind of just jacking around?

: I mean, I can write as many emails as I want, but I'm not going to get a response until tomorrow. And I am going
to be asleep.

: Right.

: So, you know, we just, you know, try to knock
out as many administrative things as I could. The -- and then just
every day was the same thing. Go home around -- once people started
kind of coming in for day work. And try to do some type of pass
over -- or, you know, turnover with my guys coming in. I have my
guys on kind of an off-shift work as a two seat squadron, we're not
allocated to as many people in the four as a single seat squadron.
Which really hurts us, obviously being here on constant deployment,
if you will. So all I had -- I had a Lance Corporal that was in the
states on leave and I had a Corporal and a Lance Corporal. And that
was all that was running the four shop at that point. And then the
MAG tasked us at that point to now send one of my Corporals down to

So it was me and a Lance Corporal. So I had to silk the
shifts to where there was somebody always in the shop, you know, to handle daily S4, logistical things. Which could be anything from putting a service request for something in the squadron all the way to all I need is, you know, shit paper for the fucking head.

So we're just kind of doing that for the week. It was pretty benign. There's really not a lot to talk about other than just come home, sleep, wake up, see the, make dinner.

-- what do you know about his 72 hour history?

He didn't talk a whole lot about it, but I mean he lives off base. His was here, so we -- there was a couple guys, we were discussing, you know, how there sleep schedule was working and he didn't have anything remarkable. It's a lot easier to sleep when you don't have kids. So, you know, we felt like he was up and chipper. And I didn't have any reason to suspect anything.

Did he appear to be in good health?

Yeah. You know, the people that are asking me like, you know, like fricken if you had -- would you have gotten in that jet with Like, yeah, I'd do it again. Like, I had full trust and faith in confidence. Like, if I didn't, I wouldn't have got in the jet. You know?
Like, I'm pretty thick headed. I'm a pretty stubborn kind of guy. Like, I have no [inaudible] telling somebody that this is unsafe and we're not doing this. And I had total confidence that we were obviously going to come back together, or else, I would have fucking put a stop to it.

What about medications or, you know, any idea if he was taking pseudoephed or had a cold or anything weird like that?

No. He looked totally fine. There was absolutely no indication whatsoever that there was anything going on with In fact he was excited to fly. You know, we were walking to the jet and we're, you know, [inaudible] you know, being myself and he's like, [inaudible]. He's all excited to fly and he was trying to, you know, pump me up. Like he was just that kind of guy. He was very energetic. He --

You'd say he's enthusiastic about flying?

He was very positive.

When did you -- tell me more about you mission, and when you learned about your mission, and how you prepared for it.

Yeah. So, I think, originally, earlier in the
week we were supposed to get the seaside AVCAV which was going to allow us to do CAS overhead the airfield --

 Commander: This airfield?

 Officer: Yes, sir.

 Which is -- I've done it in the past before at night. It's actually pretty good -- it's really good training. Especially the people that know the lay out of the base. They do some decent urban CAS. Especially, when guys start driving around the vehicles and get to really exercise the size of the pod, you know.

 Then, obviously, the geometry of the jet is always super difficult in the kind of scenario, I'm sorry. I'm kind of going down a rabbit hole with the urban CAS stuff.

 Commander: No, that's good.

 Officer: But, I think, that got turned off at some point during the week. I don't know -- I don't remember when. And then it ended up being a -- I think it ended up turning into like a proof of kind of thing where we were just supposed to go out.

 Commander: So when you were going to do the urban CAS, was that going to be a cast tank CAS?

 Officer: I know that there is supposed to be tankers later on in the week, but I don't think the plan had been entirely ironed out yet.
Okay.

And then, walking into the event, I think it was two hours prior to event, we didn't think that we had tankers. And then the -- we got word that we actually did have gas on station. So then we started working that piece. We got the tanker car. Did the standard, you know, logistical, I guess, conversation with the 152 in order to get all the information, you know, the standard stuff for. Like I said, the altitudes, frequencies [inaudible] game plan. All that stuff. So and that was -- obviously, as the flight lead, took that. And then, you know, coordinated that. And I remember he handed me the coordination card. And I have the SUMO's coordination card on and I had it on my kneeboard of that. Actually flew off somewhere during the -- somewhere during the handle pull.

Okay. So I think what I just learned is you found out that you guys were on the tanker at the brief.

It wasn't at the brief, sir. I think it was like an hour or two prior to the brief.

A few hours prior to the brief.

It was more than enough time, I would say, to get -- I mean, you're never going to say no to gas. You know, being a Harrier guy.
: Liquid fun, baby.

: Yeah.

: So you felt pretty comfortable with the mission?

: Yeah. Like I've told many different people before, if I didn't feel comfortable, you know, that's the reason why we do RN. That's the reason why we brief. That's the reason why we have the TCC conversation with your pilot before you fly. There's reasons why we do all that stuff. So, you know, despite being tasked by the MAG to fly at that time. You know, yeah, absolutely, or else I wouldn't have been -- I wouldn't have sat in that seat.

: Do you remember what night vision you had that night?

: I had the NVCDs. So they're the, like, the smart version, if you will, of our NVGs. They plug into the jets and gives you a heads up display in the actual goggles. Airspeed, altitude, and that kind of stuff.

: Is that system operating for you?

: Yes, sir.

: Technical question about the hornet, I'm not familiar. If that system malfunctions, would a display on both
your system malfunction as well as the pilots, or would it be possible for it? Because I've heard about it sometimes they can invert or malfunction.

Is it possible for it to malfunction on one and not the other or?

☐ (3) (A), (b) (6): Yes, sir. It is. So just to tell you, we were flying out of Australia for Operation Pitch Black, Southern Frontier. We were on climb out. Goggle up images. Inverted pilot. Nope, nothing.

☐ (3) (A), (b) (6): Yours inverted, the pilot's was good?
☐ (3) (A), (b) (6): Yes, sir.
☐ (3) (A), (b) (6): So when the image inverts, tell me -- I want to learn more about that. What does that mean?
☐ (3) (A), (b) (6): It's, essentially, exactly what you would think. The entire image just rotates.

☐ (3) (A), (b) (6): So up is down and down is up?
☐ (3) (A), (b) (6): Yup. And it's very easy to fix. It's was literally a up, down, and it was back to normal.

☐ (3) (A), (b) (6): And it reset it.
☐ (3) (A), (b) (6): And I didn't even say anything to my pilot when it happened down in Australia, because we were joining up as a four ship. Not really a time to start talking or that kind of stuff when
he's doing it. And it was at night, obviously. And then, I was like, "man, I've never seen this before. I thought it was like a -- I thought it was a hoax. A few people keep talking about this NVG VCD inversion." And he was like, "oh shit, you got it?" and I was like, "yeah, I just flipped them up, put them back down. We're fine." But, I don't think -- maybe I'm just making an assumption. I'll just give you guys the data and you guys can figure it out. But we never, that was -- we never had the conversation inside the jet about NVCD inversion.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): And that -- the night of the mishap?
(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): Yup. We never did.
(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): Do you feel like if his goggles inverted, he would have jumped on ICS and went, "my goggles are inverted."?

Do you feel like he would have said something?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): I believe he would. He was a --
(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): You don't recall him saying that?
(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): He was an easy guy to fly with, easy guy to talk to. In the jet, he had -- he didn't have any issues. There's some pilots that you fly with that are, you know, pretty -- I would say, like proud or whatever. You know, you always have different types of personalities that you fly with. He was the type that, if there was something wrong, he would have said something.
Do you know if his system was fully working that night; NVG wise?

Yeah. I mean, so, again, the TCCP says -- you only say something if you have to. You know, he never mentioned it.

So if he didn't say it and he was able to make every single join that night safe, and, obviously, when I say joined, obviously, something happened, but we weren't joining -- you know were I'm trying to go with this. But every join that I felt up to the impact was safe. There was no reason to talk about it.

Okay.

You know, I've flown with a lot of pilots and if people make unsafe joins, they get a little hairy. Usually, then I will start making the conversations in the cockpit like, "Hey man, like next time slow down a little bit." Like or -- you know once you start to see and giving him sight pictures or whatever start to explain to him. You know, like, "hey man, once you see this let's just pull the back on the throttles a little but. It's no big deal or try to say something. And I didn't have to say anything to him.

Did you guys feel any specific pressure to fly that night? Or did you feel like it was a do or die flight?

I mean, there's always -- there's always pressure, but I -- this squadron is in the best place that I've seen
it. I've been -- I think there's only two other guys that have been in the squadron at this, well I guess, you know, obviously 's director. But, like, we -- as far as the family goes now, like, there's only a couple guys that have been in as long as the squadron, you know, because we're cycling out. But I've never seen a squadron this good and I say that because if I had any misgivings about flying that at night, I know 100 percent if I was like -- if I said "Hey man, this is too risky" and I said "I don't want to fly." I know 100 percent that the command would back me up. I know 100 percent, and I haven't -- when I say that, like, I have no, like, reservations at all. I know 100 percent. I know and , sort of, the CO, XO, Ops O, I know 100 percent -- they would be like "All right man. That's fine." And I've never seen a squadron this good before. It's -- I PCS in June and joking around with the wife, I was like "Babe, I want to extend out here" and she wants to go back to the states. She said "you better fucking not."

: Those are fighting words. I've got one of those too.

: Yeah. We have a really good family and unfortunately this incident has only showed how good everybody's been, so yeah.

: Just the description of the rescue
attempt.

: Yeah, if you could just kind of highlight some aspects of the search and rescue?

: Sure.

: So you landed at the surface of the water, and your LPU's inflated, I assume. And your sea wires is activated and your chutes separated, sea pants hanging on the cord; is that kind of where we're at?

: Yeah, if you want I can just go -- I can just go from dropping down in the chute.

: That's all right.

: So I failed the same portion of the swim qual every four years and after -- and I re-do it which is the swim in your full gear and pull the beaded handle and the LPU doesn't inflate and you have to grab and manually inflate and I have to do it twice every year.

So the first thing that I did was grab the [inaudible] and inflate because I knew I was going to need every single second all the way down to the water to inflate this thing. But the gear worked perfectly so I was pretty happy with that. At this point, again, I hear the aircraft overhead, I know that [b](3) (A), (b) (6) is about to step the on-seat commander if the Herc hasn't already. Or if the
Herc is going to take it we can't -- in my SA, at this point is that the Herc is still flying well. And I'll get down -- I'll get to the point when I found out, I guess, later in the story.

So I pull out my -- start reaching around trying to find stuff, actually pretty hard to do when your freaking LPU is all the way up to your face. I pull out my pen flares, throw a pen flare in the air, at this point I'm just trying to just launch one off to let Soup know that I'm -- that somebody's conscious. Light one off, at this point, I see a light to, kind of like, my right and obviously you're kind of, spinning around here at the mercy of whatever wind is going on at that time. It wasn't overly windy. It was calm from what I remember and I think it's so I started yelling for and spent what felt, like, three to four minutes trying to do that.

: You're still in the sill now?

: Still in the canopy, sir. We don't get a response, obviously, so we start to transition my scan to, believe it or not, I tried to take my boots off because I -- the steeled toe boots in the water actually suck. So I try to take my boots off and I couldn't get my laces off that were underneath my G-suit. As I was hanging in the canopy. So I gave up on that. Pull out the radio, I just literally wanted to inventory everything that I had on
me, to make sure that once I hit the water, I had an idea of where everything was and I wasn't fooling around too much, if you will.

Obviously, my flashlight is still on. I think NVGs are gone. So other than that, I think at this point I have my pen flares and I tried to pull another one out and the little, like, red cartridge thing actually ended up dropping, like, three of them. I was really pissed off. So I take the remaining and I stuff them in my mouth. And then honestly the -- I would say the -- people were like, oh were you scared. And it's kind of weird when you're in those type of situations. I wasn't scared. It was a task oriented situation to where you knew there were certain tasks that you had to complete now in the next however many long minutes. And you knew that you had to complete them in order to survive. And so that was kind of like where my brain was.

Until I went through the freezing layer and I couldn't feel my fingers for like four or five minutes. And then I was like, "All right. Now I'm kind of scared." And then -- but, I pop out of the freezing layer. I start to be able to regain, you know, some dexterity and during that I had stowed stuff because I didn't want to drop anything. Everything was still attached to the liner, but, you know, you're kind of in that situation where you're like, "dude this is, like, you know, this is pretty dire." [Inaudible.]
I start to come down. I see what looks to be a boat, like, off my left. And then I see another light. I'm not quite sure what it is because it's only a single light, but off my left I see multiple lights. And I can kind of make out what looks to be some type of structure. I can't tell you exactly what it was. It just looked like it was scaffolding or something like that with lights on it. And it had this type of horizontal component to it. So I was, like, it's got to be a boat, it can't be a buoy, that kind of stuff. So I launch another pen flare thinking, you know, they're going to see -- they must have seen the wreckage, they must have seen something go down. They must have seen the fire ball, they must have seen something. So I launch another pen flare. At this point, I think I have two left. And then, it obviously didn't work and I pull out my smoke and I light that thing off. At this point I'm just trying to do anything to get anybody's attention because I'm about to go in the water and -- yeah.

So I light that thing off, and then the water actually comes as a surprise just because you're at night, you don't know when you're going to hit so I smack into the water to get your part of the story, sir. Sea wires do what they're designed to do. Obviously, already manually inflated the LPU so that's good and hit the water. Kind of take a second. Like, okay, I'm not sinking.
LPU is holding. Like, okay, like, take a breather. Start reaching around for my C-pin, the -- for you man -- the C-pin is designed to -- when you pull it, the raft is supposed to drop, which actually it's a CO2 canister and then the raft is supposed to inflate as you're falling.

Due to the night factor, obviously, I had no idea where the water was so I pull the lanyard out, yank, the raft inflates. I can tell you, sir, it's a lot more difficult getting into a raft with your LPU inflated than I thought it was going to be. I don't know if you've ever done that other than the, obviously, mandatory water training. It took me a long fucking time to get in that raft. And -- sorry, backup -- it felt like I was in the fucking chute for an hour. And I'll note, obviously, your brain judges time differently.

Well how much do you weigh?

145, sir.

Yeah, so probably at your weight, probably 800 feet per minute, 15,000 feet. That's like 20 minutes. That's a long fucking time.

It felt like forever, yeah. And I'm sorry -- the -- I pull this thing out -- it inflates, works awesome. Jumping onto get into the raft after an undetermined period of time, I don't
know how long it took, again, my time is skewed.

Did you disconnect the C-pin from your harness or is the C-pin still in your ass or de-aft I mean.

Yes, sir. I disconnected it, obviously, before I tried to get in.

Okay.

So I pulled that off, jump in the raft, once I finally get in the raft -- and then so at this point I had pretty much pulled everything out of my pockets, which led me to be like a giant fishing lanyard or fishing hook. The -- and so, like, I had been essentially tangled up in the yellow lanyard from me to the raft, et cetera. So -- which led me to -- I knew that C-pin was up there and at this point the C-pin was kind of -- it was in a way that as it was -- it was obviously sunk underwater -- that it was pulling the raft down. So I pulled the C-pin up and then I would sit there with it, but at this point I started to realize how bad I was shaking because, again, I don't know how long I was in the water for before I got on the raft. But I was -- I was decently cold and then my scan then started to transition to "okay, I need to get warm."

And, believe it or not, my apple watch survived the ejection, or else I wouldn't have had anything other than, I guess,
the radio but the -- I was looking at my watch, obviously my phone -- tried to pull my phone out but it didn't work. So I started transitioning my scan to "I need to stay warm. I need to stay warm." So I slice the C-pin off; toss it in the water; get it off, just get it out; undo all the knots; spend a really long time doing that; and then I finally get in the raft, and then at this point, I convince myself that that boat is coming towards me, which it was not.

So I launched my last pen flare and so I'm like "All right. Well fuck, no big deal. Light works, have my radio, pull out my radio. Obviously, it's Clover on the 243 and the 121-5. The other C-pin, at this point, I still didn't know that the other Herc was obviously transmitting the beacon on those frequencies too. I thought it was just so I'm trying to follow the radio and, kind of, put that down. I'm like, okay -- how do I get -- okay, it's kind of like this series of, like, grab out the radio, try to figure it out, okay, huddle, get warm. So I start taking my helmet off and start bailing off the water, I think -- sorry -- the farther away I get from the story, there are sequence of events that aren't exactly, again, in line, if you will. But, there is a portion when I'm taking my helmet, and I'm bailing out the water, you know, from the raft because the swells, they weren't any bigger than what you
would expect, I would think, for being that far out into the water.

But the -- it was enough to, like, splash over the side and I could tell you, sir, that the little see worthy aspect of the raft, I don't know if you remember, there's a little -- there's like a little canopy you can put up, it doesn't really work that well so the water still splashes over -- seeps through the little velcro thing that you put up. Then you spend another 15 minutes bailing water out of your raft but I -- once I take this thing and I get this together, I start just, kind of, holding the heat in and huddling and I start to realize that my shaking has gone down. And, obviously, the process of me trying to keep water out as well as keep warm, just building heat inside my raft.

So I plug off all the holes and just sit there and I get my shivering down to once every five to ten seconds. So at this point, I'm like "All right. I'm feeling pretty good," you know, I could last easily another four hours before hypothermia probably will legitimately set in with a combination of the windchill which was fairly significant. And, you know, having to stop every -- or having to undo the thing, let the heat out, bail out the water, et cetera, et cetera. I end up taking my earmuffs out of my helmet so I can hear if there's any sonar assets overhead, and I decided to stop using my helmet because in the process of bailing water out,
it -- you put your helmet back on, obviously the water just goes
down your neck and you get cold again. So I end up taking my boot
off and I used my boot to get water out.

I know there was a piece of the raft that has a bailer in
it and I don't know if it was just dark and I was just -- I just had
so much crap on me -- I just couldn't find that piece of it. I'm
sorry, there was at one point where I decided to deflate my LPU as
well, just so I could have mobility inside of the -- inside of the
raft. At that point, it wasn't necessary because I was [inaudible]
and so, I'm huddled there. I'm still trying to work the radio,
still trying to keep heat in, trying to focus on getting the water
out. Focusing on still on inventory. Making sure I have what I
need. So a few hours go by and, again, I'm starting to feel pretty
good, like, "All right. Now, I just need to focus on getting to
daylight," and "they were going to see the sea dive marker, it's
just a matter of time now."

So the sooner I stopped focusing on trying to signal that
boat, I gave up on that a while ago and then I -- at some point I
decided to transition my scan out to see if there's anything else
out there because I was just focusing on radio, heat, water, radio,
heat, water. And I see blinking lights out there and I'm like,
"Okay. Those weren't there before. So either this is pure
coincidence or there's SAR assets on, on station" I was like, I'm pretty sure there are SAR assets, I haven't seen that kind of blinking light before, it almost looked like sirens in the distance. So I was like, this has got to be SAR assets, and they were flying decently low though and our primary SAR asset is the JASDF out of Iwakuni and the flying boat. So I wasn't sure exactly who was on station or who it was or where they were from. So I'm like, "Okay. There's people." So I start trying to use my light again, trying to focus on seeing if I can get their attention. It doesn't work. So I transition now, next goal, make it to daylight. Water, heat, radio. Just back and forth, that -- I had my schedule set out for me, if you will, as I'm in the raft.

At one point, I undo the thing that's covering my head at this point and I'm kind of looking around and I hear a helicopter and I'm like "what's good?" Comes over to my left shoulder, I can see it all the way, light actually hits my raft, you know, kind of doing one of these things, a signal, and it goes by me. At this point, it actually gave me more hope, despite the fact they missed me on the first one because I was like "Oh shit. That's, like, a UH-6," I was like, "I didn't know that they were going to be on station and I'm like that's good." Little did I know, they had, like, a drone overhead SAR mapping the water. Like, apparently when
we went in the drink it was -- and I found out about this later -- it was just a full on like everybody launched everything, which was pretty -- it was obviously humbling, being one out of seven victims. But -- so I'm like "Dude, this is easy, like, I got this." And I'm thinking, again, that if I'm in the water, made it. He had to have, right? Like I stayed two feet away from the guy. And so then the -- like, alright. No big deal. And kind of focus back on getting the heat in, the helicopter comes back doing one of these things again and stops. And I'm like, "Easy day. No big deal."

Next thing, I'm just going to go find And sit there for a minute, they lower a diver in and the guy swims over to me, I don't know how long you guys have been in Japan, the Japanese are super respectful, even in a weird situation like that, you know. But, you know, he puts the thing over me, I try to actually put my left boot back on and I couldn't put it on because my legs were too tight so I just fucking tossed it in the water. And I grabbed my radio because it's like sending text messages every thirty minutes and I wanted to hold onto that so they could -- if was doing the same thing then they could identify him and they wouldn't bite off on my radio. So they put the thing on -- around me. I think the hoist operator was having some issues with the hoist. At this point, my LPU was deflated so the only inflation I had was the
orange thing that went around my chest, if you will. So they lower me up and they kind of drop back down. I am not a great swimmer, especially while at ship. So I dunk underwater, back up. I'm like, fuck this sucks, I don't like this. You know, I got the diver with me come I think this happened another two times. As I'm trying to swim, I finally just took that radio and -- like fuck. So then they finally get the hoist fixed, or whatever, and we go up to the helicopter and the guys bring me in. You know, they're like -- imagine a search-and-rescue Japanese guys patting you down to come up. You know, they're trying to take care of you and everything. And you're like -- you're trying to tell them that there's another dude in the water and -- in hind-site now, they were -- I can't remember what number they gave, but it was more than one. So obviously they knew that the Herc had gone down. At this time, the language barrier prevented us from -- I think. I didn't want to talk to the pilot. Because, obviously the pilot -- they had the intercom and the pilots were busy. I didn't want to -- like I said, I didn't want to start task saturating them with more shit. But I was talking with the search and rescue guy that was manning -- it was their version of the pod. It, like, scans back and forth. It looks exactly like a lighting pump. And so I'm starting to tell them there's another person. A and I'm like -- I can't remember if it
was five or four. Let me pull out my patch and look. Two people ejected.

They were like we're still looking; we're still looking. And they were base -- more assets. There were more; there were more. And I was like, we're looking. They said base, more. And then again, I didn't know that they had launched the entire fleet out. I fully expected -- I one-hundred percent expected us to fly right over to and pick him up and me and him to be sitting in that helicopter. A hundred percent. If you would have asked me that, if you would have asked me that I would have probably been like, yeah he's right there. I mean we ejected out of the same aircraft, right?

So we fly back to their naval base. We get out. Again, exactly what you'd expect from the Japanese. I asked, "Can I borrow your cell phone?" Immediately called our RDO and as I'm doing this, the Japanese are pulling my gear off and they're patting me down with towels and shit, and they're like trying to undress me. And they, you know, told them that that was the first time that I found out that there was more than me and involved. It was just -- I remember talking to him, I was like, "Hey, it was just me and right?" And they were like, "We'll tell you when you get back, brother." And I went, "fuck."
Obviously, I knew that a collision occurred. But -- I mean, collisions -- I guess, my SA was just not right because I thought if I was able to punch out and able to make it to the point where I was at, there's no way that it would have been a catastrophic collision. Obviously, it's not true because we're here today talking about it. But -- I mean the reasoning behind -- I guess pieced in didn't click until later. And then jump into their -- sorry, it's a Japanese naval base. They give you another flight suit. A dry flight suit. They give you new clothes and are like, "We gotta go. We gotta go."

So they dress me all up and get my shit. And we go to the helicopter. We take the next helicopter. I think it was about an hour and a half flight from where we were at to Iwakuni. I'm just full-on, like, I just need to talk to somebody at this point. So I just get out, grab all my shit, and went right to the ambulance. We're going to the hospital, like, I know that there was going to be people there. Apparently I just -- I walked by four or five of our squadron dudes that were just standing there. Like, I saw guys that were in flight suits walking.

So, I got to the hospital and I walk in. I see my wife and then start talking to the guys. And then, I start trying to help with the search and rescue try to -- the only piece, I think,
that came out was significant because it was dark and there was no -- there's -- you try to explain you see two lights in the middle of the ocean and try to see if that helps. But I think the only thing that did help was when I explained the -- what I saw and then with the search pattern of the helicopter, I thought that maybe they can correlate that. Because, obviously, they know where the helicopter's go. You know, north, south, east, and west. Like -- And I don't know if that helped them find.

So, yeah. They take me to the hospital. You know, they're taking x-rays. They're like, "how the fuck did you not break anything?" And again, I have no idea. They did all the standard stuff that you would do for an ejection. Take all the blood work, piss. I mean, at this point it's -- yeah. And then I'm talking to the guys trying to figure out what happened and the A and B starts taking my story. A and B, which is everything that you guys heard. And then, you know, day-by-day here we are.

: Do you remember saying when you were in the ocean that your phone didn't work, but you said you're watch worked.

: Yeah.

: When you looked at it, do you remember what time it was when you checked your watch?
Yeah. It was -- I just -- I think our ARCT. We took off around 1200 and -- I can't remember what our ARCT time was. I know we fucking nailed it, I just can't remember exactly what it was. And then I remember counting down the hours to daylight, which is roughly around like six o'clock. I remember looking down. I think the first time that I remember recalling was I think about two to three maybe.

Between 0200, 0300?

Yeah, I think it was somewhere around there.

I think it's about right when we punched-out. I think it was like 0130 or 0145 I can't remember exactly. Yeah, it was just a lot of pieces of the puzzle that the -- I'm still trying to piece together. It's little things like that where you'd think you'd remember a time on your watch.

Were you on any prescription medication?

No. Pretty normal. You know, to the standard, I just drank a little coffee. That was it.

Is there anything else you want to share?

Just that I feel tremendous loss. I just want the families to know that we -- we're there for them. I know that this is releasable. I don't know if that's going to make it or not
and obviously I need to -- I still have five other mothers that I've got to talk to. But, you know, we -- I'm just -- I'm sorry. I don't know if that's --

[0 (3) (A), (b) (6)]: Yeah, I know. It's tough. It's tough.

All right. We can go ahead and wrap up.

[0 (3) (A), (b) (6)]: The last thing. Can you just initial and date this for us?

[0 (3) (A), (b) (6)]: I don't think he drew on that.

[0 (3) (A), (b) (6)]: Yeah, I didn't.

[0 (3) (A), (b) (6)]: I don't think we are going to use that.

We have to swear your statement, so I'll ask you to raise your right hand.

[[0 (3) (A), (b) (6) was warned, sworn, and excused.]]
Today is the 25th of January 2019. I am assisted by , staff judge advocate, and , court reporter. We are interviewing .

, please state your full name, spelling your last name for the record.

You can call me "sir.

, you can call me or sir.

, how long have you been in 242?

I joined July 30th of last year.

Of 18?

Eighteen. Yes, sir.

Where were you before that?

I was at MAWTS-1.

What did you do at MAWTS-1?

I was an F-18 instructor pilot and the CAS SME.
What is MAWTS-1? What does that stand for?

Marine Aviation Weapons and Tactics Squadron.

So that's the weapons school for the Marine Corps and you're the close air support subject matter expert there?

Yes, sir.

Great. What qualifications and designations do you hold?

I am a mission commander, top gun graduate, and WTI graduate and everything that goes along with that. So --

So virtually all?

Everything except FGA.

Okay.

Sir.

How many hours do you have in the morning?

About 2200, sir.

How many hours do you have wearing night vision goggles?

I couldn't tell you for sure, sir, but it's probably upwards of six to seven hundred.
Okay. Of your approximate six hundred night vision goggle hours, how many of those hours were in the ANVS-11?

Pretty significant amount being that I was previous to MAWTS-1 and VMFA-232, which I believe was the test bits squadron when ANVS-11 rolled out.

What year was that? When were you at 232?

That was from 13 to 15, roughly, sir.

Okay. So you're in the test boat squadron for the ANVS-11 night vision cueing device. Tell me a little bit about the training you received for that and your experience.

Honestly, like all things Marine Corps, when they -- well, that's a bold statement. I retract that. Similar to the --

It's okay. You can be frank.

Similar to the JHMCS roll out, it was just kind of like, here's a piece of gear; go learn on it.

Okay.

So no dedicated syllabus for it. It was just, Hey, here's this new piece of gear. Test it out. We received --
don't by what entity or schoolhouse or VX squadron may have given us the brief on it, but I know we received a little bit of formal training in the ready room on what the new capability possessed; and how to handle it; and how to take care of it; and how to preflight it; so on and so forth. Similar to learning on your ANVS-9s. So the classroom 1.0 hours level of instruction.

[O] (3) (A), (b) (6): So you received about an hour of classroom instruction that was focused on the -- how to mount the device to your helmet and the capabilities of the new goggles?

[O] (3) (A), (b) (6): Correct, sir.

[O] (3) (A), (b) (6): Okay. What are some of the capabilities that you recall?

[O] (3) (A), (b) (6): The capabilities provide us the heads-up display in your night vision goggles.

[O] (3) (A), (b) (6): So that's the key benefits, basically, to JHMCS goggles?

[O] (3) (A), (b) (6): In my opinion, it's a critical combat enabler. It's one of the most lethal piece of gears that has come online in the hornet, in my opinion.

[O] (3) (A), (b) (6): Because of the off-more side capability?

[O] (3) (A), (b) (6): Yes, sir.

[O] (3) (A), (b) (6): To be able to look over your shoulder and...
see a T-box on the horizon or at range --

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6):  Exactly.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6):  Or to see a designation on the ground?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6):  When you're flying at night in theatre, I've got several hundred hours doing so -- I'd look over, see a muzzle flash or something, you can immediately designate, swivel all sensors over, and grab the BLU Chief POD.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6):  That sounds pretty cool. Is that a key capability to use while conducting night vision air refueling?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6):  It certainly helps being able to look outside and, you know, through a discipline scan, be able QA that the light source that you're joining on is, indeed, the, you know, what you have radar SA to, so on and so forth. So if you have a radar lock and you're trying to join on bearing line, your hud is oriented that way, but now you can look out with your goggles and see a TT box that corresponds with the light source that you believe to be joining on, so.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6):  Okay.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6):  It is a artificial --

----------:  Is it pretty useful for maintaining visual formation at close range? For example, when you're affecting a fuel transfer.
Like, how do you use the ANVS-11 in the tank?

So the personal technique, and what I teach to as a night systems instructor, is once you get within visual range — let's call it 1.0 when you can start to break out the silhouette of the aircraft and not just the light source. I'll teach my guys to hit the "recky" button on the throttle in order to turn off the helmet display. So you still have the night vision goggles, but the helmet symbology has been turned off.

To de-clutter the helmet basically?

To de-clutter the helmet.

Okay. Did you provide any night systems instruction to

I did not. Unfortunately, having only joined the squadron in July, I did not have the opportunity to fly with him, or brief him on any night systems.

Okay.

Just through the nature of the scheduling.

Do you have any situational awareness on the level of training the had received on the ANVS-11?
I do not.

What is your billet in the squadron?

Operations Officer.

How long have you have been the operations officer?

I took over at the beginning of October, sir.

So -- and when was the mishap?

December 6th.

Okay. So you were the operations officer at the time of the mishap?

Yes, sir.

But you don't have any awareness on the level of training that the mishap pilot received on the ANVS-11?

No, sir.

Do you have any training records that you keep at 242?

For pilot training officers, certainly. We have --

Does the pilot training officer work for you?

He does. Yes, sir.

Did the pilot training officer provide
you any brief on the level of training the mishap crew had on the ANVS-11?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): He was trained and qualified to fly on night vision goggles at night, to include the ANVS-11s. That's -- so -- do I know how many hours he had? Do I know what class he received on it? When he received that class? No.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): So the limit of your knowledge is his night systems qualified designation letter -- or qualification letter, and then his logbook are in his training record? That's all you knew?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): Correct.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): Do you know how many hours, roughly, that had had flying at night in the hornet?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): His total time at night? No, sir.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): Okay. Did you prepare the flight schedule for the mishap?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): I assisted in the preparation of the flight schedule.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): Did your department prepare the flight schedule for the mishap?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): Yes, sir.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): Okay. Did you review the flight
schedule?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): I did. Yes, sir.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): Okay. When you reviewed the flight schedule, did you note that (b) (3) (A), (b) (6) was conducting night systems lowlight level air refueling 200 miles offshore?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): When the flight schedule was signed, the air-to-air refueling training code was not on that flight schedule.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): I'm not asking when the Commanding Officer signed it. I'm asking when you initialed it.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): There was no night -- there was no inflight refueling scheduled for that sortie.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): Were you surprised to learn that he was conducting air refueling during the mishap.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): It was -- was I surprised? No. Was I --

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): Like, did you expect him to go to the tanker that night?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): I did not expect him to go to the tanker.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): So you're the operations officer who's department prepared the flight schedule, and you did not expect him to go to the tanker.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): That's a true statement.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): And you don't know how many hours he had
on the ANVS-11?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): No, sir.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): And you don't know how -- what training he received on the ANVS-11?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): There is not a T&R code that differentiates between -- well, there is now. We track the hours on it, but there is no requirement for hours on ANVS-9s prior to ANVS-11s. No formal paperwork on it.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): Is there any training program for ANVS-11? Is there any ground training?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): The formal training comes in the form of academic support package. When we introduce guys to night vision goggles, they start off on their ANVS-9s. And they get about ten hours before we start introducing them to ANVS-11s.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): Okay. Is there an academic support package that assists in or that is required to be completed before someone flies with the ANVS-11s?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): Yes, sir.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): Okay. Do you have that?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): It's resident in our mission planning cell.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): Have you reviewed it.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): The last time I reviewed it was probably, maybe,
May or June of last year prior to executing orders to --

: When you -- so you said you're a MAWTS instructor, so you certify night systems instructors?

: Yes, sir.

: In the F-18?

: Yes, sir.

: With the ANVS-11?

: Yes, sir.

: Okay. And when you went out on MAWTS support to certify night systems instructors, what kind of level of information were you looking for those potential night systems instructors to have about the characteristics, capabilities, and limitations and differences between the ANVS-9 and the ANVS-11?

: I'd look for them to brief the full gammit of the differences between the two, the differences --

: Can you tell me some of those?

: The differences in preflight, there is no diopter adjustment, so you're only concerned with your inner focus wheel.

: What's the limitation associated with the absence of the diopter adjustment?

: I don't -- I couldn't quote you what the limitation is. I think it's a net gain to not have to worry about
the diopter.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : So the diopter doesn't -- a diopter provides no benefit on the ANVS-9?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : In my personal opinion, no. That's just an extra step in order to achieve a perfect focus. So the best focus that you're going to get out of your NVGs for that evening.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : What is your personal uncorrected vision.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : My personal uncorrected? 20/10.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Okay. If someone had less than 20/20, would a diopter affect them? Like, what does a diopter do on the ANVS-9?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : I'd have to consult the book to give you the exact answer.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : So you're a MAWTS-1 night systems instructor and you certify night systems instructors, you can't tell me what a diopter does on an ANVS-9?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : No, sir. I'd review it before I went out to achieve the certification.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Okay. How do -- is there any difference in how the ANVS-9 and the ANVS-11 perform under different lighting conditions?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : There is a slight difference. Yes, sir. I'd
have to consult the book to tell you exactly what it is.

: Okay. Do you recall the differences in the tube lengths between the ANVS-9 and the ANVS-11?

: I don't recall the difference.

: Do you recall what those tube lengths are?

: I do not.

: Are you familiar with the term "IBOX"?

: Yes, sir.

: Tell me about it.

: It's a hoffman box. It's where we adjust --

: Nope. Not "hoffman box." I'm talking about "IBOX" for night vision goggle adjustment.

: Not familiar, sir.

: You've never heard the term "IBOX".

: No.

: You're a MAWTS-1 instructor who has certified NSIs, and you've not heard the term "IBOX".

Is that what --

: No, sir.

: -- you're telling me?

Okay. When you draft flight schedules at 242, or when you
direct your staff to direct flight schedules at 242, which they present to you for review prior to going to the Commanding Officer, how do you indicate that someone's receiving a code for the first time?

: There's an "at" symbol next to their name, meaning that it is evaluated.

: An "at" symbol?

: Yes, sir.

: Does that mean it's an initial code, or does that mean it's an evaluated code?

: It could mean both.

: Okay. If someone is getting an initial code, or an evaluated code, what things are different than, it's a code they're just doing for the fifth or tenth time?

: The "at" code implies that there's a grade sheet required.

: Grade sheet required. Is there a grade sheet required for going to the tanker for the first time?

: Yes, sir.

: Okay. Is there anything else required for going to the tanker for the first time? Any expectations on a part of the section leader providing that training?
Can you repeat the question, sir? [inaudible]

section lead --

Yes. The section leader is the -- so I'm a hornet section lead, I'm taking a guy to the tanker for the first time, what -- and I see he's going for the first time -- what would be different for me as that section leader as opposed to if I was taking a guy to the tanker for the tenth time?

The level of depth that I included in the brief.

The level of depth to include in the brief. So the section lead who's taking a guy to the tanker for the first time, would then have to allocate time and resources to providing a more academic level of brief and preparation; is that what you're trying to tell me?

Yes, sir.

Okay. So how many times had been to the night tanker?

I couldn't tell you, sir.

So you prepared the flight schedule for the mishap as the operations officer, and you don't know if he's been to the night tanker or not? You don't know if it's his first time; was it his fifth time?

It was not his first time.
It was not his first time? So when went to the tanker the night of the mishap, he had been to the night tanker before?

Yes, sir.

How do you know that to be true?

Because I was in the squadron while we were down in southern frontier in pitch black, and he flew at night and went to the tanker.

Did you fly that event with him?

No, sir.

Did you log the T&R code?

I don't know, sir.

Do you have a grade sheet?

I don't know, sir. It wouldn't have been his first one, there wouldn't have been a grade sheet required.

I'm sorry. What?

That wasn't his first time visiting the night tanker. There was no grade sheet required for that flight, to the best of my knowledge.

Okay. I'm asking -- all of these are to the best of your knowledge.

Yes, sir.
So to the best of your knowledge, at approximately what month and year did go to the tanker for the first time?

No idea, sir.

Have you reviewed training records before you scheduled him for the mishap event?

No, sir.

Had anyone in your department done that?

We were on an MSHARP validation. Had somebody in my department done that, the training officer. Yes, sir.

So you mentioned MSHARP validation. So you run an MSHARP validation for every flight schedule?

Yes, sir.

Okay. And what does the MSHARP validation do?

It balances what -- it takes a look at -- it helps us manage risk by taking a look at what codes have been logged, on what date, and what level of currency has been achieved. And it let's us know -- backs us up with potential mistakes being made.

Okay.

I.e. scheduling a guy for something that he's not
qualified to do; that's not in accordance with the syllabus; doesn't have his NATOPS complete; et cetera.

: Is that a pretty effective tool?

: It is.

: Okay. And is that routed with the daily flight schedule before it goes to the Commanding Officer?

: It is not previously. It is now.

: Okay. I'm talking about during the mishap.

: It was not during the mishap.

: So how does the CO know that the flight schedule he's receiving is good to go? That everything is scheduled in accordance with the requirements that everybody has currency and prerequisites and all that stuff? How does the CO know that?

: We give him a hot board, which speaks to the basic level of currency for being able to fly at night; when the last flight was; when the last dive was. We provide that along with the flight schedule. And he puts special trust and confidence in his operations department and the safety department and the maintenance department, that everybody's in agreement with what's going to be on flight schedule for the next day. And then he puts his signature on it.
So he's trusting the people that prepare this schedule that it's right, basically, is what you're telling me?

Yes, sir.

Okay. And how does he verify that trust? What product did you provide him to let him know that had been to the tanker before at night and had a grade sheet and did a good job and got six plugs and everything was good to do.

How did he know that?

The CO has flown with a lot more than I have. And he would have flown with him most recently on a cross-country down to Okinawa where they had flown at night; where was the section lead.

Did conduct night systems air refueling on that mission with the Commanding Officer?

I believe they did day. I don't know if they did night. I couldn't tell you. I would have to look back at the flight schedule.

Okay. So you'd have to review your records?

Yes, sir.

Okay. During the MAG ULT, were there any discussions about putting different people on different shifts, like
a day shift and a night shift and that kind of stuff in the weeks and months proceeding the ULT?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): I was the responsible for the assignment of that. I broke our [inaudible] up into three different combat crews in order to achieve a 24-hour cycle.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): Tell me more about that. How did you pick who went where and when and that kind of stuff?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): I broke up quals, capabilities, personal assessment of capabilities, and made sure that there was an equal share in accordance with the Commander's intent in order to have his primaries on the first cell and secondaries on the second cell, meaning day and mid-crew. He wanted to have overlap with his secondaries.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): When you say "primaries" and "secondaries," do you mean like CO, XO, Opso, Assistant Opso --

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): CO, Opso, Assistant Opso. Yes, sir.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): So you're the Opso so you were on the first cell, I guess --

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): Yes, sir.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): -- kind of like normal working hours.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): Earlier. Yes, sir.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): Like at 0600 or something? I don't know
the time.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : 0500.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Oh okay. So you had to come in early.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Just a little bit early.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : So you were like the 5 to 15-ish, or something like that?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Correct. Yes, sir.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Okay. And then, what was your second cell? What were those times, and who were some of the key members? Like the XO?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : The nature of the way that the flows broke out, it was leaned a little bit left, so they were coming in at about eight to nine. And that was your XO and Assistant Opso, Assistant Ammo.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Okay. And then who was on (b) (3) (A), (b) (6) cell?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : (b) (3) (A), (b) (6) was the lead mission commander. (b) (3) (A), (b) (6) -- correction; (b) (3) (A), (b) (6); (b) (3) (A), (b) (6).

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : [ph]; (b) (3) (A), (b) (6) [ph].

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Who was the field-grade officer on that cell?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : There was none.
How many field-grade officers were in the squadron?

There are one, two --

Roughly.

-- three, four, five, six, seven. Seven to eight.

So you had seven or eight field-grade officers, but you didn't have one field-grade officer available to be on this swing crew, the mishap crew?

No, sir.

Did you see any issue with that?

Negative.

So who approved flight schedule changes on the swing crew?

Approval of flight schedule changes would be the top five. It doesn't matter what crew it's coming from. That would be CO, XO, Opso, MO. And in special circumstances, the DOSS, I suppose.

So you said the top five can change the flight schedule.

CO, XO, Opso, AMO, maybe the DOSS. In our case, 242, the DOSS happened to be a lieutenant colonel who was on leave...
during that time. But, he would be approved to make a change to the
flight schedule in that instance.

(O) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Have you read OPNAV 3710?

(O) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Yes, sir.

(O) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Are you familiar with what it says about
flight schedules?

(O) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Can I quote it verbatim? No, sir.

(O) (3) (A), (b) (6) : No. I'm not asking you to quote it. I
mean as the operations officer of a squadron, you're one of the most
senior instructors in the Marine Corps. I'm asking you if you know
what OPNAV 3710 says about flight schedules; who can sign them, and
who can change them?

(O) (3) (A), (b) (6) : The CO. Or "by direction" assigned, who can
change them. I can't quote you exactly.

(O) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Have you read 1st MAW 3710 SOP for flight
operations?

(O) (3) (A), (b) (6) : I have read it. I could probably use a review.

(O) (3) (A), (b) (6) : I mean, you're an aeronautically
designated personnel in 1st MAW. I'm asking if you've read the Wing
SOP.

(O) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Have I read it? Yes.

(O) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Okay. So when you read the Wing SOP
about flight schedules, what does it say about the information required to be in the flight schedule?

[292x47]24

[59x688]about flight schedules, what does it say about the information required to be in the flight schedule?

I can't tell you off the top my head. I'd have to review it.

Okay. What does it say about who can authorize changes to the flight schedule?

I'd have to review it.

Okay. Do you think it says the DOSS can make changes to the flight schedule?

[Nonverbal response].

Okay. But you just said the DOSS could change the flight schedule?

I said CO, XO, Opso, AMO, and at extreme is DOSS.

Okay.

In VMFA-242, our DOSS happens to be a lieutenant colonel.

So you think it's based on rank, not based on billet?

I believe it's the CO's discretion.

Oh, you think it's the CO's discretion?

I think my Commanding Officer has the prerogative to designate a fellow lieutenant colonel, if he so chooses, to be
able to make a change to the flight schedule, or be able to approve a change to the flight schedule. I think that's outside the realm of sanity.

[0] (3) (A), (b) (6) : And, sir, were any of those individuals, the five individuals you mentioned, on the night shift?

[0] (3) (A), (b) (6) : No.

[0] (3) (A), (b) (6) : Okay. Was the schedule that you prepared, did it include air refueling?

[0] (3) (A), (b) (6) : No.

[0] (3) (A), (b) (6) : Why not.

[0] (3) (A), (b) (6) : I didn't -- honestly --

[0] (3) (A), (b) (6) : Please be honest.

[0] (3) (A), (b) (6) : The first, second, and third change to what MAG ULT was going to be. When the flight schedule got signed, we did not know that there was going to be a tanker available, and we did not put it on there.

[0] (3) (A), (b) (6) : Okay. So that's good. So let's talk about that. So it sounds like the word was changing a lot at the MAG. You guys are getting whipped around a little bit.

[0] (3) (A), (b) (6) : A little bit would be an understatement.

[0] (3) (A), (b) (6) : Okay. Let's be frank. And I'm reading your nonverbals that you have some frustration with the MAG

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operations, and, perhaps even Wing, about things changing. I can totally empathize with that. Okay?

So when you were the squadron operations officer preparing the weekly -- and then daily -- flight schedules to execute the MAG ULT, did you know exactly what you were doing with weeks or months in advance?

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6) : No, sir.

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6) : Why not.

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6) : Why not? Because I believe the plan was not sufficiently -- I hate to even use the word "planning" them. I don't think that -- I don't think any of the supporting units for the MAG training exercise fully understood what we were doing, when, where, and why.

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6) : Okay. Did you attend any planning conferences at the MAG, or any kind of meetings at the MAG?

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6) : There were two. I attended both.

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6) : When were they, and what did you guys talk about?

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6) : I can't quote you the exact dates. The last one was Wednesday of the week preceding the mishap.

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6) : Okay. And at that meeting, were you under the impression that you were tanking the night of the mishap?
Yes. At that meeting, there was a tanker assigned to that bowl.

Okay.

But that bowl significantly changed throughout the execution of the ULT.

Tell me more about that. It just -- like every time you called them, it was something different. You were getting emails saying, do this/do that; go to /don't go to I mean, what --

There is certainly all of that. The plan was a set of flows. They take off with a certain ordinance. They land. They hot reload, hot pit. Not necessarily in that order. They take off. They land. They hot pit. They hot load. They take off and land.

At that Wednesday, we still didn't have approval as to whether or not we were going to and what implications that would have on the planned flows. Speaking to the planned flows, they had standard combat loads assigned to them. Those standard combat loads had not been conveyed to the MAL officer, which is the Wednesday prior to execution on Monday. So nobody really knew what we were loading; where we were loading; why we were loading it; where we were taking it; were we supposed to drop it, or
were we supposed to not?

What is the point of this exercise? Is it to practice the time space distance problem and work on how much time does it take me to get back on hot load ordinance, and then go through the pits and, potentially, change out a crew? How much time does that require on the base in order to continue to launch and carry on with the mission? Is that the focus of this? Okay.

Have we had approval to go drop in any of the approved restricted areas out over the water? Have the notices to the mariners been released? Has the MAG CO been informed, and is he okay with the dropping of this ordinance out there? Does MALS even have the levels of ordinance to support the duration of this exercise?

All of those were unknowns on Wednesday. I left the Wednesday's meeting with such confusion that I felt like I had reached exhaustion. I was the operations officer of the squadron. I called for relief from the Commanding Officer. Sounds like I wasn't the only one to do so. Seems like 225's Opso reached the same conclusion. And both of our CO's met outside the Colonel's office simultaneously to try to get some fidelity on what was about to take place.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : That sounds frustrating. And then after

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the skippers came over and met with the MAG-12 CO, did you subsequently meet with [b](3) (A), (b) (6) where he gave you, basically, the final word on what you guys were going to do?

[b](3) (A), (b) (6): There was still no final word on what we were going to do. We got answers on a certain number of RFIs or issues of concern that we had on him, i.e. loading HE out of the HCLA and why. And where we were going to drop it; were we going to drop it. And, basically, the level of concern on that subject met with, okay, we're just going to go inert only out of the line.

Another issue of concern was, do you understand that the flows that are presented us have us flying in excess of six and a half hours in the aircraft? That's a violation of the SOP. You have the authority to waiver that; are you going to waiver that? And the answer was, no, that's crazy; we're not going to do that.

Well, okay. This has been the plan for quite some time, which I've been voicing my concerns on. Several of us have been. And now, it is only filtering up to the MAG Commander at that point. At which point, he made the decision, No, we aren't going to do that.

Additionally, four sorties per day. Per SOP, we're only authorized three man-ups. We brought that up and said, sir, aren't you going to waive, and he said, no.
So what I'm hearing you say --

So here we are four days. This was the plan all the way along -- and I hesitate to use the word "plan" -- all the way along, and now we are, you know, Thursday morning, prior to Sunday notification, prior to Monday execution, and now we're finally getting fidelity on these answers, which we've been bringing up for quite some time. Which means changes to what we had planned for, right? So if I had -- if I was told all the way along that guy's -- that it's okay for a guy to fly six and a half hours -- in excess of. It's okay for a guy to have four man-ups in a day. You sure? Okay. Well, I'm going to start flying my guys accordingly.

When that changes, now the house of cards falls apart. And I have to find new people to flow in and manage everything that's associated with doing so. So frustrating.

I could understand that. And the net effect of that to you down at the squadron level, you just said "house of cards," so you were doing the schedule writing process where you have limited people with different qualifications. And you're trying to rack and stack all these guys, and build actual flight schedules that get published and signed in enough time for crews to properly prepare.

Did the MAG ask you to do something that's a violation of
their own SOP up until just a few days before have any effect on that? Like, if the plan was actually what you would call a "plan" --

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): Yes, sir.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): -- was actionable; was reasonable; was consistent; and determined, let's say, hypothetically, three weeks out and carved in stone --

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): Right.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): -- and made sense, would you have been able to write better flight schedules at the squadron level?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): I would have. I still -- I had brought this up previously at the two planning conferences that there is -- and this is a group-level exercise. And there is a lot going on on these flows. And instead of individual squadron schedules during this time, there ought to be one schedule where everybody sees what everybody is doing. I don't know if we have the staff depth to be able to do that. But as an example MDTC is taking place at MAG-31 right now, and there is a MAG schedule for MDTC being the Marine Division Tactics Course. A MAG-level effort. And there is one schedule signed by [ph] that shows what every squadron is responsible for; where the squadron commander's jets are going to be; at what time and with what requirement.
And then, the squadrons write independent schedules in --
on the outsides of the MDTC contract for whatever's taking place
outside of MDTC.

: Do you feel like that's an effective way
to coordinate activities among separate squadrons within the same
MAG?

: I think it's critical and necessary. It's just
like MAWTS-1. We have all these type model series that are doing
independent mission sets along the way, sometimes combined mission
sets. And there is one schedule that shows what everybody is doing
in all the range space out there. It's not just the hornet
schedule. We've never -- that would be unsafe. So why would you,
if it is a group-level exercise, why would there not be a group
schedule that shows everybody what they are doing. That would have
completely eliminated the confusion that took place on this night as
to whether or not we were going to tank or not. That would have
been known and fixed right there.

: So if you had known that they were
tanking, how would your schedule had been different than how it was?

: It wouldn't have been. There would have been a
2201 -- correction -- a 2202 code on the schedule in addition --

: So that's how it would have been

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different? you would have a tanker code on there?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Yes, sir.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : What else would you have had on there to go with that tanker code? Would you have had a flight note?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Yes, sir.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Okay. Tell me what's normally included in a tanker flight note.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : In contact with the AAR, with SUMO. Contact or POC whoever at number. And they would work out the details.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : And if you knew that [b] (3) (A), (b) was tanking, if you're putting a 2202 -- which I think is the tanker code you mentioned, next to his name would there have been a validation process to confirm that he had been to the night tanker before, or not, and then determine if it was his initial code or not?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Yes, sir. But I can tell you that the night tanker code is a 365 refly, and he had flown within 15 days, so he was current and legal to fly at night. So he would have been approved to inflight refuel.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Okay. So I'm not saying he wasn't authorized for flight. I'm not conjecturing that. I concur from my own research that he was authorized to go to the tanker at night.

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He had the appropriate crew. And he had the appropriate currency to go to the tanker at night. He had been to the day tanker; he had been to the day flight. I'm tracking all that.

But what I'm asking you specifically is: Would you have known if this was his initial night tanker or not?

: I know that it is not his initial night tanker.

: How do you know that it is not his initial night tanker?

: Because I've been in the squadron since July, and I know that he has gone to the tanker at night.

: So based on your knowledge of something that happened in July in Australia, you believe that he went to the night tanker in Australia?

: Yes, sir.

: And you believe that he received a grade sheet for that?

: I don't think that was his initial code, sir. His initial code would have been -- I don't know when. That would not have been the first time that he went to the night tanker.

: Okay. When do new hornet pilots usually go to the night tanker for the first time?

: The FRS.
Okay. Is that with the use of night vision goggles or without, normally?

Without.

Okay. So you think he probably went to the night tanker unaided, likely behind a C-130, in California when he graduated from the FRS?

I couldn't tell you.

Would you speculate that would be typical?

I would speculate that. Yes, sir.

Okay. And you think that he went to the night tanker with ANVS-11s in Australia in the summer, like, six months before the mishap?

I couldn't tell you or speculate. I assume the answer is yes.

So you assume that he went to the tanker in Australia. You don't know he went to the tanker in Australia? I'm asking you how -- here is my question --

Yes, sir.

-- how do you know that he went to the night tanker in Australia? How do you know that? Not why do you think that's true, but, like, how do you know that?
Do you have a grade sheet? Do you have a NAVFLEER?

[O (3) (A), (b) (6)]: I do not.

[O (3) (A), (b) (6)]: Okay.

[O (3) (A), (b) (6)]: Do I know for sure? No.

[O (3) (A), (b) (6)]: Okay. So back to my previous question, if the MAG had given you reasonable notice, and you were drafting schedules that included the night tanker for [b (3) (A), (b)] which is what he did, if that code had been on the schedule, would you have then had the opportunity to go into your records and validate that he had been to the night tanker before? Or, if this was his initial night tanker?

Would you have had that opportunity?

[O (3) (A), (b) (6)]: I think the fair answer is yes.

[O (3) (A), (b) (6)]: Okay. With that opportunity, what would you have done?

What would you have done differently, is what I'm asking. If you knew he's going to the night tanker, what would you have done differently?

[O (3) (A), (b) (6)]: Nothing.

[O (3) (A), (b) (6)]: You wouldn't have done anything differently?

[O (3) (A), (b) (6)]: No, sir.
You wouldn't have checked to see if it was his first time in the night tanker?

No, sir.

You would have just scheduled him with and sent him to the tanker without seeing if you had to indicate if it was an initial look or not on your flight schedule?

You had not have put an "at" symbol next to the 2202.

Absolutely not. I have got a training officer -- technically, I have a training officer. I have a person filling the training officer billet who is very capable.

What's his name?

[ph]. [ph].

I don't think we've talked to him yet.

No, sir.

Okay. So you would expect the PTO to do that?

Yes, sir. Along with my flight officer and my schedule officers.

So you would just trust your guys to take care of that?

I have to put a certain level of trust into them.
Okay. But you don't have any responsibility to --

I spot check that backup from time to time. I would not have tripped my "spidey senses" to take a look a little bit deeper.

In your 2200 hours in the hornet, have you -- in other squadrons or at MAWTS-1 or elsewhere -- have you ever been scheduled to go do something, and then a tanker popped up, and then you went to the tanker?

Yes, sir.

If that happened, let's assume that happened a few hours before the brief like it did in the mishap, what action steps would you have taken in your previous squadron to get approval to go to the tanker from your Commanding Officer?

I would first take a look at the currency and proficiency. If the tanker just magically popped up, I would say, alright, who's flying with me? I'd take a look and then I'd say -- make an assessment of the level of seniority that I have going there. If I need to go verify a training code to make sure that somebody's eligible to go do so, then I would do so. Once I have all my ducks in a row, I would go approach the command or the top five. I would still say that to figure out if I'm approved to do
Okay. So you would seek approval from your chain of command?

I would.

Okay. And let's say, in that situation, your Commanding Officer at your previous command said, Yup, sounds good; you guys go to the tanker.

What documentation would be produced from that decision?

There would be a pen and ink -- red ink -- change to the corrective flight schedule that said 2201, day or night.

Okay, CO, XO, Opso.

So there would be a change to the flight schedule.

There'd be a change to the flight schedule.

To your knowledge, did that take place the night of the mishap here at 242?

It did not.

Are you satisfied with that?

I am -- there's a counseling that took place that said, hey man, you got to get approval to do so. It was sensitively approached based on the nature of the result of this.

But if I had been the approval authority, if I had gotten
woken up to make that decision, I would have said yes.

Okay. And then, what questions would you have asked before you said yes?

I said, where are -- I would have said where are you tanking? You got the altitude, you got the frequency. Do you have the tanker card? Have you guys coordinated? Do you know what you're doing? Then, I would have said, awesome, you guy's have an actual achievable mission; something to gain from the mission that you're doing tonight because otherwise it was just taking off and landing.

So based on your nonverbal communication right now, I perceive that you feel like the scheduled event in the absence of air refueling was not a good use of assets?

No, sir. The original -- so there was an original scheduled event that mirrored our combat flows that had a takeoff time, roughly, two to three a.m. My training office approached me about an opportunity to do some night urban CAS training on one of the ranges down here.

Why didn't you guys do it?

I believe the answer is, the death of 41 -- the death of President Bush, I think, led to a national day of mourning, so we were told, hey, you're not going to fly during that time;
nobody is flying during that time. You cannot take off. You cannot even start APUs until midnight 01.

So okay, what are we doing? I guess we're going back to this range space. We have at the time.

: So you had -- so you said CAS, and I know a little bit about CAS, so you're probably going to do that over land. So did you have a different piece of airspace for a different time to do simulated CAS over land somewhere, and then subsequently lost that airspace?

: Yes, sir.

: And --

: We didn't lose the airspace. We were told that we could not fly during that time due to the national day of mourning, I believe.

: Okay. So the airspace and the CAS code was on your flight schedule?

: An unsigned flight schedule, it was the plan.

: So a revision? So an earlier revision had different airspace and a different code on it?

: Yes, sir.

: Okay. And then -- so now on -- this would be Tuesday. On Tuesday, I would think that would have
happened, right?

: Yes, sir.

: Because the mishap was Wednesday's flight schedule, but, you know, executed Thursday morning.

: Thursday morning. Yes, sir.

: So on Tuesday, you learned of the national day of mourning being in effect for Wednesday.

: Yes, sir.

: And because of that, you could no longer execute your planned CAS mission?

: Yes, sir. That information came in, roughly, at 1630/1700.

: On Tuesday?

: Yes, sir.

: What time do you guys normally sign and publish a flight schedule?

: I try to sign a week's worth of flight schedules -- I try to sign it as soon as I can.

: Okay. So on a typical day at 242, what time is the flight schedule published?

: 13 to 1400.

: So you're publishing the flight schedule
at 1400. But in this case, you're still getting changes from higher headquarters two hours after that at 1630?

Yes, sir.

Okay. So that led to the flight schedule not only being drastically different -- different mission, different air space -- but also getting published later in the day.

Yes, sir.

And that was because of changes from higher headquarters?

Yes, sir.

Okay. Do you see any safety issues associated with that?

It happens all the time. I think we're used to flexing.

But do you think if, in generally, if aircrews know what they're doing with more notice, does that give them more time to prepare and --

A hundred percent.

-- results in better and safer execution.

Yes, sir.

So would you agree that late changes have impacts on safety, in general?
**Dialogue:**

**Speaker A:** I do.

**Speaker B:** Would you agree that a late change to go to the tanker that's not scheduled would similarly have an impact on safety? If you follow?

**Speaker A:** Yes, sir.

**Speaker B:** So I'm just saying to consider, "change generates risk."

**Speaker A:** "Change generates risk" is a true statement.

**Speaker B:** Say to mitigate the risk. Supervision can mitigate a fluid environment?

**Speaker A:** One hundred percent.

**Speaker B:** So you had three shifts running during the ULT, but had none of the top five in the night shift, would you consider that to be the most dangerous time to be flying?

**Speaker A:** I consider it to be an elevated risk time. It was mitigated with a very senior instructor in my squadron, if you're getting at the fact that he wasn't a field grade, captains lead companies in the infantry. And is a pretty damn good pilot.

**Speaker B:** Is he a WTI?

**Speaker A:** No.

**Speaker B:** Is he a top gun grad?
He would be if he wasn't fat. I'm sorry. That's probably not professional.

But you have multiple WTIs and top gun grads in the squadron?

Negative.

How many WTIs do you have in the squadron?

I have three. Two of them are lieutenant colonels, one of which was on leave, one of which is the CO.

How many top gun grads do you have in the squadron?

One, two. One of which was on leave.

And none of which were on the night shift?

No. I had a very senior and capable instructor on the night shift.

Who is also not authorized to make changes to the flight schedule.

No. But he has a phone and we operate at the speed of light. He could have called us. He made a mistake by not calling us and getting approval. That being said, if he had called me, I would have said yes.
So on Thursday, prior to the Sunday's notification prior to execution, I briefed all my aircrew on what I knew about MAG ULT -- trying to get the information out, sooner rather than later, and understanding that that night crew would need to start adjusting their sleep schedule. Recognizing the risks associated with flying during that time of night. As I broke up the combat crews, I've only got so much -- I'm trying to find a better word -- skill, talent to spread around.

was hand-selected to fly that shift based on my personal experience flying with him and watching him in his ground job and seeing his level of skill. He's wise beyond his years. So as I briefed how this was going to work and what the night crew, to the best of my knowledge, was going to be accomplishing mission set-wise, which wasn't much. I emphasized the fact that flying during that time of night is going to be your biggest challenge.

When I said, ready, break to the ready room, I heard him stand up and say, night crew, on me -- and I just happened to
pretend like I was going over to the fridge to get a glass of water, or a bottle of water out of the fridge, and I was listening to the conversation, to which he said, hey, has anybody flown during this time of night before? And nobody raised their hand. And he said, alright, well, you need to take this very seriously. I have. We need to start adjusting out sleep schedules right now; take it seriously. Let's not go "boom" at the club on Friday. Let's start getting our act in order because he identified that as being the biggest risk. And I just went [nonverbal response]; that's why I picked him. So I had full faith and confidence in his ability to execute during that time of night.

Do I agree that he should of called -- that he did not have approval to make a change to the flight schedule without higher approval? Yes. Again, I think for the third time now, had he called me, and it was me, I would have said, do you know where you're going? Do you know what time? Do you have the tanker card? You've talked to them? You've briefed them up? You briefed up your crew? Good to go.

: Sir, how many times have you come gone to the aerial -- conducted aerial refueling as an F-18 pilot?

: Hundreds of times.

: And that includes both day and night?
(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): Absolutely.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): In all the times that you have conducted aerial refueling, post-refueling, have you ever split your section and placed an aircraft echelon left while you remained echelon right?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): I have departed the tanker with aircraft on the left and the right, yes.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): Okay. And for what reasons did you decide to split your section, placing aircraft echelon left while you remained echelon right?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): It depends on what the follow-on flow or mission that we're trying to accomplish is. I recognize what the book says, and that would be a deviation from SOP. And it would be -- if I were going to do that, it would be understood and approved by the tanker crew in order to do so. For what reasons? If I need to kick some guys over to this side of the range, and I'm going to go to this side of the range, there's no reason it's easier, and in my opinion, safer, to elevate and then move away from the tanker and get to the sides of the range that we're going to go to.

If there's a bunch of aircraft on the tanker, and there is multiple tankers and we need to proceed up to the lead tanker, and then out and away, that would be something to do.
(0) (3) (A), (b) (6): And how many times have you seen that done?

(0) (3) (A), (b) (6): The split away? A handful. And I know the book says we're supposed to depart high and right, sometimes you depart high and left to manage the range space --

(0) (3) (A), (b) (6): With two aircraft?

(0) (3) (A), (b) (6): -- sometimes you have to depart low and right, sometimes you have to depart low and left.

(0) (3) (A), (b) (6): How about with only two aircraft? So one section.

(0) (3) (A), (b) (6): I don't think that I've personally ever done that, but I wouldn't think it's outside the box. It's a deviation from SOP, but I don't believe it is an unsafe one, provided that it's briefed and understood and approved by the tanker crew.

(0) (3) (A), (b) (6): But with a single section of F-18s, you've never seen that done?

(0) (3) (A), (b) (6): No.

(0) (3) (A), (b) (6): Is that something -- if you were going to split a section, or have aircraft departing in different echelons, would that be something that you briefed prior to the mission?
No. The standard is up and right. The reality of where you are at in time and space may dictate a need to brief something different on -- using time critical ORM.

Yes, sir.

Is there anybody inbound to the tanker; do we know where we are going? Tanker, this is what we want to do, are you okay with that? Yes. Okay.

Sir.

What do you know about the search and rescue capabilities in Iwakuni?

We do not have any resident on Iwakuni, except for the flying boats that launch out of here. We have the griffins as well, but obviously not too much.

Was the search and rescue alert status and disposition and capability for the MAG ULT briefed at any confirmation briefs that you attended? Did they talk to SAR?

I don't know that there was a confirmation brief. I don't know if they talked to SAR or not. I would be surprised if they did.

You didn't attend a confirmation brief for the MAG ULT as the squadron operations officer?

There was no confirmation brief. I attended the
two mission planning briefs. The last brief that I attended, I would not call it a confirmation brief, which is why I raised such concern to my Commanding Officer. I believe the Commanding Officer's -- and said, we haven't seen a confirmation brief and we are the Commanding Officers of the squadrons that are participating and we would like to see something that's going on. We would like to see what has been confirmed, and what we are going to do. To which, I believe, [b]said, hey, we'll have a confirmation brief tomorrow, Friday morning,[/b] and I believe they went into that. And there was no brief; there were no slides; there was no soup to nuts, hey this is what we're going to do. There was simply a discussion.

[b](b) (3) (A), (b) (6)[/b]: Okay. Did any products make it back to you that clearly articulated the location and alert status of SAR aircraft in support of the MAG ULT?

[b](b) (3) (A), (b) (6): No, sir.

[b](b) (3) (A), (b) (6): Did you receive, like, a map from the Wing that had, like, radiuses and pies; and show where different types of helicopters and planes and boats were; and what their call signs, frequencies, and telephone numbers were that you could give your ODO?

[b](b) (3) (A), (b) (6): No, sir.
So is it suffice to say that you, as the executor who's actually flying jets in the intersouth, were not provided support from your higher headquarters for SAR -- for SAR coordination? Specific SAR coordination.

Is there room for improvement in there? I say yes. Absolutely.

Okay. I'm trying to figure out if, basically, SAR was coordinated for the event. Specifically, at that time of day.

I don't think the liaison had been with the JASDF to say that, hey, we're executing a a larger than normal exercise in these hours during these times of nights; are you going to have an alert stood up for us? I don't think that that took -- I don't know if that took place. I would be surprised to learn that it did based on how far, personally, I felt behind we were on the entirety of the plan.

Okay.

That's the kind of finer detail that --

Yeah. That's my point, right? So that's almost like a cherry -- that's like icing on a cake, right? When you have a really tight SAR planned.

Yes, sir.
And I agree that that probably didn't happen either. I just want to -- I'm trying to understand what you understood, right?

Yes, sir.

During the normal operations at Iwakuni -- Tuesday afternoon, no MAG ULT, no nothing, just plain old day sortie. What do you think the response time would be from pulling the ejection handle to having a recovery asset on top of you in the middle of the intersouth, roughly, with a wingman on station that called on your behalf.

A wingman on station calls on my half and they are on alert. They are at their squadron during normal working hours and they are able to spin up pretty quickly, I would say 45 minutes.

So in 45 minutes, you would say -- generally, plus or minus a little bit -- you could have a JASDF, or whoever, recovery asset on top of you ready to hoist you out?

That's my assumption, but I'm just going off of --

Yeah. I just want to know how you feel, like, your perception. There's no wrong answer. I'm just trying to understand kind of like your instinct to your gut.
Here's my gut, sir. The JASDF are incredibly professional and I think they're pretty good at what they do.

Is there room for process improvement in the -- like, why is there not a bat phone in my ready room where I can call direct to the SAR, and give him the information. That, I think, would significantly improve the process.

Right now, it's, you know, break out the mishap binder and start going through it. And I think that we're relying on entities that slow down the process to get things moving. They have normal working hours. Do they have a 24-hour alert? If they do, where are they at? Those are unknowns to me.

Okay. Do you know what -- I still call it OPNAV, what OPNAV 3710 says about the wear of anti-exposure suits, in general.

It is commander's discretion.

Tracking. Do you know -- when it guides you through the decision making process, what are some of the first considerations in the decision making process for the wear of an anti-exposure suit?

It's air temperature plus wind chill to equal whatever your wind chill factor is and then water temperature. Basically, you just go to the charts and you look at what the
exposure time.

: Do any of those charts provide a recommendation?

: They provide guidance for the CO to make a recommendation on whether or not you'll be in your anti-exposure suit or not.

: The CO makes a recommendation or decision?

: The CO makes the decision.

: The CO makes the decision?

: Absolutely.

: So you believe the final determination as to the actual wear of an anti-exposure suit is at the Commanding Officer's discretion?

: We are all -- every single aircrew makes a personal decision as to whether or not he's going to wear it on his or her flight. The CO can direct you to wear it.

: Okay. Is search and rescue capability part of that decision making process? Are you aware?

: I'm not aware, sir.

: Have you ever been in a squadron where you had to make a decision about wearing a dry suit or not, or been
involved in conversations about it?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): I believe I see where you are going -- yes, sir.

Like, transoceanic movements if I'm -- let's say I'm going to be on a ten-hour mission from Oceana to Moron de la Frontera, Spain, and I'm going to cross over a portion of the water in the middle of nowhere where I don't have any divert options anyways, and there is no SAR that's going to come and get me, and we'll be over that section of cold water for two to three hours on the entire 10/11-hour mission.

The Commander's probably going to take a look at that and, you know, pull his read room and say, hey, dress suits are optional.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): Okay. As a man who's crossed the North Atlantic in a harrier, I can relate to that.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): Yes, sir.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): So in that context, you're making like a risk decision right? You're like, hey, I'm going to die anyway because it's going to take you three days to find me. Dry suit or not, I'm dead -- if you even find me. And -- but I'm definitely going to be in a dry suit for twelve hours, which could result in me overheating, becoming dehydrated --

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): Exactly.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): -- being extremely uncomfortable,
difficulty, you know, using the relief system, or whatever.

[0] [3] (A), (b) (6): Yes, sir.

[0] [3] (A), (b) (6): So in that context, you'd be like, hey, it doesn't help. So everyone's decision. Deliberate all around.

[0] [3] (A), (b) (6): Yeah. That'd be a good one. And then -- but that's not what we're talking about here, right? We're talking about the intersouth --

[0] [3] (A), (b) (6): Yes, sir.

[0] [3] (A), (b) (6): -- where you just said you think it's about 45 minutes, but maybe if I could say you might think it be a little bit longer than that, but it's going to take a little bit of time to get recovered.

So what would be some of your considerations about wearing a dry suit or not in the intersouth at 2 a.m. in December.

[0] [3] (A), (b) (6): The intersouth -- I've only been out here for a little bit, but on multiple UDPs prior to this, but --

[0] [3] (A), (b) (6): But in the UDPs, you flew in the intersouth, right?

[0] [3] (A), (b) (6): All the time. Yes, sir.

[0] [3] (A), (b) (6): Okay. So you've made that decision before?
Absolutely.

Okay. Tell me about that.

It's -- well, the CO having made the decision based on what the outside air temperature is versus the water temperature. Typically in the intersouth, the water temperature is averaged throughout the year. A little bit warmer than the surrounding areas around here, so it's always this, hey, the air is cold, but the water is warm. What are we going to do here? What's the smart thing to do? And I've seen commanders go both ways on the decision. You know, balancing the, you know, the dynamic nature of the mission that you're doing in the intersouth, and wearing that poop suit, and everything that it does to you versus, you know, what the conditions are at that time.

Flying outside of the normal workday -- and I think the assumption is that the JASDF are very professional and good at their job. And they have a fairly rapid response to come get you.

Yeah. But it's not about professionalism. It's about alert status, right?

Absolutely.

Okay. So the question goes to you: When you wrote a flight schedule for somebody to fly at 2 o'clock in the morning in intersouth, and reviewed that and forwarded that to your
Commanding Officer as the operations officer, did you consider the alert disposition of search and rescue?

: I did not. And I will take that as a hit on me. It's a lesson learned for myself.

: Okay. It's not a counseling session, I'm just asking if that came up?

: No, sir.

: Okay. So back to the dry suit piece -- and everybody's different right? I'm a fat guy, some guys are skinny, whatever. Some guys are old or young, but for you personally, how long do you think you can personally survive in 68 degree water without a dry suit? How many hours of useful consciousness and how many hours until you expire at 68 degree water, personally, would you [inaudible] to guess.

: Me, personally, I would say that I would exceed the chart, whatever the book says.

: I'm saying without a dry suit.

: Yes, sir. Without a dry suit, I think I would be okay for -- I think I've got a little bit higher cold tolerance than most people. I grew up in southern California. I surfed without a wet suit in the winter. Like, I have a cold tolerance so I think --

: Can you pick a number? Would you be
willing to pick a number? I'm trying to compare that number to what you think the SAR response time is to understand perhaps what decisions you may have made in the background, right?

I'm in my full gear and I'm in my shark taco --

I don't know what a "shark taco" is.

You're calling a dry suit --

No. The raft. If I'm in the raft up out of the water and --

Let's say you didn't get in the raft for it. Let's say you couldn't get in the raft, your arm is broken, whatever. You couldn't make your way to the raft.

Right.

So I want you immersed in 68 degree water, unable to get in your raft, your raft failed. How long do you think you could last until you're unconscious in 68 degree water and your flight suit?

Is my LPU inflated?

Yes.

I'd say 4 to 5 hours.

Okay. So you say 4 to 5 hours of useful consciousness. How long you think until you're dead?

Probably six.
Six hours?

Five to six.

Okay. So you would balance that understanding with your understanding of search and rescue. And you would, perhaps, if I'm not guiding you too much, sub-consciously, you would think a helicopter can find you and pull you out before you die in 68 degree water?

Yes, sir.

Without a dry suit?

I think so.

Okay. That's a fair answer. That's where I was going.

Judge, do you got anything?

No, sir.

So we've asked you a lot of tough questions today, and I know this has been unpleasant for you. It's quite unpleasant for me as well, believe me.

Thank you for doing it.

What I'm -- I want to give you the floor, and I'm asking you to be extremely frank, okay?

What do you think could have prevented this mishap?

More flight time.
Tell me more about that. How many -- what is the average number of flight hours your pilots are getting?

I haven't seen a hot board that has --

So the witness is producing a document. It's labeled "Pilot Hot Board". And it basically looks like a giant red square. The WIZO, everything on here is red, a couple of yellow blocks. I don't have my -- oh, I do have my glasses.

This is published 1/28/19, which confuses me because --

That's a predictive outlook for tomorrow -- or for Monday. I'm sorry.

So this is the document that you use to prepare next week's flight schedule. And I see the average total flight time in the fiscal year is 15 hours. So that means since October, most of your guys have only gotten 15 hour.

What's Headquarters Marine Corps guidance on the number of flight hours per month a pilot is supposed to receive?

I believe the Naval Safety Center says it's 15 hours per month to say, safe in an aircraft.

Okay. And I'm going to go back to the total flight time 90 just to take out the holidays. And I know you guys route it down in the total flight time in the last 90 days, on average, is ten hours. So that would be your guys are only getting
three hours a month?

: Yes, sir.

: So you feel like you can safely operate a high performance fighter jet with three hours of flight time a month?

: I think it's dependent on experience and capability, but it puts our younger guys with less experience at a significant elevated risk.

: May I have this document?

: Yes, sir.

: Okay. I'm going to include this in my report. And what it clearly shows at a glance is that you guys are not getting anywhere near the amount of flight time required to safely operate the F-18. And given that the factors of this mishap, it was mid-air collision, which is directly tied to proficiency that it could only be contributory.

Would you agree?

: I'd agree. It was legal and current to fly the flight, but --

: And sir, could you explain, so when the color red appears or when the color yellow appears on the hot board, what does that mean?
It means he's not --

So what does "red" mean?

"Red" means below where you should be, so 15 hours per month. If you're not getting 15 hours per month, it'll pop red. "Yellow" is your on glide slope to achieve it.

But have not yet achieved it?

Correct. "White" would be you are current in it.

So last flight, for instance, you see 4's and 9's. All right. This is a 1 in 15 look because after you trip 15 days, you pop certain requirements to go fly again.

So you can see [ph] hasn't flown in 58 days. Since he's been on the mishap board, that's not -- no. That's his dive delivery. I'm sorry. I'm looking at the wrong column, so last flight. [ph] hasn't flown in 41 days. Myself, I haven't flown in 40 days, so on and so forth.

So is this a document that you review as you are preparing and routing the flight schedule that you referred to before?

Yes, sir. And it works left to right. So is he EP current? Has he done a dedicated emergency procedures, sim or flight in the last 30 days? If he's on for air to ground deliveries, has he executed a dive within 30 days? Has he executed
-- when was his last flight? For instance, is he going to fly at night? Do I have him on the flight schedule? Has he flown within 15 days.

Anybody in red would not be eligible to fly at night. Anybody in yellow would not be eligible to fly at night without first receiving a day flight.

Then, you can look at the "last night" column there as well as just to gauge how long --

: So that's something that you reviewed with before his schedule went. So he would have been white in this column before you scheduled him just to fly at night?

: Yes, sir. It would have been white in the "Last Flight," "Last Night," and his "EPSIM."

: Okay. That's good. Thank you.

Any talk about using Ambien or Go/No-Go pills for the week?

: Did that discussion come up?

: Yes.

: Yes, sir.

: What was the guidance from your Commanding Officer to the squadron?

: The guidance was from the Wing Commander, that
they were not authorized for use during the exercise.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): How did the Wing Commanding General communicate that guidance?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): I believe that it came down via the MAG.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): How did the MAG communicate that guidance? You're giving the right answer. You know it to be true. I want to understand how it's communicated down.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): I can't recall if it was during one of the planning sessions or if it was an email or if it was a phone call. I can't tell you the exact meeting that I received that word, but it was --

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): -- passed verbally.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): I think 225, would be, put up a formal request for the usage of them, and it was met with a hard no from the Commanding General.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): And, sir, how was that communicated to 242? How did you notify the squadron that that would not be authorized?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): It was both an email and in, like, one of our official chat windows on WhatsApp.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): So a squadron-wide email went out?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): Yes.
(b) (3) (A), (b) (6)

: And then, also, within one of your chat groups? An all squadron-member chat group it went out?

: Yes.

: Do you think that you might have an email that says that still in your records?

: I could search for you, sir.

: If you have an email that says, don't take Ambien or Go-pills, or something to that effect, that would support this investigation. I ask that you forward it to me.

: I will.

: If you don't have it, please send me an email saying, I looked and I couldn't find it.

: I will. Yes or no. I will do.

: I think I'm done.

: Yes, sir.

: The judge will swear you out.

[(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) warned, sworn, and excused.]
I was the Commanding Officer of VMGR-152 from May of 2016 through June of 2018.


I had just transitioned from being the MAG-12 XO around January of 2016 and served as the Special Projects Officer until the change of command of VMGR-152 in May 2016. I was aware that there was a midair in April 2016 during a refueling evolution between an aircraft from VMGR-152 and VMFA-242. The F-18 from VMFA-242 hit the left hose in the aileron area of the jet, which luckily pulled the jet down and to the right. The F-18 crew did not see the tanker, and did not realize they hit the KC-130. While correcting the downward motion of the jet from the resistance of the hose, the F-18 pilot pulled up right in front of the KC-130. The KC-130 crew saw the jet maneuver in right front of them at the 10 o’clock position. (Later when I did my own math based on the amount of hose that was still on the jet when they landed, the dimensions of an F-18, and the dimensions of a KC-130, I came to the conclusion that the F-18 missed the tail of the KC-130 by 5-10 ft. at most)

By the end of May 2016 both VMGR-152 and VMFA-242 had turned over commands. When I took over command in at the end of May I was told that NO investigations, either AMB or CI, had been initiated for the mishap. I was told by a VMGR officer who went to begin the investigation in April, that when they went to get pictures of the F-18, despite obvious damage to the aircraft, the VMFA-242 maintainers were already taking it apart in order to fix it. I also have an email from my DSS that stated there was a delay in initiating the investigation, “due to undue command influence from adjacent and higher units.” I don’t know why an investigation was not initiated when the OPNAV 3750 is clear that if you suspect one occurred you begin an investigation and later if the cost drops below the mishap threshold then you can terminate the investigation. Additionally per the JAGMAN, “When required, CIs are likely to be the appropriate investigative tool for incidents involving: aircraft mishaps; explosions; ship stranding or flooding; fires; loss of government funds or property...”

In my opinion, in hindsight I know exactly why investigations were not initiated for the April 2016 mishap and that is due to the command climate that existed in VMFA-242 at the time. As the MAG-12 XO, I had several incidents where I spoke to the VMFA-242 XO in order to get information or people for Wing or higher command requirements. I would routinely get told by the 242 XO that, “my CO said we’re not doing that.” I would hand these incidents off to the MAG-12 CO to handle as “CO business,” but I strongly feel that in the case of VMFA-242 investigating the April 2016 mishap this was another “my CO said we’re not doing that,” moment.

Since I inherited the April 2016 mishap, I was involved in the endorsing chain. The primary factor that VMFA-242 tried to push was the causal factor was a communication error. Since we can conduct EMCON tanking, to say hitting the tanker was a communication error is grasping at straws. In my
opinion, there is one reason and one reason alone that you would hit the tanker and it is that the receiver pilot did not see it. The NATO STANDARD ATP-3.3.4.2 AIR-TO-AIR REFUELING (ATP-56) manual clearly states more than 50 times that tanking is a visual maneuver. For a two-seat fighter aircraft to have a midair because they didn’t see it clearly demonstrated a procedural or equipment failure that needed to be identified.

I learned of the December 2018 mishap from Japanese news reports just hours after it happened. When I found out that VMFA-242 had another midair with a KC-130 I was livid. For the same F-18 unit to not have learned the lesson from the April 2016 mishap is criminal. I stated it in my endorsement of the April 2016 mishap, if it wasn’t for the refueling hose catching the jet that midair would have been a Class A. How did they not take that near-miss as a wake-up call? How could a unit that hit another plane not be so on their game with refueling procedures is unfathomable to me. VMGR-152 went almost 50 years without a mishap. VMFA-242 hit a KC-130 twice in less than 3 years. To me it’s blatantly obvious where the issue lies.

There are a couple of incidents that stand out to me that sums up how the Marine Corps in general views VMFA-242, and incidents to highlight 242’s own way of doing business.

While I was the MAG-12 XO, a Capt came over from VMFA-242 because wanted to initiate a FFPB on him. (b) (3) (A), I can’t remember his first name (b) (6) came to discuss his options to VOLTERM or get FFPB’d. He told me that after his first tour in F-18s (which I also believe was VMFA-242) he didn’t want to fly F-18s, told the monitor he didn’t want to fly F-18s, and said he didn’t want to go back to a F-18 squadron. Of course MMOA sent him back to VMFA-242. He said he was having trouble getting back up to speed after this FAC tour and in VMFA-242 if you weren’t aggressive and one of the CO’s boys then you were ostracized. He ended up VOLTERMing and I’m not sure where he ended up eventually, but he was on the MAG staff for a while afterward.

Another one was at a hail-and-farewell that was held at a Capt’s house around June-July of 2018. I attended with for a short period of time. I knew and were fare-welcomed at this event, but I can’t recall the name of the Capt that made the event stick out in my head. This Capt’s farewell speech went on for at least 25 minutes. That’s not an exaggeration. My first thought was what kind of ego this kid had that he felt the need to speak that long. My COC speech the month prior was 10 minutes at most and this guy kept going on and on. The gist of his whole speech was how good he was, and that there may be three other guys that were good, but the rest of the pilots were worthless. I’m not kidding. I recall that and I made comments along the lines of, “What the hell is this, The Seinfeld airing of the grievances?” It was that contentious of a speech.

No matter how much I’m still in disbelief of the mishap, it’s still not much of a surprise. While there are some very professional pilots in the F-18 community, there are a still lot of “cowboys.” When an F-18 colleague was told of this recent midair his reaction was, “they probably just swapped paint.” To be that nonchalant about two aircraft hitting each other from a senior pilot shows the attitude they have with flying formation. I have had repeated issues with my career when I’m trying to manage the tanker flow,
the receiver has been told to “go reform,” and I look to the three o’clock position and the jet is literally feet off my wingtip. There have been times where the jet is so close I can clearly see the pilot’s facial features. Those were the moments I was most worried about mid-airs; if that pilot got distracted for a second it would have been catastrophic. To me, the community in general just seems to be on their own program.

It’s tragic if this mishap identifies that the same issues that contributed to the 2016 mishap contributed to the 2018 mishap. Issues that were identified in the 2016 SIR should have been corrected and if they were not then someone needs to be accountable. When I was at PMA-207, any recommendations in SIRs that had us as the action officer were followed up by the either the Naval Safety Center or NAVAIR in general, I can’t recall specifically which. However we were required to send updates on the status of the recommendations for mishaps. Based on what I suspect happened in this mishap, either no one followed up with VMFA-242 or 242 totally disregarded the lessons learned from their near miss and six Marines paid for it with their lives. Someone needs to be held accountable for what was in my mind a 100% preventable accident that cost us six aircrew and two airframes.
12/3/2018 3:48:09 PM (UTC+9)
MAG-12=0
Weather=1
ATARS=2
Source file: Hodor/Applications/group.net.whatsapp.WhatsApp.shared/ChatStorage.sqlite : 0xF73826 (Table: ZWAMESSAGE, ZWAGROUPMEMBER, Size: 33865728 bytes)

12/3/2018 3:55:24 PM (UTC+9)
Everyone shoot doc a message and ask for Ambien, he’s playing hard ball issuing it out.
Source file: Hodor/Applications/group.net.whatsapp.WhatsApp.shared/ChatStorage.sqlite : 0xF7344C (Table: ZWAMESSAGE, ZWAGROUPMEMBER, Size: 33865728 bytes)

12/3/2018 5:23:33 PM (UTC+9)
Well that dude is not a bro. Quoting Natops in a chat...
Source file: Hodor/Applications/group.net.whatsapp.WhatsApp.shared/ChatStorage.sqlite : 0xF755CA (Table: ZWAMESSAGE, ZWAGROUPMEMBER, Size: 33865728 bytes)

12/3/2018 5:34:06 PM (UTC+9)
That is very un dude
Source file: Hodor/Applications/group.net.whatsapp.WhatsApp.shared/ChatStorage.sqlite : 0xF7553F (Table: ZWAMESSAGE, ZWAGROUPMEMBER, Size: 33865728 bytes)

12/3/2018 5:53:35 PM (UTC+9)
Talked to him about it today...MAG-12 Flight Surgeon is quoting the CG’s directive about “no performance enhancing....” for the exercise.
Source file: Hodor/Applications/group.net.whatsapp.WhatsApp.shared/ChatStorage.sqlite : 0xF7543A (Table: ZWAMESSAGE, ZWAGROUPMEMBER, Size: 33865728 bytes)

12/3/2018 6:04:10 PM (UTC+9)
We can get Ambien for a flight to the states but not for this ULT nonsense...
Source file: Hodor/Applications/group.net.whatsapp.WhatsApp.shared/ChatStorage.sqlite : 0xF75375 (Table: ZWAMESSAGE, ZWAGROUPMEMBER, Size: 33865728 bytes)

12/3/2018 6:13:10 PM (UTC+9)
Did you ask about the modafinil or just ambo?
Source file: Hodor/Applications/group.net.whatsapp.WhatsApp.shared/ChatStorage.sqlite : 0xF75090 (Table: ZWAMESSAGE, ZWAGROUPMEMBER, Size: 33865728 bytes)

12/3/2018 6:24:25 PM (UTC+9)
Modafinil is shit anyways
Source file: Hodor/Applications/group.net.whatsapp.WhatsApp.shared/ChatStorage.sqlite : 0xF798EC (Table: ZWAMESSAGE, ZWAGROUPMEMBER, Size: 33865728 bytes)

12/3/2018 6:24:35 PM (UTC+9)
Dextroamphetamine is legit.
Source file: Hodor/Applications/group.net.whatsapp.WhatsApp.shared/ChatStorage.sqlite : 0xF79848 (Table: ZWAMESSAGE, ZWAGROUPMEMBER, Size: 33865728 bytes)

12/3/2018 6:25:07 PM (UTC+9)
Can we get that?
Source file: Hodor/Applications/group.net.whatsapp.WhatsApp.shared/ChatStorage.sqlite : 0xF797B1 (Table: ZWAMESSAGE, ZWAGROUPMEMBER, Size: 33865728 bytes)

12/3/2018 6:26:09 PM (UTC+9)
Think they stopped passing out dex DoD wide now.
Source file: Hodor/Applications/group.net.whatsapp.WhatsApp.shared/ChatStorage.sqlite : 0xF795D9 (Table: ZWAMESSAGE, ZWAGROUPMEMBER, Size: 33865728 bytes)

12/3/2018 6:28:22 PM (UTC+9)
152 flight doc is cool. Just walk in and tell him you have trouble sleeping.
Source file: Hodor/Applications/group.net.whatsapp.WhatsApp.shared/ChatStorage.sqlite : 0xF79504 (Table: ZWAMESSAGE, ZWAGROUPMEMBER, Size: 33865728 bytes)

12/3/2018 6:28:22 PM (UTC+9)
All I want is Ambo so I can pass out with two screaming kids running around this tiny ass apartment...
Source file: Hodor/Applications/group.net.whatsapp.WhatsApp.shared/ChatStorage.sqlite : 0xF79426 (Table: ZWAMESSAGE, ZWAGROUPMEMBER, Size: 33865728 bytes)

Enclosure 57
I got a couch.

I got a decent air mattress

Just bring headphones I jerk off a lot

I miss Derpes...

Derpes never goes away man.

That shits for life.

Anyone know if Coco's is 24 hours?

Closes at 23

Attachments:
Tip cake is not a great cook
https://mmg-fna.whatsapp.net/d/f/AlcsbwRHzz9BRJi-lUI_8LE0NsjwqALeG9jBGu540j9.enc

My burger turned out great, basically cooked itself

#nightcrew
Name the artist playing when your burger was being cooked. Typo and it's a slap bet...

Source file: Hodor/Applications/group.net.whatsapp.WhatsApp.shared/ChatStorage.sqlite : 0xF83300 (Table: ZWAMESSAGE, ZWAGROUPMEMBER, Size: 33865728 bytes)

30 sec

Source file: Hodor/Applications/group.net.whatsapp.WhatsApp.shared/ChatStorage.sqlite : 0xF83282 (Table: ZWAMESSAGE, ZWAGROUPMEMBER, Size: 33865728 bytes)

Attachments:

Driving home in traffic this morning
https://mmg-fna.whatsapp.net/d/f/AkJvRfnda7e0g1OK1iWQ_oFAgVAQPewwWiayu5YxBMAk.enc
a5d35884-328a-428b-972d-c45f22cfc67.mp4

Source file: Hodor/Applications/group.net.whatsapp.WhatsApp.shared/ChatStorage.sqlite : 0xF8315A (Table: ZWAMESSAGE, ZWAGROUPMEMBER, Size: 33865728 bytes)

Source file: Hodor/Applications/group.net.whatsapp.WhatsApp.shared/ChatStorage.sqlite : 0xF831F5 (Table: ZWAMESSAGE, ZWAGROUPMEMBER, ZWAMEDIAITEM, Size: 33865728 bytes)

Hodor/Applications/group.net.whatsapp.WhatsApp.shared/Message/Media/13868433725-1496204160@g.us/a/5/a5d35884-328a-428b-972d-c45f22cfc67.mp4 : (Size: 192013 bytes)

Source file: Hodor/Applications/group.net.whatsapp.WhatsApp.shared/ChatStorage.sqlite : 0xF87CBF (Table: ZWAMESSAGE, ZWAGROUPMEMBER, Size: 33865728 bytes)

Source file: Hodor/Applications/group.net.whatsapp.WhatsApp.shared/ChatStorage.sqlite : 0xF87DE2 (Table: ZWAMESSAGE, ZWAGROUPMEMBER, Size: 33865728 bytes)

Source file: Hodor/Applications/group.net.whatsapp.WhatsApp.shared/ChatStorage.sqlite : 0xF87A9F (Table: ZWAMESSAGE, ZWAGROUPMEMBER, Size: 33865728 bytes)


Source file: Hodor/Applications/group.net.whatsapp.WhatsApp.shared/ChatStorage.sqlite : 0xF87E6F (Table: ZWAMESSAGE, ZWAGROUPMEMBER, Size: 33865728 bytes)

FYI: melatonin is minimum 24hrs grounding.

Source file: Hodor/Applications/group.net.whatsapp.WhatsApp.shared/ChatStorage.sqlite : 0xF87146 (Table: ZWAMESSAGE, ZWAGROUPMEMBER, Size: 33865728 bytes)

Brought up a good point. We should demonstrate our willingness to comply with docs bullshit by placing some caffeine pills and melatonin gummies on top of the ODO desk. We can put a “up” and “down” sign next to the appropriate bottle.

Source file: Hodor/Applications/group.net.whatsapp.WhatsApp.shared/ChatStorage.sqlite : 0xF872EC (Table: ZWAMESSAGE, ZWAGROUPMEMBER, Size: 33865728 bytes)

Enclosure 57
I just had the exact same thoughts...

Source file: Hodor/Applications/group.net.whatsapp.WhatsApp.shared/ChatStorage.sqlite : 0xF875A1 (Table: ZWAMESSAGE, ZWAGROUPMEMBER, Size: 33865728 bytes)

Except...we should get a picture of it on HIS desk.

Source file: Hodor/Applications/group.net.whatsapp.WhatsApp.shared/ChatStorage.sqlite : 0xF87463 (Table: ZWAMESSAGE, ZWAGROUPMEMBER, Size: 33865728 bytes)

If anyone wants to inquire directly with Disbursing about their Australia voucher, I hear the buck stops with DSN

Source file: Hodor/Applications/group.net.whatsapp.WhatsApp.shared/ChatStorage.sqlite : 0xF90BD9 (Table: ZWAMESSAGE, ZWAGROUPMEMBER, Size: 33865728 bytes)

I hear coffee is a 12 he downer.

Source file: Hodor/Applications/group.net.whatsapp.WhatsApp.shared/ChatStorage.sqlite : 0xF90B2F (Table: ZWAMESSAGE, ZWAGROUPMEMBER, Size: 33865728 bytes)

Water is 7

Source file: Hodor/Applications/group.net.whatsapp.WhatsApp.shared/ChatStorage.sqlite : 0xF90A9C (Table: ZWAMESSAGE, ZWAGROUPMEMBER, Size: 33865728 bytes)

I just won’t eat anything to be safe

Source file: Hodor/Applications/group.net.whatsapp.WhatsApp.shared/ChatStorage.sqlite : 0xF909F6 (Table: ZWAMESSAGE, ZWAGROUPMEMBER, Size: 33865728 bytes)

Do less....well you have to do more than that....you are doing too much.

Source file: Hodor/Applications/group.net.whatsapp.WhatsApp.shared/ChatStorage.sqlite : 0xF90925 (Table: ZWAMESSAGE, ZWAGROUPMEMBER, Size: 33865728 bytes)

I’ve been screen shotting all his responses to Derpes... he recommends we get him out here on TAD at least for the Guam det....

Source file: Hodor/Applications/group.net.whatsapp.WhatsApp.shared/ChatStorage.sqlite : 0x12EDF3E (Table: ZWAMESSAGE, ZWAGROUPMEMBER, Size: 33865728 bytes)

This has nothing to do with Safety... can we get some Monsters and Rockstars for the coffee mess?

Source file: Hodor/Applications/group.net.whatsapp.WhatsApp.shared/ChatStorage.sqlite : 0x12EDE60 (Table: ZWAMESSAGE, ZWAGROUPMEMBER, Size: 33865728 bytes)

There are some in the fridge already

Source file: Hodor/Applications/group.net.whatsapp.WhatsApp.shared/ChatStorage.sqlite : 0x12EDDAC (Table: ZWAMESSAGE, ZWAGROUPMEMBER, Size: 33865728 bytes)

Is the Flight Schedule getting release any time soon?

I will take 2 Monsters and a Rockstar!

Source file: Hodor/Applications/group.net.whatsapp.WhatsApp.shared/ChatStorage.sqlite : 0x12EDCCE (Table: ZWAMESSAGE, ZWAGROUPMEMBER, Size: 33865728 bytes)

We’re getting away from the whole “flight schedule” concept and just flying as the jets become available

Source file: Hodor/Applications/group.net.whatsapp.WhatsApp.shared/ChatStorage.sqlite : 0x12EDBDA (Table: ZWAMESSAGE, ZWAGROUPMEMBER, Size: 33865728 bytes)
**Location:** RAAF Base Tindal

**Lat/Lon:** 14-31S 132-22E

**Time Offset:** +0930
9 March 2019

To whom it may concern:

I joined VMFA(AW)-242 in July 2014. I left the squadron in April 2018. The last year I was there, I served as the pilot training officer. I was responsible for drafting training schedules and ensuring that aircrew met requirements for proficiency and currency with the resources available. In the case of (b) (3) (A), I flew with him for both a day and night tanking mission. This is reflected in the grade-sheets in his aircrew training jacket. I’m fairly confident that he flew a CORONET down to Guam in 2018, but other than that, I have no recollection of (b) (3) tanking flight history.

I can speak to the practice of logging Training & Readiness (T&R) codes from an instructor perspective while I was at VMFA(AW)-242. We would often squeeze as much training into every available flight hour that we could. The intent was not to short change the training to aircrew. We made every effort to follow the T&R, and ensure that the aircrew met the mission performance standards in order to demonstrate proficiency.

In the case of the 2201 and 2202 event grade-sheets for (b) (3) (A), it seems as though (b) (3) (A) did not have issues behind the tanker (based on the grade-sheet comments). Despite only performing “one plug”, he must have demonstrated proficiency by meeting all of the performance standards. In the case of the 2202, the event was scheduled to perform multiple additional codes during the same two hour flight evolution. It is always desirable to give any student as many looks as possible for each training objective, but if proficiency is displayed at the minimum requirement, I would often move on to different training objectives. Although I don’t recollect the exact event (from the grade-sheet), I imagine my mindset was to maximize the training value on the most difficult and complex portion from all of the events scheduled for that sortie. Therefore, if (b) (3) (A) demonstrated proficiency in plugging on the tanker, I probably decided to focus the remaining range/flight/scheduled time on other important training objectives. Conducting night intercepts, for example, may have been one of training aspects I elected to prioritize over making repeated contact with the tanker basket. The material readiness condition of the hornet fleet, resulting in limited flight hour availability, paired with the perceived pressure to maintain operational readiness most likely contributed to this decision making process.

I do not recall my exact understanding of the number of plugs required to log a tanker code on the date in question. However, based on all the information available to me now, it seems that my understanding was that one plug was sufficient.

Enclosure 60
Sir,

We'll have safety / ops look into this over the next week.

I'm not concerned about viewing the data at all. Changing/modifying would be a concern--although the IO/AMB took records immediately to mitigate that.

My focus is on deploying the squadron to Guam tomorrow.

We've got a couple of Pro A's to fly this morning, DCO brief is at 1500, you are welcome to attend sir.

6 Feb: 1100 Cell 1 launch, 2200 MB departure

Looking like we'll have to slide 2nd cell 24 hours for a couple of nagging gripes on 06 / 00. Holding firm to 11 jets on the Transpac, feel we'll have 9 to make 6 for Wednesday and will start all, launching 2 airborne spares.

Very respectfully,

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6)

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6), USMC
Commanding Officer
Marine All Weather Fighter Attack Squadron 242
DSN: 315-255-3800
Com: (b) (3) (A), (b) (6)
BB: (b) (3) (A), (b) (6)
Subject: MSHARP data for the mishap crew?

(with any thoughts from [ ] and [ ])

Is the MSHARP data for the mishap crew is still available to anyone with an MSHARP account? If that is true- What is the correct / legal / by the book method we need to follow so individuals can't have access to that - view/change/modify. ... While still maintaining the data for future use?

Is that a sqdn action, AMB action? Etc?

SF

[ ]
Today is Friday the 25th of January, 2019. We're in Iwakuni, Japan. I am assisted by and .

Next witness is . , can you please state your full name, spelling your last name for the record.

: Yeah. . Last name is .

: , how would you like me to refer to you in this interview?

: However you want.

: Can I call you ?

: Absolutely.

: Okay. , I know that's you call sign, I'd like you to call me , okay?

: Roger.

: , what is your current billet description?

: My current billet description is the MAG-12 Commanding Officer.

: And what are the primary responsibilities of the MAG-12 Commanding Officer?
Primary responsibilities are ensure mission accomplishment, responsible for everything within the MAG.

What is your military occupational specialty?

I am a F-18 Wizzo. So --

7525?

7525, but then for Colonel's it's 8042.

How long have you been flying the Hornet, sir.

I've been flying the Hornet since about 1993 in the FRS.

So let me do some math, 26 years?

Doing the math it's probably -- yeah, its probably about 25, 26 years.

How many years do you have in the Hornet? I mean, how many hours do you have in the Hornet?

I have over -- just over 3,000 hours.

Where were you in December of 2018?

December 2018, I was here in Iwakuni for a squadron and MAG and MAW exercise.

Tell me a little bit about that exercise at the unclassified level.
Yeah. So we'd have to go into it at the classified level to get into details, but essentially it was training just to produce assorties [ph] and to get ready for increased combat capability.

Okay. Was there a plan to do some 24 hour operations during that week as well?

There was.

What was the purpose of doing 24 hour operations?

The purpose was to exercise the system and to fly sororities throughout hours of the night to increase combat capability and preparation.

How many days notice did you provide to the squadron commanders that they'd be expected to fly in the late hours?

Months. We knew that going into -- going into this. So whatever that is, months, and then it was constantly identified going into it. There was a flow that talked about that, again, months prior. Then Ops, you'd have to talk to the Ops O about a delegation of how each one are signed up for what sororities. But those hours were known and what events guys were flying for what windows.
So from your perspective, the squadron commander would've had ample time to identify crews to be flying in the early morning hours and give them time to adjust their circadian rhythms?

Right. And so then we had specific conversations about that. There was some talk about using PEDS or not. PEDS were not authorized by the CG, were not authorized. So then you'd have to control circadian rhythm based on flows. The flows were provided enough so that squadron CO's could look at the draft flow, write their schedules in advance, and figure out what crews they had to schedule so they could backwards plan, and whatever we're going to be flying at. You know, once that night, Thursday night, they could then figure out how they were going to fly Monday and Tuesday, how they were going to work the circadian rhythm for that.

And we also talked about that going in multiple times and also the Friday prior, just reaffirming that they had to make sure that they were scheduled and that the squadron ORM's flight schedule is really going to drive that to make sure that they had what they needed and they get reiterated on that Friday prior that PEDS were not authorized.

Okay. When you say PEDS, you're
referring to performance enhanced drugs and you're talking about go pills and no-go pills?

: Affirmed.

: For example Ambian --

: Affirm.

: -- or some type of stimulant?

: Affirm.

: And you're telling me that they were not authorized?

: They were not. There was talk about getting them authorized. 225 asked that week prior, so we went back at the CG and put that request in and after discussion they were not authorized. So passed back down to the squadron CO's the beginning of that Friday prior that they were not authorized and that they -- essentially didn't have to fly sororities if they couldn't work their circadian rhythm. If they could work their circadian rhythm, they felt comfortable with it, then they would fly the sororities. If they were relying on the PEDS to fly the night sororities, and then because we weren't using the PEDS then they'd have to fly the night sororities. But they were able to balance their crew day, there were no issues brought up to me.

: Okay. Did you have any cancellations
during the ULT?

[O: (3) (A), (b) (6)]: There were. There were some cancellations for weather [inaudible] also cancellations by the squadrons for different events going on in the first two days, I believe, and that's up to the squadron CO's. Like anything else, if something wasn't right, didn't feel right, they could cancel an event for whatever reason.

[O: (3) (A), (b) (6)]: Did you reprimand anybody for canceling a flight?

[O: (3) (A), (b) (6)]: No.

[O: (3) (A), (b) (6)]: Did you address a large group and express gross dissatisfaction with any cancellations?

[O: (3) (A), (b) (6)]: No. Not at all.

[O: (3) (A), (b) (6)]: So from your perspective, you feel like you made it clear that safety was paramount?

[O: (3) (A), (b) (6)]: Absolutely. Safety is everything. So over the past, you know, year I've installed something for at least one squadron commanders. We always say crawl, walk, run. I dumbed it down so it's crawl, crawl, crawl. Sometimes you gotta make sure that you take those phases and at any point you can stop, prevent, and the only thing that you've gotta do is just make sure you communicate to higher, you know, if an event was canceled for
whatever reason so we can all track it and then figure out how we
can go into the next event if there is a lesson learned from why you
canceled the previous event and that would be the only thing. Just
communicate that to higher.

Enclosure 62 (b) (3) (A), (b) (6): Were you surprised to learn that the
mishap aircrew were conducting an air refueling on the morning of
the exercise?

Enclosure 62 (b) (3) (A), (b) (6): So there was, you know, you go back to it, it
was not on the schedule. So --

Enclosure 62 (b) (3) (A), (b) (6): When you say schedule, you mean squadron
flights?

Enclosure 62 (b) (3) (A), (b) (6): Squadron flights schedule. Yes, sir. So in
the flows, there is a -- tankers were there, right, so again, for
the ULT exercise we weren't dictating specifically what missions
that they had to fly, right, so they were going to go to fly
whatever codes they needed to get, they could get specific codes.
So it wasn't, hey, on each sorority you were getting these things,
right. So there were -- had tankers available, if they wanted to
incorporate tankers, and in that case there were tankers available,
the C-130's were there. It was in the flows that were identified,
like I said, previously, the tankers were there.

Enclosure 62 (b) (3) (A), (b) (6): Okay. So just to clarify, when you say
it wasn't on the schedule, you understand now that it wasn't on the
fighter squadron schedule.

: It wasn't on the fighter squadron schedule but
the C-130's had it on their schedule, they were ready to go, it was
in the flows that the tankers were there. Absolutely.

: So at the MAG, at the Wing, MAG, and
C-130 squadrons perspective, it was all scheduled days in advance?

: It was. And it was in the flows. Absolutely.

: But we've, kind of, understand now from
242's perspective, it wasn't understood until later?

: Correct. Based on their schedule that it was
not on there.

: Okay. You were a squadron commander,
obviously, before you were a MAG commander?

: I was F-18 squadron commander.

: And so as a F-18 squadron commander, you
produced and sign flight schedules authorizing flight?

: I did.

: Did that flight schedule include TNR
codes?

: It did.

: Would it be typical for a crew in your
gun squadron to go out and execute something that's not indicated on the flight schedule in the TNR code?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : I would say that is abnormal and that's not what's expected. Any changes to the flight schedule should be approved by the CO or the XO, if you look at the F-18 SOP it clearly delineates that. It says the XO or CO for changes to flight schedule, and further, if you look at the ODO it also talks about the ODO's responsible for getting approval for any changes and then passing that down from ODO to ODO in terms of changes of approval and even in terms of hot pit or what the flow is for the jets. And so in terms of a changed schedule that that should have been, it would've been signed off by the CO.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : And the mishap was 6 weeks ago and we've all reviewed the records since then in several contexts so we're both aware that we don't think that happened at 242.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Correct. Knowing the facts that we know, then it would appear that that did not happen.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Yes, sir. What can you tell me about the search and rescue capabilities that reside here in Iwakuni?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : So, we'll back up to since it's post -- so what we know now, is we know that it's actually -- they're in alert 15 when the Japanese are flying up to alert, one hour when Japanese
are not flying it's notification to two. That's post mishap when we start digging into it. Pre mishap, it was about two hours. What I was told in our discussions, and that was when there's a F-18 that crashed several years ago, and from those discussions it was that it was the Japanese response was timely and the efforts worked fairly well and it was about a two hour response.

It appears that that is not the case, that it's less than that if the Japanese are flying and it's more than that if the Japanese are not flying.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Were the Japanese flying during the mishap?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : They were not. To the best of my knowledge.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Did -- what steps did your headquarters take to assure search and rescue was available and at the best alert level before executing the exercise?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : It would be the normal posture. So if we -- there weren't specific steps taken in addition to what we did for normal flying.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : So to ask that question another way, did we specifically advise or request the Japanese self-defense force to have alert statuses adjusted in support of our training?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : We did not. The only thing we did is we
notified the field hours and the station as to when we were going to be flying. Notified station that we needed external -- or extra hours for flying at nights and so that was approved because they had to get extra ATC controllers and everything else. So the coordination was done with station in terms of flying that external to normal field hours.

At Marine Corps Air Stations back CONUS, and I realize we're here in Japan right now, but say back at Beaufort or Miramar, for example, under what cognizance does search and rescue reside? Is that under the MAG or is that under the station?

I wouldn't be able to answer that one, I'd have to defer. Normally, the Coast Guard is what provides it back in the states and then I think when -- it varies, basically when there's [inaudible] then station had some and now stations don't have those assets so I think it depends upon the location that you're at and what assets each station has. But I'd have to defer it to somebody that has the definitive answer on that.

Okay. Do you know what the sea surface temperature was in the Intra-South during the exercise?

I'm being told it was 70.

Okay.
But I don't know that for a fact. Other than what I was told.

Was that part of your confirmation briefing process?

It was part of the dry suits are down to the CO level to figure out whether or not they were going to fly with their dry suits. That was at the CO level.

As a squadron commander I know you probably had to make decisions like that when you commanded at VMFA. What reference would you go to for the rules/regulations for the wear of the anti-exposure suit?

Yeah. So you'd go to the OPNAV, you'd get your DOSS involved on the OPNAV looking at charts in there. There's something new -- decision points is no decision points less than 50 feet. You don't have a decision and then with the combination of outside air temperature, there are some decision up to 50 to 60 and then you've got to weigh that in with temperatures of body fat, all those other factors and the time expected in the water.

Okay. How long do you think a person can survive in 70 degree water without a dry suit?

It's going to depend upon the body fat of the individual.
For yourself, you're kind of a lean guy. So for you.

Yeah, I'm a little guy, so it's going to be a couple of hours.

A couple? Three hours or so?

About three plus hours. Depending upon, well, all the other conditions.

Okay. So with that information --

And it depends also if you're wearing other undergarments and everything else besides the exposure suit.

Okay. And would you be dependent upon your squadron commanders to do the math on that and make those decisions?

Yeah, the squadron commanders are the ones who decide the flight schedule and ultimately make the decision on whether or not there's going to be exposure suit directed or not.

Okay.

And also because there were multiple type/model series. So every type/model series is a little bit different. And so if it was a one-type model series it would be different but because, again, we've got F-35's, F-18's, and C-130's, some are crew, some are non-crew, and they have different things,
that's the other reason for the CO making those ultimate decisions for each specific type-model series.

[0] [3] (A), (b) (6): So the theme of what you're saying is decentralized command and control. You're expecting CO's at different type/model series to take into consideration the ventilation features of their anti-exposure suits --

[0] [3] (A), (b) (6): Well absolutely. They've got the best SA as to their crews, as to their specific suits they're wearing, their training, and then also all those things. That's why, again, it's all in the flight schedule, they sign the flight schedule, that ultimately puts all those factors down that the 0-5 commander has intimate responsibility of for as anywhere from 15 to 25 aircrew as opposed to making that decision at the MAG level for various type-model series.

[0] [3] (A), (b) (6): You've flown a fair amount at night, I assume. In the Hornet?

[0] [3] (A), (b) (6): I have.

[0] [3] (A), (b) (6): Have you flown with the ANVS-9?

[0] [3] (A), (b) (6): So most of my -- in that experience has been previous. It was the ANVS-9 and actually before that, the old cats eyes. Was not with the 11.

[0] [3] (A), (b) (6): Have you ever --
I've never flown with the 11. I hadn't flown with a helmet till I got out here so I wanted the comfort level with the help before I used the ANVS-11.

Okay. So do you have a JHMCS helmet.

I have a JHMCS helmet, yes.

Okay. Do you have a specific SOP or training program at the MAG level that directs how many hours somebody needs on the 9's before they go to the 11's?

There's not a specific MAG directed program.

Okay. Have you received any training on the ANVS-11?

I have not. Again, I'm waiting for -- till I get more comfortable with the JHMCS before I do the 11. So I have not gotten training on the 11.

Okay. You've been to the tanker at night, back in the day with the ANVS-9's, I assume.

I have.

And likely with Marine Corps KC-130J's?

Mainly C-130's. A lot of the time it was over, obviously, in Iraq, in the dessert. And with various models, and then tanking in the day on transpax [ph] and everything else with Air Force assets.
So when you go to the tanker at night on the KC-130, what type of external lighting configuration would you expect to see on the 130, and what type of external lighting configuration would you expect to see on the respective Hornets?

So the lighting configuration is going to depend, I think — ambient conditions and what's out there, but it would be a variation of either covert or overt for the tankers based upon what the conditions were.

Okay. And who's going to direct the external lighting of the tanker, typically?

Well the C-130's will have whatever's set depending on if there's any other out there, but if you want a different condition then the lead pilot can direct the C-130 to take it to whatever tanking configuration, a lighting configuration makes sense for the ambient conditions.

So assuming a section of Hornets then, the Hornets section leader could make a request to the refueling area commander to adjust the external lighting in the C-130?

Affirmative.

Okay. Who controls movement of the receivers around the tanker?

The movement of receivers around the tanker is
controlled by the tanker. They own that. Once you get there, they will control that, where they're putting you, whether it's the single ship or four ship in movement from the fourth ship to the first ship or wherever you are in the formation; to include, departing the tanker.

: And in general, assuming two Hornets and one C-130, from start to finish, from what altitude and from what side to what side would the receivers move? Per the ATP-56?

: Yeah. Per the ATP-56, it's very specific, right. So you're going to come in, you're going to come up to the left. In this case, there's a individual back observer, you'll come in when you clear down, you'll tank and when you're done tanking, you'll be cleared over to the right. It's essentially how that'll work. And then the departure will be the instructions of the tanker of where you're going to park the tanker. Mostly, away from the tanker.

: Would you assume that the commanding officers of your three fighter squadrons would conduct air refueling in compliance with ATP-56 from low left to high right?

: Correct.

: Is there anything we haven't touched on this morning that you feel is germane to the mishap?
Is that all the questions?

That's all the questions.

Yeah. So I think the other thing to look at is just in terms of, you know, mentoring and equip, you know, what the squadrons have for manpower I think would be the other piece of this. In terms of where the squadrons are, when you look at 242, they are compared to a UDP squadron, less manning and less equipment than a UDP squadron. So I think that that also looks into this, so there's no WTI's in the squadron right now, that's been identified to higher headquarters so there's not WTI's in the PTOWTO billets at this point, and aircrews are considerably less than the crews when a UDP unit comes out here. I don't know if that make sense.

It does. So do you feel like young high-performing Staff NCOs and officers specifically seek and desire to come and serve in Iwakuni?

I think that's an interesting question. I think that, I think you get all types, like any squadron. I think though, that the fill rate when you look here and, again, compare it to a UDP squadron, there's no pre-deployment training plan like a UDP squadron, you don't stabilize, a UDP squadron stabilizes. They come over with all of their aircraft. So 12 aircraft, 242 may have aircraft that are in work or whatever so they don't have a full
[inaudible] of aircraft. And then, they've only got what [inaudible] provides it for people. And, generally, again, when you compare it to a UDP squadron, it's less in terms of crews, qualified crews, and qualified experience maintainers.

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6) : Do you -- do you know what the -- or what is your target number of flight hours per month for your aircrews here at MAG-12?

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6) : Yeah. So the minimum throughout the Marine Corps, it's about 15 is what you say for the average. It varies by that model series, but it's about 15 is what you use. The goal is to get 15 combined using simulator -- it's off air flight time that you want, but if you can't get the flight that should be combined simulator and flight time. 242 is beneath the 15 hours.

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6) : So they mitigate that with simulator time?

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6) : Simulator time. And that goes another the question, the simulator out here there's only three simulators, now four, and there's only one desimulator so there's not adequate simulators out here either.

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6) : Have you made a request to higher headquarters to increase investments in simulators?

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6) : We have. That's been identified.
What about other material resources, maintenance material support, for example. Is it part supply out here at MAG-12 the same as it might be say, back at MAG-11?

Yes. So part supply is actually better, generally speaking, out here for the supply level. Time to get out here takes a little bit longer, obviously, for overseas, but the big issue is just the qualified maintainers to actually, to do all that work.

Okay. Have you ever had to tell General Weidley that you canceled an event because of weather or you didn't feel comfortable with it?

I'll say yes, but I'll clarify. So have I ever been fearful of telling that I can't do something, no. So I can't quantify exactly what, but I've got no issue of telling him we can't do an event. So, for example, we were going to fly to an airfield less than -- or about 7,000 foot airfield and I canceled sororities on that Wednesday because of some other considerations that I wasn't comfortable with and there was no pushback whatsoever.

So I mean, to ask the question, frankly, do you feel like the Wing Commanding General has a good attitude toward safety?

Absolutely. And, in fact, he sent an email
out again on that Friday and reiterated it the Friday prior about, you know, don't push it, don't accept unnecessary risks, it's not worth losing, you know, aircraft or anything. And I reiterated that to the squadron commanders the same way. So there's no undue influence and he will -- if we have to stop something -- there's no push back from his level whatsoever.

[0] (3) (A), (b) (6) : Okay.

[0] (3) (A), (b) (6) : Does that answer that one?

[0] (3) (A), (b) (6) : It does. Thank you. That's touched on all the topics I have, [0].

[0] (3) (A), (b) (6) : [b] (3) (A), (b) (6), I'll give you the last word if there's anything you'd like to add.

[0] (3) (A), (b) (6) : I've got nothing else to add to the questioning, unless you have any other questions.

[0] (3) (A), (b) (6) : No, sir. That concludes it. The judge will swear you out.

[(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) was warned, sworn, and departed.]
tuck (/define.php?term=tuck)

when a male does a tuck, he "tucks (/define.php?term=tucks)" his penis and testes (/define.php?term=testes) back through his legs which encompasses the look (/define.php?term=the%20look) of a females genitals

does it look better (/define.php?term=better) tucked (/define.php?term=tucked) or untucked (/define.php?term=untucked)?

by Don Gulliver (/author.php?author=Don%20Gulliver) April 05, 2003

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A play (/define.php?term=A%20play) on the word Bukkake (/define.php?term=Bukkake), used to describe ejaculating on a partner's face in situations when more discretion (/define.php?term=discretion) may be needed, such as work, school, church, etc.

When I asked Erin if she would like some boocake (/define.php?term=boocake), she was intrigued (/define.php?term=intrigued), yet completely unaware that she would resemble a glazed doughnut (/define.php?term=glazed%20doughnut) by the end of the night.


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All right. Good morning, today is Thursday the 24th of January, 2019. I'm assisted by and . We're in Iwakuni, Japan. We're interviewing ?

, sir.

. Thank you, .

, can you please state your full name for the record, spelling your last name.

Yep. Name is .

. And , how would you like me to refer to you?

is fine, sir.

Just , can I just call you ?

Yes, sir.

Okay. You can call me or sir. Whatever you'd like, okay?

Okay.

Where were you in December of 2018?

So during the week that the mishap occurred,
sir, I was TAD to Okinawa for exercise Yamasukura [ph] 75.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): Okay. When -- on approximately what day did you depart Iwakuni for Okinawa?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): I departed about December 2nd. I believe --

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): And approximately what day did you return?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): I returned December 7th, returned early from the exercise as soon as I could following the news.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): So you were absent from and you did not directly participate in the MAG ULT?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): Correct.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): Did you participate in any of the planning?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): Sir, I'm the logistics officer for the squadron so I was present at some of the [inaudible] meetings while hammering out logistical stuff as far as, how we were going to get Marines to the staging area to go to [b] (6), and that sort of thing. I was not involved in any of the flight related aspects of the exercise.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): Okay. How many hours do you have in the Hornet?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): I've got about 600, sir.
Six hundred hours. And what is your MOS?

Are you a 7525?

Seventy-five, twenty-five.

Okay. Where did you receive your training to be a 7525?

Yeah, so all of the primary advance were completed at Pensacola, Florida wing in about summer of 2012. Then transferred to VMFAT-101 in Miramar. Completed the FRS December of 2013.

Okay. And what was your first gun squadron?

VMFA-AW224 in Beaufort, South Carolina.

How was that?

Good, sir.

And then when did you get to Iwakuni?

I got here June 23rd of 2018.

So June of '18. So you've only been in this squadron about six months.

Yes, sir.

Did you notice any differences between 224 and 242?

Not particularly.
Okay. What job did you have at 224?

224, I was ground safety, CMCC, and then ended up in Skeds. Did Skeds for a year and then I was the Flight O before I left.

So as the daily schedule writer, was the daily schedule writer process and schedule development process in 224 and 242 the same as far as you can tell?

Yes, sir.

Okay. Did you guys use an ORM worksheet at 224?

We did.

Did you use one at 242?

I'm not sure. I was never --

You're not sure. Have you ever flown at 242?

Yes, sir.

How many times have you flown at 242?

Been here six months.

Six months. I flew quite a bit in Australia. Since then, I haven't flown a whole lot. So total probably 30 or 40 times.

In those 30 to 40 flights, do you ever
recall reviewing and signing an ORM worksheet at the ODO desk before you walked to the jet?

[0 (3) (A), (b) (6)]: I do not.

[0 (3) (A), (b) (6)]: And those other, presumably, 300 flights at 224, do you remember doing that?

[0 (3) (A), (b) (6)]: Yes, sir.

[0 (3) (A), (b) (6)]: So would you consider --

[0 (3) (A), (b) (6)]: Usually the flight lead would fill out the ORM sheet.

[0 (3) (A), (b) (6)]: Okay. So would you consider that a difference between 224 and 242?

[0 (3) (A), (b) (6)]: Yes.

[0 (3) (A), (b) (6)]: I mean, you shook your head no and then you said yes. So which one is it?

[0 (3) (A), (b) (6)]: Yes.

[0 (3) (A), (b) (6)]: Okay. Did -- you said you routed the flight schedule at 224?

[0 (3) (A), (b) (6)]: Yes, sir.

[0 (3) (A), (b) (6)]: So on the flight schedule at 224, did it include review by the ASO, the Ops O, the XO, and the AMO before the commanding officer signed it?

[0 (3) (A), (b) (6)]: So I would take it to training officers
first, make sure they were good with it. A Safety rep -- not necessarily have to be the ASO, but either the ASO or the DOSS, have maintenance take a look at it, and the OPSO, and then finally the Skipper.

: Okay. Just so -- did you ever look at a flight schedule at 242 in the six months you've been here?

: Yes, sir. Everyday.

: Everyday. In those everydays that you looked at a flight schedule, did you notice that it did or did not have an ASO review?

: Sorry --

[Phone rings in background.]

: You can turn the volume down. Hit the volume button all the way down on that.

did as directed.

: Yeah, I think it's right there. We get like random calls, it's pretty awesome.

: So I think I misunderstood. I have not -- I do not review the schedules before they are signed.

: I understand that. Yeah, I'm talking about when you fly. If you go to fly the jet and you look at the flight schedule at the ODO desk or whatever is published in hard
Yes.
-- and you notice the bottom in 224 schedule bottom, that it had this CO signature as well as XO, Ops O, AAMO, perhaps even Ordinance, or somebody else had initialed the bottom of the schedule. Do you remember seeing that?

It was just the CO's signature.
So 224, only the commanding officer reviewed the flight schedule?
Correct. We had a routing sheet that the ASO and maintenance and OPSO would sign off on. But not the actual schedule itself.

Interesting.
So the -- on the router sheet there was a signature block for Safety, Ops, and maintenance.
And then what did you do with that routing sheet in Beaufort?
We just had it in there when we presented the schedule to the Skipper and he would just -- if anyone had any comments, they would put them on that routing sheet.
And then after the CO signed the hard schedule in Beaufort, what did you do with the routing sheet?
So we gave the signed schedule and the routing sheet to the -- our Ops clerks and they had like a clipboard hanging up, they would two-hole punch and put them on there.

So at 224 you'd retain the routing sheet?

I believe so. I'm not one hundred percent sure on that but I believe so.

And 224, did the flight schedule include an ORM worksheet for each event?

I believe it did. It was --

Okay.

-- we would rate -- we assessed each sorority as low, medium, or high risk. And if medium or high, then we'd have to have some sort of mitigation or comments or sort of -- that sort of thing.

And why did you guys do that?

Just for safety purposes, sir. Just so that --

I understand that. What order directive -- directed you to do that?

I'm not sure.

Could it be the MAG-31, MAG order 3710 SOP for flight operations?
It could be. I honestly don't know what the -- where it's written down that we had to do that. I just did it.

You just did it because you're a new guy and you do as you're told?

Yes.

Okay. So do you guys -- have you seen a like document at 242?

I have not.

Why not? Why do you think 242 does not use an ORM worksheet? That's my question.

I don't know. I haven't working in Ops. Since I've been here I've been at the four. I can't speak to --

But you've executed flight operations though?

Yes, sir.

As a wizzo.

Yes.

Do you feel well qualified to be a wizzo?

I do.

Why is that?

I've done everything the Marine Corps has
asked me to do. I've gotten qualifications. I've -- I mean --

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Okay. Those are some good answers. Are you familiar with OPNAV 3710?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Yes, sir.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Have you read it?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Yes.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Do you know what it says about dry suits?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : I believe the outside -- air temperatures below 60 degrees in a certain water temperature -- I'd have to review it but certain ranges there are at the discretion of the CO and then below certain range it's required that you wear them.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : So how many times have you worn a dry suit in the back seat of a Hornet? Roughly.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Ten times.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : How many times have you done it in Iwakuni?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : I did with the Bangles. I wore it with the Bangles when I was here on UDP.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : I'm sorry. How many times have you done it with 242?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : 242. I have not.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Do you have the dry suit issued to you?
Yes, sir.

When's the last time you put it on and had it fit checked?

Probably when I first checked in.

Have you ever seen a flight note on a 242 flight schedule that required to wear a dry suit? Anti-exposure suits.

Not that I can recall.

Have you ever been in a meeting with the commanding officer or executive officer where the wear of dry suits was directed under certain conditions?

Not that I can recall.

Do you know what their survival time is without a dry suit in 68 degree water?

I'd say 30 minutes.

So you think in 30 minutes in 68 degree water a person would expire? Maybe based on your understanding.

Sixty-eight degrees, probably three hours.

They die or they go unconscious in three hours?

Unconscious.

Okay. Do you -- what kind of survival
training have you had?  You've been to SERE School, you've been to Helo Dunker --

SERE School, yes, sir. Helo Dunker; three times, including the initial, the API. So I just went there as part of my refresh about eight months ago. It's a --

Where'd you do that? Cherry Point.

Were you required to enter a one man raft while wearing all your flight equipment with inflated LPU's?

No.

You weren't?

No, sir.

Were you -- it required to enter a full size raft with assistance of others?

Yes, sir.

Okay. So you're telling me here today that as a 7525, you have no recall of having to climb into a one-man raft in the swimming pool during the required quarter annual survival training?

That's correct.

Okay. Have you ever attempted to enter a one-man raft in a training environment wearing all your equipment?
No.

So you've been in the Helo Dunker three times and you don't have any recall of climbing into a little raft?

Correct. Other than the small raft they have at the end where they hoist you up.

I'm talking about the one-man raft, the little rubber one that's like six-feet long. Are you familiar with the one-man raft?

Yes, sir.

How are you familiar with it?

Just from talking at it -- or talking about it.

Have you ever handled one inflated?

Not that I recall.

When you say talking about it, when do you remember talking about it?

During the survival training, the Helo Dunker, Swimfis [ph] training.

Are you aware of the effects on emersion on hypothermia in a survival situation, specifically, a person will last longer if they're underwater partially submerged or fully submerged in cold water. Are you familiar with that phenomenon?
Yes, sir.

Do you know how much faster heat is extracted from the body by water compared to air of the same temperature and what that factor is?

I know it's significantly faster. I don't know the exact number.

Where did you go to SERE school?

West Coast, Coronado.

Did they talk about cold weather survival at all in Coronado?

Yes, sir.

What year did you do that?

That would have been 2012.

Do you know what OPNAV 3710 says about performance-enhancing drugs?

There's three different categories. Category I is like Gatorade, protein, stuff like that is generally okay; category II is under the approval of the flight surgeon; and then category III is like a no-go.

What's an example of a category II?

Category II, maybe like a -- caffeine pills, sleeping pills, something like that.
So go, no-go's are under the approval of the flight surgeon?

Yes, sir.

So it's your understanding that the squadron flight surgeon can authorize the use of go and no-go drugs?

That's my understanding. Yes. With CO's discretion.

Okay with CO -- so the flight surgeon can issue it with the squadron commanding officers approval; is that your understanding?

It's ultimately up to the squadron CO, yes. I'm sure that the flight doc wouldn't just do that without at least talking to the CO first. And that's just a guess though.

And you're a captain in the Marine Corps. How long have you been a captain. Five years?

About five years.

So you're -- are you selected for major now?

No, sir.

So you're on the upcoming field grade?

Yes. Okay. So you're like a year and a half away from being a field grade officer in a fleet hornet squadron.
should you choose to remain on active duty; is that correct?

   (b) (3) (A), (b) (6): Yes.

   (b) (3) (A), (b) (6): And it's your belief that the O-5, Lieutenant Colonel Commander can authorize the use of go and no-go drugs? If I was a new guy asking you that question, that's how you would answer it?

   (b) (3) (A), (b) (6): I would say it's -- if the flight doc okay's it.

   (b) (3) (A), (b) (6): Okay. Are you aware if go and no-go drugs were authorized for this wing ULT?

   (b) (3) (A), (b) (6): As far as I -- my understanding is they were not.

   (b) (3) (A), (b) (6): How did you come to have that understanding?

   (b) (3) (A), (b) (6): Just from some conversations. I know there was some chatter about it on our group chat -- WhatsApp group.

   (b) (3) (A), (b) (6): WhatsApp, what is WhatsApp? I'm not familiar. I'm 47 years old, man, you've got to bring me in --

   (b) (3) (A), (b) (6): So it's like -- just messaging, like --

   (b) (3) (A), (b) (6): Like on your cell phones, on your iPhones?

   (b) (3) (A), (b) (6): Yes.
(O) (3) (A), (b) (6)  : And that's a way you got to formal --

(O) (3) (A), (b) (6)  : So we have like a group chat window, kind of, thing and it's, kind of --

(O) (3) (A), (b) (6)  : Actually it sounds pretty cool. Pretty efficient, good way to communicate.

(O) (3) (A), (b) (6)  : Yes, sir.

(O) (3) (A), (b) (6)  : So you guys talk about like official and unofficial things like social events as well as when the AOM is or whatever?

(O) (3) (A), (b) (6)  : Correct.

(O) (3) (A), (b) (6)  : Sounds pretty good. I wish we would have had that in the '90s. Saved me a lot of time calling the ODO. So on that chat, did you observe or participate in conversations where there was discussion of the use of go or no-go pills?

(O) (3) (A), (b) (6)  : I did.

(O) (3) (A), (b) (6)  : What do you recall?

(O) (3) (A), (b) (6)  : I recall that the -- I don't remember who said it but I believe it was the flight doc. First off, he's like no. My understanding was that the MAG CO specifically said that there would be no use of go, no-go's during the exercise.

(O) (3) (A), (b) (6)  : So you're understanding that in the electronic chat room that you observed,  gave an order
not to use go, no-go pills which was relayed by your squadron flight surgeon?

: Yes, sir.

: Did offer different guidance?

: No. Not that I saw.

: Okay. Did any squadron crew members express dissatisfaction with that decision?

: There was a little bit.

: Yeah, that's understandable. And what was the basis of that? Like what was their complaint?

: I think it just had to do with flying really irregular hours. Long workdays, the, you know, people -- people aren't exactly used to flying at 0100, 0200 in the morning. So just, kind of, helping us adjust to that schedule.

: Yeah, that's understandable. How long have you known ?

: I met when I checked into the bats about six months ago.

: And you're both wizzo's. Did you guys ever participate in the same flight events?

: I don't think we have actually.
Did you ever plan events together?

No.

Did you ever come into contact with him socially?

Yes, sir.

How's he doing?

He's -- he's well.

What do you know about his personal life?

Married, kids, single?

Yes, sir.

And he was scheduled to fly from midnight to five a.m.?

Yeah, if that's what the schedule said.

Are you aware that he's mishap aircrew for the accident?
Yes, sir.

Are you aware roughly what time of day the accident took place?

About 0200.

Okay. Have you ever conducted aerial refueling in the F-18?

Many times?

Many times.

Day and night?

Yes.

With night vision goggles?

Yes.

With ANVS-11 and ANVS-9?

ANVS-9's.

ANVS-9?

Yes.

At 224 or here at 242?

Both.

Both. So you've been at the tanker at night in 242?

Yes, sir.
With goggles?

Yes.

Do you recall the light level condition?

So the -- the only time I did it with 242 was off a -- I think it was a Canadian C-130.

Down in Australia?

In Australia.

Okay.

And they didn't have any covert lighting.

Okay.

So they -- I remember the lights on the boom being very bright, like pretty much blew me on the goggles. Like, it was almost better to -- to go unaided.

So what'd you do?

I don't recall, sir. I think --

Who was your pilot?

It was [inaudible], sir.

Okay.

We had just -- I think we had a night strike [inaudible] a section. I hit the tanker. I remember some comments about the lights being really bright, it was a little bit hard to see, but we tanked no issues and --
What are some techniques that you guys use when the lights are really bright? What are some things that you guys do to -- assuming you cannot adjust the tankers lights.

Okay. Assuming we can't adjust our lights, then maybe looking over the goggles would be one thing.

So outside the cockpit under goggle scan; is that what you're saying?

Yes, sir.

Ever any discussion or consideration to flipping the goggles up?

I believe after that flight -- after we started flying with these things a few times, I think that was discussed. I don't remember if --

When you say these things, do you mean ANVS-9 or ANVS-11?

ANVS-9's.

Okay.

Just the weird lighting on this Canadian C-130's, I think there was some discussion about tanking unaided. I remember it being briefed, I don't remember the specifics of it.

Does the C-130 have a white light on the horizontal stabilizer of the C-130 that shines forward to eliminate
the back of the C-130 during night aerial refueling? Are you familiar?

: Yes, sir. That sounds correct.

: Do you know what that light's called?

: No.

: Have you ever seen it illuminated?

: No, we're usually covert when we tank off the U.S. C-130's.

: Why is that?

: Just for tactical reasons.

: So you're saying that --

: And it also doesn't --

: Go ahead.

: -- it also doesn't bloom out the goggles.

: So when you go to the United States Marine Corps KC-130J, you normally request or select the tanker to go covert?

: Yes. From my experience.

: And when the tanker is covert, what overt lights are then visible?

: None.

: Okay. So it's suffice to say unless
you're looking through the 40 degrees straight through your field of view of the goggles then you would not see the tanker; would that be true?

(d) (3) (A), (b) (6) : That's correct. You'd be 10 feet away from it and see nothing.

(d) (3) (A), (b) (6) : [b) (6), (b) (1) (A)

(d) (3) (A), (b) (6) : (b) (6), (b) (1) (A)

(b) (6), (b) (1) (A)

(d) (3) (A), (b) (6) : [b) (6), (b) (1) (A)

(d) (3) (A), (b) (6) : [d]

(d) (3) (A), (b) (6) : [b) (6), (b)

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(b) (6), (b) (1) (A)

(d) (3) (A), (b) (6) : [d]

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(b) (6), (b) (1) (A)

(d) (3) (A), (b) (6) : [d]

(d) (3) (A), (b) (6) : [b) (6), (b) (1) (A)

(b) (6), (b) (1) (A)

(d) (3) (A), (b) (6) : [d]

(d) (3) (A), (b) (6) : [b) (6), (b) (1) (A)

Okay. And so you -- aircraft -- participating aircraft scheduled, planned, and briefed, or authorized either covert or lights out in the airspace?

(d) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Yes, sir.

(d) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Why do you believe that to be true?
What would it mean if the flight schedule said "do regard", "Intra-South, do regard." What does that communicate to you?

In regards to what, sir? Just --

So if you read a flight note on the flight schedule that said that you were scheduled to go operate in the Intra-South, do regard; what would that communicate to you?

Do regard means we would be using that airspace under the assumption that nobody's keeping civilian traffic out of there, or other military flights.

So how would that affect your decision making about the use of lights?

In that case, it'd still probably -- I mean, obviously wouldn't want to be covert until we're joined up on the C-130, and then still have them go covert when we're tanking, then the F-18's would keep their lights on. I think that would -- they'd still see the lights from our aircraft, we're close proximity.
So you'd keep the lights on the Hornet?

Yes, sir.

Okay. And if the lights are on on the Hornet and the probe is extended at night, what is the probe light doing on the Hornet? Is it off or on?

It should be on.

Is there a switch to secure the probe light?

No.

How do you secure the probe light on a Hornet with the probe light out?

We'd switch to --

Have you ever been to the tanker at night on the goggles with the probe light off in an F-18?

Not that I can recall.

So you recall --

Only when we go --

Okay.

-- I'm sorry. Only when we're in, like, night mode.

Okay. What is night mode?

So it's basically the, like, covert lighting
for --

Thank you. Okay. Thank you. So have you flown with JHMCS?

Yes, sir.

Day?

Just day.

Have you -- so you have not flown with the ANVS-11?

No.

Have you been issued the ANVS-11?

No.
Why not?

So they had to get me a new visor and that sort of thing when I checked in. So, checked in, pretty much chopped straight to Australia. Was there for three months, came back, finally got the ball rolling on the JHMCS, they had to recut my visor and get a new helmet and everything so it was taking some time. I had just now gotten it. Not sure why I haven't gotten the ANVS-11's yet.

So what is your ANVS-11 transition training schedule?

I'm not sure.

So someday when your ANVS-11 shows up in the box and flight lead lets you know, hey sir, we have your ANVS-11's. What action steps will you be required to take before you are authorized to dawn the ANVS-11 and fly with them at night?

I'm not sure.

Sufficive to say that based on your answer --

I'll have to ask.

Okay. You'll have to ask.

Yes, sir.

So do you have any peers that got
ANVS-11's for the first time in the recent months?

: I don't believe so.

: So you're under the impression that when your ANVS-11's come in, you can just go fly with them?

: No. I would definitely want to get some training first. Like maybe go to a night lab or something like that.

: Okay. So the Aviation Medical Officer might, the AMSO might provide you training?

: Yes, sir.

: What's his or her name?

: Female Lieutenant -- starts with an R.

: Is she at the squadron or the MAG?

: She's at the MAG.

: Okay. Have you received training from her before?

: Yes, sir.

: What was that?

: Night lab.

: When did you do that?

: It was right after I checked in, like that first week I checked in.
June or July. Yes, sir.

Were any other members of your squadron there?

Yes. It was probably about ten of us.

Mishap aircrew there? I don't remember them being there. No.

Okay. Did you receive -- were any of the personnel there equipped with the ANVS-11?

I don't know.

Was ANVS-11 briefed or discussed?

No.

What was briefed and discussed?

It was all ANVS-9 stuff.

Okay. Were there other VMFAAW-242 aircrew there?

Yes, sir.

Okay. Would it be fair to say that at least one of those people were probably issued and authorized the ANVS-11?

Probably.
Do most of the guys in your squadron have ANVS-11?

I'd say it's about 50/50.

So only about half the crew's in your squadron have ANVS-11? Roughly.

Yes, sir.

Okay. Have you ever had any "all officers" training events where ANVS-11 capabilities and limitations were discussed in detail?

No.

Are there any restrictions on the use of ANVS-11?

I don't know off the top of my head.

Are there any restrictions on the use of ANVS-9 while conducting air refueling?

Not that I'm tracking.

Are you authorized to conduct night systems air refueling in the F-18?

Yes, sir.

So you're authorized to look through the tubes while maintaining position and conducting fuel transfer, join and departure from the tanker at night wearing ANVS-9's with the
goggles down looking through the tubes?


[3] (A), (b) (6): In all light-level conditions?


[3] (A), (b) (6): Are you night systems qualified?


[3] (A), (b) (6): Where did you receive that training?

[3] (A), (b) (6): The initial training, sir?


[3] (A), (b) (6): That would've been back at 224.

[3] (A), (b) (6): Did you fly with a night system's instructor?


[3] (A), (b) (6): Did he discuss night systems air refueling? Or she.

[3] (A), (b) (6): I don't remember. It was, like, four or five years ago. I don't remember.

[3] (A), (b) (6): Have you ever received any instructions on air refueling specifically?


[3] (A), (b) (6): Did they talk about day and night considerations?
What were some of the things that were discussed about the night considerations for air refueling?

Just things like -- basically adjusting the tankers light level, if you need to.

When you say light level you mean lighting condition?

Lighting condition. Yes, sir.

Okay.

That sort of thing, just being real slow and smooth and methodical about everything. Big thing with the join, just like, the perception through the goggles. May not get the same visual cues that we're used to during the daytime, so just be real slow and smooth on a join.

So you say perception use through the goggles. Do you mean that due to the limited field of view and the lack of depth perception, that it might be more difficult for air crew to ascertain the position around the tanker at night looking through the goggles; is that what you're saying?

Yes. I think that's a fair statement.

Okay. Air refueling, in general, under both day and night conditions, in general, how could a Hornet crew
arrive to the tanker?

: So --

: Left, right, top, bottom?

: So it should join it to left echelon.

: Left echelon?

: Yes, sir.

: Okay. And then what? Assuming the tanker crew clears you.

: Yep. So they'll then clear the stern, if it's two baskets, DASH 1 will take the right, DASH 2 will join on the left.

: Okay.

: If, you know, the switch safe call that they're clear to join and then plug. Once satisfied, back out, remain in a stern until you're cleared into right echelon and then you go into right echelon, DASH 1 being closest to tanker and DASH 2 stepped back from him.

: And then, when and how would you depart the tanker?

: Generally high and to the right.

: And then which way would you turn if you were going to turn? If you're on the right side.
Right.

You would turn -- so you'd turn away from the tanker?

Yes.

Generally. Who controls aircraft movement around the tanker? Assuming two Hornets and one tanker.

The tanker pilot.

What is his billet for -- what's that called? What's the tanker pilot called? You got the lead Hornet guy is called the section leader and the DASH 2 is called a wingman, what's the tanker pilot called?

AR -- I'm not sure.

You're not familiar with the -- have you heard of the ATP-56?

I know the name, I'm not sure I've read it.

Okay. Are you familiar with 1st MAW wing order 3710?

Yes, sir.

What is that?

It's the Wing SOP.

SOP for flight operations?

Yes.
Have you read it?

Yes, sir.

Okay. Judge?

You were talking about, you guys have like an official WhatsApp group chat among the squadron. Do you guys have unofficial group chats. [Inaudible.] There's like official group chats for official business and unofficial group chats.

That is correct. Yes.

Okay. In your unofficial group chats, did you guys also discuss the use of go, no-go pills or the frustrations?

It was discussed, yes.

Okay. Would you be willing to take screenshots and send us both the official and unofficial group chats from the WhatsApp and send it to us in email?

I'm not sure. I don't even know if I have them. I just got a new phone like two days ago. So --

And you don't have your old phone anymore?

No.

What happened to your old phone?
[o (3) (A), (b) (6)]: I do still have it, but since I changed -- I can't get on WhatsApp on my old phone anymore. I can try.

[o (3) (A), (b) (6)]: Okay.

[o (3) (A), (b) (6)]: I can try. I can send it to you.

[o (3) (A), (b) (6)]: Okay. I appreciate it. Yeah, so just, really, like, two or three weeks prior to the mishap until the last chat you have on there. We'll provide you with our email addresses.

[o (3) (A), (b) (6)]: Okay.

[o (3) (A), (b) (6)]: Okay.

[o (3) (A), (b) (6)]: And you can just give it to the judge and he'll give it to me. And I'll tell you -- if there's anything in there that's unrelated to the mishap, we don't care about that. So --

[o (3) (A), (b) (6)]: So you want just stuff that's related to the --

[o (3) (A), (b) (6)]: No, I want the full conversations and we'll sort through it.

[o (3) (A), (b) (6)]: Everything, like, the week of the mishap or --

[o (3) (A), (b) (6)]: Yeah, about two to three weeks prior to the mishap up until through the present day.
Okay.

And what I'm trying to tell you to put you at ease because I have no idea what's on there. If there's bafoonery [ph], that's completely unrelated to any of this, it won't be something I'll make an issue out of. If that makes sense. Because I don't know what's on there, but if you guys are in there making fun of or whatever about something completely unrelated, that's not going to come to his attention out of you providing this information. I'm just trying to determine what the dead people thought about the use of go and no-go pills.

Do you understand?

Yes, sir.

Okay.

Yeah, but with that. Don't delete anything, just take screenshots of whatever you have and send it to us. Okay? All right, sir.

Are there any factors related to this mishap, any facts or circumstances related to this mishap that you would like to share at this time that I haven't asked you about?

No.

Is there anything that you would like to add?
(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): No, sir.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): Is there anything that you'd like to clarify?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): No.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): The judge will swear you out.

[b (3) (A), (b) (6) was warned, sworn, and departed.]
Definition of *fluffer* in English:

**fluffer**

*NOUN*

*US slang*

In the pornographic film industry: a person employed to stimulate a male actor to ensure that he has an erection when required. Hence: a person employed to prepare or warm up an audience for another act.

**Origin**

1970s; earliest use found in Screw. Apparently from *fluff* + *-er.*

**Pronunciation**

*fluffer* /ˈflʌfə/
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Source: NAVAIR Deckplate AIRRS Reports
VMGR-152 KC-130J BuNo 167981 Cat I Strike (1S0) XRay

XRAY Status Code: P
ORG Code: GL3
ORG Short Name: VMGR-152
Action Date/Time: Dec 6, 2018 1:50:00 AM
BUNO: 167981
Actf Status Code: 130
Remarks: LAXT XRAY 077, AIRCRAFT BUNO 167981 STRICKEN IAW COMNAVAIRFORINST 4796.2C DUE TO MISHAP. LOCAL TIME OF STRIKE IS 0150.//
Op Status: 
Location: Iwakuni
Fleet Assigned: 
Supply Org: A&II
Strike Damage Cat: 1
Strike Damage Emp: A
Strike Damage Cause: A
Strike Damage Disp: 2
Est Completion Date: 
FID/PED: Dec 6, 2018
ASPA: 
Action Code: S
TMS: KC-130J
PUC: 000397
PUC Received From: 
In-service PUC: 
POC Name: 
POC Phone: 
POC Email: 
OOMA Serno: 20180108

BUNO History
From: Commanding General, 1st Marine Aircraft Wing  
To: Commandant of the Marine Corps (DCMC, Aviation)  
Via: (1) Commanding General, III Marine Expeditionary Force  
(2) Commanding General, Marine Forces Pacific

Subj: REMOVAL OF MCAS IWAKUNI USMC SEARCH AND RESCUE CAPABILITY

Ref: (a) ICAO, Annex 12

1. 1st MAW supports the removal of the MCAS Iwakuni USMC Search and Rescue (SAR) capability and the formal integration of MCAS Iwakuni SAR requirements into the Japanese National SAR Plan. The deactivation of the MCAS Iwakuni USMC SAR has the concurrence of Marine Corps Bases Japan. Both 1st MAW and Marine Corps Bases Japan recommend MCAS Iwakuni act as the lead agent in developing the POA&M for the deactivation.

2. Japanese SAR assets provide adequate SAR coverage for MAG-12 and transient U.S. aircraft. Per the reference, Japan is responsible for overall SAR coverage throughout Japan. There are 127 Japanese SAR vehicles (88 ships/boats and 39 SAR aircraft) within 100 miles of MCAS Iwakuni that provide 24-hour coverage (varying between 15 min to 2-hour standby) to all MAG-12 local operating areas. Japanese weather launch minimums are similar to existing minimums (500'/1nm visibility for helicopters).

3. The removal of the USMC SAR capability at MCAS Iwakuni will allow the return of approximately 55 Marines to the operating forces. Request the resulting modification to the MCAS Iwakuni manpower structure not result in additional 1st MAW FAP billets to fill MCAS Iwakuni billets previously filled by SAR personnel.

4. 1st MAW concerns may be directed to [b] (3) (A), (b) (6), Deputy AC/S G-3 at DSN 315-645-7321. A detailed brief of implementation, costs and savings is available from [b] (3) (A), (b) (6), OIC, MCAS Iwakuni SAR, DSN [b] (3) (A), (b) (6).

Copy to:  
CG, MCBJ  
CO, MCAS IWAKUNI  
AC/S G-3, 1st MAW

Enclosure 70
Sat, Nov 3

Hey doc do you have a few minutes to talk sometime today?

I know it’s Saturday man I’m sorry.

Fri, Nov 30

Hey doc, this ULT thing is going on Sunday. I’m on the graveyard. The skipper said he authorized everyone’s for downers, and possibly uppers.

Mon, Dec 3

I'm sure you know by now but the CG did not authorize go/no-go pills for this ULT thing...

I didn’t know a CG approval was required. How about Ambien?

The goal being to sleep during the day with running around my apartment. 4 10mg would cover this whole exercise.
**UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS**
**MARINE AERIAL REFUELER TRANSPORT SQUADRON 152**
**MARINE AIRCRAFT GROUP 12**
**MCAS IWAKUNI**
1st MARINE AIRCRAFT WING, MARFORPAC
UNIT 37220, FPO AP 96310-7220

**Wednesday December 5, 2018 (18339)**

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**EVENT DETAILS**

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<td>RJO-RTH-RJOI</td>
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**GENERAL NOTES:**
1. ALL CREW WILL BRING GAS MASKS AND WEAPONS CARDS.
2. SCOUT NANO'S WILL REMAIN ON AND IN GPS TRANSMIT FOR ALL AIRCRAFT IN FLIGHT.

**AIRCRAFT ENROUTE:**
SUMO 29/167883 (RCOM) ETA 07 DEC 18

**FLIGHT NOTES:**
1. SUMO 51 WILL HOTFSET TO SUMO 51, CREW WILL LOAD CHALK 11.
2. SUMO 51 WILL HOTFSET TO SUMO 51, CREW WILL LOAD CHALK 12.
3. WILL SHOW IN ACCORDANCE WITH CREW REST. STANDBY CREW CHECK IN AND OUT WITH FDG AND MAINTENANCE CONTROL, CREW DAY IS 0700-1900.
QUESTION OF THE DAY:

Q: WHAT DOES THE RIWR TGT SEL SWITCH DO?

RETURN鎖 THE AIRCRAFT TO IDENTIFY INDIVIDUAL RIWR SYMBOLS IF MULTIPLE THREATS APPEAR ON THE SAME BEARING AND DISTANCE.

A: (b) (3) (A), (b) (6)

COMMANDING OFFICER

Enclosure 72
### AAR BRIEFING CARD

#### TRACK INFORMATION:
- **TRACK NAME:** ITRA-S 15 (W-173)
- **TRACK DATE:** 6-Dec-18
- **ARCT:** 0100-0300L
- **RV TYPE:** ECHO
- **NUMBER OF TANKERS:** 1
- **RV ALT:** 17K
- **SPARE:** N/A
- **JOINUP ALT:** 16K
- **SIMULTANEOUS:** YES
- **AR ALT:** 17K
- **LIGHTING:** OVERT
- **Airspeed:** 230 KIAS
- **ALT SET:** 29.92
- **JOKER/BINGO:** 15K
- **LIGHT SIGNALS:** STANDARD/OVERT
- **MSA:** N/A

#### TANKER / RECEIVER INFORMATION

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<th><strong>TANKER C/S:</strong></th>
<th>SUMO 41</th>
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| **RCVR TACAN:** | 29Y |
| **RCVR MODE 1:** | |
| **RCVR MODE 3:** | AS ASSIGNED |
| **FUEL RQD EA:** | 8K |
| **FUEL RQD TOT:** | 16K |
| **RCVR TCN SEP:** | |

#### COMMUNICATIONS / PRESETS (* Denotes Secure)
- **PRIMARY:** 290.8
- **TERTIARY:** 136.15
- **SECONDARY:** 303
- **EMCON COND:** 1

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**RCVR POC:** (b) (3) (A), (b)  
**TANKER POC:** MAJ BROPHY 255-2113
VMFA (AW) - 225 SCHEDULES
VMFA (AW) - 242 SCHEDULES
75 YEARS OF DEATH FROM THE DARKNESS
CHANGE 1
Determining 7 Feet Of Dirt From The Darkness
## Pilot HOTBoard

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<th>Last Night</th>
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<th>Act Last FY</th>
<th>14-Day Flights</th>
<th>30-Day Flights</th>
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## WSO HOTBoard

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## MATSS Iwakuni WSO HotBoard

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## MAG-12 - FA-18D Pilot/WSO 30 60 90

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### APPENDIX 1 - ODO CHRONOLOGICAL LOG

The duty officer, or person designated by him, will maintain a log of events connected to any mishap as they occur. All telephone conversations, message releases, receipts, events, and any unusual problems encountered shall be logged as they occur. Use the log below instead of the SDO log.

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<td>REPORTS PE12 AND SO41 WENT DOWN</td>
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<td>(b) (3) (A), (b) (6)</td>
<td></td>
<td>JAPANESE AIR SELF-DEFENSE FORCE TO LAUNCH US</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## APPENDIX 1 - ODO CHRONOLOGICAL LOG

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<th>CALLER</th>
<th>PHONE #</th>
<th>EVENT/INFORMATION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0300</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Coordinating with MAG-12, MC to start.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0305</td>
<td>(a) (3) (A), (b) (6)</td>
<td>955-7591</td>
<td>Requesting information.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0331</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>MAGR-153 working to launch SAR asset.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0345</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Naval Safety Center contacted (late entry).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0350</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>09 on deck, 05 launches.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0350</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>09 on deck, 05 launches.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0351</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Pro called.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0352</td>
<td>(b) (3) (A), (b) (6)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Reports SAR assets launch out of Ashiya and RJFN.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0405</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>15:1 pre-flighting waiting on JASDF de-conviction.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0410</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>US-2 on standby, BAT91 over site at 9.5K FT.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0415</td>
<td>(b) (3) (A), (b) (6)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Gets email informing JASDF intent to launch aircraft.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0417</td>
<td>(b) (3) (A), (b) (6)</td>
<td></td>
<td>SAR launch O&amp;O, EST. time on station 0540 out of Ashiya &quot;Rescue Helo 71&quot;.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0420</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Adjutant calls to get names.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0425</td>
<td>(b) (3) (A), (b) (6)</td>
<td></td>
<td>15:5 still trying to coordinate de-conviction.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0427</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Updated T/O time for rescue 71. Update on SAR asset here, translator being sent to base ops. 2130 will launch when de-convected.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0430</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Every 20 taking off, will be at 11K. Some spinning up to launch, radar.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0437</td>
<td>(b) (3) (A), (b) (6)</td>
<td></td>
<td>1st SAR entering area, 1nym LLC T/O in 5 min.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Enclosure 76
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0444</td>
<td>Mk-12 Adt</td>
<td></td>
<td>Casualty breach - message delivery not authorized without their approval</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0445</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Scott AFB tanker control, launching SAR asset. (b) (3) (A), (b) (6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0449</td>
<td>Scott - AFB</td>
<td></td>
<td>Beacon close - F-18, (b) (3) (A), (b) (6) PACOM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0500</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Coordinated with Charkam park, Su-105s not gotten authorization to launch yet.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0504</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2 SAR assets at 1k in area, pt 91 orbiting on boundary, 1 SAR asset at 6k runa to the north, additional SAR assets on the way, 750m south at 900ft. Seaplane US-2 launched, 152 planning launch on 20 men.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0513</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Called base wx to update sea state.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0515</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Radar reports bat 91 returning. Seaplane over Chemeca.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0522</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Charkam park coordinated with. (b) (3) (A), (b) (6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0524</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>A/C OS-75 RTB, 10 men out, SAR helo on station. OSC0 no joy on last known POS. SEAT beacon going off while turn on station. flew bearing line between two given points.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**APPENDIX 1 - ODC CHRONOLOGICAL LOG**

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<th>PHONE #</th>
<th>EVENT/INFORMATION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0528</td>
<td>b) (3) (A), (b) (6)</td>
<td></td>
<td>CALLED TO CONFIRM EJECTIONS, CMC BEING REJECTED BEACON IDENTIFIED</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0531</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>PCR'S SUBMITTED TO CASUALTY CENTER</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0534</td>
<td>132 ODD</td>
<td></td>
<td>COORDINATION WITH 152 ON LAT/LONGS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0544</td>
<td></td>
<td>132 ODD</td>
<td>IVORY GOT POINTS PASSED TO THEM, STANDING BY.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0546</td>
<td>MAG 12 ADS</td>
<td></td>
<td>SECOND PERSON NEEDS TO BE IDENTIFIED TO GO WITH --&gt; RECOMMENDED SECOND CALL TEAM OF TWO, DONE IN ALPHA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0554</td>
<td></td>
<td>132 ODD</td>
<td>BAT 91 (AK ODS) ON DECK, LINE SHUT DOWN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0557</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>ORIGINAL LAT/LONG PERRI PASSED AND 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0600</td>
<td>MAG DC5</td>
<td></td>
<td>MAG DISD-SAR RECEIVED (b) (3) (A), (b) (6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0601</td>
<td>Maj McFed</td>
<td>(b) (3) (A), (b) (6)</td>
<td>PICKED UP BY JASDF SAR, CONSCIOUS, COMING BACK TO JOE TO REFUEL AND TAKE HIM TO HOSPITAL, THEN HEADING BACK OUT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0615</td>
<td>Maj 12 AJS</td>
<td></td>
<td>NOT AUTHORIZING OFFICIAL NOTIFICATION TO SQUADRON WILL HANDLE IT THEMSELVES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0618</td>
<td>Maj 12 AJS</td>
<td></td>
<td>NO CONTACT AUTHORIZED WITH RESTAURANTS</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Enclosure 76
## APPENDIX 1 - ODO CHRONOLOGICAL LOG

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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0633</td>
<td>ALOPS Leader</td>
<td></td>
<td>SAR HELO LANDING LOCATION</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0637</td>
<td>ALOPS Leader</td>
<td></td>
<td>(b) (3) (A), (d) (6) - Needs Prep 3 update</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>MAG is handling it</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0641</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>SAR HELO not sure landing location</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>THREE AIRCRAFT IN SAME PLACE S-15 TRAS WENT'T BE ABLE TO SEE HELOS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(b) (3) (A), (b) (6)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0646</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>BROKEN ARM AT RESCUE BASE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>DIDN'T USE SKIDING IN CHUTE TWO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>LIGHTS IN WATER CLOSE TO EAH OTHER</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>TOWARDS MIDDLE OF ITARIS DIDN'T SEE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>FLAKES, DIDN'T USE STABE, SOMEONE ELSE FOUND OTHER AIRCRAFT (NOT CONFIRMED)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>ASKED IF OTHER PLANE WENT DOWN. AT JASDF NAVAL BASE, FLY TO RJOT IN 10-15 MIN.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0659</td>
<td>ALOPS Leader</td>
<td></td>
<td>KOMAT 51MA, ABOUT TO LEAVE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0708</td>
<td>Base Ops</td>
<td></td>
<td>Called asking about 51M flight info</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(b) (6)</td>
<td>Told him it was cancelled for operational requirements. Individual wanted more info, hung up on him</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0747</td>
<td>RJOT Base Ops</td>
<td></td>
<td>JMSDF helo w/ (b) (3) (b) (6) Shadow 65, new ETA 0840L to JASDF line</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0800</td>
<td>Skipper</td>
<td></td>
<td>Local notifications complete</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0807</td>
<td>RJOT Base Ops</td>
<td></td>
<td>Shadow 65 is five out</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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<tr>
<td>0816</td>
<td>(b) (3) (A), (b) (6)</td>
<td>Coordinating with (b) (3) (A), (b) (6) and (b) (3) (A), (b) (6) on how investigation would proceed. Squadrons will do two separate investigations until single case is convened.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0822</td>
<td>Base Red</td>
<td>(b) (3) (A), (b) (6)</td>
<td>replaced (b) (3) (A), (b) (6) on day, currently (1) US-1 and (1) US-2 in area sweeping ITRA's.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0825</td>
<td>(b) (3) (A), (b) (6)</td>
<td>(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) on deck R101 being taken to clinic</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0840</td>
<td>Base RED</td>
<td>(b) (3) (A), (b) (6)</td>
<td>PMO Lieutenant calls about getting a pass onto the base. Will email him the proper form to be filled out.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0849</td>
<td>(b) (3) (A), (b) (6)</td>
<td>(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) is w/ (b) (3) (A), (b) (6) at clinic, doctors asked him if he made a lat/long transmission from his CSEL approximately two hours ago, which he did not.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0906</td>
<td>(b) (3) (A), (b) (6)</td>
<td>No new information since last call.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0407</td>
<td>(b) (3) (A), (b) (6)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Scope still shows two aircraft sweeping ITA S.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0508</td>
<td>(b) (3) (A), (b) (6)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Working on compiling info, asked to send over AAR report via email.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0931</td>
<td>WX</td>
<td></td>
<td>At base MTO, asked about location of BRN 020. Water temp currently 21°C, sea state waves E/E of 1 kts, wave height 1.9 meters. Base weather will update every hour.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0917</td>
<td>(b) (3) (A), (b) (6)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Requested help in passing from other aircrew who were on scene commanders. Second aircrew reported beacon going off for entire flight. MTO is trying to find ways to track aircraft position.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0944</td>
<td>152 CD</td>
<td>(b) (3) (A), (b) (6)</td>
<td>Looking for will send WX updates constantly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0945</td>
<td>WX</td>
<td>(b) (3) (A), (b) (6)</td>
<td>will send WX updates constantly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0950</td>
<td>White Snake</td>
<td></td>
<td>255-35560 White Snake #</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0958</td>
<td></td>
<td>(b) (3) (A), (b) (6)</td>
<td>3 AC in search area ITA S A/F KCL3010 in comms with Dialect (Spanish) with A/F ZJRA S</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1005</td>
<td>(b) (3) (A), (b) (6)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Has a visitor's pass valid through 1 Jan, currently at house</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1010</td>
<td>MAG</td>
<td>(b) (3) (A), (b) (6)</td>
<td>Directs meeting at 1030</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1012</td>
<td></td>
<td>(b) (3) (A), (b) (6)</td>
<td>Phone call to collect phone and wallet. Key is on looking into it.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1020</td>
<td></td>
<td>(b) (3) (A), (b) (6)</td>
<td>Call, looking for an update on will call directly.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1035</td>
<td></td>
<td>(b) (3) (A), (b) (6)</td>
<td>No broken bones</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1037</td>
<td></td>
<td>(b) (3) (A), (b) (6)</td>
<td>2TC left hand forms 15K A/S 250 C-130 wings arrived from 15K to 12K between 270 - 280</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1048</td>
<td></td>
<td>(b) (3) (A), (b) (6)</td>
<td>Cord all A/C in area rescue CS Freq 2417.0 all A/C fly above 3Kft</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1054</td>
<td></td>
<td>(b) (3) (A), (b) (6)</td>
<td>RADAR - No update 3 A/C in JTAS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1115</td>
<td>CRT</td>
<td>(b) (3) (A), (b) (6)</td>
<td>Personnel discovered in water, not yet recovered.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1125</td>
<td></td>
<td>(b) (3) (A), (b) (6)</td>
<td>AMB heading to clinic to interview</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1158</td>
<td>CRT</td>
<td>(b) (3) (A), (b) (6)</td>
<td>Person in water wrapped in parachute appears unconscious. SMDSF ship attempts pickup 1700L</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1159</td>
<td>CRT</td>
<td>(b) (3) (A), (b) (6)</td>
<td>Requested to contact MAG (A) assumes ODO.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1209</td>
<td>ZYCO</td>
<td>(b) (3) (A), (b) (6)</td>
<td>AMB repositioning to 6020s.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1220</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Calls to report 1x unconscious person located, status unknown, N 323853 E 134 5363 location of person in water.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1225</td>
<td>CHAT</td>
<td></td>
<td>SUSD SETOYKI picked up 1x unconscious person out of water.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
From: [Redacted]
Sent: Thursday, December 6, 2018 3:48 AM
To: [Redacted]
Cc: [Redacted]
Subject: Mishap Initial ATC Details
Signed By: [Redacted]

Sir,

Initial timeline details from ATC below.

1656Z (0156L): PROFN11 contacted WhiteSnake range monitor and reported crash and downed aircraft. Coordinates: N32 38.63 E134 38.12 (Within ITRA South S-15)
PROFN11 fuel remaining for overhead holding until 1756Z (0256L)
Iwakuni ATC notified Fukuoka ACC be landline to request Search and Rescue (SAR)

1746Z (0246L): JASDF Air Defense Facility "DIALECT" notified Iwakuni ATC that SAR are planning launch

1750Z (0250L): Fukuoka ACC informed the Iwakuni ATMC Liaison that the Japan Rescue Coordination Center (RCC) would not direct SAR launch

1754Z (0254L): PROFN11 reported to WhiteSnake observing active strobe lights at coordinates N32 37.78 E135 03.16

1825Z (0325L): PROFN11 returning to RJOI due to fuel

1837Z (0337L): PROFN11 landed RJOI

1845Z (0345L): Iwakuni ATC received flight plan clearance for another MAG12 aircraft to proceed to ITRA South area. Not yet called for taxi.

Regards,

Air Traffic and Airspace Manager
MCAS Iwakuni
### Part I - Takeoff Data

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1. DATE</th>
<th>2. ACFT Type/No.</th>
<th>3. DEP PT/ETD</th>
<th>4. RWY TEMP</th>
<th>5. DEWPOINT</th>
<th>6. TEMP DEVIATION</th>
<th>7. PRES ALT</th>
<th>8. DENSITY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>181205</td>
<td>FA-18</td>
<td>RJOI 0800</td>
<td>180/84F</td>
<td>11C/52F</td>
<td>+3</td>
<td>-170 FT</td>
<td>+320 FT</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>9. SFC WIND</th>
<th>10. CLIMB WINDS</th>
<th>11. LOCAL WEATHER WATCH/WARNING/ADVISORY</th>
<th>12. RSC/RCR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0005KT</td>
<td>SEE CROSS SECTION</td>
<td>NONE</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

13. Remarks/Takeoff Alt: FCST
VALID FOR 0300Z-0600Z DEPARTURES *ENROUTE/MISSION DATA VALID 0300Z-0600Z

### Part II - Enroute & Mission Data

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>14. FLT LEVEL/WINDS/TEMP</th>
<th>15. SPACE WEATHER</th>
<th>16. SOLAR/LUNAR</th>
<th>LOCATION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SEE ATTACHED</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SFC-FLL300</th>
<th>NO IMPACT</th>
<th>MARGINAL</th>
<th>SEVERE</th>
<th>BMNT</th>
<th>Z</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FREQ</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Z</td>
</tr>
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<td>GPS</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>MR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RAD</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Z</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

17. Clouds at FL Town:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YES</th>
<th>NO</th>
<th>IN AND OUT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

18. Obscurations at FL Level Restricting Visibility:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YES</th>
<th>NO</th>
<th>TYPE</th>
<th>N/A</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

19. Minimum Ceiling - Location
020 FT AGL - W. HONSHU

20. Maximum Cloud Tops - Location
240 FT MSL - W. HONSHU

21. Minimum Freezing Lvl - Location
020 FT MSL - KOREA

22. Thunderstorms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CHART X</th>
<th>LINE</th>
<th>ARENA</th>
<th>IN CLEAN</th>
<th>IN CLOUD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ISOLATED 1-2%</td>
<td>LIGHT</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>TRACE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FEW 3-15%</td>
<td>MODERATE</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>LIGHT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCATTERED 16-45%</td>
<td>SEVERE</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>MODERATE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NUMEROUS &gt;45%</td>
<td>EXTREME</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>SEVERE</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

23. Turbulence

| LEVELS SFC-050/160-200 | LIGHT | X | X | TRACE | X | X |
| LEVELS 100-180/020-140 | MODERATE | X | X | LIGHT | X | X |

24. icing

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LOCATION</th>
<th>W. HONSHU</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

25. Precipitation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LOCATION</th>
<th>W. HONSHU/S KOREA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

### Part III - Aerodrome Forecasts

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DEST-RKTH</th>
<th>0300Z-0800Z</th>
<th>06012KT</th>
<th>7SM NSW</th>
<th>SCT015 BKN120</th>
<th>30.21 INS</th>
<th>+12 C</th>
<th>-200 FT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ALTN-RKTN</td>
<td>0300Z-0800Z</td>
<td>31006KT</td>
<td>7SM NSW</td>
<td>FWN020 BKN100</td>
<td>30.20 INS</td>
<td>+09 C</td>
<td>-140 FT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALTN-RKPK</td>
<td>0300Z-0800Z</td>
<td>33008KT</td>
<td>7SM NSW</td>
<td>FWN020 BKN080</td>
<td>30.18 INS</td>
<td>+11 C</td>
<td>-230 FT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEST-R110</td>
<td>0300Z-0800Z</td>
<td>08020KT</td>
<td>7SM VCSH</td>
<td>BKN020 BKN120</td>
<td>N/A INS</td>
<td>N/A C</td>
<td>N/A FT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALTN-RKTY</td>
<td>0300Z-0800Z</td>
<td>34004KT</td>
<td>7SM NSW</td>
<td>SCT020 BKN100</td>
<td>30.24 INS</td>
<td>+7 C</td>
<td>+60 FT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INFO-RKJK</td>
<td>0300Z-0800Z</td>
<td>02010G15KT</td>
<td>7SM NSW</td>
<td>FWN020</td>
<td>30.29 INS</td>
<td>+4 C</td>
<td>-310 FT</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Part IV - Comments/Remarks

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>BRIEVED</th>
<th>RSC/RCR</th>
<th>YES</th>
<th>X</th>
<th>NOT AVAILABLE</th>
<th>PMSV</th>
<th>ATTACHMENTS</th>
<th>YES</th>
<th>NO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

35. Remarks
GENERAL NAVAL AViators SHALL BE THOROUGHLY FAMILIAR WITH WEATHER CONDITIONS FOR THE AREA IN WHICH FLIGHT IS CONTENDED.

ATTACHMENTS IN THE CANNED ROUTE CAN BE OBTAINED VIA SHAREPOINT OR BY CALLING OR EMAILING WSB IWAKUNI.

### Part V - Briefing Record

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>WX BRIEFED TIME</th>
<th>WX BRIEFING NO.</th>
<th>RJOI</th>
<th>CR - 145</th>
<th>FORECASTER'S NAME</th>
<th>NAME OF PERSON RECEIVING BRIEFING</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>05 / 0259</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

40. Void Time

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>05 / 0600</th>
<th>41. EXTENDED TO/INITIALS</th>
<th>42. WX REBRIEF TIME/INITIALS</th>
<th>43. WX DEBRIEF TIME/INITIALS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Z</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## CANNED ROUTE FLIGHT WEATHER BRIEFING FOR: PENINSULA + R110 RANGE

THIS BRIEF IS INTENDED FOR LOCAL AREA OR CANNED/Stereo ROUTE FLIGHTS ONLY

### AERODROME FORECASTS CONT.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>26.</th>
<th>27. VALID TIME</th>
<th>28. SFC WIND</th>
<th>29. VSBY/WEA</th>
<th>30. CLOUD LAYERS</th>
<th>31. ALTIMETER</th>
<th>RWY TEMP</th>
<th>PRES ALT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>INFO-RKSO</td>
<td>0300Z-0800Z</td>
<td>33005KT</td>
<td>7SM NSW</td>
<td>SCT100 BKN200</td>
<td>30.30 INS</td>
<td>+4 C</td>
<td>-310 FT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEST-RJOI</td>
<td>0300Z-0800Z</td>
<td>01005KT</td>
<td>7SM NSW</td>
<td>SCT030</td>
<td>30.10 INS</td>
<td>+17 C</td>
<td>-160 FT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALTN-RJFZ</td>
<td>0300Z-0800Z</td>
<td>29006KT</td>
<td>7SM NSW</td>
<td>FEW030</td>
<td>30.11 INS</td>
<td>+17 C</td>
<td>-120 FT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALTN-RJFN</td>
<td>0300Z-0800Z</td>
<td>05006KT</td>
<td>7SM NSW</td>
<td>FEW020 SCT100</td>
<td>30.07 INS</td>
<td>+21 C</td>
<td>+120 FT</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### COMMENTS/REMARKS CONT.

35. REMARKS

08 NOT FOUND FOR RKTH

GENERAL NAVAL AVIATORS SHALL BE THOROUGHLY FAMILIAR WITH WEATHER CONDITIONS FOR THE AREA IN WHICH FLIGHT IS CONTEMPLATED.

ATTACHMENTS IN THE CANNED ROUTE CAN BE OBTAINED VIA SHAREPOINT OR BY CALLING OR EMAILING WS8 IWAKUNI 0 OR M:\_WKMN\_SM8IWAKUNI\WS8SM\MIL

RJ01 PA/DA: -180 / +180; SST: 72°F/22°C SEAS: 3-5FT; RKTH PA/DA: -210 / -750; SST: 72°F/22°C SEAS: 3-5FT; R-110 SST: 66°F/19°C SEAS: 3-5FT

OBSERVATIONS:

METAR RKJ 050156Z AUTO 06005KT 10SM CLR 03/M09 A3037

### PART V - BRIEFING RECORD

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>36. WX BRIEFED TIME</th>
<th>37. FLIMSY BRIEFING NO.</th>
<th>38. FORECASTER'S NAME</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>05 / 0259 Z</td>
<td>RJOI  CR - 145</td>
<td>(B) (C) (A)</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>40. VOID TIME</th>
<th>41. EXTENDED TO/INITIALS</th>
<th>42. WX REBRIEF TIME/INITIALS</th>
<th>43. WX DEBRIEF TIME/INITIALS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>05 / 0800 Z</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
## Alternate Airfield Forecast

### RKSO

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time (Z)</th>
<th>Wind</th>
<th>Vis</th>
<th>Wx</th>
<th>Sky</th>
<th>Lowest Altimeter</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2100-0100</td>
<td>34007KT</td>
<td>9999</td>
<td>NSW</td>
<td>SCT120 BKN150</td>
<td>30.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0100-0500</td>
<td>35005KT</td>
<td>9999</td>
<td>NSW</td>
<td>SCT080 BKN100</td>
<td>30.33</td>
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<tr>
<td>0500-0900</td>
<td>36005KT</td>
<td>9999</td>
<td>NSW</td>
<td>SCT060 BKN080</td>
<td>30.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0900-1400</td>
<td>VRB04KT</td>
<td>9999</td>
<td>NSW</td>
<td>SCT060 BKN080</td>
<td>30.30</td>
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### RKTY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time (Z)</th>
<th>Wind</th>
<th>Vis</th>
<th>Wx</th>
<th>Sky</th>
<th>Lowest Altimeter</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2100-0100</td>
<td>29003KT</td>
<td>9999</td>
<td>NSW</td>
<td>BKN200</td>
<td>30.25</td>
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<tr>
<td>0100-0500</td>
<td>30004KT</td>
<td>9999</td>
<td>NSW</td>
<td>SCT020 BKN120</td>
<td>30.27</td>
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<tr>
<td>0500-0900</td>
<td>VRB03KT</td>
<td>9999</td>
<td>NSW</td>
<td>SCT020 BKN100</td>
<td>30.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0900-1400</td>
<td>VRB03KT</td>
<td>9999</td>
<td>NSW</td>
<td>BKN020 BKN080</td>
<td>30.22</td>
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</table>

### RKTH

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time (Z)</th>
<th>Wind</th>
<th>Vis</th>
<th>Wx</th>
<th>Sky</th>
<th>Lowest Altimeter</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
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<tr>
<td>0100-0500</td>
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<td>9999</td>
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<td>SCT015 BKN025</td>
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<tr>
<td>0500-0900</td>
<td>01010KT</td>
<td>9000</td>
<td>SHRA BR</td>
<td>SCT010 BKN020</td>
<td>30.22</td>
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<tr>
<td>0900-1400</td>
<td>35008KT</td>
<td>8000</td>
<td>SHRA BR</td>
<td>BKN005</td>
<td>30.17</td>
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</table>
# Alternate Airfield Forecast

## RKTN

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Time (Z)</th>
<th>Wind</th>
<th>Vis</th>
<th>Wx</th>
<th>Sky</th>
<th>Lowest Altimeter</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2100-0100</td>
<td>33004KT</td>
<td>9999</td>
<td>NSW</td>
<td>SKC</td>
<td>30.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0100-0500</td>
<td>34006KT</td>
<td>9999</td>
<td>NSW</td>
<td>SCT020 BKN080</td>
<td>30.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0500-0900</td>
<td>VRB03KT</td>
<td>9999</td>
<td>NSW</td>
<td>SCT015 BKN020</td>
<td>30.28</td>
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<tr>
<td>0900-1400</td>
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<td>NSW</td>
<td>SCT010 BKN020</td>
<td>30.24</td>
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## RKPK

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<th>Vis</th>
<th>Wx</th>
<th>Sky</th>
<th>Lowest Altimeter</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>34007KT</td>
<td>9999</td>
<td>NSW</td>
<td>SKC</td>
<td>30.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0100-0500</td>
<td>35005KT</td>
<td>9999</td>
<td>NSW</td>
<td>FEW015 BKN080</td>
<td>30.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0500-0900</td>
<td>36005KT</td>
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<td>NSW</td>
<td>FEW010 SCT020 BKN070</td>
<td>30.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0900-1400</td>
<td>33006KT</td>
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<td>NSW</td>
<td>FEW010 BKN020</td>
<td>30.18</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

## RKJK

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Time (Z)</th>
<th>Wind</th>
<th>Vis</th>
<th>Wx</th>
<th>Sky</th>
<th>Lowest Altimeter</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>BKN120</td>
<td>30.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>01010KT</td>
<td>9999</td>
<td>NSW</td>
<td>BKN110</td>
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<tr>
<td>0500-0900</td>
<td>02012KT</td>
<td>9999</td>
<td>NSW</td>
<td>BKN080</td>
<td>30.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0900-1400</td>
<td>03010KT</td>
<td>9999</td>
<td>NSW</td>
<td>BKN080</td>
<td>30.28</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Summary Lists

DATE: 12/05/2018 14:12
KEYS: LOCATION: RJ1,RJF2,RJFN
PERIOD: [18/12/05 14:12] - [18/12/06 02:12]
SCOPE: E,W,AE,AW,EW

Issued within 24 hours ! Urgent ❄️ Figures are attached 🌐 Linked AIP-SUP

RJOI

1198-18 FROM 18/11/07 15:00 TO PERM
E/REF DOD FLIP
AIP PAGE RJOI AD2-24.5 (CHANGE TO READ)
RJOI/IWAKUNI HI-TACAN RWY02
(PLAN VIEW)
ADD IN TEXT
FIX/DME MILEAGE
JELIP/5
INTERCEPT ALTITUDE (BETN JELIP AND WEGAT/7)
1200 (MINIMUM ALTITUDE)

1197-18 FROM 18/11/07 15:00 TO PERM
E/REF DOD FLIP
AIP PAGE RJOI AD2-24.5 (CHANGE TO READ)
RJOI/IWAKUNI HI-TACAN RWY02
(PLAN VIEW)
ADD IN TEXT
JELIP
DME MILEAGE 5

1196-18 FROM 18/11/07 15:00 TO PERM
E/REF DOD FLIP
AIP PAGE RJOI AD2-24.5 (CHANGE TO READ)
RJOI/IWAKUNI HI-TACAN RWY02
(PLAN VIEW)
CHANGE TO READ
FIX/DME MILEAGE
WEGAT/8 SACOG/11 STADK/14
INSTEAD OF
FIX/DME MILEAGE
WEGAT/7 SACOG/8 JELIP/13

1195-18 FROM 18/11/07 15:00 TO PERM
E/REF DOD FLIP
AIP PAGE RJOI AD2-24.5 (CHANGE TO READ)
RJOI/IWAKUNI HI-TACAN RWY02
(PLAN VIEW)
CHANGE TO READ
FIX/DME MILEAGE
WEGAT/8 SACOG/11 STADK/14
INTERCEPT ALTITUDE (BETN WEGAT AND SACOG/11)
2200 (MINIMUM ALTITUDE)
INTERCEPT ALTITUDE (BETN SACOG AND STADK)
2900 (MINIMUM ALTITUDE)
INTERCEPT ALTITUDE (BETN STADK AND SHIMN)
3400 (MINIMUM ALTITUDE)
INSTEAD OF
FIX/DME MILEAGE
WEGAT/7 SACOG/8 JELIP/13
ENCLOSURE 77

INTERCEPT ALTITUDE (BETWEEN VEGAT AND SACOG)
1900 (MINIMUM ALTITUDE)
INTERCEPT ALTITUDE (BETWEEN SACOG AND JELIP)
2300 (MINIMUM ALTITUDE)
INTERCEPT ALTITUDE (BETWEEN JELIP AND SHWN)
3300 (MINIMUM ALTITUDE)

1194-18 FROM 16/11/07 15:00 TO PERM
E) REF DOD FLIP
AIP PAGE RJOI AD2-24.5 (CHANGE TO READ)
RJOI/IAWAKUNI HI-TACAN RWY02
(PROFILE VIEW)
CHANGE TO READ
VERTICAL DESCENT ANGLE
3.06
INSTEAD OF
VERTICAL DESCENT ANGLE
3.10

1193-18 FROM 16/11/07 15:00 TO PERM
E) REF DOD FLIP
AIP PAGE RJOI AD2-24.5 (CHANGE TO READ)
RJOI/IAWAKUNI HI-TACAN RWY02
(PROFILE VIEW)
ADD IN TEXT
VGS1 AND DESCENT ANGLE NOT COINCIDENT WITH VGS1 3.0/TCH 67

1192-18 FROM 16/11/07 15:00 TO PERM
E) REF DOD FLIP
AIP PAGE RJOI AD2-24.5 (CHANGE TO READ)
RJOI/IAWAKUNI HI-TACAN RWY02
CHANGE TO READ
KNOTS/FPDM
60/240 120/480 180/720 240/960 300/1200 360/1440
CONTROLLING OBSTACLE 1457
CAUTION: MISSED APPROACH MINIMUM CLIMB RATE TO 2100
INSTEAD OF
KNOTS/FPDM
120/480 180/660 240/960 300/1100 360/1320
CONTROLLING OBSTACLE 1313
CAUTION: MISSED APPROACH MINIMUM CLIMB RATE TO 3300

1191-18 FROM 18/11/07 15:00 TO PERM
E) REF DOD FLIP
AIP PAGE RJOI AD2-24.5 (CHANGE TO READ)
RJOI/IAWAKUNI HI-TACAN RWY02
MFA 25NM
CHANGE TO READ
MFA (BTM 070 AND 213)
5400
MFA (BTM 213 AND 303)
4000
INSTEAD OF
MFA (BTM 070 AND 213)
5500
MFA (BTM 213 AND 303)
4300

1190-18 FROM 18/11/07 15:00 TO PERM
E) REF DOD FLIP
AIP PAGE RJOI AD2-24.5 (CHANGE TO READ)
RJOI/IAWAKUNI HI-TACAN RWY02
CHANGE TO READ
CIRCLING
MFA: CIRCLING NOT AUTHORIZED W OF RWY 02-20. CAT D REMAIN WITHIN
2.8NM.
INSTEAD OF
MFA: CIRCLING NOT AUTHORIZED W OF RWY 02-20.

1189-18 FROM 18/11/07 15:00 TO PERM
E) REF DOD FLIP
AIF PAGE RJOI AD2-24.5 (CHANGE TO READ)
RJOI/IWAKUNI H1-TACAN RWY02
CHANGE TO READ

MISSED APPROACH: CLIMBING RIGHT TURN TO 3300 TO INTERCEPT NEU R-130 TO BAALL AND HOLD.

INSTEAD OF

MISSED APPROACH: CLIMB TO 700 VIA NEU TACAN R-199, THEN TURN RIGHT TO 3300. INTERCEPT AND PROCEED ON R-130 TO BAALL AND HOLD.

FROM 18/11/07 02:00 TO 15/01/31 08:00
D12018 NOV 07 0200/0800 NOV 08-2019 JAN 31 0100/0800
E) UNHANDED ACFT (HEL)

1. FLT AREA: BOUNDED BY FLW POINTS
340232N13151115E 340112N13145266E
335642N13152211E 340204N13153586E
AROUND KUDAHATSU-SHI IN YAMAGUCHI

2. NUMBER : 1
3. CHARACTERISTICS: LWE/0.4M WID/0.5M WT/3.4KG COLOP/WHITE
F)SPC G) 1400FT AMSL

FROM 18/11/07 15:00 TO PRRM
E) REF AIP PAGE RJOI AD2-24.7 (CHANGE TO READ)
RJOI/IWAKUNI RNAV(GPS) RWY02
(PLAN VIEW)

MSA RWY02 25NM
CHANGE TO READ
MSA 5400
INSTEAD OF
MSA 5500

FROM 18/11/07 15:00 TO PRRM
E) REF AIP PAGE RJOI AD2-24.7 (CHANGE TO READ)
RJOI/IWAKUNI RNAV(GPS) RWY02
(PLAN VIEW)

CHANGE TO READ
TASZ (WAYPOINT NON-COMPULSORY)
FPPOS (WAYPOINT NON-COMPULSORY)
INSTEAD OF
TASZ (FLYOVER POINT)
FPPOS (FLYOVER POINT)

FROM 18/11/07 15:00 TO PRRM
E) REF AIP PAGE RJOI AD2-24.7 (CHANGE TO READ)
RJOI/IWAKUNI RNAV(GPS) RWY02
(PLAN VIEW)

CHANGE TO READ
KNOTS/FTM
60/260 120/520 180/780 240/1040 300/1300 360/1560
CONTROLLING OBSTACLE 1457
CAUTION: MISSED APPROACH MINIMUM CLIMB RATE TO 2100
INSTEAD OF
KNOTS/FTM
60/280 120/560 180/840 240/1120 300/1400 360/1680
CONTROLLING OBSTACLE 1778
CAUTION: MISSED APPROACH MINIMUM CLIMB RATE TO 2800

FROM 18/11/07 15:00 TO PRRM
E) REF AIP PAGE RJOI AD2-24.7 (CHANGE TO READ)
RJOI/IWAKUNI RNAV(GPS) RWY02
(PROFILE VIEW)

ADD IN TEXT

VGS1 AND GLIDEPATH NOT COINCIDENCE VGS1 3.00/TCH 67.

FROM 18/11/07 15:00 TO PRRM
E) REF AIP PAGE RJOI AD2-24.7 (CHANGE TO READ)
RJOI/IWAKUNI RNAV(GPS) RWY02
(PROFILE VIEW)

INTERCEPT ALTITUDE
CHANGE TO READ
(ETN TAZZ AND STYNE)
1960 (MINIMUM ALTITUDE)
INSTEAD OF
(STN TAZZZ AND STYNS)
1980 (MINIMUM ALTITUDE)

**1172-18** FROM 18/11/07 15:00 TO PERM
E) REF AIP PAGE RJO I AO2-24.7 (CHANGE TO READ)
RJOI/IWAKUNI RNAV(GPS) RWY02
(PLAN VIEW)
INTERCEPT ALTITUDE
COR TO READ
(STN PPROPS AND TAZZZ)
3200 (MINIMUM ALTITUDE)
INSTEAD OF
(STN PPROPS AND TAZZZ)
3300 (MINIMUM ALTITUDE)

**1171-18** FROM 18/11/07 15:00 TO PERM
E) REF AIP PAGE RJO I AO2-24.7 (CHANGE TO READ)
RJOI/IWAKUNI RNAV(GPS) RWY02
1. DELETE TEXT
SERVE
INTERCEPT ALTITUDE(STN PPROPS AND SERVE)
3300 (MINIMUM ALTITUDE)
2. DELETE VIEW
(PLAN VIEW)
SERVE(FLYOVER POINT)

**1170-18** FROM 18/11/07 15:00 TO PERM
E) REF AIP PAGE RJO I AO2-24.7 (CHANGE TO READ)
RJOI/IWAKUNI RNAV(GPS) RWY02
(PROFILE VIEW)
CHANGE TO READ
GP 3.00/TCH 55
INSTEAD OF
GP 3.02/TCH 50

**1169-18** FROM 18/11/07 15:00 TO PERM
E) REF AIP PAGE RJO I AO2-24.7 (CHANGE TO READ)
RJOI/IWAKUNI RNAV(GPS) RWY02
CHANGE TO READ
MISSED APPROACH: CLIMBING RIGHT TURN TO 6000
DIRECT MYE VOR/DME AND HOLD,
CONTINUE CLIMB-IN-HOLD TO 6000.
INSTEAD OF
MISSED APPROACH: CLIMB TO 700, THEN CLIMBING RIGHT TURN TO 6000
DIRECT MYE VOR/DME AND HOLD,
OR AS DIRECTED BY ATC. MAX 230 KIAS.

first prev < 1 2 3 > next last
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<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Notes</th>
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<tr>
<td>1/23/2019</td>
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<td>(b) (3) (A), (b) (6)</td>
<td>1st tour brand new guy</td>
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<td>Mishap ODO, new guy</td>
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<td>1/25/2019</td>
<td>F</td>
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<td>1st tour, unavailable Wed-Thurs</td>
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Good afternoon Sir,

Just wanted to share this with you FYSA.

R/S

-----Original Message-----
From: [B] (3) (A), (b) (6)
Sent: Friday, January 11, 2019 12:46 PM
To: [B] (3) (A), (b) (6)
Subject: RE: JAGMAN Next Week's Schedule

Soup,

No worries I'll put you down for the 17th. New schedule as follows:

**Wednesday January 16th**
- 1000-1100 (b) (3) (A), (b) (6) (Plans/FOPS)
- 1100-1200 (b) (3) (A), (b) (6) (AOPS/FOPS)
- Lunch
- 1300-1400 (b) (3) (A), (b) (6) (COPS)
- 1400-1500 (b) (3) (A), (b) (6) (MATSS OIC)

**Thursday January 17th**
- 0800-0900 (b) (3) (A), (b) (6) (MAG XO)
- 0900-1000 (b) (3) (A), (b) (6) (152 FDO and Sched Writer)
- 1000-1100 (b) (3) (A), (b) (6) (152 OpsO)
- 1100-1200 (b) (3) (A), (b) (6) (MAG OpsO)

**Thursday January 24th**
- 0700-0800 (b) (3) (A), (b) (6) (MAG CO)
- 0800-0900 (b) (3) (A), (b) (6) (152 CO)

Adj, I have not heard of any other changes, please send out calendar invites for [B] (3) (A), (b) (6) with location in CO's conference room.

V/R,
Thursday (30 Nov 19)
- Timeline MAG ULT
- Senior "Guy": 2100-0600
- Felt comfortable w/shift

"CMR"
- Track proficiency in TR-Skills
- Based on mission specifics

- Seaside Atta'?

Sunday / Monday
- 0600-1200 / Shift to 2100

Mishap
- 1845 wake up (8.5-9 hrs)
- 2030-0045: show up to work
- call from VMRP-152 (Ant OpSo)
  - give gas + go home early
  - not scheduled
  - said he would send us
  - Sierra 15 (NW corner)
  - 17 L F4

- Printed 5 copies of card card

Normally brief ~ 2 hrs
that night ~ 1.5 hrs
- he did not need additional time

TAC SOP: Appx B
Brief last ~ 10 min
- mostly SOP
- wish more depth . . .

1202 Currency: 1.4 hrs.
Night at AP:
- 0400-0600 times tenking
- takeoff 0051
"Mids" 7 not functioning

SUMO 41
radioed

0150 L: Impact
while... OJ03
Tuesday 2000-0700 Wed (6 Dec 98)

Showed up @ 0730 - 1st Flight - Not Tactical

- Demonstrate ability

Know he was executing flights to conduct operations

but no tanker

Mark 2

Whitesnake:
- Passed - Cat long
- ODD (4) "Bat"

When you land: SAR on station

MAG-12 produced FL0's on SIFR

1st time saw - On Monday 3 flights - 1 flight scheduled 2

Boated 2 scheduled time (27.5)

ODD said sumo 1 called on 1st flight code: 2102 (Fam Flight) 1st
3703 (Night Arm Recon) 2nd Flight

Sched B (posted in back)
- Aircrew or signal (times, miss, ranges).... more
  - Anything affect O&M: CO == XO
  - Wouldn't consider tanker a signal, a
  - part of exercise
From: Commanding Officer
To: [REDACTED]

Subj: FLIGHT QUALIFICATIONS AND DESIGNATIONS

Ref: (a) NAVMC DIR 3500.50C
(b) NAVMC DIR 3500.14D
(c) CNAF-M 3710.7
(d) F/A-18 ADMIN SOP REV 4

1. Having fulfilled the requirements set forth in the references, you are hereby granted the following qualifications and designations:

- Operations Duty Officer: 31 January 17
- Night Systems: 31 January 17
- Air Combat Maneuvering: 31 January 17
- Low Altitude Tactics: 31 January 17
- Section Lead: 31 January 17
- Low Altitude Tactics Instructor: 8 June 17
- Division Lead: 19 June 17
- Forward Air Controller (Airborne): 2 November 17
- Mission Commander: 26 February 18
- Fighter Attack Instructor: 29 June 18

Copy to:
ATJ
NATOPS
F/A-18 AVIATION TRAINING FORM
NAVMC 3500.50B, F/A-18 T&R MANUAL (26 JUN 2012)
AI-3704: DAY MED ALT AI

STUDENT: (b) (3) (A), (b) (6)
INSTRUCTOR: (b) (3) (A), (b) (6)
FLIGHT POSITION: Dash 4
CREW POSITION: Pilot
DATE: 11 April 2018
PASS: X INCOMPLETE: □ REFY: □

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<th>DND</th>
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<th>4</th>
<th>REMARKS</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Mission Preparation</td>
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<td>x</td>
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<td>Learning Points</td>
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<td>2. Brief</td>
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<td>• Be more vocal when calling tied and letting lead know if you are delaying takeoff for a reason</td>
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<td>3. Admin</td>
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<td>• Good tether between the section</td>
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<td>4. TacAdmin</td>
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<td>• Good work maintaining position and sight</td>
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<td>5. Tactical Execution</td>
<td>x</td>
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<td>• Employed sim ordinance on the target</td>
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<td>6. TCC</td>
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<td>• Don’t be so conservative with your missiles. Had a shot opportunity towards the end of the VUL</td>
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<td>7. Debrief</td>
<td>x</td>
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<td>• Expedient rejoin and RTB</td>
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<td>8. Mission Performance Standards</td>
<td>x</td>
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<tr>
<td>a) Recognize and react appropriately to threats.</td>
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<td>b) Adhere to planned air-to-air/air-to-ground timeline and target area tactics.</td>
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<td>c) Deliver weapons on planned DPI.</td>
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<td>d) Adhere to WASP delivery parameters and TACSOP valid delivery criteria.</td>
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<td>e) Take valid shots.</td>
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<td>9. Administrative flight requirement (if required).</td>
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REMARKS
Executed as -4 of VMFA-533 Division AI, with 121 sweep. 7 v 3. Threat: J-11b, Event Completed

DND - Not applicable or not observed.
UNSAT* - Unsafe or complete lack of ability and/or knowledge. Requires substantial input from the instructor for safe execution and/or mission accomplishment.
1 - Safe but limited proficiency. Requires frequent input from the instructor.
2 - Correct. Recognizes and corrects errors. Requires occasional input from the instructor.
3 - Correct. Efficient, skillful, and without hesitation. Requires minimal input from the instructor.
4* - Unusually high degree of ability. Requires no input from the instructor.
*Mandatory comments in remarks section for items scored at this level.
**F/A-18 AVIATION TRAINING FORM**

**NAVMC 3500.50B, F/A-18 T&R MANUAL (26 JUN 2012)**

**SAA-2507: 2V2 BVR (NTD) VID SIM**

**STUDENT:** (b) (3) (A), (b) (6)

**FLIGHT POSITION:** Dash 2

**CREW POSITION:** Pilot

**INSTRUCTOR:** (b) (3) (A), (b) (6)

**DATE:** 6 JULY 2017

**PASS:** X  **INCOMPLETE:**  **REPLY:**

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<td>2. Brief</td>
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<td>Admin:</td>
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<td>3. Admin</td>
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<td>x</td>
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<td>Standard departure out to the R-225. Good work joining in spread but</td>
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<td>4. TacAdmin</td>
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<td>remember to join on the right side per the brief. No issues on the return</td>
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<td>5. Tactical Execution</td>
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<td>coming in for the visual straight in.</td>
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<td>6. TCC</td>
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<td>c) meld/sort mechanics</td>
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<td>d) maneuvering target mechanics</td>
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<td>g) merge mechanics</td>
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<td>k) merge clean-up</td>
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<td>m) Maintain mutual support.</td>
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<td>n) Take valid shots.</td>
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**REMARKS**

Mission to conduct 2v2 intercepts in the R-225

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**DND - Not.**

**UNSAF** - Unsafe or complete lack of ability and/or knowledge. Requires substantial input from the instructor for safe execution and/or mission accomplishment.

1 - Safe but limited proficiency. Requires frequent input from the instructor.

2 - Correct. Recognizes and corrects errors. Requires occasional input from the instructor.

3 - Correct. Efficient, skillful, and without hesitation. Requires minimal input from the instructor.

4* - Unusually high degree of ability. Requires no input from the instructor.

*Mandatory comments in remarks section for items scored at this level.

---

SAA-2507: 2V2 BVR (NTD) VID SIM

82
**F/A-18 AVIATION TRAINING FORM**

**NAVMC 3500.50B, F/A-18 T&R MANUAL (26 JUN 2012)**

**SAA-2506: BVR RADAR & SRR (NTD) SIM**

**STUDENT:** (D) (3) (A), (b) (6)  
**FLIGHT POSITION:** Dash 2  
**CREW POSITION:** Pilot

**INSTRUCTOR:** (D) (3) (A), (b) (6)  
**DATE:** 29 JUN 2017

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<tr>
<td>1. Mission Preparation</td>
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<td>TacAdmin:</td>
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<td>2. Brief</td>
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<td>- If you are given the inside of the turn for forward quarter RWR checks then be a little more aggressive to make the merge happen.</td>
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<td>3. Admin</td>
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<td>- I will receive STT only indications in the forward quarter. You are able to spike the other FTR with PDI at PB1 out of AIM-9X set.</td>
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<tr>
<td>4. TacAdmin</td>
<td>X</td>
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<td>- Good job maintaining sight all day today, including through aggressive maneuvers for maneuvering targets.</td>
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<tr>
<td>5. Tactical Execution</td>
<td>X</td>
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<td>- Be thinking about what you need to do with your jet to be in position when you take a commit. You may be committing for cold so be thinking about basic tac form things to stay in position.</td>
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<td>6. TCC</td>
<td>X</td>
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<td>Conducted 5 sets of a 2v2 intercept with two runs hostile and three bogey.</td>
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<td>7. Debrief</td>
<td>X</td>
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<td>Lessons learned / things to think about:</td>
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<tr>
<td>8. Mission Performance Standards</td>
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<td>- Good work maintaining sight and taking shots when required.</td>
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<tr>
<td>a) intercept geometry (2D/3D)</td>
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<td>- Nicely done realizing and vocalizing when you have ROE solved.</td>
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<tr>
<td>b) timeline awareness</td>
<td>X</td>
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<td>- Radar mechanics were good as they were on his 1v1 event. A few times you would be working off the bottom of the radar screen but it wouldn’t be long until you corrected it. When you get out of SCAN RAID it should be in your habit pattern to decrement the range. Good job with maneuvering target mech, try to tighten down to the exact numbers.</td>
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<td>c) meld/sort mechanics</td>
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<td>- Nice work taking valid shots and gaining tally 2 for a majority of the intercepts.</td>
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<tr>
<td>d) maneuvering target mechanics</td>
<td>X</td>
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<td>- Continue to work on SRR. It is one of the first things to fall out when we get task saturated. You have to be able to do that, fly form, and execute a good lookout doctrine at the same time.</td>
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<tr>
<td>e) RWR awareness</td>
<td>X</td>
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<td>- 3D geometry and tether for ID. For one of the IDs the tether between 1 and 2 may have (~2 negative yardstick, no SA display recorded for PPU debris) broken down resulting in 1 not being able to support 2. Unable to assess the tether in the debris but it may have gotten beyond the recommended numbers, likely due to both 1 and 2 maintaining an offset beyond the recommended numbers.</td>
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<tr>
<td>f) weapons employment</td>
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<td>X</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>Debrief:</td>
<td></td>
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<td>g) merge mechanics</td>
<td>X</td>
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<td></td>
<td>- Whiteboard and tape debris.</td>
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<tr>
<td>h) SRR mechanics</td>
<td>X</td>
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<td>- Good job knowing what to look for to validate your shots, but be able to validate the shot within a couple seconds.</td>
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<tr>
<td>i) standardized comm</td>
<td>X</td>
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<td>- Good job asking questions on what you should be studying in the future.</td>
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<tr>
<td>j) notch mech</td>
<td>X</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Press.</td>
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<td>k) merge clean-up</td>
<td>X</td>
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<td>l) Take valid shots.</td>
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<tr>
<td>9. Administrative flight requirement (if required).</td>
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**REMARKS**

Conducted 2v2 AWI within the R-225.

Overall slightly above average to above average event for (D) (3) with some learning points for future improvement. Good job executing new tactics for the first time, maintaining site, and taking shots.

Brief: (D) (3) will not know one of the defensive ranges on the HSCP SB TL and will not know what program to set his ALE-47 to for the A/A reactive flare program.

Admin: no issues.

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1 - Safe but limited proficiency. Requires frequent input from the instructor.  
2 - Correct. Recognizes and corrects errors. Requires occasional input from the instructor.  
3 - Correct. Efficient, skillful, and without hesitation. Requires minimal input from the instructor.  
4* - Unusually high degree of ability. Requires no input from the instructor.  
*Mandatory comments in remarks section for items scored at this level.
F/A-18 AVIATION TRAINING FORM  
NAVMC 3500.50B, F/A-18 T&R MANUAL (26 JUN 2012)  
SAA-2505: RADAR/EA/COMBAT SYS

STUDENT: (b) (3) (A), (b)  
FLIGHT POSITION: Dash 2  
CREW POSITION: Pilot  
INSTRUCTOR: (b) (3) (A), (b)  
DATE: 29 JUN 2017

PASS: X  
INCOMPLETE:  
REPLY:  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ITEM</th>
<th>DND</th>
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<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>REMARKS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 1. Mission Preparation | | X | | | | Conduct:  
| 2. Brief | | X | | | | Good work maintaining yourself on timeline and utilizing the radar mech 
| 3. Admin | | X | | | | described during the brief. Weakest point will be comm during this event. A few 
| 4. TacAdmin | | X | | | | times the WSO will get out a comm call that should have been the pilot. 
| 5. Tactical Execution | | X | | | | Things to think about and focus on in the future: 
| 6. TCC | | X | | | | - 3D geometry on LEO flow. 
| 7. Debrief | | X | | | | - 2 will be spiked approaching the merge on a group declared bogey and take a 
| 8. Mission Performance Standards | | X | | | | shot prior to solving for ID. When asked in the debrief if he had solved for ID 
| a) Understand and demonstrate sufficient knowledge of air-to-air combat systems and displays. | | X | | | | (b) (3) (A), (b) stated that he took being spiked as HA/MI and thus had solved for 
| b) Execute appropriate counter EA TTPs. | | X | | | | POE. The briefed ROE to get to hostile was PEI+LOF with PEI being satisfied by 
| 9. Administrative flight requirement (if required) | | | | | | NCTR or a VIDO (eyeball was not briefed in order to facilitate ID and merge 
| | | | | | | mechanics). Don’t make up your own ROE and possibly frat someone. 
| | | | | | | - On the same run 2 will break high and to the right approaching the merge, 
| | | | | | | yielding angles and turning room to the bogey. You don’t want to yield angles 
| | | | | | | and turning room like that. Continue to the merge, wait for the appropriate 
| | | | | | | visual cues, and then take out the turning room.  
| | | | | | | - Good job taking out the turning room and maneuvering out of plane on other 
| | | | | | | merges and taking shots. Just realize what going nose high will and will not buy 
| | | | | | | you, and if you can retain, add, or don’t bleed energy to leave yourself the 
| | | | | | | option to go out of plane on deck.  
| | | | | | | - Took 1x invalid SH to the 50 mi SHPRI. 
| | | | | | | - Good notch on subsequent bogey run, broke lock. Use the same mechanisms and 
| | | | | | | technique on future notches. 
| | | | | | | - After breaking lock with the notch 2 will pitch in and have no SA to the bogey, 
| | | | | | | who will end up 1nm in trail. You have to clean the merge up. We could have 
| | | | | | | accomplished this today by pitching in in accordance with the recommendation. 
| | | | | | | - Need to clean up the shot comm and shot status updates.  
| | | | | | | - Good radar mech. Keep doing what you’re doing with the radar. 
| | | | | | | Debrief: Conducted a tape debrief to analyze timeline awareness and proper 
| | | | | | | shot doctrine as well as QA radar mech. Cleared up any confusion remaining 
| | | | | | | from the initial brief. Biggest things to work on are ROE adherence and shot 
| | | | | | | comm.  
| | | | | | | Press. |

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6)  

Instructor Sign

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SAA-2505: RADAR/EA/COMBAT SYS

82
### F/A-18 AVIATION TRAINING FORM

**NAVMC 3500.50B, F/A-18 T&R MANUAL (26 JUN 2012)**

**AA-2504: 1V1 DISSIMILAR BFM**

**STUDENT:** (b) (3) (A), (b) (6)

**FLIGHT POSITION:** Single

**CREW POSITION:** Pilot

**INSTRUCTOR:** (b) (3) (A), (b) (6)

**DATE:** 15 FEB 2018

**PASS:** X   **INCOMPLETE:**   **REFLY:**   

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ITEM</th>
<th>DND</th>
<th>Unsatisf</th>
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<th>4</th>
<th>REMARKS</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2. Brief</td>
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<td>Admin: Significant delay on deck due to ATC issues will see the section hold on deck for approx. 40 min. Conducted a Mill power takeoff with a very slow rendezvous in order to make the best use of gas. No issues on the RTB as a single. All else standard.</td>
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<td>3. Admin</td>
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<td>TacAdmin: Conducted an expendables check and G-warm. Long intercept (approx. 25 miles) once inside the area in order to meet with adversary F-15. Aircrew will have to be more directive with the Japanese pilot to get the fight set up. Fuel at this point would allow for only 1 set. Following the KIO, took some effort to get de-confliction from the section of F-15s with one aircraft appearing to initially join on Bat 22. Once de-confliction solved no further issues.</td>
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<td>4. TacAdmin</td>
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<td>Conduct: 1 set complete. F-15 will call a right-to-right but will severely float his turn, forcing aircrew to update to a left-to-left. This will yield a very offensive merge. F-15 will maneuver oblique nose high to the left and then reverse, going oblique nose high to the right. Bat 22 will pull across adversary's tail following the merge and go pure nose low. Aircrew will momentarily go blind then immediately pick up the adversary to their right, causing a wide low to high merge. Bat 22 will go nose low again following this merge and find themselves in a slightly offensive position with both aircraft heading towards the deck. Bat 22 will be bingo at this time. Overall factors outside our control forced a short set (ATC delays, distance to range). Event is complete.</td>
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<td>5. Tactical Execution</td>
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<td>Press</td>
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<td>6. TCC</td>
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<td>7. Debrief</td>
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<tr>
<td>8. Mission Performance Standards</td>
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<tr>
<td>a) Deny opponent weapon employment opportunities.</td>
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<td>b) Achieve first weapons employment opportunity.</td>
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<tr>
<td>c) Gain a positional advantage.</td>
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<tr>
<td>d) Employ follow-on weapons.</td>
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<tr>
<td>e) Transition to offensive or defensive BFM.</td>
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<td>f) Separate or kill attacker.</td>
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<td>g) Take valid shots.</td>
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<tr>
<td>9. Administrative flight requirement (If required).</td>
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**REMARKS**

Cope North 2018: Conducted Dissimilar BFM against Japanese F-15s (304th Squadron based out of Naha, Okinawa.)

**Instructor Sign:** X

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4* - Unusually high degree of ability. Requires no input from the instructor.

*Mandatory comments in remarks section for items scored at this level.*

AA-2504: 1V1 DISSIMILAR BFM 82
# F/A-18 AVIATION TRAINING FOR
NAVMC 3500.50B, F/A-18 T&R MANUAL (26 JUN 2012)
AA-2503: 1V1 NEUTRAL BFM (HA/Roller)

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<tr>
<td>1. Mission Preparation</td>
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<td>2. Brief</td>
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<td>3. Admin</td>
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<td>4. TacAdmin</td>
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<td>5. Tactical Execution</td>
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<td>6. TCC</td>
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<td>7. Debrief</td>
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<td>8. Mission Performance Standards</td>
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<tr>
<td>a) Deny opponent weapon employment opportunities</td>
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<tr>
<td>b) Achieve first weapons employment opportunity</td>
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<td>c) Gain a positional advantage</td>
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<td>d) Employ follow-on weapons</td>
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<td>e) Transition to offensive or defensive BFM</td>
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<td>f) Separate or kill attacker</td>
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<td>g) Take valid shots</td>
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<td>9. Administrative flight requirement (if required)</td>
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**REMARKS**

- **Brief**: Full execution brief conducted day prior. Quick Admin/TacAdmin brief conducted prior to flight. Standard.
- **Admin**: 10 second go departure out of Yokota Air Base straight into routing for the working area. No issues on the transit or RTB.
- **TacAdmin**: Continue to build off previous event (2502) learning points.
- **Conduct**:
  - 1xFlats
  - 1xRoller
  - 2x Butterfly sets

On the flats would start off with the adversary being restricted to MIL in order to facilitate training. Will find himself high and slightly out front of the adversary aircraft, thus allowing the bandit to "tree" and prevent room for taking shots. Set will end in a KIO.

Good performance on the roller. Managed to maintain a neutral to slightly offensive position and able to take a shot. Continue to max perform the aircraft. Do not cut off the top of the roller too early when pulling across to the adversary. Fight will continue down to the deck for a KIO.

Initial butterfly set will set both aircraft electing to go up into the vertical. Setting a stacked merge with the adversary low. BFM error conducted on the pass will maneuver aircraft nose low too early and become slightly defensive.

Next set will elect to go nose low. Better job at maintaining a pure vertical maneuver. Maximize your inside/outside scan as during this set you will go ballistic before continuing the fight. KIO for bingo and RTB.

Overall a continued improving trend from the last event. As you continue to study and gain more experience doing BFM you will see your performance increase.

**Press.**

---

**11/24/2017**

**Instructor Sign**

**DND** - Not.
**UNSAT** - L

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2. Correct. Recognizes and corrects errors. Requires occasional input from the instructor.
3. Correct. Efficient, skillful, and without hesitation. Requires minimal input from the instructor.
4. Unusually high degree of ability. Requires no input from the instructor.

*Mandatory comments in remarks section for items scored at this level.*
# F/A-18 Aviation Training Form

**NAVMC 3500.50B, F/A-18 T&R Manual (26 Jun 2012)**

**AA-2502: 1V1 Defensive BFM**

<table>
<thead>
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<th>REMARKS</th>
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<tr>
<td>1. Mission Preparation</td>
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<tr>
<td>2. Brief</td>
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<td>3. Admin</td>
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<td>4. TacAdmin</td>
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<td>5. Tactical Execution</td>
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<tr>
<td>a) Defeat initial weapons employment.</td>
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<tr>
<td>b) Maneuver to deny follow-on WEZ.</td>
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<tr>
<td>c) Neutralize attacker.</td>
<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>d) Separate or kill attacker.</td>
<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>e) Take valid shots.</td>
<td>X</td>
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<td>X</td>
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</table>

**REMARKS**

Pass.

ADMIN/TACADMIN: Ensure to place the UT Pod to STBY on all flights, regardless of planned use or not. Execute a hard turn when “checking” for the Perch otherwise the range and ADT setup will not be correct.

TR: 1 Snapshot inside < 1000' and <500' pass.

SSO: 1x invalid range, see above (miss).

9K: DBT Nose Low, ensure to respond to queries regarding DBT. Not Max performing (living at 20-240) when SN is a factor or queried to MPP. Executing a 10 deg DNL PDT at 5k above the deck. Lives around 200 on deck. Late Gun Recognition. Hit the Deck

6K: NH Break Turn. Not MPPing. High ODA, late to no Guns D. Hit the deck.

3K: No recognition of Gun at start and no initiation of mechanics when directed. Fast on deck, High ODA.

3K: Delayed reaction for Guns D. Good follow on LV placement. Must honor a Deck Save call, especially when proven to not be able to live a 100-200'.

Improving trend. Good adherence to Axiom 2 post Guns D.

**11/24/2017**

**Instructor Sign**

**DND - Not Signed by Instructors**

** Unsatisfactory ( Unsat) - Requires substantial improvement.**

1 - Safe but limited proficiency. Requires frequent input from the instructor.
2 - Correct. Recognizes and corrects errors. Requires occasional input from the instructor.
3 - Correct. Efficient, skillful, and without hesitation. Requires minimal input from the instructor.
4* - Unusually high degree of ability. Requires no input from the instructor.

*Mandatory comments in remarks section for items scored at this level.

**AA-2502: 1V1 Defensive BFM**

82
### F/A-18 AVIATION TRAINING FORM

**NAVMC 3500.50B, F/A-18 T&R MANUAL (26 JUN 2012)**

**NS-2404: MED ANGLE DIVE/POP/STRAFE**

| STUDENT: | (B) (3) (A), (B) (6) |
| FLIGHT POSITION: | Dash 2 |
| CREW POSITION: | Pilot |
| INSTRUCTOR: | (B) (3) (A), (B) (6) |
| DATE: | 7 JUL 2017 |

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<td>a) Adhere to USMC FA-18 ADMIN SOP.</td>
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<td>b) Know and understand visual illusions associated with NVG usage.</td>
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<td>c) Adhere to WASP delivery parameters and TAC SOP valid delivery criteria.</td>
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<td>d) Adhere to tactical abort parameters.</td>
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**REMARKS**

Conducted NS 2401, 2402, 2404 in the R-225. High lux night.

---

**DND** - Not applicable or not observed.

**UNSAT** - Unsafe or complete lack of ability and/or knowledge. Requires substantial input from the instructor for safe execution and/or mission accomplishment.

1 - Safe but limited proficiency. Requires frequent input from the instructor.

2 - Correct. Recognizes and corrects errors. Requires occasional input from the instructor.

3 - Correct. Efficient, skillful, and without hesitation. Requires minimal input from the instructor.

4+ - Unusually high degree of ability. Requires no input from the instructor.

*Mandatory comments in remarks section for items scored at this level.*

---

**NS-2404: MED ANGLE DIVE/POP/STRAFE**

F/A-18 AVIATION TRAINING FORM
NAVMC 3500.50B, F/A-18 T&R MANUAL (26 JUN 2012)
NS-2402: FAM/FORM/AWI

STUDENT: (D) (3) (A), (B)
FLIGHT POSITION: Dash 2
CREW POSITION: Pilot
INSTRUCTOR: (D) (3) (A), (B) (6)
DATE: 7 JUL 17

PASS: X  INCOMPLETE:  REFY: 

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<td>a) Adhere to USMC FA-18 ADMIN SOP and USMC FA-18 TAC SOP.</td>
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<td>b) Maintain visual mutual support.</td>
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<td>c) Maintain briefed formations.</td>
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<td>d) Conduct safe rendezvous.</td>
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<td>e) Conduct radar intercept to arrive within valid LAR.</td>
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<td>f) Take valid shots.</td>
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REMARKS
Conducted NS 2401, 2402, 2404 in the R-225. High lux night.

DND - Not applicable or not observed.
UNSAT* - Unsafe or complete lack of ability and/or knowledge. Requires substantial input from the instructor for safe execution and/or mission accomplishment.
1 - Safe but limited proficiency. Requires frequent input from the instructor.
2 - Correct. Recognizes and corrects errors. Requires occasional input from the instructor.
3 - Correct. Efficient, skillful, and without hesitation. Requires minimal input from the instructor.
4* - Unusually high degree of ability. Requires no input from the instructor.
*Mandatory comments in remarks section for items scored at this level.
F/A-18 AVIATION TRAINING FORM
NAVMC 3500.50B, F/A-18 T&R MANUAL (26 JUN 2012)
SNS-2401: FAM SIM

STUDENT: [Blank]
FLIGHT POSITION: Dash 2
CREW POSITION: Pilot
INSTRUCTOR: [Blank]
DATE: 7 JUL 2017
PASS: X  INCOMPLETE:  REF: 

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<td>1. Mission Preparation</td>
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<td>Brief: Continue to look for opportunities to brief portions of the event. This will come to benefit you later on. Briefed ordnance. Standard.</td>
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<td>Good work being smooth and expeditious on the night tanking. Would drop back a little too far prior to getting into position behind the basket but this will improve with experience. No issues on the RTB for the VFR straight-in to YPDN.</td>
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<td>b) Demonstrate an understanding of visual illusions associated with NVG usage.</td>
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REMARKS
Conducted NS 2401, 2402, 2404 in the R-225. High lux night.

Conduct: A/A portion – Executed as a 1v1 Hostile. Good work beginning the mech for lofting the shots but system set up as mentioned in TacAdmin would hinder that. Good timeline awareness throughout the vul. Since you were a single be very aggressive on executing your out in order to preserve the reattack. Notch was effective for parameters (slightly hot) but would not break lock. Unable to gain radar SA/Tally at the merge and would KIO for training objectives met. Good block awareness.

A/G portion – Wingmen would be deadeye so lead will laser in each LGTR. Working the different night section positions throughout the runs. Good practice with the J-lase comm but adding in extraneous information based on the profile.

Debrief: Conducted a thorough tape debrief as well as instruction on radar mech and proper laser comm. Overall a safe night event for you. Continue to clean up the minor TacAdmin points and continue to study and grow with each event.

Press.
# F/A-18 AVIATION TRAINING FORM
## NAVMC 3500.5B, F/A-18 T&R MANUAL (26 JUN 2012)
### AA-2501: 1V1 OFFENSIVE BFM

**STUDENT:**
-2 (b) (3) (A), (b) (6)  
-2 Pilot (b) (3) (A), (b) (6)

**INSTRUCTOR:**
-2 (b) (3) (A), (b) (6)  
WSO (b) (6)

**DATE:** 2017 09 29

**PASS:** X  **INCOMPLETE:**  **REIFY:**

## ITEM  |  DND  |  Unsat  |  1  |  2  |  3  |  4  |  REMARKS
--- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | ---
1. Mission Preparation  |  |  | X  |  |  |  | Admin:  
Section Go out of ROJ. -2 will start slightly suckd but will correct expeditiously.
4.0 Bingo- got us back with approximately a 2.8 on deck
2. Brief  | X  |  |  |  |  |  | 
3. Admin  | X  |  |  |  |  |  | 
4. TacAdm  |  | X  |  |  |  |  | 
5. Tactical Execution  |  | X  |  |  |  |  | 
6. TCC  | X  |  |  |  |  |  | 
7. Debrief  | X  |  |  |  |  |  | 
8. Mission Performance Standards  |  |  | X  |  |  |  | 
   a) Maintain offensive position.  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 
   b) Employ follow-on weapons.  |  |  | X  |  |  |  | 
   c) Separate prior to becoming neutral.  |  |  |  |  |  | X  | 
   d) Take valid shots.  |  |  |  |  |  | X  | 
9. Administrative flight requirement (if required).  |  |  |  |  |  | X  | Conduct:
SSD: One “skip it” due to not pulling to the inside as the Shooter, otherwise, employment was safe. As the target, as soon as you hear “snap” start the reversal to prevent getting too far on the sets. Effective gun defense on the maneuvering target.
9K Set- Valid F3 to start. Improper pursuit curve post F-3 (need to Level Wings momentarily) resulting in an early Attack Window Entry. Late Ditch Follow. Did not max perform throughout (was at 370kts at one point in the DF). L-Hand turns, no follow-on shots. Ended on the deck in a slightly offensive luffberry. 
Check Airspeed on Ditch Follow (WSO TCC: “Airspeed”/”Unload”) and Weapon Selection (WSO TCC: “Gun Heat”)
6K Set- Valid F-3 to start, Ditch Follow, Role Reversal. Level Wings momentarily post Initial F-3, did not max perform in ditch follow. Invalid Gun attempt in the middle of first ditch follow resulted in a role reversal. Failed to transition to DBFM, resulting in being shot twice.
3K Set- Valid F-2 to start, 2x Ditch follow to the right. Neutralized on deck Gun Weave. (WSO TCC: “Nose is off” to tell pilot he can regain aispspeed)
HABFM - Short BFLY set. Both go up. Didn’t have the appropriate airspeed for the desired gameplan. Missed shot opportunity en route to slow speed merge. Early redefinition resulting in becoming defensive.
TCC:  
-Check Airspeed to QA Max Performance Numbers and be directive to Pilot if he’s not hitting those numbers  
-QA weapons selection to what is most appropriate (ex. don’t fly through a WEZ and go straight for a gunshot), be directive as required  
-Honor Sensor Nose- Call it out on ICS and put out expendables; if not sure if the pilot is doing it, just do it and call it out on ICS; Call Guns-D over ICS even if it is in a Canned Set.

---

**DND -**

UNSAT* - Unsafe or complete lack of ability and/or knowledge. Requires substantial input from the instructor for safe execution and/or mission accomplishment.
1 - Safe but limited proficiency. Requires frequent input from the instructor.
2 - Correct. Recognizes and corrects errors. Requires occasional input from the instructor.
3 - Correct. Efficient, skillful, and without hesitation. Requires minimal input from the instructor.
4* - Unusually high degree of ability. Requires no input from the instructor.

*Mandatory comments in remarks section for items scored at this level.
**F/A-18 AVIATION TRAINING FORM**
**NAVMC 3500.50B, F/A-18 T&R MANUAL (26 JUN 2012)**
**NS-2405: SEC IAM DELIVERIES**

**STUDENT:** (b) (3) (A), (b) (6) 
**FLIGHT POSITION:** Dash 2 
**CREW POSITION:** Pilot / WSO 
**INSTRUCTOR:** (b) (3) (A), (b) (6) 
**DATE:** 14 JUL 2017 

**ITEM** | **DNO.** | **1** | **2** | **3** | **4** | **REMARKS**
--- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | ---
2. Brief |  | ✓ |  |  |  | Admin: 10 sec go out of YPDN for the standard departure out to the R-225. Practiced maintaining formation at different ranges and aircraft and light setting. No issues for remainder of transit to the area. RTB to YPDN for the straight in. No issues. 
3. Admin |  | ✓ |  |  |  |TacAdmin: Conducted G-warm from the tac wing position and expendable checks. Standard. Dash two will get a gun gun caution prior to beginning the roll in and will commence all gun runs simulated. No issues for the QTR and BDA. When switching from A/G to A/A remember to give the WSQ a few more moments to complete BDA on the last run. 
4. TacAdmin |  | ✓ |  |  |  | Conduct: Performed 6 total runs. 2x Gun threat, 2x Med angle and 2x Pop deliveries. Good parameters for both sim gun runs. First run will be valid for parameters but invalid for SE. 2nd run will be overall valid. 
5. Tactical Execution |  | ✓ |  |  |  | Moving towards the two 30 degree dive deliveries. First run will be invalid for ASL, valid SE and valid for effects. Second run will be similar to the first. Moving the pattern down to the pops, good LAT checks and pop mechanics. First pop run will be overall valid. Second pop run will be invalid for ASL but valid for SE. 
6. TCC |  | ✓ |  |  |  | Overall common trends included pulling past the ASL and executing a J-hook back. Overcorrecting back to the ASL causing unnecessary overshoots. Steps to correct this include having a more forceful unload when reaching the ASL, using the top of the velocity vector to point towards the crotch of the release que and easing on the corrections. Good WSQ TCC with working the pod and helping to fine tune corrections for each of the 6 runs. 
7. Debrief |  | ✓ |  |  |  | Debrief: Conducted a thorough tape debrief to validate each run and assess lessons learned. 
8. Mission Performance Standards |  |  |  |  |  | Conduct night GP deliveries in the R-225/BFTA. 
9. Administrative flight requirement (if required). |  |  |  |  |  |  

**REMARKS**
Conduct night GP deliveries in the R-225/BFTA.

Good Event overall! For both lands the [b] (3) [A] (A), (b) (6) 
Keep up with the good attitude and mission prep. It only gets more difficult from here. 
Congrats! NS girl!

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**UNSAT** - Unsafe or complete lack of ability and/or knowledge. Requires substantial input from the instructor for safe execution and/or mission accomplishment. 
1 - Safe but limited proficiency. Requires frequent input from the instructor. 
2 - Correct. Recognizes and corrects errors. Requires occasional input from the instructor. 
3 - Correct. Efficient, skillful, and without hesitation. Requires minimal input from the instructor. 
4 - Exemplary. Exceptional, high degree of ability. Requires no input from the instructor. 
*Mandatory comments in remarks section for items scored at this level.* 

---

**NS-2405: SEC IAM DELIVERIES**
**ITEM**

1. Mission Preparation
2. Brief
3. Admin
4. TacAdmin
5. Tactical Execution
6. TCC
7. Debrief
8. Mission Performance Standards
   a) Adhere to USMC FA-18 ADMIN SOP
   b) Acquire and designate briefed target with sensors
   c) Maintain mutual support and proper visual lookout with NVO scan adhering to mission crossover times
   d) Adhere to WASP delivery parameters and TACSSP valid delivery criteria
   e) Adhere to tactical abort parameters
9. Administrative flight requirement (if required)

**REMARKS**

Conducted night medium, low angle deliveries and gun strafe in the R-225 AFT.

Incomplete for no drops on the 30 DEG dive deliveries due to a flight gear issue and only one strafe with the gun. More reps needed.

**Brief:**
Talked about night considerations and proper NVG setup.

**Admin:**
10 sec go out of YPON towards the R-225 (b) (3) (A). will be flying a sucked position on the transit out to the area. While this may be more comfortable for you as a wingman realize that lead also needs to maintain sight and you are creating more work for them. Corrections to fix this is to maintain a better night scan and constantly check airspeed, heading and altitude to make sure you are doing all you can to remain in the proper position. This will get easier as you gain more experience flying at night. No issues on the RTB for VFR straight in to YPON.

**TacAdmin:**
Standard expendables check and G-warm. Better job at maintaining position but continue to refine the sight picture WRT bearing line. Keep comm within the cockpit to a minimum so that you can better hear any calls from lead. Remember that on the BDA checks you do NOT elevate above lead's aircraft.

**Conduct:**
Will start with a spacer pass over the i3 Target area. Conducting two 30 DEG roll-ins. Initial parameters were fine but due to some NVG issue will not drop on the first two passes.

Moving towards the 15 DEG pop attacks. Good parameters setting up for the run and good LAT checks. Good parameters into the pops with you dropping slightly high. Good safe escapes and overall both runs valid for parameters.

Last run will be a single gun bunt. Airspeed will be too fast (530 kts) going into the attack. Good dive angle but a late trigger pull will have you coming off right at the bottom of the Z-diagram. Realize that this is not where you want to be, doubly so at night, because the assumptions for the Z-diagram are no longer valid. Good TCC by the WSO by first calling "Airspeed" and then ultimately the "Pull Up". Employment was ultimately valid, albeit poor. Inexperienced sight picture lead to this and a breakdown in both aircrew scans lead to a poor 9K check. Getting better at this comes with experience but continue to develop both your sight pictures.

**Debrief:**
Conducted a tape debrief to validate drops and assess lessons learned.

**Signature**

Instructor Signature

DND - Not applicable or not observed.

UNSAT* - Unsat or complete lack of ability and/or knowledge. Requires substantial input from the instructor for safe execution and/or mission accomplishment.
1 - Safe but limited proficiency. Requires frequent input from the instructor.
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3 - Correct. Efficient, skillful, and without hesitation. Requires minimal input from the instructor.
4* - Unusually high degree of ability. Requires no input from the instructor.

*Mandatory comments in remarks section for items scored at this level.
# F/A-18 AVIATION TRAINING FORM

**NAVMC 3500.50B, F/A-18 T&R MANUAL (26 JUN 2012)**  
**NS-2403: 2V2 INTERCEPTS**

**STUDENT:** (b) (3) (A), (b) (6)  
**FLIGHT POSITION:** Dash 2  
**CREW POSITION:** Pilot / WSO  
**DATE:** 13 JUL 2017

**REMARKS**

1. **Mission Preparation**
   - X
2. **Brief**
   - X
3. **Admin**
   - X
4. **TacAdmin**
   - X
5. **Tactical Execution**
   - X
6. **TCC**
   - X
7. **Debrief**
   - X
8. **Mission Performance Standards**
   a) Adhere to USMC FA-18 ADMIN SOP.
   - X
   b) Maintain visual mutual support.
   - X
   c) Perform proper radar mechanics.
   - X
   d) Adhere to briefed air-to-air timeline.
   - X
   e) Take valid shots.
   - X
9. **Administrative flight requirement (if required).**
   - X

**REMARKS**

Conducted 2v2 Night Intercepts in the R-225 — Overall, average event.

**Brief:**
Discussed night related keys for success in maintaining VMS throughout the event.

**Admin:**
10 sec go out of YPDN towards the R-225 (b) (3) (A), will be flying a sucked position on the transit out to the area. While this may be more comfortable for you as a wingman realize that lead also needs to maintain sight and you are creating more work for them. Corrections to fix this is to maintain a better night scan and constantly check airspeed, heading and altitude to make sure you are doing all you can to remain in the proper position. This will get easier as you gain more experience flying at night. No issues on the RTB for VFR straight In to YPDN.

**Dash 2**

**TacAdmin:**
Standard expendables check and G-warm. Better job maintaining position. Remember to acknowledge lead's comm calls. No issue on the BD checks heading out of the area.

**Conduct:**
Began the first run in the north heading south. Dash 2 will be on the western side. Good job maintaining VMS and proper position. RDR DEGD will prevent dash 2 from shooting but good work following lead up lifting his shots and good expendables use executing the out. Remember to use SRR. Be quicker getting your radar set up for the pitch in mechanics. Still fighting the RDR DEGD so no shots out of dash 2, still maintained SA and timeline awareness with off board data.

**2nd run** will, again, have the flight starting off in the north with dash 2 on the west. Performed a SENS bit on the radar that showed pass but still having a degraded radar for remainder of the flight. Slightly late executing the notch and would be roughly 30 degrees cold. Good TCC by WSO on providing the initial heading and follow on corrections, good work by the pilot on maintaining sight of lead during the entire maneuver and putting out expendables. Just remember to vocalize you’re doing so. If you feel yourself getting task saturated maintaining sight, don’t be afraid to pass the radar. Coming into the merge dash two will be on the northern side behind lead, with lead in the south being the first to the merge. Will be visual lead and tally two.

**3rd run** starts of the same. Executing a boogey VID. Good work maintaining sight and floating the turn when lead pitches in for the VID. Good headwork of switching to the AIM-9 and good knowledge of how to rapidly switch between targets using the bump acq logic. Dash 2 will have lead in sight and tally two in a good position to engage.

**Debrief:** Conducted a tape debrief to assess lessons learned and ways to improve in the future.

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**DND - Not applicable or not observed.**

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1. Safe but limited proficiency. Requires frequent input from the instructor.
2. Correct. Recognizes and corrects errors. Requires occasional input from the instructor.
3. Correct. Efficient, skillful, and without hesitation. Requires minimal input from the instructor.
4. Unusually high degree of ability. Requires no input from the instructor.

*mandatory comments in remarks section for items scored at this level.*
### F/A-18 AVIATION TRAINING FORM

**NAVMC 3500.50B, F/A-18 T&R MANUAL (26 JUN 2012)**

**AS-2310: BUDDY LAS/E/BOMB/ SECTION IAM FLIGHT**

**STUDENT:** (b) (3) (A), (b) (6)

**FLIGHT POSITION:** Dash 2

**CREW POSITION:** Pilot

**INSTRUCTOR:** (b) (3) (A), (b) (6)

**DATE:** 28 JUN 17

**PASS:** X  **INCOMPLETE:**  **REFLY:**

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<td>2. Brief</td>
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<td>3. Admin</td>
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<td>4. TacAdmin</td>
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<td>5. Tactical Execution</td>
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<td>6. TCC</td>
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<td>7. Debrief</td>
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<td>8. Mission Performance Standards</td>
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<tr>
<td>a) Adhere to USMC FA-18 ADMIN SOP.</td>
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<tr>
<td>b) Acquire/designate target with TPOD.</td>
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<tr>
<td>c) Maintain proper geometry for weapons support until impact.</td>
<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>d) Adhere to WASP delivery parameters and TACSOP valid delivery criteria.</td>
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<td>e) Adhere to tactical abort parameters and safe escape maneuvers.</td>
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<tr>
<td>9. Administrative flight requirement (if required).</td>
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</table>

**REMARKS**

**Practice dropping LGTRs in the R-22S BFTA**

**Brief:** Standard

**Admin:**

When taking off out of YPDN remember to fly the SID until 10 tac or when vectored off of the SID. From there you can cut the corner to close the gap on leads aircraft via geometry. Lead’s aircraft would be dissimilarly configured and as a result would gain airspeed at a faster rate. If you notice this just come up on the radio and ask them to give you a little.

Good job with tanker ops and plugging the basket in a smooth and expeditious manner. Probe would slip out but you would quickly work it back in. Keep in mind that when that happens you must request a reconnect. Cannot do so at your own volition.

**TacAdmin:**

Good laser checks flowing into the area. Continue to better profile your jet and use geometry to your advantage to keep a better position. No need to use the speedbrake as much as you did. Standard BD checks.

**Conduct:**

Intent is to drop the 4x LGTR in both the buddy bomb/lase profiles. Initial confusion on Capt Reslir’s part about which profile would be occurring first and as such incorrect/no call would go resulting in the first pass being a no drop.

Conducted a second pass with an example of the call that would go smoothly.

Realize that unlike dropping GBU-16s you must be as close to lead as possible when dropping LGTRs in order to match the parameters as best as possible.

Have a harder LGB crank in order to stiff arm the target and have more pod time to ensure that laser energy is on the target.

Overall today was a below average event. J-lase comm needed work and while it was improving from the first run it was still not where it should have been. Same with position keeping during the buddy bomb profiles.

**Debrief:**

Conducted a thorough tape debrief validating each drop and understanding what is required to make dropping LGBs more successful in the future. Continue to listen and act on the critiques and as always continue to remain in the books and study.

Press.

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3. Correct. Efficient, skillful, and without hesitation. Requires minimal input from the instructor.
4* - Unusually high degree of ability. Requires no input from the instructor.

*Mandatory comments in remarks section for items scored at this level.

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<td>Brief: Standard</td>
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<td>Admin:</td>
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<td>3. Admin</td>
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<td>Slightly slow on the initial join up. No issues remainder of flight.</td>
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<td>4. TacAdmin</td>
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<td>TacAdmin:</td>
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<td>5. Tactical Execution</td>
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<td>X</td>
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<td>Good work maintaining a safe separation during the BDA. Lead aircraft</td>
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<td>6. TCC</td>
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<td>had a few issues to work out. Standard.</td>
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<td>7. Debrief</td>
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<td>Conduct:</td>
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<td>8. Mission Performance Standards</td>
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<td>X</td>
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<td>Overall intent is to practice multiple runs with the buddy bomb/lase</td>
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<td>a) Acquire/designate target with TPOD.</td>
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<td>profiles and practice the laser comm. Remember to switch between</td>
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<td>b) Maintain proper geometry for weapons support until Impact</td>
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<td>manual and auto during the bomb profiles. Would have a no drop on</td>
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<td>c) Adhere to WASP delivery parameters and TACSDP valid delivery</td>
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<td>first pass due to a switchology error. Be harder on yourself during</td>
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<td>d) Adhere to tactical abort parameters and safe escape</td>
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<td>SAPDART and if it helps continue to vocalize it.</td>
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<td>9. Administrative flight requirement (if required).</td>
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<td>Dropped on the second pass and third passes and switched to sim mode</td>
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<td>for each follow on pass. Would only have time for one gun pass due</td>
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<td>to fuel considerations. Good work profiling the jet working it down</td>
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<td>from altitude to save fuel. Would be fast coming in on the gun run</td>
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<td>and with the gusty tailwinds would cause your aircraft to have a</td>
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<td>substantial arc during the burn. Good work recognising it wasn’t</td>
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<td>going to work and taking your own abort.</td>
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<td>Conducted a tape debrief to validate each drop and clean up the</td>
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<td>laser comm.</td>
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<td>Press.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sim conducted as a flight. Dropping two GBU-16 in the BFTA</td>
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<td>Good knowledge in the brief. Keep that up.</td>
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<td>2) laser was dead eye. First run was a buddy bomb profile, lead</td>
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<td>Frist did not drop due to switchology errors. Had the TDC assigned</td>
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<td>to the LPPOD when dropping out of manual. Make sure the TDC is</td>
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<td>assigned to the HUD for this. Second and third pass, no issues</td>
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<td>Successful drop from manual on the second and third was a drop</td>
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<td>on a coordinate while lead was in the overhead.</td>
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<td>Single gun run before RTB utilizing the bust strafe profile. Started</td>
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<td>out a little fast and did not push hard enough to ever get the target</td>
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<td>in sight. Basically arched over the target and aborted the run.</td>
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<tr>
<td>No issues with admin or tac admin, to or from the area.</td>
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### F/A-18 AVIATION TRAINING FORM

**NAVMC 3500.50B, F/A-18 T&R MANUAL (26 JUN 2012)**

**SAS-2308: TPOD/JDAM/LJDAM SIM**

**STUDENT:** (b) (3) (A), (b) (6)

**FLIGHT POSITION:** Dash 2

**CREW POSITION:** Pilot

**INSTRUCTOR:** (b) (3) (A), (b) (6)

**DATE:** 26 JUN 17

**PASS:** X  **INCOMPLETE:** [ ]  **REPLY:** [ ]

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<td>2. Brief</td>
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<td>3. Admin</td>
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<td>4. TacAdmin</td>
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<td>5. Tactical Execution</td>
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<td>6. TCC</td>
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<td>7. Debrief</td>
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<td>8. Mission Performance Standards</td>
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<tr>
<td>a) Adhere to WASP delivery parameters and TACSOP valid delivery criteria.</td>
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<tr>
<td>b) Adhere to tactical abort parameters and safe escape maneuvers.</td>
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<tr>
<td>c) Execute proper procedures for weapon programming and release.</td>
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<tr>
<td>9. Administrative flight requirement (if required).</td>
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**REMARKS**

AS2308 Sim conducted as a flight.
Flight taking off out of YPDN to the Brashaw Range complex to employ JDAM and the gun.

Overall: Slightly above average event for Guano for the above average strafes for having not shot the gun in a long time. Good job capturing the debrief points.

Brief: Demonstrated how to use the GPS crypto keys to load JDAM and how to plan.

Admin:
- Good job listening to the brief and recording the stores displays on the ground. 10 sec go out of YPDN for the Darwin 6 departure out to the R-225. On the transit out to the area work hard to be that 9-1 0 abeam distance. A few times Capt Resiland would be at 1.1-1.2. Ways to fix this include matching leads Nav heading and making small adjustments to see what that gets you in relation to the abeam distance.

No issues on the RTB. Conducted a VFR straight in to YPDN due to Noise Abatement procedures. Don't trim stabs to zero when back on deck.

TacAdmin:
Prior to entering the working area make sure to automatically close the distance in order to conduct exposable checks. Continue to work on your tacform position keeping. Trust in the G to maintain. Not an overall issue but a few times you would end up sucked but quickly correcting.

Conduct:

**[b) (3) (A)]**
- First time seeing the target so conducted a target recee prior to dropping any ordnance. From there came around and conducted two passes dropping JDAM. The first drop will be a pre-planned and the second was a coordinate passed from -1 to -2 who then input the coordinate into the system.
- No issues with JDAM execution. JDAM deliveries were unassessable for tapes. There has been a rash of CVRS issues recently so that was likely the issue. Make sure to remember to giper the jet if your displays don't record.

Following the drops conducted 3x25° strafes. For it being the first time shooting the gun in the fleet the 3x strafes were above average. All strafes were valid for parameters, aimpoint, and effects. One strafe overall invalid due to safe escape. Technique was very good and **[b) (3) (A)]** was threading the needle with the piper on all of his deliveries. Nice job.

Press.

---

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**F/A-18 AVIATION TRAINING FORM**

**NAVMC 3500.50B, F/A-18 T&R MANUAL (26 JUN 2012)**

**SAS-2307: TPOD/LGB/LMAV SIM**

**STUDENT:**

**FLIGHT POSITION:** Dash 2

**CREW POSITION:** Pilot

**INSTRUCTOR:**

**DATE:** 8 JUN 2017

**PASS:** X  **INCOMPLETE:**  **REFLY:**

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Mission Preparation</td>
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<td>Brief: Was able to sit down with (b) (3) (A), and go through the lectures on LGB preflight + employment.</td>
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<tr>
<td>2. Brief</td>
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<td>Admin: Standard departure out the R-247. Taking off via a 10 sec go. Dash 2 would start the join and take a bit too much of a cut away to make the join happen, kept it safe but would wind up pulling too much power and would be sucked on lead for the climb out to altitude. RTB was standard for the initial and pitch back at YPON.</td>
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<tr>
<td>3. Admin</td>
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<td>TacAdmin: 6 warm standard and began set up towards the target. Good set up on the LPOD making sure you aren’t putting out laser energy. Standard fence out and BDA for the RTB.</td>
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<tr>
<td>4. TacAdmin</td>
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<td>Conduct: Practiced multiple runs as a solo setting up and employing the LGB. Practice comm and mech to make sure the pod isn’t being masked. Overall a smooth process and a couple of runs the WSO reminded you to arm the laser. To fix that just add the pod to the end of your sapdCheck pars.</td>
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<td>5. Tactical Execution</td>
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<td>From there swapped out roles with the wiperman being the one to lose and lead setting up for the attack run (b) (3) (A). All practice flying the pattern “Dorito of Death” around the target. Took a lot of getting used to working out the geometry and timing. Still not proficient but an improving trend on each run.</td>
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<td>6. TCC</td>
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<td>Debrief: Drew out a diagram and talked about how to set yourself up for success. Proficiency will come with experience but it is imperative to get practice time now to help that along.</td>
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<td>7. Debrief</td>
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<td>Buy the ramp so that on the recovery platform you want your jet in position to receive the laser energy based on the pilot planned cont'd.</td>
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<td>8. Mission Performance Standards</td>
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<tr>
<td>a) Adhere to WASP delivery parameters and TAC SOP valid delivery criteria.</td>
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<td>b) Adhere to tactical abort parameters and safe escape maneuvers.</td>
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<tr>
<td>c) Execute proper procedures for weapon release and guidance.</td>
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<td>9. Administrative flight requirement (if required).</td>
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**REMARKS**

Conducted the LGB fam flight in the R-247. Practiced self-lase and buddy-lase.

Sim completed as a flight.

---

**DND - Not applicable or not observed.**

**UNSAT* - Unsafe or complete lack of ability and/or knowledge. Requires substantial input from the instructor for safe execution and/or mission accomplishment.**

1. Safe but limited proficiency. Requires frequent input from the instructor.

2. Correct. Recognizes and corrects errors. Requires occasional input from the instructor.

3. Correct. Efficient, skillful, and without hesitation. Requires minimal input from the instructor.

4* - Unusually high degree of ability. Requires no input from the instructor.

*Mandatory comments in remarks section for items scored at this level.
# F/A-18 AVIATION TRAINING FORM

## NAVMC 3500.50B, F/A-18 T&R MANUAL (26 JUN 2012)

### SAS-2306: SACT FLIGHT

**STUDENT:** D) 3) A), (b) (6)

**FLIGHT POSITION:** Dash 2

**CREW POSITION:** Pilot

**INSTRUCTOR:** D) 3) A), (b) (6)

**DATE:** 7 JUN 2017

**PASS:** X  **INCOMPLETE:**  **REF: Y**

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<td>2. Brief</td>
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<td>3. Admin</td>
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<td>4. TacAdmin</td>
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<td>6. TCC</td>
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<td>c) Correctly assess the threat based upon the briefed scenario and aircraft system cuing.</td>
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<td>d) Correctly perform briefed TTPs while maintaining situational awareness and mutual support.</td>
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**REMARKS**

Practiced surface to air counter tactics in the R-247.

**Brief:** Good knowledge overall in regards to SACT. A few mix ups on certain numbers bu [D) (3) (A)], knew the maneuvers to be performed cold.

**Admin:** Section Go out of YPN0 for the standard departure out to R-247. [D) (6)]

[D) (3)] would pull his throttles a little too much on the section go and as such would be in a sucked position during the climb out. To fix that make sure you do not pull the throttles out of burner. Pull the throttles to min-burner and a small application of the brakes. Slightly sucked on the climb out to altitude. Once established and headlining into the area no issues.

On the return home no issues. Lead will report TCN issues. As a flight we would manage the arc and come in for the initial and pitch.

**TacAdmin:** Standard G warm and getting the systems set up for the event. No need to have the HUD repeater on the left DDI for extended periods during this phase of flight. On the BD checks coming home there would be a bit of confusion on the altitude to level off at. Other than that no issues.

**Conduct:** Maintain a higher energy state on the jet in order to perform the aircraft as need be to defeat the threats. If [D) (3) (A)], maintained a tighter weave and maintained the required G loads on the jet it would have worked out well. The Fix for this is to not make such excessive movements on the jet and ~ keep the maneuvers within parameters. Deploying chaff too early, debriefed real-time.

Keep the comm concise to avoid jamming up the radios. Avoid pulling too far past your required reversal point. Conducted a thorough tape debrief and identified the issues to fix that would have made the weave work out better.

Overall Capt. Resillard had a safe flight and made continuous improvements on the conduct. Continue to learn from each event and stay in the books.

**Overall, good flight with good learning points.** [B) (3) (A) has a great attitude and was attentive during brief and debrief. He has shown an eagerness to learn his craft to survive and be lethal in the airplane. Thanks for the opportunity. Press

[B) (3) (A)
**F/A-18 AVIATION TRAINING FORM**

**NAVMC 3500.50B, F/A-18 T&R MANUAL (26 JUN 2012)**

**SAS-2305: SACT SIM**

**STUDENT:** (D) (3) (A), (b)

**FLIGHT POSITION:** Bat 2

**CREW POSITION:** Pilot

**INSTRUCTOR:** (b) (3) (A), (b)

**DATE:** 26 May 2017

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<td>1. Mission Preparation</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Brie(d) (3) (A), show up prepared for the event. Keep studying the elements of Air Interdiction and how it all relates to SACT.</td>
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<tr>
<td>2. Brief</td>
<td>X</td>
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<td>Admin: Started off airborne. Working through some sim issues would flex to using GBU-12 vice 38 in the interest of time.</td>
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<tr>
<td>3. Admin</td>
<td>X</td>
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<td>TacAdmin: Overall good work maintaining sight throughout the sim. Understood that the visuals in the sim are difficult but still keep yourself in a position where lead can see you.</td>
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<tr>
<td>4. TacAdmin</td>
<td>X</td>
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<td>Conduct: Conducted multiple runs to practice penetrating into an SA-3 WIZ and executing good defending comm and procedures. Overall (D) (3) showed an improving trend on each run. Good work maintaining sight and SA going in from the A/A environment to the A/G environment. While initially on the first few runs there were areas to be improved on (D) (3) (A), applied the critiques and by the end of the simulation the section was able to successfully fight their way into the target, defend with mutual support, employ weapons on the target and fight their way back out. One thing that falls out of our scan a lot when doing SACT is airspeed management. You can fix it with an overbank, ease of the pull (if appropriate), or AB if it’s not an IR missile... but don’t use AB and waste fuel to compensate for poor mech. Don’t forget to jetison the appropriate stores at the appropriate times. We conducted multiple runs and on the later runs started putting an air-to-air picture out there so that you could see how hard it can sometimes be to transition from an A/A mindset to A/G and SACT. Good job maintaining sight throughout the courses and operating on timeline.</td>
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<td>5. Tactical Execution</td>
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<td>Solid improvement on each run and multiple good learning points for 1st Lt Resiland. Continue to stay in the books. What I appreciate during this event and during the previous event that I did with (D) (3) (A) is that he listens to the instruction and incorporates it from run to run. Keep doing that.</td>
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<td>6. TCC</td>
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<td>We talked about it a lot and one thing I want you to focus on is understanding SACT deconfliction. Being loaded to get the comm out and adjust racors as appropriate to maximize your ability to defend. You can take the supporting and engaged fighter roles and apply it to multiple different skill sets.</td>
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<td>7. Debrief</td>
<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>8. Mission Performance Standards</td>
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<tr>
<td>a) Adhere to WASP delivery parameters and TACSOP valid delivery criteria.</td>
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<td>b) Adhere to tactical abort parameters and safe escape maneuvers.</td>
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<td>c) Correctly assess the threat based upon the briefed scenario and aircraft system cueing.</td>
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<td>9. Administrative flight requirement (if required).</td>
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**REMARKS**

Mission was to conduct SACT and treat the event as an actual Air Interdiction.

Two pre-planned targets on locations at Iwakuni with a co-located SAM site.

---

**DND** - Not applicable or not observed.

**UNSAT** - Unsafe or complete lack of ability and/or knowledge. Requires substantial input from the instructor for safe execution and/or mission accomplishment.

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3 - Correct. Efficient, skillful, and without hesitation. Requires minimal input from the instructor.

4* - Unusually high degree of ability. Requires no input from the instructor.

*Mandatory comments in remarks section for items scored at this level.
## F/A-18 AVIATION TRAINING FORM

### AS-2304: MED/LOW ANGLE SGL/SEC POP (GP/STRAFE)

**STUDENT:** (b) (3) (A), (b) (6)  
**FLIGHT POSITION:** Dash 2  
**CREW POSITION:** Pilot  
**INSTRUCTOR:** (b) (3) (A), (b) (6)  
**DATE:** 9 JUN 2017  
**PASS:** X  
**INCOMPLETE:**  
**REPLY:**  

### ITEM | DND | Unsatisfactory | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | REMARKS
--- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | ---
1. Mission Preparation | | | | | | |  
2. Brief | | | | | | |  
3. Admin | | | | | | |  
4. TacAdmin | | | | | | |  
5. Tactical Execution | | | | | | |  
6. TCC | | | | | | |  
7. Debrief | | | | | | |  
8. Mission Performance Standards | | | | | | |  
  a) Adhere to WASP delivery parameters and TACSTOP valid delivery criteria. | | | | | | |  
  b) Adhere to tactical abort parameters, when applicable. | | | | | | |  
9. Administrative flight requirement (If required). | | | | | | |  

### REMARKS

- **AS 2304.** Strafe attacks + Section pops conducted into the R-247.

Admin: Standard departure out of YPDN. Conducted a section take off with a climb out to FL240, -2 cleared for weapons checks on the climb out. No issues on the transit out to the area. RTB is standard coming in for the initial and pitch.

TacAdmin: -2 will check in negative LPCD. Complete the G warm and begin set up for the strafe pattern. On the fence out -2 will be a bit far from lead and take a moment to join up. No issues for the BDA.

Conduct: In total will conduct 3x gun strafe runs, 2x15 degree roll-ins and 2x15 degree section pops. First strafe will begin up at altitude. Good ASL and piper placement. Overall good parameters but will be slow on the airspeed. Will transition to the published Z for the next two gun strafes. Again, overall good parameters but will be slow on the airspeed.

To fix this make sure to keep a good scan flowing. While bunting from higher altitudes it may be necessary to bring the throttles to idle, but from the altitudes we were working with about midrange would have set you up for success.

Following the completion of the gun strafes the flight will transition to the 15 degree roll-ins as a solo. Good improvement on your pull to the ASL. Had better tracking time and ASL placement than previous events, will still find yourself working the slightly shallow wire. Still refining the overall mech. Continue to refine your scan.

Moving onto the section pops. Good job setting up and voicing LAT checks. Form was good but continue (based on your comfort level) to work it down to 500ft. As it was you were maintaining the 600-800ft range. Good work performing the jet and being where you need to be to make the attacks work and be on timeline. Don't forget the "pooping" comm. On the first pop pulled a bit too aggressive on the climb out and just barely missed the airspeed by a few knots. On the second run good job correcting the mistake made on the first pop.

Overall another safe flight for Capt Resiland and good basic procedures on the conduct. Proficiency will come with more experience. Conducted a tape debrief and validated each run. PRESS

---

Signed by (b) (3) (A), (b) (6)

---

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<td>8. Mission Performance Standards</td>
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<td>a) Adhere to WASP delivery parameters and TOPGUN valid delivery criteria.</td>
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<td>b) Recognize errors in delivery techniques and makes corrections.</td>
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<td>c) Adhere to tactical abort parameters.</td>
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**REMARKS**

Departed out of Darwin Australia to conduct High and Medium angle attacks in the R-247 as a section.

**REMARKS**

Admin: Section Go departure out of Darwin (b) (3) (A), maintained a good parade position rolling the down the runway and during takeoff. Passing about 5k (b) (3) (A), began to slowly slide aft. To fix this keep in mind that with both aircraft heavy any slight changes in power will make it harder to catch back up. Also realize that once the takeoff is completed you do not need to maintain the exact same altitude, use that geometry to your advantage.

Beginning descent into the area from FL240 to 15, (b) (3) (A) would flush out slightly in front of lead. Again don't have to be on the exact same altitude. Make it work for you. No issues maintain spread or tac wing. RTB uneventful with a fan break back at YFON.

Tac Admin: On 10k checks make sure to roger up fuel as well. Didn't say it on the first comm call but quickly corrected. Make sure to roger up fuel state for Joker fuel as well if lead calls it first.

Conduct: Completed 7 runs on a small set of buildings located in the southern R-247. 3x45 degree and 4x30 degree. Overall trend was to work a wide pattern and not pulling far enough to the target. Good 135 degree overbank and initial pull to the target but still unloading just a bit too soon. Careful to not let your velocity vector drift up when coming down the chute. Good work adding in your heading to the "IN" call.

Overall (b) (3) (A) conducted a safe evolution for his second flight in the squadron. Conducted a tape debrief and went through A/G validation for each drop. Continue to work on your mech and review CCIP modes.

Good flight for Guano. Press!

---

**Date:** 6/7/2017

**Instructor Sign:** (b) (3) (A), (b) (6)

Signed by: (b) (3) (A), (b) (6)

**DND - Not applicable or not observed.**

**UNSAT** - Unsafe or complete lack of ability and/or knowledge. Requires substantial input from the instructor for safe execution and/or mission accomplishment.

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<td>(A), (b)</td>
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<td>AA 2508 2V2 OR 2V2 SEM/TAP THE CAP</td>
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<td>LAT 2603 SEC LAT</td>
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## F/A-18 AVIATION TRAINING FORM

**NAVMC 3500.50B, F/A-18 T&R MANUAL (26 JUN 2012)**

**AR-3202: DAY AR**

**STUDENT:**

**INSTRUCTOR: wrongful content**

**FLIGHT POSITION:** Dash 2

**CREW POSITION:** Pilot

**DATE:** 26 AUG 2017

**PASS:** X  **INCOMPLETE:**  **REPLY:**

### REMARKS

**Day AR conducted in the MEUEX CTA. SCAR platform provided by Slasher 01.**

**Instructor Comments:** (*4*) The safety of flight referred to on the right requires attention. In the debrief, Resiard was queried on why he was on the same altitude as lead. The response was that he heard lead tell him to be on 6000' and that lead was taking 5,500'. After later reviewing the tapes, it was very clear that lead assigned himself to 6,000', meaning that wing SHOULD NOT be on 6,000'. The biggest "other" here is the fact that wing mis-heard a clear comm call from lead. There is no way to remedy this in flight, as wing was confident that he was doing the right thing despite a clear gameplan passed from lead. That is why it is very unsafe. If there is "confusion" that can be remedied by fessing up and re-gaining deconfliction. But being confident that you heard something that was never said does not permit follow-on clarification and could ultimately result in a mid-air collision. The biggest take-away here is to improve your active listening. This event is complete for tactical execution, but make sure you focus on sound TACADMIN procedures (safe holding) in future events.

**9/14/2017**

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<tr>
<th>ITEM</th>
<th>DND</th>
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<th>REMARKS</th>
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<td>1. Mission Preparation</td>
<td>X</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>Brief:</td>
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<tr>
<td>2. Brief</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Standard SCAR brief.</td>
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<tr>
<td>3. Admin</td>
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<td>4. TacAdmin</td>
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<td>5. Tactical Execution</td>
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<td>6. TCC</td>
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<td>7. Debrief</td>
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<td>8. Mission Performance Standards</td>
<td>X</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Conduct:</td>
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<tr>
<td>a) Conduct visual and sensor reconnaissance of assigned area and detect targets.</td>
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<td>Starting to hold overhead Lead will hold at 6k and direct dash 2 to hold at 6.5 or above. This will go misunderstood on Dash 2's part and wingman will also hold at 6k. Each aircraft takes a 50 degree offset from each other to aide in sensor tasking. Later on in the flight it will become noticed that both aircraft are on the same altitude. Wingman will push the nose low to create a safe pass. (Instructor Comment: when I asked you what altitude you were at, you responded with &quot;6,000&quot;. That was before you saw me, and it was later observed that we were actually at 5,700' which was out of our range space. In addition to poor CAS holding procedures by violating the stack assignment from the JTAC, this also could have resulted in a flight violation if it had been a trend. My assessment of the nearly co-altitude pass was that you were not visual until I had crossed your flight path within about 2,000'... that is dangerous). Reset the holding altitudes and continued with the mission.</td>
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<tr>
<td>b) Employ appropriate weapon and tactics for threat and target type.</td>
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<tr>
<td>c) Minimize threat exposure and perform appropriate threat counteractics.</td>
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<tr>
<td>d) Adhere to WASP delivery parameters and TACSOOP valid delivery criteria.</td>
<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>9. Administrative flight requirement (if required).</td>
<td>X</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**Signed by**

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6)
**F/A-18 AVIATION TRAINING FORM**
**NAVMC 3500.50B, F/A-18 T&R MANUAL (26 JUN 2012)**
**CAS-3106: NIGHT CAS**

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<td>a) Comply with JCAS TTPs</td>
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<td>b) Comply with tactical abort parameters</td>
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<td>c) Adhere to WASP delivery parameters and TAC SOP valid delivery criteria</td>
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<tr>
<td>d) Execute appropriate threat counter tactics</td>
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<td>e) Execute proper JCAS comm</td>
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<td>f) TOT +/- 15 secs</td>
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<td>g) Achieve effects on target or weapon impact within CEP</td>
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<tr>
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**REMARKS**
Conducted Night CAS in the MEUEX CTA.

**Instructor Comments:** Concur with the assessment to the right. Despite being NS complete, continue to focus on the differences of operating at night, vice during the day. As was emphasized in the brief and de-brief, first prioritize survivability. With safe deconfliction established you will be able to shift the predominance of your focus to tactical execution. Nice work. The join buffoonery is not desired, but as long as you are safe, improvement will come with experience.

**Brief:**
Standard CAS brief. Already experienced with area operating in same location earlier in the day. Discussed night considerations when using NVGs in a night urban cas environment.

**Admin:**
Night Section Go departure out of ROON towards the MEUEX CTA. Good position keeping on the departure. On the RTB dash 2 will end up a few miles behind lead heading back to ROON. Wingman will attempt to get aboard too quickly and miss a call from lead saying that he is slowing to 250kts. This ends up in the wingman zooming past lead and having to take a cut away to slow down. This puts wingman further from lead and will have to follow lead in for the arrival to ROON. Too much of a tight turn to final for dash 2 and vice severely wrapping up the turn dash 2 will elect to go around and come back for a second try. Keys for improvement include understanding that under NVGs you have poor depth perception. This makes judging closure difficult. Also do not be in a hurry to execute the rejoin. Half the speed and twice the caution when flying at night.

**TacAdmin:**
No G-warm due to quick entry into the area. Would skip BDA checks for reasons mentioned above.

**Conduct:**
Entered into the overhead block 6-9k. Conducted two deliveries.

1. Type II BGC, 1xGBU-38. Wingman will receive a target that is between two buildings. Due to cloud coverage and line of sight acquisition of said target would be prove to be difficult. Continuous talk on would finally see dash two captured.

2. Type II BOT. 1xGBU-12. Lead and wingman will remain in the overhead to find the targets. Better comm here on the push-pull of information and would lead to a quick correlation for a GBU-12 weapon release with dash 2 following in 1 min spacing.

**Debrief:**
Overall good work maintaining de-confliction and plotting all your targets. Continue to practice not giving read backs until you have plotted the coordinate.

3/14/2017

X [b (3) (A), (b) (6)]

Instructor Sign

**DND - Not UnsAT**: 
1 - Safe but limited proficiency. Requires frequent input from the instructor.
2 - Correct. Recognizes and corrects errors. Requires occasional input from the instructor.
3 - Correct. Efficient, skillful, and without hesitation. Requires minimal input from the instructor.
4* - Unusually high degree of ability. Requires no input from the instructor.

*Mandatory comments in remarks section for items scored at this level.

[b (3) (A), (b) (6)]

**CAS-3106: NIGHT CAS**
82
F/A-18 AVIATION TRAINING FORM
NAVMC 3500.50B, F/A-18 T&R MANUAL (26 JUN 2012)
SAS-2302: MED/LOW ANGLE SGL/SEC POP/DIVE(GP(HIGH DRAG) /ROCKETS/STRAFE) SIM

STUDENT: (D) (3) (A), (b) (6)
FLIGHT POSITION: Bat 2
CREW POSITION: Pilot

INSTRUCTOR: (D) (3) (A), (b)
DATE: 25 May 2017

PASS: X INCOMPLETE: □ REFY: □

ITEM DND D1 D2 D3 D4 REMARKS
1. Mission Preparation X
2. Brief X
3. Admin X
4. TacAdmin X
5. Tactical Execution X
6. TCC X
7. Debrief X
8. Mission Performance Standards
   a) Adhere to WASP delivery parameters and TOPGLN valid delivery criteria. X
   b) Maintain briefed formation, visual mutual support, and achieve briefed attack separation via timing. X
   c) Adhere to tactical abort parameters. X
9. Administrative flight requirement (if required).

REMARKS
Mission to conduct low ingress pop attacks.
Conducted 13 deliveries as a single ship and 3 deliveries as a section.

Brief: Good brief. (D) (3) (A) showed up prepared with the appropriate products. Went down to comm/nav for a quick lecture on how to load comm 1 crypto.

Admin: Started on deck at 1000, engines running. Worked through how to set up comm crypto. Standard departure out to the R-567. Remember to do a good cockpit sweep as the wing tank switch was set to off.

TacAdmin: Tack each sim as an actual flight so don’t forget to conduct a G-warm and turn on the RWR gear. Use your LDDI as your working DDI. Do not forget to audible LAT checks complete.

Conduct: Target was the North Dam in the R-567. Good job working down towards the terrain and making the appropriate corrections when the RADALT went off.

(D) (3) (A) showed an improving trend on each run. Good work listening and applying the critiques discussed on each run. Trend was to pull through the ASL and to also have a shallow off set angle. Good job making corrections and executing a dive tos when necessary but continue to work on setting that correct off set angle the first time. Towards the later runs there would be improvement in this area. 13 runs as a solo.

Don’t forget to put in the altitude for your target! For the sections pops, nice work maintaining sight and fixing your position. The first two section pops will be detached (D) (3) (A) would be told to action and didn’t quite hit 90 for the abeam, still able to employ weapons and execute the off target rendezvous. On the second run (D) (3) (A) would action on his own and set the appropriate beam angle for an overall better run.

The final run would be an attached pop. Again, good work maintaining formation.Lots to start the pop but would make some corrections to still allow for safe employment of weapons.

Over all (D) (3) (A) showed an improving trend through the sim. Receptive to critiques and did well applying said critiques on each run. Good job listening to the instruction and applying it from run to run. Keep studying and keep refining the Admin and TacAdmin.

(D) (3) (A)
**F/A-18 AVIATION TRAINING FORM**
NAVMC 3500.50B, F/A-18 T&R MANUAL (26 JUN 2012)
SAS-2301: HI/MED/LOW ANGLE DIVE (GP(LOW DRAG)/CBU) SIM

**STUDENT:** (b) (3) (A), (b) (6)
**FLIGHT POSITION:** Single
**CREW POSITION:** Pilot
**INSTRUCTOR:** (b) (3) (A), (b) (6)
**DATE:** 24 May 2017

**PASS:** X  **INCOMPLETE:** □  **REFLY:** □

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<tr>
<td>1. Mission Preparation</td>
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<td>The key to fixing all of these variations is how to work on having a consistent good start. When (b) (3) (A), did have good starts the parameters and effects worked out well. It is when you are constantly making corrections is when you would see the no drops. Working on the gun strafe took more fine tuning. Debrief real time about the hot gun scenario. It would take (b) (3) (A) a few passes to get accustomed the gun strafe. Nail your heading on the diamond and begin your push over and maintain that constant bunt. Position the reticule to the diamond and check your parameters to make sure everything is valid. Arm up only when the gun is pointed at the deck. Overall a good sim to knock off a lot of rust for (b) (3) (A). Continue to study and learn from each event. Maintain a positive mental attitude and take the lessons learned and apply it to the next event. Press. Instructor Comments: Nice assessment of the learning objectives.</td>
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<td>2. Brief</td>
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<td>Basic Circle the wagon flight to knock off rust and get reacquainted with the A/G environment.</td>
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<td>3. Admin</td>
<td>X</td>
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<td>Brief: Standard</td>
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<td>4. Tact Adm</td>
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<td>Admin: Standard departure out to the R657. Introduction to the targeting pod. See 2101 gradsheet for further details</td>
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<td>5. Tactical Execution</td>
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<td>Tact: Adm: Start off with a spacer pass over the Prison. Would conduct 11 roll ins followed by multiple gun strafes. Over a (b) (3) (A) is working to get accustomed to the pattern. Remember that the Z diagram will be written in AGL and you must do the mental math to compensate for target elevation. This will cause (b) (3) (A) to fly low on the initial two passes. Trends included pulling through the ASI, high airspeed and variations in the pattern work. Don't wait until the velocity vector is on the ASI to begin your roll. Start right before and that should alleviate the constant corrections.</td>
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<td>6. FCC</td>
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<td>Keep your airspeed in the scan. Would fly the Z diagram depicted airspeed around the pattern but realize that is putting you fast coming down the chute. Keep the HSI in your scan as well to ensure you are not getting too wide or too tight on the pattern. Good work ripping at the same distance each time but that angle in relation to the run in had too much variation causing you to do more work to correct and have less tracking time.</td>
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<td>7. Debrief</td>
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<td>8. Mission Performance Standards</td>
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<td>a) Adhere to WSP delivery parameters and TACSSP valid delivery criteria</td>
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<td>b) Recognize errors in delivery techniques and makes corrections</td>
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<td>c) Adhere to tactical abort parameters</td>
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<td>9. Administrative flight requirement (if required)</td>
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DND - Not applicable or not observed.
UNSAT* - Unsafe or incomplete lack of ability and/or knowledge. Requires substantial input from the instructor for safe execution and/or mission accomplishment.
1 - Safe but limited proficiency. Requires frequent input from the instructor.
2 - Correct. Recognizes and corrects errors. Requires occasional input from the instructor.
3 - Correct. Efficient, skillful, and without hesitation. Requires minimal input from the instructor.
4* - Unusually high degree of ability. Requires no input from the instructor.
* Mandatory comments in remarks section for items scored at this level.

SAS-2301: HI/MED/LOW ANGLE DIVE (GP(LOW DRAG)/CBU) SIM
**ITEM** | **DND** | **Unsat** | **1** | **2** | **3** | **4** | **REMARKS**
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---
1. Mission Preparation | X | X |  |
2. Brief | X |  |
3. Admin | X |  |
4. TacAdmin | X |  |
5. Tactical Execution |  |
6. TCC |  |
7. Debrief | X |  |
8. Mission Performance Standards | X |  |
a. Adhere to USMC FA-18 ADMIN SOP. | X |  |
b. Adhere to Air-to-Air Refueling Manual. | X |  |
c. Execute safe rendezvous procedures. | X |  |
d. Use proper communications procedures. | X |  |
e. From a stabilized position, successfully engage the basket expeditiously. | X |  |
f. Respond quickly and safely to all communications and communication out signals from the tanker aircraft. | X |  |
9. Administrative flight requirement (if required). | X |  |

**REMARKS**
Conducting night A/A and A/G events in the R-225. Mid mission tanking provided by C-130. 1 night plug.

7/19/2017

**Instructor Comments:** Nice work.

Tanking:
Good work being smooth and expeditious on the night tanking. Would drop back a little too far prior to getting into position behind the basket but this will improve with experience. Good procedures and comm.

**Signed by:** (b) (3) (A), (b) (6)
F/A-18 AVIATION TRAINING FORM
NAVMC 3500.50B, F/A-18 T&R MANUAL (26 JUN 2012)
AAR-2201: DAY AAR

STUDENT: (b) (3) (A), (b) (6)
FLIGHT POSITION: Dash 2
CREW POSITION: Pilot
INSTRUCTOR: (b) (3) (A), (b) (6)
DATE: 21 JUN 2017
PASS: X INCOMPLETE: □ REF: □

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<tr>
<td>2. Brief</td>
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<td>8. Mission Performance Standards</td>
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<td>a) Adhere to USMC FA-18 ADMIN SOP.</td>
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<td>b) Adhere to Air-to-Air Refueling Manual.</td>
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<td>c) Execute safe rendezvous procedures.</td>
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<td>d) Use proper communications procedures.</td>
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<td>e) From a stabilized position, successfully engage the basket expeditiously.</td>
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<td>f) Respond quickly and safely to all communications and communication out signals from the tanker aircraft.</td>
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<td>9. Administrative flight requirement (if required).</td>
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</table>

REMARKS

Tanking:
Good job being smooth and expeditious getting into the basket. It helped with managing the timeline for the LFE. Work on not sliding so far back from the hose as it will only take up more time slowly sliding forward. Once you have more experience you will be able to position yourself closer to the hose and start from there.

Instructor Comments: Real nice job on the tanker. Always remember to remain calm when behind the basket. Everyone gets the "tanker blues" at some point, so don’t ever let a bad day on the tanker effect your confidence. For this evolution, real nice job being safe and expeditious.

REMARKS
Conduct two ship red air in support of larger Australian force exercise. Conducted pre-mission tanking on an RAAF KC-30. Conducted one plug.

DND - Not applicable or not observed.
UNSAT* - Unsafe or complete lack of ability and/or knowledge. Requires substantial input from the instructor for safe execution and/or mission accomplishment.
1 - Safe but limited proficiency. Requires frequent input from the instructor.
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3 - Correct. Efficient, skillful, and without hesitation. Requires minimal input from the instructor.
4* - Unusually high degree of ability. Requires no input from the instructor.
* Mandatory comments in remarks section for items scored at this level.

Signed by: (b) (3) (A), (b) (6)

Instructor Sign: (b) (3) (A), (b) (6)

7/19/2017
**F/A-18 AVIATION TRAINING FORM**

**NAVMC 3500.50B, F/A-18 T&R MANUAL (26 JUN 2012)**

**SFAM-2101: EP SIM**

**STUDENT:** [Box] (b) (3) (A), (b) (6)

**FLIGHT POSITION:** Single

**CREW POSITION:** Pilot

**INSTRUCTOR:** [Box] (b) (3) (A), (b) (6)

**DATE:** 24 May 2017

**PASS:** [X]

**REMARKS**

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<td>8. Mission Performance Standards</td>
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<tr>
<td>a) Execute the correct NATOPS immediate action and troubleshooting procedures</td>
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<td>b) Make appropriate flight leadership decisions</td>
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<td>9. Administrative flight requirement (if required)</td>
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</table>

**REMARKS**

First sim for (b) (3) (A). Goal was to knock off the rust from being out of the cockpit and an introduction towards the local area and TCC.

Brief: Standard

Admin: Would be on deck engines running. Brief overview of what is accomplished in the cockpit by the pilot and wso. Introduced to comm checks both in the clear and secure.

Standard instrument clearance out of Iwakuni into the R567. No issues on the taxi, takeoff, and departure. Good work handling the EPs.

Press.

**Instructor Comments:** Nothing additional to add. Welcome to the squadron, it's going to be a blast.

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1. Safe but limited proficiency. Requires frequent input from the instructor.

2. Correct. Recognizes and corrects errors. Requires occasional input from the instructor.

3. Correct. Efficient, skillful, and without hesitation. Requires minimal input from the instructor.

4. Unusually high degree of ability. Requires no input from the instructor.

*Mandatory comments in remarks section for items scored at this level.*

---

82
F/A-18 AVIATION TRAINING FORM  
NAVMC 3500.50B, F/A-18 T&R MANUAL (26 JUN 2012)  
SOAAW-3603: SCREEN / CLOSE ESCORT SIM

STUDENT: (b) (3) (A), (b)  
FLIGHT POSITION: -4  
CREW POSITION: Pilot  
INSTRUCTOR: (b) (3) (A), (b)  
DATE: 2 DEC 2017  

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<td>Used New Common Timeline</td>
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<td>Admin and Tac Admin- Sim Standard</td>
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<td>4. TacAdmin</td>
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<td>Run 1:</td>
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<td>6. TCC</td>
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<td>-Time Line adherence on Skate Flow</td>
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<td>7. Debrief</td>
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<td>-POD Mech</td>
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<td>8. Mission Performance Standards</td>
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<td>-radar mech</td>
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<tr>
<td>a) Maintain mutual support.</td>
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<td>Run 2:</td>
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<tr>
<td>b) Execute proper radar mechanics.</td>
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<td>-Time Line</td>
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<td>c) Target as directed.</td>
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<td>-3D geometry</td>
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<tr>
<td>d) Recognize threat tactics.</td>
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<td>-How to solve offboard for a PHID</td>
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<tr>
<td>e) Take valid shots.</td>
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<td>Overall improving trends as the sim det progresses.</td>
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<tr>
<td>f) Timeline awareness.</td>
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<td>See grade sheet for SAAM 3401.</td>
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<td>g) Tactical decision making IAW mission objectives.</td>
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<td>9. Administrative flight requirement (if required).</td>
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**REMARKS**

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4* - Unusually high degree of ability. Requires no input from the instructor.
*Mandatory comments in remarks section for items scored at this level. 

X

Instructor Sign
### F/A-18 AVIATION TRAINING FORM

**STUDENT:** [b] (3) (A), (b) [A]

**FLIGHT POSITION:** 4

**CREW POSITION:** PILOT

**INSTRUCTOR:** [b] (3) (A), (b) [A]

**DATE:** 1 DEC 2017

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<td>8. Mission Performance Standards</td>
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<tr>
<td>a) Execute proper radar mechanics.</td>
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<td>b) Target as directed.</td>
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<td>c) Recognize threat tactics.</td>
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<td>d) Take valid shots.</td>
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<td>e) Timeline awareness.</td>
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**REMARKS**

Run 1:
- Time Line adherence on Skate Flow
- POD Mech: QA, ensure L&S is boxed, get a FLIR Track and use your A/A Pod Bold Face
- Good radar mech used techniques discussed to get radar SA at range.

Run 2: S-G Hostile
- Create an L&S on the PPU at Redec Range/Call
- Time Line adherence on Short Skate Flow
- Check Shot Doc based on Flow and Targeting

Overall improving trends as the sim det progresses.

see grade sheet for SAAE-3401.

---

**REMARKS**

NXN Sim Det

Used new Common Timeline

Admin and Tac Admin - Sim Standard

---

**X**

Instructor Sign

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3 - Correct. Efficient, skillful, and without hesitation. Requires minimal input from the instructor.

4* - Unusually high degree of ability. Requires no input from the instructor.

*Mandatory comments in remarks section for items scored at this level.
**F/A-18 AVIATION TRAINING FORM**

**NAVMC 3500.50C, F/A-18 T&R MANUAL (5 APR 2016)**

SL: Admin/TacAdmin Brief

<table>
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<tr>
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<th>INSTRUCTOR: (b) (3) (A), (b) (6)</th>
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<tr>
<td>FLIGHT POSITION: N/A</td>
<td>DATE: 29 DEC 17</td>
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<td>CREW POSITION: N/A</td>
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**PASS: X  INCOMPLETE: ☐  REPLY: ☐**

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<tr>
<td>1. Mission Preparation</td>
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<td>Admin:</td>
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<td>2. Brief</td>
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<td>- Started 19 seconds late. Make sure your watch is up to date.</td>
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<td>3. Admin</td>
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<td>- For a new pilot/wso joining the squadron make sure to brief more in depth on combat systems.</td>
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<td>4. TacAdmin</td>
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<td>- Talked about techniques for marker set up</td>
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<td>5. Tactical Execution</td>
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<td>- Don’t need to start the brief as formal as you did. Quick intro into what everyone will be doing will suffice.</td>
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<td>6. TCC</td>
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<td>- Don’t forget to brief weather for the divert fields</td>
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<td>7. Debrief</td>
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<td>- Spent a bit too much time talking about the timeline. Something as simple as &quot;walk as required to start APU on time&quot;</td>
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<td>8. Mission Performance Standards</td>
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<td>- Leave waypoints 1-10 open</td>
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<tr>
<td>9. Administrative flight requirement (if required).</td>
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<td>- Draw arrows on the board and use it to your advantage.</td>
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**REMARKS**

Practiced Admin/TacAdmin briefing.

**TacAdmin:**

- Leverage what is standard and talk about what is not.
- Go more in depth on combat systems such as MIOS, CIT, DCS
- More in depth on secure commis
- Discussed techniques for briefing TacAdmin and how to improve.
- A bit out of order on the Fence out comm in regards to doing a battle damage assessment.
- Think about the event prior and know what you need to cover and what can be standard.

Overall average brief. Room for improvement in a lot of areas but making steady improvements.

---

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4** - Unusually high degree of ability. Requires no input from the instructor.

*Mandatory comments in remarks section for items scored at this level.*

---

SRQD-6110: FCF SIM
### F/A-18 AVIATION TRAINING FORM

**NAVMC 3500.50B, F/A-18 T&R MANUAL (26 JUN 2012)**

**LFE-4601: DAY LFE**

**STUDENT:** [Redacted]

**FLIGHT POSITION:** Dash 2

**CREW POSITION:** Pilot

**INSTRUCTOR:** [Redacted]

**DATE:** 21 JUN 2017

**PASS:** ✗  **INCOMPLETE:**  **REPLY:** □

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<td>4. TacAdmin</td>
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<td>5. Tactical Execution</td>
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<td>7. Debrief</td>
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<tr>
<td>a) Effectively integrate into the LFE package</td>
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<tr>
<td>9. Administrative flight requirement (if required)</td>
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**REMARKS**

Conduct two ship red air in order to support larger Australian force exercises.

Brief: Conducted a red air brief at local squadron spaces followed by a crew brief back at the squadron spaces.

Admin: Conducted a section take off out of YPDN for a standard departure out to the LFE airspace. Set up for the rendezvous with the KC-30.

Good job being smooth and expeditious getting into the basket. It helped with managing the timeline for the LFE event. Work on not sliding so far back from the hose as it will only take up more time slowly sliding forward. Once you have more experience you will be able to position yourself closer to the hose.


Conduct: Begin the VUL as a two ship in support of other red air in the area. Throughout the flight good work maintaining VMS when applicable and staying in your block at all times.

This is the [Redacted]'s first experience as a red air and also first experience participating in an LFE. A lot of learning and exposure occurred on this event. Crew coordination managing common and fuel management aided in maintaining situational awareness.

Good work hanging on and remain in the books. Press.

**INSTRUCTOR COMMENTS**

**GREAT JOB ON THE TANKER.**

**WHENEVER YOU'RE RED AIR ALWAYS FOCUS ON HOW YOU CAN BEST FACILITATE BLUE AIR ACHIEVING THEIR TRAINING OBJECTIVES.**

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**DND** - Not applicable or not observed.

**UNSAT** - Unsafe or complete lack of ability and/or knowledge. Requires substantial input from the instructor for safe execution and/or mission accomplishment.

1 - Safe but limited proficiency. Requires frequent input from the instructor.

2 - Correct. Recognizes and corrects errors. Requires occasional input from the instructor.

3 - Correct. Efficient, skillful, and without hesitation. Requires minimal input from the instructor.

4 - *Unusually high degree of ability. Requires no input from the instructor.

*Mandatory comments in remarks section for items scored at this level.*
## F/A-18 AVIATION TRAINING FORM

**NAVMC 3500.50B, F/A-18 T&R MANUAL (26 JUN 2012)**  
**SAI-3703: MED ALT AI**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>STUDENT:</th>
<th>(D) (3) (A), (B) (6)</th>
<th>INSTRUCTOR:</th>
<th>(D) (3) (A).</th>
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<tr>
<td>FLIGHT POSITION:</td>
<td>Pilot</td>
<td>DATE:</td>
<td>10 AUG 2017</td>
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<tr>
<td>CREW POSITION:</td>
<td>Dash 2</td>
<td>PASS:</td>
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### ITEM | DND | Insat | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | REMARKS
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---
1. Mission Preparation | X | |
2. Brief | X | |
3. Admin | X | |
4. TacAdmin | X | |
5. Tactical Execution | X | |
6. TCC | X | |
7. Debrief | X | |
8. Mission Performance Standards | X | |
a) Recognize and react appropriately to threats. | X | |
b) Adhere to planned air-to-air/air-to-ground timeline and target area tactics. | X | |
c) Deliver weapons on planned DPI. | X | |
d) Adhere to WASP delivery parameters and TAC SOPS valid delivery criteria. | X | |
e) Take valid shots. | X | |
9. Administrative flight requirement (if required). | X | |

### REMARKS

SAI 3703. Conducted as a two-ship. Overall, average event.

Brief: Standard

Admin: Started the sim on deck. Working full system set up as single seat. Standard 10 sec go departure into the running join. No an issue today but realize during actual operations there will be extensive comm chatter. Continue to be an active listener on the comms.

TacAdmin: Standard expendable checks. Continuing with routing towards pre-planned targets. Check qual just means check your JDAM health. Don’t forget to double check your radar set up and sanitize the airspace per the threat.

Conduct:

Following ‘Attack’ call flight will switch to A/G mode. A brief recc of the target on the pod prior to releasing ordnance. Lead will call in Zone but dash 2 will not have an in Zone indication. The reason for this is due to the target coordinates being inputted into the Launch Point vice the Target. This will go unnoticed by dash 2 pilot. Learning point here is to QA your system thoroughly beforehand because as when things get more dynamic and hectic it will not be easier. As you get more experience and repetitions the easier this will become.

Following the A/G mission the flight will find a radar picture and execute SSK flow. Good work taking all valid air to air shots. Good sort and mech. Continue to work on the comm. Strive to shoot, and say the comm as you are executing your out. On the pitch in, good work again taking shots. Dash 2 will be untargeted and will proceed to the merge. Radar picture will be clean.

Debrief:

Conducted a tape debrief to assess lessons learned and keys for improvement. Biggest take away is properly checking your JDAM. The entire flight went smooth just clean that part up and you will be solid. Continue to stay in the books and maintain a good attitude.

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*Mandatory comments in remarks section for items scored at this level.

SAI-3703: MED ALT AI
### F/A-18 AVIATION TRAINING FORM
#### NAVMC 3500.50B, F/A-18 T&R MANUAL (26 JUN 2012)
#### AI-3702: LOW ALT AI

**STUDENT:** (b) (3) (A), (b) (6)  
**FLIGHT POSITION:** Dash 2  
**CREW POSITION:** Pilot  
**INSTRUCTOR:** (b) (3) (A), (b) (6)  
**DATE:** 16 AUG 2017  
**PASS:** X  
**INCOMPLETE:**  
**REPLY:**  

**ITEM** | DND | Unsat | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | **REMARKS**  
--- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |  
1. Mission Preparation | X |  
2. Brief | X |  
3. Admin | X |  
4. TacAdmin | X |  
5. Tactical Execution | X |  
6. TCC |  
7. Debrief | X |  
8. Mission Performance Standards | X |  
9. Administrative flight requirement if required | X |  

**REMARKS**

- **Conduct:** Entered into the ITRA and began climb up to FL30. Asking AIC for picture calls. AIC responded clean and formation began looking low to cover the blind zone. Dash 2 will have a brick pop up at 7k ft that will go unnoticed until the last minute, at which point could not regain radar SA. Keys to fix this involve developing a good scan. Understand that you are eyes out flying form but remember to repeatedly glance at your Radar. When you see that brick place your cursor over it and begin your counter deceptive meld. Once that is complete call it out and have AIC declare the group.

- **Flight:** Flight will proceed into the attack phase. Continue to work on your JDAM validation. Complete it on the ODI that is recording first. Valid sim JDAM employment from both aircraft.

- **Coming off target:** The flight will receive a pop up group call with the bandit being low and climbing near the wingman’s position. Dash 2 attempts to gain tally and will be unsuccessful. A lot happening quick but remain within your block. Discussed in the debrief about what you would do real world if you come to a merge low SA.

- **Section:** Will begin to flow cold with the bandit returning to the east. Flight will turn back in to set up for another presentation but lack of time on range space would not allow this.

- **Debrief:** Debriefed with Red Air and conducted a white board debrief. Tape debrief conducted after to assess key learning points and ways for improvement. Over all mission success with the C3 nodes being destroyed. Continue to work on using your radar to gain SA and continue to practice your JDAM val.

- **Instructor Comments:** Not awesome performance from anybody on this fight. Overall, we did not employ any AMRAAM. The red air presentation was challenging, and they got the best of both of us. Agree with the comments above. Nice admin and tacadmin from -2. Overall, average for -2, below average for -1.

9/14/2017

**Instructor Sign**

**DND - Not Signed by** (b) (3) (A), (b) (6)  
**UNSAT* - Unsafe or complete lack of ability and/or knowledge. Requires substantial input from the instructor for safe execution and/or mission accomplishment.**  
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*Mandatory comments in remarks section for items scored at this level.

**AI-3702: LOW ALT AI**
F/A-18 AVIATION TRAINING FORM
NAVMC 3500.50B, F/A-18 T&R MANUAL (26 JUN 2012)
SAI-3701: LOW ALT AI

STUDENT: (b) (3) (A), (b) INSTRUCTOR: (b) (3) (A), (b)
FLIGHT POSITION: -2 DATE: 29 Nov 2011
CREW POSITION: Pilot
PASS: □ INCOMPLETE: □ REFLY: □

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<td>c) Deliver weapons on planned DPI.</td>
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REMARKS

NXN Sim Det

Used New Common Timeline

Admin and Tac Admin- Sim Standard

Bombing Yuma AF in 8-2301 W

X

Instructor Sign

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*Sedimentary comments in remarks section for items scored at this level.
F/A-18 AVIATION TRAINING FORM
NAVMC 3500.50B, F/A-18 T&R MANUAL (26 JUN 2012)
AAD-3404: NIGHT DCA (AREA DEFENSE) W/ EA

STUDENT: (D) (3) (A), (D) (6) INSTRUCTOR: (D) (3) (A), (D) (6)
FLIGHT POSITION: -4 DATE: 2 DEC 2017
CREW POSITION: Pilot

PASS: ☐ INCOMPLETE: ☐ REPLY: ☐

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<td>d) Maintain visual/fluid mutual support.</td>
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<td>g) Timeline awareness.</td>
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<td>h) Tactical decision making in mission objectives.</td>
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REMARKS

NIK Sim Det
Used new Common Timeline
Admin and Tac Admin- Sim Standard

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F/A-18 AVIATION TRAINING FORM  
NAVMC 3500.50B, F/A-18 T&R MANUAL (26 JUN 2012)  
SAAD-3403: DCA (AREA DEFENSE) W/ EA  

**STUDENT:** (b) (3) (A), (b) (6)  
**FLIGHT POSITION:** 4  
**CREW POSITION:** Pilot  
**INSTRUCTOR:** (b) (3) (A), (b) (6)  
**DATE:** 2 DEC 2017  
**PASS:** ☐ **INCOMPLETE:** ☐ **REPLY:** ☐

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**REMARKS**  

NKX Sim Det  

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Admin and Tac Admin- Sim Standard

X  

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# F/A-18 Aviation Training Form

**NAVMC 3500.50B, F/A-18 T&R Manual (26 Jun 2012)**

**AAD-3402: DAY DCA (Area Defense)**

**StUDENT:** (b) (3) (A), (b) (6)

**Flight Position:** Dash 2

**Crew Position:** (b) (3) (A), (b) (6)

**Instructor:** (b) (3) (A), (b) (6)

**Date:** 10 April 2018

**Pass:** √  **Incomplete:** □  **Reply:** □

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<td>2. Brief</td>
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<td>- Keep practicing your briefing skills</td>
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<td>3. Admin</td>
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<td>- Don’t get Risk to Force / Risk to Mission backwards</td>
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<td>4. TacAdmin</td>
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<td>- Brief your audience</td>
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<td>5. Tactical Execution</td>
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<td>- Good TCC during conduct to attrite groups</td>
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<td>6. TCC</td>
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<td>- Good patient radar mech</td>
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<td>g) Timeline awareness.</td>
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<td>h) Tactical decision making IAW mission objectives.</td>
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<td>9. Administrative flight requirement (if required).</td>
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**Remarks**

Event Completed.
### Item 1: Mission Preparation
- DND: X
- UNSAT: 
- 1: 
- 2: 
- 3: 
- 4: 

**Remarks:**
Brief: Standard. Demonstrated how to plan HARM on JMPS.

### Item 2: Brief
- DND: X
- UNSAT: 
- 1: 
- 2: 
- 3: 
- 4: 

**Remarks:**
Admin: Working through issues with the sim to get everything up and running but would eventually get all three aircraft up and out towards the area.

### Item 3: Admin
- DND: 
- UNSAT: X
- 1: 
- 2: 
- 3: 
- 4: 

**Remarks:**
Followed checklist to get HARM appropriately set up on deck. No issues on the transit out to the area.

### Item 4: TacAdmin
- DND: 
- UNSAT: 
- 1: 
- 2: 
- 3: 
- 4: 

**Remarks:**
TacAdmin:
Conducted expendable checks and G warm. No issues.

### Item 5: Tactical Execution
- DND: 
- UNSAT: X
- 1: 
- 2: 
- 3: 
- 4: 

**Remarks:**
Conduct:
Manual threat loaded on deck, no issues.

### Item 6: TCC
- DND: 
- UNSAT: 
- 1: 
- 2: 
- 3: 
- 4: 

**Remarks:**
PB shots taken on appropriate system to provide SEAD window as briefed with Dash 3 detaching to manage his own timing per the game plan. Working through sim issues again to get the HARM working, mostly troubleshot getting HARM out of STBY. Would eventually get it and sorted and would see Dash 3 taking the first HARM shot one sec late per the brief. Good second shot as well. Brief was to take 4 PB shots on a 45° spacing maneuver profile, only two shots taken due to flight leadership.

### Item 7: Debrief
- DND: X
- UNSAT: 
- 1: 
- 2: 
- 3: 
- 4: 

**Remarks:**
Setting up TOO mode for the HARM would again see some issues with the sim. Flight would set up a counter-rotating CAP point. Lead will drive dash 3 around for a bit but would eventually get settled to have sensors constantly looking down range. TOO mode would finally work towards the end. This is [a] (b) (c) (d) (e) third sim of this event due to previous sim issues and the cumulative knowledge and practice with TOO is enough to complete.

### Item 8: Mission Performance Standards
- DND: 
- UNSAT: X
- 1: 
- 2: 
- 3: 
- 4: 

**Remarks:**
During the RTB the flight will have a pop up group declared by AIC. Dash 3 will not be targeted in but maintained formation and radar SA as per HSAGP.

### Item 9: Administrative flight requirement (if required)
- DND: X
- UNSAT: 
- 1: 
- 2: 
- 3: 
- 4: 

**Remarks:**
Overall working through a lot of sim technical issues but good learning in the employment of the HARM.

**INSTRUCTOR NOTES:**
Be more vocal if conduct is not being executed IAW the brief and tactfully inform lead if your sensors are working better than others. No rank in the cockpit!
F/A-18 AVIATION TRAINING FORM
NAVMC 3500.50B, F/A-18 T&R MANUAL (26 JUN 2012)
SSEAD-3501: SLAM-ER/JSOW SIM

STUDENT: (b) (3) (A), (b) (6)
FLIGHT POSITION: Dash 2
CREW POSITION: Pilot
INSTRUCTOR: (b) (3) (A), (b) (6)
DATE: 8 NOV 2017

PASS: ✗ INCOMPLETE: □ REFILL: □

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ITEM</th>
<th>DND</th>
<th>Uns.</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
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<th>4</th>
<th>REMARKS</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Mission Preparation</td>
<td>✗</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Brief: Standard. Demonstrated how to plan SLAM-ER on JMPS.</td>
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<td>2. Brief</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Admin: Working through issues with the sim to get everything up and running but would eventually get all three aircraft up and out towards the area.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Admin</td>
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<td>✗</td>
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<td>Followed checklist to get SLAM-ER appropriately set up on deck. No issues on the transit out to the area.</td>
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<tr>
<td>4. TacAdmin</td>
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<td>TacAdmin: Conducted expendable checks and G warm. No issues.</td>
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<td>5. Tactical Execution</td>
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<td>Conduct: Set up CAP to provide time to manage weapons per the game plan. Working through sim issues again to get the SLAM-ER working. Would eventually get it sorted and would see Dash 2 taking the first shot. Good second shot as well.</td>
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<td>6. TCC</td>
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<td>Setting up TOO mode for the weapon would again see some issues with the sim. Flight would set up a counter-rotating CAP point. TOO mode would finally work towards the end. This is Capt Reslard's third sim of this event due to previous sim issues and the cumulative knowledge and practice with TOO is enough to complete.</td>
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<tr>
<td>7. Debrief</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Overall working through a lot of sim technical issues but good learning in the employment of the SLAM-ER.</td>
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<td>8. Mission Performance Standards</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Conducted SSEAD 3501 operating as Dash 2 in a 2-ship.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a) Effectively mission plan for JSOW and SLAM-ER</td>
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<td>b) Deliver JSOW with a TOT +/- 15 secs.</td>
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<td>c) Execute proper procedures for marriage checks.</td>
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<td>d) Execute proper procedures for weapon programming and release.</td>
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<tr>
<td>e) Execute proper procedure for weapon terminal guidance (SMAU).</td>
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<td>9. Administrative flight requirement (if required).</td>
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REMARKS
Conducted SSEAD 3501 operating as Dash 2 in a 2-ship.

DND - Not applicable or not observed.
UNSAT* - Unsafe or complete lack of ability and/or knowledge. Requires substantial input from the instructor for safe execution and/or mission accomplishment.
1 - Safe but limited proficiency. Requires frequent input from the instructor.
2 - Correct. Recognizes and corrects errors. Requires occasional input from the instructor.
3 - Correct. Efficient, skillful, and without hesitation. Requires minimal input from the instructor.
4* - Unusually high degree of ability. Requires no input from the instructor.
*Mandatory comments in remarks section for items scored at this level.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ITEM</th>
<th>DND</th>
<th>Line 1</th>
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<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
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<tr>
<td>1. Mission Preparation</td>
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<td>multiple events completed each day during the sim det. Flowing from event to event the lessons learned from each sim will be compounded with another as the day progress. While the individual details involved in each sim are combined to create a general picture of the student progress.</td>
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<td>2. Brief</td>
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<td>Common trends for the sim det include:</td>
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<td>3. Admin</td>
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<td>- Time Line adherence</td>
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<td>4. TacAdmin</td>
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<td>- Radar Mechanics</td>
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<td>5. Tactical Execution</td>
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<td>- 3D Geometry</td>
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<td>6. TCC</td>
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<td>7. Debrief</td>
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<td>8. Mission Performance Standards</td>
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<td>a) Execute proper radar mechanics.</td>
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<td>b) Target as directed.</td>
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<td>c) Execute proper cold ops.</td>
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<td>d) Maintain visual/visual mutual support.</td>
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<td>e) Execute proper VIF mechanics.</td>
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<td>f) Take valid shots.</td>
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<td>g) Timeline awareness.</td>
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<td>h) Tactical decision making IAW mission objectives.</td>
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**REMARKS**

NX Sim Det

Used new Common Timeline

**TCC:**
Operated mostly as single seat but still maintain that communication between the lead aircraft.

**Debrief:**
Paused the sims after each run to get a quick debrief real time. Will have a full tape debrief at the conclusion of each event.

**Mission Performance Standards:**
- Good practice with the POD Mech when operating as single seat. Multiple repetitions on using the LPD in A/A to gain a visual acquisition. Ensure L+5 is boxed and the FLIR is set up properly.
- Dealing with advanced threats. Good use of radar techniques to get radar SA at range.
- Good use of off-board sensors to help maintain SA both to the hostiles and the friendly. Good use to maintain sensor spread.
- Biggest other in the A/A piece of sim training was the shot towards a friendly aircraft through a designation on the SA page. Debriefed in depth how this happened and how to avoid it from happening again

Overall this was a great opportunity to leverage the sim usage at Miramar to build solid, repeatable habit patterns.

**X**

DND - Not Instructed Sign / Requires substantial input from the instructor.

**UNSAT** - 1
1. Safe but
2. Correct. Recognizes and corrects errors. Requires occasional input from the instructor.
3. Correct. Efficient, skillful, and without hesitation. Requires minimal input from the instructor.
4* - Unusually high degree of ability. Requires no input from the instructor.

*Mandatory comments in remarks section for items scored at this level.
F/A-18 AVIATION TRAINING FORM  
NAVMC 3500.50B, F/A-18 T&R MANUAL (26 JUN 2012)  
SSCAR-3301: SCAR SIM

STUDENT:  
FLIGHT POSITION:  
CREW POSITION:  

INSTRUCTOR:  
DATE:  5 October

PASS:  X  INCOMPLETE:  
REPLY:  

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<tbody>
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<td>2. Brief</td>
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<td>3. Admin</td>
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<td>4. TAC Admin</td>
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<td>5. Tactical Execution</td>
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<tr>
<td>a) Effectively locate and pass targets to AR assets.</td>
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<td>b) Prioritize targets in accordance with target precedence list.</td>
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<td>c) Effectively coordinate target attacks.</td>
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<tr>
<td>d) Effectively pass target and threat information to AR assets and C3.</td>
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<tr>
<td>9. Administrative flight requirement (if required).</td>
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**REMARKS**

Despite the fact there were no cautions or lights, the board speeds were a clear indication that a safe stop with normal brakes could not be made. I talked to my personal technique of doubling the board plus 10-15 kts. Ex 5 Board 315kts and tempering that with GW altitude, and runway conditions.

Overall average event for Resiland. Take the sim as seriously as the jet with the limited sortie environment we're in. Use this to build your experience and learn from it.

Conducted SCAR on Korean IC set as a 2 ship.

Conduct included a section of F-16 and a section of A-10. Average execution with tasking out AR players, deconfliction, and coordinating attacks. Coordinated multiple attacks on IDF, TBM, and armor. Used SPINS for ingress and egress

Learning Points were:
- Sanitize the airspace before going A/G over hostile territory with significant terrain/blind zones. MIG-21 VISCAP was in the area, only reason it was picked up was due to a sim of losing up on jackyl.
- SPINS; be familiar with the check-in formats and routing system.
- When a TPL 1 was called out by JSTARS, use your AR assets to prosecute/help find if you can't. SCAR left the AR players out and spent extra time trying to find. AR players were calling nothing to report in the south. (Target wouldn't show up in the sim, but real world I would have brought another section up to assist).
- Don't hold AR players in a MANPAD WEZ, block12-14 with 2-3k foot terrain.
- Give AR players a STIREP
- Be a little more directive when giving smack tasking when using altitude deconfliction. You don't need to give a full 9-line, but general final attack geometry will ensure bomb fall line deconfliction. Wasn't a factor today.

Biggest other of the flight was the landing. SR02 had a brake failure on touchdown with a 7k runway, 2.5kth gas, and 3x 500lb bombs on board. There were no Hyd Cautions or any other cautions. Passing the 3 Board, speed was 115-120kts and passing the 2 Board speed was 80-90 kts. SR 02 ran off the end of the runway. The first time anything was said TCC wise was past the 2 Board when SCOJO asked if he was going to stop. There are multiple options in this scenario. Go Around being the first, then either selecting E-Brakes and/or dropping the hook if you do not go around.

**DND** - Not
**- Unsatisfactory**  
1 - Safe but...
2 - Correct
3 - Correct
4* - Unusual

*Mandatory comments in remarks section for items scored at this level.
# F/A-18 AVIATION TRAINING FORM

**NAVMC 3500.50B, F/A-18 T&R MANUAL (26 JUN 2012)**

**AR-3203: NIGHT AR**

**STUDENT:** (b) (3) (A), (b) (6)  /  **INSTRUCTOR:** (b) (3) (A), (b) (6)

**FLIGHT POSITION:** Dash 2  /  **DATE:** 28 Aug 2017

**CREW POSITION:** Pilot / WSO

**PASS:** X  /  **INCOMPLETE:**  /  **REPLY:**

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<th>DND</th>
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<th>2</th>
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<th>REMARKS</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Mission Preparation</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td>Brief: Standard</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Brief</td>
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<td>Admin: Night Section Go out of RODN towards the W-174, RTB via night section landing. Following the completion of the knock off. The flight will attempt to rejoin. Lead will be visual and begin executing a left turn to remain in the area and facilitate the join. Dash 2 will be visual and begin a turn but will actually be visual of a random aircraft also heading in the direction of RODN. Attempting to join on this aircraft dash 2 will exit the area. Will pick up a squawk from ATC and continue towards RODN while lead comes for the join.</td>
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<tr>
<td>3. Admin</td>
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<td>X</td>
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<td>How to fix this includes using your system to your advantage. The A/A TCN showed an increasing range that went unnoticed until the WSO pointed it out. Understanding that lead was trying to rejoin the flight before exiting the area. At any time if you are unsure of something just go ahead and ask the question.</td>
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<tr>
<td>5. Tactical Execution</td>
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<td>Conductor. Entered into the area and conducted a high altitude sweep. Following the sweep dash 2 will be cleared off to investigate his sector for the next 15 minutes. Wingman will locate a boat and conduct two GBU-12 attacks. Good TCC on locating the target visually using the NVGs and then using the pod to get captured. Good TCC on the weapon to target match.</td>
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<tr>
<td>6. TCC</td>
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<td>Following the attacks wingman will be passed coordinates from lead that would be located on the 'Porkchop'. Dash 2 will execute a successful gun attack. Would set up for another North-West attack but would abort. Third run will be similar to the first and be successful.</td>
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<tr>
<td>7. Debrief</td>
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<td>X</td>
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<td>Debrief: Debriefed the KIO to the rejoin and how it is important to maintain high SA and if you do not just ask the question.</td>
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<tr>
<td>a) Conduct visual and sensor reconnaissance of assigned area and detect targets.</td>
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<td>X</td>
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<td>Instructor Comments: Good recall of the event. This was a unique exposure to Armed Reconnaissance. The range did not facilitate the incorporation of multiple Target Areas of Interest due to a single land mass (Porkchop). As such, there was an alternate search gameplan briefed. All assessment points to the right are accurate.</td>
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<tr>
<td>b) Employ appropriate weapon and tactics for threat and target type.</td>
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<td>X</td>
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<td>c) Minimize threat exposure and perform appropriate threat counter-tactics.</td>
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<tr>
<td>d) Adhere to WASP delivery parameters and TACNAC valid delivery criteria.</td>
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<tr>
<td>9. Administrative flight requirement (if required).</td>
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<td>X</td>
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</table>

**9/14/2017**

**X** (b) (3) (A), (b) (6)

Instructor

Signed by: (b) (3) (A), (b) (6)

**DND - Not applicable or not observed.**

**UNSAT** - Unsafe or complete lack of ability and/or knowledge. Requires substantial input from the instructor for safe execution and/or mission accomplishment.

1 - Safe but limited proficiency. Requires frequent input from the instructor.

2 - Correct. Recognizes and corrects errors. Requires occasional input from the instructor.

3 - Correct. Efficient, skillful, and without hesitation. Requires minimal input from the instructor.

4* - Unusually high degree of ability. Requires no input from the instructor.

*Mandatory comments in remarks section for items scored at this level.
### F/A-18 AVIATION TRAINING FORM
NAVMC 3500.50B, F/A-18 T&R MANUAL (26 JUN 2012)
SCAS-3102: PGM CAS SIM

**STUDENT:** (b) (3) (A), (b) (6)  
**INSTRUCTOR:** (b) (3) (A), (b) (6)  
**FLIGHT POSITION:** -2  
**CREW POSITION:** Pilot  
**DATE:** 8/7/2017  
**PASS:** X  
**INCOMPLETE:**  
**REFLY:**  

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<tr>
<td>1. Mission Preparation</td>
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<td>2. Brief</td>
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<td>3. Admin</td>
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<td>4. TacAdmin</td>
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<td>5. Tactical Execution</td>
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<td>6. TCC</td>
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<td>7. Debrief</td>
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<td>8. Mission Performance Standards</td>
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<td>a) Comply with JCS TTPs.</td>
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<td>b) Comply with tactical abort parameters.</td>
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<td>c) Adhere to WASP delivery parameters and TACSOP valid delivery criteria.</td>
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<td>d) Execute appropriate threat counter tactics.</td>
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<td>e) Execute proper JCS comm.</td>
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<td>f) TOT +/- 15 secs.</td>
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<td>g) Achieve effects on target or weapon impact within CEP.</td>
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<td>9. Administrative flight requirement (if required).</td>
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**REMARKS**

on JDAM employment and then a 1.0 to 1.5 of sim time with an instructor instructing him on proper JDAM employment – without a WSO. I will happily do this if needed.

**Mission Prep / Brief**
- From the previous SCAR/AR event I went through all the types of JDAM deliveries that you can execute, and showed him the MAWTS-1 GPS Weapon ASP in addition to breaking down LMT and LTKS GBU-34 logic and showing him the section in the TACSCOP. JDAM / LJDAM employment should be second nature at this point. I do not know if S/NM's ground job or other admin requirements are interfering with him being able to study.
- Brief leverages CAS TTPs as standard and focuses on the time from receiving the 5-line to target area tactics. Even with a 2 hour block of sim time, the "JTAC" (Barbie) arriving 20' early to set up the sim up, and aircrew arriving prior to the sim block time, the sim will not be ready until ~20 minutes into the sim block.

**Admin**
- No issues

**TacAdmin**
- Select MGRS on LPOD.
- Ensure VDL is transmitting.
- ALR should be NORM not AL.
- TGP issues may have been a result of a simism.
- For 2 WSO, there is no need for sim checks. Good laser checks otherwise.

**First attack**
T2 BOC 2x38 each aircraft simo. Actual TOT is w/in 5" of assigned. Lessons learned:
- Not ready for readback until around a minute after -1 is ready. -2 WSO will input coordinates into the CAS page first, not the PPI. Remember to prioritize what is important. What you need to drop BOC is a grid and an elevation. Having everything else set up is a luxury when all you need is 480KGS / 8nm/minute to be on time. Put all that stuff in after you get your jet set up for an attack as fast as possible.
- Ends up in ~1 mile sucked tac wing. Isn't impossible to execute this delivery from that position, and you could execute an attack similar to this from spread if desired, but the briefed position was the same position for a buddy bomb profile. Recommend that after you have good readbacks take TAC WING and

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**DND - Not applicable or not observed.**

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2. Correct. Recognizes and corrects errors. Requires occasional input from the instructor.
3. Correct. Efficient, skillful, and without hesitation. Requires minimal input from the instructor.
4. Unusually high degree of ability. Requires no input from the instructor.

*Mandatory comments in remarks section for items scored at this level.*

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**82**
stay there while following lead around and validation. This is technique.
-Briefed comm for release to achieve simo impacts was “-1 in zone, -2 in zone.” -2 will not have a LAR displayed but will still call in zone after -1 calls in zone two more times. -1 will still drop his bombs even if you are unable to drop yours. Don’t call in zone if you aren’t in zone. Say you’re “unable release this pass, troubleshooting” or something similar.
-2 no drop due to not having a LAR. During debrief we thoroughly attempted to determine why this was. -2 utilize PP1 and PP2 for the bombs, this may have been the issue. Different LPs were also in the bombs, result of the load utilized (sim default) for the event. Likely an issue with the sim for separate preplanned. -2 would have had a TOT within 15” if this issue didn’t occur.
-I will mention it now but this is an issue on all runs. Guano doesn’t have a methodical way of executing JDAM validation or he gets behind the jet and isn’t able to do it while executing the attacks. I showed him the way that I execute my JDAM validation (HSI>DATA>ACFT, stores – step, DAWPN top lvl – step, DAWPN mission – stop, do on other display, verbalize) and told him that this is what he should look like (technique). For several of the attacks today the bombs will guide to the target, so valid for effects, but based off of JDAM validation you would not be able to know if they were valid were a fin to break or you had a duster.

Second attack
T2 BOT 1xGBU-12 each 1’ spacing
-1 will have a valid release w/ drop symbology but will not see impacts. MOC did not see a bomb come off the jet. -1s laser was interrupted so it would have been invalid for laser. -1 will call negative impacts. -2 will abort. Fighters will execute successful re-attacks. Lessons learned:
-Really nice job gaining correlation. -2’s sim won’t be displaying the buildings by which the target (T-72s) are parked, so he is able to find them quickly. From -1s perspective they intermittently masked behind buildings. -2 does a really nice job of getting -1 correlated quickly with a laser handoff. Remember what that comm and mech was like and utilize it in the future.
-2 aborts due to -1 calling negative impact, issue with and HSI, but -2 wouldn’t have been in the position to release in the first place due to flying through the release cue while nose off the target. If -1 doesn’t drop you should more than likely execute your attack unless a situation arises that would preclude you from executing yours. There was an issue with your HSI (simism, not being able to delete previous 9-line so an old IP was showing), but once again you don’t need the HSI completely set up. You are captured the target so release. Position yourself appropriately to execute the attack. Brief today was after good readbacks you are approved to detach to intercept your own timing for an interval attack. -2 will fly away from the target and have to make a play for FAH at the last moment and turn nose on to the target at ~2.5 miles with the release cue behind him.
-It wasn’t briefed this way, but going forward I would recommend not using laser comm when you are hosting your own bomb. Just execute your attack, no need to tell everyone that you’re losing.
-Re-attacks executed, -1 within 5” of TOT, -2 19” late.

Third attack
T2 BOT gun 30” spacing
-No “squirters” being displayed in the sim. -1 valid params/aimpoint/safety. -2 invalid params (airspeed), valid aimpoint, safety. -No major issues other than airspeed control on this attack. Just remember that if you execute a bunt the tendency is to get fast. Anticipate this by keeping your airspeed under control early, and then accelerating as you get closer to release.

Fourth attack
T2 BOT 1x38. Fighters execute valid attacks TOT 2” early.
-No issues for this attack other than incomplete JDAM validation from -2.
-Nice job getting correlated w/ the talk on from -1.

Fifth attack
T2 BOT 1x38 each 1’ spacing. Fighters execute valid attacks -1 10” late -2 3” early.
-Nice job with the TOT spacing. Improving trend all day today. No major issues with this attack.
Sixth / Seventh attack

T2 BOC to BOT 2x38 ea

Possibly some confusion when the JTAC calls "1/2 good handshake, that building is your target". -1 will go TOO POS REL and employ on the target, -2 will drop on coordinate. -2 will drop on coordinate out of POS ABS but -2 WSO will be lasing the target. Not sure if there was TCC confusion with the lasing out of POS ABS but -2 will be saying the target as if dropping BOT POS REL but will drop out of POS ABS. Bombs hit target due to coordinates being good.

-2 pilot then asks for a reload to practice system entry and -2 pilot will then enter coordinates for that attack again. MOC will reload with JDAMs for some reason which didn’t affect the delivery BUT one LJDAM was dropped in GUIDE GPS or GUIDE DUAL with no laser energy provided. In the debrief I told him not to worry about it but there may be an issues with habit patterns for LJDAM set up. Guano will put the coordinates in for the target accurately for both bombs but will put an elevation of ‘7’ for one (accurate) and ‘2,000’ for the other one (inaccurate). -2 will drop and the first bomb will shuck the target but the second bomb is significantly off target. Issue with JDAM TOTs as a -2 (was an issue on previous events in the jet that were supposed to be sim codes, dramatic improvement today in the sim), and that the heart of the issue is an absence of habit patterns and lack of understanding of how to set up a JDAM, not necessarily CAS procedures. I will caveat all this with saying that he has flown all CAS codes with a WSO, so I don’t know if he is able to execute CAS procedures on his own. If the intent were to go and drop weapons without an instructor in the back seat then the event would have been incomplete. Bottom line: Captain Resilard needs ground and sim instruction on how to properly employ JDAM and LJDAM. Recommend that the sim be on his own and in a CAS environment to the maximum extent possible in order to maximize training and confirm that he doesn’t have an issue with CAS procedures outside of JDAM / LJDAM set up and employment.

Debrief

Validated all drops. Guano is receptive and has a good attitude, but he needs a lecture and sim instruction on how to deliver set up a JDAM for delivery without a WSO. He also needs to practice a methodical, repeatable JDAM validation habit pattern because he doesn’t have one at the moment. Taking a holistic approach, I told ops that I would consider the event complete because he was supposed to go on the road for sim CAS, in the jet you cannot sim quantity / A-QTY releases, I don’t think he has a major problem with flying form or hitting TOTs as a -2 (was an issue on previous events in the jet that were supposed to be sim codes, dramatic improvement today in the sim), and that the heart of the issue is an absence of habit patterns and lack of understanding of how to set up a JDAM, not necessarily CAS procedures. I will caveat all this with saying that he has flown all CAS codes with a WSO, so I don’t know if he is able to execute CAS procedures on his own. If the intent were to go and drop weapons without an instructor in the back seat then the event would have been incomplete. Bottom line: Captain Resilard needs ground and sim instruction on how to properly employ JDAM and LJDAM. Recommend that the sim be on his own and in a CAS environment to the maximum extent possible in order to maximize training and confirm that he doesn’t have an issue with CAS procedures outside of JDAM / LJDAM set up and employment.
F/A-18 AVIATION TRAINING FORM
NAVMC 3500.50B, F/A-18 T&R MANUAL (26 JUN 2012)
SCAS-3101: GP CAS SIM

STUDENT: (b) (3) (A), (b) (6)
FLIGHT POSITION: Dash 2
CREW POSITION: Pilot
INSTRUCTOR: (b) (3) (A), (b) (6)
DATE: 21 JUL 2017
PASS: X INCOMPLETE: □ REPLY: □

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<th>REMARKS</th>
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</table>
| 1. Mission Preparation | X | | | | | TacAdmin: Conducted LSS while transiting to the BFTA. Checked in with Darkside Air. Used the pod to slew around the target area searching for targets. Good work inputting the data into your tablet and maintaining get formation keeping. Continue to maintain active listening on the comms.
| 2. Brief | X | | | | | Conduct:
| 3. Admin | X | | | | | First 5-line Lead will be BOT and working dash 2 to get correlated to the target. Dash 2 will be captured after a talk on. Pushing into the area both aircraft will be late and resume the ToT by one minute. [D] [6] will feel rushed and end up pushing too early, realizing this and perform 5-turns in an attempt to make time. Will call IP inbound 2 miles within the IP. Good parameters for the rocket bunt. Good work not employing with the late cleared hot. Switchology issue with RADALT.
| 4. TacAdmin | X | | | | | Ways to fix this include understanding how the ToT Adjusted. Do not feel rushed and visualize the geometry needed to make the timing work on. Good SAPDART checks early and continuously QA your timing and geometry. You received the late cleared hot because of your IP inbound call was not where you actually were and the FAC on the ground could not visualize pick up your aircraft until late.
| 5. Tactical Execution | X | | | | | Proceeded with an immediate re-attack. Good bent geometry and parameters. Aimpoint will be barely off the diamond. Timely cleared hot with rockets away. Be precise with your rocket employment. Do not spam the pickle button.
| 6. TCC | X | | | | | For the second 9-line proceeded to hold above the target. Again, would push late with successful rocket employment. Same parameters as first run with aimpoint being slightly off the diamond. Both Aircraft will have rockets that failed to fire and as such will discontinue the mid-mission tanking and RTB back to YPDN.
| 7. Debrief | X | | | | | Debrief:
| 8. Mission Performance Standards | | | | | | Conduct a thorough tape debrief to assess validate employment and assess lessons learned. Overall a big improvement from the first incomplete of this event. Continue to study and as you do more CAS events and gain more experience you will find you will make less errors. Press.
| a) Comply with JCAS TTPs. | | | | | | Sim Conducted as a flight. CAS in the R-225 BFTA
| b) Comply with tactical abort parameters. | X | | | | | Brief: Have load plan in case you need to jettison for any reason.
| c) Adhere to WASP delivery parameters and TACSOP valid delivery criteria. | X | | | | | Admin:
| d) Execute appropriate threat counter tactics. | X | | | | | Slight confusion with ordnace on arming the jets at the end of the runway. Don't forget to turn on your landing light. Standard departure out of YPDN and out towards the R-225 to meet up with the tanker.
| e) Execute proper JCAS comm. | X | | | | | Smooth tanker ops. No issue on the RTB back to YPDN for the visual straight in.
| f) TOT +/- 35 secs. | X | | | | | |
| g) Achieve effects on target or weapon impact within CEP | X | | | | | |
| 9. Administrative flight requirement (if required). | | | | | | |

**REMARKS**

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4* - Unusually high degree of ability. Requires no input from the instructor.

* Mandatory comments in remarks section for items scored at this level.

SCAS-3101: GP CAS SIM
Instructor comments:

All things being considered average event for (3) (A), (b) (6) given where he is at in the syllabus. Good attitude and good job with taking notes in the debrief and capturing them in the gradesheet.

Brief
-No major issues. Good job showing up prepared.
-Remember to have a load plan whenever we are employing actual weapons.

Admin
-No issues.

TacAdmin
-No major issues.
-When doing laser checks or attempting a laser handoff let the lasing platform know if you do not get a spot within a reasonable amount of time. We transited from one IP to another w/-1 lasing (will end up being deadeye) and -2 staring w/ no conn.
-You can see the importance of executing laser checks. -1 jet ADB implies laser will be operational despite multiple grieves and laser checks confirm -1 is deadeye.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6)
-Only factor -1 is -1 deadeye.

Execution
Initial 9-line T1 BOT -1 GBU-32 -2 rockets. -1 is unable to generate acceptable coordinates so -2 will generate and then pass coordinates for -1’s GBU-32. -1 will request 1’ rolex TOT due to system entry error. -1 will employ w/in 15” of the rolex’d TOT. -2 will execute a low level ingress and pop and will abort due to not receiving a cleared hot. -2 will get an immediate re-attack and then execute a bun deliver. First nine line lessons learned:
-When using generating coordinates for a JDAM utilize the target coordinate generation rule of thumb. Not utilizing it can be the difference between a successful and unsuccessful attack. Reference the NTPR for CAT coordinates.
-FAC(A) will not be visual and thus will not give -2 a cleared hot. The FAC may be utilizing the comm as an indicator of where they should be looking at in the sky to pick up your aircraft. It is especially important during type 1 control to only call IP inbound when you are actually at the IP.
-If you are a re-attack then execute a roll-in to re-attack ASAP. Don’t go out to >5 miles and then execute a bunt.
-FAC will call good hits. Delivery is invalid (parameters) for -2 for aimpoint. 1 rocket on target is better than multiple sprayed around the target.
-Good job not releasing on the first pass w/o the cleared hot.

Subsequent 9-line T2 BOT -1/2 rockets. Fighters will request to go into the overhead for BOT correlation. A talk on between -1 and the FACs will then occur, after which -1 will be given an immediate TOT followed by -2’s attacks with a correction from lead’s hits. -1 will command 4 rockets to fire but only 1 will fire. -2 will roll-in and rockets will fail to fire. Fighters will get an immediate re-attack type 3 window. Rockets will not fire. Fighters do not have time to head to the tanker and return for more CAS (land time). Lesson learned:

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## F/A-18 AVIATION TRAINING FORM

**NAVMC 3500.50B, F/A-18 T&R MANUAL (26 JUN 2012)**  
**CAS-3105: URBAN CAS**

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<tr>
<td>2. Brief</td>
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<td>Admin: Section Go departure out of RODN to enter the MEUEX CTA blocks 6-9k. RTB to RODN via radar vectors to final for the section landing.</td>
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<td>3. Admin</td>
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<td>TacAdmin: Quick transit to the area. Standard check in with controllers.</td>
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<td>4. TacAdmin</td>
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<td>Conduct: Tight airspace today and cloud coverage made staying in the area and remaining correlated difficult. Good work being off leads altitude and using pilot relief modes to your advantage to help alleviate the task loading and allow you to focus more on looking outside.</td>
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<td>5. Tactical Execution</td>
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<td>Conducted three total runs with the third being supporting lead's weapon to the target.</td>
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<td>6. TCC</td>
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<td>8. Mission Performance Standards</td>
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<td>1. Type II BOC. GBU-38. Having sim boxed and not being at the appropriate airspeed will make the IN RANGE / IN ZONE cue to not appear. Continued to press and sim employ two GBU-38s simultaneously. Strive to be in a better TacWing position.</td>
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<td>a) Comply with JCAS TTPs.</td>
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<td>2. Type II BOT. 1xGBU12 with 2 minute spacing between attacks. Would update to a dash 2 dropping a QTV 2 while lead played goalie.</td>
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<td>b) Comply with tactical abort parameters.</td>
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<td>3. Wingman will be lasing lead's GBU-12 into the target. Good work getting correlated and putting the aircraft in a good position to lose the weapon all the way to impact.</td>
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<td>c) Achieve WASP delivery parameters and TACSON valid delivery criteria.</td>
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<td>Overall solid work in the urban CAS environment. Keep in mind that you want to have more of a push-pull of information coming from the controllers on the ground. As it was today they were mostly pushing out information.</td>
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<td>d) Execute appropriate threat counter tactics.</td>
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<td>Debrief: Discussed lessons learned and keys for improvement on follow on events. Also contacted the controllers to discuss what went well and what can be improved.</td>
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<td>e) Execute proper JCAS comm.</td>
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**REMARKS**

Conducted Day Urban CAS in the MEUEX CTA over Camp Hansen Okinawa in support of 5th ANGLICO.

**Instructor Comments:** This was quite a fun event. Big things to remember during Urban CAS are to evaluate the threat, then come up with a gameplan on exactly how you can best support the ground scheme of maneuver. Urban considerations are often canyons, terrain effect, maintaining correlation, and moving target specifics. The good work from the JTAC allowed us to see how many of these considerations can be dealt with to effectively get ordnance on the deck. The weather added a nice real world training aspect. Nice work. Keep looking outside.

9/14/2017

X

[Signature]

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### F/A-18 AVIATION TRAINING FORM

**NAVMC 3500.50B, F/A-18 T&R MANUAL (26 JUN 2012)**  
**CAS-3104: DAY PGM CAS**

**STUDENT:** (b) (3) (A), (b) (6)  
**INSTRUCTOR:** (b) (3) (A), (b) (6)  
**DATE:** 24 AUG 2017

**FLIGHT POSITION:** Dash 2  
**CREW POSITION:** Pilot

**PASS:** X  
**INCOMPLETE:** □  
**REPLY:** □

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**REMARKS**

Second flight of the day following the nav leg from RCI to RODIN. Conducting day PGM CAS in the W-174 off the coast of Okinawa in support of 3rd Recon.

**Brief:**
CAS standards. Emphasized talking about the working area. Routing to and from.

**Admin:**
No issues. Shot a section TACAN approach with -2 detached to 1.0 in trail prior to entering the clouds.

**TacAdmin:**
-When you hear “reference xxx accel G-warm” do not take your time getting out to 1.0 abeam. Get to 1.0 abeam immediately. We don’t have the time, range space, or gas to waste. Initially Guano will go to 0.7 or so abeam and stay there for an awkward amount of time until pipped to get to 1.0 abeam.
-Work on holding in DCS during CAS. It may seem difficult to maintain position initially but it gives you plenty of straight and level time. Utilize the pilot relief modes. A good flight lead will be on/on allowing you time to listen, write, and plot. Tac wing may feel easier to maintain position but it is more stick and rudder intensive.

3 total 9-lines.

1. Type II BOC. 1xGBU12 per aircraft with dash 2 taking a 2 minute spacing. No major issues. Guano will be “20” late off of -1’s timing but the section will be given an immediate push. Immediate push may have thrown off timing. I would recommend flying for setting spacing once you have good read backs, then follow your lead around until he goes IP inbound then do your spacing maneuver. Validate parameters, aim point, safety.

2. 9-line is a Type I BOC gun attack -2 first with -1 30° in trail. Dash 2 will be the first to roll-in followed by lead’s aircraft. Lead will pass -2 the lead as -1 is negative ROVER and correlation is achieved by a ROVER talk on. -2 does a nice job correlating and then passes -1 4/6 and -1 is able to correlate immediately. -2 is within +/- 15° TOT and -1 is +/- 40° in trail. Valid parameters, pipper, aim point, safety. Really nice job correlating, being on time, and nice strafe.

3. Type II BOC simo run 1xGBU-38 per aircraft. JTAC will call danger close and give initials but it is not need back. Don’t forget the mando readbacks – DAFF-P. Drop is unassessable for tapes, but -2 is in position for the attack and flight is on time.

Overall solid run today with dash 2’s timing being within +/- 30 seconds. Quickly getting the systems set up and staying in position to engage targets in an expeditious manner. Keep using the tablet to your advantage and plot out the targets. Continue to work on improving your timing.

**Debrief:** Discussed lessons learned and keys for improvement on follow on flows. Also debriefed with controllers on what went well and how things could have been improved.

**Instructor edited student comments with inputs and some clarification. Overall average event.**
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**REMARKS**

Conducted 3103 GP CAS in the R-567 with Propane 11/12 providing FAC(A)...

**Brief:**

Standard

Admin:

Taxi the aircraft just a bit slower. Know you took the jet from a low fuel state and was concerned about getting a fuel hot but you were headed to the pits anyway so just take your time. Slightly delayed on deck but eventually will get two on the runway for a section go.

First flight for Capt Resillard in Japan. Getting to the area happens really quick but good work being flexible getting everything done prior to entering the area. No issues on the RTB for the '350' knot 2 second break.

Tac Admin:

A little flexible with the G-warm but good work rolling with it. Standard set up to begin CAS. Slight spillage out of the area that will be recognized by lead. Quick to correct and didn't remain an issue for the remainder of the flight. Standard BDA on the way back home.

Conduct:

Checked in as a two ship to profane and began immediate talk on to the Dam. Dash 2 will be captured on the buildings just north of the dam and would take the tac lead. Initially receiving a TOT of +57 and later updated to a push when ready due to fuel management for the airborne FAC. Extensive cloud coverage but would still see a successful employment of 2x Sim MK83.

Following the run, due to cloud coverage, flight will request to remain in the overhead. Both aircraft will abort one run due to weather. Propane will provide FAH our discretion and will RTB for fuel. Following the update will see -2 have two more successful attacks before RTB.

Conducted an area fam of the R-567.

Debrief: Standard. Assessed lessons learned and keys for improvement.

Congrats on the last flight pouty!

8/4/2017

Instructor Sign

Signed by [Signature]

DND - Not applicable or not observed.

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1 - Safe but limited proficiency. Requires frequent input from the instructor.

2 - Correct. Recognizes and corrects errors. Requires occasional input from the instructor.

3 - Correct. Efficient, skillful, and without hesitation. Requires minimal input from the instructor.

4* - Unusually high degree of ability. Requires no input from the instructor.

*Mandatory comments in remarks section for items scored at this level.
F/A-18 AVIATION TRAINING FORM  
NAVMC 3500.50B, F/A-18 T&R MANUAL (26 JUN 2012)  
SCAS-3101: GP CAS SIM

STUDENT: (b) (3) (A), (b)  
FLIGHT POSITION: -2  
CREW POSITION:  
INSTRUCTOR: (b) (3) (A), (b)  
DATE: 13 July 2017  
PASS:  
INCOMPLETE:  
REPLY: 

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9. Administrative flight requirement (if required).  

REMARKS

Conducted out of Darwin, Australia, in the Mount Bundy range w/ 3/4 JTACs and JFOs controlling. Incomplete due to not achieving TR requirements for attacks.

Mission preparation:

- Good job asking the day prior what needs to be done for the event the next day.
- It was not put in the appropriate amount of work for the event.
- He was constrained in his ability to show up several hours prior to the brief in order to mission plan due to his follow on event. That being said, he had plenty of time to get the products in order the night before, but left the squadron at 1800 the day prior and showed up unprepared for the event.

The day prior to the event I mentioned that I had seen someone with good paper imagery running around, and he should ask them for a copy. I asked if he had imagery in the brief so that I could ensure that he knew how to properly plot a grid and if not teach him, but he didn't bring any imagery to the brief. Instead he tried to procure imagery after the brief. The imagery he did procure did not allow him to properly plot grids, and he didn't attempt to plot any locations throughout the flight.

1) How do you expect to ensure that you aren't employing ordnance on a friendly location if you don't even know where they are in relationship to where you are attacking?

2) You need to come to the brief with your imagery. You need to have the location of friendly's plotted out. You need known gun target and phase lines depicted.
3) You need to update friendly positions and plot targets in the jet.

We should strive to have no items to “clean up” after the after the brief and before walking. Inevitability we will be clean up items, but we better be able to clean them up... especially if it's imagery.

There were multiple errors on the kneeboard card, including our flight's callsign, IFF, weapons codes (LGB code on card when carrying MAU86, hort), takeoff numbers, and multiple bug settings. During ESG, I worked with him during mission planning to create a kneeboard card after I reviewed what he had at the time and stressed to him the importance of small things like making sure the takeoff numbers are correct. This is starting to become a trend with (b) (3) (A), (b) showing up to briefs unprepared.

1. There is nothing wrong with recycling products from a previous event. It is even encouraged to cut down on mission preparation time, but you have to make sure everything is accurate.
2. Using the wrong takeoff numbers can get you killed. I mentioned to (b) (3) (A), (b) a mishap where the aircrew of a Hornet prematurely rotated and ended up running off the end of the runway due to a prolonged takeoff roll as a result of the early rotation.
3. The hard RADALT should be set to 1,900' for the 25° strafe, not 450°. If you become accustomed to the RADALT going off as your prompt that you are at OTRA or cease fire slant range and your RADALT is set at 450° then you will kill yourself.

If you need help procuring paper imagery then ASK FOR HELP. After this event I created CAS imagery for Mount Bundy and e-mailed it to Captain Resiardi.

Brief

(b) (3) (A), (b) was late to the brief and did not know what program his ALE-47 needed to be set to for surface-to-air reactive flares.

- There's confusion with the weapons code when we get out to jet and see 8SU-66s configured for low drag vice CFAs. I ask an order to run over to -2 and let them know the codes should be 30/63 but that word doesn't make it to them.
- This results in having to shut down the right engine to dial the correct codes in.

Over time you'll be able to memorize all the weapons codes. For future reference, 31 is a weapons code for a MK-82 with CFA (82SB) and 30 is for a 8SU-66 LD/HO (82YT). Generally the schedule is going to specify LD/HO if we are using 8SU-66s and won't specify that when we are dropping CFAs (like it said today). This isn't a big deal but the more you know...

(b) (3) (A), (b)
Admin
-Good job with the solid admin today. A little slow on the join which can sometimes be an issue if you are -2 in a division. 350 knots isn’t an airspeed limit for joins if you’re limiting yourself to that. Just remember to keep everything safe and under control. Good job though.

TacAdmin
-When holding in DCS make sure to be off of lead’s altitude. With pilots and WSOs heads down copying nine lines there is the potential for a collision of we aren’t deconflicted via altitude. Don’t be afraid to use the pilot relief modes.
-Hesitant to join up for BD checks.
-Good job w/TacAdmin the rest of the day.

Conduct
-T2 BOC 2x82 each simo
-2x failed attempts at correlation
-T2 BOT 2x82 from -1

Slasher flight will initially receive a T2 BOC 2x82 each simo. Captain Resillard will do a good job of taking tacwing and positioning himself on the appropriate side of the formation for the BOC off of -1’s system. Slasher flight is going to be 35” due to lead’s fault. Learning point: accelerate to 480 ground early, the jet isn’t going to accelerate loaded like it is when it was slick. Regardless, -2 does a good job as mentioned but only releases one bomb. Both -2 pilot and WSO did not hear 2x82 each but on tape replay the JTAC requests 2x82 each. Mission successful.

The JTACs will then request a BOT with illumination round as the mark. 1 and 2 will both ingress twice, the first time via roll-in and the second time via burn, on time but will be unable to contact or capture the mark. After phone debriefing with the JTACs he mentioned that the rounds they were shooting were illumination rounds that land on the deck and burn for ~45” and should have almost whitened out our LPOD when in IR mode, but that they may not have been visible due to landing on backside of a hill. During the tape debrief -2’s LPOD is in IR mode and in the target area the entire time, but no illumination rounds are seen.

After the second attack attempt -1 will capture another target set within 200m of the original target and receive approval from the JTAC to attack that target. A laser handoff to correlate -2 will be attempted but is unsuccessful, -2’s pod may have been masked. -1 then passes a grid prior to executing the attack. -1 successfully strikes the target but -2 is unable to contact lead’s hits and thus doesn’t execute the attack. On tape debrief the hits are visible on the LPOD but are hard to see. Just remember how difficult the inert impacts are to see compared to HE going off and do your best to capture them. Had the flight not been almost bingo further attempts at correlation could have been made. When you are attempting to correlate your wingman the quickest way to do it is to ensure you have TXDSG boxed and your wingman can hook your designation and then correlate further. If you are not timber sweet then the quickest way is to pass coordinates via DCS, then execute a laser a handoff, and continue correlating from there. The flight is bingo immediately after -2’s attack and RTBs.

Debrief:
-During the debrief I will ask Captain Resillard what the mandatory readbacks are for remarks/restrictions since he didn’t read back his final attack heading on either one of his nine lines today. He did not know the mandatory read backs.
-Captain Resillard’s cell phone will go off in the debrief.

From what I have seen you don’t have an issue with flying the jet but your tactical knowledge is below average as well as your notion of what the acceptable level of preparation is for an event. We stressed the importance of studying and pre-mission preparation and remember that the workload will only increase in a workup and when you get a ground job. You’re being given a tremendous opportunity by currently not having a real ground job and you needs to take advantage of it. If you devote yourself to fixing this knowledge gap and showing up prepared for events then I believe you have potential to be above average. Sooner than you think you’re going to find yourself without the luxury of having the entire day to study and mission plan, and when you do work on flying it is going to be almost exclusively mission planning and preparation. This is a byproduct of ground job requirements and the fact that as mission complexity increases (think AWIC LFE employment) the demand for bespoke planning is essential while the knowledge base needs to already be there. Take advantage of the time you have right now so that when you find yourself mission planning an LFE where you’re doing almost every skillset we have you don’t place yourself in a situation where you have to run to the MPC to remind yourself what the long burn timeline numbers are.

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**F/A-18 AVIATION TRAINING FORM**

**NAVMC 3500.50B, F/A-18 T&R MANUAL (26 JUN 2012)**

**AA-2508: 2V1 OR 2V2 SEM/TAP-N-CAP (DISSIMILAR)**

**STUDENT:**

**FLIGHT POSITION:** Dash 2

**CREW POSITION:** Pilot

**INSTRUCTOR:**

**DATE:** 30 JAN 2018

**PASS:** X  **INCOMPLETE:**  **REPLY:**

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<td>Admin: Don’t wait for your lead to tell you to close it in prior to going into weather. Be preemptive. No issues on the departure or RTB.</td>
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<td>TacAdmin: Conducted a G-warm and expendable check. No issues. Good TacAdmin allowed the section to complete 5 sets.</td>
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<td>1st set will start with a group declared bogey. Conducted the appropriate timeline based on the threat. Timeline was compressed due to late radar pickup of slick super. Executed a notch and set up a good shooter-eyeball split with lead. No radar SA out of merge. Both aircraft will be clean and lead will call unable ID. Dash 2 will pick up late tally and anchor with bandit. Dash 2 will be engaged and go oblique nose high. Dash 2 will have one more merge before lead pitches in and kills the bandit.</td>
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<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Mission Performance Standards</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a) Detect via SRR, RWR, and visual lookout.</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b) Execute proper VID mech.</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>c) Execute proper notch mech.</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>d) Execute proper merge clean-up.</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e) Effective section engaged maneuvering and communication.</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>f) Take valid shots.</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Administrative flight requirement (if required).</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**REMARKS**

Conducted Section Engaged Maneuvering in the R-134.

Red Air provided by VFA-195

2/1/2018

**Notes:**

DND - Not.

UNSAT*: L

1 - Safe but requires additional input from the instructor.

2 - Correct.

3 - Correct.

4* - Untimely signed by the instructor.

Mandatory comments in remarks section for items scored at this level.
F/A-18 AVIATION TRAINING FORM  
NAVMC 3500.50B, F/A-18 T&R MANUAL (26 JUN 2012)  
AI-3704: DAY MED ALT AI

STUDENT: (b) (3) (A), (b) (6)  
FLIGHT POSITION: Dash 4  
CREW POSITION: Pilot  
INSTRUCTOR: (b) (3) (A), (b) (6)  
DATE: 11 April 2018  
PASS: X  
INCOMPLETE:  
REFLY:  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ITEM</th>
<th>DND</th>
<th>Unsat</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>REMARKS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Mission Preparation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td>Learning Points</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Brief</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Be more vocal when calling tied and letting lead know if you are delaying takeoff for a reason</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Admin</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Good tether between the section</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. TacAdmin</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Good work maintaining position and sight</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Tactical Execution</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Employed sim ordnance on the target</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. TCC</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Don’t be so conservative with your missiles. Had a shot opportunity towards the end of the VUL.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Debrief</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Expeditious rejoin and RTB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Mission Performance Standards</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a) Recognize and react appropriately to threats</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b) Adhere to planned air-to-air/air-to-ground timeline and target area tactics.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>c) Deliver weapons on planned DPI.</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>d) Adhere to WASP delivery parameters and TACSOP valid delivery criteria.</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>e) Take valid shots.</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Administrative flight requirement (if required).</td>
<td>x</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

REMARKS

Executed as -4 of VMFA-533 Division AI, with 121 sweep. 7 v 3. Threat: J-11b, Event Completed

DND - Not applicable or not observed.  
UNSAT* - Unsafe or complete lack of ability and/or knowledge. Requires substantial input from the instructor for safe execution and/or mission accomplishment.  
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3 - Correct. Efficient, skillful, and without hesitation. Requires minimal input from the instructor.  
4* - Unusually high degree of ability. Requires no input from the instructor.  
*Mandatory comments in remarks section for items scored at this level.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ITEM</th>
<th>DND</th>
<th>Unsat</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>REMARKS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Mission Preparation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>NNX Sim Det</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Brief</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Used New Common Timeline</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Admin</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Admin and Tac Admin- Sim Standard</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. TacAdmin</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Run 1:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Tactical Execution</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Time Line adherence on Skate Flow</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. TCC</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- P00 Mech</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Debrief</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Radar Mech</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Mission Performance Standards</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Run 2:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a) Maintain mutual support</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Time Line</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b) Execute proper radar mechanics</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- 3D geometry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c) Target as directed</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- How to solve offboard for a PHID</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d) Recognize threat tactics</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Overall Improving trends as the sim det progresses.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e) Take valid shots</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>see grade sheet for SAAD 3401</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>f) Timeline awareness</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>g) Tactical decision making IAW mission objectives</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Administrative flight requirement (if required)</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**REMARKS**

X

Instructor Sign

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# F/A-18 AVIATION TRAINING FORM

**NAVMC 3500.50B, F/A-18 T&R MANUAL (26 JUN 2012)**  
**SOAAW-3601: SWEEP SIM**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>STUDENT:</th>
<th>(A) (3) (B) (B) (6)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FLIGHT POSITION:</td>
<td>-4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CREW POSITION:</td>
<td>PILOT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INSTRUCTOR:</td>
<td>(A) (3) (B) (B) (6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DATE:</td>
<td>1 DEC 2017</td>
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## REMARKS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ITEM</th>
<th>DND</th>
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<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>REMARKS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Mission Preparation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Run 1:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Brief</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Time Line adherence on Skate Flow</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Admin</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- POD Mech. QA, ensure L+5 is boxed, get a FLIR Track and use your A/A Pod Bold Face</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. TacAdmin</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Good radar mech used techniques discussed to get radar SA at range.</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Tactical Execution</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>Run 2: S-G Hostile</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. TCC</td>
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<td></td>
<td>- Create an L+5 on the PPL at Redec Range/Call</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Debrief</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>- Time Line adherence on Short Skate Flow</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Mission Performance Standards</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Check Shot Doc based on Flow and Targeting</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a) Execute proper radar mechanics.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Overall improving trends as the sim det progresses.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b) Target as directed.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><em>see grade sheet for SAAD -3401.</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c) Recognize threat tactics.</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d) Take valid shots.</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>e) Timeline awareness.</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**NXX Sim Det**

Used new Common Timeline

Admin and Tac Admin - Sim Standard

---

X

Instructor Sign

---

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**F/A-18 AVIATION TRAINING FORM**

**NAVMC 3500.50C, F/A-18 T&R MANUAL (5 APR 2016)**

**SL: Admin/TacAdmin Brief**

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<thead>
<tr>
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<th>(D) (3) (A), (D)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FLIGHT POSITION</td>
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<tr>
<td>CREW POSITION</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INSTRUCTOR</td>
<td>(D) (3) (A), (D)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DATE</td>
<td>29 DEC 17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PASS</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INCOMPLETE</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REFY</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ITEM</th>
<th>DND</th>
<th>Unsatisfactory</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>REMARKS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Mission Preparation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Admin:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Brief</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td>- Started 19 seconds late. Make sure your watch is up to date.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Admin</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- For a new pilot/wso joining the squadron make sure to brief more in depth on combat systems.</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. TacAdmin</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Talked about techniques for marker set up</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Tactical Execution</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Don’t need to start off the brief as formal as you did. Quick intro into what everyone will be doing will suffice.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. TCC</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td>- Don’t forget to brief weather for the divert fields</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Debrief</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Spent a bit too much time talking about the timeline. Something as simple as “walk as required to start APU on time”</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Mission Performance Standards</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Leave waypoints 1-10 open</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Administrative flight requirement (if required).</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>- Draw arrows on the board and use it to your advantage</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Discussed techniques for briefing the comm plan quickly.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>- Good work slowing down the tempo for the brief, may have been a bit too slow at times but it is getting better.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>- Overall put some more thought and discussion into the actual departure routing, LCS point and Risk to Force and Risk to Mission.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>- Good time for the admin brief and good work briefing the EPS.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**REMARKS**

Practiced Admin/TacAdmin briefing.

**TacAdmin:**

- Leverage what is standard and talk about what is not.
- Go more in depth on combat systems such as MIDS, CIT, DCS.
- More in depth on secure comms.
- Discussed techniques for briefing TacAdmin and how to improve.
- A bit out of order on the Fence out comm in regards to doing a Battle Damage Assessment.
- Think about the event prior and know what you need to cover and what can be standard.

Overall average brief. Room for improvement in a lot of areas but making steady improvements.

---

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INSTRUCTOR COMMENTS

**GREAT JOB ON THE TANKER.**
Whenever you're Red Air always focus on how you can best facilitate Blue Air achieving their training objectives.

**INSTRUCTOR COMMENTS**

Conduct: Begin the VUL as a two ship in support of other red air in the area. Throughout the flight good work maintaining VMS when applicable and staying in your block at all times.

This is Capt Resillard's first experience as a red air and also first experience participating in an LFE. A lot of learning and exposure occurred on this event. Crew coordination managing comm and fuel management aided in maintaining situational awareness.

Good work hanging on and remain in the books. Press.
### F/A-18 AVIATION TRAINING FORM

**SAI-3703: MED ALT AI**

**STUDENT:** (b) (3) (A), (b) (6)

**FLIGHT POSITION:** Pilot

**CREW POSITION:** Dash 2

**DATE:** 10 AUG 2017

**REMARKS**

**SAI 3703. Conducted as a two-ship. Overall, average event.**

**Brief:** Standard

Admin: Started the sim on deck. Working full system set up as single seat. Standard 10 sec go departure into the running join. No an issue today but realize during actual operations there will be extensive comm chatter. Continue to be an active listener on the comms.

**TacAdmin:**
Standard expendable checks. Continuing with routing towards pre-planned targets. Check qual just means check your JDAM health. Don't forget to double check your radar set up and sanitize the airspace per the threat.

**Conduct:**
Following 'Attack' call flight will switch to A/G mode. A brief rece of the target on the pod prior to releasing ordnance. Lead will call in zone but dash 2 will not have an in zone indication. The reason for this is due to the target coordinates being inputted into the Launch Point vice the Target. This will go unnoticed by dash 2 pilot. Learning point here is to QA your system thoroughly beforehand because as when things get more dynamic and hectic it will not be easier. As you get more experience and repetitions the easier this will become.

Following the A/G mission the flight will find a radar picture and execute SSK flow. Good work taking all valid air to air shots. Good sort and mech. Continue to work on the comm. Strive to shoot, and say the comm as you are executing your out. On the pitch in, good work again taking shots. Dash 2 will be untargeted and will proceed to the merge. Radar picture will be clean.

Debrief:
Conducted a tape debrief to assess lessons learned and keys for improvement. Biggest take away is proper checking your JDAM. The entire flight went smooth just clean that part up and you will be solid. Continue to stay in the books and maintain a good attitude.
**F/A-18 AVIATION TRAINING FORM**
**NAVMC 3500.50B, F/A-18 T&R MANUAL (26 JUN 2012)**
**AI-3702: LOW ALT AI**

**STUDENT:** (b) (3) (A), (b) (6)  
**FLIGHT POSITION:** Dash 2  
**CREW POSITION:** Pilot  
**INSTRUCTOR:** (b) (3) (A), (b) (6)  
**DATE:** 16 AUG 2017

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<td>1. Mission Preparation</td>
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<td>a) Recognize and react appropriately to threats.</td>
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<td>b) Adhere to planned air-to-air/air-to-ground timeline and target area tactics.</td>
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<td>c) Deliver weapons on planned DPL.</td>
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<td>d) Adhere to WASP delivery parameters and TACSSAP valid delivery criteria.</td>
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<td>e) Take valid shots.</td>
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<td>9. Administrative flight requirement (if required).</td>
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**REMARKS**

AI 3702 conducted in the ITRA  
Brief:  
Standard. Set ALR to Ai vice Norm.  

Admin:  
No issues getting out the line. Slight delay in taking off waiting for Red Air to troubleshoot and traffic. Depart out of Iwakuni via 10sec go. Dash 2 will attempt to complete the join before losing lead in the clouds. Called blind and maintained a safe separation. Picked up lead on radar and continued for the radar trial departure.  

VMC on top and proceeded towards the ITRA training area.  

RTB back to Iwakuni and split the section up for separate PARs. Watch your airspeed, was a little fast and closing the distance on lead. Non-issue but if you got too close you would have been waved off and had to come around for another PAR.  

TactAdmin:  
Performed a G-warm and Fwd Ctr RWR checks. Checked JDAM on deck and in transit.

**Conduct:**  
Entered into the ITRA and began climb up to FL30. Asking AIC for picture calls. AIC responded clean and formation began looking low to cover the blind zone. Dash 2 will have a brick pop up at 7k ft that will go unnoticed until the last minute, at which point could not regain radar SA. Keys to fix this involve developing a good scan. Understand that you are eyes out flying form but remember to repeatedly glance at your Radar. When you see that brick place your cursor over it and begin your counter deceptive meld. Once that is complete call it out and have AIC declare the group.  

Flight will proceed into the attack phase. Continue to work on you’re JDAM validation. Complete it on the DOI that is recording first. Valid sim JDAM employment from both aircraft.  

Coming off target the flight will receive a pop up group call with the bandit being low and climbing near the wingman’s position. Dash 2 attempts to gain tally and will be unsuccessful. A lot happening quick but remain within your block. Discussed in the debrief about what you would do real world if you come to a merge low SA.  

Section will begin to flow cold with the bandit being low and climbing near the wingman’s position. Dash 2 attempts to gain tally and will be unsuccessful. A lot happening quick but remain within your block. Discussed in the debrief about what you would do real world if you come to a merge low SA.  

**Debrief:**  
Dubriefed with Red Air and conducted a white board debrief. Tape debrief conducted after to assess key learning points and ways for improvement. Over all mission success with the C3 nodes being destroyed. Continue to work on using your radar to gain SA and continue to practice your JDAM val.  

**Instructor Comments:** Not awesome performance from anybody on this flight. Overall, we did not employ any AMRAAM. The red air presentation was challenging, and they got the best of both of us. Agree with the comments above. Nice admin and tactadmin from -2. Overall, average for -2, below average for -1.
### F/A-18 AVIATION TRAINING FORM

**NAVMC 3500.50B, F/A-18 T&R MANUAL (26 JUN 2012)**

**SAAD-3403: DCA (AREA DEFENSE) W/ EA**

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<td>8. Mission Performance Standards</td>
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<tr>
<td>a) Execute proper radar mechanics.</td>
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<td>b) Execute proper targeting.</td>
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<td>c) Execute proper cold ops.</td>
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<td>d) Maintain visual/liquid mutual support.</td>
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<td>e) Execute proper VID mechanics.</td>
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<td>f) Take valid shots.</td>
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<td>g) Timeline awareness.</td>
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<td>h) Tactical decision making IAW mission objectives.</td>
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<td>9. Administrative flight requirement (if required).</td>
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**REMARKS**

NKX Sim Det

Used new Common Timeline

Admin and Tac Admin- Sim Standard

---

DND - Not applicable or not observed.

UNSAT* - Unsafe or complete lack of ability and/or knowledge. Requires substantial input from the instructor for safe execution and/or mission accomplishment.

1 - Safe but limited proficiency. Requires frequent input from the instructor.

2 - Correct. Recognizes and corrects errors. Requires occasional input from the instructor.

3 - Correct. Efficient, skillful, and without hesitation. Requires minimal input from the instructor.

4* - Unusually high degree of ability. Requires no input from the instructor.

* Mandatory comments in remarks section for items scored at this level.

---

Instructor Sign

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6)
# F/A-18 AVIATION TRAINING FORM

**NAVMC 3500.50B, F/A-18 T&R MANUAL (26 JUN 2012)**

**AAD-3402: DAY DCA (AREA DEFENSE)**

## STUDENT:

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6)

## INSTRUCTOR:

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6)

## FLIGHT POSITION:

Dash 2

## CREW POSITION:

[Blank]

## PASS:

[Checked]

## DATE:

10 April 2018

## INCOMPLETE:

[Unchecked]

## REFLY:

[Unchecked]

## ITEM | DND | Unsat | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | REMARKS
--- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | ---
1. Mission Preparation | | | | | | | Learning Points
2. Brief | | | | | | Keep practicing your briefing skills
3. Admin | | | | | | Don't get Risk to Force / Risk to Mission Backwards
4. TacAdmin | | | | | | Brief your audience
5. Tactical Execution | | | | | | Good TCC during conduct to attrite groups
6. TCC | | | | | | Good patient radar mech
7. Debrief | | | | | | Continue to improve on shot comm
8. Mission Performance Standards | | | | | | 
   a) Execute proper radar mechanics.
   b) Execute proper targeting.
   c) Execute proper cold ops.
   d) Maintain visual/fluid mutual support.
   e) Execute proper VID mechanics.
   f) Take valid shots.
   g) Timeline awareness.
   h) Tactical decision making IAW mission objectives.
9. Administrative flight requirement (if required). | | | | | | REMARKS

Event Completed.

---

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**F/A-18 AVIATION TRAINING FORM**

NAVMC 3500.50B, F/A-18 T&R MANUAL (26 JUN 2012)

SSEAD-3502: HARM SIM (PP/TOO)

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<tr>
<td>1. Mission Preparation</td>
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<td>Brief: Standard. Demonstrated how to plan HARM on IMPS.</td>
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<td>3. Admin</td>
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<td>Admin: Working through issues with the sim to get everything up and running but would eventually get all three aircraft up and out towards the area.</td>
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<td>5. Tactical Execution</td>
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<td>Followed checklist to get HARM appropriately set up on deck. No issues on the transit out to the area.</td>
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<td>7. Debrief</td>
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<td>a) Effectively mission plan for HARM.</td>
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<td>Conduct: Manual threat loaded on deck, no issues.</td>
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<td>b) Deliver PB HARM IAW TAGOP tactics with a TOT +/−15 secs.</td>
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<td>c) Effectively employ HARM in TOO mode.</td>
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**REMARKS**

Conducted SSEAD 3502 operating as Dash 3 in a 3-ship providing a SEAD window for strikers.

PB shots taken on appropriate system to provide SEAD window as briefed with Dash 3 detaching to manage his own timing per the game plan. Working through sim issues again to get the HARM working, mostly troubleshooting getting HARM out of STBY. Would eventually get it and sorted and would see Dash 3 taking the first HARM shot one sec late per the brief. Good second shot as well. Brief was to take 4 PB shots on a 45° spacing maneuver profile, only two shots taken due to flight leadership.

Setting up TOO mode for the HARM would again see some issues with the sim. Flight would set up a counter-rotating CAP point. Lead will drive dash 3 around for a bit but would eventually get settled to have sensors constantly looking down range. TOO mode would finally work towards the end. This HARM third sim of this event due to previous sim issues and the cumulative knowledge and practice with TOO is enough to complete.

During the RTB the flight will have a pop up group declared by AIC. Dash 3 will not be targeted in but maintained formation and radar 5A as per HSGP.

Overall working through a lot of sim technical issues but good learning in the employment of the HARM.

**INSTRUCTOR NOTES:**

Be more vocal if conduct is not being executed IAW the brief and tactfully inform lead if your sensors are working better than others. No rank in the cockpit!

11/1/2017

[DND - Not applicable or not observed.

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*Mandatory comments in remarks section for items scored at this level.]
**F/A-18 AVIATION TRAINING FORM**

**NAVMC 3500.50B, F/A-18 T&R MANUAL (26 JUN 2012)**

**SSEAD-3501: SLAM-ER/JSOW SIM**

**STUDENT:** (b) (3) (A), (b) (6)  
**FLIGHT POSITION:** Dash 2  
**CREW POSITION:** Pilot  
**INSTRUCTOR:** (b) (3) (A), (b) (6)  
**DATE:** 8 NOV 2017

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<tr>
<td>2. Brief</td>
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<td>Admin: Working through issues with the sim to get everything up and running but would eventually get all three aircraft up and out towards the area.</td>
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<td>3. Admin</td>
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<td>Followed checklist to get SLAM-ER appropriately set up on deck. No issues on the transit out to the area.</td>
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<td>4. TacAdmin</td>
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<td>TacAdmin: Conducted expendable checks and G warm. No issues.</td>
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<td>5. Tactical Execution</td>
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<td>Conduct: Set up CAP to provide time to manage weapons per the game plan. Working through sim issues again to get the SLAM-ER working. Would eventually get it and sorted and would see Dash 2 taking the first shot. Good second shot as well.</td>
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<td>Setting up TOO mode for the weapon would again see some issues with the sim. Flight would set up a counter-rotating CAP point. TOO mode would finally work towards the end. This is the (b) (3) (A) third sim of this event due to previous sim issues and the cumulative knowledge and practice with TOO is enough to complete. Overall working through a lot of sim technical issues but good learning in the employment of the SLAM-ER.</td>
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<td>7. Debrief</td>
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<td>a) Effectively mission plan for JSOW and SLAM-ER</td>
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<td>b) Deliver JSOW with a TOT +/- 15 secs</td>
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<td>c) Execute proper procedures for marriage checks</td>
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<td>d) Execute proper procedures for weapon programming and release</td>
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<td>e) Execute proper procedure for weapon terminal guidance (SMAU)</td>
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**REMARKS**

Conducted SSEAD 3501 operating as Dash 2 in a 2-ship.

**DND** - Not applicable or not observed.

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*Mandatory comments in remarks section for items scored at this level.

---

Instructor Score: X
### F/A-18 AVIATION TRAINING FORM

**NAVMC 3500.50B, F/A-18 T&R MANUAL (26 JUN 2012)**  
**SAAD-3401: DCA (AREA DEFENSE)**

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**ITEM** | **DND** | **1** | **2** | **3** | **4** | **REMARKS**
--- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | ---
1. Mission Preparation | | | | | | Multiple events completed each day during the sim det. Flowing from event to event the lessons learned from each sim will be compounded with another as the day progress. While the individual details involved in each sim are combined to create a general picture of the student progress.  
Common trends for the sim det include:  
- Time Line adherence  
- Radar Mechanics  
- 3D Geometry  
  
Admin:  
Sim standard briefs with the group participating on the sim det.  
TACAdmin:  
See above.  
Tactical Execution:  
Leveraging having a division fully operable sims with highly competent sim operators to build effective and repeatable habit patterns. A good upwards trend throughout the week for the A/A execution.  
TCC:  
Operated mostly as single seat but still maintain that communication between the lead aircraft.  
Debrief:  
Paused the sims after each run to get a quick debrief real time. Will have a full tape debrief at the conclusion of each event.  
Mission Performance Standards:  
- Good practice with the POD Mech when operating as single seat. Multiple repetitions on using the LPDU in A/A to gain a visual acquisition. Ensure L+S is boxed and the FLR is set up properly.  
- Dealing with advanced threats. Good use of radar techniques to get radar SA at range.  
- Good use of off-board sensors to help maintain SA both to the hostiles and the friendlies. Good use to maintain sensor spread.  
- Biggest other in the A/A piece of sim training was the shot towards a friendly aircraft through a designation on the SA page. Debriefed in depth how this happened and how to avoid it from happening again  
Overall this was a great opportunity to leverage the sim usage at Miramar to build solid, repeatable habit patterns.

2. Brief | | | | | |  
3. Admin | | | | | |  
4. TACAdmin | | | | | |  
5. Tactical Execution | | | | | |  
6. TCC | | | | | |  
7. Debrief | | | | | |  
8. Mission Performance Standards | | | | | |  
   a) Execute proper radar mechanics.  
   b) Target as directed.  
   c) Execute proper cold ops.  
   d) Maintain visual/fluid mutual support.  
   e) Execute proper V/D mechanics.  
   f) Take valid shots.  
   g) Timeline awareness.  
   h) Tactical decision making IAW mission objectives.  
   i) Administrative flight requirement (if required).  

**REMARKS**  

NXX Sim Det  
Used new Common Timeline

---

**DND - Not**  
Requires substantial input from the instructor.  

**1 - Safe but**  
Recognizes and corrects errors. Requires occasional input from the instructor.  

**2 - Correct**  
Efficient, skillful, and without hesitation. Requires minimal input from the instructor.  

**3 - Usuriously high degree of ability**  
Requires no input from the instructor.  

**Mandatory comments in remarks section for items scored at this level.**  
SAAD-3401: DCA (AREA DEFENSE)
F/A-18 AVIATION TRAINING FORM
NAVMC 3500.50B, F/A-18 T&R MANUAL (26 JUN 2012)
SSCAR-3301: SCAR SIM

STUDENT: (b) (3) (A), (b) 
FLIGHT POSITION: -2 
CREW POSITION: Pilot

INSTRUCTOR: (b) (3) (A), (b) 
DATE: 5 October

PASS: x INCOMPLETE: [ ] REFILY: [ ]

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<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
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<td>b) Prioritize targets in accordance with target precedence list</td>
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<td>c) Effectively coordinate target attacks</td>
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<td>d) Effectively pass target and threat information to AR assets and C3</td>
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<td>9. Administrative flight requirement (if required)</td>
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**REMARKS**

Conducted SCAR on Korean IC set as a 2 ship.

Conduct included a section of F-16 and a section of A-10. Average execution with tasking out AR players, deconfliction, and coordinating attacks. Coordinated multiple attacks on IDF, T6M, and armor. Used SPINS for ingress and egress.

Learning Points were:
- Sanitize the airspace before going A/G over hostile territory with significant terrain/blind zones. MIG-21 VISCAP was in the area, only reason it was picked up was due to a simism of showing up on jackyl.
- SPINS: be familiar with the check-in formats and routing system.
- When a TPL 1 was called out by JSTARS, use your AR assets to prosecute/help find if you can't. SCAR left the AR players out and spent extra time trying to find. AR players were calling nothing to report in the south. (Target wouldn't show up in the sim, but real world I would have brought another section up to assist).
- Don't hold AR players in a MANPAD WEZ, block12-14 with 2-3k foot terrain.
- Give AR players a SITREP
- Be a little more directive when giving smack tasking when using altitude deconfliction. You don't need to give a full 5-line, but general Final Attack geometry will ensure bomb fall line deconfliction. Wasn't a factor today.

Biggest other of the flight was the landing. SR02 had a brake failure on touchdown with a 7k runway, 2.5ish gas, and 3x 500lb bombs on board. There were no Hyd Cautions or any other cautions. Passing the 3 Board, speed was 115-120kts and passing the 2 board speed was 80-90kts. SR02 ran off the end of the runway. The first time anything was said TCC wise was past the 2 board when SGO3 asked if he was going to stop. There are multiple options in this scenario. Go Around being the first, then either selecting E-Brakes and/or dropping the hook if you do not go around.

DND - Not Unsatisfactory
UNSAT* - t 1 - Safe but... 2 - Correct 3 - Correct 4 - Unsatisfactory

*Mandatory comments in remarks section for items scored at this level.
NATOPS EVALUATION REPORT

1. NAME (last, first, middle initial):
   (D) (3) (A), (D) (6)
2. RANK:
   (D) (3) (A), (D) (6)
3. EDIP NUMBER:
   (D) (6)
4. DATE OF LAST EVALUATION:
   10 Apr 2017
5. UNIT:
   VMFA(AW)-242
6. CREW POSITION & QUALIFICATIONS:
   PILOT
7. HOURS IN MODEL:
   184.3
8. DATE OF CHECK FLIGHT:
   12 Apr 2018
9. TOTAL FLIGHT HOURS:
   430.7
10. AIRCRAFT MODEL:
    F/A-18A-D
11. AIRCRAFT BUNO:
    TOFT-37
12. FLIGHT DURATION:
    2
13. EXPIRATION DATE:
    30 Apr 2019

NATOPS EVALUATION

14a. REQUIREMENT
14b. DATE COMPLETED
14c. GRADE

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<td>ORAL EXAMINATION</td>
<td>12 Apr 2018</td>
<td>Q</td>
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<td>EVALUATION FLIGHT</td>
<td>12 Apr 2018</td>
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<td>11 Apr 2018</td>
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OVERALL FINAL GRADE: QUALIFIED

14d. REMARKS OF EVALUATOR:
FLIGHT CONDUCTED PER CNAF M-3710.7(SERIES) AND COVERED START EMERGENCIES, TAKEOFF ABORTS, LOSS OF THRUST ON TAKEOFF, OUT-OF-CONTROL FLIGHT, IN-FLIGHT EMERGENCIES, SINGLE ENGINE PROCEDURES / CONSIDERATIONS, AND LOSS OF DIRECTIONAL CONTROL.

CAPT RESILARD IS RECOMMENDED TO BECOME FULLY NATOPS QUALIFIED IN THE F/A-18A-D AIRCRAFT.

CONDUCTED CRM FLIGHT EVALUATION PER CNAFINST 1542.7(SERIES).

15a. PRINT NAME OF EVALUATOR:
   (D) (3) (A), (D) (6)
15b. RANK:
    (D) (3) (A), (D) (6)
15c. DATE:
    12 Apr 2018
15d. SIGNATURE:
    (D) (3) (A), (D) (6)

16a. PRINT NAME OF EVALUATOR:
    (D) (3) (A), (D) (6)
16b. RANK:
    (D) (3) (A), (D) (6)
16c. DATE:
    12 Apr 2018
17. REMARKS OF UNIT COMMANDER:
   IS FULLY NATOPS QUALIFIED IN THE F/A-18A-D AIRCRAFT.

18a. UNIT COMMANDER:
    (D) (3) (A), (D) (6)
18b. RANK:
    (D) (7)
18c. DATE:
    23 Apr 18
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NATOPS INSTRUMENT RATING REQUEST

1. NAME: (Last, first, middle initial):
(b) (3) (A), (b) (6)

2. RANK: (b) (3) (A), (b) (6)

3. EDIPU NUMBER: (b) (6)

4. DATE OF LAST EVALUATION:
28 Apr 2017

5. UNIT:
VMFA(AW)-242

6. CREW POSITION & QUALIFICATIONS:
PILOT

7. HOURS IN MODEL:
184.3

8. DATE OF CHECK FLIGHT:
13 Apr 2018

9. AIRCRAFT MODEL:
F/A-18D

10. AIRCRAFT BUNO:
TOFT-16

11. FLIGHT DURATION:
1

12. EXPIRATION DATE:
30 Apr 2019

13. MISCELLANEOUS SUMMARY

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14. TOTAL PILOT TIME:
430.7

15. CURRENT RATING:
STANDARD

16. ISSUED RATING:
STANDARD
(b) (3) (A), (b) (6)

17. WRITTEN EXAMINATION COMPLETED:
☑ SATISFACTORILY ☐ UNSATISFACTORILY

18. INSTRUMENT PILOT TIME

| ITEM | LAST 6 MO. | LAST 12 MO. | TOTAL ALL YEARS |
|------|------------|-------------|----------------|----------------|
| 1ST EXAM (Grade) | 86 | N/A | N/A |
| 2ND EXAM (Grade) | N/A | N/A | N/A |
| 3RD EXAM (Grade) | N/A | N/A | N/A |

20. 1ST EXAM (Grade):
86

21. 2ND EXAM (Grade):
N/A

22. 3RD EXAM (Grade):
N/A

23. EXAMINING OFFICER:
MCAILS

24. RANK:
N/A

25. UNIT:
VMFA(AW)-242

26. DATE OF EXAM:
09 Apr 2018

27. PART ONE (Basic Instruments)

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<th>ITEM</th>
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<td>STEEP TURNS*</td>
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* Not required when evaluation is conducted under actual instrument conditions.

29. FLIGHT EXAMINER:
(b) (3) (A), (b) (6)

30. RANK:
(b) (3) (A), (b) (6)

31. DATE:
13 APR 18

32. REMARKS:
INSTRUMENT QUALIFIED PER CNAF M-3710.7(SERIES).

33. REMARKS:

34. UNIT COMMANDER:
(b) (3) (A), (b) (6)

35. RANK:
(b) (3) (A), (b) (6)

36. DATE:
23 APR 15

OPNAV 37102 (REV 4/2016) FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY - PRIVACY ACT SENSITIVE: Any misuse or unauthorized disclosure of this information may result in both criminal and civil penalties

Enclosure 83
# NATOPS INSTRUMENT RATING REQUEST

1. **NAME (Last, first, middle initial):** [Redacted]
2. **RANK:** (b) (3) (A), (b) (6)
3. **EDIP NUMBER:** (b) (6)
4. **DATE OF LAST EVALUATION:** 31 May 2016
5. **UNIT:** VMFAT-101
6. **CREW POSITION & QUALIFICATIONS:** PILOT
7. **HOURS IN MODEL:** 95.3
8. **DATE OF CHECK FLIGHT:** 28 Apr 2017
9. **AIRCRAFT MODEL:** F/A-18
10. **AIRCRAFT BUNO:** AFT 3
11. **FLIGHT DURATION:** 1
12. **EXPIRATION DATE:** 30 Apr 2018

## 13. MISCELLANEOUS SUMMARY

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14. **TOTAL PILOT TIME:** 341.7

15. **CURRENT RATING:** STANDARD

16. **ISSUED RATING:** STANDARD

17. **(b) (3) (A), (b) (6)**

18. **INSTRUMENT PILOT TIME**

19. **THIS IS TO CERTIFY THAT THE APPLICANT HAS...**

   - [ ] SATISFACTORY
   - [ ] UNSATISFACTORY

20. **WRITTEN EXAMINATION**

   - 20. 1ST EXAM (Grade): CLOSED (4.0)
   - 21. 2ND EXAM (Grade): N/A
   - 22. 3RD EXAM (Grade): N/A

23. **EXAMINING OFFICER:** ON FILE

24. **RANK:** ON FILE

25. **UNIT:** MAG-11 / MICALMS

26. **DATE OF EXAM:** 27 Apr 2017

## 27. PART ONE (Basic Instruments)

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<tr>
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<td>INSTRUMENT APPROACHES</td>
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<td>COMMUNICATIONS AND NAVIGATION EQUIPMENT</td>
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<td>5</td>
<td>EMERGENCY PROCEDURES</td>
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<td>VOICE PROCEDURES</td>
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* Not required when evaluation is conducted under actual instrument conditions.

## 29. FLIGHT EXAMINER:

- (b) (3) (A), (b) (6)

## 30. RANK:

- (b) (3) (A), (b) (6)

## 31. DATE:

- 28 Apr 2017

## 32. PART TWO (Instrument flight within control areas with emphasis on VOR/TACAN where feasible)

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<td>VOICE PROCEDURES</td>
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</table>

## 33. REMARKS:

- INSTRUMENT QUALIFIED PER CNAF M-3710.7 (SERIES).

## 34. UNIT COMMANDER:

- (b) (3) (A), (b) (6)

## 35. RANK:

- (b) (3) (A), (b) (6)

## 36. DATE:

- 1 Mar 2017

**OPNAV 3710/2 (REV 4/2016)**

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Enclosure 83
Certificate

Marine Corps Aviation Learning Management System Enterprise

04/09/2018

IE5 - Fixed Wing (TACAIR) Credit Course

has successfully completed the following training course:

This is to certify that

( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
From: Commanding Officer, Marine Fighter Attack Training Squadron 101
To: Commanding Officer, Marine Aircraft Group 12

Subj: REPLACEMENT PILOT TRAINING REPORT; CASE OF 7523 USMC

1. The following data is provided as a qualitative summary of training while attached to this command.

2. General
   Syllabus: CAT-I Pilot
   Aircraft Type: F/A-18 A-D
   Start Date: 20 Mar 2016
   Completion Date: 21 Apr 2017

3. Qualification Status
   NATOPS Check Flight (Trainer): 8 Jun 2016
   NATOPS INST Check (Trainer): 31 May 2016

4. FRS Performance
   Finished in the 4th percentile, 32.7 NSS ranking 133 out of the last 139 VMFAT-101 CAT-I replacement pilot graduates.
   Unsatisfactory Events: SFAM 113, SCQL 104, SCQL 105, FCLP 115
   Carrier Qualification: DNQ (Waived)

5. Training Areas of Interest
   Performance was below average at VMFAT-101. He consistently displayed a positive attitude and strove to improve on each event. Did not qualify at the aircraft carrier due to a field disqualification because of headwork. After the disqualification the DCA waived the boat for CAT I production.

6. Professionalism/Character
   Conducted himself as the consummate professional during his time at VMFAT-101. He is a well-respected and extremely hard working Marine Officer. I fully expect to continue his performance in his next squadron.
DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
NAVY MEDICINE OPERATIONAL TRAINING CENTER
NAVAL SURVIVAL TRAINING INSTITUTE DETACHMENT
55 RADFORD BOULEVARD, SUITE 211
PENSACOLA FL 32508-1091

IN REPLY REFER TO
3760
02 May 2017

From: Officer in Charge, Naval Survival Training Institute
To: (b) (3) (A), (b) (6)

Subj: NASTP TRAINING QUALIFICATION LETTER

Ref: (a) OPNAVINST 3710.7U

1. In accordance with reference (a), has received AIRCREW REFRESHER NASTP TRAINING FOR CLASS 1 AIRCRAFT on 02 May 2017 at Aviation Survival Training Center LEMOORE.

2. (b) (3) (A), (b) (6) received a grade of Q. All required modules were completed.

3. This qualification expires on 31 May 2021 unless additional conditions listed in reference (a) chapter 8, paragraph 8.4 apply.

4. This qualification applies to the following aircraft(s) only:
CLASS 1: AV-8, EA-6, F-16, F/A-18, S-3, T-2, T-45, T-6B
CLASS 4: C-12, C-130T, C-20, C-21, C-26, C-35, C-37, C-40, C-9, E-4, E-6, P-8, T-1A, T-39, T-44

Enclosure 83
## NATOPS FLIGHT PERSONNEL TRAINING/QUALIFICATION JACKET

### SECTION III B - OPERATIONAL PHYSIOLOGY & SURVIVAL TRAINING

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### TRAINING ACTIVITIES

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Enclosure 83
### SECTION III B - OPERATIONAL PHYSIOLOGY & SURVIVAL TRAINING

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**Training Activities**

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## Section III B - Operational Physiology & Survival Training

### Name (Last, First, Middle Initial)

- **(b) (3) (A), (b) (6)**

---

### Type of Training

#### Course Category: Aviation Physiology
- **CSEL, HYPOTIA**
- **SPAR, D**
- **VMFAT-101**
- **NITE LAB, INDOC-AH/AH-9**
- **HMZ CROCKER**

#### Emergency Egress
- **SSQ 5/16/17**
- **GTP**

#### Water Survival
- **VMFAT-101**

#### Land Survival
- **D, WE, SERE**

---

### Completed
- **X**

### Incomplete
- **__**

---

### Training Activities

1. Pensacola, FL
2. Miramar, CA
3. Norfolk, VA
4. Corpus Christi, TX
5. Lemoore, CA
6. El Toro, CA
7. Jacksonville, FL
8. Barbers Point, HI
9. Cecil Field, FL
10. Cherry Point, NC
11. Whidbey Island, WA
12. Beaufort, SC
13. Point Mugu, CA
14. Patuxent River, MD
15. Brunswick, ME
16. FASOTRAGRPAC NSF, NI
17. FASOTRAGRULANT
18. MCAS New River, NC
19. Okinawa
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**TRAINING ACTIVITIES**

1. Pensacola, FL  
2. Miramar, CA  
3. Norfolk, VA  
4. Corpus Christi, TX  
5. Lemoore, CA  
6. El Toro, CA  
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16. FASOTRAGRUPAC  
17. FASOTRAGRULANT  
18. MCAS New River, NC  
19. Okinawa  
20. NASC, Pensacola, FL  
21. 

Enclosure 83
1. **Tanking with goggles on, off, or in the up position is a decision each aircrew will have to make.** When conducting aerial refueling operations be sure to brief and understand the lack of depth perception when trying to attain the proper closure.

2. With most tanker lighting does not affect the aircrew. However, some tanker lighting is extremely bright and can cause the goggles to degain making it difficult to judge closure. In some tankers the tanker can go to NVG lighting or to a reduced lighting scheme if required.
Personal Information:

Medical Information:
Medical Class: (b) (3) Medical Date: 12/2010

BasicMed Course Date: None BasicMed CMEC Date: None

Certificate Information:
Certificate: COMMERCIAL PILOT
Date of Issue: 8/8/2012

Ratings:
COMMERCIAL PILOT
  AIRPLANE SINGLE ENGINE LAND
  AIRPLANE MULTIENGINE LAND
  INSTRUMENT AIRPLANE

Limits:
ENGLISH PROFICIENT.
U.S Department of Transportation
Federal Aviation Administration
Airman Details Report

Personal Information:

Medical Information:
Medical Class: Third Medical Date: 5/2013

BasicMed Course Date: None BasicMed CMEC Date: None

Certificate Information:
Certificate: COMMERCIAL PILOT
Date of Issue: 6/15/2016

Ratings:
COMMERCIAL PILOT
AIRPLANE SINGLE ENGINE LAND
INSTRUMENT AIRPLANE

Limits:
ENGLISH PROFICIENT.
Sir,

I do not have knowledge of an assignment letter.

V/r,

-----Original Message-----
From: [redacted]
Sent: Wednesday, January 30, 2019 4:08 PM
To: [redacted]
Subject: FW: looking for an assignment letter

[redacted], please respond and cc me.

-----Original Message-----
From: [redacted]
Sent: Wednesday, January 30, 2019 4:02 PM
To: [redacted]
Subject: looking for an assignment letter

[redacted],

That MCO 5100.29B states: "Assign, in writing, the responsibility for execution of the safety program to the deputy commander or executive officer (XO)."

I believe the VMFA(AW)-242 XO at the time of the mishap is on your AMB. Kindly request his assignment letter or an email stating that he does not have knowledge of one (signed before the mishap).
The Cost of Silence: Normalization of Deviance and Groupthink

Senior Management ViTS Meeting
November 3, 2014

Chief, Safety and Mission Assurance

Deputy Chief, Safety and Mission Assurance

This and previous presentations are archived at sma.nasa.gov/safety-messages
Normalization of Deviance

Vaughan’s Normalization of Deviance

“Social normalization of deviance means that people within the organization become so much accustomed to a deviation that they don’t consider it as deviant, despite the fact that they far exceed their own rules for the elementary safety”

—Diane Vaughan, 1996

Examples

• Shuttle Solid Rocket Booster O-ring received criticality 1 waivers despite design goal of no joint failures. Joint material erosion and blow-by were accepted as risks.

• Shuttle External Tank foam loss was viewed as maintenance issue, not a safety-of-flight issue despite observed damage and design goal of no foam loss. Foam strikes to orbiters were accepted as risks.

• Cruise ship Costa Concordia grounded on Isola del Giglio, Italy. The ship captain consciously deviated from the approved course.

• International Space Station Extra-vehicular Activity-23 (ISS EVA-23) water in helmet close call occurred a week after a drink bag leaked in the same suit. Previous drink bag leaks allowed a conclusion of the same problem.
Normalization of Deviance Can Lead to Groupthink

There’s a natural human tendency to rationalize shortcuts under pressure, especially when nothing bad happens. The lack of bad outcomes can reinforce the “rightness” of trusting past success instead of objectively assessing risk.

Richard Feynman compared the practice to Russian Roulette:

“When playing Russian roulette the fact that the first shot got off safely is little comfort for the next. For a successful technology, reality must take precedence over public relations, for nature cannot be fooled.”

In real life, it’s more uncertain than that. We’re not playing Russian roulette. When dealing with exotic new materials, thin technical margins or high-energy systems, we don’t even know how many bullets are in the gun.

There are eight symptoms of groupthink. All of them need not be present for the process to influence decisions.
Eight Symptoms of Groupthink

Groupthink
“…a quick and easy way to refer to a mode of thinking that persons engage in when they are deeply involved in a cohesive in-group, when concurrence-seeking becomes so dominant that it tends to override critical thinking or realistic appraisal of alternative courses of action.”

—Irving I. Janis, 1982

1. Illusion of Invulnerability
When engineers raised the possibility of O-ring blow-by, it was said that this risk “was true of every other flight we have had.”

2. Belief in Inherent Morality of the Group
“I had the distinct feeling that we were in the position of having to prove that it was unsafe instead of the other way around.”

3. Collective Rationalization
“We were counting on the secondary O-ring to be the sealing O-ring under the worst case conditions.”
Eight Symptoms of Groupthink continued

4. Out-Group Stereotypes
   “My God, Thiokol, when do you want me to launch—next April?”

5. Self-Censorship
   A no-go recommendation below 53 °F at the pad became “Lower temperatures are in the direction of badness for O-rings.”

6. Illusion of Unanimity
   Silence is interpreted as agreement.

7. Direct Pressure on Dissenters
   “Take off your engineering hat and put on your management hat.”

8. Self-Appointed Mindguards
   Subject matter experts excluded from decision briefs and meetings.
Recommendations

1. Never use past success to redefine acceptable performance. Consider risk decision options after in-depth analysis and objective assessment of scenario-driven probability and severity.

2. Require systems to be proven safe and effective to operate to a formally acceptable risk level, rather than the opposite.

3. Prevent groupthink; know and avoid its symptoms. Appoint people to represent opposing views or ask everyone to voice their opinion before discussion.

4. Keep safety programs independent from those activities they evaluate.

5. Balance project schedule, milestones and operational tempo against available resources based on an impartial, comprehensive risk assessment.

6. Employ a rigorous systems engineering process. Seek a safe and balanced design in the face of opposing interests and conflicting restraints. Focus on assessments to optimize the overall design and not favor one system/subsystem at the expense of another.
Sources

Privacy Act Data Cover Sheet

To be used on all documents containing personal information

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Warfighter Culture OPT

“It is the responsibility of leadership to work intelligently with what is given, and not waste time fantasizing about a world of flawless people and perfect choices.”

Marcus Aurelius

19 Dec 2018
Culture – Defined

Culture is the non-physical operating environment that binds every human organization.

• Supports a wide range of informal rules and attitudes
• Profoundly affects how a particular unit works, trains, and fights

Marines
The Few. The Proud.
Marine Corps culture lags the civilian sector significantly WRT modern safety culture. This is highlighted within aviation. We have not evolved for several reasons.

- We are proud of our culture. Our culture wins battles. We don’t want to change.
- “Acceptable combat losses” may have colored tolerance for error.
- The idea that risk is “tactical” and safety initiatives are “non-tactical” may appeal to our warrior ethos.
- The military traditionally fears reporting.
- Military communication is top-down.
- The military focuses on who is causing the problem.

Civilian safety culture has evolved dramatically in the last 35 years:

- The civilian world asks; “What is the problem?”
- It encourages granular reporting and two-way communication which allows the commercial sector to more accurately answer this question.
2018 National Security Strategy Summary:

“Cultivate workforce talent. Recruiting, developing, and retaining a high-quality military and civilian workforce is essential for warfighting success. Cultivating a lethal, agile force requires more than just new technologies and posture changes; it depends on the ability of our warfighters and the Department workforce to integrate new capabilities, adapt warfighting approaches, and change business practices to achieve mission success.”

SECDEF
“Our Corps needs our officers to be forward thinking and forward looking agents of change; to see where current practices are either counterproductive or inefficient and not simply accept the status quo.”

CMC
Warfighter Culture – The Vision

- CMC (SD) will guide development efforts.

- Warfighter Culture initiatives will combine the best of Marine Corps culture and “just culture” fundamentals:
  
  - Input from the Lejeune Leadership Institute, CMC (SD) programs, various bottom-up reporting methods, and Culture Workshop experience
  
  - Elements of the 4th MAW SAFE Program which leverage the expertise of USMC reserve airline pilots and commercial aviation best practices
Warfighter Culture – Desire End State

➢ Warfighter Culture is:

- Warlike
- Mission effective
- Force preserving
- Open to dialogue
- Focused on excellence not focused on blame
- Encouraging of honest reporting
- Open-minded
- Forward looking

➢ Warfighter Culture accurately defines problems and works effectively to solve them.
Warfighter Culture – Program Background

➢ Commercial safety culture developed from airline cockpit resource management (CRM) methodologies:

• The seminal event for CRM: United Airlines Flight 173 was a scheduled flight from John F. Kennedy International Airport in New York City to Portland International Airport in Portland, Oregon, with a scheduled stop in Denver, Colorado. On December 28, 1978, the aircraft flying this route ran out of fuel and crashed in a suburban Portland neighborhood.

• Research following the crash determined that 80% of airline accidents involve human factors.

• This crash forced efforts to evolve pilot culture.
35 years later, the results of efforts to change airline culture have produced an industry which leads every safety standard.

- If United Airlines was 99.999% safe, they would crash an airplane every 4 days.

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Commercial aviation human factors practices have permeated throughout industry because human nature is common and does not change.

- Commercial aviation practices have not permeated Marine Corps aviation.
Present Culture

- Our present culture tends toward the punitive.

  - People make errors. Errors can cause mishaps.
  - Our organizational approach has been to seek out errors and identify the responsible individual. Individual punishment follows. This punitive approach does not solve the problem.
  - People function within systems designed by an organization. An individual may be at fault, but frequently the system is also at fault.
  - Punishing people without changing the system perpetuates the problem rather than solving it.
What can we do about it?

- Safety can and should be used as a strategic lever for cultural change.

- The 4th MAW SAFE program is an example of a new initiative already influencing Marine thinking. It is based on almost four decades of human factors study by the aviation industry and NASA.

- This program has been presented at WTI, the School of Aviation Safety Commander’s Course, and the Cockpit Resource Management Instructor’s (CRMI) Course.

- The SAFE program teaches “just” culture fundamentals and emphasizes doing the “right thing” (Safety Theory 2/Safety Management Systems (SMS)) vice not doing “the wrong thing” (Safety Theory 1/Punitive Culture).
The SAFE Program is relational because culture is about people.

Studies show programmatic approaches to cultural change are not fruitful.

• WTI student critique (Capt): “While the material could be perceived to be idealistic, conveyed it in a manner that made me feel like we could make a difference. It won't be popular in commands, it promotes speaking up and being a voice of reason. This presentation should be given at all levels of the SNCO/officer corps (not as a computer course; in person).”
Safety Theory 1 – Punitive Culture

- Safety is implicitly achieved when as few things as possible go wrong.
- Focus is on preventing negative actions.
- Safety Theory 1 says; “These guys did this bad thing. Don’t do that.”
Safety Theory 1 - Negative Training

Latent Failures

- Poor Leadership
- Funding constraints

Active Failures

- Poor crew pairing
- Inadequate training
- Inexperience
- Fatigue and distractions
- Violating SOPs
- Pushing limitations

- Inexperience
- Fatigue and distractions

- Poor Leadership
- Funding constraints

Enclosure 94
Safety Theory 2 and Warfighter Culture generates the greatest probability of a desirable outcome with intentionality – “Do the right thing.”

- Focuses on positive actions to ensure that as many things as possible go right – Safety Management System (SMS).
- Acknowledges that people are not perfect without blaming.
- Traps errors with Threat Error Management (TEM)
- Creates a safety net with HF/CRM.
Marines fight battles.

- We can’t wait for perfect situations.
- We must attack based on Commander’s Intent.

Safety Theory 2 supports this.

- Let’s people know when they are outside the lines.
- Facilitates repairing actions or continued aggressive actions with risk mitigation.
Safety programs, leadership, training and SOPs create systematic windows which decrease in size as we progress toward an outcome. We must pass safely through these windows in order to continue. We focus on doing “right” things. Each passing gate increases probabilities of safe outcomes, We recognize deviations earlier.
Safety Theory 1 vs. 2

- Safety theory 1 focuses on negative learning; “Don’t do that!”
  - Default is to continue unless things are very bad.
  - Does not explicitly put leaders to a continuation decision.
  - USMC cultural predispositions and stigmas oppose stopping.

- Safety theory 2 focuses on doing things correctly and positive reinforcement. It capitalizes on Marine Corps cultural discipline and integrity.
  - Default is to stop unless certain conditions are met.
  - The decision to stop is not personalized, it is institutionalized.
  - Safety is the by-product of the pursuit of excellence.
  - People learn better from positive reinforcement.
  - Emphasis on conditions-based continuation supports aggressive execution.
  - Emphasizes known human factors and relationships. Builds teams.
  - Combats the “zero-defect” mentality and inspires innovation.
Safety Theory 2 – The Stabilized Approach
Stabilized Approach: System Of Systems

2500′
- Cleared Approach
- Approach confirmed

1500′
- A/S below 180
- Gear Down
- Landing Checklist

1000′
- Verbalize deviations
- Final Configuration
- A/S +15/-5
- On G/S

500′
- Go Around for deviations
- Final Configuration
- A/S +15/-5
- On G/S

Go Around?

Combat Effective!

Continue only if conditions are met.

Enclosure 94
The Stabilized Approach: Why it Works

- Get into the window and the system works for you.
- It points you at the next window and its parameters.
- Gives early recognition of any negative trends.
- Turns the “Stop” call into a positive.
- Examples of The Stabilized Approach: the carrier pattern; a live fire exercise.
- Intentional emphasis on excellence.
- Helps to accurately identify problems.
Stabilized Approach Failures

Reasons why we fail:

• We don’t know the “window.”
• We make it happen, reinforcing failure – normalization of deviance.
• We don’t know the truth – cognitive bias.
• We don’t understand the problem – lack of open dialogue.
• We don’t stop – “Hack it!”
The Stabilized Approach: A Metaphor

- Command Climate
- USMC Programs
- Training programs
- SOPs

- Leadership
  - Planning
  - Time to prepare

- Preparation
  - Rest
  - Nutrition/hydration
  - Briefing
  - Environmentals
  - Equipment
  - Rehearsals

- Focus
  - Discipline
  - Skill
  - Adherence to policy

Success!
- Bombs on target
- Time on target

Let’s do it right!
Questions We Must Answer

Has the system failed the Marine or has the Marine failed the system?

- Is the window right?
- Is the equipment right?
- Are the systems right?
- Is there a mechanism to call “Stop!”?
- Do Marines know it?
- Is there a stigma to saying “Stop!” i.e. doing the right thing?
A just culture balances the need for an open and honest reporting environment with the desired end of a quality learning environment and culture. While the organization has a duty and responsibility to our Marines and sailors, those same Marines and sailors are held responsible for the quality of their choices.

Just culture requires a change in focus from errors and outcomes to system design and management of the behavioral choices of all Marines and sailors.

Our culture and the systems we design to bring that culture to bear on the mission can better serve our warfighters and help to generate greater combat power.
Keys To Success

- Honest, two-way communication at all levels of leadership.
- People not programs.
- Leadership not management.
1. CMC (SD) has recently observed numerous cultural programs/initiatives across the MAGTF which have been developed to address a litany of destructive behavioral concerns which threaten the force.

2. The 39th Executive Safety Force Preservation Board (ESFPB) has directed an examination of this subject IOT standardize efforts. CMC (SD) has been directed to provide a comprehensive problem statement and Courses of Action to the 40th ESFPB scheduled for 16 May 2019.

3. IAW direction, CMC (SD) will host a Safety Culture OPT tentatively scheduled for 12-14 Feb 2019 to synchronize efforts. The OPT will study methods and implementation strategies to advance MAGTF culture as we develop Marines at all levels. Discussions will include organization, structure, data collection and analysis, “Just Culture” initiatives, curriculum development, education, training, assessment, and mentoring.
Problem Framing

- Our technology evolved. This caused our tactics to evolve from linear warfare to maneuver warfare and the MAGTF. Our culture must now evolve and mature. This is exciting and necessary. We should be open-minded and enthusiastic about finding ways to generate more combat power per capita while developing the well-being of our Marines.
Our efforts will be cost negative by directly addressing critical, systemic organizational and manpower issues. Decreasing negative manpower costs and increasing retention through improved morale/experience will lead to lower recruiting and training costs and a more mature force more capable of high-level decision-making. This will increase combat effectiveness with fewer accidents and less negligent behavior.
Problem Framing

- Punitive vs Just Culture
Warfighting has changed. Modern conflict is more complex. Failure of our culture to evolve beyond the punitive culture of old contributes to significant personal friction for our Marines and our leaders.

- Suicide
- PTSD
- Sexual Harassment
- Social Media Management
Warfighter Culture - Considerations

➢ Culture W/S output stops at the O-5 level. This does not inform higher WRT systemic issues. Dialogue is constipated. All COAs must communicate output above the O-5 level – de-identified, for use in aggregation, problem framing, data analysis, and solution-oriented outputs. (Current efforts do not identify and address systemic issues.)

➢ False sense of urgency prioritizes completing the training over the quality of the training.

➢ HHQ must show subordinates that quality is our priority through fitreps and promotion boards.

➢ Unless a Marine willfully violates policies and procedures, we must examine the system in the case of negative outcomes.
Warfighter Culture - Considerations

- Is aviation the easiest place to start? Beta in aviation? Low hanging fruit? Two beta tests?

- Would we like the average age of the force to increase? Is this possible?
Warfighter Culture – Naming Conventions

➢ Higher does not like “Safe and Just culture.”

• Warfighting culture?
Warfighter Culture - COAs

- COA 1 – Current Culture W/S with better Manning (i.e. do almost nothing)

- COA 2 – Current Culture W/S with better Manning, with output to higher levels, with data aggregation, with better analysis, with problem framing entities which develop solutions and make recommendations for implementation through regular discussions with decision makers. Each element is necessary or a toothless entity will die over time as personalities change.
Warfighter Culture - COAs

COA 2 Cont’d:

1. Input
   • ASAP
   • GSAP
   • Surveys
   • CIRRAS

2. Center For Warfighting Culture (CWC)
   • Curricula Development
   • Inter/Intra-Departmental coordination
   • Training Management
   • Data Analysis
   • OPT Coordination – problem framing and COA Dev

“The creativity and talent of the American warfighter is our greatest enduring strength, and one we do not take for granted.” SECDEF

3. Education & Training
   • Engaging leaders
   • Facilitating Dialogue

4. Assessment - Culture Workshop
   • Assist Visits
   • Mentoring
Warfighter Culture - COAs

- COA 3 – Develop a department within an existing organization to make use of existing COMRELS, structure, and resources.
Warfighter Culture OPT - Participants

- CMC (SD)
- M&RA
- HQMC G-10
- TECOM
- EDCOM
- LLI
- Religious Programs
- Health Services
- MFR
- MARFORPAC
- MARFORs
- JAG?
- MCCLL
Questions?
Warfighter Culture

- Publications/Video/QR Cards
- Education/Training
- Assessment
- Reporting
- Systemic Changes
- Information Operations
LLPC Kadena AB
April 27th – 30th 2016

Enclosure 95

Unclassified

Lite Level Planning Calendar

Lat/Lon: 26-21N 127-46E
Time Offset: +0900

- Sun Above Horizon
- Moon Below Horizon
- Low Moonlight Level (< 0.0022 lux)
- High Moonlight Level (>= 0.0022 lux)
- Nautical Twilight
- Civil Twilight

Enclosure 95
clock, degree of circadian desynchrony (jet lag), physical health, additional duties, misuse of alcohol, caffeine, tobacco, or dietary supplements and adequacy of crew rest facilities. These factors must be understood by all concerned and appropriate countermeasures established to assure they do not reduce personnel readiness. FSs and AMSOs shall proactively establish an Aeromedical Adjunctive Training Program appropriate to their unit’s human factors risks. Appendix E provides minimum requirements for Aeromedical Adjunctive Training. Flight personnel should report any physical indisposition to superiors and assume flight duty only when fit to do so. Since an individual may frequently be the poorest judge of personal fitness, commanding officers shall ensure that flight personnel are adequately observed and appropriate temporary grounding action is taken when necessary. The following guidelines and requirements should be considered for all aspects of naval aviation.

8.3.2.1 Crew Rest and Sleep

8.3.2.1.1 Crew Rest for Flight Crew and Flight Support Personnel

Crew rest is the non-duty time before a flight duty period begins. Crew rest includes free time for meals, transportation, rest and shall include an opportunity for eight hours of uninterrupted sleep time for every 24-hour period. Crew rest does not begin until after termination of official duties and is required prior to reporting for preflight preparations. Flight crew shall not be scheduled for continuous alert and/or flight duty (required awake) in excess of 18 hours. However, if it becomes operationally necessary to exceed the 18-hour rule, 15 hours of continuous off-duty time shall be provided prior to scheduling the member for any flight duties. Flight and ground support personnel schedules shall be made with due consideration for watch standing, collateral duties, training, and off-duty activities. Crew rest can be reduced to less than 12 hours in order to maintain a 24-hour work/rest schedule, but a shortened crew rest period (for example to maintain circadian rhythm) shall always include an opportunity for 8-hours of uninterrupted sleep.

Note

If continuous awake duty time exceeds 16 hours, performance efficiency begins to drop. After 18 hours, performance efficiency rapidly declines to 75 percent of effectiveness or less. The loss of effectiveness is manifested by lapses in attention, slower reaction time, slowed information processing, decreased vigilance, and increased error frequency. Accident rates for just about every type of human activity increase after 18 hours of wakefulness, particularly during the night “circadian trough” when sleep would normally occur.

8.3.2.1.2 Circadian Rhythm

Circadian rhythms are cyclic fluctuations of numerous body functions that are set like a “biological clock” by daylight exposure and sleep/awake periods. Changing local sleep/awake periods or rapidly crossing more than three time zones disrupts circadian rhythms and can cause a marked decrease in performance. This condition, called “jet lag,” is compounded by illness, fatigue, dehydration, alcohol use, poor nutrition, or drugs, and is resolved only by accommodation to the new local time or sleep/awake period. The accommodation period can be estimated by allowing 1 day for every zone crossed in excess of 3. Accommodation begins when a new daily routine is established. During that period, aircrews are not grounded but can be expected to perform at a less than optimal level. Less intense flight profiles and close observation by the flight surgeon during the accommodation period may be desirable. Shift work, where individuals are required to work during the night for extended periods, requires even longer times for adaptation (up to 4 weeks). Individuals may never fully adapt to night shift work unless completely isolated from daylight exposure, and additional controls may be necessary for safe operations. Specific fatigue countermeasures to adapt to and minimize disruption of circadian desynchrony can be found in NAVMED P-6410 (01JAN00), Performance Maintenance During Continuous Flight Operations.
8.3.2.3 Nutrition

All flight and ground support personnel should be provided a positive program of information for the establishment and maintenance of good dietary habits. Failure to eat within 12 hours preceding end of flight may impair performance and ability to adequately control aircraft. Reducing diets should be under supervision of a flight surgeon. Nutrition and diet information is also available as NASTP Adjunctive Training (Appendix E) and can be provided by a Naval Aerospace Physiologist (NAP), AMSO, or FS.

8.3.2.3.1 Nutritional Supplements

A nutritional supplement is a product taken by mouth that contains a “dietary ingredient” intended to supplement the diet. The ingredients in these products may include vitamins, minerals, herbs or other botanicals, amino acids, protein, and substances such as enzymes, organ tissues, glandular extracts, and metabolites. Dietary supplements can also be extracts or concentrates, and may be found in many forms such as tablets, capsules, softgels, gelcaps, liquids, or powders, and food bars. Use of nutritional/dietary and other OTC supplements/products by flight personnel except those approved by BUMED is prohibited. Harmful effects are often associated when used in very high doses or in non-standard manner and virtually none are tested or assured safe in the aviation environment. The term “natural” does not mean it is safe. FSS shall be consulted to assist with making informed decisions regarding nutritional supplements. The use of nutritional supplements of all types shall be reported to the FS and recorded during every periodic physical examination or physical health assessment. See also policy in paragraph 8.3.2.5.a(6) for further information.

8.3.2.4 Exercise

Planned physical fitness programs promote health. All levels of command are encouraged to establish approved physical fitness programs for all personnel in accordance with OPNAVINST 6110.1. Aircrew shall ORM their recreational physical activities for risk of injury and/or fatigue and plan for adequate recovery time prior to resuming flying duties.

8.3.2.5 Drugs

Drugs are defined as any chemical that when taken into the body causes a physiological response. All flight and support personnel shall be provided appropriate information by a command drug abuse education program.

a. Legal drugs are those medically prescribed or legally purchased for treatment of illness. Guidance and flight restrictions are provided in the Naval Aerospace Medical Institute’s (NAMI) on-line Aeromedical Reference and Waiver Guide.

(1) Prescription drugs — Taking drugs prescribed by competent medical authority shall be considered sufficient cause for recommendation of grounding unless their use is specifically approved by a flight surgeon, or a waiver for specific drug use has been granted by CHNAVPERs or the CMC. Consideration shall be given to the removal of ground support personnel from critical duties, for the duration of the drug effects, if appropriate. Medicines such as antihistamines, antibiotics, narcotic pain relievers, etc., obtained by prescription for short term use to treat a self-limited condition shall be discarded if all are not used during the period of medication. Unused quantities of performance maintenance drugs (amphetamines or sleeping pills) shall be returned to the flight surgeon or medical clinic for purposes of strict accountability.

(2) Over-the-counter drugs — Because of the possibility of adverse side effects and unpredictable reactions, the use of over-the-counter drugs by flight personnel is prohibited unless specifically approved by a flight surgeon. Ground support personnel shall be briefed on the hazards of self-medication and should be discouraged from using such drugs.

(3) Alcohol — The well-recognized effects of excessive alcohol consumption are detrimental to safe operations (i.e., intoxication and hangover). Consumption of any type of alcohol is prohibited within 12 hours of any
mission brief or flight planning. Adherence to the letter of this rule does not guarantee a crewmember will be free from the effects of alcohol after a period of 12 hours. Alcohol can adversely affect the vestibular system for as long as 48 hours even when blood-alcohol content is zero. Special caution should be exercised when flying at night, over water, or in IMC. In addition to abstaining from alcohol for 12 hours prior to mission brief or flight planning, flightcrews shall ensure that they are free of hangover effects prior to flight. Detectable blood alcohol or symptomatic hangover shall be cause for grounding of flight personnel and the restriction of the activities of aviation ground personnel.

(4) **Tobacco** — Smoking has been shown to impair night vision, dark adaptation, and increase susceptibility to hypoxia. Smoking is hazardous to nonsmokers, as the effects occur whether smoke is inhaled directly or secondarily. Further guidance on smoking is contained in paragraph 7.1.9 of this instruction.

(5) **Caffeine** — Excessive intake of caffeine from coffee, tea, cola, etc., can cause excitability, sleeplessness, loss of concentration, decreased awareness, and dehydration. Caffeine intake of 450 mg per day (3 to 4 cups of drip coffee) is the recommended maximum intake. Caffeine use when managed appropriately, can aid in maximizing performance during long sorts or periods of sustained operations, however, the caffeine effect is maximized in individuals who are not habituated to its effects as regular users.

(6) **Nutritional/Dietary and other Over-The-Counter (OTC) Supplements and Products** — The use of nutritional/dietary and other OTC supplements/products by flight personnel except those approved by BUMED is prohibited. Guidance and restrictions are provided in the Naval Aerospace Medical Institute’s (NAMI) on-line Aeromedical Reference and Waiver Guide.

b. The use of illicit drugs is prohibited.

### 8.3.2.6 Illness

Acute minor illnesses, such as upper respiratory infections, vomiting, or diarrhea can produce serious impairment of flight personnel. All illnesses shall be evaluated by competent medical authority. The submission of DD 2992, Medical Recommendation for Flying or Special Operational Duty, shall be accomplished placing flight personnel in a down status when the individual has been found disqualified by medical authority. While any medical authority may place flight personnel in a down status utilizing the DD 2992, returning flight personnel to an up status utilizing the DD 2992 shall be issued only by an FS. Where an FS is not available, DD 2992 shall be handled in accordance with BUMEDINST 6410.9. Flight personnel who are hospitalized shall be evaluated in accordance with MANMED and current BUMED directives and have a DD 2992 issued prior to flight. Ground support personnel should be similarly monitored. Aircrew shall not fly for at least 48 hours after general, spinal, or epidural anesthetic. Return to flying status thereafter shall be upon the recommendation of a flight surgeon and at the discretion of the commanding officer.

### 8.3.2.7 Dental Care

Dental procedures that involve the use of local injectable drugs (e.g., Novocain) shall be cause for grounding for a period of 12 hours. Use of intravenous sedatives shall require grounding for 24 hours. Dental Class III except for asymptomatic third molars is generally considered cause for grounding except on the advice of a Dental officer.

### 8.3.2.8 Pregnancy

a. Pregnancy is considered disqualifying for flying duties. Because of the real and unknown medical hazards of flight, flight personnel shall consult with their flight surgeon when they first suspect they are pregnant. Aircrew members who are confirmed to be pregnant are grounded. Notification shall be submitted to the aviation unit commanding officer via DD 2992 and to NAVOPMEDINST DET NAVAEROMEDINST (Code 342) (NAMI) via an abbreviated aeromedical summary. Aircrew members may request a waiver to continue their flying duties while pregnant. Following evaluation by the flight surgeon and obstetric care provider, and communication with NAMI, a Local Board of Flight Surgeons shall be convened to consider the aircrew member’s request for a
waiver to continue flying while pregnant. If the pregnancy is considered uncomplicated, NAMI concurs and the Local Board of Flight Surgeons determines the member meets requirements for a waiver, an aeromedical clearance notice shall be issued with the restrictions mandated in the following sections. The Flight Surgeon shall submit an aeromedical summary to Naval Operational Medical Institute (NOMI). The procedures and requirements for waiver submission are contained in Aeromedical Reference and Waiver Guide at the NAVOPMEDINST DET NAVAEROMEDINST (Code 342) website.

b. Designated Naval Aviators who are authorized to fly during pregnancy shall perform flight duties in a Medical Service Group 3 capacity only.

**Note**

A student naval aviator (SNA) shall not fly/assume flight controls with a Medical Service Group 3 pilot and therefore is prohibited from flying training missions with a pregnant pilot.

c. Flying during pregnancy is prohibited in single-piloted aircraft, ejection seat aircraft, high performance aircraft that will operate in excess of 2gs, aircraft involved in shipboard operations or flights with cabin altitudes that exceed 10,000 feet.

d. Clearance will be valid only until the start of the third trimester. Participation in NASTP or other survival programs is not permitted. If NASTP qualifications expire during the pregnancy, clearance for continued flying shall not be granted beyond the date of expiration of those qualifications.

e. Following completion of the pregnancy and return to full duty, a post-grounding physical shall be submitted to NAVOPMEDINST DET NAVAEROMEDINST (Code 342) for endorsement. This submission shall include information regarding any complications encountered during pregnancy as well as the health of the child and mother following delivery.

f. If the aircrew member becomes pregnant during aviation training prior to designation as an Aircrewman, Naval Aviator, Naval Flight Officer, or Aeromedical Specialist, she shall be grounded until after completion of the pregnancy and return to normal full duty.

g. Normal uncomplicated pregnancy in female air traffic controllers is not considered physically disqualifying in itself. Specific duty modifications during the pregnancy if required should be managed locally.

h. Additional guidance that applies is provided in OPNAVINST 6000.1 series Guidelines Concerning Pregnant Servicewomen.

### 8.3.2.9 Emotional Upset/Excessive Stress

Stress is a component of normal living, but excessive stress levels can manifest as mood and behavior changes and lead to deteriorating performance and chronic health effects. Commanding officers must remain alert to the emotional and physical status of assigned personnel and take corrective action as may be necessary either for individuals or particular groups (i.e., referral for professional evaluation, short standoff from flight duties, rest and recreation, leave, etc.).

**Note**

Commanding officers and flight surgeons shall comply with applicable directives pertaining to mental health evaluation of servicemembers (see SECNAVINST 6320.24, Mental Health Evaluations of Members of the Armed Forces). Individuals who fall under “Military Whistleblower Protection” guidelines (SECNAVINST 5370.7) may require additional administrative procedures in conjunction with evaluation. Commanding officers are encouraged to consult with local flight surgeons and legal officers.
8.3.2.15 Dehydration

Of all causes of fatigue, one of the most treatable is dehydration. Early stages of dehydration can lead to emotional alterations and impaired judgment. Ingestion of plain water throughout the day will reduce probability of dehydration and resultant fatigue. Heat and dehydration information is available as NASTP Adjunctive Training (Appendix E) and can be provided by an NAP, AMSO, or FS.

8.3.2.16 Simulator Sickness

Simulator exposure can cause perceptual sensory changes that may compromise safety. The experience of symptoms such as nausea, disorientation, and sweating has occurred in fighter, attack, patrol, and helicopter simulators. Symptoms of simulator sickness may occur during simulator flight and last several hours after exposure. In some cases, the onset of symptoms has been delayed as much as 18 hours. The symptoms have occurred in both full motion and fixed simulators to pilots and other aircrew as well as instructors. Preliminary data suggest that more experienced flight personnel may be at greater risk, as well as individuals who are new to the simulator. Flight personnel exhibiting symptoms of simulator sickness should consult with a Flight Surgeon prior to returning to flight duties.

8.3.2.17 Anthropometric Requirements

Applicants and designated flight personnel shall meet the anthropometric standards per OPNAVINST 3710.37 series. Refer to NAVAIRINST 3710.9 series for specific aircraft cockpit anthropometric measurement limitations.

**WARNING**

- Any person flying in an ejection seat aircraft whose nude body weight is below or above the COMNAVAIRSYSCOM-certified crew member weights for an ejection seat is at increased risk for serious injury or death from ejection. COMNAVAIRSYSCOM-certified weights are depicted in Figure 8-9.

- Any person flying in a rotary wing or tiltrotor aircraft whose nude body weight is below or above the COMNAVAIRSYSCOM-certified crew member weights for a crash force attenuating seat is at increased risk for serious injury or death during hard/crash landing. COMNAVAIRSYSCOM-certified weights are depicted in Figure 8-10.

8.3.3 Performance Maintenance During Continuous and Sustained Operations

Operational commitments may necessitate continuous and/or sustained operations in which sleep and circadian rhythms are disrupted, leading to potentially hazardous fatigue. NAVMED P-6410 (01 Jan 2000), Performance Maintenance During Continuous Flight Operations, A Guide for Flight Surgeons, provides background on the subject, strategies for fatigue reduction, and guidance in the use of sleep-inducing and anti-fatigue medications ("no-go pills" and "go-pills") in aircrew. Commanding officers, in consultation with their Flight Surgeons, are authorized to use any of the strategies described in the guide when mission requirements and operational risk management indicate use would be appropriate. The use of stimulants and/or sedatives shall only be authorized following the commanding officer’s consultation with the wing commander or equivalent, and the flight surgeon. The flight surgeon, furthermore, shall have consulted with his/her supervisor in the aeromedical chain of command. See also paragraphs 8.3.2.1 and 8.3.2.2. Optimally, aircrew should be pre-tested using specific medications to determine
3.6 EMPLOYMENT OF NAVAL AVIATORS BY CIVILIAN CONTRACTORS

Civilian contractors to the Federal Government cannot legally employ a naval officer on the active list to give flight demonstrations of aircraft intended for the United States Government.

3.7 COMMAND

A naval aircraft or formation of naval aircraft shall be flown under the command of a pilot in command, mission commander, or formation leader, as appropriate, and so designated by the reporting custodian or higher authority. The status of each individual participating in the mission or formation shall be clearly briefed and understood prior to takeoff and must be indicated as required by DOD FLIP General Planning. When a flight schedule is published, the pilot in command, mission commander, or formation leader shall be specifically designated for each aircraft or formation, as appropriate. Reporting custodians shall establish minimum requirements of initial qualification and requalifications for each model aircraft in their custody and for each flight phase and/or mission normal to the aircraft models (e.g., day solo, night solo, functional check, FCLP, air combat maneuvers (ACM), night combat air patrol (CAP), intercepts, airborne early warning (AEW), barriers, etc.). They shall be guided by the requirements of this instruction where applicable and by appropriate NATOPS manuals. Flight personnel meeting those requirements may be considered qualified in model and phase and are eligible for designation as pilot in command, mission commander, or formation leader for a specific mission.

3.7.1 Pilot in Command

Pilot in command refers to the pilot of an individual aircraft. The pilot in command is responsible for the safe, orderly flight of the aircraft and well-being of the crew. The pilot in command may also be the mission commander or formation leader when so designated. Pilot in command should not be confused with the various qualifications defined in Chapter 12. If there is no NATOPS manual for a particular model aircraft or if an existing manual fails to set forth specific initial qualifications and currency requirements, a pilot shall not be designated as pilot in command unless the pilot has made at least two takeoffs and landings and logged 5 hours of pilot time in the same model aircraft within the preceding 90 days. Also, lacking NATOPS guidance for a specific aircraft, 10 hours first pilot time in model is required for initial qualification. Pilots meeting the criteria may be considered qualified in model and phase and are then eligible for designation as pilot in command. In the absence of direct orders from higher authority cognizant of the mission, responsibility for starting or continuing a mission with respect to weather or any other condition affecting the safety of the aircraft rests with the pilot in command. The authority and responsibility of the pilot in command shall not be transferred during flight. It shall not be transferred to another individual except as required by emergency, operational necessity, or as directed by the commanding officer of the unit to which the aircraft is attached. The authority and responsibility of a pilot in command is independent of rank or seniority in relation to other persons participating in the mission or flight except for the following.

3.7.1.1 Officer in Tactical Command Embarked

Wing, group, or squadron commander, if embarked on a mission involving aircraft of their command, retains full authority and responsibility regarding command, including the mission in which participating.

3.7.1.2 Flag or General Officer Embarked

The pilot in command of an aircraft with a flag or general officer eligible for command at sea or in the field embarked as a passenger shall be subject to the orders of such flag or general officer in accordance with U.S. Navy Regulations. When such an embarked passenger exercises authority to command the aircraft, that passenger thereby assumes full responsibility for the safe and orderly conduct of the flight. The embarked passenger shall give due consideration to the judgment of the pilot in command regarding items of flight safety such as hazardous weather and aircraft/crew limitations. Flying rule violations, accident reports, and any other actions arising out of the flight will be referred to the embarked passenger as the responsible commander of the aircraft.
Note
The provisions of paragraphs 3.7.1.1 and 3.7.1.2 shall not be used to circumvent normal NATOPS qualification procedures if the officer desires to physically pilot the aircraft. Flights that require a NATOPS-qualified crew shall not be physically piloted by any individual not so qualified; however, the flight may be directed by an officer in tactical command embarked who is not NATOPS qualified.

3.7.1.3 Flight Control Station
The pilot in command shall occupy a flight control station during critical phases of flight (i.e., takeoff, landing, formation flight, functional checkflight (FCF), degraded aircraft performance regimes, etc.). During an Instructor Under Training (IUT) flight in a multi-piloted aircraft, the pilot in command or a qualified/qualifying IUT Instructor pilot shall occupy one of the flight control stations during critical phases of flight, provided the pilot in command remains in the flight station.

3.7.2 Formation Leader
A formation of two or more naval aircraft shall be under the direction of a formation leader who is authorized to pilot naval aircraft. The formation leader may also be the mission commander when so designated. The status of each member of the formation shall be clearly briefed and understood prior to takeoff. The formation leader is responsible for the safe and orderly conduct of the formation.

3.7.3 Mission Commander
The mission commander shall be a properly qualified naval aviator or NFO designated by appropriate authority. The mission commander may exercise command over single naval aircraft or formations of naval aircraft. The mission commander shall be responsible for all phases of the assigned mission except those aspects of safety of flight that are related to the physical control of the aircraft and fall within the prerogatives of the pilot in command. Mission commander qualifications shall be outlined in appropriate NATOPS manuals. The mission commander shall direct a coordinated plan of action and be responsible for effectiveness of the mission.

3.7.4 Instructors
In those aviation commands where training is conducted, the commanding officer is authorized to designate highly qualified naval aviators and NFOs as instructors. Instructor duties shall be specifically delineated by the unit commanding officer (CO) in formal directives. The instructor will be charged with authority and responsibility to provide appropriate direction to students (naval aviation or NFO) to ensure safe and successful completion of each training mission. The exact function, authority, and responsibility of the individual flight instructor are dependent upon the training mission and the crew assigned as issued in approved training syllabuses. On those training missions where a pilot under instruction is the pilot in command, instructor guidance shall be advisory in nature and under no circumstance shall pilots in command be relieved of their authority and responsibility as outlined in paragraph 3.7.1. Termination of the training or evaluation portions of the flight for reasons of safety, unsatisfactory performance, or material discrepancy shall be the instructor’s prerogative.

3.8 CREW RESOURCE MANAGEMENT
The objective of the Crew Resource Management (CRM) Program is to integrate the instruction of specifically defined behavioral skills throughout Navy and Marine Corps aviation training, and to integrate the effective application of these behavioral skills into operational aviation procedures wherever appropriate. CRM training will increase mission effectiveness, minimize crew preventable error, maximize aircrew coordination, and optimize risk management.
3.8.1 Critical Behavioral Skills

The critical behavioral skills that form the basis of CRM training are:

a. Decision making. The ability to choose a course of action using logical and sound judgment based on available information. Effective decision making requires:
   (1) Assessing the situation.
   (2) Verifying information.
   (3) Identifying solutions.
   (4) Anticipating decision consequences.
   (5) Making the decision.
   (6) Telling others of the decision and rationale.
   (7) Evaluating the decision.

b. Assertiveness. An individual's willingness to actively participate, state, and maintain a position, until convinced by the facts that other options are better. Assertiveness is respectful and professional, used to resolve problems appropriately, and to improve mission effectiveness and safety.

c. Mission Analysis. The ability to develop short-term, long-term, and contingency plans and to coordinate, allocate, and monitor crew and aircraft resources. Effective planning leads to flight conduct that removes uncertainty, increases mission effectiveness, and enhances safety.

d. Communication. The ability to clearly and accurately send and acknowledge information, instructions, or commands, and provide useful feedback. Effective communication is vital to ensure that all crewmembers understand aircraft and mission status.

e. Leadership. The ability to direct and coordinate the activities of other crewmembers or wingmen, and to encourage the crew to work together as a team. There are two types of leadership:
   (1) Designated Leadership — Leadership by authority, crew position, rank, or title. This is the normal mode of leadership.
   (2) Functional Leadership — Leadership by knowledge or expertise. Functional leadership is temporary and allows the most qualified individual to take charge of the situation.

f. Adaptability/Flexibility. The ability to alter a course of action based on new information, maintain constructive behavior under pressure, and adapt to internal and external environmental changes. The success of a mission depends upon the crew's ability to alter behavior and dynamically manage crew resources to meet situational demands.

g. Situational Awareness. The degree of accuracy by which one's perception of the current environment mirrors reality. Maintaining a high level of situational awareness will better prepare crews to respond to unexpected situations.
3.8.2 Effective CRM Training

Optimal CRM training is integrated, research-based, and skill-oriented, incorporating the Information, Demonstration, Practice, and Feedback Instructional Methodology. The success or failure of Crew Resource Management rests ultimately with each individual performing duties as an aircrew member in naval aircraft. Naval Aircrew shall exhibit thorough knowledge of self, aircraft, team, environment, the seven critical skills, and risk to employ sound and logical judgement in the prevention of human errors. Human error is the leading causal factor in aviation mishaps. Additional human error-based training should complement CRM training. More information is available through the U.S. Navy CRM website at https://www.netc.navy.mil/nascweb/crm/crm.htm.

3.9 OPERATIONAL-RISK MANAGEMENT

Operational-Risk Management (ORM) is a systematic, decision making process used to identify and manage hazards that endanger naval resources. ORM is a tool used to make informed decisions by providing the best baseline of knowledge and experience available. Its purpose is to increase operational readiness by anticipating hazards and reducing the potential for loss, thereby increasing the probability for success to gain the competitive advantage in combat. The integration of the ORM process into the planning and execution of everyday operations is required by OPNAVINST 3500.39 and is useful not only in naval aviation, but applies throughout the warfighting spectrum.

3.9.1 ORM Process Description

a. ORM employs a five-step process:
   (1) Identify hazards.
   (2) Assess hazards.
   (3) Make risk decisions.
   (4) Implement controls.
   (5) Supervise.

b. The ORM process is utilized on three levels based upon time and assets available.
   (1) Time-critical: A quick mental review of the five-step process when time does not allow for any more (i.e., in-flight mission/situation changes).
   (2) Deliberate: Experience and brain storming are used to identify hazards and is best done in groups (i.e. aircraft moves, fly on/off).
   (3) In-depth: More substantial tools are used to thoroughly study the hazards and their associated risk in complex operations (i.e., Weapons Det).

c. The ORM process is guided by the four principles:
   (1) Accept risk when benefits outweigh the costs.
   (2) Accept no unnecessary risk.
   (3) Anticipate and manage risk by planning.
   (4) Make risk decisions at the right level.
CHAPTER 8

Aeromedical and Survival

8.1 GENERAL

To improve the survivability of flight personnel, CNO (N98) has implemented the aircrew survivability enhancement program (ASEP). Sub-elements of this program are aviation life support systems (ALSS), CBRND, safety, human performance, and training. Guidelines and requirements contained here are considered minimum. Recommendations for changes or improvement in equipment, procedures, or training shall be addressed via the chain of command to COMNAVAIRFOR (N455) for evaluation and, if appropriate, implementation.

8.2 AVIATION LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEMS

The safety and survival equipment/requirements specified in paragraphs 8.2.1, 8.2.2, 8.2.3, and 8.2.4 of this manual are minimum requirements. Systems description, limits, procedures, deviations and authorization requiring a flight clearance shall be specified in an Interim Clearance (IFC), NATIP or NATOPS flight manual for the individual T/M/S aircraft. The latest equipment for use by aircrew personnel and passengers for flight in all naval aircraft is listed in Aviation Crew Systems manuals, NAVAIR 13-1-6.1 through NAVAIR 13-1-6.10, and NAVAIR Publications: NA 16-30PRC90-2, NA 16-30PRC149-1, NA 16-35PRC112-1, NA 16-35PRC112-1-1, NA 16-30URT140-1, and NA 16-35AVS9-4.

8.2.1 Aircrew Personal Protective Equipment Requirements

8.2.1.1 Aircrew

Note

• All Aircrew shall perform a Pre-Flight and Post-Flight Inspection of their Aircrew Personal Protective Equipment.

• Items below marked * may be omitted by flight personnel flying in rotary wing executive transport mission aircraft and those in fixed-wing cargo/transport class aircraft if such flight does not involve shipboard operations and omission is approved by the commanding officer.

*a. Protective helmet — The helmet shall be 100 percent covered with white reflective tape except as modified by approved aircrew system changes. Up to 30 square inches of light-colored reflective tape may be applied so long as the white tape remains visible from all directions. The use of reflective tape may degrade night vision device (NVD) performance. Temporary, nonreflective cloth covers may be worn over the reflective tape.

*b. Aircrew safety/flipper boots.

*c. Fire-resistant (aramid) flight gloves.

*d. Fire-resistant flight suit (aramid) — Aramid or cotton-type undergarments shall be worn. Suitable fire-resistant unit issue clothing (aramid) may be substituted for the flight suit for flight personnel in non-ejection seat aircraft.

*e. Identification tags — Two tags on a chain worn around the neck; alternately one tag may be laced into the boot, and the other carried elsewhere on the person.
CNAF M-3710.7

*f.* Survival knife — Do not wear exposed or attached to the life preserver.

*g.* Personal survival kit — Appropriate to the area of operations.

*h.* Signal device — Required for all night flights and flights over water or sparsely populated areas.

*i.* Survival Vest — The incorporation of inflatable life preservers shall be worn in accordance with item n. and o.

j. Survival radios and beacons.

   (1) Survival radios.

      (a) An approved voice-capable survival radio shall be carried by each aircrewman on all flights, unless otherwise directed by aircraft NATOPS manuals.

      (b) A voice-capable radio shall be packed with all multiplace rafts.

   (2) Emergency beacons.

      (a) An approved automatically actuated line-of-sight emergency beacon shall be installed in all ejection seats. Emergency beacon shall remain automatically actuated unless the aircraft will be operated in hostile fire areas.

      (b) Beyond-the-line-of-sight, emergency beacon shall be packed with all multiplace rafts carried on board aircraft when performing extended overwater flights outside of normal oceanic air traffic routes.

k. Flashlight — Required for all night flights.

l. **Antiexposure suits** — Final determination with regard to actual wearing of antiexposure suits shall be made by the commanding officer (CO) or officer in charge (OIC) of the aviation unit concerned. The decision will be based on an operational risk management (ORM) analysis and take all pertinent factors into account (e.g., class aircraft, type and duration of assigned mission, ambient cockpit temperatures and environment factors, suit wearability, combat versus noncombat environment, availability of SAR resources, and ALSS accessible to all personnel onboard the aircraft); refer to Figure 8-1. The latest available type continuous-wear or quick-donning antiexposure suits, as appropriate, shall be provided for flight personnel of naval aircraft when in the event of a mishap there would be a significant risk of water entry and when either of the following two conditions prevail:

   (1) The water temperature is 50 °F or below.

   (2) The outside air temperature (OAT) is 32 °F or below (based on the wind chill factor corrected temperature (see Figure 8-2)).

Note

- **Actual determination as to when anti-exposure suits must be worn by flight personnel shall be determined by the CO or OIC. However, it is strongly recommended that anti-exposure suit use be mandatory when either of the above two criteria are met. The threat of lethal cold shock is very significant under these conditions and occurs within the first two to three minutes following immersion.**

- **Flight personnel have the option to wear the provided anti-exposure suits as a personal decision whenever they deem circumstances merit their use.**
COLD WATER IMMERSED FUNCTIONAL EXPOSURE LIMITS BY TYPE OF EXPOSURE PROTECTION

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Note 1: All clothing configurations include aircrew safety boots, standard wool socks, HGU-84/P helmet, CWU-27/P flight coverall
Note 2: OTS ensembles are configured for tactical flight and also include CMU-33/P survival harness, PCU-56/P torso harness, CSU-13/B/P anti-G suit

Figure 8-1. Antiexposure Suit Requirements (Sheet 1 of 2)
CAUTION

This table shows estimated Immersed Functional Exposure Limits based on laboratory tests and simulations. Actual functional Exposure limits will vary based on the individual personal fitness including rest, meals, activity level, injuries and mental attitude and factors such as sea state, ambient air temperature, and total immersed time.

Note

• This table depicts predicted Functional Exposure Limits and not Survival Time.

• Predictions are based on body fat/weight combinations of:
  8% @ 155 lbs, 11-14% @ 166 lbs, 15-18% @ 177 lbs,
  19-26% @ 193 lbs, 27% @ 216 lbs.

USING TABLE TO MAKE OPERATIONAL DECISIONS

1. Consult with Operations to determine likely alert-to-rescue time. Allow for rescue of all aircrew.

2. Determine the coldest water temperature (rounding down) of which you will be flying.

3. Choose the body fat range that most closely resembles you, underestimating rather than overestimating.

4. Determine functional exposure limit by matching the water temperature row with the type of individual exposure protection available.

Example:

An 18% body fat aircrewman is scheduled for an unescorted night flight with a total of five personnel that will depart NAS Norfolk and terminates approximately three hours later on a carrier at sea. The coldest water temperature over which the crew will fly is 53 degrees. Operations estimates SAR time to be approx 1 hour and 30 minutes to arrive on station. Taking into account 1 hour to locate the survivors and an additional 1 hour and 15 minutes to rescue all five crew members, the total in water time would be 225 minutes for the last crewmember. Thus, he needs to select clothing that will protect him for no less than 225 minutes. The aircrewman has been issued the CWU-62/P, CWU-23/P liner and CWU-43, CWU-44 underwear.

The aircrewman selects the “15-18%” body fat data range and 50 degree water temperature (rounding down). Based on the table, he determines that he can wear the underwear without the liner under the CWU-62/P to last for the 225 minutes estimated it will take for the SAR rescue.
Figure 8-6. AFRL DCS Risk Assessment Model (100% Pre-Oxygenation and Mild Activity)

8.2.4.2 Pressurized Aircraft

Figure 8-7 governs the use of oxygen equipment in pressurized aircraft other than tactical jet aircraft flown above 10,000 feet aircraft altitude. Oxygen shall be used when cabin altitude exceeds 10,000 feet except as modified by paragraph 8.2.4.3.

8.2.4.3 Ejection Seat Aircraft

Oxygen shall be used by all occupants from takeoff to landing. If mission duration exceeds LOX availability, aircrew may secure the oxygen system as necessary. Emergency bailout bottles, when provided, shall be connected prior to takeoff.

**WARNING**

- Ejection without the oxygen mask or visor connected to the helmet may result in significant injury or death.
- Cabin altitude must be checked to ensure aircraft is following pressurization schedule prior to removing the mask at flight altitudes exceeding 10,000 feet.

**Note**

The oxygen mask may be removed for brief periods of time for adjustment or intake of water/food.
8.2.5 Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, Defense (CBRND) Protective Equipment

Appropriate CBRND protective equipment (to include theater/regionally prescribed medical counter-measures) shall be available for all flight personnel on flights into, from, or in the vicinity of identified CB threat and/or CB weapons use. Refer to NAVAIR 00-80T-121, Chemical and Biological Defense NATOPS Manual. CBRND training is a Level B — Recommended Deployment Work-Up Training found in Appendix E.

8.3 HUMAN PERFORMANCE AND AEROMEDICAL QUALIFICATIONS FOR FLIGHT AND FLIGHT SUPPORT

8.3.1 General

Operational readiness and aviation safety are enhanced by assuring that flight crew and flight support personnel achieve and maintain an optimal state of physical and emotional health. It is important that personnel are adequately rested and that conditions which contribute to fatigue, impair health, decrease performance and increase mishap potential are reduced or eliminated. This section outlines basic guidelines that individuals and all levels of supervision and command can use to attain and monitor personnel performance.

Note

- The senior aviation commander responsible for conduct of air operations may exceed these guidelines, should operational necessity dictate. Exceeding the guidelines increases the probability of crew fatigue, causing impaired judgment and reduced performance. When exceeding the guidelines, commanders shall manage the increased risk created by crew fatigue. Consultation with the Flight Surgeon (FS) or Aeromedical Safety Officer (AMSO) is strongly recommended in the development and implementation of appropriate risk controls.

- Landing signal officers (LSOs) shall meet the physiological standards required for aircrew in a flight status to perform the duties of a controlling or backup LSO. Maladies or injuries that do not impair mental acuity (such as minor sprains, etc.), but that preclude normal flight status may be waived by the flight surgeon on a case-by-case basis.

- Commanding officers and flight surgeons shall comply with applicable directives pertaining to mental health evaluation of servicemembers. (See DoD Directive 6490.1, Mental Health Evaluations of Members of the Armed Forces that is implemented by SECNAVINST 6320.24). Individuals who fall under “MilitaryWhistleblower Protection” guidelines per SECNAVINST 5370.7 may require additional administrative procedures in conjunction with evaluation. Commanding officers are encouraged to consult with local flight surgeons and legal officers.

- UAS flightcrews should comply with all sections of paragraph 8.3.

8.3.2 Factors Affecting Aircrew Performance

Numerous complex factors affect the performance of flight and support personnel. Commanders and mission planners must assess the impact of factors that contribute to operational fatigue and reduce aircrew performance. The principle factors include: weather, extremes of temperature, nighttime operations, use of vision imaging systems, mission delays, personal equipment & ALSS, duration of the duty period, quality and duration of sleep (prior to duty), number of hours flown during the previous several duty periods, time of day relative to the body’s internal circadian
primary flight instruments, call a “knock it off (with reason),” and conduct an IMC nose-high recovery. (T-1).

3.28.3.3. After approximately 5 seconds, or sooner if airspace or altitude restrictions require, the flight lead will command “roll left (or right), 30 down”. (T-1). All aircraft will roll inverted and accomplish the military power, 3-4 G wings-level pull to place the bore cross at the 30 degree nose-low, then roll upright on the reference heading. (T-1). Once intra-flight deconfliction is assured, pilots will repeat the horizon crosscheck and visibility assessment while maintaining the 30 degree-nose low attitude. (T-1).

3.28.3.4. If during any portion of the maneuver a flight member determines that the visibility or horizon reference is unsuitable for tactical maneuvering per AFI-11-214 guidance, the flight lead will modify the training profile and either transition to non-NVG formations or NVG formation tactics limited to AFI11-214 “Restricted Maneuvering” guidelines. (T-1). Pilots will continually modify profiles or airspace utilization throughout the sortie if conditions change and no longer permit the planned maneuvering. (T-1). Flight training modification includes: restricted maneuvering limitations (with or without NVGs) per AFI-11-214, a non-NVG formation IMC game plan, or accomplishing a brief alternate mission without NVGs.

3.28.3.5. Pilots will continually cross-check visually perceived attitude aided by NVGs with frequent cross-checks of primary flight instruments throughout the mission. (T-1).

3.28.4. NVG Qualifications. Pilots will not wear NVGs in flight unless they are NVG qualified or a qualified NVG IP is in the flight (ratio of one NVG IP per non-NVG qualified pilot). (T-1). F-16B/D Familiarization flights are authorized but the unit must ensure appropriate academics are accomplished and an NVG IP is in the front seat. (T-1).

3.28.5. Radio Calls. All flight members will make a radio call when donning, raising, or stowing NVGs. (T-1).

3.28.6. Obstacle/Intra-Flight Deconfliction. When flying in route, only one flight member per element will don/raise/stow NVGs at a time. (T-1). Flight leads will call turns if forced to maneuver while flight members are donning/raising/stowing NVGs. (T-1).

3.28.7. Takeoffs/Landings. Pilots must stow or raise NVGs during takeoff until at or above 2,000 feet AGL in climbing or level flight and only in VMC. (T-1). Pilots must stow or raise NVGs no later than 5 minutes prior to landing unless NVGs are necessary to handle an emergency or mission requirements dictate. (T-1).

3.28.8. NVG Use during Air to Air Refueling (AAR). Pilots must stow or raise NVGs no later than the stern position and resume NVG use no earlier than boom disconnect. (T-1).

Section 3F—Other

3.29. Targeting Pod Operations. Pilots will not use the TGP for anything other than navigational SA below 1,000 feet AGL (e.g., Only VID aircraft, designate for weapons delivery, etc. above 1,000 feet AGL). (T-1). (USAFCW, Test, and AATC: Minimum altitudes for TGP operations are established in WIC or test syllabus requirements, continuation training plans or operational test and evaluation requirements).
(5) Air Combat Maneuvering (ACM) is prohibited while wearing NVGs.

(6) Tanking while using NVGs is prohibited.

(7) External lighting shall be set as appropriate for wingmen.

(8) If NVG degradation occurs, and switching to the alternate battery does not immediately rectify the problem, NVG operations for that aircrew must cease. In this case the following will immediately apply:

(a) The aircraft lighting of other aircraft in the flight is set to allow all aircrew to maintain visual contact.

(b) Cockpit lighting shall be set to a level satisfactory to both aircrew.

(c) MINALT >3000' AGL.

(9) Formation Flights. NVGs assist the aircrew in situational awareness during formation and rendezvous operations. There exists several severe limitations to NVG performance that all aircrew must brief. The following are restrictions to NVG formation and rendezvous operations:

(a) Rendezvous:

1. NVGs may be worn during rendezvous operations; however, they shall not be used as the primary source of range, bearing, and closure rate information. The rendezvousing aircraft, especially during initial acquisition using the NVGs, shall closely monitor cockpit instruments for closure, bearing, altitude indications, and visual image correlation.

2. Avoid rendezvousing directly into a low-angle moon or bright cultural lights as the illumination from these sources significantly reduces NVG performance. Maximum closure for running rendezvous is 25 KCAS inside of 1 NM. Aircraft Carrier (CVN) rendezvous shall be conducted with a maximum of 25 KCAS excess airspeed decreasing to co-speed within 0.5 NM.
PMA-202 Night Vision Cueing and Display 500th unit delivery

From Amie Blade AIR-1.0 Public Affairs Officer   Feb 28, 2019

Capt. David Padula (left) takes delivery of the 500th NVCD unit from a representative of Rockwell Collins Elbit Vision Systems in Merrimack, New Hampshire
U.S. Navy photo

A common tenet from Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) Admiral Richardson’s Four Lines of Effort is increasing the speed of getting capability to the fleet. In the current geo-political climate, taking a measured risk approach in order to accelerate capability delivery is imperative to maintaining strategic and tactical superiority over adversaries. The Night

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Vision Cueing and Display (NVCD) program, managed by the Aircrew Systems program office (PMA-202), is an example of one such program willing to take measured risks in order to accelerate capability.

The history behind the execution of the NVCD program is a testament to the Aircrew Systems program office’s ability to innovate and think outside the box. The NVCD program was first transferred to NAVAIR when the Air Force withdrew from the joint effort in 2013. It is a Rockwell Collins Elbit Vision Systems product that provides nighttime capability for Joint Helmet Mounted Cueing System in all F/A-18 variants and the EA-18G.

The improvements provided by the NVCD over the legacy night vision system equate to a fivefold improvement between the target acquisition to engagement component of the Kill Chain. When the Navy assumed full control of the program, NVCD was billed as ready for near-term Full Rate Production. It turns out, it was not. Multiple hardware and reliability issues drove the program to delays, budget reductions and a tenuous execution profile. The Aircrew Systems program office had to flex, and that flexibility involved additional testing, innovative approaches to solutions, and taking on risk to acquire what has become a night vision system highly favored by the fleet today.

The team solved these technical, reliability and funding issues by taking measured risks. And, on January 16, 2019, those measured risks proved to be worthwhile as Capt. David Padula accepted the 500th delivery of the fleet-favored NVCD system on behalf of the government. Padula spoke to the audience, largely made up of the Rockwell Collins Elbit Vision Systems employees at their facility in Merrimack, New Hampshire, “The capability
that is provided for our aviators is unprecedented," Padula told the audience. "We fight our wars today differently from an aviation perspective because of this system, the system you all had a very, very intimate part of."
AS3SSH

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It's 1335 on Wednesday the 23rd of January 2019. I'm [REDACTED]. I've got [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] with me and we are interviewing -- is it [REDACTED] or how?

[REDACTED]: [REDACTED].

[REDACTED]: Please, [REDACTED], please, state your full name, spelling your last name for the record.

[REDACTED]: [REDACTED].

And, [REDACTED], what do you go by? Or [REDACTED]. Any of those.

[REDACTED]: Okay. I'll just call you [REDACTED], is that all right?

[REDACTED]: Yes, sir.

[REDACTED]: Okay. Thanks [REDACTED].

What is your military Occupational Specialty?

Mine is 7525 or a weapons systems officer for the F-18 at Delta.

That's great. And when did you finish your training?

I completed my fleet replacement squadron in -- it was either about end of July of 2017.
July of '17?

Yes, sir.

So you have been at 242 about a year and a half then?

About, sir.

When did you get to Iwakuni exactly, what month and year? The table can exactly where.

It should have been the end of August of 2017. I want to say roughly the 29th is when I showed up, I believe.

August of '17. And who was the commanding officer then?

It was [ph].

, very good. How many hours do you have in the Hornet?

Somewhere between two and 300. I haven't really checked my logbook for too recently for that, but I think it's just a little closer towards the 200.

When is -- where were you in December of 2018?

Here, in Iwakuni for the most part at the beginning. Leave in the second half.

Okay. So were you here for the
Okay. What role did you have in it?
Day crew, so non night crew and just aircrew.
Okay. And who else was on day crew, roughly?
Was he your pilot?
He was supposed to be a pilot on the day prior, or, excuse me, the day after I believe.
First names were and then ,
Who was the senior officer on day crew?
I believe it was either the commanding officer or the executive officer. I believe they were both day crew, from what I remember.
You think the CO and XO -- and who's the XO?
So you were day crew, which was what, like, eight to 1600is or something?
(b) (6)

(D)(3)(A): And the CO and XO were both on day crew, as your recall?
(b) (6)

(D)(3)(A): From what I remember. It might not be completely accurate. It might be, like, mid-crew or swing shift or whatever that, like, mid-crew is referred to as.
(b) (6)

(D)(3)(A): Okay. Are you night systems qualified?
(b) (6)

(D)(3)(A): As in complete with the night systems syllabus, Yes, but not as, like, an instructor if that's what --
(b) (6)

(D)(3)(A): No, I'm just asking. So you're NSQ?
(b) (6)

(b) (6)

(D)(3)(A): Have you been in the Tanker before?
(b) (6)

(b) (6)

(D)(3)(A): Been in the Tanker in the day time?
(b) (6)

(b) (6)

(D)(3)(A): Tanker at night?
(b) (6)

(b) (6)

(D)(3)(A): Tell me about that.
(b) (6)

(D)(3)(A): We were doing a section lead syllabus event for [ph] who are then Pilot Training Officer.
(b) (6)

This was back in, I want to say, about a year ago when they were
doing their section lead syllabus. Give or take a year.

I believe it was with a C-130. I'm pretty sure it was with a C-mount or a 152 C-130 --

What do you remember about the Tanking evolution?

Not much other than the fact that it went relatively as briefed and I remember it was an easier join-up than we thought because we ended up seeing them coming across our nose while we were coordinating the meet-up. Tanked on the right hand side, and that's all I really remember, a least, like, over all of that event.

Do you remember how you departed the Tanker?

I believe it was to the right, since we were on the right hand side.

What about the other jet?

I believe it was the same. I'm trying to remember exactly. I don't remember the exact nature, but if it was anything as everything else that I'm used to, which I believe it wasn't so it just made it stand out otherwise. We should have
departed, gone to echelon right after we were waiting, and then depart to the right after that. Either straight ahead or high and to the right, as coordinated with the Tanker the whole time.

[D] [3] (A), [b] (6): Were you wearing any VCE's?

[D] [3] (A), [b] (6): No I was wearing the ANVIS 9's or the non joint helmet mounted key wing system.

[D] [3] (A), [b] (6): Why is that?

[D] [3] (A), [b] (6): I did not have my JOHOMIC's [ph] set up then yet.


[D] [3] (A), [b] (6): Is from what I remember. It might have been, I'd have to double check, but from what I remember I think it was regular NVG's.

[D] [3] (A), [b] (6): Have you -- do you have it now? Do you have ANVIS 11's now?

[D] [3] (A), [b] (6): Yes.

[D] [3] (A), [b] (6): Have you flown with them very much?

[D] [3] (A), [b] (6): Relatively. I prefer to fly with those over the older type.

[D] [3] (A), [b] (6): Why is that?

[D] [3] (A), [b] (6): It gives us -- or it gives me a little bit more essay so I can have not have my heads up display take up one of my
DDI's but still -- or one of my displays in the cockpit, but still have situational awareness to my air speed and altitude, my angle of attack, set the parameters, and also see where certain sensors are slated.

[Redacted]: Where did you get your ANVIS 11 training?

[Redacted]: From -- should have been from one our night systems instructors. I don't remember details of it.

[Redacted]: What are some of the differences between the ANVIS 9 and the ANVIS 11 that you remember being trained to?

[Redacted]: Biggest difference is you now have symbology by your right eye, eye ball. And then other than that, it's just letting -- that and then you now have, I guess, the calibrating before you fly. It's only one item that you're calibrating per eye as opposed to the older system where it involved three adjustments per eye. Other than that, pretty much the same as, in terms of symbology, the same as flying with JAHAMIC's during the day, in terms of symbology.

[Redacted]: Were you -- so the benefit is its got the symbology in the HUD and it's easier to adjust; is that what I heard you say?

[Redacted]: For the most part, yes. I know that there is talk about sometimes the symbology getting inverted when flying with
the JAHEMIC's NVG's. I have not seen that myself though. Usually -- from my understanding it's with under, like, high G maneuvers or some type of -- something dynamic though.

[0] (3) (A), \[\ldots\] : Have you ever heard of it happening. You ever met anyone --

[0] (3) (A), \[\ldots\] : Yes. I have heard of it; I have not seen it myself though.

[0] (3) (A), \[\ldots\] : And what's the word around the ready room? What causes that and how do you fix it?

[0] (3) (A), \[\ldots\] : Not sure of the cause, or then the possibly G or some type of unusual attitude maybe. The fix has been to, from my understanding, was just to unplug it, the JAHEMIC's from the aircraft so you're not getting any symbology at all, but you're still getting the night vision benefit of the goggles.

[0] (3) (A), \[\ldots\] : Any negative about the ANVIS 11? Anything the 9 does better than the 11?

[0] (3) (A), \[\ldots\] : Not that I can really tell for myself, but I've heard that the ANVIS 11, excuse me, the 9's have a little better, I guess, fidelity in what you're seeing. But, not enough for me to really notice too much without doing it side by side, which would be, kind of, tough to do since it's on the helmet. It would be -- switching helmets would be, kind of, awkward.

8
Have you -- what's your day job in the squadron?

The S-1, sorry, the Administration Assistant Officer.

Admin officer. Okay.

Are you ever around -- is your office near the CO's office?

Yes.

So you handle paperwork that comes to the CO?

A bit. My focus in the shop is more for the DTS, or the Defense Travel System. I'm one of the guys thats been doing -- is smarter on that, so I handle most of that within the shop.

You ever stood ODO?

Yes.

Did -- what are some of the response -- do you still stand ODO sometimes?

Yes.

What are some ODO responsibilities?

Checking weather, NODOMS, coordinating fuel, coordinating with maintenance, mainly being the point of contact for
-- also coordinating with other squadrons if there's changes or anything like that where we need to coordinate with the other squadrons for that.

[0 (3) (A), (b) (6)]

... You ever have a flight schedule change while you were standing duty?

[0 (3) (A), (b) (6)]

... Yes.

[0 (3) (A), (b) (6)]

... Tell me about that.

[0 (3) (A), (b) (6)]

... We got the request from, usually ops or maintenance. If it's not a cancelation, it wouldn't necessarily require a CO approval since it can be done -- it's pretty basic. But, for the actual changes to the flight schedule, if the CO's around, then we'll try and catch him and let him know what's going on with that, and then he'll either give the OK or the no-go on the change. And if the CO's not around, then sometimes it can be delegated to the executive officer or the operations officer if really needed. But, it should be going up to the CO.

[0 (3) (A), (b) (6)]

... Once the CO approves a flight schedule change, how do you record that?

[0 (3) (A), (b) (6)]

... On our electronic or Excel version. We'll put it in red, the change, whatever the change is in red, and then do, like, a space and then "CO OK". And then on the paper flight schedule, I'll make the change in red ink and annotate it there.
(b) (3) (A), [REDACTED]: Does the Co, like, sign the paper copy, or do you put your initials on there, or anything like that?

(b) (6)

(b) (3) (A), [REDACTED]: No I don't think -- at least -- no, I don't think I've ever really got the signature. I haven't really seen much of the flight schedule changes recently, so, I haven't been standing a whole lot recently for obvious reasons.

(b) (3) (A), [REDACTED]: Did you have any involvement in the mishap at all? Were you, like, around when it went down or around during the SAR effort or anything?

(b) (6)

(b) (3) (A), [REDACTED]: Myself and [REDACTED] were the SAR, or the search and rescue aircraft that went out after [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] got back.

(b) (6)

(b) (3) (A), [REDACTED]: So you assumed on scene commander?

(b) (6)

(b) (3) (A), [REDACTED]: Yes.

(b) (6)

(b) (3) (A), [REDACTED]: Tell me about that.

(b) (6)

(b) (3) (A), [REDACTED]: I got a call around, from what I remember the time was like 0249. Got a call from the squadron duty officer, asking me to come in. I came in. I was informed that Profane 12 and AC-130 were down, that I was flying with [REDACTED], going to go out and go look for them. Went down to flight equipment, calibrated my NVG's. There was some miscoordination with myself and my pilot, but we eventually got down. Started up the
jet, took off runway 20, went out on the route that took us up higher so that we could save some fuel. Got out to the area, I remember hearing the sea beacons.

: About what time? Was it still dark when you got out there?

: Still dark. I don't remember exactly, I'm trying to remember from the take off times. I don't remember that -- I couldn't give you a very good estimate. It was somewhere between three and four I want to say, or maybe five, I'm not sure. And then landing sometime between, I want to say, 0500ish.

: Still dark when you landed?

: Yes. And then after we landed, I was told by the XO to go to get into my office for the CACO, or the Catch Assistance Coordination Officer, I believe. That's one of the things I've never known.

: Okay. Did you guys talk to while you were out there looking for them?

: No. We didn't have any radar communications with them. We flipped between -- on our auxillary radio we went to the SAR frequency guard which is , and then the maritime guard frequency of .

: Who did you talk to?
The only person -- or the people we were able to get in touch with on any of those frequencies was one of the boats that was in the area. We thought we had found them because we saw a strobe light for about 20 minutes, but it turned out it was a boat with a strobe light. But, we were talking to someone, trying to get someone to those coordinates that we thought they were at. It was just -- it was a Japanese fisherman, or I don't know if he was a fisherman, but a Japanese guy in a boat. That's all we really know.

Is there any talk about using ambiens or go pills or anything?

I just know that several aircrew were requesting those from the flight doctor.

How did they request?

I'm not sure. The flight doctor put a message out on the all officers chat saying that --

All officers chat on Whats App?

Yes, sir. Saying that --

What did it say?

I don't remember the exact wording, but generally saying that several aircrew were asking about -- I'm not sure if it was go-no go pills, or just Ambien specifically, or what the exact pills were. I assume that the go to is Ambien for the
no-go's. But that he was not able to issue them, and that would be
a 24 hour down as well. Actually, I take that back, I don't
remember if he said it was necessarily 24 hour down, but that he was
unable to issue it. And I believe it was him, it could have been
someone else that said it was CG directed that we were not supposed
to have any performance enhancers or any go-no go pills for the
exercise.

: Okay.

: At least that's my understanding of it.

: Do you remember who in the chat was
requesting?

: No.

: But it was on the chat --

: It was on the -- because on the chat it just
said several people or several aircrew. So I don't know -- he never
said the names specifically.

: So the doc, he said several aircrew
have requested it?

: Yes.

: So you said the last time you did a
night Tanking, was that the only time you've done night Tanking was
a year ago?
That's the only time I've done night Tanking. Roughly, I'd have to actually check the --

How often do you guys Tank with 152?

Usually before a transpacific flight to get, for example, before we go down to ..., where we'd be doing a lot of Tanking. The reason is that we need get --

It's, like, once or twice a year?

About twice a year, roughly.

And then those are usually daytime?

Yes. Because the TransPac would be during the day.

So you guys barely get any time in with the VMGR-152?

I wouldn't say that. That's more -- our main focus is before we go on a detachment so that everyone, all the pilots, can get Tanker current.

Okay.

Then occasionally during other times, to either maintain currency or just for, yes, just maintain currency. I don't work in ops so I don't really have good, like, good situational awareness to the plan in terms of when all that is set up or, like, how often really.
But since August of 2017, you've only gone once?

That I remember, yes. At night, yes.

When you did it at night, did you guys flip your goggles up, or leave them down, or do you remember?

I left mine down.

Do you know if anyone else flipped them up or how that was briefed or was there any discussion about it?

I don't think anyone would have flipped theirs up. Intuitively I want to be able to see it, and the only reason I could see why you might flip them up would be with, like, the light on the probe that was in the basket was, like, washing out of your goggles and you somehow couldn't turn off the light for whatever reasons.

But, intuitively you would want to keep the NVG's down so you can see the Tanker, the basket, and everything near, everything a little more clearly, rather than point of light.

Have you ever -- do you remember what kind of lighting configuration the Tanker was in?

Not off the top of my head.

Do you know what kind of lighting configuration your Hornet was in?
Should have been in standard, having the navigation lights on, you know, collision lights should have been on. But, mostly I can't -- I can't really see the inner collision light very well from the backseat.

Do you remember if the probe light was on?

Not that I can remember to say yes or no. It was too long ago for me to actually, like, call it with sufficient detail.

Okay. Do you fly with Captain Reslar a lot?

A bit. Mostly in Guam last year when we were there for COBRA North.

How was that?

I mean, I had fun with it. He was one of my friends so I just enjoy flying with him.

Yes. Sorry that you guys lost him, he seems like a nice guy.

Yes.

Did you ever know him to be struggling as a pilot or any challenges he was facing more than someone with his experience level?
Not that would be outside the standard deviation. Did good on some things, not as good as others. But, within an acceptable standard, I guess, is how you put it.

Did you ever fly with [name]?

Yes.

How was he? Was he pretty good?

I'd say so.

What do you think his reputation's like in the squadron as a pilot?

Good. Really good. Mission commander, like, pretty much the only thing he had left for his quals was to, I guess, go to MDTC, or Marine Division Tactics Course, and weapons training instructor, or weapons and tactics instructor, excuse me.

Is he going pretty soon, do you know?

It does not appear so.

Why is that?

It looks like the -- [ph] or was slated to go to WTI or MDTC and WTI next.

And that decision was made before the mishap?

Yes.

Why do you think that decision was made?
That would be an ops question, or ops and CO. So you don't know? I don't know the exact reasoning and I don't want to speculate on other people's thoughts on that. That made decision.

Yes, no that's a good answer, okay.

You ever fly with? Obviously he's a WISSO --

No. I mean, in terms of in the same flight --

Yes.

So we'd be in different aircraft.

Yes, that's the question.

Only one time that I can remember specifically. And that was -- that was, like, a year ago when they were -- him and were doing the section lead [inaudible] in the dash two backseat, with the dash two pilot being the instructor.

Do you remember anything significant about that?

No, sir.

How's reputation in the squadron?

Competent. In terms of stating the facts,
competent, but sometimes a little hard to work with. But, you can still work with him.

(b) (3) (A), (6): Was it -- were any of those, anybody from the mishap aircrew, did they have any human factors concerns that you are aware of?

(b) (3) (A), (6): I know that for ..., you know, (b) (6)

(b) (3) (A), (6): I think what you are eluding to is it -- (b) (7)

(b) (3) (A), (6): was on the night page and (b) (6)

(b) (3) (A), (6): Yes. (b) (7)

(b) (3) (A), (6): So was there much discuss -- did you hear any discussion about who was on what shift and why?

(b) (3) (A), (6): Not that I was, I guess, privy to. I was on cross country down in Oki, or Okinawa, prior to the MAG-ULT. So I know there was some stuff going on before hand, like a meeting, but I wasn't there for that meeting so I, kind of, missed out on --
going to be on what crew and that kind of stuff?

(b) (3) (A), 
(b) (6)

: Yes. I just knew that I was day crew and when to show up.

(b) (3) (A), 
(b) (6)

: Do you have any idea why you were selected for day crew?

(b) (3) (A), 
(b) (6)

: Just a toss of the hat, I guess.

(b) (3) (A), 
(b) (6)

: (b) (6), (b) (7)

(b) (3) (A), 
(b) (6)

: Okay. But you're on day crew?

(b) (3) (A), 
(b) (6)

: Yes.

(b) (3) (A), 
(b) (6)

: Okay.

(b) (3) (A), 
(b) (6)

: So you brought up has (b) (3) (A), 
(b) (6)
Okay.

Does he have -- does he have a qualification for that flight that you or another WISSO doesn't have that was important for that flight?

Not that would be important for the flight, no.

For the dash 2 FAM Tank, you would think you could have a pretty basic WISSO back there, correct?

He just needed to be night systems qualified, I guess.

Are you night systems qualified?

Yes.

Are there other WISSO's that are night systems qualified that are on the day page?
Yes.

Okay. Is there anything else about the mishap and the circumstances surrounding it that you'd like share with us, so you make it so that we could do a more balanced and complete report? Are there any other factors you want us to consider?

Not that I can think of right now.

Anything on your mind that contributed to it? From your perspective?

Not that I can think of, really, for -- no.

Okay.

Nothing, sir.

Judge will swear you out.
MISHAP DEBRIS RECOVERED

~162NM

~86NM
MISHAP RECOVERY LOCATIONS

- Recovered Items
  - Persons Recovered
  - Rafts Recovered
  - Survival Equipment Recovered
  - Crew Gear Recovered
  - Aircraft Pieces Recovered
  - Other Items Recovered

~21NM
~11NM
### MISHAP ITEMS RECOVERED

- 5X RAFTS
- 4X FIRST AID KITS
- 4X U/I AIRCRAFT PIECE
- 2X CHAIR CUSHION
- 2X WOODEN BLOCK
- 2X GREEN SEA DYE MARKER
- 2X TIRE
- 1X BAG W/ SURVIVAL GEAR
- 1X BAG EMPTY
- 1X F/A-18 NOSE (?)
- 1X SILVER CAN
- 1X GREEN CAN
- 1X PARACHUTE BAG
- 1X BACKPACK
- 1X EMERGENCY LIGHT
- 1X HELMET/HEADSET
- 1X PILOT HELMET
- 1X FLIGHT JACKET
- 1X MANUAL (NATOPS?)
- 1X TAG W/ STRING
- 1X FLAP PART
- 1X ORANGE ANTI-EXPOSURE SUIT
- 1X SILVER PACK
- 1X OXYGEN TANK
- 1X SEAT PART
- 1X KC-130 CHECKLIST
- 1X LIFE JACKET
- 1X SMALL TANK
- 1X CIRCULAR CYLINDER
- 1X ORANGE BUOY/BEACON (SOFTBALL-SIZED)
- 1X ORANGE BAG WITH USA STENCIL
- 1X U/I HELMET (PILOT OR CREW?)
- 1X RAFT COVER
- TAIL PART
- MULTIPLE PROPELLER PIECES
- FUSELAGE DEBRIS
- POLYSTYRENE FOAM
### Flight Schedule For

**Wednesday, 28 November 2018**

**As Of COB:** 26 November 2018

**F/A-18**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Flight Number</th>
<th>T-34C</th>
<th>FY Hrs Proj:</th>
<th>FY Hrs Cum:</th>
<th>Mon Hrs Proj:</th>
<th>Mon Hrs Cum:</th>
<th>Mon Hours:</th>
<th>Prog.</th>
<th>Notes</th>
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<tr>
<td>T-34C</td>
<td>F/A-18</td>
<td>9500.0</td>
<td>1207.3</td>
<td>658.7</td>
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<td>2479</td>
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#### Turn Pilot AM

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<th>AM ODO</th>
<th>MID ODC</th>
<th>PM ODO</th>
<th>SHUTR</th>
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<tbody>
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<td></td>
<td>(A)</td>
<td>(A)</td>
<td>(A)</td>
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#### Turn Pilot PM

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<th>SHUTR</th>
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<td>(B)</td>
<td>(A)</td>
<td>(A)</td>
<td>(A)</td>
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</table>

#### Enclosure 112

**Schedules:**

- **FAM 3001W**
- **FAM 110W**
- **FAM 110D**
- **FAM 110A**

**Aircrew:**

- **SUPT**
- **FTK107**
- **FTK108**
- **FTK109**

**Notes:**

- **NONE**
- **DDR**
- **GVR**
- **ABLRR**

**Tac Freq:**

- **2000**
- **2100**
- **2200**
- **2300**

**Pri:**

- **1**
- **2**
- **3**

**AIC Flow:**

- **HP/HS**
- **HP**
- **HP**

---

**UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS**

**Marine Fighter Attack Training Squadron 101**

**Marine Aircraft Group 11**

**3D Marine Aircraft Wing, MARFORPAC**

**PO Box 452028**

**MCAS Miramar San Diego, California 92145**

---

**T-34C SCHEDULE**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Callsign</th>
<th>A/C</th>
<th>Mission</th>
<th>Start</th>
<th>End</th>
<th>Notes</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>SHUTR-91</td>
<td>A-18</td>
<td>LOW SAFE</td>
<td>1300</td>
<td>1400</td>
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<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>SHUTR-92</td>
<td>A-18</td>
<td>PRO-A</td>
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<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>SHUTR-93</td>
<td>A-18</td>
<td>LSO FERRY</td>
<td>1300</td>
<td>1400</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
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---

**TWO-STICK JET REQUIRED**

**FORMATION LEADER**

**# NATK AIRCRAFT**

**INSTRUCTOR/PIC**

**G LPOD CONFIGURED AIRCRAFT**

**M IDS CONFIGURED AIRCRAFT**

---

**HP**

**HS**

---

1 of 3
**General Notes:**
This flight schedule constitutes official orders.
ODO cancel unused ranges, post weather and NOTAMs.
RACs report incomplete events to schedules ASAP.
ODO coordinate back-up A/C and pass to flight lead prior to walk.
Simulator changes after schedule distribution require a phone call to Simulator CI Usage 26.5 Hours.
Flight Schedule written for 5C and 4D F/A-18 aircraft.
All aircrew shall log individual SHARP entries.

**Tac Notes:**
1. SAVE 6X-MK76 FOR FOLLOW ON EVENT.
2. INSTRUCTORS DECONFLICT AIRSPACE.
3. LOWSAFE PROVIDED BY EVENT 6019.
4. 1SK AND BELOW ONLY FOR CACTUS WEST AREA.
5. OUT AND IN APPROVED.
6. CHARLES BRIEF EXECUTION AND DECONFLICTION PLAN.

**Ordnance:**
A-CATM-9
B-TCTS POD
D-6 x MK76
F-6 x MK76 (NIGHT)
G-LPOD
H-2 x LGTR
L-10 CHAFF / 20 FLARE
R-REQUIRED
V-SIM JDAM
X- FULL INTERNAL FUEL

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SIM</th>
<th>Brief</th>
<th>Start</th>
<th>End</th>
<th>Mission</th>
<th>Aircrew</th>
<th>Console</th>
<th>Comments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AFT 1(C/D)</td>
<td>0700</td>
<td>0800</td>
<td>1100</td>
<td>STK WU</td>
<td>18-6</td>
<td>CI</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFT 2(C/D)</td>
<td>0700</td>
<td>0800</td>
<td>1100</td>
<td>STK WU</td>
<td>18-6</td>
<td>CI</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFT 3(C)</td>
<td>0700</td>
<td>0800</td>
<td>1100</td>
<td>SAWI 105</td>
<td>(6)(3)(A), (6)(A)</td>
<td>CI</td>
<td>PIAB</td>
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<tr>
<td>AFT 4(C)</td>
<td>0730</td>
<td>0800</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>NATOPS/INST CHECK</td>
<td>(6)(3)(A), (6)</td>
<td>VMFA - 232</td>
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<td>AFT 5(C)</td>
<td>0700</td>
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<td>0900</td>
<td>SFAM 114</td>
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<td>AFT 6(C)</td>
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<td>1100</td>
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<td>1100</td>
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<tr>
<td>AFT 6(C)</td>
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<tr>
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<td>1330</td>
<td>1430</td>
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<td>1400</td>
<td>1500</td>
<td>NATOPS CK</td>
<td>(6)(4)</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**ACADEMICS:**
0800-0900: AFAM 116 - SOP Lecture - Shooters Court - 19-2
0900-1000: AFAM 142 - CRS Rules - Shooters Court - 19-2
1000-1045: ACQL 107 - Bingo / Divert Fields - Shooters Court - 19-2
1430-1530: RPRB - CO’s Conference Room
1500-1630: AFAM 112 - Flight Control 1 - Classroom 1 - 19-2

**GROUND EVENTS:**
0630-0700: Maintenance Meeting - Maintenance Control - All Required
0730-0745: Ops Maintenance Meeting - Schedules Office - 6-3
0800-1000: Key West Det Meeting - VMFA-314 Ops Office
0900-1000: Phase Meeting - AMO Conference Room - All Required
0900-1000: CDI Training - Shooters Court
1000-1130: MAG Ops Meeting - MAG Ops Office - 6-3
1500-1600: Remedial Physical Training - Main Gym - All Required Personnel / Open to Everyone - S-3
1700-1715: CDI Training - Shooters Court
1700-1830: Maintenance Meeting - Maintenance Control - All Required
1900-0000: CDI Training - QA

**FREE TIME:**
None

**QUESTIONS OF THE DAY**
EMERGENCY: SINGLE ENGINE FAILURE IN LANDING CONFIGURATION?
NATOPS: WHAT ARE 3 INDICATIONS OF A PLANNING LINK FAILURE?
SOP: MAX # OF AIRCRAFT ON RUNWAY FOR TAKEOFF?
T-34C: REAR COCKPIT ON FIRE?
THREAT: SA-15?
United States Marine Corps
Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 232
Marine Aircraft Group 11
3rd Marine Aircraft Wing, MARFORPAC
PO Box 452055
San Diego, CA 92145

Flight Schedule for

Wednesday 28-November-2018

| EVT | C/S | PREP | ETD | ETA | DEP | ARR | PILOT | TR Codes | FPC | Flight Plan | AREA/TOS | Fuel | Tac | ORD | FLE | Notes |
|-----|-----|------|-----|-----|-----|-----|-------|----------|-----|-------------|----------|-------|-----|-----|-----|-----|-------|
| 1-1 | DEVIL 71 | 0900 | 1200 | 1330 | KNKK | KNKK | * | 3104.3105 | 1A7 | A-01 / 16 | KANE E / S | 1215-1330 | HP/HS | 17 | ABCG | MED | 1 |
| 2-1 | DEVIL 81 | 0900 | 1200 | 1330 | KNKK | KNKK | * | 2102 | 1A1 | T-01 M / 03 | P 6/7 | 1230-1330 | HP/HS | 18 | BCJ | LO | 2 |
| 3-1 | DEVIL 71 | 1130 | 1430 | 1600 | KNKK | KNKK | * | 3104.3105 | 1A7 | A-01 / 16 | KANE E / S | 1445-1600 | T | 17 | ABCG | MED | 1 |
| 4-1 | DEVIL 81 | 1130 | 1430 | 1545 | KNKK | KNKK | * | 2501 | 1A6 | T-01 R / 03 | P 1/2 | 1430-1530 | T | 18 | ABCJ | HI | 4 |
| 5-1 | DEVIL 82 | 1545 | 1845 | 2030 | KNKK | KNKK | * | 3106 | 1A7 | T-01 M / 03 | SHOBA P 9/13 | 1800-2130 | T | 17 | ABCFFJ | MED | 3,5 |
| 6-1 | DEVIL 71 | 1600 | 1900 | 2015 | KNKK | KNKK | @ | 2405,5702 | 1A7 | A-03 / 17 | R-2510 | 1915-2015 | T | 18 | ABCD | MED | 5 |
| 7-1 | DEVIL 82 | 1130 | 1200 | 1300 | KNKK | KNKK | * | 2405 | 1A7 | A-03 / 17 | R-2510 | 1915-2015 | 2101, 27C GPS Training | 2101, 27C GPS Training | MED | 5 |

**Notes**

1. Reference 1st MRB Spins.
2. PILOTS DECONFLICT AIRSPACE. EXECUTE RNAV APPROACHES.
3. STEEL KNIGHT FRAg #29-53.
4. MURDERBOARD AT PREP TIME.
5. IF AVAILABLE, SPARE AIRCRAFT REQUESTED WITH ABCDEF

**flight Notes**

1. 0700 MAINTENANCE MEETING.
2. 0730 FOD WALK.
3. 1000 MAG OPSO’S MEETING FOR MAJ MACHNIK IN THE MARION CARL CONFERENCE ROOM.
4. 1030 TABLET CLASS FOR PMR CALL IN THE MPC.
5. 1630 MAINTENANCE MEETING.

**ordnance**

A. LPD
B. DOUBLE BUBBLE
C. CATM-9X
D. 200 x 20mm
E. 64MK-76
F. 2xLGTR
G. SIM GBU-12
H. SIM JDAM
I. 30C
J. 30F

**operational**

Enclosure 113

Operations Officer

Commanding Officer

Maintenance Officer
### Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 314

Marine Aircraft Group 11, 3rd Marine Aircraft Wing  
P.O. Box 452841  
MCAS Miramar, San Diego, CA 92145-2041

---

**Wednesday, November 28, 2018**

**Julian:** 8331  
**KNKX:** 0730-0800  
**PSI (Z-8):** 0915

### Airfield Hours

**KNKX:** 0730-0800  
**PSI (Z-8):** 0915

---

### Environmental Data

- **Sunrise / Sunset:** 0531 / 1642  
- **Moonrise / Moonset:** 2240 / 1137  
- **EENT / Illum:** 1740 / 72%  
- **LLI Period:** 1753-2313

---

### Questions of the Day

- **NATOPS QOD:** What are the release criteria if the Manual Override Handle is activated on the ground or in the air prior to ejection?  
- **TACTICAL QOD:** What are the three problems that must be solved by the shooter during a gun shot?  
- **EF QOD:** OBOCS DEGD caution in flight?  
- **THREAT QOD:** SA - 11

---

### Meetings & Academic Events

**Time** | **Location** | **Description** | **Personnel**  
---|---|---|---  
0700-0730 | Flight Line | FOD Walk | All Available  
0700-0745 | Maintenance Control | Maintenance Meeting | All Required  
1000-1100 | Bob Hope Theatre | Corporals Course Graduation | All Interested  
1000-1100 | Marion Carl Conference Room | MAG-11 Operations Meeting | Maj Andrews  
1100-1300 | BCP/RCP | All Required, All Interested  
1500-1530 | CO's Office | EAS Interview | LtCol Hinton, Sgt Cabral  
1600-1615 | CO's Conference Room | Maintenance Meeting | All Required  
1700-1730 | CO's Conference Room | STAN Board | All IP's, Capt Heiser

---

### Officer Leave / TAD

- **(A)**  
- **(b) (6)**

---

### THIS FLIGHT SCHEDULE CONSTITUTES OFFICIAL ORDERS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ext T/O</th>
<th>Callsign</th>
<th>Land</th>
<th>FPC</th>
<th>Mission</th>
<th>T&amp;R</th>
<th>Route Range</th>
<th>Fuel</th>
<th>Ordnance</th>
<th>Tac Fl Notes</th>
<th>MSN #</th>
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<tr>
<td>1-4</td>
<td>0915</td>
<td>KNITE 31</td>
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<td>1A7</td>
<td>CAS</td>
<td>A-7/A-16</td>
<td>HP/H5</td>
<td>A*,B*,E*,M*,Q*</td>
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<td>1115</td>
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<td>A-7/A-16</td>
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<td>6103,2304</td>
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<td>2-2</td>
<td>1130</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>1A6</td>
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<td>6103,2309</td>
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<td>1120</td>
<td>KNITE 31</td>
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<td>1A6</td>
<td>AA</td>
<td>6103,2309</td>
<td>W-291 P-6/7</td>
<td>T</td>
<td>A*,B*,E*,Q*</td>
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<td>1120</td>
<td>KNITE 41</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>1A6</td>
<td>AA</td>
<td>6103,2309</td>
<td>W-291 P-6/7</td>
<td>T</td>
<td>A*,B*,E*,Q*</td>
<td>3</td>
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</table>

**Legend:**  
- *: Section Leader  
- **: Division Leader  
- *: Mission Commander  
- @: Evaluated Sortie  

**T:** Truck Fuel  
**H:** Hot Pits  
**S:** Hot Seat

**General Notes:**  
1. This flight schedule requires a (4) jet flow.  
2. All times are Local (Z-8) unless otherwise indicated.  
3. Unless otherwise indicated, all flights originate from and land at KNKX.

**Tactical Frequencies:**

- **A:** CATM-9X  
- **E:** TCTS-POD  
- **I:** MK-82 Inert  
- **M:** Sim MK-82  
- **Q:** Ext Wing Tanks  
- **S:** No Ext Tanks  
- **T:** 27A/B  
- **W:** 1/A  
- **X:** 82

**Simulators:**

- **Time (Brief):**  
- **Simulator:**  
- **Event:**  
- **Pilot:**  
- **Monitor:**

**No Simulations Scheduled**

---

**This FLIGHT SCHEDULE CONSTITUTES OFFICIAL ORDERS**

---

**Environmental Data:**

- **Sunrise / Sunset:** 0531 / 1642  
- **Moonrise / Moonset:** 2240 / 1137  
- **EENT / Illum:** 1740 / 72%  
- **LLI Period:** 1753-2313

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**Questions of the Day:**

- **NATOPS QOD:** What are the release criteria if the Manual Override Handle is activated on the ground or in the air prior to ejection?  
- **TACTICAL QOD:** What are the three problems that must be solved by the shooter during a gun shot?  
- **EF QOD:** OBOCS DEGD caution in flight?  
- **THREAT QOD:** SA - 11

---

**Commanding Officer:**  
**(A)**  
**(b) (6)**
From: (b) (3) (A), (b) (6)
To: Commanding General, 1st Marine Aircraft Wing

Subj: REQUEST FOR EXTENSION ICO 6 DECEMBER 2018 MID-AIR COLLISION MISHAP COMMAND INVESTIGATION

Ref: (a) 1O Appointment Letter 5830/CG dated 10 Dec 18

1. I request an extension of time for completing the command investigation for which I have been appointed by the reference. I request a new submission date of 30 April 2019.

2. The reason for this request is to allow the transcription service provider to complete transcriptions for the interviews, and we are currently pending additional toxicology reports for the aircrew involved in the mishap.

Copy to:
SJA, 1st MAW
From: Commanding General, 1st Marine Aircraft Wing
To: [Redacted]

Subj: REQUEST FOR EXTENSION ICO 6 DECEMBER 2018 MID-AIR COLLISION MISHAP COMMAND INVESTIGATION

1. Returned. Your request for an extension is granted. Your investigation is now due 30 April 2019

[Signature]
T. D. WEIDLEY

Copy to:
SJA, 1st MAW

Enclosure 116
From: [b] (3) (A), (b) (6)

To: Commanding General, 1st Marine Aircraft Wing

Subj: COMMAND INVESTIGATION AND LINE OF DUTY DETERMINATIONS IN THE DEATHS OF [b] (3) (A), (b) (6) 7557 USMC, [b] (3) (A), (b) (6) 7557 USMC, [b] (3) (A), (b) (6) 7557 USMC, [b] (3) (A), (b) (6) 7557 USMC, [b] (3) (A), (b) (6) 7557 USMC, [b] (3) (A), (b) (6) 6276 USMC, and Corporal William C. Ross [b] (3) (A), (b) (6) 6276 USMC.

Ref: (a) JAGINST 5800.7F (JAGMAN)

1. In accordance to the reference, the Command Investigation of the aviation mishap that occurred on 6 December 2018 off the coast of Japan is ongoing.

2. As the Investigating Officer, this letter records my line of duty recommendations conducted in accordance with Chapter II of the reference concerning the deaths of [b] (3) (A), (b) (6) 7557 USMC, [b] (3) (A), (b) (6) 7557 USMC, [b] (3) (A), (b) (6) 7557 USMC, [b] (3) (A), (b) (6) 7557 USMC, [b] (3) (A), (b) (6) 7557 USMC, [b] (3) (A), (b) (6) 6276 USMC, and Corporal William C. Ross [b] (3) (A), (b) (6) 6276 USMC.

3. At approximately 0150 on 6 December 2018, a VMGR-152 KC-130J aircraft with Bureau Number 167981 and using call sign SUMO41, was struck by another aircraft during a mission and crashed into the ocean off the coast of Japan. [b] (3) (A), (b) (6) and [b] (3) (A), (b) (6) William C. Ross were onboard the KC-130J. The flight originated at Marine Corps Air Station Iwakuni, Japan. The destination was Marine Corps Air Station Iwakuni, Japan.

4. Corporal Daniel E. Baker, and [b] (3) (A), (b) (6) died in the line of duty while performing their assigned military duties and not due to their own misconduct.

Copy to:
SJA, 1st MAW
FIRST ENDORSEMENT on Col Schoolfield ltr 5830/IO of 28 Feb 19

From: Commanding General, 1st Marine Aircraft Wing
To: Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, Manpower and Reserve Affairs (MMSR-6)

Subj: COMMAND INVESTIGATION AND LINE OF DUTY DETERMINATIONS IN THE DEATHS OF 7557 USMC, 6276 USMC, AND 6276 USMC, AND 6276 USMC died in the line of duty while performing their assigned military duties and not due to their own misconduct.

1. Readdressed and forwarded.

2. On behalf of the Marines and Sailors of the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, I wish to express my deepest sympathy and sincere condolences to the families, friends, and loved ones of ...
Marine Corps Task List
(MCTL - 2.0)
the airlift of personnel, supplies and equipment into or within the battle area by helicopter, tiltrotor or fixed-wing aircraft. (JP 3-0, 4-0, MCWP 3-2, MAWTS-1)

<table>
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<th></th>
<th>M1</th>
<th>Number Of MOS qualified and deployable aircrew available.</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>M2</td>
<td>Percent Of T/O personnel MOS qualified and deployable.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>M3</td>
<td>Number Of aircraft ready and available.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>M4</td>
<td>Percent Of Full Mission Capable (FMC) aircraft of PAA.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>M5</td>
<td>Number Of sorties daily sustained during contingency/combat operations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>M6</td>
<td>Number Of J Model sorties daily sustained during contingency/combat operations.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>M7</td>
<td>Number Of F/R/T sorties daily sustained during contingency/combat operations.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>M8</td>
<td>Percent Squadron pilots External Lift qualified.</td>
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<td>M9</td>
<td>Percent Of Transport Assault Support Requests executed.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>M10</td>
<td>Hours Flight hours devoted to Transport Assault Support.</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**MCT 1.3.4.1.1 Conduct Airborne Rapid Insertion/Extraction**

Airborne rapid insertion/extraction is the planned insertion/movement of forces conducted rapidly followed by a planned and rapid withdrawal. Helicopter Rope Suspension Techniques (HRST) provides Marines with the ability to conduct insertions and extractions where landings are impractical. Airborne rapid insertion/extraction includes methods such as rappelling, fast rope, special patrol insertion and extractions, etc. (MCWP 3-2, 3-11.4, 3-24, MCRP 3-11.4A)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>M1</th>
<th>Number Of MOS qualified and deployable aircrew available.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>M2</td>
<td>Percent Of T/O personnel MOS qualified and deployable.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>M3</td>
<td>Number Of aircraft ready and available.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>M4</td>
<td>Percent Of Full Mission Capable (FMC) aircraft of PAA.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>M5</td>
<td>Number Of sorties daily sustained during contingency/combat operations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>M6</td>
<td>Number Of sorties daily sustained during contingency/combat operations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>M7</td>
<td>Percentage Squadron pilots HIE qualified.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>M8</td>
<td>Time To provide insertion operation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>M9</td>
<td>Time To provide extraction operation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>M10</td>
<td>Casualties   To friendly forces due to enemy action during I/E operations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>M11</td>
<td>Casualties   To friendly forces due to enemy action during SPIE operations.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**MCT 1.3.4.1.2 Provide Operational Airlift Support**

To plan, coordinate and provide Operational Airlift Support (OAS) missions via Service and Joint channels, including HQMC (ASM), Joint Operational Support Airlift Center (JOSAC), CO MCAS Futenma (WESTPAC), or Marine Corps component commands. (JP 1-0, 3-0, 3-30, MCWP 3-2, 3-27)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>M1</th>
<th>Percent Of assigned missions that were successfully completed.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>M2</td>
<td>Percent Of flight hours ISO JOSAC missions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>M3</td>
<td>Hours Flown ISO of assigned missions.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**MCT 1.3.4.1.3 Provide Aerial Search and Rescue (SAR) Services**

Provide aerial Search and Rescue (SAR) services to tactical fixed wing aircraft or as requested by adjacent commands or the local community. (JP 1-0, 3-0, 3-30, 3-50.2, 3-50.21, MCWP 2-6, 3-2, 3-11.4, 3-24, 3-25.4, NDP 1, 6, NWP 3-50.1 Rev A, NTA 6.2, OPNAVINST 3130.6D)

|   | M1 | Number SAR missions conducted. |

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MCT 1.3.4.2 Conduct Air Refueling
Aerial refueling allows MAGTF aircraft, both fixed- and rotary-wing, to conduct Tactical and Force extension operations, extend time on station, and extend mission range. The Marine Aerial Refueler Transport Squadron (VMGR) has the primary task to provide the tactical aerial refueling service to Marine aviation units. *(JP 3-0, 3-04, 4-0, 4-01, 4-03, MCWP 3-2, NDP 1, 4, NWP 3-01.10, 3-22.5 Series, 3-56.1, 4-01, 4-08)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>M3</td>
<td>Number</td>
<td>Of aircraft ready and available.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M4</td>
<td>Percent</td>
<td>Of Full Mission Capable (FMC) aircraft.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M5</td>
<td>Number</td>
<td>Of sorties daily sustained during contingency/combat operations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M6</td>
<td>Number</td>
<td>Of J Model sorties daily sustained during contingency/combat operations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M7</td>
<td>Number</td>
<td>Of F/R/T sorties daily sustained during contingency/combat operations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M8</td>
<td>Lbs.</td>
<td>Of fuel transferred.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M9</td>
<td>Percent</td>
<td>Of lift available.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M10</td>
<td>Number</td>
<td>Of aircraft available to refuel.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M11</td>
<td>Number</td>
<td>Of aircraft that could not refuel.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M12</td>
<td>Time</td>
<td>On/Off station.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M13</td>
<td>Percent</td>
<td>Of maximum capacity experienced.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M14</td>
<td>Percent</td>
<td>Of fuel available versus requirements.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M15</td>
<td>Percent</td>
<td>Of needed fuel transferred.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M16</td>
<td>Time</td>
<td>To complete the evolution.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M17</td>
<td>Seconds</td>
<td>Until plugged and receiving.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M18</td>
<td>Seconds</td>
<td>From tanker “cleared-in” call until ready to receive fuel.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M19</td>
<td>Lb(s).</td>
<td>Of fuel available in the air.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M20</td>
<td>Seconds</td>
<td>From tanker “cleared in” call until ready to fuel.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M21</td>
<td>Minutes</td>
<td>To conduct helo on-deck refueling.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M22</td>
<td>Minutes</td>
<td>To conduct helo in-flight refueling (HIFR).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M23</td>
<td>Percent</td>
<td>Of aircraft plugged on first approach to basket.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M24</td>
<td>Percent</td>
<td>Of fuel required available from organic air refueling assets.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M25</td>
<td>Minutes</td>
<td>Delay in mission due to inadequate number of air refueling assets.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M26</td>
<td>Percent</td>
<td>Of pilots in Air Wing current and proficient in day/night tanking.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M27</td>
<td>Percent</td>
<td>Squadron pilots AR qualified.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

MCT 1.3.4.2.1 Provide Aviation-Delivered Ground Refueling
Rapid ground refueling (RGR) is a method of providing fuel to aircraft and tactical ground vehicles (TGV) utilizing KC-130 and CH-53 aircraft in austere locations, where no other source of fuel is readily available. This method of refueling permits operation of fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft and TGV without the requirement to commit the significant logistical assets necessary to operate helicopter expeditionary refueling systems (HERS), or tactical airfield fuel dispensing systems (TAFDS). RGR can also quickly resupply established forward-arming and refueling (FARP) sites and forward-operating bases (FOB). The capability of the KC-130/CH-53 to operate as a tactical ground refueler enhances MAGTF operations. *(ANTTP 3-22.3-KC-130)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>M1</th>
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<th>Of T/O personnel MOS qualified and deployable.</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>M2</td>
<td>Percent</td>
<td>Of Full Mission Capable (FMC) aircraft of PAA.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
From: Commanding Officer
To: (b) (3) (A), (b) (6)

Subj: DESIGNATION AS MARINE ALL WEATHER FIGHTER ATTACK SQUADRON 242 AVIATION SAFETY OFFICER

Ref: (a) CNAF M-3710.7
(b) MCO 5100.29B

1. In accordance with the references, you are hereby appointed as the Aviation Safety Officer for Marine All Weather Fighter Attack Squadron 242. Your appointment will remain in effect until such time that you are debriefed or relieved of your responsibilities by competent authority.

2. You will indicate by endorsement of this letter that you have familiarized yourself with the references and that you have assumed the duties as the Aviation Safety Officer for this command.

FIRST ENDORSEMENT

From: (b) (3) (A), (b) (6)
To: Commanding Officer

1. I have read and understand the instructions contained in the references. I am aware of my responsibilities as the Aviation Safety Officer for the command.
Media Release #: 18-004  
Date: December 11, 2018

Marine Corps declares remaining Marines involved in F/A-18 and KC-130 aviation mishap deceased; search and rescue operations concluded

MARINE CORPS BASE CAMP BUTLER, Okinawa, Japan – The Marine Corps has pronounced the five remaining Marines involved in the F/A-18 and KC-130 aviation mishap deceased. The change in status comes at the conclusion of search and rescue operations.

The next-of-kin for the five deceased Marines have been notified.

“Every possible effort was made to recover our crew and I hope the families of these selfless Americans will find comfort in the incredible efforts made by US, Japanese, and Australian forces during the search,” stated U.S. Marine Corps Lt. Gen. Eric Smith, commanding general, III Marine Expeditionary Force.

Our most valued asset is the individual Marine. We remain faithful to our Marines and their families as we support them through this difficult time. We ask for members of the public to please respect the family and allow them privacy.

The KC-130 Hercules was assigned to Marine Aerial Refueler Transport Squadron 152 (VMGR-152, call sign “Sumo”), 1st Marine Aircraft Wing.

"All of us in the Sumo family are extremely saddened following the announcement of the conclusion of search and rescue operations," said U.S. Marine Corps Lt. Col. Mitchell T. Maury, commanding officer of VMGR-152. "We know this difficult decision was made after all resources were exhausted in the vigorous search for our Marines. Our thoughts are heavy and our prayers are with all family and friends of all five aircrew."

The F/A-18 Hornet involved was assigned to Marine All-Weather Fighter Attack Squadron 242 (VMFA-242). The aircraft were conducting regularly-scheduled training. It is not confirmed that aerial refueling was ongoing when the mishap occurred.

The Marine Corps rigorously investigates all aviation mishaps to identify the causes, learn from them, and mitigate future incidents.

The circumstances of the mishap are currently under investigation. There is no additional information available at this time. The identities of the Marines will be provided 24 hours after next of kin have been notified. Media can contact III Marine Expeditionary Force public affairs at IIIMEFMEDIA@usmc.mil.

-30-
Today is the 26th of March, it's 2019. I'm [b](3) (A), (b) (6) and I'm assisted by [b](3) (A), (b) (6) and we're interviewing [b](3) (A), (b) (6) from VMFA-242. Time now is approximately noon.

[b](3) (A), (b) (6), can you please state your full name for the record, spelling your last name.

[b](3) (A), (b) (6): [b](3) (A), (b) (6).

[b](3) (A), (b) (6): How would you like me to refer to you through this interview?

[b](3) (A), (b) (6): [b](3) (A), (b) (6) is fine, sir.

[b](3) (A), (b) (6): What is your Military Occupational Specialty?

[b](3) (A), (b) (6): 7525.

[b](3) (A), (b) (6): What is a 7525?

[b](3) (A), (b) (6): It's a weapons systems officer.

[b](3) (A), (b) (6): For the F-18?

[b](3) (A), (b) (6): Correct.

[b](3) (A), (b) (6): So you're basically an F-18 backseater?

[b](3) (A), (b) (6): Correct.

[b](3) (A), (b) (6): Cool. Tell me about your experience, hours, qualifications, and deployments as a 7525.

[b](3) (A), (b) (6): Sure. I've been in the operational forces since 2011 to the present. I have about 960 hours in the aircraft. Qualifications: LAT, ACM, and night systems. And
then for designations: Section lead and night systems instructor. 

Okay. What was your billet in the squadron during the mishap, December 18th?

I was an aviation safety officer.

ASO. And you attended the Naval Aviation Safety Officer Course in Pensacola, Florida?

Yes, sir.

When did you do that?

It would have been October and early November of 2016.

Of 2016? How long is that course?

The ASO course is five weeks. I stayed an extra week to do the Crew Resource Management Instructor Course.

So you're an ASO and a CRMI?

Correct.

Okay.

But I am not a NATOPSI.

Okay. What is it -- what is -- did you know the mishap crew?

I did, sir.

Okay. Any personal knowledge of the crew you'd like to share?
Unfortunately, because of the AMB I cannot go into any opinions on it. Was a first tour pilot. Prior to the mishap, he had an incident where he took a precautionary arrestant on the overrun arresting gear. That incident was addressed by the Co, the DOS, the training officer, and the OPSO. Handled in that manner and then gave a debrief to the ready room.

Was your -- what was your personal participation in the mishap flight events or planning?

Did not have any, sir.

Okay. We might circle back to that.

Okay.
Any personal observations on the mishap flight events or planning?

[b](3) (A). (b) (6): No, sir. We were on different crews. I was day crew, they were night.

[b](3) (A). (b) (6): Okay. So three crews. So you were on the early crew, if you will?

[b](3) (A). (b) (6): Correct.

[b](3) (A). (b) (6): Okay. And what was your approximate report time for the early crew? Like 0500, 0600, something like that?

[b](3) (A). (b) (6): I want to say it was probably around zero -- between 0600 and 0630, probably. It might have been earlier.

[b](3) (A). (b) (6): Okay. What was your personal participation in the mishap scheduling process at the squadroning MAC?

[b](3) (A). (b) (6): So the scizzo's will work ahead on schedules that they know are coming up. So I had looked at the planned schedule for the mishap day, either a day or two prior. So the plan at that time was for the mishap flight to go to the seaside atca and do simulated casts. I was unaware of the last minute schedule change until after the schedule had been routed and signed. So I did not see the final version of the schedule where the change occurred.

[b](3) (A). (b) (6): Let me ask a clarifying question there. So last minute schedule change, do you mean change to airspace? Because you said seaside atca, and the mishap was in
the Iteras South. So I went from an over land piece of airspace, to an offshore airspace, correct?

Yes, right. Correct.

And you never saw that as part of the change process, if you will?

No, sir, I did not.

Okay. And you say last minute change. It was before a commanding officer's signature, so that would be 1500, 1400, what time of day do you think that change occurred?

I don't know exactly. I just know that I had been doing mission planning, and when I came out there was a note on the ODO board that stated aircrew couldn't start their engines prior to 0100 local. And I learned from the ODO at that time that they were planning to go to the Iteras South.

Okay. And when you say 0100, you mean 0001 after midnight, not after 1 a.m.?

Correct, after midnight.

Okay.

So that was my first indication that there was a schedule change --

But you say schedule change, but the published flight schedule reflected the Iteras South.

Correct.

I would consider a schedule change to be a pen change after publication, but --

Right. I understand, I'm being unclear
there. So what I'm referring to is the schedule that I had already looked at prior to that, and sometime that afternoon while I was debriefing from the previous flight and then in mission planning for the next day, there was a change that I became aware of after the schedule was already in front of the CO for his signature.

[b][3] [(A), (b) (6)]]: I understand. I got it.

Okay. Did you have any personal observations on the days before the mishap regarding aircrew wellness?

[b][3] [(A), (b) (6)]]: I didn't see them at all, sir, due to the misaligned --

[b][3] [(A), (b) (6)]]: Did you have any personal observations of the mishap aircrew's professionalism, skill, or judgment?

Aeronautical.

[b][3] [(A), (b) (6)]]: Sir, I'm unable to go into anything on that due to the A and B constraints because that would be an area of opinion.

[b][3] [(A), (b) (6)]]: Do you have any -- your personal understandings -- what is your personal understanding of the go/no go pill authorization, and how, and why you know that to be true?

[b][3] [(A), (b) (6)]]: So the CO stated in an AOM that the CG had not approved go/no go pills for the exercise or for the MAG-ULT.

[b][3] [(A), (b) (6)]]: Okay. And you know that to be true because you heard the CO say it, [b][3] [(A), (b) (6)]?  

[b][3] [(A), (b) (6)]]: Correct.
Who can change the flight schedule at 242?

Per the admin SOP, it's the CO or XO.

Okay.

The admin SOP does not state what a -- constitutes a schedule change. It just talks about schedule changes, but it does not give examples of schedule changes.

So your inference there might be that adding a tanker code may not constitute a change in some peoples mind?

Not necessarily. All I'm referring to there from my perspective from reading of reading that, it appears that the admin SOP was written to give the local commander some broader authority to determine what constitutes schedule changes. Unfortunately, there is no clarifying documentation within the admin SOP on that, but it does clearly state CO or XO.

As the ASO, what would you consider a schedule change?

Times, aircrew, mission sets. So the F-18 has 12 mets, casts, FATGAY, Scar AR, Seed. Things along those lines, those are what -- when I think of mission sets, those are what I think of. So big ticket type changes to the schedule.

Okay. Does -- can you define a risk or hazard in the risk management process?

Sure. So, bare bones, I'm identifying the hazard, I'm assessing the hazard, and then I'm going to identify
controls, implement those controls, and then supervise. So that's the bare bones process.

Okay. What's the difference between a risk and a hazard?

A risk is something that you are -- you're assessing, so how much risk is involved with a particular hazard. So I believe risk is an assessment of a hazard. A hazard is something that can cause a mishap, cause injury, can hurt somebody, or damage property.

Does 242 use an ORM worksheet?

No, sir. Up to the mishap we did not. I have been the ASO under two different CO's with this command. [ph] did not want to use the risk management worksheet and neither did [ph]. They were not aware of any order that stated it was required.

So the answer is you don't use one because the CO doesn't want to and there's no order requiring it?

Correct, sir.

[inaudible].

Yes, sir.

Is there anything that you would like to add?

No, sir.

Is there anyone else that you would recommend that we speak with?

No, sir.
Okay. So I wanna go back and probe you a little bit on skip pre-mishap, all right. Pre-mishap, roles and responsibilities of the Aviation Safety Officer, and the schedule writing process at 242 pre-mishap. Okay. So we'll go slow, okay.

So when a schedule is written at 242 pre-mishap, what does that process look like and what is the ASO's involvement in that?

Sure. So it could come either to the DOSS or the Aviation Safety Officer, whoever was available. The scizzo's would bring it in a routing binder and it always had the hot board with it, it always had the previous day's schedule. And prior to, so under [ph], the flight schedule had three different signature lines on it. And the safety signature line could be signed either by the ASO or by the DOSS. That was the unwritten SOP, if you will. It was not in writing.

After took command some time that summer, that shifted to one signature on the flight schedule. The schedule's officers put another sheet behind it with a line for each day where either I or the DOSS would sign. The beginning of December, they didn't in there, they had forgotten to print it out. And I asked them a couple different times, like, hey put the signature page back here. I don't know if it ever did because I was out of the squadron after the mishap occurred, but those first few days of the writing in December
there was not a schedule, or there was not a -- sorry -- there was not a signature page back there.

Regardless, I still looked at the flight schedule, so I go through the hot board, I look at peoples day currency, I look at their night currency. If they're going out to do a dive, I look at their dive currency. And then I just, kind of, consider who is with who. You know, what aircrew are flying with who. That said, there -- there are not -- at the time, there were no known crew conflicts to me, prior to the mishap with people who should not be flying together. But those are, generally speaking, the things that I look at.

And then if it's a particular time of year, water temperatures and so on, then I'll ask questions about that. But usually that's more of a day of, kind of, walk into the ODO, like, hey they're going flying in this airspace, what's the water temperature out there? Okay. It's 55 degrees, do you have the CO's approval yet? No, I don't. And why not? That's more of a day of, kind of, current OPS. But as far as looking at the flight schedule, those are the things that I'm looking at.

Okay. Why -- what reason did provide to you, as ASO, for removing your signature block from the flight schedule?

I didn't get one from him.

So how did you come to notice that? Just one day we change of command, and then a few days later you saw a flight schedule and it wasn't on there?
Yes. And I asked the scizzo's, like, hey why isn't this here? And the explanation that I was given was that the CO wanted to be the one to sign the flight schedule. He wanted to be the one because he was assuming the risk. That was my understanding.

Did [ph] not sign the flight schedule?

He did. So there was one line for him and there were three other small initial blocks, if you will.

Okay. So the initial blocks were removed because, as you understood it, the commanding officer's prerogative?

Correct.

And the absence of a published a requirement for the same?

Correct.

There's no order that says that it has to be initialed.

Correct, sir. And it's understanding also that East Coast is the same way. The Hornet fleet is just a commanding officer signature, without the other ones.

So if -- you're telling me if I were to get all the flight schedules from MAG-31, they would -- none of them would have an ASO initial block on it?

I believe that's correct, sir. I believe that's correct, it might be --
How does that improve safety at MAG-31?

I don't know that it does or doesn't, sir. I know that the Aviation Safety Officer at each command has a responsibility, or the DOSS has the responsibility, to review the flight schedule. That's the best information I have for you.

Okay.

They may have some other internal procedure that I'm not aware of, but --

Okay. We've talked about daily flight schedule routing, again, staying totally pre-mishap right here in our minds. How is the ASO involved in the publication of the weekly flight schedule?

Can you clarify?

I can. So when the Pilot Training Officer and WISSO Training Officer sit down with the Operations Officer to identify the training priorities and develop a schedule that covers a week or ten days or some kind of, you know, ATO cycle's three days.

So something more than a flight schedule dropping at 1600 for somebody that has to brief at 8 a.m. the next morning, who basically gets no planning time, how is a schedule developed that goes at least a few days or a week in advanced to give a potential pilot or WISSO time to properly rest, ramp, and prepare for a flight schedule? How is the Aviation Safety Officer integrated into that process at 242?
It's initial -- it's an individual effort. So it's initiative of the Aviation Safety Officer to go in and look at the board --

Can you tell me about the board, is there a dry erase board with magnets or --

There are two, or there have been two in the past.

Okay.

Where the, roughly, two weeks was flowed out with pucks and things like that.

Okay. So you had, like, a two week flow.

So I could walk in and I could look at the board and, kind of, see the rough of what's coming up. And, okay, well this guy is flying here, well, why is he flying on the day here. And I will say this, under there were a lot more issues with book ending aircrew. That really stopped when came onboard.

And by book ending, you mean flying very late one day and early the next day, with minimum crew rest interval?

Correct. It got to the point under that I sent him an email and I got a rather heated response with some other people copied on the email. And I went to each one those people and said, here's what I see, here's what I researched on flight schedules, and then we
had a sit down with the CO. And he actually had a very good response to it, that then triggered a conversation with the ready room.

This would have probably been about a year and a half ago, where he said, hey don't bust your crew rest for the entire week by showing up early to do something else on the flight schedule. So he clarified his intent after that meeting.

I did not see any of those issues with \( (b) \) (3) (A), (b) (6). The scheduling process of continuity across the week with aircrew and how they were scheduled was, in my opinion, handled better between the two commanding officers.

\( (b) \) (3) (A), (b) (6): Do you guys do a human factors council?

\( (b) \) (3) (A), (b) (6): Yes, sir.

\( (b) \) (6), (b) (3) (A): And that's not on your list.

\( (b) \) (3) (A), (b) (6): Sure.

\( (b) \) (3) (A), (b) (6): So we'll just, kind of, see how we get going on that so.
So in the case of (b) (3) (A), (b) (6), you saw the flight schedule with (b) (3) (A), (b) (6) flying in the wee
hours; is that correct? The flight schedule you saw as the ASO, the airspace changed, but did the aircrew change?

I think the time also changed. So, initially, from what I can remember, it was earlier in the evening.

Okay. As the ASO, did you see the crew shift assignments in the weeks, or in the days before the mishap event? When you guys went to a day, mid, and late night crew, were you afforded the opportunity --

Yes.

-- To review and play -- and provide input to who was selected for day, afternoon, and late night flights?

I was aware of who was put there.

Did the Operations Officer come to you, come to you and ask you for your Aviation Safety Officer validation of his crew selection?

No.

Did the commanding officer ask you to validate crew selection?

No.

By shift, shift selection?

No.

Okay. Were you surprised to see -- on the late shift, on the graveyard shift?

No. Not necessarily.
Did it bring you any pause as the Aviation Safety officer to approve a flight, whether he has initial block or not; did it give you any pause to approve a flight schedule for [b] (3) (A), (b) (6), who was on the graveyard shift?

I will say I had a conversation the week prior with the OPSO about late night operations, and the ability to transition aircrew to that.

And by transition, you mean move them from the mid shift to the graveyard shift?

No. To transition aircrew to a night -- a night shift from a day shift.

A ramping into the night page, kind of?

Correct.

Okay.

Correct. It was more of a general conversation with not looking at individuals.

Okay. Well, let me stay on just for a little bit further, okay.

Sure.

So you knew that [b] (3) was on that shift, you knew that [b] (3) was scheduled for the mishap flight, and you know [b] (3) [A], (b) (6), (b) (3) (A), (A), (b) (6), (b) (3) (A), (A), (b) (3), (b) (6), (b) (3) (A) [A], (b)
Okay. So let's go back to the ramping conversation. Tell me more about your conversation with the OPSO about ramping the day crew to the graveyard shift.

It was an ASO conversation, it was the OPSO, like, I have a concern.

Okay.

That we don't have enough time to transition.

Okay. So the crews were announced on Thursday or Friday before the mishap?

Sounds correct.

Okay. So, and I don't think you guys were flying Monday wee hours, I could be mistaken. I know you guys were flying Tuesday or maybe that was canceled. So you would at least have, like, four days, maybe three. So is it you
had concerns that three or four days is not enough time to go from being awake during the normal interval cycle to being awake in the middle of the run trop?

**[b] (3) (A) (b) (6)**: That was the gist of my conversation.

**[b] (3) (A) (b) (6)**: And what was your recommendation to the Operations Officer?

**[b] (3) (A) (b) (6)**: That we have more time, but we didn't.

**[b] (3) (A) (b) (6)**: That we go back in time a week and pick the crews a week before?

**[b] (3) (A) (b) (6)**: Yes, it was a --

**[b] (3) (A) (b) (6)**: So that's a great question. So how far out did 242 -- how many weeks in advance did 242 know that you guys were conducting ULT during the mishap week?

**[b] (3) (A) (b) (6)**: I don't know.

**[b] (3) (A) (b) (6)**: When did you come to learn of there being a ULT?

**[b] (3) (A) (b) (6)**: I knew there was going to be a ULT. I learned about the late night or 24-hour operations the week prior.

**[b] (3) (A) (b) (6)**: Okay. Judge.

**[b] (3) (A) (b) (6)**: No questions, sir.

**[b] (3) (A) (b) (6)**: Let's stop, thanks.

All right. The judge will swear you out.

**[b] (3) (A) (b) (6)** was warned, sworn, and departed.]
Good morning. Today is the 26th of March, 2019. We're in Iwakuni, Japan. My name is [b] (3) (A), (b) (6). I'm assisted by [b] (3) (A), (b) (6) and [b] (3) (A), (b) (6). Our next interview is with [b] (3) (A), (b) (6).

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6), could you please state your name for the record, spelling your full name.

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6): It's [b] (3) (A), (b) (6). It's spelling [b] (3) (A), (b) (6).

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6): Okay. [b] (3) (A), (b) (6), how would you like me to refer to you in this interview -- [b] (3) (A), (b) (6) --

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6): [b] (3) (A), (b) (6) or [b] (3) (A), (b) (6). It's whatever --

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6): Okay. [b] (3) (A), (b) (6), I guess, is your call sign?

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6): Yes, sir.

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6): Could you spell that for me?

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6): [b] (3) (A), (b) (6).

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6): [b] (6), (b) (3) (A)

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6): Yes, sir.

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6): Okay. What is your military occupational specialty?

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6): It's a 7523, F-18 pilot.

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6): Okay. And how long have you held that MOS?
Since 2011.

So about 8 years or so?

Approximately.

Tell us a little bit about your experience with F-18 hours, quals, deployments, and whatnot.

I'm currently about 830 F-18 hours. I'm a mission commander, fighter tactics instructor. I've got a lat-eye qual, which is low-altitude tactics instructor qualification. And I'm a forward airborne -- or forward air-controller airborne FACA. That's as far as my quals go.

And in my experience, I finished the RAG, F-18 RAG in Miramar in about 2000 -- I think it was about 2011. And I reported to my first squadron, which was the VMFA-314 out of Miramar. I did two deployments with them. The first deployment was a combat deployment to SITCOM. I participated in OIR, Operation Inherent Resolve.

The second deployment was a EDP out here to Iwakuni in 2015. I did one year in factor with 1st Recon Battalion out at Pendleton. And reported here to Iwakuni in September of 2017. And I've been here since.

Okay. Great.

How long have you been in 242 then? When did you check into 242?

September of '17, so about a year and a half -- about a year and six months or so.

Okay. And the mishap occurred in
December of 18. So you said about a year and a half.

What billets have you held at 242?

When I checked in, I was the assistant operations officer. From there, I transitioned to the pilot training officer role, which is the current billet that I hold. And then, in between there in the assistant operations and pilot training officer billets, I was in a work-up to go to WTI, the weapons and tactics instructor course. So when you're in that work-up, you're kind of sequestered off from everything else.

So while I was the PTO on paper, pilot training officer on paper, from August of 2018 through -- really through the mishap. I was not fulfilling a significant amount of the role. I was fulfilling what I could administratively. But I was not, quote/unquote, the acting PTO.

Who was the acting PTO?

So it would have been the OPSO. So the OPSO, was kind of filling in for what I could not administratively work out.

What are the roles and responsibilities of a pilot training officer in an F-18 squadron?

I'm responsible for really the overall adherence of the squadron to the training readiness manual in terms of career progression and the progression through the training of them. Making sure the squadron is all training for whatever a mission may be.

What kind of action steps do you take
to ensure a squadron is properly trained, or a pilot is properly trained? Tell me more about that.

Basically ensuring that the squadron -- or the aircrew -- are abiding by our training readiness manual, which kind of steps through progression of different events.

So until we get a "count 1" pilot, who is brand new and straight from the rack, has never flown, really, tactical sorties ever, there is a progression that we take them through with a couple FAM flights. We do a couple basic air-to-surface flights. And those involve sims and flights into an air-to-air syllabus for a "count 1" aircrew.

Then for aircrew that are beyond, or kind of, completed beyond those events, I kind of worry about getting them the mission skills and just progression through mission skills. So say for instance, close-air support is one of our mission skills that we have. Then, there's a progression where you start with a couple sims. And then, you go into a basic flight; and then, a little more advanced flight.

Then, you get into night CAS. So my responsibility as the PTO is to ensure that that training is kind of done and the aircrew receives lectures or classes on the front-end of that so that they can employ and they can do the missions correctly.

And then, another piece of it is, to kind of be one of the contra of instructors to ensure that the instruction is kind of standardized throughout the squadron.

And then, in addition to those things, we look into
combat leadership and ensure that we have the combat leadership that we need. So a section lead qualification, a division lead qualification, mission commanders, forward airborne controller. All of the qualifications we need to do our mission sets, ensuring we get the aircrew those qualification in kind of a progressed model. So that all goes into like an aircrew training plan that we'll write and publish and say, hey for the next -- we'll publish an annual aircrew training plan that says for the next year, these are roughly the things we'll be looking at. For the next three months, we'll be focusing on air-to-air. For the next three months, we'll focus on air-to-ground.

And then, well break that down into a quarterly training plan. We'll take that quarter and say that quarter was supposed to be air-to-air. These are the things we're going to focus on; here's the individuals we're going to teach subject matter experts on classes "x" subject. And then, here's the events we're going to do, aircrew we're going to try to qualify as a section lead or division lead and so forth.

[b](3) (A), (b) (6) : Okay. Thanks for that.

Where were you in December of '18? Were you here in Iwakuni?

[b](3) (A), (b) (6) : I was in Iwakuni. Yes, sir.

[b](3) (A), (b) (6) : Were you -- did you know the mishap F-18 aircrew?

[b](3) (A), (b) (6) : Yes, sir.

[b](3) (A), (b) (6) : [b](3) (A), (b) (6) and [b](3) (A), (b) (6).
Did you participate in the ULT at all?

No, sir. I did not. The ULT was -- I was supposed to go to MITC, so Marine Division Tactics Instructor Course, in Beaufort, South Carolina. The course was from January 7th through February 2nd. So for every MAW 1's sponsored formal course like that, there is a 45-day prior kind of cut off. 45 days prior, you're supposed to be sequestered -- kind of what I was talking about early -- and kind of sequestered off. And have -- you're supposed to be able to just focus on nothing else but training for that course.

Obviously in practice, that doesn't always work. So I'm still the new PTO trying to work through a few things here and there. But not --

So what I was tracking is you were scheduled to go to a MOTS course out in Beaufort, South Carolina in January. So that from about 15 November through the 1st of the year, you were not participating in squadron flight training. Is that correct?

Yes, sir. So squadron flight training in terms of -- I was participating in squadron flight training, but the training was for me. Not as much me out there training anyone. So I'm participating in squadron flight ops, but those flight ops are MDTC work-up events. So work-up events, sorties dedicated strictly for myself and , who was supposed to be the WISSO to go through. So that is what we were doing.
So the ULT came up and there was no training value for myself and him participating in the exercise. Because what MDTC is based on is basic fighting maneuvers. So 1 v. 1 F-18 --

Yes, sir. It's an excellent question.

It progresses through. So it starts out with 1 v. 1 BFs, so you get a -- basically, a 1 v. 1 BFM stand-check. Then, it builds to deployment, which is our 2 v. 2 section engagement, where you had two airplanes versus one or two airplanes. So that's the first week and a half of the course. It focuses on those two items. Kind of building blocks.

And then, the last two weeks is on division employment with division DCAs, defensive counter airs, and division AIs, division air indication missions.

Okay. So tell me what you were doing in December.

In December, I was standing and preparing airborne briefs for that. And I started to go --

So who was preparing the weekly flight schedule? Who was doing the things required to publish a flight schedule?

The schedule officers and the flight officer are the ones who prepare the weekly flights.

And --

We don't have an actual weekly schedule that
we publish. It was being prepared by the flight officers and the
SCISSOs. And then, I was helping where I could in terms of crew
select pool.

and I sat down prior to the event when we
finally had an idea of what we were supposed to do. And we sat
down and were the ones that kind of came up with the walk-through
with crews, the crew allocation through, and sat down at his
white board and spent an hour kind of going through putting
different Marines everywhere.

: So you and sat and worked
together to develop the three crews.

Yes, sir.

: The day, mid, and graveyard shift?

Correct. Yes, sir.

: That were then scheduled for what I'm
going to call, like, a weekly flight schedule?

Yes, sir.

Because the ULT was only like a week
long.

Yes, sir.

Because you had to put people on
early, mid --

Correct. So we just kind of flew everyone
out.

And somehow those said named officers
were notified, and and were told --
Yes, sir. -- with ample time to adjust their circadian rhythm because they would be flying late at night?

I would not define it as ample time, sir.

Tell me about that.

I know that normally ample time -- so traditionally, ample time to go to like a graveyard shift is like 2 weeks. 2 to 3 weeks to be totally adjusted and be fully adjusted without the need of --

How much time did these guys get?

They were given a week. About a week. So the announcement was made. Kind of, everyone's walk-through was kind of what the flight schedule would look like for the week on Thursday. And then, they were not scheduled to fly the graveyard until I think it was Wednesday night, Thursday morning. I believe that was what it was.

So about 5 or 6 days?

Yes, sir. About 6 days.

Okay.

Which I think characterizing it as ample time is an incorrect characterization.

Okay.

It was enough time, but I would not say it was ample time. Ample time would be, like, 2 weeks, 3 weeks.

What techniques would you use if given ample time, you personally, to shift your circadian rhythms to
fly at 2 a.m.?

[b](3) (A), (b) (6): My technique -- because I've done this at our combat deployment at SITCOM -- is we flew the graveyard shift. Our on-station times were 10 p.m. to 4 a.m. and midnight to 6 a.m.

So the technique is basically, it takes probably for me, it takes about 5 days of you stay up, kind of, as late as you can. And you go to bed and fall asleep for however long as you can. And when you wake up, provided that you have Ambien or sleep or something like that. So get up and take a sleep aid from a medical provider, which I have never been denied or never not been issued when asked for. Especially for switching cycles.

So my technique is sleep aid, go to sleep. Usually, I'll only be able to sleep for 2 to 3 hours. It's either bright outside or my circadian is ready. Take some Ambien, drink a glass of water, and go back to bed. And then, that will usually get me back to sleep for about 4 to 6 hours.

And then, wake up, resist the urge to go back to sleep because in about 6 hours you're going to really feel like you want to go back to sleep. Resist the urge to go back to sleep until basically as late as you can again. Basically do that for 2 to 3 days and get onto the kind of cycle.

You want to be at work on the cycle. So you want to wake up at about 5 p.m. or so, so you have 3 or 4 hours before going to work at 10 p.m. So once you get off work at say, 8 a.m., you can go back and spend about an hour and a half and then
go right to sleep for a nice 8 or 9 hour chunk.

[REDACTED]: So you said that -- it sounds like you've taken Ambien before?

[REDACTED]: Yes, sir.

[REDACTED]: What other squadrons have you been that provide --

[REDACTED]: This squadron and 314.

[REDACTED]: Tell me about the last time you were provided Ambien in 242.

[REDACTED]: Because of the timezones and whatnot?

[REDACTED]: Yes, sir. We crossed timezones. So any time you cross a timezone, you get a 72 hour down period. That's supposed to help with your circadian rhythm cycle.

[REDACTED]: So what month was this?

[REDACTED]: July. I want to say July of 2018. It may have been June. June or July of 2018.

[REDACTED]: Who was your flight surgeon?

[REDACTED]: It was [REDACTED].
Yeah.
Okay. And so what is your -- what is your perception of who's authorized to dispense Ambien?

To dispense Ambien?

What is your knowledge? And, I mean, what do you --

So as --

It sounds like you feel like you can just go to the doctor and ask for it and if the flight surgeon gives it to you, You're good to go?

Yes, sir. That is -- yes.

Okay. Was Ambien used during this December 18 ULT's?

I do not know.

Was it authorized? There was no statement that said Ambien was not authorized. And I know that
this -- there was no statement that said Ambien is not authorized. There was a statement, and I don't remember the context of it or when or where it was said, but it mentioned that performance-enhancing drugs were not authorized. And I understand that I believe by definitions and some research and some of this information is information that has come out over the last three or four months. But Ambien, apparently, is classified as a performance-enhancing drug from what I understand.

Prior to this I would never have classified Ambien as a performance enhancing drug. So when performance-enhancing drug was said, hey performance-enhancing drugs are authorized, to me that's go pills. That is not Ambien.

So you -- when did you get your wings? You said in '11?

I was winged in 2011.

Okay. So you've been a naval aviator for a year? So you're familiar with OPNAV or CNAV 3710?

Yes, sir.

And you've read this section in 3710 about drugs?

Yes, sir.

And you read that obviously well before the mishap?

Right.

Yeah. Okay. So -- but you're saying
that you didn't know that Ambien or no-go pills were considered a performance-enhancing drug until after the mishap and everybody's talking about it now that it's been three months?

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6): Yes, sir. I would say that's probably accurate.

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6): And you've taken a NATOPS check in the F-18 every year?

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6): Yes, sir.

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6): So you've had, like, eight NATOPS checks in the F-18, maybe more?

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6): Yes, sir.

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6): But you didn't consider Ambien or no-go pills to be a performance-enhancing drug?

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6): I would. No, sir. I would not consider Ambien to be a performance-enhancing drug.

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6): Okay. So do you believe that Ambien was authorized or not authorized for the ULT, based on the information. Not based on the information you have now, if you could try to rewind back on December the 3rd or whatever, you know, a few days before the mishap. Were you under the impression that Ambien was or was not authorized for the mishap? And if so, why did you feel -- how you feel -- how you perceived? Or do you recall?

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6): I will be honest --

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6): Please be honest.

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6): -- if I was flying those night events, and I
had a prescription for Ambien, I would have taken Ambien.

Yes, sir. I feel that would have been the responsible thing because, I mean, to me the responsible thing is to get eight hours of sleep. To get rest and be ready to perform my duties, which as a mission Commander or as a section lead, like, whatever your, you know, billet is. But for me, like, I think about things in terms of, you know, I don't know, you know, I'm the training officer. So I think about things in terms of taking care of the other aircrew out there.

And for me to be on my best game, I know that I need to get sleep. And that's, you know, I've always operated that way, like, sleep is very important. And I know that that shift, like, being on that shift with inadequate sleep is not going to to work out well. Was there need for, you know -- I don't -- having -- there's a lot of what ifs, I guess. And I was somewhat removed intentionally so that I could focus on preparing for MDTC. Had I been involved in, like, hey you're flying on this night. You know, sir, I don't know exactly what I would have done because this is you know, I'm a quarterbacking a little bit. But I 100%
believe that I would have taken Ambien.

Now I may have asked additional questions and said hey performance-enhancing drugs, like, you're not talking about Ambien, right? Like, that's, you know, it's not a performance-enhancing drug. And maybe there would have been a conversation that would have said, no. That, like, that includes Ambien. Ambien is not authorized period.

With whom would you have gotten an authorization from?

I would have talked to our flight doc.

And what's his name?

[ph].

So you would have talked to her? And what if said, do not take Ambien? What would you have done?

I would not have taken Ambien.

Okay.

I would not have taken the Ambien. I would have protested significantly and said, like, you realize that you are basically --

How would you approach that?

With him. I probably would -- and I would have personally gone and talked to see him, and said hey, sir, like you realize that we are --

Do you feel like the mishap aircrew went and talked to the CO?
I think that -- I would say that, I would say that probably did. I don't know that all of --

You have any knowledge of or were you present for any conversations between and about the use of Ambien?

No, sir.

Okay.

So were you involved in or privy to any conversations talking about performance-enhancing drugs or Ambien prior to the mishap?

I was not involved in the conversation. There was a blue -- there was a -- I think it was a WhatsApp message that -- maybe it was somewhat tongue-in-cheek. Maybe it wasn't. But it was like, hey Doc I need some Ambien. Or doc can we get some Ambien? And the response was, like, a copy and paste out of I don't remember if it was that 3710 or out of some Naval supplement manual.

Would you ever receive that WhatsApp chat as being facetious or as being literal?

The request was, I would say, I received that request as a lot of things in a Fighter Squadron. There's a little bit of jesting, but there's always a little bit of underlying truth in it. So their request was probably made in somewhat jest. Like, hey doc, like, we need some Ambien and yeah a little bit of jest. But everybody went, well yeah, of course we do, like, you know on the graveyard shift. And then the
response from the flight doc was -- it was basically just like a copy and paste out of a manual.

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6): What manual? What was the copy and paste?

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6): I don't remember.

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6): So was his response, yes?

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6): His response was no.

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6): Okay. So you understood prior to the mishap, and the Squadron understood prior to the mishap, that the use of Ambien was not authorized?

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6): The use of -- no.

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6): So he requested it, and the doc said no.

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6): He requested Ambien for himself and the doc was like, I will not issue Ambien.

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6): Okay.

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6): So yes. Inferring down the line, if what you said, you can make the inferences. Yes.

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6): Yes, you can take Ambien or yes, you can not take Ambien?

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6): What you said in terms of the interpretation of the doc saying no, I'm not giving you Ambien is the inferences that you can make.

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6): Let me try this. Let me ask a very simple straightforward question. Okay? You know, we have these messages and we've read them and we've talked to 20 other people.
Absolutely.

So we're trying to get -- I don't consider instructions from a cognitive flight surgeon to be an inference. That's just my perspective, right, you know. And I've only been a pilot and record for like 22 years or whatever right? But if I went to my fly doc and I said, me personally, or said doc, may I have an Ambien and he said no, I might request mast as the case may be.

Right.

But I would understand that to be, I may not have Ambien and I may not take Ambien. What I think you're trying to articulate was, and maybe I'm confused and that's why I'm trying to clear up here. I'm trying to get you to help me understand. I think what you just said is the docs not going to give you any more Ambien, but if you have some Ambien from the previous period of time, what you do with it is up to you. Is that what you're articulating?

No. So I guess what I'm articulating is the doc basically said I am not going to broadly issue Ambien to everyone in the squadron.

Okay.

Like, the entire Squadron is not all getting Ambien.

Okay.

Which to me would mean that would be followed
up by a personal conversation, not via group message chat to the
doc that said --

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6): Do you know if [b] (3) (A), (b) (6) or
[b] (3) (A), (b) (6) went to the doctor and got a prescription or a
downing chit? Do you have any knowledge?

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6): I do not. No, sir.

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6): Were you present for any conversations
between a cognizant flight surgeon and [b] (3) or [b] (3) ?

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6): No, sir.

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6): Okay. I think we got enough on that
judge.

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6): I'm not trying to, like, evade or -- I
realized that there's gravity in what we're talking about.

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6): We just want you to be transparent.

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6): Yes, sir.

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6): And honestly answer the questions.

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6): And my honest answer is that I would have gone
and talked to [b] (3) (A), (b) (6) and said doc, like, why can I not have
Ambien?

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6): And if doc said because I'm doctor and
I said so, what would you do?

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6): I would take it higher.

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6): Okay. And if you took it to,
hypothetically, Commanding General of the 1st Marine Aircraft
Wing and he said no, you're not taking Ambien. What would you
do?
Then I would not take Ambien. And there's high potential that I would order them out of the flight.

Okay. That's a great point. So if you report it -- if you were scheduled for a flight and you reported for duty and you felt that you weren't medically fit, properly rested, properly nourished, whatever. Weren't feeling good. What would you do?

I would without hesitation cancel. Or not, you know, whatever you want to call it. I'm safe, or I'm out of the flight. I will say that there was a perception that week of a -- I want to say to use the word -- I'm not going to use the word. There was a perception that week that this was very important and needed to be executed. That perception came pressure from MAG. That pressure came and was evidenced the first morning of it.

So I think the first day of execution was -- I can't remember if it was a Monday or Tuesday, but whatever the first day of execution was, it was supposed to be a four-ship of 242, a four-ship from 225, and I believe a four-ship from 121. So about 12 aircraft total and a two-ship; from VMGR. So I guess 14 aircraft total. The two-ship of VMGR warned when our fuel was going to go out and execute some tactics that we had kind of worked up, some briefed. It was actually a pretty cool event. I was kind of bummed that I wasn't flying it.

The CO was flying it. He was a mission commander and at the brief, the weather was briefed as really bad. And he
basically said, all right, we're not gonna -- because it was going to be a fly tank fly evolution. Then we were going to come back to the pits and then go back out. And he basically said, hey, we're going to cancel the first SORTY. And we're going to delay.

And we were going to launch the second SORTY. Same players. Same mission. We're just going to slide the thing to see if the weather gets better. So we rolexed [sic] everything by half an hour. Got the same weather report and the weather was the same or worse, and he said we're canceling for weather. And that was not received well from the southern MAG Operation Center. The MAG had stood up a moc MAG Operation Center in their war room. Where they were supposedly monitoring everything that was going on. And the call, and I don't know whether it was from the SWO or what individual at MAG. It may have been the MAG CO. I don't know that, but there was a call that was made, like, how dare you cancel your flight. How dare you cancel this event without consulting with us?

: So you say you don't know, was that because you weren't on the call.

: I wasn't on the call.

: Okay.

: Correct.

: So you heard this from somebody else?

: I was standing in the room when the CO was on
the phone.

Ok.

So the squadron commander, was in the ready room and he was on the telephone with someone at the MAG Operation Center?

Correct.

Do you feel like that was?

I think it was, but I don't know.

And are you using vernacular when you say how dare you? Or are you trying to communicate that you perceived that was very upset at the cancellation?

Yes. That I don't think that the words how dare you were used. But the implication, whatever the words are because I don't know what the words were, but the interpretation of that was basically, like, why are you canceling this flight?

Do you think controlling the MAG had access to the same weather report?

I think the MAG had access to the same weather report.

Do you think the MAG is familiar with the weather capabilities and limitations associated with F-18 and C-130 operations in this AOR?

I would say that as a general whole, they are, yes.

So why wouldn't the MAG come up with
the exact same decision, with the same information, and the same regulations?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): That is an excellent question. And why they didn't and call us cancel us.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): Yes. Why wasn't the MAG calling you and saying, hey, we looked at the weather, it's crummy. Let's go ahead and cancel.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): That's an excellent question, sir.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): Let's take a three-minute break. I need to go to restroom. I was actually going to the head when you came in, so I got a bladder full. This is , the time is 0835-ish, a little after on the 26th of March. We're back on the record after a short intermission. We're here with , I want to talk to you a little bit about pilot training, schedule writing, and crew selection stuff. So you mentioned earlier that you and selected the crews for the shifts, for the mishap shifts?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): Yes, sir.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): So what kind of considerations were you guys looking for when you chose , and for the graveyard shift?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): Okay. So without -- just going to them specifically, but in general we were looking at being able to provide quals across all the shifts. So looking to have a minimum one mission commander per shift. Ideally, two mission commanders per shift. Looking to
provide primaries, kind of, during the daytime hours when most of work still, like, work was still going to go on during this ULT. It's not like we were deployed somewhere and could not totally, you know, focus on stuff. So looking to provide, for the most part, the primaries during the -- first, during the daytime shift, kind of, secondaries in that second mid shift. And then provide reps in the third shift that could, kind of, swing across all of it.

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6): What made Resliard an ideal candidate for this shift? Who do you think was the best choice for late night shift?

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6): I would say that he was not chosen specifically for the late-night shift.

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6): But he was. He was on the late-night shift.

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6): Yes, sir. So --

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6): Let me ask it questionably. Why was on late night shift?

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6): Because he was not a primary that needed to be on --

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6): By primary you mean administrative task. The S-1 officer --

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6): Yes, sir. An S-1 and S-2 doesn't fly. But, you know, an S-1 officer and S-4 officer, really the OPSO and the CO. And it wasn't one of those. So the way the, you know, like, we didn't start with the junior aircrew in a sign that you we
start with the junior aircrew and assign them. We started with
the qualifications. You know, the big qualifications. So the
mission commander. So we divvied across the mission --

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6) : But you had junior aircrew flying the
daytime?

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6) : Yes, sir.

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6) : Who was counterpart in terms
of qualification and designation who was operator during the
daytime? I'm sure there was several.

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6) : So a comparison would have been -- so
[b] (3) (A), (b) (b)
was another, you know, pilot, similar timeframe. But
[b] (3) (A), (b) (6) was the sched [sic] writer. So
[b] (3) (A), (b) (6) needs to execute duties during the day.
[b] (3) (A), (b) (6) was
the adj. So in terms of duties that are, like, important for
functioning of the squadron and producing the schedule,
[b] (3) (A), (b) (b)
[b] (3) (A), (b) (6) duties in terms of that were not significant. You know,
[b] (3) (A),
(b) (6) he can -- he has paperwork to do and things to do, but not
necessarily any of that falls in --

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6) : Do you believe the
[b] (3) (A), (b) (6) ground job during the mishap was squadron adjutant.

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6) : Yeah, I think so.

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6) : Okay. What about ? What
made
[b] (3) (A), (b) (6) : a great choice for that crew?
[b] (3) (A), (b) (6) : I honestly -- I'm not sure. I understand your
line of questioning. I disagree. I disagree with the way that
you're asking that in saying that as if we went -- as if we

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picked. We were like alright, we've got to fill these two slots. All right. This guy is the perfect one for this and this guy's a perfect one for this.

[ redacted ]: Okay.

[ redacted ]: Sir, in a perfect world I wish we could do that, and that we had all of the qualifications in the aircrew required to do that. The simple fact is we don't. And once you fill the required billets of hey, we need a mission commander, I need a div lead, and I need a section lead. What falls out at the end of that is only about probably six aircrew.

Maybe six pilots and four WISSOS that falls out at the end of that. And then it's a case of, okay. I've got these and probably it's not even that many because we had taxes to pay to -- there was something going on in Okinawa. I can't remember the name of it. Something went on Okinawa. We had someone on leave.

Anyways, there were, you know, there were a few out. So it was once the overall qualifications were assigned like hey, we've got a div lead and a section lead and, you know, mission commander on this shift and on this shift. So, like, for instance [ redacted ] was -- [ redacted ] was the mission commander. Very high trust and confidence in him and was a perfect selection in our mind for that night shift.

One of the reasons being that he wasn't the OPSO or AMO or the CO. He was a QAO. So he was a maintenance representative. He can be a maintenance representative that's
there for night. The AMO's during the day. He would be there during the night. The double AMO I think was on the second shift, the mid-shift. So he would be on the night shift.

Another excellent reason that he was chosen is he has combat experience flying during that time. So he had done an OIR deployment where they flew the graveyard shift. So, like, those two things, like well, he's a perfect one for this selection. So that's where he got the mission commander on the night shift.

And then -- so was a section lead in its div lead workup. And was an easy fit also in terms of kind of the way that the job billets kind of shook out. Okay. We need another section lead. is a, you know, qualified able-bodied WISSO. He is in div lead work-up, like, he's doing well. We'll put him on the night shift as well as another planner. Someone that we trust.

And then the rest of it, you know, so same thing. He's a section. We needed another section lead WISSO on that shift. So he went to that shift because the other shifts may have already been filled.

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(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Did you have other section lead WISSOS, people with similar qualifications and experience as that were on the day page that had different family situations? And what do you know about ORM situation? Or is ORM situation general? Because human factors. What do you know about 's human factors and other people's human factors as that was incorporated in the decision to make who's flying at
2 a.m. and who's flying at 2 p.m.?

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6): Okay. In terms of similar qualifications, him and [b] (3) (A), (b) (6) are the -- were the only section lead WISSOS that we had at the time I believe.

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6): Is there a WISSO whose call sign is [b] (3) (A), (b) (6)?

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6): Yes.

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6): What is his name?

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6): [b] (3) (A), (b) (6).

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6): Tell me about [b] (3) (A), (b) (6)’s qualifications. [b] (3) (A), (b) (6): He's just a WISSO. He's not -- he doesn't have any section lead, any combat experience.

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6): What flight position was [b] (3) (A), (b) (6) flying in? In the mishap. You wrote the schedule right? Was [b] (3) (A), (b) (6) -- was he --

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6): [b] (3) (A), (b) (6) or [b] (3) (A), (b) (6)?

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6): [b] (3) (A), (b) (6).

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6): Yes.

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6): [b] (3) (A), (b) (6) WISSO.

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6): Right.

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6): Was he the section lead or was he the dash 2?

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6): They were the dash 2?

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6): So a section lead qualification would not be required for that position?
Yes, sir.

Can we agree? What I'm trying to get at is could have flown instead of? Probably. Yes, sir.

Probably or absolutely?

Well, I don't remember the reason why was not on the flight schedule that night.

That's what I'm getting at. So what is -- you work in ops, you're the pilot training officer.

Right.

You worked directly with the operations officer, the dry erase board, to put people in the day, mid, and night shift.

Right.

I'm trying to ask why you put Resliard and to fly at 2 a.m.? That's what I'm asking you. I want you to see if you can answer that for me. Why did you choose those people and not other people?

I guess --

It's okay to say we didn't think about it. You can say that because that's what it looks like to me, without putting words in your mouth.
And I'm asking if you as a pilot training officer, and is the operations officer, gave that any consideration before putting him on this shift.

: Are you on the graveyard shift?

: I was not. And I've flown on the graveyard shift or that late-night shift before. And yes, it's not ideal. But it can be done. The answer -- the dogmatic answer to your question is that I consider -- do we consider every human factor associated with every aircrew when we assign them to the shift? The answer's no.

: Okay.

: So our human -- that would be our human factors council I think is the one where we focus on the aircrew.
So the pilot training officer and the OPSO sit in on the human factors council.

So the last human factors council before the mishap?

So in terms -- and the way I. You know, I guess in my view of it, that was not a -- everyone's got small kids. If we said, well if you got young kids, like, you can't fly on the graveyard shift. Well the only guys flying on graveyard shift would be the unmarried single guys. And frankly, like one, that's not fair for them. And two, we could do that based on the fact that one of the unmarried single guys is the OPSO and we need him on the day shift. You know, like, that --

Why did you need the OPSO on the day shift?

That was what was directed by the CO. The CO wanted --

So squadron commander decided they wanted the OPSO on the day shift?

Yes, sir. The CO said he wanted his primary on the day shift.

And okay.

So the OPSO and the AMO.

Okay. So I'm tracking that. So it
sounds like the CO prioritized ground duties over flight duties then. Because we all know the most hazardous time to fly is going to be in the middle of the run trough at 2 a.m. So we had basically junior crews with limited supervision, and there was no Lieutenant Colonel's flying at that time of day. But we had Lieutenant Colonel's day and mid-shift, Co and XO. Did we even have any majors? Were there any field grade officer scheduled to fly at all during the graveyard shift? Any one of your rank? Because it looks like it's all the JO's.

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6): No, sir. There was not.

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6): So we prioritized, and I'm conjecturing, you can disagree with me. The observation I'm making is that we prioritized ground duties over flight duties at 242. That the priority is -- the principle is to do the ground job. Do you disagree with that?

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6): I would disagree with that.

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6): Tell me why.

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6): The reason that -- in my mind the reason the CO, obviously I don't know his exact reason why he wanted his primaries on that, but the reason that I understood the CO wanted the OPSO and the AMO on that daytime shift was because, one, that was when the MAG was around and we were still trying to figure out what exactly the MAG wanted us to do. So he wanted his primaries there, so that we can make decisions. So there was this thing about Poheng, going to Poheng. Could we go to Poheng, could we not go to Poheng? There was all kinds of stuff and I
was able to remain mostly removed from that discussion.

**[b] (3) (A), (b) (6)**: And why were you removed from that discussion?

**[b] (3) (A), (b) (6)**: For the MDTC work-up.

**[b] (3) (A), (b) (6)**: So you said that earlier in the interview. So you're the pilot training officer for a gun squadron, you're a field grade officer, and you're focused on your own personal training. To prepare yourself personally to go do 1v1 to Beaufort in January, and you're not taking part in the planning and execution of the MAG ULT where and and others are going to the Tanker at 2 a.m. Is that, kind of, what you're telling me? Because that's what I'm hearing. Am I characterizing that wrong? So, what's the priority?

**[b] (3) (A), (b) (6)**: Per the order for, like, the course catalog, 45 days prior you're supposed to be sequestered with zero ground jobs.

**[b] (3) (A), (b) (6)**: So commanding officer of MOTTS-1 has ordered the, I guess, the commanding general of 1st MAW that you're not to participate in proper scheduling of crew for a unit level training event? It's actually a Wing event, right?

**[b] (3) (A), (b) (6)**: So it's really -- we call it a ULT, but I mean the walk was stood up at the Wing. The MOC is stood up at the MAG, and you guys are executing it. Definitely the MAG level.

**[b] (3) (A), (b) (6)**: But, the MOTTS-1 skipper in Yuma is saying the pilot training officer, major, field grade officer is not going to fly late at night? Like, why weren't you
flying? I'm just asking you.

[b](3) (A), (b) (6): For the reason that I was doing -- executing the, kind of, the work-up stuff. Like, working through, briefing labs --

[b](3) (A), (b) (6): Why is it so important for you to go to -- what is your current qualification? You said you're a mission Commander?

[b](3) (A), (b) (6): Yes, sir.

[b](3) (A), (b) (6): So, I mean, you could go out and lead a division. You're a division lead, right?

[b](3) (A), (b) (6): Yes, sir.

[b](3) (A), (b) (6): So you can go out and lead a division of Hornets to strike a target, like, right now?

[b](3) (A), (b) (6): Yes, sir.

[b](3) (A), (b) (6): So, why is it so important that you go to Beaufort and go to MDTC? What's the benefit of -- what is the readiness benefit to 1st Marine Aircraft Wing for you to go to MDTC?

[b](3) (A), (b) (6): Because MDTC is the stepping stone to go to WTI.

[b](3) (A), (b) (6): What is the benefit of you going to WTI?

[b](3) (A), (b) (6): WTI provides the squadron with the instructor cadre, as well as per the --

[b](3) (A), (b) (6): You said you're an FAI, right?
Yes, sir.

Are you an NSI?

No, sir.

Okay. So would you come back from WTI as an NSI?

Yes, sir.

Okay. So then you would be a night systems instructor so you can do an initial night systems qualifications?

Correct.

Okay.

And per the order, a PTO, a training office, is actually supposed to be a WTI. So they're supposed --

So that's to give you the qualifications to do the job to which your billeted?

Correct. Yes, sir.

Okay.

And there's supposed to be X number of WTI's in a squadron, excluding the CO. I believe the number is 3.

Do you guys have enough WTI's at 242?

We have the -- we are -- we do on paper. However, one of those WTI's is at the MAG as the MAG XO. So while he counts on paper, practically, he is not. The other -- we have three WTI's in the squadron. The OPSO, the XO, and the CO. The CO sometimes doesn't, you know, usually traditionally not counted as one of the WTI's. So we just have those two.
the MAG XO, is our other one. And then, who was previously in the squadron, and then is now the MATS OIC was another WTI that was in the mix.

And the plan all along was that back to -- harken back to that summer where I was out doing [inaudible] stuff in Miramar. I was supposed to go to WTI in the fall class in September or August as an FAI with a waiver because MDTC is a required prereq for WTI. I had everything complete except for I had not been to MDTC because the class has been canceled and the waiver was not approved in the 11th hour.

So I did not go to WTI. Was not, you know, didn't go to WTI and get my WTI qual. And so now, I'm in a work-up again in November to go to MDTC so that I can in turn go to WTI in the Spring and provide the squadron with a qualified pilot training officer.

So who is filling a pilot training officer roll while you're focused on your personal training as a field grade officer? Who's doing that? Who's doing that work?

The -- myself and the OPSO.

The squadron operations officer,?

Yes, sir.

Okay. So have you ever flown with

Yes.

How did he do?
Nothing noteworthy.
Average.
Average. Yes, sir.
Fleet average.
Like, nothing crazy. I had a -- my last flight with him was probably two weeks prior where we had gone out and done a -- around two weeks prior.
Was your flight with him at night? That you recall.
Not that I can recall off the top of my head.
Did you ever go to the Tanker with him during the day?
Yes. I think the event that I mentioned the last time I flew with him was probably two weeks prior. And if I remember correctly it was kind of like a mission fairly similar to what we planned, kind of, for the ULT stuff. We had a Tanker. We were doing some SAM takedown tactics and stuff. And he was part of my -- he was my dash 2 of my -- of our fore-ship I think.
So nothing noteworthy about him.
Nothing noteworthy. We went to the Tanker, like, no issues.
Okay. Did you see the flight -- the mishap -- did you see the mishap flight schedule as an operations officer, working inside the operations department, did you have -- were you able to take a break from your studies with enough time to see the flight schedule before the commanding
officer signed?  Did you have any role in the publication of the daily flight schedule at 242, as the PTO?

[ ]: The daily, not as much.  I will usually --

[ ]: How do you know the daily flight schedule reflects your PTO priorities if you don't review it?

[ ]: And that's why I say not as much.  So it is everyday the -- I am not a required -- the PTO is not a required stop in the schedule routing process.

[ ]: Who is?  Tell me about your schedule writing process.

[ ]: So our schedule gets routed from the scizzo's and then it usually gets a -- an inside the ops department look by the PTO, the WTO, the assistant OPSO. Someone that's not one of the sched [sic] writers that just wrote it. Usually gets reviewed. Just, kind of, look through and make sure --

[ ]: Where do the sched writers get their ideas?  I mean sched writer, that's a junior billet, right?  Did you ever serve as a sched writer?

[ ]: Yes, sir.

[ ]: So that's like a new guy job?

[ ]: Yes, sir.

[ ]: So how did the new guys get their guidance?

[ ]: From the training officer and the flight officer.

[ ]: Okay.
So those -- if I remember correctly, we had the names and the events for that week flowed out for the entire week.

On something I might call weekly flight schedules?

On something you would call a weekly. It was not published as a weekly, but it was essentially, hey guys this is the plan for the week.

Okay.

And once that is done, like, the scizzo's -- it doesn't require a significant amount of work to take names from that and put them there. And ensure that they are, you know, current to perform the event, ensure that they --

Okay. Lets pause there. So how would a new guy scizzo know that for example, was qualified to conduct a night systems aerial refueling?

They would look at our our sim tracker. So the printout of M-SHARP that spits out a product that shows, like, a stoplight chart.

Okay.

That would show a --

So they would look at a code for example, a 2202, and see if he was red or current?

2202, or a 2402, or whatever, you know, hey he's going out to do night stuff. So the combination of that and our hot board. Which our hot board will show, hey the last night
flight, you know, is he current to fly at night? Yep, he's current to fly at night. And is he qualified to tank at night? Yes.

: How effective is that process?

: I feel like it's fairly effective. There's, I mean, there's human error involved with everything. I know that we have since gone to validate an inside of M-SHARP so that --

: Were you previously writing it outside of M-SHARP on just, like, a spreadsheet or something?

: Yes, sir. So I -- from the other squadrons that I know, I don't know many squadrons that -- so I've been to two squadrons. This squadron and 314. But, from talking with some of my friends in other squadrons, like, most squadrons write it based on a word or Excel document. However, it is -- just because the, I guess, the clunkiness of M-SHARP is kind of -- what M-SHARP spits out in terms of a flight schedule is, kind of, difficult and clunky to deal with. And it's hard to read. And so most writers operate off of a Word document.

: Okay. So then how does an officer in the operations department that produces this document, whoever that might be, how does he ensure it's accurate and complete without using the M-SHARP validation process? What process is in place of that?

: So that's what I was discussing with the hot board and the CMMR tracker.

: Okay.
Of going through that.

Okay. So who reviews the flight schedule before the CO signs it?

So once there, it goes to the OPSO, the OPSO reviews it. And then it'll go to our ASO or DOSS, like, a safety representative. They'll review it and then it goes to the CO for his signature.

So you've worked in the operations department at 242 since you joined a year and a half before the mishap; is that correct?

Yes, sir.

And so in that time, did you ever have occasion to publish and route a flight schedule perhaps earlier when you -- earlier when you were there or did you ever observe someone to do that?

Yes, sir.

Okay. And you just said the ASO. So you're saying the flight schedule goes to the ASO for review?

Yes, sir.

Okay. So did the mishap flight schedule go to an ASO for review?

I can only assume that it did, sir. I did not route that one.

Why would you believe -- what would cause you to believe that to be true?

Because that was our standard practice.
Okay. Did the ASO initial the flight schedule?

I don't know.

Have you looked at a 242 flight schedule in the last year?

Yes, sir.

Have you looked at the bottom of the flight schedule and noticed whose signatures are on that schedule, aside from the commanding officer?

Yes, sir. Since the mishap there is --

No. Before the mishap.

It was just commanding officer.

So the flight schedule went from the most junior guy in the squadron, who's the flight schedule writer?

Right.

With input that's very simple, directly to the commanding officer, and he signing it off and authorized flight? Without the ASO, OPSO, AMO, PTO, WTO, or anybody else looking at it? Is that what you're telling me?

No, sir.

Or is that not what you're telling me?

That's not what I'm telling you.

Okay. So who are the people who review the flight schedule for the commanding officer?

Someone else in ops, OPSO.
Okay.
The ASO or DOSS. And then it goes to the CO.
Okay. And how do you know that to be true?
I'm sorry, the AMO as well. It usually goes to the AMO as well.
Okay.
Because I understand what you're asking.
There is no proof on the flight schedule that that is done.
Or anywhere. I mean there is no --
I know for a while there was a -- the scizzos were, kind of, keeping a copy for, like, a sheet that said, hey, you know, like had each block. Like, a block for the OPSO. Kind of like a routing sheet, like a block, but it was like a monthly block that just showed, hey the AMO, the OPSO, the ASO have all, you know, looked at this.
I know they were doing that for a little while, but --
We're supposed to ignore those.
That's what I heard.
Okay. So you guys ever use a risk assessment worksheet or an ORM worksheet before the mishap?
No, sir.
Did you ever use one at 314?
Yes, sir.
So you used one a MAG-11, but you don't use one at MAG-12?
Correct.

So when you checked into MAG-12 a year and a half ago, and you said where's the risk assessment worksheet, what were you told?

I did not ask about the risk assessment worksheet because the MAG-11 risk assessment worksheet is, in my opinion, nothing more than a pencil drill.

Tell me more about why you believe that to be true.

The questions that it asked, the things that it brings up, and the overall employment of it is just very -- I don't know if arbitrary is the right word. But it's like four questions, like, is it VFR? If the answer is yes, then it's low. If it's not VFR, then you get to decide what it is. Whether it's medium or high. You know, is the water temperature, you know, cold? Is it hot? You know, like what's the water temperature? Is the, you know, are you carrying live ordnance? You know, it was just -- it's like six or eight questions that provide a low, medium, or high, or dealer's choice because there's like a question mark associated with it. Like, well, you know, I think it's a low. To me that's medium.

And then there's a spot for the ODO to fill in based on the weather. And a spot for the aircrew to fill in based on, you know, any operational things that come up in the brief. Like, hey you know, I don't have any ORM to talk about this time. One guy was like, hey I didn't sleep that well last night. Okay.
But in practice it was really nothing more than a pencil drill. Like hey, make sure you fill out your ORM worksheet before you go flying. And then those things -- like, no one ever collected them. No one -- it was just there, you know, there would just be a stack of 300 sheets of paper at the ODO desk from ORM worksheets that were filled out.

So based on your words and your nonverbals, I'm taking that you believe that the MAG-11 ORM worksheet was a waste of time?

I believe so. I think it could have been something. And maybe it was just, you know, new guy in a squadron. You know, young in a squadron that's like, I don't even understand why we're doing this. Like, it doesn't, you know, it doesn't make sense. There's no real thought put into this, and so it just kind of got, I guess, discarded -- discounted as something that was like --

So I'm hearing from you that the actual risk assessment worksheet that you previously experienced was not super effective?

Yes, sir.

Perhaps a distracter. What about the practice of risk management in general? How do you feel about that?

I think we all conduct risk management. In
general, like, more than.

I'm asking if you think it's important.

It's absolutely important. Yes, sir.

Okay. Do you feel that going to the Tanker in low light level at 2 a.m. 200 miles offshore would be medium or high risk?

Yes, sir.

Okay. So how was that communicated to And what mitigations were put in place to mitigate the risk associated with that, that was communicated on the flight schedule from the operations Department, which you work? How did you guys mitigate that? You didn't use the worksheet. The ASO didn't review the flight schedule.

Right. The mitigation was His experience. And the fact that he is a, you know, an FAI. So he was a qualified instructor. He's a mission commander.

Fighter Attack --

Fighter Attack Instructor. Yes, sir.

Okay. Were we doing fighter attack that night or -- I thought we were just going to the Tanker and doing --

Yes, sir. But, it still speaks to his abilities. It still speaks to his abilities as an aircrew. He
has been through a MOT certification. In terms of his ability to teach and his ability to conduct flight operations. So it speaks to his ability.

Can you define a risk?

A risk is -- a risk would be something that has the potential to cause harm.

Can you define a hazard? I mean per 3710?

Verbatim definitions, no.

Can you tell me the difference between a risk and a hazard?

A risk and a hazard -- my understanding of the difference between the two, so a risk could be something that could be mitigated. So something that can be mitigated, and then a hazard is just something that is there that can't necessarily be mitigated, I guess.

You're a division leader in the F-18, you're a major of the Marine Corps, the pilot training officer of a fighter attack squadron, and I'm not hearing a clear definition of risk or hazard from you. I'm going to give you one more chance at that.

That's you -- okay. Who can change the flight schedule at 242? Who's authorized to change your squadron flight schedule?

The CO and usually the CO's representative. So if the CO's gone, usually it falls to, like, the XO or the
OPSO.

[b] (3) (A) (b) (6) :: So you believe that the Executive Officer or the Operations Officer can change the flight schedule?

[b] (3) (A) (b) (6) :: Yes. For the CO, like, for the CO. I know currently it is the CO only. Previously --

[b] (3) (A) (b) (6) :: I'm asking pre-mishap.

[b] (3) (A) (b) (6) :: Yes, sir.

[b] (3) (A) (b) (6) :: So you feel like the Operations Officer, as the squadron CO's direct representative, can change the flight schedule? Would he do that after he talked to the CO or just in general he can make that decision?

[b] (3) (A) (b) (6) :: Not in general. Like, so when I say for the CO I mean for the CO, like, the CO is -- the CO is flying on a flight. Or the CO is doing something where he's indisposed and there's something that needs to be changed or addressed right then. But otherwise, it's the CO or the XO.

[b] (3) (A) (b) (6) :: CO and XO can change the flight schedule. And why do you believe that to be true?

[b] (3) (A) (b) (6) :: I'm not sure I understand. I think you're asking like --

[b] (3) (A) (b) (6) :: What reference guides you in that belief?

[b] (3) (A) (b) (6) :: Okay. I would say -- so what makes me believe that to be true is standard practice, and I cannot quote you the reference, sir.

[b] (3) (A) (b) (6) :: Okay. Are you familiar with the F-18
admin SOP?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): Yes, sir.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): Have you read it?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): Yes, sir.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): Okay. Judge, are we good on the Ambien stuff?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): No, sir. So you said you got a prescription for Ambien to adjust your circadian rhythm sometime in June or July 2018?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): Yes.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): And that was from (b) (3) (A), (b) (6)?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): Yes.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): Is he the squadron flight surgeon?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): He was at the time.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): Okay. You said you went with a WISSO, also going out with you to Miramar?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): No. The WISSO wasn't placed in Miramar.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): Okay. Was he taking Ambien or he didn't go?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): He wasn't placed in Miramar, like, no requirements at all.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): Going back to the conversation that occurred discussing the canceling of flights on the first day of the ULT.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): Okay.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): What made you believe, or how did
you get your impressions from the conversation? You said you were in the room, but you didn't hear the conversation. What happened afterward that leads you to believe that the MAG was disappointed or upset?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): Because when the CO got off the phone he basically in so many words -- if I remember correctly, I don't remember who was in the ready room. But he basically got off the phone and was like well MAG is not really excited that we canceled the flight schedule without talking to them. That was the gist of the conversation. Verbatim, I don't remember exactly what was said, but whatever was said made me believe that the MOC -- the MAG was displeased with the fact that he had canceled the flight schedule. Or canceled that event without consulting them.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): Okay. Was there any follow-on discussions about that?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): Define follow-on discussions, like --

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): So he got off the phone, was he visibly upset? Did he make the comment to the entire ready room? Who was he --

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): It was not to the entire ready room. I would say he was -- I would say this -- I would say visibly upset. He just made the comment that that was, you know, it was like well, you know, the MAG is not pleased that, you know, we canceled this event and they want us to talk to him. And then I'm involved due to the nature of my billet involving plenty of, you know,
closed-door meetings with the OPSO and the CO and, you know, other senior leadership. I think was probably where some more of that came out with like, hey like the MAG was, I think that's where the rest of that my feeling -- my interpretation of that conversation came from.

[b](3) (A), (b) (6): Is there anything that you'd like to add? Anything you would like to clarify?

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6): No, sir.

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6): Is there anyone that you recommend that we speak with that you don't know if we have. Maybe you bumped in to somebody and was like man, I really want to talk to [b] (3) (A), (b) (6) and tell him what I know about this?

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6): No, sir. You pretty much talked to everybody. And our schedules talked to everyone.

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6): Have you -- are you a member of the A and B?

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6): No, sir.

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6): Okay. I mean with hindsight, being 20/20 we're talking about this a little bit. What do you think was, frankly I mean, what could we have done different about this mishap? I mean obviously you thought about it.

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6): Yes, sir. So I think some of it goes back to -- so our, you know, our total aircrew flight time. So, you know, I'm sure you have a copy of our hot board from the day of the mishap.

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6): I do.
You know, I have a copy on my bulletin board that I look at pretty frequently. And that just to remind me that we're not as good as we think we are and it's due to the fact that we don't have the flight time and the proficiency.

So, you know five hours in 30 days is abysmal.

Was that how many hours had?

I -- without it in front of me, I know the entire -- the average across the squadron was very low. You know, I don't remember what it was. I know I was a high man and I was around 10 hours, because I had been flying a little more because I was in this work-up event. But across, you know, across the squadron when your average is, you know, five hours.

And there's -- I feel like there's so many things that play into the reason that our hours were low that it's more than can really be discussed. Systemic -- probably systemic things, like all kinds of things that lead to that low flight time.

But, being dealt the hand of the low flight time when we were -- looking back at it, I do not think that I would change anything that we did. Anything that we planned, you know, hindsight being 20/20 there's -- given the same problem, I don't think that I could solve it -- that I would solve it very differently than the way we solve the problem that we had.

Okay. Thanks.

Sir.

Judge, will you swear him out?
Yes, sir.

was warned, sworn, and excused.
Okay. We're on the record. I'm , it's 1120, on Wednesday, the 23rd of January, 2019.

Present in the room are , and court reporter, .

We are interviewing via FA, all weather, 242. please state your full name, spelling your last name for the record.

is . what do you go by?.

, sir.

. What's your first name?

:

What -- do you go by ?

I go by , sir.

Is it okay if I call you ?

That's fine, sir.

I don't want to call you . Is that what means?

Yes.

Why do they call you ?

It's the standard new-guy call sign. He was
as well.

: Oh so you guys are like and . It's, like, is what they call the new guys at 242?

: Yes, sir.

: Your family calls you , so I'm going to call you .

You can call me or sir, okay?

So, what is your military occupational speciality?

: I am a 7523. I'm a pilot.

: Okay. You're a hornet pilot. And where were you trained?

: Miramar, BMFAT 101.

: When did you complete 101?

: I left 101 in May of last year?

: May of '18?

: Yes, sir.

: When did you check into the BAT?

: July of '18.

: July of '18. Who was your commanding officer when you checked in?

: When I checked in it was ,
sir.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : (b) (3) (A), (b) (6) was the CO already.

Awesome.

How many hours do you have in the hornet at 242?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : At 242, roughly fifteen.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Fifteen hours. So you've been in a squadron for seven months and you've logged fifteen hours.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Yes, sir.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Were you medically ill?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : No, sir.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Have you been disqualified from flight?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : No, sir.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Taking extensive personal leave?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : No, sir.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Why is it that you only have fifteen hours and you're required to fly fifteen hours a month. You've been here for seven months, so you should have like -- I don't know, Math for Marines -- like one hundred hours.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Our jets have had some maintenance difficulties. I was able to -- I arrived here in July and we went to Australia right away. But as a guy who had only been here for a couple of days, I was -- my role at the time was to be an ODEO. And
so that was what I did. So I was not qualified to fly any ELFs. There wasn't any focus or time to do unit level training for me. So for the majority of our time in Australia, I did not fly.

I got some currency fights and then a couple of codes around the end of our time there. But then I was in our RBE for five or so weeks afterwards trying to get the jets back to Japan from Australia. After that, I went to ground safety school in October at Camp Pendleton. I was back here in the beginning of November. I took time off to go home for Christmas at the end of December and I have been back here since then. I flew twice on Saturday. That was the first time I had flown in 54.

: Okay.

Where were you in December of 2018?

: I was here, sir.

: Did you participate in the LFE -- or there UFT rather?

: Not as a pilot. I was a designated ODO for the night shift. I was the ODO at the time of the mishap.

: Okay. So you took over from the person that's called , at about what time on the 5th?

: Probably right around 2200 that night, sir.
2200, which is -- I don't have the flight schedule in front of me. But that seems to closely approximate the brief time that the mishap occurred.

Does that sound about right?

Yes, sir. They were -- I believe they had just begun briefing as I arrived.

Okay. Did they brief in the ready room?

No. Not that I was a witness to.

So they went to a briefing space or some other space to brief.

Okay. As the ODO, how many flight hours did you have in the hornet when you were standing ODO at the mishap -- in the squadron. Sorry. How many flight hours did you have when you were standing duty in December of 18?

About twelve.

About twelve hours. And in those twelve hours, how many times have you done air refueling?

None.

Have you ever done air refueling?

Yes. I did. I tanked off of a C130 twice in 101.

Day -- and one day flight and one night
flight?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Day and night for both event.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Okay. Did you wear night-vision goggles?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : No, sir. I was not aided.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : So you did a night unaided and obviously a day tanker fuel. And that was how long ago? Like nine months ago?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Actually, probably a little longer than that, sir.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : So maybe a year ago?

So what are some of the ODO responsibility at 242? When you stand ODO, like, what's your job? How would you describe the role of the operations duty officer?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : So maintain the weather and the NOTAM's and make sure that's up to date. Make sure that we know the status of the devert fields as well as ground field. If there are anything applicable that the aircrew knows that. Coordinating range space and coordinating other units that are going to be in that range space. The main thing is to keep the flight schedule moving. So when jets come back, whether they're going to hop in or hop seat or if they're going to go in, and if there is going to be flexing with maintenance. Working with maintenance and then maintaining constant...
communication control on any updates or changes that are coming.

That would be it in a nutshell, sir.

[O] (3) (A), (b) (6) : How many times have you stood ODO at 242?

[O] (3) (A), (b) (6) : Quite a few times, especially in Australia.

I would probably say 25 to 30 times.

[O] (3) (A), (b) (6) : Did you maintain the original flight schedule as the ODO?

[O] (3) (A), (b) (6) : Yes, sir.

[O] (3) (A), (b) (6) : What are some of the things that you put on that flight schedule?

[O] (3) (A), (b) (6) : Actual take-off and landing times. If there is something that comes back that's different or that they want noted, you'll do that. But mostly just in red ink the actual time they took off and the actual time they landed. And then, that will go in a folder with the NAFLERE** that the aircrew bring inside.

[O] (3) (A), (b) (6) : Were you ever on when there was a flight schedule change?

[O] (3) (A), (b) (6) : Yes, sir.

If there was any kind of change then we'd ask for CO, XO, or OPSO approval.

[O] (3) (A), (b) (6) : Tell me about how you documented that.

[O] (3) (A), (b) (6) : If somebody -- if there was going to be an
aircrew change or something like that we would put it in red on the flight schedule that is on the TV, so the digital copy. And I would say "needs approval". And then, the first of those three that I saw, is "this okay with you?"

And then, whoever that person was I would say XO approved or OPSO approved.

[0 (3) (A), (b) (6)]: Were you surprised to learn that at two a.m. that the mishap aircrew were conducting air refueling?

[0 (3) (A), (b) (6)]: Yes, sir.

[0 (3) (A), (b) (6)]: Why is that?

[0 (3) (A), (b) (6)]: I was not aware when the flight schedule came out that we were going to be doing that. I told the AMB this when I interviewed with them. I --

[0 (3) (A), (b) (6)]: So before we -- stop. Any discussions with AMB, you have to realize that statement is privileged and we're not asking you to talk about anything you discussed with AMB.

[0 (3) (A), (b) (6)]: Okay.

[0 (3) (A), (b) (6)]: Well, he can tell us what he told the AMB. But he can't tell us what he discussed with AMB.

[0 (3) (A), (b) (6)]: You don't have to.

[0 (3) (A), (b) (6)]: Okay. That's fine.

[0 (3) (A), (b) (6)]: You're not suspected of any misconduct.
Don't be defensive.

: This is honestly a point that I've thought a lot about. I didn't know that they were going to be tanking that night until I got there. And I don't actually remember how I found out. I think it was just a conversation.

: So when you assumed ODO, you said at 2200 you took over the deck, or there about. You did a turnover with Jim.

And what did he tell you?

: That might have been. I don't remember the conversation super well. I don't think there was -- I don't think it was a long one. But I have to assume that's when I found out that we were going to be tanking because I knew they were going to be tanking when they were out there. But I cannot tell you exactly when I found out. And I know that -- I only know now. In retrospect, I wasn't on the flight schedule and it was something, I guess, that got added later. I don't know how that process went.

: So yeah. I mean that's what we're getting at. So was the TNR code for night systems air refueling on the flight schedule?

: I don't know about the actual TNR code. But at the bottom, there would normally be an air refueling.
In the flight note?

In the flight note, coordinate this person this phone number. There wasn't anything there.

Okay. So you're on the desk. At midnight, they start the jets. And then, a few minutes after that give you an outbound call and they take off at about one a.m., or whenever that shows.

What do you think they were going to do?

They were going to go turn circles in the intrasouth tank. Turn circles and come home.

Okay. At that time, when they called you telling you that they were taking off, you understood that they were going to the tanker?

Yes, sir.

What on the flight schedule document that you were maintaining as the ODO reflected that?

I don't think I put anything on the flight schedules, sir. It didn't click for me until later that it wasn't on there.

Did the mishap section leader -- is he senior to you?

Yes, sir. Quite a bit.
Okay. Would you consider him to be a more experienced F-18 pilot than you?

Yes, sir.

Would you consider him to be more experienced about how things go at 242 than you?

Yes, sir.

Would you expect him to offer you instruction on things like a flight schedule change?

Yes, sir.

Did he ask you to add a tanker code to the flight schedule?

No, sir. I did not interact with the aircrew that night.

So you didn't talk to until you talked to him on the radio when he called outbound. Is that the only time you saw him?

That was the only time I interacted with him until the proposed mishap, sir. And their engines were on at 1201.

Okay.

That was a note that was brought down. There was a Japanese holiday on for fourth.

A Japanese holiday is what you were told?
There was a Japanese holiday on the fourth so there was a note that had come down somewhere that engines would be on at 1201 because it was not the fourth anymore.

Okay.

And they turned them on exactly as I expected them to be.

The fourth or the fifth.

I'm sorry. The day of the mishap. There was a Japanese holiday.

Okay. So let's go to the mishap a little bit. So you're sitting at the ODO desk and you get a call from.

No. That was not the first thing that happened.

Tell me the first thing that happened.

The first thing that happened was -- so I -- we had secured the ready room and I had a SIM the next day so I had a JUMPS computer in front of me. And so --

When you say, "secure the ready room," do you mean like cleaning it up for the night?

Make it a secure space.

Okay.
We made it a secure space. So we had a SIPR computer and a JUMPS machine out there. And so, I was studying. I got a phone call from a [REDACTED] at Langley Air Force Base and he said that there was an ejection seat beacon going off. And he assumed that it had accidently been tripped by maintenance downstairs and he wanted help tracking it so he could turn it off.

I said, "okay," and he read it out to me. He read the serial number and then the aircraft BUNO and then the aircraft 11.

Which is the mishap aircraft?

I told him that it was fine. And so, there was a change in voice and he said that you need to get in touch with them then.

And so, the first thing that I did after I hung up with him is -- [REDACTED] were the other two aircrew that were there that night. They were just on the night shift, but they didn't have any scheduled events that day. But I went out to the hallway and said, "[REDACTED], I think we have a problem," and I told him what the phone call had just been. And he said, "Oh, shit. That's not good. We need to call them." I said, "okay."

We got on the phone and tried tower. We got transferred to NOF. I think it was a proach and whitesnake is the controlling...
agency out there. And they all sit in the same room.

So a couple of things simultaneously happened after that. We got on the phone with [b](3) (A), (b) (6). They are receiving the initial emergency mayday call from [b](3) (A), (b) (6). At the same time, and at about the same moment, the same Sergeant from Langley calls back and there is another sea beacon going off and it corresponds to the AFT seat in the same aircraft. So that was pretty much out cue that something was definitely wrong. We told them to activate the crash alarm. Then we went from there.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): Okay. How long did you stay on duty?
(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): I suppose I got off the desk at around 1130 the next morning.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): So you were there for the whole search and rescue stuff?
(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): I insisted on staying as long as they'd let me.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): Okay. What time did your CO come in?
(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): So if the mishap had happened at, like, 1:42, he I think was in roughly an hour or so afterwards. The XO and the ASO were there before he was, so they were the first ones to get there.

But, pretty much, everyone was there by, I suppose, maybe
3:30.

: Okay.

: But that's just a guess. I'm not sure if that number is right.

: Who were you guys communicating with at the MAG?

: The MAG has set up a war room. And so, they had it from the yellow team, so there were people there already. So there was a chief warrant officer -- I believe his name was -- and he was the war room coordinator there. So he was the person who I ended up speaking to, you know, most of the time throughout the night.

: What kind of information were you two exchanging?

: Coordination efforts on search and rescue. And then, as time went on they started wanting to talk about CACO things. Those are really kind of the main things, but search and rescue was my big focus.

: So tell me about that.

: So I was on the phone with pretty often with the radar room at proach. I was talking to a pair of civilians over there. I believe was the civilian in
charge there. He was having a hell of a time --

Do you know how to spell his name by chance?

Not --

I don't know if this is one-hundred percent accurate -- but...

Okay.

He was the guy I talked to most of the time. And he was the person I told to activate the crach alarm and start working on the search and rescue assets.

There were multiple false alarms as the night went on of there's a bird flying when there was not. Now there is. Actually, we're just kidding. There's not.

I mean, what do you mean by that?

We both got false reports from radar that a Japanese SARR asset had taken off and it was not true. I believe it was 4:06 in the morning that an actual SARR asset took off from an airfield in Fukuoka. And they were the first to respond.

So do you believe the ejection was about 0142?

0142 to 46. I believe at 47 was when is when
I got the first phone call. And, yeah, it took about two hours to get an asset airborne.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : So that would be about 0347?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : 0406 I believe is when the actual -- we actually got a phone call that the aircraft took off. It was a 60 out of an airfield near Fukuoka.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Okay. And what kind of information do you think maybe have been passed about location?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : We had a lot long that (b) (3) (A), (b) (6) had passed. And we had pushed that up, so I'm sure that they had that. And then, he had stayed on station. And I believe they thought they had seen a strobe and they were trying to get a lat long. So I think we had two at that point. I think we had three by the end of the night.

Somebody from Scott Air Force Base called with a lat long associated with a beacon. But, by then, we had two. We had the initial one and then one where they thought they had seen a strobe.

I don't know this for sure. I never, actually, a single time directly communicated with a CHASDIV SARR asset. Later on in the night, I'll talk to a CHASDIV COC person. But that was it and that was not until much later.

So I think that they got that information. They went to
the right area and they started searching.

[3] What time do you think they found at around 0600. So I'm sure they had found him 20 to 30 minutes before that. So that was when we got that phone call.


[3] So multiple false alarms. They do get the SARR asset airborne. I don't know what kind of alert status they were on or like what they knew about our ULT training or our flight schedules. They eventually get out there.

[3] Your body language communicates that you're surprised it took basically five hours from ejection until recovery on .

Is that fair?

[3] Surprised could be one word.

[3] Or maybe disappointed?

[3] Frustrated. Disappointed. That was my main focus. That night and I'll admit that I've never had a scenario like this before. I had always kind of just thought that a SARR could be taking off ten minutes after we get the call and I don't think that's realistic, especially in hindsight. And I don't think
it was realistic that night. I don't know this for sure but I think that the crew that took off were taken out of bed and told take off and go fly. I don't know that for sure, but that's what it seemed like with the timeline. So, yeah, that was my focus. Getting SARR assets and getting a SAR aircraft airborne. And, yeah, it took way too long. So, yeah, frustrated, I would certainly say.

What time was found?

I think he was found a little bit before noon. Probably around 11:30 or so.

The same day?

The same day. Yes, sir.

So you feel like you remained on duty until was located?

I was there until they, and as I watched as they went through the efforts that they did to pick him up.

What do you mean, "you watched?"

There was a SIPR chat going?

And without discussing classified information, you observed in the chat that one asset had located him and another asset was trying to extract.

Is that what you're trying to talk about?

Yeah. One asset had seen him and did not
respond to a hoist.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Were those airborne assets?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : I believe that was an airborne asset. It was a helicopter that found him. And I tried to drop a hoist to him, but did not have a rescue swimmer? So they were not able to pick him up because he did not respond to that. So I believe a Japanese destroyer went and actually picked him up.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : So let me say back to you what I think you said.

You said you think a helicopter found him. Probably a Japanese 60. And you think it lowered a cable to him and he was floating on the surface of the water unresponsive in some way, deceased or unconscious or something.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Yes, sir. That's how I believe the course of events went.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : And you believe that airborne asset communicated with the surface asset.

And what do you believe the surface asset did?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : I believe the probably dropped some kind of boat to go and pick him up and bring him back to the main ship.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Okay.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Do you remember the timeline? Do you
remember when the helicopter arrived and tried to drop the hoist?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): We were getting -- our information was roughly 20 minutes old by time we were getting it.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): Okay.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): So I would guess that about 11:00 o'clock is when they first found him and tried to drop a hoist. And probably about 11:30 --

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): So the destroyer was already on its way out there?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): The destroyer was out there. I don't know exactly where it was.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): It was only about 30 minutes before --

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): Yeah. It was not very long.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): Okay.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): And then, the ship went out to actually get him. I believe there were three Japanese destroyers that I read later that were out there.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): Okay. And you feel like the 60 didn't have a SAR swimmer on board?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): Yes, sir. That's what I believe. Based on my understanding, they dropped a hoist. They didn't have a SAR swimmer on board.
The 60 didn't have a SAR swimmer on board?

Yes, sir. That's what I believe. Based on my understanding, they dropped a hoist and when they dropped the hoist he didn't respond to it. So they couldn't effect the pick up if they had a swimmer.

Okay. You said earlier that you were surprised to learn that they were doing tanking that night. And then, later you told me that you knew they were going to the tanker when you were the ODO. So let me ask the question in a different way.

Is it because air refueling at that time of day was not briefed when you guys briefed the whole exercise? Why did you say that? Why did you say you're surprised and then later you said you weren't?

I don't think you're lying. I'm just trying to think at one point you were surprised that they were going to the tanker and at another point you understood that they were going to the tanker.

So why did you have one perspective at one time and then another perspective at and then a different perspective at a different time?

So at one point -- at the actual time, it did
cross my mind that it was weird that they were going to the tanker. That didn't strike me as odd because that is a normal part of operations, going to the tanker. I didn't realize that it wasn't on the flight schedule. I was surprised later when I interview with AMB -- that they said it was not on the flight schedule. And they gave me the flight schedule because I had thought, okay. I knew they were tanking. I must have been on the flight schedule. And then, I looked at it was like, okay. That can't be true because it's not on the schedule. And so, that was when I was surprised and that's when I started to think back like how did I find out then that they were tanking. And I think it must have been that either in the turnover or just in conversation that I heard that they were doing it. So at the time, it didn't really cross my mind. It was later when I saw, kind of, the more complete picture that I was surprised.

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6) [b]: When the exercise was briefed, did you attend a confirmation brief before or did you have any squadron like ULT overview brief?

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6) [b]: Yes, sir.

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6) [b]: What day was that?

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6) [b]: I guess that would have been the previous Wednesday or Thursday before it started.
Did they talk about night air refueling?

Not that I recall, sir.

Did they tell you that you would be the late night ODO?

Yes, sir. They did.

So you had several days notice to adjust your circadian rhythm to working the late shift?

We did get several days. I believe the brief was on Thursday. We had an event that we all had to be at on Friday morning. So we all, from what I understand --

Like a squadron formation or what?

I was not a formation. But it was something we were all supposed to be at.

Okay.

I do remember that I couldn't start adjusting over until Saturday. So Saturday, Sunday. And then, Monday, Tuesday, we were switching over. And, I guess, that would have been Thursday night, so Wednesday night as well. So we had about five days to start.

Was there any discussion about ambian or any kind of sleep aids?

Yes, sir. There was.
Tell me about that.

We were denied our request from any kind of sleep aids from the AMSO. And the AMSO -- or not the AMSO. Our flight doc.

So you asked the flight surgeon, hey man. Can we get some ambian and he said what?

He said, no. And I believe he gave justification, I believe, right out of the book that this was --

So along the lines of not authorized?

Not authorized by the MAG.

Okay. Who actually put in the request with the flight surgeon?

There was never, like, an official request. There were people asking him.

Who was asking him?

Did you ask him?

I didn't ask him. I wasn't flying. I knew I wasn't flying. So I didn't feel a sense of urgency. I don't exactly remember who would have asked.

Best guess?

Do you think the aircrew that were flying might have asked?
Possibly.

How did you hear about the request?

It was on WhatsApp.

So you guys have a big squadon WhatsApp chain? So if you look at your WhatsApp chain, you would be able to tell us who was asking. All right. Can you do that and get back to us?

Sure.

Thanks.

Going off the flight schedules, was it your understanding that either the CO, XO, or OPSO could all approve changes in the schedule?

Yes, sir.

How often did you get XO or OPSO approval in your time at the BFA-242?

It wasn't common, but it wasn't unheard of either.

Okay.

Any time that -- it would generally be an aircrew change. If somebody had something else on their schedule and they needed a replacement, then that would require approval. But it wouldn't be, it would generally not be that difficult to get
because it was pretty cut-and-dry.

: You said you did interact with the mishap flight crew or the other mishap aircraft the night of the incident. Is that normal? Did you interact with them the nights before?

: Um-hmm.

: What did you guys talk about the nights before? How did they seem?

: So we were -- we didn't have much to do. It's hard to do your ground job when no one else's work sometimes. And we were just there to be adjusting.

: Okay.

: There was definitely talk of, you know, the witching hour around midnight to two a.m., people were tired and we were all trying to adjust. So that was in conversation. You know, I had a long talk with about our girlfriends and personal lives. You know, that was really the last time I got to talk with him. So we were all just, kind of, shooting-the-shit and hanging out, waiting for the night to go by.

: How is and his relationship with his?

: They were really good.

: Was she out in Iwakuni when this
happened?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Um-hmm.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Where was she visiting from?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Okay.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Ok.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : She was in town and I don't know where her permanent residence is. I know she's back in [b] (6), (b) (7)(C) .

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Was he upset that he had to run twenty-four hour ops during her visit?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : No, I don't think so. [b] (6), (b) (7)(C).

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Okay.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : She was here for -- she actually had like a one-year student visa. They weren't pressed for time.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Okay. Did questions or talk come up about go-no pills during your talks the nights previous?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : With him and I or, well, with anyone?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : With anyone in the aircrew.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Yeah. People were talking about it. Like, it'd be nice to get some Ambian so that way I can sleep later during this time of the day. So I could stay awake at night.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Did anyone discuss that they had Ambian or that they were taking Ambian?
(D (3) (A), (b) (6)): No.

(D (3) (A), (b) (6)): Or that they were coming up with other ways to go to sleep?

(D (3) (A), (b) (6)): Not that I recall.

(D (3) (A), (b) (6)): Did people usually brief in the ready room, where you're posted as ODO pre-flight?

(D (3) (A), (b) (6)): No. We didn't. They would brief in briefing spaces.

(D (3) (A), (b) (6)): You said post mishap you had a conversation with (D (3) (A), (b) (6)).

What was that conversation?

(D (3) (A), (b) (6)): I didn't really have a conversation with him one-on one.

(D (3) (A), (b) (6)): Okay.

(D (3) (A), (b) (6)): Did I say that?

(D (3) (A), (b) (6)): Yeah. You just mentioned post-mishap you had a convo with (D (3) (A), (b) (6)).

(D (3) (A), (b) (6)): We talked on the radio. Part of the timeline was getting an initial call from (b) (6) as they were coming back.

(D (3) (A), (b) (6)): Okay.

(D (3) (A), (b) (6)): When they were coming back we got a report.
from them. But, no. That night we didn't have a chance to talk one-one-one. I was busy and so was he.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : You didn't talk with or anybody from the mishap?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : So no. Same thing. was back as well, but I was running as fast as I could, talking on the phone, getting SAR assets moving. Talking to radar and seeing where they are on their scope.

And then, , he gets picked up. He gets flown. They stop at a field in southern Japan to refuel and then they come back to Iwakuni. He goes to the hospital. I finally went home, I guess, around 4, 3 or 4, that day. And then I came back to work at like 5:30 because I thought we were going to keep working, but there wasn't much to do. So I came back to work and there was a group of people in our squadron bar and he was there. But he was there in civilian clothing. He didn't have a lot of -- he didn't really have any bandages on him. And that was the first time that we had spoken at all.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : So you had spoken to the day after the mishap?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : So actually no. Let me take that back. He called us. He borrowed a Japanese person's cell phone and he called...
the ready room.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): Okay.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): And he gave us a report of what he'd experienced. And then he asked, were we the only aircraft that went down? And I said, no, you weren't. And then he asked if they found and I said, no, they're still looking.

So he called us. We talked for about 10 or 15 -- no, as I recall it was 5 to 10 minutes. And then, he left because they were ready to take off again. He said that he would call as they were about to get airborne. And he called us again just to say we're leaving. We're coming to Iwakuni.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): Do you remember what you guys talked about in those 5 to 10 minutes, the details?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): Yeah. He called. We had been looking for him, we had been looking for all morning. And we knew he had been picked up, but then he calls. He goes, "Hey, it's ." I'm like okay, this is extremely surreal. And he asks, "Are we the only plane that went down?" And I said, "No."

"Did they find I said, "No. They're still looking. Can you tell me anything that you remember?"

And I believe the XO and also the ASO were there.

He said he thinks his arm is broken. He's not sure what
happened. He landed in the water. I think he said he started trying to swim to a light and he realized it was going to be too far away. So he stopped. He says he doesn't remember the wind being very strong, so he thought that him and could not have landed too far away from each other.

And then I think he said something about when he was in the helicopter, the CHASDIV helicopter, they -- he was fighting through the language barrier. But he thought he heard one of the crewmen say they found him and that they were working on picking him up. And I don't think that was ultimately true, but that was what his impression was in the moment.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): Okay. Anything additional when you spoke to him at the bar?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): Not really. I'm just glad you're okay. I can't believe you're here.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): Okay.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): I'm not sure there is anything else we need from you?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): Is there anything else you would like to add or talk about?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): I wish we had a closer relationship with the CHASDIV, especially as our only search and seizure asset on this
base. I've only been here six months and I have a scan that's about two inches wide. But it seems to me like they live on their side of the base and we live on our side of the base, and yet we are putting out lives in their hands. And I wish that we had a closer relationship with them.

Like, I'm actually working on -- I would like to go take a tour of their squadron and them come take a tour of ours just so we know each other as people. It's not like -- because when we tried to make direct contact with them, the ASO, drove over to their squadron hanger and couldn't get through the fence. And there is a phone number we have there, but we never directly talked to the local CHASDIV search and rescue squadron here as far as I know. And if I could do this again, I would cut out the middle man, which was radar in this case. And I would be talking to them directly. But I don't think we have a relationship with them where that would be normal.

\[\text{(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) }\]: Have you ever known 242 to cancel a flight event for ORM considerations? Like when you were in Australia or something did you ever see a flight lead or a senior respected member of the squadron just say hey, we're not doing that. It's too much and too hard. It's too hazardous. Any stories of anything like that happening?
Not that I recall. But I could see that happening. I could also definitely see that being a possibility as the schedule is being signed.

What do you mean?

I could see -- because there's quite a few eyes that look at the schedule before it gets signed and published. And I've seen it have to go back and get redone before from people who have brought up concerns. And a lot of times it's this aircrew that's had X, Y, and Z the previous few days for prereqs.

Do you work as a schedule writer?

No, sir. I don't. And so my exposure to that is very limited. That's very antidotal.

What is your ground job in the squadron? You said safety, right?

I'm the NATOPS officer and the ground safety officer.

Oh, NATOPS and safety.

Have you ever been in air spaces and doss when the daily schedule writer was bringing the schedule by?

Yes, sir.

Tell me about that process.

He is looking for the DOSS. The DOSS will
look it over and say if he's okay with it or not.

: What tools does the DOSS use to determine if it's okay or not?

: You'd have to ask him. I'm sure he uses the hotboard and he'll ask questions. But you'll have to ask him, sir. Actually, was the DOSS that I had worked for and before him was .

: Okay. So how many months have you been with this squadron?

: Since July of last year.

: When did they start calling you ?

: The day that I arrived.

: And that's standard for everybody?

: Yes, sir. It is.

: When do they stop calling you ?

: Whenever you earn a call sign.

: How long does it normally take to earn a call sign in your observation?

: Probably six months. I think I'm a little bit longer than average. But you do something silly in the jet. You know how it is, sir. You do something silly and you get a call sign that's not meant to be endearing or complimentary.
How many guys in the squadron right now are referred to as?

Two. Myself and . And we will get a third one next week, I think.

And do you plan on calling him sir?

He'll be sir.

And what's the purpose of calling him? Why would you want to call him?

That's just the squadron tradition, sir.

Okay. Anything else?

No, sir.

All right.
It's about 1505 on Wednesday, the 23 of January, 2019. I am assisted by staff judge advocate, and court reporter. We're here to interview -- is it?

Yes, sir.

Please state your full name for the record, spelling your last.

And what do you go by?

or my call sign?

Either?

My call sign is.

? Yes, sir.

What does that mean?

It's not the most appropriate story for this room.

Okay. I'm just going to call you, okay, because I don't know what your call sign means and I wouldn't want to insult you by using it or mock you in any way.

You can call me or sir. Whatever you want, okay?

Okay.
When did you get your wings? 2013.

2013? Where at? I was in Kingsville.

Where did you go to the FRS? San Diego.

101? Yes, sir.

When did you finish that? At the end of 2015.

2015? I'm sorry. I think I got winged in 2011 to tell you the truth. I don't really keep track, to be honest with you. 2011 I got winged. And then, I got -- I went to the FRS and finished at the end of 2015.

It took you four years to get you to the FRS? No. To get my wings to go to primary. It took me about three and a half years from the start -- from TBS to my wings was about three and a half years.

Okay. So what month and year did you get your wings?
August of -- oh my God, the year.

am I stressing you out?

No. I honestly don't remember right now.

What month and year did you complete the FRS?

2015.

Okay. So you probably got your wings about a year before that?

Yes, sir.

Okay. Let's go with that.

Yes, sir.

When you completed the FRS, then what happened?

After the FRS, I came straight here.

Okay. What month and year did you come to Iwakuni?

January of 16.

January of '16?

The 12th.

Okay. So you've been here for three years?

Over three years. Yes, sir.
Okay. Cool. Did you go straight to 242?

Yes, sir.

Who was your commanding officer?

I was the NPCO and then the SKEZ officer.

What was your first job in the squadron?

I was the NPCO and then the SKEZ officer.

So you wrote the daily flight schedule?

Yes, sir.

That's a thankless job, isn't it. How'd you like that job?

You learn a lot about the workings of the squadron itself because the input from maintenance, operations, safety, basically everyone coming together trying to make the schedule happen.

That's great. About how many hours do you have in the hornet?

411.

When -- what's your day job in the squadron now?

Flight officer.

So you're still in ops?

Yes, sir.
So you've been in ops for three years?

No, sir.

Okay. So you're SKEZO. Then what did you do?

From SKEZO, I became the power line officer. And then, I became the S-4a. And then, I was on an IA to the Middle East. And then, became the flight officer this past December.

Who sent you on an IA to the Middle East?

That was under [redacted].

How long were you over there?

Six months.

Where did you go?

Qatar, or Qatar. However you want to pronounce it, sir.

Did you work at the K-Hawk?

Yes, sir.

How was that?

To be honest, it was kind of boring. There wasn't a lot to do as far as my billet. It was very easy.

Yeah.

But I learned Afghanistan and Iraq big-picture
type stuff.

: That's good. You have 400 hours in the Hornet. I'd assume that you're night systems qualified?

: Yes, sir.

: Are you a night systems instructor?

: Yes, sir.

: That's great. How long have you been an NSI?.

: Last year in November I got the qualification.

: So 3 months ago or?

: Over a year ago.

: -- 14?


: That's great. How many goggles hours do you have do you think, roughly?

: I think around 45 to 50.

: About 50 goggle hours and your an NSI?

: Yes, sir.

: Cool. Of those 50 goggle hours, roughly how much do you have with the ANVS-9 and roughly how much with the ANVS-11, or do you have any with the ANVS-11?

: I would say more with the 9s than the 11s. But
the NVCDs it's probably only 15 percent of my time.

[0 (3) (A), (b) (6)]: Okay.

[0 (3) (A), (b) (6)]: At best.

[0 (3) (A), (b) (6)]: So you flew on the ANVS-9s for a while. Is that because you didn't have the ANVS-11s yet?

[0 (3) (A), (b) (6)]: That is correct, sir.

[0 (3) (A), (b) (6)]: So how -- when was the ANVS-11 introduced to VMFA-242?

[0 (3) (A), (b) (6)]: I couldn't put an exact date on it. But as soon as -- during Rino.

[0 (3) (A), (b) (6)]: So in '17. Probably fall or spring of '17?

[0 (3) (A), (b) (6)]: Yes, sir.

[0 (3) (A), (b) (6)]: So you guys only had ANVS-11s for only, like, a year, a year and a half, right?

[0 (3) (A), (b) (6)]: Not super long. And not everybody had their JHMCS helmet made as well. Because it slowly got -- it's a pretty expensive system, so you've got to, like, have the helmet itself available and cut to your face. And then, you can attach the 11s to it as well as the NVCDs.

[0 (3) (A), (b) (6)]: Does everybody in the squadron have ANVS-11s?
I'm not aware of that. I'm not sure.

Okay. That's a good answer. Thank you.

So when you transition from the ANVS-9 to the ANVS-11 -- you said you had about 1500 goggle hours total and maybe about 40, 30 to 40 on the ANVS-9, what specific training did you get for the ANVS-11?

You get briefed. So it's like a ground school lecture.

Who provides that?

The AMPSO does. They talk about it in their classes. And then -- I don't remember if we actually got an NSI to teach us about the ANVS-11s. But it is in our night considerations brief. We do speak about that.

Tell me about that.

So the night considerations brief, it goes over the pre-flight, some of the differences in the system; basically, the differences in the blooming of the goggles and the focus of the resolution of what you're actually going to see.

The ANVS-11s -- because they're JHMCS capable -- it has an extra attachment on the bottom right of the actual device itself. So it blocks a little bit of your view if you're looking down at the right side. So sometimes you have to kind of tilt your head a
little in a weird way to actually see your instruments a little more easily, sir. So basically, basic upkeep, pre-flight, how it works, some issues you may run into.

There is an inversion issue as well. But that's pretty easily solved. You just look through your HUD and it re-rights itself. But obviously, that could cause illusions.

: So you talked about a little thing sticking out of the right eye. Is that the NDU, the night display unit?

: Well, I don't know what's actually inside of it. It's probably, like, the hardware that actually runs it. So it's just something that kind of hampers your vision a little bit.

: What's the size of this thing you're talking about? Like the size of a 9-volt battery, the size of your thumb, the size of dice?

: It's not really noticeable while you're in the chair, sir.

: Okay.

: Like, you're just aware that you have to look differently. But it's not anything that would not really like --

: When you say "look differently," I think you're talking about your undergoggle scan. Is that what you're
talking about?

: Yes, sir.

: Okay. What about your under goggle outside the cockpit scan? Would it affect that?

: You're probably going to have to tilt your head up a little bit more on the right side.

: Right side. And what side is the HUD display on? Also on the right?

: Yes, it's only the right eye.

: But it looks like both are right when you're looking through it?

: You can't really tell unless you close your eye.

: Okay. What about the performance characteristics. As an NSI, what are the performance characteristics differences between the 9 and the 11?

: With the 9, it helps -- well, one, they're easier to pre-flight. So the system itself basically baselines you at 20-20. So if you aren't 20-20, it's not going to be as good as the 9s are because you can't actually focus it to your individual eye issues if that makes sense.

But it helps with blooming. So say the actual C-130 is
over blooming of the goggles itself when you get close to bright lights. It's actually a lot more dim and you can see the aircraft a lot better. That's really -- that and the ability to see the JHMCS symbology is what makes it so much better.

It's a lot better weight. So the weight of it isn't as far forward. So it's a little bit easier on your neck.

: What about performance at different light levels -- is it more difficult or?

: I would say, for only my 50 hours on it, I couldn't really tell you the difference.

: Now I'm just saying as an NSI, when you're teaching it?

: I would say it's not noticeable under different light conditions. They operate the same way.

: There's no -- as an NSI, you wouldn't give a class to note any performance differences between the ANVS-9 and ANVS-11 under different light level conditions. Is that what your saying?

: Yes, sir. Only with the blooming, that's the only real difference.

: So in low light, ANVS-11s are just as good as ANVS-9s?
I believe so. Yes, sir. I don't notice anything and --

Why do you believe that -- you said you just don't notice any difference?

I don't notice a difference. Yes, sir. I would get back to the book.

But when you're briefing it or when you're going out to meet the new guy?

To be honest with you, I've never used my NSI qualification because I got sent to Qatar right away.

So you got your NSI and you got sent to Qatar. But I mean, you're a current qualified NSI.

Not according to the squadron right now.

Tell me about that.

Because I cannot take a new guy out in the aircraft at night time because I'm not current enough in the aircraft to do so.

How many hours have you flown in the last year?

8.5.

Over the last year?

Yes, sir.
How many months -- okay. So when did you get back from Qatar?

Like October of this past year.

So like three months ago?

Yes, sir.

So you've been here for three months and you've flown 8.5 hours?

Since this past January. So January of 2017 -- I'm sorry. Since January of '18 until now. About a year I've only flown eight and a half hours in a jet.

Total time?

Yes, sir.

And of that 13 months, you were gone for six?

Yes, sir.

So in 7 months, you flew 8.5 hours.

Thirteen minus six is seven.

Yes.

In 7 months of availability, you flew 8.5 hours?

Part of that was the PTP training to actually go to Qatar. I had to go to Okinawa to shoot the rifle. I missed a
DET and the whole squadron was gone. It was like a weird period of waiting for a spot at the rifle range while I was down in Okinawa.

**Q:** Which resulted in what?

**R:** Like a month and a half delay of me actually leaving for Qatar, and I didn't go to the DET, and I didn't fly at all during that time because I was waiting for this rifle spot to open.

**Q:** Okay. So you're the "FlightO."

**R:** What does a "FlightO" do?

**R:** I will secure range space for training. I try to help out the training officer as far as the flow of the schedule like who's going to be flying.

I basically try to take his plan and incorporate the range space with what he wants to do. So if we're trying to accomplish air-to-surface SORTYs, we're going to be reserving different ranges that are required -- I guess it's kind of a dumb way to say it. If we're doing air-to-air SORTYs, I would schedule over-the-water landing airspace. Or if we're doing air-to-surface, it needs to be land. That sort of thing, you know. I try to see what he wants to do in the future and try to schedule.

**Q:** Who locks on [inaudible]?

**R:** It depends on the squadrons that are here.
Worst case, we just try to do it internally.

- : I mean who in the squadron does it? Is it you two?

- : Mostly it's the training officer.

- : Who locks on Tankers?

- : That would be my responsibility.

- : Did you expect them to go to the tanker during the mishap?

- : I knew that they were probably going to go to the tanker, but I couldn't tell you exactly when that was put on the schedule.

- : Why did you know that they would probably go to the tanker?

- : Because the MAG had a flow of what they wanted to accomplish and there was a tanker on that line, or a possible tanker on that line.

- : So you were not surprised to learn that they were at the tanker at the time they were at the Tanker?

- : It did not shock me.

- : Did -- do you know why it wasn't on the flight schedule then?

- : I'm not aware of that.
Are you involved in the flight schedule publication as the "FlightO?"

The way the checklist is set up is the check of the schedule skips me.

Why is that?

I'm not sure, sir. It just kind of depends on the operations officer?

Who is the OpSo that wrote the schedule for the mishap?

The operations officer would be .

So wrote the schedule?

He didn't write the schedule.

He was the OpSp?

Yes, sir.

Who was the daily schedule writer?

I'm ninety-nine percent positive it was that actually wrote the schedule.

and . Did he have an actual reason to believe -- I mean, do you have any other explanation as to why and failed to put the tanker on the flight schedule?

The actual ULT stuff was very chaotic and
constantly changing.

: Tell me about that.

: Even the day before some of the stuff was happening, they had an explanation for what they wanted to do.

: Who's they?

: The MAG.

: MAG-ops?

: Yes, sir.

: What do you mean by that? They couldn't tell you what time you took off?

: No, sir. So like, we were trying to do operations out in and even the day before we weren't even sure we were allowed to land even though we had Marines on deck ready to return aircraft.

: What do you contribute that to?

: It would have to had been from our flying issues. It just -- it shocked me to -- I'm sorry, sir.

: Please, go ahead.

: It shocked me to think that we were planning on going to tomorrow at the time and not have the authority to land there the day before. Like, yes, we're doing this for sure.

: Where does that authority come from?
I don't know.

How do you get your information?

Through the chain of command.

And your chain of command is who, for ops I mean. Who at MAG-ops do you talk to is what I'm asking.

For most of my flying, I went through current ops and it was [b] and [b]. They were my main sources.

So going to [b] or not going to [b], how is that relevant to going to the tanker or not going to the tanker? Are those related?

Was it going to the tanker if we could not go to [b]?

Was that the second order?

No. It was just an example of how jumbled everything seemed to be.

Is that common in actuality within your time frame?

I have never been through as much of a headache as this was before. There is always friction --

[inaudible].

To tell you the truth, I'm not sure, sir. But it just kind of seemed like it was thrown together at the last
minute. And they didn't have a good handle on what they wanted us to do as far as SORTY scale.

Okay. So you checked into the gun squadron in January of 2016. Did I get that right?

Yes, sir.

So has 242 ever had a mid-air collision with a tanker before?

There was an incident a couple years ago with -- they took a hose off of a C-130. It was and down in Okinawa.

Down at 242?

Yes, sir.

It was in a 152 C-130?

Yes, sir.

What was your -- and you were the SCISS officer at this time?

I believe I was in the power line.

Power line?

Yes, sir.

So tell me more about the [inaudible] in the squadron at this time.

What lead to the mishap?
Yeah. What happened, like, what do you know of what happened? Were you told -- you were not in flight, right?

No, I was not.

I mean, you were a brand new guy to the squadron.

I was at least a year, year and a half I'd say.

And then you heard some guys at the tanker. Was it daytime?

Night.

Night. So 242 went to the night tanker and took a hose home. What did you do? What did you hear about how that happened or whatever?

I don't know if I can actually disclose the actual incident itself. I think it's still privileged information.

Well, the only aspect that would be privileged would be if -- so I'm an ASO, by the way.

Yes, sir.

There are various concepts of privileged would be your statements to the AMB, AMB calculations, and AMB deliberations. So anything that you saw or heard outside of the AMB is not privileged or protected from disclosure.
So I'm asking you what do you think happened?

[0 (3) (A), (b) (6)]: He hit the SORTY.

[0 (3) (A), (b) (6)]: The C-130 guy?

[0 (3) (A), (b) (6)]: No, the mishap pilot.

[0 (3) (A), (b) (6)]: And was he, like, plugging and -- like crutch-plugging and too the basket?

[0 (3) (A), (b) (6)]: It was a very similar situation. They unplugged and they were trying to draw out the other aircraft, the lead aircraft.

[0 (3) (A), (b) (6)]: So the two Hornets?

[0 (3) (A), (b) (6)]: Yes, sir.

[0 (3) (A), (b) (6)]: So two Hornets from 242 at a tanker from 152 at night. Do you know if it was high light or low light?

[0 (3) (A), (b) (6)]: I don't remember.

[0 (3) (A), (b) (6)]: Do you know -- during that night, would you assume that they were using night vision goggles or do you know?

[0 (3) (A), (b) (6)]: I don't recall whether he was under the NVGs or not.

[0 (3) (A), (b) (6)]: Okay. He would have had them, either flipped up or flipped down.

[0 (3) (A), (b) (6)]: Yes, sir.

[0 (3) (A), (b) (6)]: Okay. Are you the power line?
Yes, sir.

Yes, sir. Did you have the opportunity to observe the mishap hornet after the incident?

I only saw pictures.

How were those pictures?

It didn't have to be repaired.

It didn't have to be repaired. So you're guys didn't repair it?

The canopy had to be replaced.

The canopy had to be replaced?

Yes, sir. They scraped up the canopy.

Now when you saw canopy when talking to people you don't know, that's not the wind screen bow, but that's the big piece aft.

Yes, sir. The whole big piece got scraped off. Well, I can't say for certain that it had to be replaced or if they buffed it out, but it was --

It was damaged?

-- it was damaged.

And you saw -- how can you hit a C-130 with a canopy, but they have a hose on the right wingtip, or do you not know?
The aircraft took the hose off with the right wing. The hose itself hit the canopy. It never hit aircraft to aircraft. It was only aircraft to hose.

I understand.

But it was a close mid-air.

Oh, it was actually in mid-air.

Correct. They never actually made contact with each other.

And you're saying it wasn't a mid-air because the hornet never touched the airframe of the C-130; is that your understanding?

That's my understanding.

But the hornet obviously touched the basket and the hose?

Yes, sir.

And you don't consider or that wasn't considered in your opinion. But the commands opinion is that was not part of the airplane because that was the hose.

I don't know if they classified it as a mid-air collision or not.

That's what I'm trying to get at.

Yes, sir. I don't remember.
What do you remember?

That they took the hose off.

Okay. And do you remember the month and year of that?

I couldn't recall, sir. I'm sorry.

Were you present when ... took the flight from ...?

Yes, sir.

I was at his change of command.

Good for you. Do you remember the month and year of that change of command?

It was in -- I think it was in the same time. April-ish.

Maybe May of '16?

May of '16. Yes, sir. Because he was the CO in the summer. So May of '16.

I'm just trying to figure out how much time passed between the event and the change of command so I can understand what effect it may have had on reporting.

If you're the ADJ, you would have been familiar with new changes in the change of command schedule.

Well, do you mean the change of command sir and...
the mishap? I couldn't tell you a solid time on that because I don't remember.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): A couple months?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): It wasn't --

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): Was it possible that the mishap was on April the 28th and the change of command was on May the 16th? Would that be possible like two weeks later?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): I don't recall.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): Okay. Did your Marines prepare that airplane?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): I don't recall either. I could tell you if I was the scizzo at the time if I knew the exact date. But whatever reason, I was a little further along --

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): Did you guys have to do that?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): I don't recall that.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): Did you guys have a safety standdown?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): I don't recall.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): Did address the squadron about standardization behind the tanker or flight safety? Was there a thing? Do you remember the spaz saying we took at a C-130 last night because of a COD, so be careful. Was there something like that that happened?
I'm sure there was, sir. But I couldn't tell you a specific meeting that took place. Any time a close call happens, we do what's called "lessons learned." Flying with no rank sort of thing, sir. And with anything like that, there's always a class or some more additional training.

And how that was replaced during command or the command from command? The mishap?

No, the Friday's meeting. It's always been that way. Since you've been here?

Yes, absolutely. Okay.

If there's time to get together, then it's every single time. And every little -- things that -- it's sort of like a use there errors in your favor and you're trying to learn form each other basically. And it happens almost every Friday.

Do you recall specifically anything after that incident happened?

I don't recall an exact meeting, but I'm sure it took place. Do you know what I mean?
I guess, like --

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Do you remember any comments from the commanding officer or mishap pilot or mishap section after the event?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : He -- I'm almost positive (b) (3) (A), (b) (6) had to give a class about mid-air tanking.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Okay. Do you remember going to that class?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Yes, sir.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Do you remember some of the things that were briefed?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Not specifics.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : What do you remember if that was under (b) (3) (A), (b) (6) or (b) (3) (A), (b) (6)?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : I don't recall.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Do you find it eerie that these two events were so similar or do you think they're not? Do you see similarities between these incidents?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Yes, sir.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : What were some similarities that you see?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : They happened at almost identical times of the flight.
And what do you mean by that?

They were both trying to rejoin under a lead. They were a little bit different in circumstances.

Explain.

The first one, the flight lead was climbing the C-130 and the mishap pilot got disoriented and he thought that he had the same frame of reference. So the aircraft looked the same, but he didn't realize that he was pulling away. And that's why he went left prematurely. So he didn't have the altitude to clear the C-130, and that's when he hit the hose.

Which hose did he hit?

The right side. And then as soon as --

Is that the -- so he hit the right one with the canopy and then the left when he [inaudible]. Is that what you think happened?

I don't recall if it was the right hose that he actually tore off, sir.

But he hit both hoses?

I believe he only hit one. I would have to reread the --

So your information is limited to the SAR?
Yes.

Okay. We're can only talk about the SAR specifically and that's why we're dancing around. This is a JAGMAN, so the SAR is for safety purposes only. So I'm not -- the purpose of this interview is not to quiz you on the SAR. The purpose of this interview is to quiz you because you are one of the few people, if not the only, that was in the squadron at the time. In fact, I think you are the only one.

Was anyone else in the squadron then?

He came -- I think -- I don't know if he was there for the mishap, but he's the only other person that's been in the squadron as long as I have. I think I got here maybe 4 or 5 months after him.

Did -- do you know -- so you're the scizzo when that happened right?

If I knew the date of the mishap with.

It was April the 28th, 2016. That's what my records show --

I was the scizzo at that time.

-- plus or minus a couple of days. So you wrote the flight schedule then?
I cannot recall if I was the actual scizzo. There was three of us.

No. Not for the mishap, but I'm talking about -- not for the April of 2016 incident, but during that timeframe you were a schedule writer.

Yes, sir.

During that time frame as a schedule writer, do you recall if the mishap aircrew were forwarded an opportunity to have a significant period of time after the incident or at all?

I don't think so because I think they flew back or at least the lead aircraft flew back because it wasn't damaged. The mishap aircrew I don't think flew right away. To be honest, I don't remember what happened.

They maybe sat on the bench for a week or two, but nothing serious?

I don't think anything serious happened.

Do you remember them going to a field flight performance board?

No.

Do you recall an interview by a JAGMAN investigator doing a PI or a CI?
Yeah.

Do you know who that investigator may have been?

I don't recall if there was an investigation and there was no loss of life. It might have been a class, at least a Class B because the canopy is pretty expensive. I couldn't tell you the class of the mishap. I don't recall.

But you're confident that there was repair to the aircraft that had to of cost something?

Absolutely.

Do you have any recollection of the dollar cost to repair the aircraft?

No. And it would include the damage to the C-130 as well. I think that they combined the estimation of the actual mishap.

Okay. Do you recall any discussions about the mishap determination as to whether it was a C or a B?

I know it took place. I don't recall details.

Okay. Last line of questioning and then I'll let you get out of here so you're not too late for your thing.

Yes, sir.

The -- do you know what the word

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re-baseline means in terms of NSHARP?

It's if you take a code that you haven't done in a while and then -- there's a way -- I don't know verbatim, sir. But basically, my understanding of base lining is that you're not current to do this and then you get your recurrency. And some codes have to be -- I couldn't give you an intelligent answer right now, sir.

Basically, you're out of currency for some things and you can get recurrent. Just because you are green or like ready to do a certain qualification, it doesn't mean you're actually proficient in that qualification.

Okay. So in the construct of NSHARP, have you ever known of anyone with administrative permissions to go to NSHARP and manipulate that data to create green squares or whatnot for NSHARP validation for scheduling purposes and what circumstances they might do that?

I've -- there are ways you can do flights, or sims as flights. That's the only way I think someone could make a red square turn green. If it was a flight that also qualified as a sim. Because if we didn't have a sim available at the time, we could do some flights or some sims as flights.

Did you ever know of anyone in the
operations department of 242 during your time to do something as such in NSHARP that you thought was questionable in terms of adjusting prerequisites and making sure guys -- they should be both current and proficient in things but they weren't actually?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): The prerequisites for certain flights in the past, I would say some of the flights might have been taken out of order. But it doesn't necessarily mean that. So when I went through the section syllabus, there are certain flights you're supposed to do in the order of the TNR, the Training Readiness Manual. Those flights are done out of order just based on what was available at the time, sir. Not as far as range space, crew, or things like that. I've never heard of anybody being not current for something. Or according to NSHARP, not being current and someone pencil-whipping a currency. And then, saying you're good to do this flight. If that makes sense.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): That's what I was asking.

So you feel like in both 2016 and 2018, all air crew were properly scheduled, current, and proficient?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): They were properly scheduled, sir. But could I say that I had awesome night currency. No, as far as everyone being super comfortable in the plane at night time.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): What do you mean? Why is that?
Well, we just weren't flying that much?

Why not?

Maintenance. We were having issues with the jets and I think at the time when I got back, we only had -- and another reason why I haven't been flying much myself -- is we just don't have the air crew to fly. You try to augment that with simulators, but there's numerous factors that you can't simulate.

Okay. I think that's all I need.

Anything from you, Judge?

That's all I have, sir.

[The witness was warned, sworn, and excused.]
Good afternoon, today is January 23rd, 2019. It's about 1415, we're in Iwakuni, Japan. with and present in the room interviewing , VMFA-all weather-242.

, please state your full name, spelling your last name for the record.

: And what do you like to go by?

: I go by my middle name of , or my call sign .

: I'm going to call you if that's okay. And you can call me or sir.

How long have you been at 242?

: Approximately one year and eight months. I got here June 1st of 2017.

: What's your job in the squadron?

: Currently, I am the Family Readiness Officer and the SACO.

: How many hours do you got in the Hornet?

: Approximately 230.
And you're a Hornet pilot; is that correct, 7523?

Yes, sir.

Where did you go to the FRS?

101.

Math for Marines, you got what, about 130 hours at 242? How many hours is the FRS? About 100?

I had approximately -- Yes, sir. Approximately 110 out of the FRS. So I have a little over 100 hours here, sir.

So lets say 120 hours here. So you've been here for 20 months and you have 120 hours in the Hornet. Is that about right?

I believe so, sir.

So you're only flying six hours a month on average?

Well, this last six months has skewed that average quite heavily. I've only got about 20 hours in this last six months.

Twenty hours in the last six months? Are you medically disqualified from flying?

No, sir.
Did you take an extended period of leave or attend a formal training program?

No, sir.

Were you TAD for any reason? For an extended period of time?

No, sir. For two weeks.

So you were here for six months and you flew 20 hours.

That's -- yes, sir.

Ish.

Yes, sir.

Do you know what the Marine Corps policy is on the minimum hours per month for a pilot?

I know it's recommended that we achieve 15 hours every month, sir, and that reduces our mishap rate.

So six times 15 would be 75 hours?

Yes, sir.

And you've flown 20. So you're, like, 55 hours short of what you consider the Marine Corps standard would be for hours for safe flight operations?

That's about correct, sir.

Are you the only person in your squadron
in this condition?

(b) (3) (A): No.

(b) (6)

(b) (3) (A): Is there -- what, there's another guy?

(b) (6)

(b) (3) (A): There -- without looking at our records right now, but I know most of our air crew are in the same situation right now, sir.

(b) (6)

(b) (3) (A): Why is that?

(b) (6)

(b) (3) (A): We flew in Australia for August. We left for Australia in late July. July we didn't fly too much because we were grooming the jets to go to Australia. We flew heavily in August in Australia, and then September and October we flew very little as we were trying to get back to Iwakuni. And then November, December we were working on a maintenance slump in trying to get -- we didn't have too many RBA aircraft at that time.

(b) (6)

(b) (3) (A): So basically, available jets to train with is what you're saying?

(b) (6)

(b) (3) (A): Yes, sir.

(b) (6)

(b) (3) (A): Have you ever stood ODO?

(b) (6)

(b) (3) (A): Yes.

(b) (6)

(b) (3) (A): Can you tell me briefly the key responsibilities of an ODO at 242?

(b) (6)

(b) (3) (A): The ODO is responsible for all the daily

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flight operations, as the Operations Duty Officer. There's a number of responsibilities that he's responsible for. He liaises with maintenance and ensures that the aircrew that are walking fully understand what jets they are going to.

He checks the weather, the nodums, make sure that all the conditions are good to go fly. He talks with the operations department to make sure that their intent is being met and that the flight schedule is being executed appropriately with the schedule that the CO signed. And he answers any questions that might arise about the daily flight schedule.

What are the key components of a daily flight schedule? What's the key information that's on the daily flight schedule for execution?

We have the names of the aircrew. We have the airport that they take off and land from. We have their take off and land times. We have the TNR codes that they are executing. We also have the ordinance that's going to be on the jets. We have their hot pit or truck fuel plan, hot seat plan. We've got the duties delineated on schedule. And any flight notes about airspace. We have the airspace on the schedule as well. Any pertinent notes for the aircrew about the airspace of the operations they're doing.

Is there TNR code for area refueling?
Have you ever done area refueling in a Hornet?

Have you done it at 242?

Have you done it at night?

Have you done it with goggles?

Did you have your goggles up, or down, or both?

I did it with both.

ANVS-9 or ANVS-11?

Both.

How many hours do you have with the ANVS-9, with the old goggles, roughly?

Approximately 12-15 I believe. Greater than ten, less than 20, I know that.

How many hours with the ANVS-11, the NVCD, roughly?

Very roughly, I would probably say about the
same, sir.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) :: So maybe 20 hours with the old goggles and about 20 hours with the new goggles -- ish?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) :: That would -- not quite that many, sir.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) :: A little less?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) :: Perhaps less I'd say.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) :: When did you transition from the nine to the eleven, personally?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) :: After I reached at least ten to 12 hours on the 9's.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) :: And why is that? Why did you wait until then?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) :: That was the minimum requirement before going to the 11's.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) :: Where is that written?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) :: I believe that was a squadron SOP.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) :: In your squadron flight SOP or do you have an NVG SOP?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) :: I can't say for certain, sir.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) :: But, you feel like you had to have 12 hours on the ANVS-9's before you could fly with the NVCD's?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) :: Yes.
And then tell me about your NVCD training. What specific training did you receive when you went from flying the 9's to flying the 11's?

We -- I believe I did it in the night lab for my annual refresher training. We bring the goggles that we use, and we train to those specifically. So I brought those to the night lab and received that training there.

With an AMSO?

Correct.

Okay. And what are some of the performance differences between the nine and the eleven?

The 11's, in my personal experience, are clearer. They, as in, they are not -- the image is sharper, crisper as compared to the 9's. But, some of the lights can have more of an intensity, like, more of a halo effect around them. But, I felt that the sharper, crisper image was better than the 9's and I like flying with those more.

Do you wear glasses?

I do not.

What is your vision? Are you 20/20, 20/15?

20/20.
So you have 20/20 uncorrected vision?
Yes, sir.

Do you -- going back to your training, what specific features were you taught as far as performance characteristics that are different between the nine and the eleven? Aside from the display of the JAHEMIC's data.

What performance differences? I don't think I understand your question, sir.

Is there anything that an eleven does better than a nine or a nine does better than an eleven, aside from you said it being crisper, but, like, were you taught any differences?

That was the main performance difference that I'd been taught.

The performance is it's crisper?
Yes, sir.

And you were -- how were you -- the AMSO just told you that, or did you get a training manual, or is there a computer aided training module that you went through with some online training, like, where did you get that training?

It -- I believe that was what the AMSO was teaching. My recollection is a little fuzzy though, sir.
Any differences in the -- are a night systems qualified pilot?

Yes.

Okay. And so you've flown with an NSI?

Yes.

Okay. At 242?

Yes.

Who was that?

I have flown with [ph] who is no longer here, and our old CO, [b](3)(A), [b](3)(A), [b](3)(A), [b](6).

I have flown with [ph] who is no longer here, and our old CO, [b](3)(A), [b](3)(A), [b](3)(A), [b](6).

Do you remember any of those three gentlemen giving you, like, a detailed brief before you went flying?

Yes. We did when I did my 2400 series syllabus. We did talk extensively about the night systems and the NVG's and NVCD's. I don't remember --

But, you did that with the ANVS-9, right?

Yes.

So you did your initial training with the ANVS-9.

Yes.

Did you become night system qualified on

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the ANVS-9?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) 
(b) (3) (A), (b) (6)

Yes.

And then you're already NSQ'd and then you walk to the jet one day and you've got a choice. You can put on the ANVS-11's or you can put on the ANVS-9's, if you have that equipment available; is that correct?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) 
(b) (3) (A), (b) (6)

Yes.

And then one day, you had enough hours and you had a helmet and you had some ANVS-11's and you put those on and your flew with them, right?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) 
(b) (3) (A), (b) (6)

That's correct.

What training happened for you to transition from nine to eleven? When did someone sit down with you and go, hey let me tell you a few things that are different between the nine and the eleven. Did something like that ever happen? Did you take any written test on that, was there any academic instruction?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) 
(b) (3) (A), (b) (6)

I could tell you there was no written test and I didn't sit down and read a pub about it. My training officer, (b) (3) (A), (b) (6) who was also one of the NSI's, he did sit down and talk to me about JAHOMIC's and the NVCD's. I don't remember the exact content of our conversation. It was more of a chalk talk,
going down a flight-E, handling them type of thing, rather than an academic setting. That's about the best of my recollection, sir.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): So what do you do in a flight-E that's different between the nine and the eleven?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): Wearing the JAHEMIC's mount. Basically, just the way it mounts to the helmet is really some of the only differences.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): Okay. What, if any, performance characteristics differences aside from you mentioned it's more crisp in your opinion and you mentioned that it has the HUD display data, any other physical characteristic differences you were taught between the two? Performance characteristic differences?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): No, sir, not that I remember.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): Okay. You said earlier that TNR codes go on flight schedules.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): Yes.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): And you think there's probably a TNR code for air refueling?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): Yes.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): There's probably one for day and one for night?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): Yes, sir.
If -- would that normally be on the flight schedule? If someone was going to the Tanker, would the night Tanker code normally be on the flight schedule, or is that often omitted?

As far as I know, the 2200 codes are the aerial refueling codes. And I don't remember if they have a re-flight currency. The general trend that we have is that we put the primary mission TNR code on the schedule and any auxiliary codes that have re-fly windows that we need to re-hack. So if it doesn't need to be re-hacked, if it's just a fly once and then you're good, there's a likelihood that it would not be on the schedule.

Do you think a Tanker code is fly once and then you're good?

No.

Okay. So, I mean, do you think you could go to the Tanker in 2010 and then go back to the Tanker in 2019, without having re-flown it?

No, sir.

Okay. If you were going to change the flight schedule, what process as the ODO would you take? So lets say that you're the duty and somebody says, hey we're going to go to the Tanker, and lets say the flight lead says there's no Tanker code
on the flight schedule. How would that go?

[0x6] (b) (3) (A), [b] [b]: As the ODO, first, I'd talk to ops and make sure that they're tracking with it. And if that's what the OPSO's intent is --

[0x6] (b) (3) (A), [b] [b]: Say it is.

[0x6] (b) (3) (A), [b] [b]: -- then I would go to the CO, find him and say, hey, sir, this is what ops would like to have happen today. This is their proposed change, we need your approval for this.

[0x6] (b) (3) (A), [b] [b]: And lets say the CO approves it. How would he document his approval?

[0x6] (b) (3) (A), [b] [b]: He would tell me and then I keep a corrected flight schedule at the ODO desk and I make changes in red to that. Whether it's a paper copy or an Excel document that we have up on the computer. Make changes in red there and then voice that to the crew when they come by and they're walking, if they're not already aware, find them somehow and notify them of the change.

[0x6] (b) (3) (A), [b] [b]: Okay. And the CO would sign the flight schedule or initial the flight schedule to initial that change, or how would he --

[0x6] (b) (3) (A), [b] [b]: He gives his verbal approval and then that -- usually we use the letters OK CO on the corrected flight schedule.

[0x6] (b) (3) (A), [b] [b]: Which is a Microsoft Excel document?
Yes, sir. And we also have a paper copy that we are using.

What would you annotate on the paper copy?

Same as that in red pen, write OK CO. Write the change, whatever it may be, OK CO.

Would the CO ever come in and personally sign his name to the flight schedule after a change? Would he ever personally approve a flight schedule change by making a pen entry on there. Would that be normal?

It depends. So things have changed with from how did it.

Tell me about that.

is much more -- he likes -- when he makes changes to the flight schedule, he likes to rewrite the entire schedule and put change one at the top, change whatever. , it was much more of a we're executing the original schedule that is signed. So --

And, like, so you're saying [ph] didn't like schedule changes?

He --

Are you saying would take out a red
pen and scratch out a code and put on another code and initial it, or both?

(b) (3) (A): Well, before we got to the day of execution, it would -- he was very particular about what we were doing and before he would sign the schedule the day before, he would -- he wanted it to be exactly as we were executing, so that if there was a change, it was something, like, a crew change. This guy is swapping out for that guy.

(b) (3) (A): And how is different?
(b) (6) (b) (6)

(b) (3) (A): He prefers to just make a change to the flight schedule and write a change one.
(b) (6)

(b) (3) (A): On the day of execution?
(b) (6)

(b) (3) (A): Yes.
(b) (6)

(b) (3) (A): So on the day of execution --
(b) (6)

(b) (3) (A): Well, I don't know if I've had too many times when this has happened, like, there's been sweeping changes to the flight schedule that require such things. The most that I've seen has just been minor deviations from whatever the schedule might be. Usually with a crew, this guy he can't clear his ears today, so he's out. But, we got this guy, he's going to take his place. OK CO on the Excel document.

(b) (3) (A): Where did you get your wings?
(b) (6)
At Kingsville, sir.

Wingsville baby.

Yes, sir.

I'm an Asteridian grad. What month and year?

April of 2016.

Was Reslar down there when you were there?

He was. We went to the boat together.

Cool. How was that?

The boat was great. We went to Key West, a lot of fun. Him and got another guy coming out here in the Summer, who we went to the boat with as well.

Nice.

Prior [inaudible] guy.

And you both went to 101 together too right?

Yes, we did.

How was that?

It was good. 101 was a good time, sir.

How did you do at the FRS?

Average, I think.
How'd Reslar do at the FRS? I have his records.

I would say average as well. I've never been as good of a judge about --

Did you know of him to have any -- did you guys do any together, like, go do range together, or big LFE's together, corrected weight shipments together? Or was he a class ahead or behind you?

He -- where was he? I think he was the class ahead of me. One class ahead of me.

Did he make it through the FRS at an -- in a normal amount of time, to your knowledge?

Yes. Yes, he did, sir, because we graduated at the same time.

Do you recall him having to re-fly a bunch of events or being under a lot of stress or anything like that at the FRS? Or was he just, kind of, another normal guy learning how to fly the Hornet?

As far as I remember he was just like the rest of us.

So you guys checked into 242 after receiving very similar training then. So in many ways, you and
have very similar experiences in the last couple of years.

Is that an accurate statement?

[Redacted]: Yes, sir. We were pretty much just on opposite shifts for that whole week. I was the mid-shift, he was the night shift. We were both wingmen. And I was pretty much, I was filling the wingmen role on my mid-shift, and he was --

[Redacted]: No, no, I'm going back, like, three years. Did you guys go to TBS together? Like, where did you meet him, API, primary?

[Redacted]: I met him first at advanced in Kingsville.

[Redacted]: Okay. And that was two years ago, right?

[Redacted]: Probably late 2015. I think when we started working up for the boat is when I got to know him the best, sir.

[Redacted]: Three point five years ago, three years ago.

[Redacted]: Yes, sir.

[Redacted]: Did you guys go through the NSQ syllabus together at 242, roughly?

[Redacted]: Yes. Myself, him, and [Redacted] were all about the same track and on the same timeline, sir.

[Redacted]: Would it be fair to say that your night vision goggle experience and his night vision experience is
strikingly similar?

(b) (3) (A): Yes, sir.
(b) (6)

(b) (3) (A): Okay. And you've been to the Tanker at night with the goggles?
(b) (6)

(b) (3) (A): Yes.
(b) (6)

(b) (3) (A): C-130?
(b) (6)

(b) (3) (A): Yes, sir.
(b) (6)

(b) (3) (A): Goggles up or goggles down?
(b) (6)

(b) (3) (A): I tried both.
(b) (6)

(b) (3) (A): which did you prefer?
(b) (6)

(b) (3) (A): I'm not sure I even have enough experience to have a preference yet, sir.
(b) (6)

(b) (3) (A): That's okay. Was it a C-130?
(b) (6)

(b) (3) (A): It was, actually, in Australia. It was a Canadian C-130. It was the most recent.
(b) (6)

(b) (3) (A): Do you recall the lighting configuration of the C-130? Overt, covert, bright, dim?
(b) (6)

(b) (3) (A): It was dim. I'm not sure if it was covert. I have very little night Tanking experience, but I know it was dim.
(b) (6)

(b) (3) (A): Before you went to the night Tanker, what kind of instruction did you receive and who provided it?
(b) (6)

(b) (3) (A): My -- I received my original 2202, the night
Tanking code. I got that in Australia in 2017. And then --

[292x47]21

[58x689]Tanking code. I got that in Australia in 2017. And then --

[b] (3) (A). [b] (b) (6) Who provided that training? Who was your section lead?

[b] (3) (A). [b] I think that night, that was our CO at the time, [b] (6). He was my flight lead.

[b] (3) (A). [b] (6) What did [b] talk to you about before he took you to the Tanker; do you remember?

[b] (3) (A). [b] (6) I can't remember, sir.

[b] (3) (A). [b] (6) Was Tanking the only thing you were doing that night, or was it, kind of, a side note?

[b] (3) (A). [b] (6) It was in the middle. We were doing basically two events. So we went to the range, did a bunch of break up and rendezvous, hit the Tanker, and then went back to the range and did some [inaudible] stuff.

[b] (3) (A). [b] (6) So he warmed you up with some BNR's, took you to the Tanker, and then went out and did some LGTR drops?

[b] (3) (A). [b] (6) I believe. We might have hit the Tanker before we went to the range as well, I can't remember, sir, that was a good long while ago.


[b] (3) (A). [b] (6) How many times have you gone to the C-130 since you've been at 242?
Day and night?

Correct. Just both.

A number of times.

More than ten?

It might be right around ten.

How about at night, then, just nighttime?

Very few times.

Rough guess?

I might have actually only been to a night C-130 probably three times. Maybe Australia of 2017 and then I think I did it two nights in a row in Australia this year, so this last August. So it might just be those three times I believe.

If you would have been asked to go to the Tanker the night that Reslar went, would you have any hesitation?

I don't think so, sir. Well --

Would that have been a big deal to you?

I ask that because your currency proficiency and training, I mean, you and Reslar have, like, identical recent experiences, you know what I mean? And so I'm just trying to ask frankly without, you know --

So my personal experience, when I was in

Enclosure 133
Australia I think we did it back to back I believe. The first night I had no issues and the second night I just couldn't get into the basket for whatever it was. It just kept moving around all over the place and I think I got 300 pounds of gas before we had to go execute the LFE. So I think my confidence was a little bit lower about being at the Tanker at night.

So I don't know how I would have felt, especially, being so late. I think they had a midnight, 0100 ARCT. It was, I think it was Wednesday night, so maybe they had a little bit of time to get used to their sleep schedule, but I think I might have been uncomfortable. It definitely doesn't sound like a fun time, sir. It's a challenge, that's for sure.

---

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): Are you familiar with OPNAV 3710?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): Yes.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): Do you know what it says about dry suits?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): Yes.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): Can you tell me a little bit about that?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): I believe the figure is 55 degrees. When the water temperature is below 55 we have to wear dry suits basically, or if the air temperature with the wind chill is going to be 32 degrees, I don't know if those numbers are exactly correct, but
that's roughly where it is. So we have that -- we also have that page posted up at our ODO desk and we reference that along with water temps, especially in the Winter, whenever we're going to fly.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): So how many times have you worn a dry suite at 242?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): I've actually haven't had to wear my dry suite to go fly. The times that I'd been flying here, it's just the water temperature hasn't been cold enough to necessitate that.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): All right. Judge.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): So in your job as the SACO, how often do you guys do random urine analysis in the squadron?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): Every month?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): So is that pretty scheduled, or is it random, or is it all hands?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): It's random every month. Random ten percent, we usually aim for 13 percent of the Marines.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): Did you pull urine or blood from the mishap aircrew prior to mishap?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): I did not, no, I did not.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): So you weren't involved with that at all?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): I was not.
Okay. Have you had any recent positive urine analysis come back at 242?

We haven't had any positive pops the whole time I've been SACO since I got here in June of 2017.

Okay. Nothing else, sir.

Any discussion about using go-no go pills from the mishap flight, I mean, for the week that went into the mishap?

Yes.

Tell me about that.

Lets see, so I recall our flight doc said that go pills had to be authorized by the Wing CG and I believe our OPSO mentioned that the Wing CG did not approve the use of go pills. And I don't believe we got any no go pills. I did not personally ask for any and I don't know what the circumstances behind issuing the no go pills was.

Did you hear about anybody specifically complain or specifically ask for those? Like, were you present for a conversation when anybody said, man I really could use some Ambien and the flight surgeon said, can't fuckin' do it.

I was not present for any of those one on one conversations.
Were there any conversations on WhatsApp or any other, you know, electronic media discussing that, that you observed?

Yes.

Tell me about that.

I know we -- there were some aircrew that asked or had put out, hinted that they wanted no go pills or some sort of something, go pills, no go pills. And I don't remember the exact conversation, my impression was that our flight doc was hesitant to give them out.

Do you still have that WhatsApp conversation?

I think so.

We're going to need you to take screenshots of that conversation, at least two weeks prior to the exercise, and then through today and e-mail them to us.

Okay.

Yea, if you could do that, we won't have to confiscate your device.

Okay. So from two weeks prior through today?

Correct.

Roger.
And any adjunctive stuff and if there's any solatious commentary in there that's not germane, it's not going to be public. So don't worry about if it's, you know, people are making fun of in that app or something goofy like that. I know you guys don't know me, but if there's anything in there that's not related to the mishap, it's not coming out. I'm just looking for the stuff that's related to go pills, no go pills, who knew what. We're trying to understand what the junior officers in the squadron really understood about what was approved and what you guys were doing. And I'm trying to figure out between the CG and you, literally, how far down the communication path went up and down so we can effect some meaningful changes to do justice to, frankly, Reslar's death.

Yes, sir.

You know what I mean. So I don't -- don't be defensive about that, okay.

Yes, sir.

But, I mean, everybody uses What App now, I know that. We use it, you know, we text and chat all the time. So it's a great way to go back and find that stuff out, so I'd really appreciate if you'd do that and just give it to the judge so you don't have to give it to me, if that's okay.
Yes, sir.

Is there anything else that you would like to share that you think could have contributed to this mishap that we haven't touched on? Take your time.

I don't believe so. But, if I think of anything else, I'll bring it up to you, sir.

Yes, you can always e-mail me or or anybody else. We just want to make sure that when we put out this full report, you know, we'll take all the time we need, I don't want the report to go out and you and your peer group to be like, well, that's not the whole story. I need the whole story so I can, you know, use that information to effect meaningful change. Cool?

Yes, sir.

Judge will swear you out.

[The witness was warned, sworn, and excused.]
Good morning, my name is [b] (3) (A). [b] (6) I am conducting a JAGMAN investigation with [b] (3) (A). [b] (6) who's a VMGR-152 schedule writer. Present in the room today are our said Captain, as well as, [b] (3) (A), [b] (6) the judge advocate general of 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, and our court reporter, [b] (3) (A). [b] (6).

The time on deck is approximately 1046, or 44 rather.

And with that said, would you please state your rank and name for the record, spelling your last name.


[b] (3) (A). [b] (6) Thanks [b] (3) (A). [b] (6), first name [b] (3) (A), (b) (6).

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6) What is your Military Occupational Specialty?

[b] (3) (A). [b] (6) Yes, sir.

[b] (3) (A). [b] (6) Yes, sir.

[b] (3) (A). [b] (6) Okay. Awesome. How long have you been doing that?

[b] (3) (A). [b] (6) I got out here last February of 2017. So I'm coming up on two years with the squadron. And I got my wings in June of 2016. So I haven't been -- I've been flying though since February of 2017.

[b] (3) (A). [b] (6) Awesome. So where were you in the month of December of 2018? What were you doing?
I was planning for this exercise in December. So this happened the first week. A lot of November was spent planning --

Tell me about some of the planning that you did in November leading up to the exercise from the first week of December of '18.

So I attended a couple of meetings at MAG where the purpose was to just get everyone on board. For C-130's, I was focused on the transport of cargo to the airfield that we were flying to. And then also the aerial refueling with the other MAG-12 squadrons here.

So, roughly, as I've heard from other witnesses in the first of December, 2018, there'd be F-18's flying out of Iwakuni, rehearsing typical mission sets. And C-130's flying from Iwakuni to locations, dropping off and picking up people and cargo in support. And then there would also be C-130's conducting air refueling in different places of F-18's.

Do you understand that, in general, to be correct?

Yes, sir.

How did the Tanker squadron communicate with the fighter squadron, the receiver squadron, about what they would do together in terms of air refueling? How was air refueling communicated, the specifics of it, between receivers and Tanker about the what, where, and when?

Okay. So that -- and soo I was the go-to
basically, since I was planning this exercise. I was also the FDO.

[black]
(b) (3) (A): What does FDO stand for?
(b) (6)

(b) (3) (A): The Flight Duty Officer.
(b) (6)

(b) (3) (A): So it's kind of like an ODO, or SDO, or any person at the desk?
(b) (6)

(b) (3) (A): Yes, sir. So we stand at a week at a time, kind of, at 152.
(b) (6)

(b) (3) (A): Okay.
(b) (6)

(b) (3) (A): But since I was planning this I was also scheduled as the FDO for the entire week.
(b) (6)

(b) (3) (A): Okay.
(b) (6)

(b) (3) (A): So what would happen, we -- there was basically two ways we were communicating. The first was through the flows, and that was written months in advanced.
(b) (6)

(b) (3) (A): So the flow, that's like a gant chart on a power point presentation, with horizontal lines that it's got -- on a vertical axis it's got the squadrons, and a horizontal axis is times perhaps?
(b) (6)

(b) (3) (A): Yes, sir.
(b) (6)

(b) (3) (A): And then included in those lines would the specifics, like the give and the location?
(b) (6)

(b) (3) (A): Yes, sir. So these were written months ago. And that was, kind of, the first way I think we were communicating. Was we were planning -- I was planning our SORTY's and writing the schedules a week before the actual
exercise, based off of the flows. And then I was revising them as the week went on with any changes that were happening last minute. So the first day comes up, we have the schedule written for the next day. And all I have to do is try and get the crews that I have assigned to the ariel refueling mission in contact with who's flying the mission for the jets. So --

(b) (3) (A): E-mail between the OPSO's and --
(b) (6)
(b) (3) (A): So I was calling their duty desk and I was just asking them, hey I have my C-130 crew assigned. I'd like to get them in touch with who you have flying the next day. And that worked for the first day. And that was mainly how we did it. And then they would link up and that's when they would start coordinating the specifics.

And then for the -- on Monday, I know that we had, or Sunday, I can't really remember which day it was. But, for the first day of flying, I had one of our C-130 crew members go over to the jet squadron to attend their confirmation brief. And then --

(b) (3) (A): Did 242 have a confirmation brief?
(b) (6)
(b) (3) (A): I think it was at 242, or it was at 225. I can't remember which building they went to specifically.

(b) (3) (A): But, were all the jet guys at the same place?
(b) (6)
(b) (3) (A): I think so.
(b) (6)
(b) (3) (A): They had a combined confirmation brief?
I think so. I'm not sure.

Okay.

I just know that we sent one member from the C-130 crew to the confirmation brief. And this was for the, I believe we did this on Sunday, for Monday's flight schedule.

Are you surprised to learn that night aerial refueling was being conducted at the time and place of the mishap? Or did you expect that?

I was expecting that. It would have just been a little bit of a different time if the President hadn't passed away. So the national day of mourning is what shifted Wednesday's schedule so drastically.

So tell me more about that. So, alright, we've got from previous interviews that, and of course we're familiar, that Wednesday was a national day of mourning. So it was declared to be a federal holiday. Obviously, we're in Japanese standard time out here, so that impacts all of that.

But, when did we find out about Wednesday being a national day of mourning? When did you find out?

So on Tuesday morning I had the crews assigned for Wednesday's lines. Which would have been a ten line schedule. So Tuesday morning I started calling the jet squadrons, seeing if they had their crews assigned and trying to just link up. Just like I had done the previous two days.

Yes.

They didn't really know what they were
doing yet, or they hadn't had the crew assigned, or they said they would get back to me when they had that information. So the day, kind of, went on like --

(b) (3) (A): They didn't know because of the day of mourning or?

(b) (6): And I think it became clearer later. So I got an e-mail from around 1300 or so, that timeframe in the afternoon saying that the flow were probably going to be totally different due to the national day of mourning. And that he would have more information after they had the 1500 CUB on Tuesday.

So, basically, I was just waiting for that CUB to happen, and then waiting for my OPSO to come back to the squadron to tell me what Wednesday was going to look like. Before she came back from MAG, the FDO desk got a call from informing us, pretty much, what Wednesdays AR mission was going to look like. And that was -- we couldn't do anything until midnight, so the plan was to take off --

(b) (3) (A): Which was actually Thursday, right.
(b) (6): Thursday morning at midnight, correct.
(b) (6): Okay.
(b) (3) (A): But for Wednesday's schedule, we couldn't turn engines on until midnight basically. So we planned one AR mission to make up for the whole day lost, to take off at 0030 Thursday morning and conduct one ariel refueling mission, and then come back.
And when about did you know that was going to be the plan?

That was around, probably, 1600 -- between 1600 and 1700.

On Wednesday or Thursday?

On Tuesday.

On Tuesday?

To write Wednesday's schedule.

Okay. So that way at close of normal work day on Tuesday, you're able to publish a schedule that reflected what you just described to be executed on Wednesday, calender day, to allow for planning and briefing before midnight to take off 30 minutes after midnight. So that the actual flight event is on Thursday?

Yes, sir.

Okay.

So the crew showed at 2130 Wednesday night.

I understand.

So that's why they were on the Wednesday schedule.

Cool. So when did 242 get the word on that now?

So I'm not sure because I was sitting at the FDO desk the whole time. , our OPSO, was at the CUB on Tuesday at 1500.
Okay. And I can only assume that other representatives from the MAG were at this meeting to find out what they were doing. So I don't really know. I can't give you a solid answer on that. But --

But, you think -- and we'll talk to -- but, you think had similar information you just described? Was able to share that at the CUB on Tuesday?

Probably. I --

That would have been what you expected?

Correct. She was our rep there from 152.

Okay.

I would only assume that the other squadrons had sent one to find out what they were doing, since said that flows were going to be changing due to this national day of mourning. I only assume that the other squadrons were there to see what they were doing.

Since MAG called us and, pretty much, told us what we were doing AR wise.

As to the shift in time, what time was that flight scheduled for?

Okay. So the crew of Sumo-41, normally Wednesday's schedule would have been a ten line schedule. Their
flight would have been part of a section that would have taken off at around -- they would have landed. They were scheduled to land, per the flows, at around midnight 30, so Thursday morning. And then we would have had an additional single C-130 landing at 0200 on Thursday morning.

[291x44]9
[63x690]

: Okay.
(b) (3) (A): So originally, the crew, Sumo-41, was going to be Sumo-48, I think, in a section, landing at 0030. And then Sumo-49 would have been landing at 0200.

: So you had C-130's scheduled to fly past midnight prior to the day of mourning?

: Yes. I had to aircraft's -- and this was just per the flow, yes. Just a tentative, rough, hard schedule was two C-130's would have landed, roughly, a little after midnight. And then a single one would have been landing around 0200. And that was just based off of what the flows -- that's how I wrote all the schedules until things changed and I had to just revise the schedule.

: And you had the flows for some amount of time prior to the exercise?

: The flows had been written for a while. And they had just been updated every so often. Originally, this was supposed to be Vigilant Ace, so some of the airspace was supposed to be somewhere else. And then when that got canceled, things like that changed. But, for the most part the times and the, you know, the gives were roughly the same.
Okay. So you said you're a schedule writer?

Just when I'm on FDO. Yes, sir.

Yes. So you're experienced in developing flight schedules and preparing them for your commanding officer's approval, right? To authorize flight?

Yes, sir.

Do you -- are you familiar with the program called MSHAR?

Yes, sir.

Do you use it?

Yes, sir.

Do you -- does the C-130 have training codes for specific types of flights, like, for cargo versus day, and versus night, and versus aerial delivery?

Yes, sir.

Is there a training code for night air refueling, when you're providing fuel to fighters?

No. So 3600 is the code that's for day and night for fixed wing. The only night code for AR that we have is if we are refueling a helicopter.

Interesting. So it's the same code, day or night, if you're providing fuel to a fixed wing?

Correct. But, we also add an additional code, which is 2151 or 2150, denoting if it's high light or low light. So we just have an extra code saying that it's going to
be on goggles, but the fixed wing AR code is the same day or
night, if it's for jets or [inaudible].

[b] (3) (A): So if you were going out and doing
night systems, low light level air refueling, what would the two
codes that you would typically include on the flight schedule?

[b] (3) (A): So it would have been 3600 and then 2151.
[b] (3) (A): What would be the purpose of putting
that on the flight schedule? Why is that?

[b] (3) (A): That's so that it gets screened properly.
[b] (3) (A): Tell me about that. What is screening?

[b] (3) (A): So whenever we put the -- we get the
codes, the training codes or whatever codes that are going to
happen for the flight, we put that on the schedule. I'm the
first person who should be screening it. So I go through MSHARP
and I try and catch anything. If I miss anything, the schedule
goes through DOSS. And their job is to screen the schedule.

[b] (3) (A): And DOSS, that's the Director of
Safety and Standardization? That's, like, the Flight Safety
Department?

[b] (3) (A): Yes, sir.
[b] (3) (A): And what is DOSS looking for when they
screen the flight schedule?

[b] (3) (A): They're looking for people who are
unqualified, not current. If they haven't received that code,
then it should be annotated as an initial code. And if it is an
initial code, do they have the prerequisites to get that code? Do they have their flight physical up-to-date? They're just -- they're screening all of these safety things to make sure that you are legal and qualified to fly.

[b] (3) (A): Okay. Have you ever prepared a flight schedule that you walked down to the DOSS shop, and DOSS had a question about?

[b] (3) (A): Well, probably.

[b] (3) (A): Yes. And how -- and lets say, for example, you prepared a schedule that had an error in it and DOSS caught it. And how, I mean, how would that go down? What would the DOSS would tell you they had a problem and if you couldn't resolve that, then what would you and what would the DOSS representative do with that?

[b] (3) (A): So if there is a mistake on it that can be corrected, then I just simply go back to the computer and correct the schedule and bring him a new one. But, if it's -- if it comes to the point where someone can't fly because we can't fix it before the flight, then we have to just reassign and find a new crew member to go who can do it. And that's really all I've ever experienced. It's either --

[b] (3) (A): So hypothetically, what if the DOSS had, like, a huge problem with the schedule and there was, like, an argument between a hypothetical schedule writer and a hypothetical DOSS? What would those two officers do? Or how would they resolve that?
Like a [inaudible]?

Like a disagreement about the risk associated with an event perhaps?

I think that's when the OPSO would get involved at that point.

And maybe even the CO, depending on the situation?

Then she would probably take it to the CO if she deemed it necessary.

It would be elevated to your chain of command?

Correct. It would be.

Well, how do you know -- how does the CO know the DOSS has seen the flight schedule?

There is an initial. So there's four people I need to take the schedule to, to get it initialed before the CO signs it.

Okay. Who are those people and what are they looking for?

So the first person I take it to is Air Crew Training. And they're looking at the training side of it. They're seeing who's getting initial codes, who needs what, and they're also -- they should also be screening to make sure on MSHARP that they're also legal to fly. So they're also, you know, they're kind of a back-stop before it gets to DOSS.

When Air Crew Training initials it, they're telling me
okay, I like who you have on the schedule, I like the codes, continue. I take it to DOSS. That's where DOSS is now screening all of the codes that Air Crew Training screened to make sure are correct. And they're also checking to make sure -- they're not checking so much for Air Crew Training, of course, but they're checking to make sure, like I said earlier, that the crew member is legal, and current, and --

(b) (3) (A): Are you familiar with OPNAV 3710, SOP for flight operations?

(b) (3) (A): Yes, sir.
(b) (6)

(b) (3) (A): Does OPNAV 3710 require that your flight schedule have those little initial blocks at the bottom of it? What is OPNAV 3710 require? Are you familiar?

(b) (3) (A): I can't recall that one, sir. I'm sorry.
(b) (6)

(b) (3) (A): Okay. Are familiar with the operational risk management process, ORM? You ever heard of ORM?

(b) (3) (A): Yes, sir.
(b) (6)

(b) (3) (A): Can you, in the aviation context, can you define a hazard?

(b) (3) (A): So it's something that --
(b) (6)

(b) (3) (A): In your own words, I mean.
(b) (6)

(b) (3) (A): Yes, sir. It's just something that can pose a potential threat to the aircraft. And that's where we have a risk assessment worksheets that we fill out as FDO's, as well. They go --

(b) (3) (A): Well, let me ask, sorry. What's a
risk? You just defined a hazard for me, something that can happen to the aircraft. Then what's this -- what is a risk? Is that -- are they the same thing, or is that something different or?

[redacted]: No. So I would define risk as something that we are, kind of, willing to accept to a certain degree to get the mission done and get training done. But, a hazard is something that, you know, I would say a thunderstorm is a hazard. That's something that's, kind of, rigid and can actually --

[redacted]: Okay. So you were talking about an ORM worksheet. Tell me about that.

[redacted]: Yes, sir. So we fill out -- they're called risk assessment worksheets, that we put in with the schedule. And that's where we fill these out and we just try to identify any risks, I guess.

[redacted]: When you identify risks, what do you do with it?

[redacted]: So on the backs of the sheet, there's a bunch of different boxes depending on what kind of mission that we're doing. So if we're doing an AR mission, some of the things are like, is it a formation, is it at night, I think. I'd have to review it.

[redacted]: What's the purpose of this document?

[redacted]: It's to identify any risk. Like, on all of them it's, like, is the crew qualified and current? If you're doing HELO AR, is the plan going to be above 140,000 pound? Just
things like that. It would be easier if I have one in front of me. I could explain it.

(b) (3) (A): It's okay. I've seen one. All right.
(b) (6) (b) (3) (A): Yes, sir. So I fill it out and I -- if it is a medium or above, then the whole RAW is now a medium. And I fill it out with any, you know, to try and make it low. And then DOSS does the same thing. They look at it and they'll fill it out and the CO signs it, as well.

(b) (3) (A): Lets talk a little bit about your skill and experience as a C-130 pilot and aircraft commander.

Have you ever conducted night air refueling of a fixed wing aircraft?

(b) (3) (A): Yes, sir.
(b) (6) (b) (3) (A): And in your conduct of night air refueling of fixed wing aircraft, have you ever done that under night systems, while you were wearing night vision goggles?

(b) (3) (A): Yes, sir.
(b) (6) (b) (3) (A): Were you wearing the ANVS-9 perhaps, night vision goggle?

(b) (3) (A): I believe so. Yes, sir.
(b) (6) (b) (3) (A): Yes. You get issued that one. What external lighting configuration would be normal for the C-130?

(b) (3) (A): Usually, just overt and then if the aircraft -- if the jets request covert, then we'll go up covert.
(b) (6) (b) (3) (A): Okay. So overt, so that's position lights, anti-collision beacon, strip lights --
We'll turn the bottom strip off for refueling.

The bottom strobe on the C-130, which is the red anti-collision light, which is labeled strobe. And that's normally off during your refueling. If you turn it on, does that communicate something?

If we turn that on, that would signal to break away from the aircraft. But, we always turn -- that's part of our pre AR flow is to turn that off. So it's always off.

Okay. And there's another strobe that's on top of the vertical stabilizer, right, near the elevator?

Yes, sir.

And that one would normally be on?

Yes, sir.

Okay. If you switched the C-130, KC-130J external lighting system to covert or at night, aided if you will, what does that do to all the external lights on the aircraft?

It allows, if you're on NVG's, it just makes it easier for the jets to be able to see the aircraft without it blinding them out, or hailing them out with the overt lighting. It just makes it, like, NVG compatible.

So the assumption being that the receiver is wearing night vision goggles and looking the tubes at the C-130?
Yes.

It, kind of, dims the C-130 lights and the -- so the C-130 have something called strip lights on the fuselage of the aircraft?

Yes, sir. There's formation lights.

Formation, form lights?

Yes, sir.

And the form lights are -- that's like a green, kind of? And are they overt, or covert, or both, or tell me about those.

They're IR.

They're IR strip lights?

Yes, sir.

Okay. Do you have --

If you turn the form lights up all the way you can see them. They just get brighter.

Okay.

But, if -- they will work over covert I believe.

Okay. So you think it's just one light that you dim and don't dim? Is that how you think it works? Or do you think it's two lights next to each other, one is overt, one is covert? Or are you not sure?

I think it's one light.

Okay. All right. Are there any other special lights that the C-130 has, external, for the purpose of
air refueling that you can think of?

[b] (3) (A): There's pod lights.
(b) (6)
[b] (3) (A): Tell me about pod lights.
(b) (6)
[b] (3) (A): So at the end of the refueling road, our
(b) (6) -- so just in front of the -- so when the jet is about to plug,
they should be able to see, it's either going to be a circle with
a -- it's, like, either going to be a green circle, an amber
yellow, or all of it which is would be red I believe. If it's
yellow with the circle. And that's just being able -- that's
telling them different things. Like, green is good fuel flow.
If it's amber, the Tanker is ready to plug. And then if it's
red, it's don't plug, basically.

[b] (3) (A): And that's on the external store that
(b) (6) kind of looks like a pod, if you will. It kind of looks like an
external fuel tank that contains the reel and the basketer drone
assembly. It's up there on the wing, is that where you're
talking on where that is? Or is that actually on the basket?

[b] (3) (A): It's on the basket, sir.
(b) (6)
[b] (3) (A): So there's a light that changes
(b) (6) colors. It's actually on the basket of the C-130?

[b] (3) (A): No, sir. I think it's on the pod.
(b) (6)
[b] (3) (A): Yes. It's up on the pod, right? Yes.
(b) (6)

But, if your probe is in the basket and you could look
up the hose on the pod, then you would see that and that would
give the air crew information about how far up they pushed in or
pulled out or whatever on the hose. Okay.
And then the basket itself, does it have any kind of illumination on it? Does it light up or does it have a ridiom or a tridiom or glow in the dark stuff? Or do you know much about that?

(b) (3) (A): Not really, sir. I'm not sure.

(b) (6): Okay. It's okay to answer. It's a -- you're supposed to fly the Herc, right? Not the lit basket.

What about on the horizontal stabilizer of the C-130? Are there any lights there that shine forward, or do you have landing lights, or taxi lights, or other kinds of lights on the C-130?

(b) (3) (A): I think there is a strip light on the horizontal stabilizer.

(b) (6): Okay.

(b) (3) (A): I'd have to review though.

(b) (6): Is there a light on the horizontal stabilizer that shines forward that illuminates the back of the C-130 for use of receivers to, kind of, light up the back of your airplane to make it easier to fly formation? Or are you familiar with anything like that?

(b) (3) (A): I'm not sure, sir. I don't think so.

(b) (6): Okay. Have you ever conducted air refueling at night where the fixed wing receivers asked you to go covert?

(b) (3) (A): Yes, sir.

(b) (6): Is that normal, not normal?
It's I would say typically normal.

Normal? And in what kind of airspace would you do that in?

Special use airspace.

Some kind of, like, restricted area or some place where it was scheduled so you're protected?

Yes, sir.

Okay. Is the Itras South, when operating disregard, would you consider that special use airspace?

I would consider it special use. Yes, sir.

Okay. Even when it's -- even when the flight schedule notes it says to regard, it would still be special use airspace?

I have never flown it. I didn't think it would ever be do regard. It's always been under control ever since I have been here.

Okay.

I know it was VFR procedures that night.

Yes.

I guess it wouldn't -- I would always consider it special use airspace if you're in those confine --

Okay. And if you're in the Herc, and the Herc is covert only, would a unaided pilot of another aircraft be able to see you pretty well, or not? Or are you not
They should be able to, sir.

So when you're --

Unaided, no. I'm sorry, not unaided.

Unaided?

Unaided, no. No, sir.

Okay. So then that would necessitate that another person, no matter where they were, they'd have to have goggles on to see.

Yes, sir.

Okay. Have you ever been conducting air refueling at night, covert, with an F-18, and the F-18 went midnight where he turned off all his lights. Have you ever seen or heard of that?

No, sir. Usually, the last person -- if they do that then at least the last jet in the formation should be carrying all of the lights, basically. They should be overt if they do that.

Overt with, like, red wing tip, green wing tip, white tail light, and maybe an overt strobe or anti-collision beacon?

With the strobe lights and position lights. Yes, sir.

And what's the purpose of that?

That's just to -- so if we're in a formation, if we're -- we're basically one flight. We are
conducting MARSA, but for other aircraft, they know there's an aircraft there at least.

[b] (3) (A):  Okay.
(b) (6)
[b] (3) (A):  We're just so close to each other it's, you know, like one big airplane basically, I guess.
(b) (6)
[b] (3) (A):  Okay. When you conduct air refueling, do you have an enlisted crew member in the back performing observer duties?
(b) (6)
[b] (3) (A):  Yes, sir.
(b) (6)
[b] (3) (A):  Tell me what -- where he or she is, and the purpose of that crew station.
(b) (6)
[b] (3) (A):  So there's one in each of the observer windows. And they are telling us, and they're our main line of communication because we can't see anything behind our wing. They are telling us when the jet is in the observation or left, echelon left, basically. And they are telling us when they're stable, when there's no rate of closure, and when they're actually in that position. They tell us when they are stern, so that's when they get right behind the basket. They tell us when they are stable and there's no rate of closure, and then that's when we clear them to contact.
(b) (6)
[b] (3) (A):  Okay.
(b) (6)
[b] (3) (A):  So they play a pretty important role in this.
(b) (6)
[b] (3) (A):  So if a Hornet was in the stern position and had all of his or her lights completely off, then
the observer would have to be looking through the night vision
goggles to see that Hornet?

Yes, sir.

Okay. What are -- at 15,00 feet, what
doors would you have open?

We wouldn't have any doors open.

You'd have all the doors closed,
right?

Yes, sir.

And why is that?

Well, we -- above 10,000 we're not -- you
would have to be on oxygen above 10,000. But, we never do jet
refueling or almost any refueling with the doors open.

So the aircraft's pressurized?

Yes, sir.

So you would have all the doors closed
because the doors, because the aircraft is pressurized?

Yes, sir.

And where are the windows this
observer or observers in the back, where are those in the C-130?

They're on the paratroop doors. And
that's the window that they're looking out of.

Okay. Rough size of that window?

Probably, I'd say you'd be able to --
probably the size of your head.

So maybe 12 inches square?
(b) (3) (A): Around. Yes, sir.

(b) (6)

(b) (3) (A): Plus or minus four or five inches?

(b) (6)

Maybe a little bigger?

(b) (3) (A): Yes, sir.

(b) (6)

(b) (3) (A): What about the window to dead six o'clock. Is there a big window in the very back of the C-130?

(b) (3) (A): No, sir.

(b) (6)

(b) (3) (A): So there's window. So the ramp and door when they're closed, there's no transparent --

(b) (3) (A): No.

(b) (6)

(b) (3) (A): -- there. So really, there's a door out to the left, parachute. There's a window at the left parachute door and a window at the right parachute door, but there's -- if the aircraft is not in any of those positions, and the observer is not wearing night vision goggles, then the receiver would not be visible to the observer. Am I saying that right?

(b) (3) (A): For the most part. Yes, sir. Running up along towards the flight station there are a couple more windows. They'd be able to see a receiver.

(b) (3) (A): Okay.

(b) (6)

(b) (3) (A): But, that's not the windows that they look at because --

(b) (3) (A): That's not where they are.

(b) (6)

(b) (3) (A): -- the parachute door, the paratroop door window is the farthest aft window that they can look out of. And
that's what they look out of to see the jets.

[b] (3) (A):  Okay. Were you surprised to learn that we were doing, or that your MAG was doing air refueling at 2 a.m., 200 miles offshore? Or is that, kind of, normal stuff?

[b] (3) (A):  For the exercise, I was not surprised.

[b] (3) (A):  Why is that? Why were you not surprised?

[b] (3) (A):  Because that was part of the flows.

[b] (3) (A):  It was the plan?

[b] (3) (A):  I was anticipating it for, pretty much, months leading up. The only thing that really changed was the airspace was different.

[b] (3) (A):  So in anticipation of that plan, what types of action were taken at the squadron level to identify and schedule crews to fly at that hour when I think maybe most people are asleep. I don't know if you guys regularly do 24 hour ops, but was it -- were crews identified the day prior, the week, the month? How far out were crews identified?

[b] (3) (A):  I started writing the schedules for the -- of the week prior, but names changed pretty consistently when DOSS or Air Crew Training identifies when someone can't fly. It's very common for names to change. It's not unheard of for us to fly after midnight. We do red eyes to Alaska and to Hawaii every so often. That requires us to show late in the day and then fly ten or 11 hours past midnight. What we did is just what we normally do for a reschedule. All the crews were assigned
12 hours of crew rest.

[3 (A):  Okay. How many days in advanced do you think the mishap air crew of the C-130 had notice before they were flying at that hour to adjust their circadian rhythms, and their clocks, and what not?

[3 (A):  I would say probably one or two days prior.

[3 (A):  At least one day?

[3 (A):  So I had it on our -- are you familiar with our prog?

[3 (A):  I am not familiar with the prog.

[3 (A):  Okay.

[3 (A):  Is that the prognostic?

[3 (A):  I don't really don't even know what it stands for, but it's basically --

[3 (A):  It's the forecast?

[3 (A):  It's the forecast, so everyone can see on the prog what they're doing for the next month or so.

[3 (A):  Okay.

[3 (A):  So I started assigning crews on prog about a week or two weeks before. But, those changed so drastically all the time with just different changes. Especially with the airfield that we were flying to, those hours changed. So that changed the amount of SORTY's we were doing on one day vice the other.

[3 (A):  Are familiar with a drug called
Ambien?

: Yes, sir. I've heard of it.

: You have heard of it? Have you ever taken it, to your knowledge?

: No, sir.

: Was Ambien prescribed to your ready room for this event?

: No, sir.

: What about any type of go pill, some type of go-no go pills? Did the flight surgeon give you guys go pills to help you keep up?

: No, sir. I didn't hear about anything being prescribed by the doc for this exercise.

: Okay.

: So you were talking about the flight schedule and the different individuals that it has to go to before it gets to the CO. You said Air Crew Training and the DOSS. Where else does the flight schedule have to go in VMGR-152?

: It then goes to the OPSO.

: Okay.

: So she signs it. She's basically doing the same thing, everything everyone else is doing. She's just screening it, checking for any mistakes, and then it goes to maintenance. And maintenance is just seeing if they can support the schedule with aircraft. They're not screening for --
So they are not an initial block on the flight schedule?

Pardon?

Do they have an initial block on the flight schedule?

They have an initial block, but --

Okay.

-- they're basically just on the maintenance side of it though. Seeing if they can support.

So they're screening it for their functional area, which is aircraft availability for that time of day?

Yes, sir. They're not screening it for safety or anything like that. But, the other three usually are.

And then where does it go after maintenance?

And then that's where I take it to the CO and he signs it.

Okay. How about changes to the flight schedule. How is that done at VMGR-152? Once it's signed by the CO?

Once it's signed?

Correct.

Okay. So once it's signed, it's usually red penned. If something needs to change, I mean, we try and avoid this at all cost to red pen anything, but I think on the
schedule, on Wednesday's schedule we had a red pen because one of the pilots we identified later couldn't -- wasn't going to be available for that flight. So we red penned it and put a new pilot on. And then the CO usually initials next to it so he's made aware of any changes after the schedule's been signed.

(b) (3) (A): Why does your CO initial it?
(b) (6)
(b) (3) (A): Because he's the one signing the dockets. He signed it. I think it's just showing that RCO knows about any changes.

(b) (3) (A): So you think your CO is the approval authority for flight schedule changes?
(b) (6)
(b) (3) (A): Yes, sir.
(b) (6)
(b) (3) (A): Could the ODO just change it and not tell the CO? Would that be a big deal?
(b) (6)
(b) (3) (A): I think it would, yes, it would be a big deal.

(b) (3) (A): So that's not okay. Could the ODO add a training code to one of your flight schedules and, like, could you -- if someone was scheduled to go do I don't know aerial delivery and then decided for whatever reason to do aerial delivery and then do fixed wing aerial refueling, and that code was not included in the flight schedule and the aircraft commander went out and did that, would the CO be cool with that? Would that be okay?

(b) (3) (A): No. I don't think he would be cool with it. It's supposed to -- everything should be screened. So if
we're doing something --

[b] (3) (A): So the flight schedule should include the times, the crew, and the specific TNR code, and be approved by the commanding officer?

[b] (3) (A): Yes, sir.
(b) (6)
[b] (3) (A): Is that your understanding?
(b) (6)
[b] (3) (A): Yes, sir.
(b) (6)
[b] (3) (A): Okay. Have you ever read Wing Order 3710, 1st Marine Aircraft Wing Flight SOP? Have you ever read that?

[b] (3) (A): I think I looked at it when I first got here, but I didn't --
(b) (6)
[b] (3) (A): How did you receive a copy of that document?
(b) (6)
[b] (3) (A): I believe I found it on the Sharepoint, I think.
(b) (6)
[b] (3) (A): Okay. So it was a PDF or a Word document? Do you remember?
(b) (6)
[b] (3) (A): I think so. Yes, sir. Something like that.
(b) (6)
[b] (3) (A): Okay. Just like [inaudible] you flipped through it. Has it been updated since you checked into the wing, or do you know?
(b) (6)
[b] (3) (A): I'm not sure, sir.
(b) (6)
[b] (3) (A): Okay. Does the MAG have an SOP, a 3710, flight -- MAG-12 SOP for flight operations?
I believe so. We have our inflight guide. That's what we reference a lot.

Okay. What kind of information is in the inflight guide?

VFAR operations here, like, if you're coming in from the break, or down -- there's a lot of stuff down in Oki as well.

Procedural stuff?

Yes, sir.

Okay. Does VMGR-152 have a squadron order 3710 SOP for flight operations?

Yes, sir.

Have you ever read that document?

Yes, sir.

Is that a Word document on Sharepoint, or is that a PDF, or do you know what form it normally takes?

It's a PDF on -- our new CO, kind of, wrote it back in September. He took over the 152 in June and then published a new 152 SOP. And that got sent out around September of last year, August/September timeframe. And that got disseminated throughout the squadron.

Okay. Is it a document that you feel like the members of your squadron take seriously?

Yes, sir.

So if your commanding officer -- what's your CO's name?
provided written guidance and put his signature on a document that said do or don't do something, and your aircrew did something different, do you think that would be a problem?

Yes, sir. It's going against what the CO -- it's a written order.

It's a -- and you feel like your CO would hold people accountable for that?

I think so. Yes, sir.

Okay. Have you ever known of a flight to be canceled at 152?

Yes, sir.

Have you ever known of a flight to be canceled for safety, or ORM, or some kind of personal consideration?

Not that I'm aware of. I'm sure at some point that has happened. But, nothing that I'm aware of.

If you felt unsafe to fly, maybe you came to work and you were sick, or you were emotionally upset because you learned of a death in the family, or some other personal issue arose in your life, or if you were asked to do something you didn't feel that you were current proficient to do, but somehow you got scheduled for it anyway. And you showed up to the ODO and you just, kind of, threw your head up and said, you know what, I can't do this. What kind of repercussions would
you expect from your CO for that?

[ (b) (3) (A), (b) (6)]: I wouldn't expect any repercussions.

[ (b) (3) (A), (b) (6)]: What about from your MAG commander?

[ (b) (3) (A), (b) (6)]: From the MAG CO?

[ (b) (3) (A), (b) (6)]: Yes.

[ (b) (3) (A), (b) (6)]: I wouldn't expect that he would probably know about it.

[ (b) (3) (A), (b) (6)]: Why is that?

[ (b) (3) (A), (b) (6)]: I'm not sure what line of communication the CO has with the MAG CO on name changes to the schedule.

[ (b) (3) (A), (b) (6)]: So you feel like your CO would just handle it at the squadron level, put in another qualified crew member, pen the schedule, sign it, ORM it, brief it up, and probably get it done if he -- assuming he probably could?

[ (b) (3) (A), (b) (6)]: I -- that's under my -- I don't know what he talks to the MAG CO about. I don't know if he does, but I would think that it would stop with my CO. And if he approves it then --

[ (b) (3) (A), (b) (6)]: You don't think you would get in trouble though?

[ (b) (3) (A), (b) (6)]: No. I don't think I would get in trouble at all. I think if you're making a safe choice, he'd actually be happy.

[ (b) (3) (A), (b) (6)]: Have you ever seen anybody get in trouble for --

[ (b) (3) (A), (b) (6)]: No, sir.
Have you ever -- has the CO, as your squadron commander, ever stood up in the ready room and said, "the next person that comes in here and says they can't fly because they're congested is out of my squadron."

Have you ever heard anything like that?

Absolutely not, sir.

Would you be shocked to hear something like that?

I would be. I would be shocked.

Yes. Okay. All right.

How many aerial refueling missions have you said you have flown? So how many times have you done AR?

Probably ten or so.

Out of those ten, when fixed wing aircraft approach, what echelon do you usually put them in?

Left.

Always?

Yes.

And after they're finished, how do you usually direct the aircraft?

So when we're all done with it, we should all usually be in the echelon right, unless we direct them elsewhere depending on where they want to depart. But, normally they have just joined echelon left, go through the baskets, and echelon right, and then we depart them depending on where they
want to go.

They will say we want to head South. We'll either
descend them or climb them 1,000 feet before they initiate any
turns. So we will say you're clear to depart to the South, climb
to 1,000 feet above before initiating any turns. And then
they'll say copy, see you.

[b](3) (A): Have you ever split a section of
fixed wing aircraft? So one on echelon right, one on echelon
left?

[b] (3) (A): Not that I remember. But, it's -- I'm
sure it has been done before.

[b] (3) (A): But, I'm saying in your experience.
[b] (6)
[b] (3) (A): No. No.
[b] (6)
[b] (3) (A): You're an aircraft commander or are
you a co-pilot?

[b] (3) (A): Aircraft commander, sir.
[b] (6)
[b] (3) (A): Would you be authorized at your
current qualification level to be the aircraft commander
conducting night systems low light level air refueling of fixed
wing aircraft? Do you have that code?

[b] (3) (A): I have that code. Yes, sir.
[b] (6)
[b] (3) (A): So you can go do that all by yourself?
[b] (6)
[b] (3) (A): I could go do that with another person
who was NSQ'd, so night system qualified and has that code. I'm
not a BIP, which is a Basic Instructor Pilot. I can't assign any
initial codes.
[b](3) (A): You couldn't teach it, but you could do it?

[b](3) (A): I could do it with another qualified pilot.

[b](3) (A): Okay. Would you feel comfortable doing that?

[b](3) (A): I would. Yes, sir.

[b](3) (A): Are you familiar with the document called the ATP-56?

[b](3) (A): Yes, sir.

[b](3) (A): What does that document say about night systems aerial refueling? Do you know? You know where the -- have you ever read a section in the ATP-56 that talks about night systems air refueling?

[b](3) (A): Yes, sir. A while ago.

[b](3) (A): What were some of the key components to that document?

[b](3) (A): So it's not very different from daytime. It's -- you have to maintain separation at least 1,000 feet until the jets are visual, so that's day or night. And then I would say it's not really conducted any much differently. I've never done it differently than I would in day and night. It's just you're on NVG's.

[b](3) (A): Are there different sections of the ATP-56 for fixed wing refueling and helicopter refueling, HAAR and fixed wing AAR?
No, sir.

What are -- are there differences between day and night for helicopter, HAAR, helicopter refueling or are they similar?

No. I think there's a night section.

There is. So there's a night and a night systems. So I'm breaking up the word night and night systems when we speak right now. So do you think that there is a night systems fixed wing section in the ATP-56?

I believe there is.

And do you feel like there's a night systems helicopter section in the ATP-56, as you recall?

Yes, sir.

That's some stuff that you would have been read, and taught, and discussed in your training to be prepared to be an aircraft commander?

Yes, sir.

For part of your NSQ.

Normally review it before you go on a flight too.

Okay. And there's -- clearly there's copies of current ATP-56's to be found in VMGR and V2 spaces?

Yes, sir.

Okay. All right. I think that's it. Is there anything you would like to add that I have skipped over. You can comment anything that you think is germane about this.
mishap. We really are committed to finding out where we can approve, not only documenting what happened, but, you know, where we can improve and any contributing factors. Anything on your mind, please.

[Redacted]: I don't have anything, sir.

[Redacted]: How do you feel about the culture of safety and the command climate with VMGR-152?

[Redacted]: I think it's really good. The CO, before the exercise, gave a brief for the exercise on Friday before the week, and the CO at the end of it stood up in front of the squadron and said, if this is training do not push it if you are uncomfortable. He specifically said, if it's weather or anything that you deem not safe, don't feel like you have to push it for this exercise.

[Redacted]: That's great.

[Redacted]: Nothing else, sir.

[Redacted]: Thank you, [Redacted]. The judge will swear you out.

[Redacted] was warned, sworn, and excused.}
[The interview opened at 1255, 26 January 2019.]

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : It is Thursday, January 24, 2019. We're in Iwakuni, Japan. I'm (b) (3) (A), (b) (6). I am assisted my (b) (3) (A), (b) (6) and (b) (3) (A), (b) (6), present in the room with (b) (3) (A), (b) (6). (b) (3) (A), (b) (6) is being interviwed as a witness.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6), please state your full name for the record, spelling your last name.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : (b) (3) (A), (b) (6).

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : (b) (3) (A), (b) (6), how would you like me to refer to you?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : is fine, sir.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Okay. (b) (3), what is your military occupational specialty?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : 2573, sir. I am a F-18 pilot. 2573 journalist -- excuse me, sir -- 7523, excuse me.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : When did you get your wings, (b) (3) ?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : It was the spring of 2016 in March I recall, sir.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : 3 of 16?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Yes, sir.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : And when did you complete the F-18 FRS?
It was June of 2017.

Where did you attend the F-18 FRS?

I was in Miramar.

Okay. When did you get to Iwakuni?

That same June, sir.

What is your job at the Bats?

I'm a schedules writer.

Did you write the schedule in the first week of December in 2018?

I did. Yes, sir.

Did you write the schedule for the mishap aircrew?

I did.

Do you understand that the tanker code is not on that flight schedule?

I do, sir.

Can you talk to me about that?

Yes, sir. To the best of my recollection, when we still had the seaside adca [ph] airspace. And we're planning on doing the cascode before we adjust to the times. We had canceled our tanker support. Subsequent to that, when the schedule was rewritten, I do not recall coordinating any tanker support for
the -- for that subsequent flight. And as such, did not put any tanker code on the schedule or any tanker coordination.

: Okay. Were you provided a flow document?

: We were provided a flow document, sir. We had deviated from that, to an extent, when we had scheduled the seaside adca [ph] for some cascodes. And that had been approved by the MAG. Subsequently, we were informed that day at the commanders -- the previous day when I was writing the schedule --

: Tuesday?

: Yes, sir.

: Okay.

: The fifth. -- was informed that we that we wouldn't be able to launch for the seaside adca [ph] due to some airspace restrictions. And then our subsequent launch was required to be after midnight to conform with those airspace restrictions. Subsequently, the MAG provided the coordination for the airspace and that's what made it on the schedule.

: Did the MAG tell you anything about a tanker?

: Not that I recall, sir.

: Were you surprised to learn that the mishap aircrew were tanking at the time?
The exercise that we were doing; things were fairly fluid with scheduling with the MAG and the weather and airfield availability on the [b](b), (b), (b), (b). So things had been changing to an extent and I was not surprised to hear that there was a tanker present even though I had not scheduled one.

Okay. Is it common to go do something that's not on the flight schedule?

I would not say that it's common, sir. It's not unheard of.

If somethings not on the flight schedule, in context were talking about, like, I think they were going for a night FAM. I think you had to downgrade them to a FAM when you got bumped to the itra [ph] south airspace I assume?

Yes, sir.

And then a tanker became available if you were the ODO or if you were in the flight, would you request a schedule change to add the tanker code?

As the ODO I would've brought it up to OPS, sir. And got the OPSO's recommendation. Whether he wanted to bring that to the CO to either get an okay from the commanding officer, to add that, or if he was not comfortable with just adding to the flight schedule doing a flight schedule change to add that code,
sir.

Do you feel like it's unusual that they went to the tanker without going through that process?

I can't say anything for certain, sir.

Well, my question is if you were the ODO or if you were in the flight, would you have wanted to add the code and seek the CO's approval for that or would you just go to the tank like it's no big deal?

I'm not a fight lead, sir, so I can't say his line of thought with going to the tanker even though it was unscheduled nor was I the ODO. So I can't say for certain what his thought was.

How do you verify that someone is current and qualified to go to the tanker?

As far as tanker currency goes, we have a hot board that has most of our currencies on it. As far as C-130 currency, sir, I don't believe that it was on the hot board that we had.

Do you know what the currency in rule is for a C-130 night tanking?

I believe it's 365 det. I'm not certain.

So what would you have to have done in
the previous 365 to go to the night tanker?

: I couldn't say for certain.

: Okay.

: What is your hot board? Is that like a white board that's in squadron spaces?

: So the hot board is a document that we use to track currencies -- dive currencies. Flight time within 30, 60, 90 days.

: And how's the information gathered onto the hot board? Who does that?

: The hot board is done by our operations clerks. And they provide that to the schedule officers every morning as a product to write the schedule with.

: So y'all don't actually look at the nav flares, you just rely on the hot board?

: Yes.

: It's the same data though.

: Okay.

: The nav flares -- everything goes through M Shark and the nav flares in M Shark input and hot board is an M Shark output.

: Rah, sir.
And before we go further, I just want you to know, I'm really sorry about your guys getting lost. I can see that you're upset. We're upset too and we're not out to get anybody in trouble, but I have to be very thorough with this investigation and, you know, ask people uncomfortable questions.

Understood, sir.

So it's just business.

Yes, sir.

Okay. Have you been in a night tanker?

I have, sir. Twice.

Tell me about that.

First time I went was in our exercise that we were doing in Australia, this summer, sir.

What month was that?

I believe when I went was in August, sir. I'd have to check my logbook for the exact date, but the exercise was August timeframe.

How many flights did you get?

I went to the tanker twice, sir. One plug each time.

Okay. Did you log into night systems tanker code?
Yes, sir. I believe I did. I'd have to check my nav flare to be certain about that.

So you went and got one plug. So you went to the night tanker for the first time, you got one plug, and you logged the code?

The first time I went to the night, sir, was at the FRF. We did the initial tanker code there.

Okay. So you brought that night code with you to the fleet okay. And then -- and you said you got here in June of 17?

Yes, sir.

So from June of 17 until August of 18 was the next time you went to the tanker --

I've been to the tanker --

-- night tanker?

-- night tanker. Yes, sir.

So I'd been more than 365 days since you went to the night tanker and how many flights did you think you had?

At the night tanker, sir?

Yes.

That -- on each flight just one. Just got gas for the voles that we were doing, sir.
(O) (3) (A), (b) (6): And then you logged the 2202 probably?

(O) (3) (A), (b) (6): I think so.

(O) (3) (A), (b) (6): Or you should have.

(O) (3) (A), (b) (6): I should have, sir.

(O) (3) (A), (b) (6): Okay. Do you recall what type of flight supervision you had to have with you to go do that?

(O) (3) (A), (b) (6): I don't recall what we had with us, sir. That was something that I do recall came up in our brief in Australia; was whether I could go to the night tanker in conjunction with another flight. We had some of the mots eyes peas with us there. And they looked over the TNR and talked about it with all the mots eye peas and came to the determination that a thorough brief would suffice for any sort of preparation and that that was okay.

(O) (3) (A), (b) (6): Tell me about your brief.

(O) (3) (A), (b) (6): In the brief, sir, we covered tanker procedures, joint procedures and especially optical illusions, the lighting that we were going to use on the tanker, and then any sort of contingencies about how we could mitigate closure --

(O) (3) (A), (b) (6): Do you think (O) (3) (A) would have received a similar brief since you guys are similar in timeframe?

(O) (3) (A), (b) (6): I would've thought so, sir. I can't say, specifically, any brief that he would have received.
(2) (3) (A), (b) (6): Did you wear the ANVS-11s?

(2) (3) (A), (b) (6): I did, sir.

(2) (3) (A), (b) (6): Did you -- how many hours do you have in the goggles?

(2) (3) (A), (b) (6): I couldn't say for certain, sir. Most of my night time has been flown on the 11s.

(2) (3) (A), (b) (6): 20 hours, 50 hours, 100 hours?

(2) (3) (A), (b) (6): I would say over 20. Probably between 20 and 40, sir.

(2) (3) (A), (b) (6): Okay. And how many hours roughly do you think you had the ANVS-9s or -8s?

(2) (3) (A), (b) (6): Less then 10, sir.

(2) (3) (A), (b) (6): And why did you -- so you few a couple hours with the 9 are the FRS, right?

(2) (3) (A), (b) (6): I did at the FRS, sir. And then I did my initial NS qual here with the 9s.

(2) (3) (A), (b) (6): Why is that? Why didn't you just go straight to the 11s?

(2) (3) (A), (b) (6): They didn't have them available for me yet, sir.

(2) (3) (A), (b) (6): And then when you transitioned from the 9s to the 11s, what kind of training did you get?
We sat down with our NS systems quals over there and they gave a very detailed brief about the specifics of the [inaudible] s. The lack of visual acuity that you can have. How you can have the [inaudible] flip upside down and some of the mitigating things that you can do for that.

Can you talk about the differences in performance between highlight level and lowlight level and between the [b] and the [b] s?

Yes. That was discussed. I think the big point there being that the [b] s don't quite add the same acuity which means you get a bigger visual bloom with them from any sort of light sources, is usually what comes up in the briefs, sir.

Okay. Do you have a dry, suit?

I do. Yes, sir.

How many times have you worn it?

Probably two or three, sir.

When was the last time?

The last time I flew over water, sir.

When was that?

It's been over a month ago now, sir.

So you wore your dry suit in the month of November or December?
It was December, sir.

So right before the mishap?

It was post mishap, sir.

Okay. And what led you to decide to wear the dry suit or who directed you to wear the dry suit?

We checked the water temperature, sir. I recall the last that we did it they were still within the OPNAV limits for the acceptable to not wear it, but they were fairly low and considering the mishap that just occurred we, as a flight, elected to wear the dry suits.

Okay. Tell me about available search and rescue in Iwakuni.

Available search and rescue, sir, usually all that is coordinated through the Japanese Air Self-Defense Force on base there. That's one of our first calls per our procedures is to push out to them.

Okay. And so you have that phone number at the ODO desk?

Yes, sir. We do.

Tell me about their typical response time or their advertised response time.

Sir, I believe it's somewhere in the
neighborhood of an hour to an hour and a half to get a flying boat down to the Iterria [ph] South. Longer if they need to utilize a helicopter.

: Are they night vision qualified capable?

: I'm not sure they are, sir.

: Okay. For the helicopters, are they hoist equipped?

: I believe, just based on what we learn in the mishap, sir, now that they are. I did not know a lot of the details about their capabilities before the mishap.

: Okay. Before the mishap --

: Yes, sir.

: -- what was your understanding about how long it would take a search and rescue asset to arrive on scene in the middle of the Iterra South to pick somebody up [inaudible].

: My personal understanding, sir, was somewhere in the neighborhood of an hour and a half to two hours.

: Okay. Based on your training, have you been to SERE school?

: I have not, sir.

: Why have you not been to SERE school?

: When we were getting orders, myself and
we were about the same timeframe, there was a push to get us out here quickly. And the squadron elected to forego that.

: When are you going to SERE school?

: I do not know, sir.

: Do you understand that SERE school is a requirement for personnel with higher risk of isolation like yourself?

: Yes, sir. I do.

: Have you brought that to your commanding officer's attention?

: It came up several months ago, sir. There was a survey that went out looking for personnel who had not attended SERE school. I'm not sure if it was brought to his attention specifically.

: Have you requested to attend SERE school?

: I have not, sir.

: Has gone to SERE school?

: I do not know, sir.

: Have you gone to aviation survival training in the HELO dunker?

: I have. Yes, sir.
When's the last time?

Last time was just subsequent to myself coming out. I initially had failed a portion of it just prior to coming out here to Iwakuni, sir. And had the 90 day refresh requirement on that. Subsequently went back to Mirmar post our Australia dep just after getting out here and completed it.

Good for you. It's gonna be tough. I've done it a lot and it's harder every time.

I'm not a very good swimmer, sir. It's tough every time.

What is your understanding of the time of useful consciousness that you would experience, based on your body composition, in 68-degree water without an anti-exposure suit?

I can't say for certain, sir.

What's your understanding of the time of survival you would experience with your body type in 68-degree water without an anti-exposure suit?

I'm not certain, sir.

Have you had any training going on?

Yes, sir. It's come up. I can't say right now what it would be.

Okay. If you were going to go do a
flight at 2 o'clock in the morning, 200 miles offshore, in 68-degree water, would you come without a dry suit?

: Not post-mishap, sir?

: The context is pretty --

: Yes, sir. Pre-mishap, I can't say for certain. I hadn't worn the dry suit previous to that, sir.

: Okay. So you've never worn a dry suit before the mishap?

: I had not, sir. No.

: Okay. So you flew out of Iwakuni in December of 17 and you didn't wear a dry suit?

: No, sir. I did not.

: So if I was to say the environmental conditions were strong, similar to the way they were on December 15?

: Yes, sir.

: Did you ever fly in the Intra South?

: I don't recall, sir.

: Did you ever fly over water?

: I don't recall specific flights last year, sir.

: Okay. What crew were you on for the MAG ULT? Day?
I was on the day crew, sir.

The day crew.

Yes, sir.

Why were you selected for day crew?

I don't know, sir.

Okay. Was there any discussion about the use of go or no-go pills?

It came up during the brief that we received the Thursday prior, sir.

And what was your understanding of the instructions provided by your commanding officer with regard to the use of go and no-go pills?

That we would not utilize them, sir.

Did you utilize them?

I did not. No, sir.

Do you have them?

I have never used them, sir.

Okay.

So you don't have any go or no-go pills?

I do not.

They were never issued to you?

No. I've never been issued. I didn't take
the sample pill at the trial either.

Did they actually give you those pills or --

There was a trial done last year. I didn't take part in it.

Okay.

So let's go back to the ANVS-11. I want to know if you received any specific training about the capabilities and the limitations between the ANVS-9 and ANVS-11?

When I began utilizing them, we did sit down and have a brief with some of our night systems qualified instructions there, sir. I don't recall, specifically, what the name of that training was.

Okay. Were you told that the ANVS-11 performs better or worse in lowlight level conditions than the ANVS-9?

We were told that it preforms worse generally, sir.

Okay. Were you -- were there any discussions about, perhaps, during certain lowlight level conditions an aircrew may elect to wear the ANVS-9 in lieu of the ANVS-11 given consideration to the mission?

I know that some aircrew do prefer them in
lower light level conditions, sir. I tend to wear the [D]s.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): Okay. And why is that?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): They are a light system. That are easier to focus. And generally it's just more mobile and I feel like my situational awareness is better when I can move my head around and see what's happening during the flight.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): Okay. What is your uncorrected vision?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): 20/20, sir.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): Okay. Is there anything that you feel contributed to this mishap that we haven't talked on that you'd like to discuss or bring up?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): Nothing, sir.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): You sure?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): Yes, sir.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): If we could do it all over again, what would you do differently?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): I think specifically, sir, I would have really preferred if we had a lot more flight time. I don't feel like our people where receiving the flight time, pre-mishap, that they needed to be proficient. A lot of that boils down to the aircraft availability and scheduling beforehand. I think that is the main thing I would change, sir.
So how many hours have you flown in the last six months?

In the last six months, 33, sir.

So in six months, you've only flown 33 hours?

Yes, sir.

So do you know what the Marine Corps position is on how many hours you need per month to be safe?

I don't recall, sir.

Would you believe me if I told you it was 15.7 hours per month?

I recall now hearing that, sir.

So, math in public, 6 times 15.7, I think, is -- that's 90, right?

Yes, sir.

So 90 hours is the Marine Corps position on the minimal number of flight hours you have to have per month [sic] to be safe to fly. And you said you have how many?

Just over 30, sir.

So you have less than half of the minimum hours the Marine Corps says to be safe for fly? Is that what you think is true?
(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): As I understand. Yes, sir.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): How do you guys mitigate that?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): Day-to-day, sir?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): Yes.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): We try to -- if people are not current and proficient, get them out on the low tasking flights.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): What about simulator utilization? It's pretty high?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): Simulator is high as we can make it, sir. The simulators here, specifically with the operators, are not very capable with replicating the missions that we're tasked to conduct.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): Can you go to the tanker in the simulator?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): No, sir.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): Can you -- do you have a night systems simulated air refueling code in the hornet?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): Not that I have ever connected here, sir.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): I mean, you write the schedule. You must be familiar with the TNR?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): I have never scheduled that here, sir.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): Okay. What tanker codes are you familiar with in the TNR?
The one that we pay the most attention to, I would say, sir, is the strap tanking code for transpacks, things like that.

And what number is associated with that?

I can't recall, sir.

Could it be 6111?

It could be, sir.

Okay. Did you fly with much?

With, at least a handful of occasions.

And how did that go?

It went well, sir.

Okay. Do you feel like he's a decent WISSO? Was on the ball. Did a good job preparing? Just being in the flight?

Personally, sir, I've always considered him to be very good WISSO.

Okay. That's what I'm asking. Is there anything else you'd like to share with us that you think would help us?

Nothing I can think of, sir.

You seem a little upset. Is there
something else you want to talk about?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): No, sir. No. This just strikes close to home. He was very, very close to me. Good friends.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): We're really sorry about that and we want to do it justice for this investigation.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): Yes, sir.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): Okay. Judge will swear you out.

[The interview closed at 1443, 24 January 2019.]
[The interview opened at 0952, 29 March 2019.]

: All right. Today is the 26th of March. It's a few minutes before 1300. We're in Iwakuni, Japan. I am , assisted by and . We're interviewing .

, can you, please, state your full name for the record, spelling your last name?

: ,

: How would you like me to refer to you during this interview?

: [ph] is my call sign. That's fine, sir.

: ?

: Yes, sir.

: Okay. , you can call me or sir. What is your MOS, ?

: 7523, sir.

: Okay. And what is that?

: That's a Marine Corps hornet pilot, F-18 pilot.

: How long have you been a 7523?

: 17 years -- 16 years.

: Okay. About how many hours do you have in the hornet?

: A through D about 2500. E and F about 200,
Tell me about some of your key qualifications in the F-18.

I'm a division lead MDTI so I went to MDTC. And I was a FACA [ph], not current, FCF. Those are the big ones, sir.

Tell me about your key deployments in the F-18.

I did West PAC way back when. And then I did OIF in the F-18. I did OIF as a FAC. And then I did Afghanistan in the F-18.

Okay. What was your billet in the squadron in December of 2018?

I was the executive officer, sir.

Okay. As the executive officer, what were your key functions and responsibilities as the squadron XO?

I saw myself as the chief of staff. So managing key department heads, your S-1s through your S-6s. And being a conduit for information for the CO. Also managing a lot of personnel. So working, you know, the not so good side of -- disciplinary side of that as well as working with orders, Fitreps, the admin side as well for the officers and working with the sergeant major.

What were your specific roles and responsibilities with regard to the safety program as the executive officer?
I'm the head of the safety program. And then so I work with the DOSS and the ASO and work with them. Make sure they have a voice with the CO.

What specific roles and responsibilities do you have with regard to flight schedule development as the executive officer?

Not as much. It's mostly handled on the ops side. Operations takes care of the majority of that. So it doesn't get routed through me.

The flight schedule is not routed through you?

No, sir.

How long were you the XO at 242 before the mishap?

About five months, sir.

So you took over about the same time did?

About six weeks later.

Okay.

So it was gapped.

Okay. And so in your time as the XO for about four to five months before the mishap, how often was the flight schedule brought to you for review before the commanding officer saw it?

Not often, sir. Minimal. Mostly when the schedule writer would do his normal walk and then he'd take it to
You say, "the schedule writer would do his normal walk." What does that mean?

He'd make sure S-5 would see it.

And what is S-5? Is that safety?

Yes, sir.

Okay.

Obviously it wouldn't leave ops if the Ops O didn't see it and then the maintenance office.

So you feel like the Ops O and the AMO always saw the flight schedule or usually should see the flight schedule before the commanding officer did?

Yes, sir.

Do you believe that was taking place?

As far as I knew, sir.

Okay. Where was you -- what was your location the week of 5 December? Were you here in Iwakuni?

I was, sir.

What were your roles and responsibilities with regard to the execution of the ULT?

So my big part was -- I was working with out maintenance chief and our sergeant major for [inaudible], tracking our Marines, getting them out to It was very tenuous. Are they going? Are they not going? Are they going? Are they not going? You know, are we sending jets to . So if we're not sending jets to , then I'm not going to send
the Marines. And so it was still -- a lot of uncertainty if we're going to up till nearly Thursday, Friday, the week prior.

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6): What was the consensus of that uncertainty? Why was there uncertainty?

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6): I don't think they had the clearance. I'm not sure. I was working mostly through MAG and I don't know, at the time --

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6): It was like a PPR thing? Was it a resting gear? Was it billeting?

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6): Resting gear I know was part of it. And then as far as everything else, I gotta kind of stop there, sir.

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6): Okay.

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6): Tweaking into --

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6): Getting into A and B stuff?

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6): Yes, sir.

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6): Okay. So I'm just trying to ask you what you knew before. It's just hard for you to break that out for you at this point?

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6): Yes, sir.

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6): It's been a few months. Okay.

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6): A lot of uncertainty --

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6): Okay. You can stop there. Lets talk about your personal knowledge of the mishap crew. Your personal knowledge of that crew pre-mishap of the case. Try to devoice yourself of everything you've heard after the mishap.
Okay.

Pre-mishap. So it's December the 1st.

Yes, sir.

Did you know the mishap F-18 crew?

I did, sir.

Okay. Great. Did you participate in the human factors counsel process at 242?

No, sir.

Okay. So as the squadron executive officer you did not participate in the human factors counsel?

That's correct, sir.

Did you see the human factors counsel scheduled on your plan of the day or plan of week or daily flight schedule?

It's on the schedule. Yes, sir.

Okay. How often did it meet?

At least once a month.

Okay. And who attended?

The commanding officer, ASO was there, DOSS, a random aircrew, and there might have been another person or two, sir.

Flights surgeon ever go?

Yes, sir.

Okay. Did -- and without talking -- did you -- let me ask a different question. Were you cognizant of the different crews that were selected by the shift crews? I'm
talking about who was day crew, who was afternoon crew, and who was flying the graveyard shift for the week of the ULT?

[b] (3) (A). (b) (6): It was in the confirmation brief.

[b] (3) (A). (b) (6): Okay. So you were provided some type of confirmation brief product that told the aircrew what shifts they were on?

[b] (3) (A). (b) (6): Yes, sir.

[b] (3) (A). (b) (6): Okay. And what shift were you on?

[b] (3) (A). (b) (6): I was on the mid-shift, sir.

[b] (3) (A). (b) (6): The mid-shift. And that's like a 10 a.m. report?

[b] (3) (A). (b) (6): Anywhere from 8 to 10, sir.

[b] (3) (A). (b) (6): Okay. And then you would be flying until crew day limits, 10 p.m. or whatever is appropriate?

[b] (3) (A). (b) (6): Yes, sir.

[b] (3) (A). (b) (6): Okay. And how soon did you personally get that information for your own personal knowledge?

[b] (3) (A). (b) (6): I got that the week prior. I can't remember what day.

[b] (3) (A). (b) (6): Wednesday or Thursday before?

[b] (3) (A). (b) (6): Yes, sir.

[b] (3) (A). (b) (6): Okay. And was that provided? Did you guys have an AOM and everybody was told, "hey, [b] (3), you're day crew. [b] (3), you're night crew. [b] (3), you're mid-crew." Is that how that was briefed out?

[b] (3) (A). (b) (6): Yes, sir.
So what level of involvement did you have in selecting who was on what crew by shift. Who was on what shift?

I did not select the crew, sir. I did not have involvement in how the crew were selected?

Who did?

The Ops O.

So you feel like unilaterally selected who was flying when acting as the squadron Ops O?

With engaging with the CO, sir.

So you think the CO and the Ops O? Or the Ops O with the CO's guidance?

Yes, sir.

Okay. But you personally were not involved in that process --

Correct, sir.

-- as the squadron executive officer and the guy that runs the safety program for the squadron? You weren't invited to that meeting basically?

Yes, sir.

Okay. Did you know or come to know that was on the graveyard shift?

Yes, sir.

Were you aware of that before the mishap? I mean were you tracking that before the mishap?

Yes, sir.
Okay. Did that give you any pause?

It did not, sir.

Why -- how would you expect to get to and from work?

Drive, sir.

You expect to operate a POV on board Marine Corps Air Station, Iwakuni on December the 5th and drive to and from work on the 6th?

Yes, sir.

Okay. As the squadron executive officer, you wouldn't have nay concern about that? About him driving a car?

No, sir.

Okay. Let's talk about Ambien. Was the use of Ambien authorized?

No, sir.

How did you come to understand that the use of Ambien was not authorized?

Via the WhatsApp which -- that you guys have, sir. You see that's how I was made --

That's how you guys communicated?

That's how that word -- that's how I first heard it, sir.

Did you have any questions about that? Was it unclear to you?

It seemed pretty strait forward to me, sir.
Did you get any feedback from any of your subordinate officers? Did anybody come to you and be like hey XO this is bullshit, we need Ambien?

No, sir.

Did anybody come to you and express safety concerns about ramping from the day crew to the night crew on four days notice and the use of Ambien associated with that?

Did anybody talk to you before the mishap?

had mentioned the -- it was like an off-hand comment. "Hey, no Ambien?" And I was like, "no." And that was --

Was this in the ready room? He just kind of wandered up to you and said, "XO, no Ambien?" shrugged his shoulders? Is that what you're describing?

It's kind of how I would --

Something like that?

Yes, sir.

Okay. And how much further did that conversation go after that?

That was it.

Did you probe him on that or ask him about if he had safety concerns or --

I did not, sir.

Do you remember when that happened?

Was it prior to the mishap, sir?
Yes.

And was it after the WhatsApp message went out?

I can't be sure.

Okay. Did you have any personal observations of things leading up directly to the mishap flight event? Did you -- were you in the ready room the day of the mishap -- the day before the mishap and having conversations with, or

We overlap by about an hour.

Okay. Did you see those guys?

I did, sir.

Okay.

And was out, you know, doing his -- I'd see him in his office working S-4 things. I don't remember seeing very often. I'm sorry.

sir. And then I saw in the ready room and he was QAO. So he spent a lot of time downstairs as well.

What was job in the squadron?

He was the ALSS, sir.

ALSS, flight E?

Flight E. Yes, sir.

What was his -- do you remember what his job was before he was flight E?

He was the adjutant?
When about -- what month and year did he turn over adjutant?

It would have been November I believe, sir.

So he just turned over?

Correct, sir. He had not been down there very long.

Okay.

And then October, November, we did, kind of, a job shift when we got back from Australia. It would have been about that time.

Okay. What was your personal participation in the scheduling process at the MAG? Did you go to any MAG confirmation briefs leading up to the ULT?

I had gone to a couple of the COBs, sir.

Tell me about them.

I had been to one on Thursday prior and that's where I'd -- we still don't have confirmation on So I was interested in that. And that's the thing that sticks out. It's been a little while now. I can't really -- I don't know what else to talk about there. And then I had, lets see, been to one next Monday, afternoon, and nothing really sticks out from that one, sir.

Were you surprised to learn that the mishap aircrew were conducting an air refueling during the mishap, or did you expect them to go to the tanker that night? When you found out later that they had hit the C-130, where you
surprised to learn that they were tanking or did you expect them to go to the hanger then?

: I had heard about it, sir.

: You had heard about the schedule change?

: The -- yes, sir.

: How did you hear about the -- before the mishap you did?

: Yes, sir.

: How did you hear about that? Tell me about that.

: I had passed in the hall --

: At about what time? After the brief? Before take off obviously? Or before the brief or --

: It had been before the brief, sir.

: Okay. So after got to work, but before briefed, you passed in the hall and you guys had an exchange? Tell me about that.

: It was just about a tank -- tanker or something.

: And how did you respond to that?

: I just said, "roger."

: Okay. Did it occur to you that we needed to do a flight schedule change then or that you, as the squadron executive officer, needed to approve that flight schedule change?

: The way it was presented to me is it was information that the approval process had already occurred
because he didn't, you know, stop and ask me.

...: He just told you he was going to the tanker.

...: Right.

...: He didn't ask you if he could go to the tanker. He told you we're going to the tanker.

...: He said, kind of like --

...: Am I understanding you right?

...: I guess.

...: He didn't come up to you and say XO is it okay if we change the flight schedule and go to the tanker?

...: Exactly.

...: He said, "we got tankers tonight." and just kept walking? And you're like --

...: Yes, sir.

...: I don't want to coach you too much on that, but I know you're on the A and B so I don't want to probe too deeply on that key point. So after you got that information, did you go to the ODO and look at the master flight schedule at the ODO desk and confirm that the process had been followed?

...: I went to, I was going to a meeting with the 225 XO and --

...: Over at MAG or --

...: It was back to my office -- and then the 225 XO --

...: Okay.
--- for about an hour.  

And then after that meeting, did you swing by the ODO desk and check on your ODO?  

I popped in there, checked on the guys.  

Okay. and when you checked on the ODO knowing that there was a flight schedule change before the brief mishap event, what action did you take as the squadron executive officer?  

That were I just saw the guys. Saw how they were doing. And then --  

By "the guys" do you mean the mishap crew was already in the ready room briefing or preparing to brief?  

There before.  

Okay.  

And like how's everybody doing? Doing good, doing good. And then I could feel they were getting in their zone so then I walked out.  

And about what time of day was that?  

It would have been 2200, sir.  

So you were in the squadron spaces at about 2200?  

Yes, sir.  

Is that right before your retired to your quarters for the evening?  

I was back in my office, sir.  

Okay. How late did you stay in your
office that night?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): Probably 2330, sir.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): So you stayed in your office until they walked to go fly basically, right? Because they didn't take -- they started engines, I think, after -- or APUs after midnight. so, roughly, you were in -- and had you heard, at that time, about the restrictions about starting APUs?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): Yes, sir.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): And the restrictions about starting APUs, as I understand it from other witnesses, is nobody was supposed to go through switches until after midnight.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): That is correct, sir.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): Okay. But you left before then. You said 2330 is when you left?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): Right around ish. Yes, sir.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): Okay. Who was the operations duty officer at about 2330 or 2300 when you left?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): That would have been (b) (3) (A), (b) (6). And with you as the squadron executive officer and the senior man present, did you go by and check in or check out with (b) (3) (A), (b) (6)?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): I did not, sir.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): Okay. What kind of weather were you tracking?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): That it was good weather.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): Okay. What were you tracking about sea
surface temperatures at that time?

(b)(3)(A),(b)(6): At that time -- I wasn't tracking sea surface temperatures at that time.

(b)(3)(A),(b)(6): What were you tracking about search and rescue alert disposition at that time?

(b)(3)(A),(b)(6): I wasn't tracking at that time, sir.

(b)(3)(A),(b)(6): What were you tracking about your aircrew wear of anti-exposure suits at that time?

(b)(3)(A),(b)(6): I wasn't tracking at that time.

(b)(3)(A),(b)(6): Okay. Did you -- when [b](3) told you they were going to the tanker, did you ever go back and look at the squadron master flight schedule and see if it reflected the night systems air refueling code and or a tanker note? Before the mishap, did you do that?


(b)(3)(A),(b)(6): Did it ever occur to you to do that before the mishap?


(b)(3)(A),(b)(6): Do you consider that to be a schedule change; adding a tanker. Do you consider that to be a schedule change before the mishap?

(b)(3)(A),(b)(6): I would've thought it would have been a schedule change.

(b)(3)(A),(b)(6): Who's authorized to make a schedule change in a hornet squadron?

(b)(3)(A),(b)(6): Per the Wing order at CO, per the admin SOP,
it's CO, XO. And MAG just put out a new policy; it's CO only.

(b)(3)(A), (b)(6): Okay. Who signs the flight schedule at 242, pre-mishap?

(b)(3)(A), (b)(6): Commanding officer.

(b)(3)(A), (b)(6): Anybody else sign it?

(b)(3)(A), (b)(6): No, sir.

(b)(3)(A), (b)(6): NSO, XO, Ops O? Anybody else?

(b)(3)(A), (b)(6): Not on the flight schedule.

(b)(3)(A), (b)(6): How does the commanding officer know that his flight schedule has been reviewed by the aviation safety officer?

(b)(3)(A), (b)(6): There's usually a routing sheet in the back, sir.

(b)(3)(A), (b)(6): Okay. Have you seen this routing sheet before in the past?

(b)(3)(A), (b)(6): In the past, I have not, sir.

(b)(3)(A), (b)(6): So you believe there's a routing sheet, but you've never seen the routing sheet?

(b)(3)(A), (b)(6): Okay. Did anybody ever bring you the flight schedule and have you check it before it went to

(b)(3)(A), (b)(6): No, sir.

(b)(3)(A), (b)(6): Have you guys ever used a risk assessment worksheet at 242 -- ORM worksheet?

(b)(3)(A), (b)(6): Like the one that goes per flight, sir?

(b)(3)(A), (b)(6): I'm thinking the ones at MAG-11, MAG-14,
MAG-31, MAG-13, MAG-24, MAG-26. The risk assessment worksheets that many other MAGs in the Marine Corps use. Did you ever use a risk assessment worksheet like that at MAG-12 at 242?

: No, sir.

: What other MAGs have you flown in?

: Just MAG-11.

: Okay. Did MAG-11 have risk assessment worksheets?

: They did, sir.

: Can you tell me a little bit about that?

: It would have -- the schedule writer would usually fill it out and, for each event, it would go down and it would put the -- it was either number based. And then I believe the [inaudible] Ops O would sign it or -- I can't remember if the Ops O or the CO would sign it. It's been a while since I flown with MAG-11.

: Okay. And what month and year did you come to MAG-12?

: In July of 18.

: July of 18. So you just got here.

: Yes, sir.

: So when you checked into MAG-12 in July of 18 and you started flying with 242. The first time that you looked at the flight schedule, especially as a flight leader, were you asking the ODO, like, hey man, where's the risk assessment worksheet? Did you notice it's absence?
I did see that it wasn't there. I did not ask.

Okay. Did you, when you were in gun squadrons at MAG-11, did any of those squadrons at MAG-11 have a place on the daily flight schedule where the aviation safety officer, the executive officer, the operations officer, the aviation maintenance officer, or the ordinance officer initialed the flight schedule?

Usually I saw it was ASO and, I believe, the Ops O.

You never saw the aviation maintenance officer sign the flight schedule? You never saw maintenance initials on the flight schedule?

It's been a little while. I can't remember if they had a maintenance officer sign or not.

Okay. What squadron were you in in MAG-11?

232 and 121, sir.

Okay. Judge, what do you got?

No questions, sir.

Did you ever fly with ?

I did once, sir.

How did he do.

Actually, pretty well.

Did you ever fly with ?

I did.
How did he do?

It was -- I did not notice any discrepancies. We flew one flight. We dropped ordInance on Australia. And handled the pod well, handled comms. No TCC issues.

Did you ever fly with ?

I did not, sir.

As the -- you said earlier that you're the squadron XO so you handled kind of the personnel stuff and discipline stuff and fitrep stuff. So kind of the officer development stuff. So if a company grade officer was having a hard time, you know, either legally or having a hard time at home or having some kind of problem. Would that be something that you would, perhaps, deal with?

Yes, sir.

Okay. Did you, were you helping, with out getting into detail, were you helping with any challenges in his personal life?

That was -- I understand my [inaudible]. That's all.

All right. So here's what I'm asking you, before the mishap where you helping with any personal, administrative, or legal matters?

I was not, sir.

Okay. Let get into before the mishap. Were you helping with any personal, administrative, or legal matters? before the mishap?


(b)(3)(A),(b)(6): So you weren't tracking any legal issues or any administrative issues with (b)(3)(A),(b)(6)?


(b)(3)(A),(b)(6): Were you cognizant of (b)(3)(A),(b)(6) and (b)(3)(A),(b)(6) career progression in the Marine Corps?

(b)(3)(A),(b)(6): I knew (b)(3)(A),(b)(6) [sic] was 1P'd.


(b)(3)(A),(b)(6): I meant (b)(3)(A),(b)(6) had been 1P'd.

(b)(3)(A),(b)(6): Okay. What about (b)(3)(A),(b)(6)? Did you know that he had been passed over or had he been passed over at that time?

(b)(3)(A),(b)(6): He was not eligible for promotion.

(b)(3)(A),(b)(6): (b)(3)(A),(b)(6) was not eligible for promotion; is that what you believe to be true?


(b)(3)(A),(b)(6): So how many years, commissioned service, roughly, does (b)(3)(A),(b)(6) have?

(b)(3)(A),(b)(6): Four to five.

(b)(3)(A),(b)(6): (b)(3)(A),(b)(6) only have five years commissioned service? So you think that (b)(3)(A),(b)(6) got commissioned in, approximately, 2014 or 2015?


(b)(3)(A),(b)(6): Okay. And you don't think that (b)(3)(A),
has been passed over for promotion to major?

: Correct, sir.

: Okay. What about? How was his professional development going? Professionally, how was he doing? Any concerns?

: No, sir.

: Okay. Had taken a physical test recently? PFT? Did he run a PFT or a CFT pre-mishap, recently?

: I'm not sure when the last one he had run, sir.

: Do you know if he passed or failed his PFT or CFT recently?

: If he had failed, I probably would have know about it.

: Judge?

: No, sir.

: Is there anything outside your privileged exposure that you'd like to add to this interview or to my investigative efforts to help me understand what happened and why?

: This whole experience has been humbling. I've learned a lot. It caused myself to have a lot of self reflection. And so I take what I've learned from this unfortunate incident and move forward.

: Is there anyone else that you'd recommend
that I speak with? Is there anyone that you know that wants to talk to me that I haven't talked to or anything else you think I need to look at?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): Not that I can think of, sir.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): Judge will swear you out.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): Please, stand up, raise your right hand. Do you swear that the statement you provided is the truth to the best of your knowledge?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): Yes.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): And, sir, we ask that you not discuss anything that you talked about with us today other than with your A and B personnel just because we continue our investigation.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): Okay.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): Thank you, sir.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): Thank you.

[The interview closed at 1021, 29 March 2019.]
Today is Friday the 25th of January, 2019. We're in Iwakuni, Japan. I'm assisted by Judge Advocate and Court Reporter.

The next interviewee is , please state your full name for the record, spelling your last name. It's .

And, how would you like me to refer to you during this interview? is fine.

, okay. , you can call me or sir, okay?

Yes, sir.

, what is your current job in the Marine Corps? What's your billet?

Commanding Officer of VMGR-152.

How long have you been in command at 152?

Since June 15th of this past year.

What is your MOS?

7557, Aircraft Commander, KC-130s.
How long have you been a C-130 pilot?
Since 2002.

Roughly how many hours do you have in the Herc?
Thirty-five hundred.

What qualifications and designations do you hold in that Herc?
I hold the Weapons Tactics Instructor, WTI; Division Lead; Assistant NATOPS Instructor; Fleet Replacement Squadron Instructor.

Are you a night systems instructor as well?
I was. That qual expired, and since coming back, with me being in the current position as commanding officer it takes more of a work-up to get it done than see -- the juice wasn't worth the squeeze.

But you've been previously designated?
I have.

Roughly, how many hours do you have on night vision goggles?
I'd say about 600.

Where were you in December of 2018?
December, I was here in Iwakuni.

Here in Iwakuni the whole time? What was your squadron doing in the first few weeks of December of '18?

We were doing the MAG ULT exercise.

Tell me about that. The purpose of it, at the unclassified level.

It started out as Vigilant Ace and then I know it switched to the [inaudible] one of her few different names and then switched down to the MAG ULT and basically testing different plans. As you said, keep it on the unclass here so just --

So basically, under the mission of the VMGR, you were providing assault support transport from here to other bases as well as providing air refueling?

Absolutely.

Okay. Did you attend or participate in any coordination meetings at the MAG level where you coordinated your roles and responsibilities with the roles and responsibilities of adjacent squadrons?

I was at at least one meeting before that.

Like a confirmation or a CUB [ph] or
anything like that?

: Confirmation brief actually I was not at. I believe I was flying that day -- a local mission. But I did have my XO in attendance, [ph], as well as the Ops O attended a lot of those meetings as well as our planner for that which is [ph].

: Were you surprised to learn that your aircrew was conducting air refueling on the night of the mishap?

: I was not surprised.

: How did you know that they were going to be tanking that night?

: It was briefed to me previously. I knew, kind of, the flows for the week of what we were going to be doing. It was on the flight schedule.

: Tell me about your flight schedule. So you're the squadron commander. You sign this flight schedule?

: I do.

: And when you sign a flight schedule, what kind of information are you reviewing?

: I'm reviewing all of it as, kind of, the last, the final sanity check. But it goes through lots of checks and balances before it gets me. So it goes through air crew
training initially, gets viewed by them seeing if people are unproficient in codes, et cetera, if they need to be signed for the aircraft, not signed for the aircraft or if instructors need to be on the aircraft. Next it goes to our DOSS, our DOSS reviews that, we use both MSHARP 2.0 as well as they have their own tracker that we're starting to lean off of since MSHARP is getting to be a better product. Initially, there were some rubs with that but they view for the same reasons to make sure we have qualified people on there instructing, et cetera. And then next, it goes to the Ops O and it also goes to the maintenance officer and then it comes to me. So there's four -- yeah, I believe it's four -- initials on there.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) (b) (3) (A), (b) (6): How do you come to understand -- you said initials, so are you presented with a document that has other people's initials on it?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): it goes through them first before it gets to me.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): So your flight schedule has blocks at the bottom with initials --

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): It does.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): -- for the safety maintenance and training on it?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): It does.
Oh you brought an example, you're presenting that to me?

I always carry this with me so it is.

He has an example of the flight schedule for the 25th of January and I can see at the bottom it says ACT, which is Air Crew Training; DOSS, Department of Safety and Standardization; Operations; and Maintenance; and in the bottom right-hand corner it actually has your signature. So when you're presented with this document, you're certain that four of your lead supervisors in this squadron have reviewed this flight schedule and you're effectively the fifth supervisor and the final supervisor that signs off on it?

Yes, sir.

Okay. And I'm looking at your schedule for some few things. You have one block in here that T&R, what does that mean?

Training Readiness.

And underneath that I see a list of four digit numbers. Here's an example of a T&R code, 6120. What is that code, do you know?

That's an EP review, so they're
going in the sim to do emergency procedures.

: So when -- and I have your flight schedules from the mishap, of course, but we don't have them here in front of me, but when your crews go out to conduct night air refueling, is there a T&R code associated with that?

: There is.

: Do you know that code off the top of your head?

: I believe it's 3550.

: Would it be normal for you to have a flight schedule that excluded that code and they went out and did refueling anyway?

: No. If we're flying a CAT mission, so if we're flying just basically a point A to point B mission hauling cargo --

: What does CAT stand for? I'm not familiar.

: A Combat Assault Transport.


: Yeah. If I'm doing just a transport mission, in fact, I flew that plane before the mishap crew flew that plane because Hazi [ph] was the turnaround. But anyway, I flew a
CAT mission up to (D)(6), and -- just hauling cargo up there. There was no code associated with that for me because that's not a -- that's really not a T&R code for us, unless we're doing EP's, if that's already planned or whatever, then we have a 6120. But no codes associated with that so there was nothing next to my name.

(D)(3)(A), (B)(6): If you were scheduled for a transport mission and then an hour or two before the brief, some receivers call up and said we want to tank, and let's say you were able to approve that, it made sense to approve that, would you change the flight schedule?

(D)(3)(A), (B)(6): The master flight schedule would be changed. It would be red penned.

(D)(3)(A), (B)(6): Tell me more about that.

(D)(3)(A), (B)(6): We keep the master on top of the FDO desk, so in our ready room, you know, the squads refer to them as ODO, I call them a flight duty officer, FDO. So we keep the master schedule right there, and myself, I'm the only one that can make changes to that and do red pen and I'll initial next to any counter red pen changes that are happening.

(D)(3)(A), (B)(6): So what I'm understanding you to explain to me is that if a few hours before the brief an adjacent squadron called your squadron and expressed a desire to conduct air
refueling, and let's say it's okay to do that, it made sense to do that, though it would be uncommon but let's say it was safe and legal, then the FDO perhaps in consort with another trusted agent like your operations officer would come to you and present you a piece of paper with red ink changes to it which you would sign?

Yes, sir.

And that would therefore be your approval to execute a change to the flight schedule?

Yes, sir.

In the absence of that, would it be acceptable for your crews to go do that?

In the absence, it would have to be dire, you know, dire circumstances.

No. Normal training.

Normal training? No. That needs to happen.

So if your crews went out and provided fuel -- say hypothetically your crews went out and provided fuel and your flight schedule did not reflect that and you found out about it after the fact, would you be okay with that?

Not at all.

Would you perhaps reprimand those crews
or counsel them?

Absolutely.

Could they expect to even sit down a few days depending on the circumstances?

Oh. They'd be benched immediately.

Okay. So it would be reasonably serious in your mind?

Absolutely, sir.

And why is that?

It's unbriefed. I mean, it's, you know, we have planning processes in place, checks and balances I mentioned before. From a safety standpoint as well as, it's just a good sanity check. It's good professionalism, good business.

So you consider it to be unprofessional and even circumventing the ORM process?

Oh. Absolutely.

So are you familiar with the acronym ORM?

Yes, I am.

Can you define it for me?

Operational risk management.

Okay. Are you familiar with the term hazard in the context of aviation? What constitutes a hazard?
Yes, sir.

How would you define that?

Hazard would be any -- put me on the spot, all right --

Feel free to use your own words.

Well anything that's going to be a detriment to safety of flight.

Okay.

If we're talking from an aviation platform.

Okay. So anything that can go wrong, kind of, can be a detriment is a hazard. What -- how would you define a risk? And how is the word risk and hazard different, is what I'm getting at, a little ORM quiz for you here.

All right. Risk -- I'm trying to figure out how I differentiate between the two to tell you the truth.

Okay. Can you tell me --

I mean you have risks that you're going to assume --

Okay.

-- at times, and we put mitigating
controls in place.

You mitigate a risk. Okay.

Yes, sir.

Okay. So you're getting to the ORM process a little bit. So can you tell me a little bit about, in your own words, what is the ORM process as it applies to executing C-130 missions and how you incorporate that in your flight schedule?

Well part of our briefs, of course, the ORM process is also in check through this process right here, so that goes along with who is qualified to be flying with whom, what instructor, you know, if we have a untrained --

So you're gesturing to your flight schedule and you're pointing at names, so you would pair the appropriate crews, crew pairing would be a part of your risk management process?

It would be a part of it, but it's not -- from a T&R standpoint, so if, you know, obviously you need an instructor if you have someone getting an initial code on there and you'd have an instructor that's going to be instructing them.

If someone's getting an initial code, how is that indicated on your flight schedule?

Oh there's an x next to the code.
So I'm looking at your flight schedule here and I see 3700X next to [ph], so does that mean [ph] is receiving a 3700 for the first time?

Yes, sir.

And is that -- and above that I see [ph], does that mean [ph] is the instructor providing that training?

Yes, sir.

What's different about an initial code compared to a normal code? What does that mean, you're just -- not to use the word, but you're doing it for the first time?

Absolutely. Doing it for the first time so there's going to be a -- you're going to go over the grade sheet item by item. Talk them through it, making sure they studied, that they are aware of procedures before you go up there so you're not doing on-the-job training, learning on the fly, and the instructor, of course, knowing they have someone up there that's brand-new and you're going to go over controls more, talk them through, just actually, you know, instruct.

Notice there is inherent risk with that, if someone's never done that before. Now there in the sim, for that code that you were talking about, now 3700 is an ALZ an Assault Landing Zone.
So short-field landings that we do on improved and unimproved surfaces. If you're doing that for the first time, absolutely, there's a lot of risk with landing a 120,000 lbs aircraft, that's --

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6)  So there'd be some deliberate risk management that goes into that, I assume.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6)  Yes.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6)  A thorough brief, we'd be more careful about the weather perhaps.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6)  Absolutely.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6)  We would talk about takeoff and landing of your aircraft. And then the student, the pilot under instruction that's received initial code would then be required to do more robust academic preparation to ensure that he or she understood the fundamentals of the task at hand.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6)  Yes, sir.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6)  Okay. And they know that because there's an x next to the flight schedule?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6)  Correct.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6)  What time of day do you normally publish your flight schedule on a routine, mid-week day?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6)  1530, around that time.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6)  And how early, if you had a 1530 flight
schedule publication, how early would the student be expected to report -- prepared to brief an event the next day?

They're not going to be discovering they have a flight the next day when the flight schedule comes out.

How are they going to learn of that?

They'll learn ahead of time. We have the aircraft prog.

Tell me about the prog, does that stand for prognostic?

To tell you the truth, I do not know.

It's a forecast scheduled prog?

It's been called the prog for years and that's how I've always referred to it as the prog. So shame on me for using the acronym and not knowing.

Okay.

Or shortened term, but the prog is located on our Sharepoint and it's probably the most viewed document, at least by air crew that everyone's seeing basically where they're going to be flying for the next month. You know, it does -- it is somewhat fluid and does change for different reasons, but for the co-pilots, they're pretty much -- when they're scheduled
for something, they're going to be on it.

[Paper clipped]: Okay.

[Paper clipped]: I'm probably the biggest violator of having to come off the prog last minute, et cetera, and making it more of a fluid document just because of CO duties and meetings that pop up that may have to change. But when that does happen, it's not happening day of or even day prior, it's usually about a week prior if that does happen. But co-pilots, they have plenty of time ahead to know that they're going to be doing this initial flight, they have time to prepare and we try to give them the courtesy, at least with that, not trying to throw too many things at them at once.

[Paper clipped]: Okay. Do you guys use go and no-go pills at your squadron?

[Paper clipped]: No.

[Paper clipped]: Why not? Why don't you guys --

[Paper clipped]: I don't see the need. I think we have enough CRM, we have multi-pilot aircraft, you know, it's a --

[Paper clipped]: Has there ever been any discussion about your flight surgeon dispensing Ambien to your air crews?

[Paper clipped]: No.

[Paper clipped]: If an air crew came to you with what you thought was a legitimate reason to take Ambien, what steps would you
as a commanding officer take to approve or disapprove that? What level of approval would be required?

: I'm not familiar, I mean, that's honestly something -- the only time I've ever seen go, no-go pills used OF-1 when I was a lieutenant and we had crews that were flying behind lines basically and those guys were on light schedules and using them. That's the only thing I know about it, so because of my lack of knowledge with this, I merely talk to the flight surgeon, I don't really talk to MAG CO. It would run up the chain.

: You would seek guidance from your MAG CO?

: Definitely.

: Would you reference any key documents as well, key orders and directives, for information?

: Yeah. I'd be looking at the -- formally known as the OPNAV, the SENAV, you know, 3710 and I would talk to my department of safety and standardization.

: Do you have any idea -- would you -- hazard a guess what kind of guidance is contained in the 3710?

: I couldn't even speculate because honestly we just don't use them.

: So you'd look it up is what you're saying?
I would look it up.

You talk to your boss and you'd look it up?

Yes, sir.

Would you tell one of your captain's, don't worry about it, you can take an Ambien if you want, it's no big deal?

No, sir.

What's the policy inside Naval Aviation about taking non-prescribed medications of that nature?

It's forbidden.

Prohibited by OPNAV?

Yes, sir.

Or SENAV? I guess we have to start saying SENAV -- that doesn't matter -- so you've had a lot of time to think about this mishap, I know, and I may ask you some kind of blunt questions here, okay? What do you think we as a MAG and a Wing could have done differently to prevent this from happening?

It's still, kind of, a shock that it did happen because I've never used the word routine for a mission, but this is a very standard mission that we do. It's our primary mission, air refueling. We've done this over and over and over
again, and especially with Fixed Wing Aircraft -- before this happened it would appear to be lower risk than doing a helicopter refueling mission because we're flying closer to stall speed, we have the giant rotors next to our aircraft and that definitely is more of a pucker factor, if you will, for us flying those type of missions than a Fixed Wing.

[3] (A), (b) (6): So a Fixed Wing mission, you're up at 15,000 feet or so, you're in the 200 knot airspeed band -- 250 knot airspeed band, so nice and fast well [inaudible] speeds.


[3] (A), (b) (6): With a couple miles of sky below you.


[3] (A), (b) (6): With high performance receivers that don't have rotating wings, so you would think if a Harrier F-35 or Hornet come up, the probability of them striking your air frame and --


[3] (A), (b) (6): Yeah. Has it ever happened before?

[3] (A), (b) (6): Our last Class A happened in 1969 over in Vietnam with a F-4 joining up on one of our aircrafts. So that's the only other time that I -- just knowing that from squadron history. Now since I've been flying, been in for nineteen and a
half years now, I haven't heard of this.

: Have you ever heard of a 242 Hornet having a mid-air collision with a 152 tanker?

: 2016, yes.

: Tell me about that.

: I've only read the SIR.

: Don't disclose any special -- well, I can't have you tell me what the SIR says. So if your information is limited to the SIR, then I guess we can't discuss that.

Do you have any information that's outside of the SIR?

: I have hearsay information because I haven't talked to all the people, specifically, about it. I've talked to people that have talked to people. Let's put it that way.

: You heard any stories around the bar about it?

: Basically.

: What did those say?

: Stories saying that 242 did not want to treat this as a mishap. That after it happened, they immediately started doing work on the plane. It wasn't considered a mishap aircraft.

: Why do you think 242 made the argument
that striking your airplane with an airplane was not a mid-air collision?

[O] (3) (A), (b) (6) \(\text{\textbf{: I have no idea. It would appear to be that -- I don't want to point fingers at people or try to throw people under the bus, but if appears to be almost a cover up, like someone trying to cover their tracks.}}\)

[O] (3) (A), (b) (6) \(\text{\textbf{: Well, the reason that's important. Well, first of all, what you're referring to has come up in several other witness statements. So you are not the first person to mention that. That's how I became aware of it as being assigned this investigation. And I've been in Marine Corps Aviation since 1991 and I found it odd that I had never heard of that happening in 2016, because I keep a pretty close track of aviation safety events as a safety professional myself. So I was surprised to learn that it happened in '16.}}\)

Do you consider the hose in the basket to be part of the airplane?

[O] (3) (A), (b) (6) \(\text{\textbf{: I do.}}\)

[O] (3) (A), (b) (6) \(\text{\textbf{: Okay. So in your mind, if a receiver struck the hose in the basket. Particularly, if they were not attempting to affect the field transfer; for example, they were coming or going from the tanker and side swiped a hose in the}}\)
basket, would that be any different than side swiping perhaps the rutter?

[0 (3) (A), (b) (6)] [0 (3) (A), (b) (6)] [0 (3) (A), (b) (6)] I don't see that as being different.

[0 (3) (A), (b) (6)] Okay. Have you -- do you know if the 2016 event was day or night?

[0 (3) (A), (b) (6)] Night.

[0 (3) (A), (b) (6)] Do you know if it was with or without the use of night vision goggles?

[0 (3) (A), (b) (6)] That I'm not aware of.

[0 (3) (A), (b) (6)] Okay. What specific policies were put in after the 2016 event that affected how you were directed to conduct air refueling in 2018? Was there additional training, TTP's, or SOP's put in place at MAG-12, VMFAAW-242, or VMGR, what they did to prevent the same thing from happening again.

[0 (3) (A), (b) (6)] Honestly, sir, I don't know. I was in the Pentagon at the time, when this happened. And, in fact, I discussed it with 242's current CO because we worked across the hallway from each other and known each other for years. So he's the one who actually brought it to my attention, because I didn't hear it through my community, I heard it from him first. So we discussed it. Disbelief that that thing happened and that's the first that we heard of it, because he had his hands on the SIR. And the fact that
that wasn't really common knowledge, even in the aviation hallway or anywhere, it was kind of shocking. If any controls were put in place then anything from 152 standpoint, I would hope something happened with 242 or the MAG procedurally, but not knowing enough about it --

: Okay.

: -- I can't speak intelligently.

: That really concludes the germane questions that I had for you. I know you spent the last six or eight weeks thinking about this. If we had to do it all over again, what do you think we could do differently to prevent this mishap?

: I promise I'm not as familiar with MAG Ops. We're OP Con to the Wing. So we don't deal with them as much. Not sure how much they're injected in a squadron ops or how things are passed down as far as what mission sets going to be conducted.

I've heard and, again, this is all secondhand information, but I've heard that the mishap crew from 242 didn't know they were tanking until basically prior to the mission, which I find that that's unbelievable. Unbelievable to me, I mean we have planning processes in place here, there's -- this was an exercise that was
laid out for a while. Yes, it was a moving target. It did switch, as I said, from Vigilant Ace on down. But still, the fact that they were finding, you know, prior to their brief is shocking to me. We knew what we were doing weeks in advance.

: So better communication?

: Absolutely.

: Okay. What are some steps that you took with a 24 hour operation? So the mishap occurred at 2 a.m., did you take any steps as a commanding officer when you selected your crews for different times a day to mitigate the risk of flying late at night?

: No, we did. We actually had two NSI's from a pilot standpoint that were up there, very senior crew. Now, [ph] was actually expired but he was legal to fly with another NSI, that's why he was not signing for the aircraft. That's why [ph] was signing for the aircraft. So, I mean, we did put controls in place, made sure we had the right people doing this for the first mission we were doing that late at night. It was ORM'd heavily from the MAG on down. At least it was communicated that for me from . He did say on many different occasions that, you know, if you're -- basically take a knee, if you feel like I'm going too fast, et cetera.
So the mishap aircrew who passed away in the C-130, they are highly experienced or low experienced?

Highly experienced. Pilot standpoint, highly experienced.

Yeah, pilots. Did you have any new guys flying?

Well define new guy, sir. I mean, we had two --

People with less than one year in the squadron. Pilots.

No. Well, one in the squadron, yes.

In the mishap crew.

Well [ph] just checked in six months prior.

Okay. Let me ask the question differently. Had [ph] conducted night systems air refueling before as a C-130 pilot?

Yes. He was an NSI.

So tell me what NSI means like I don't know what that means.

Night Systems Instructor. So he -- designated only by -- only MOTS can be given the check ride. You
have to have a certain amount of night hours, I'm just trying to remember how many it is off-hand, but both high light and low light. You have to take open and closed book exams. You have to instruct a slew of events. You have to fly every night systems event that's out there. So someone that's proficient and has a lot of experience on goggles are the only people that can become night systems instructors. You can't make the new guy --

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): So it's sufficed to say he was highly qualified and highly experienced?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): He was highly qualified. Yes, sir.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): Sir, why did you have a more experienced crew flying the night shift?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): This was the first night mission, and I'm not going to throw the new guys right up there. Maybe people that haven't flown -- both these guys have deployed before, I mean, (b) (3) [ph] has deployed numerous times, (b) (3) [ph] as well. The point is if you're going to fly a 24 hour ops, you're flying all around the clock, so I mean people that have done it before also threw mitigation in there but not flying in the day prior. I think (b) (3) [ph] had a sim on Monday and he was standing by on Tuesday and this happened on Wednesday. Late Wednesday evening, early Thursday morning. And (b) (3) [ph] only flew on Monday, he never flew on
Tuesday either.

Now granted, it takes a little longer to get your circadian rhythms in check, but it's not like we were flying a midday mission the day prior. You know, we tried to put some controls in place with that, but also mitigated by having two NSI's on there, people with experience.

[O (3) (A), (b) (6)]: When did you have your less experienced pilots flying during the exercise? During the day or the night?

[O (3) (A), (b) (6)]: It was day missions.

[O (3) (A), (b) (6)]: And why did you have your less experienced pilots flying during the day?

[O (3) (A), (b) (6)]: It's just less risk and you're assuming, I mean, you know, you're putting on goggles, you're field of view is down, to basically to this.

[O (3) (A), (b) (6)]: So you just gestured with your hand. What's the field of view about?

[O (3) (A), (b) (6)]: Forty degrees.

[O (3) (A), (b) (6)]: And what's the field of view with the naked eye? Roughly?

[O (3) (A), (b) (6)]: I mean, roughly 180.

[O (3) (A), (b) (6)]: Yeah. 180.
You don't have peripheral vision on goggles, so if you want to see something that's over here, you have to turn the head.

And, sir, what steps did you take to ensure that you had squadron leadership distributed during the different times during the day when you're flying missions?

Well just that. I mean, we basically split them up. I don't have the schedule with me from that day, but we flew a lot of sororities on the first couple of days of that exercise. So I mean it's just making sure we're not flying, you know, XO, Ops O, CO, AMOL, looking at division all at the same time. So they were spread loaded throughout the day, so was actually on more of a later afternoon and then did the evening flight for that week. I flew more and more in the midday or mornings. I mean, we had leadership back in the squadron.

Yes, sir.

So it suffices to say that you recognized the hazard of flying 24 hour operations and you took your CO, XO, Ops O, AMO, your key leadership and you spread them out throughout the 24 hour day.

Absolutely.

So that you always had supervision?
Absolutely.

And experienced aircrew men in all flight events?

Yes, sir.

Okay. That's it. Anything else? Anything you'd like to add?

You talked about, you know, what can we do to prevent this from our hurt standpoint, honestly I don't know what else we could've done. Because I think, you know, we had, as I said, a very senior crew up there. We are taking steps with lighting, our -- so many of our documents right now from SENAV to FAA rules, to you name it, are all over the place including our NATOPS with what lighting should be.

And by that, you mean conflicting guidance from different sources?

Yes. Yes, sir.

Okay.

Yes, sir. Something like position lights, like basic OPNAV or SENAV. You know, having your position lights on 30 minutes prior to sunset or 30 minutes after, you know, sunrise. They're not NVG compatible in our aircraft. So like, when can we go covert, not going covert? Basically blackens the plane
out completely, but you do see it on NVG's. You'll see everything that's going on. So we're running that issue right now with conflicting and trying to figure out because not all type model series is conducted the same way.

I know we do aided -- our receivers are aided when they're tanking. Right now, we're running into issues down in Okinawa because they're -- we're not in a special use air space with the shooter track and geology. There's a few tracks down there that are, kind of, made up. We've been using them for years and it's come to light. You know, we want to keep our lights on because you're running a [inaudible] four door from Naha with people coming in, but it's blowing out the receivers as they come in which is also a safety fight issue. So we're trying to sit together at a table and figure out exactly what needs to happen. We're trying to put changes in from a type model series standpoint. I'm talking to NAV Air [ph], to see if we could get dimmable position lights, but that's not going to happen anytime soon. It's going to take some time, so for right now, we're trying to go with special use airspace and be able to either go covert if, you know, put enough risk management into play to do that.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): Does the C-130 have white lights on the leading-edge of the horizontal stabilizer that shine forward and
illuminate the flaps of the wings? The wings and flaps.

We have them. We don't fly with them on that often, but it's basically like a --

What are they called?

ICE.

No, not the ICE lights, that's not what I'm talking about. I'm talking about the lights that are at back of the tail of the C-130 that shine forward that light up the back, that would basically light up the flaps of the refueling pods with a white light.

With pod illumination?

I think -- I don't know what they're called.

I think it's a pod illumination light, I believe.

Okay. But you know what I'm talking about?

I do.

Yeah. So the ICE light is on the leading edge wing -- is perpendicular to the --

Right. It shoots it out.

Yeah. That's not what I'm talking about.
So I think you called it a pod light, I thought they were called tanker lights, but do you guys ever use those?

[0 (3) (A), (b) (6)]: Not often.

[0 (3) (A), (b) (6)]: When would you use or not use them?

[0 (3) (A), (b) (6)]: I'd say maybe like at dusk or something, you know, when you're, kind of, in that pinky time when it's not quite you're going to be aided yet but you need maybe to see better if the receivers are --

[0 (3) (A), (b) (6)]: And it's for the receivers benefit and not yours, right?

[0 (3) (A), (b) (6)]: Not as much as someone shining in the back there.

[0 (3) (A), (b) (6)]: Okay. And that's that.

[0 (3) (A), (b) (6)]: Yes, sir.

[[b (3) (A), (b) (6)] was warned, sworn, and departed.]
[The investigative interview opened at 1638, 24 January 2019.]

: Today is Thursday, the 24 of January, 2019. We are in Iwakuni, Japan.

: Judge Advocate General and as the court reporter. We are interviewing of VMFA-242 as a witness to the fatal mishap of December 2018.

: , can you please state your full name and spell your last for the record.

: My call sign, sir. My call sign is .

: ?

: Yes, sir.

: Okay, . You can call me or sir as you'd like.

What is your billet in the squadron?

: The aircraft maintenance officer, sir.

: How long have you had that job?

: Since June of 2018.

: How long have you been at 242.

: I checked in -- it was 2016. June 2016, sir.
Okay.

What positions have you held in the squadron?

I was the WISSO training officer. Then I was the assistant maintenance officer. Then I was the QAO. I'm currently in my billet, now.

A lot of time downstairs?

Yes, sir.

Where were you in December of 2018.

I was in Iwakuni, sir.

What was your role in the MAG ULT?

I was still functioning as the AMO and I was flying missions as scheduled daily.

What crew were you on?

I was on the swing crew, so I would fly.

So what was your working day?

I'm trying to think the -- the first day I was on nights that night. So I flew and I came in around noon. I flew a night mission.

Did that mission go?

Yes, sir.

Okay. And then, where were you during
the mishap?

: I was at home in bed.

: What was your crew day on the day of the mishap? Like when did you come in to part the spaces?

: I think I showed up that morning around eight or nine-ish. So I landed, debriefed, and got out of there to allow adequate rest and everything. Then I showed up the next day and I was fragged for a fly, a pit-fly to and back to here, sir.

: On Tuesday?

: Tuesday was the fifth, correct?

: No. Tuesday was the fourth.

: So on the fourth I flew the night op.

: Okay.

: So I flew the night op and on the morning of the fifth, or the after day of the fifth.

: That's just enough time to get home, sleep, and get right back in?

: Yeah. So I think I flew Monday night.

: Yeah. You came back and flew Tuesday morning.

: Tuesday to Came home and went to bed. And then, four hours later I got the phone call that the crash had
happened.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): You might have skipped a day there because I think on Wednesday was the day of mourning and I think they canceled all of the day flights on that one day.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): That was the day I went to (b) (6), (b)

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): But I understand the gist of what you're saying.

Okay. So you've been here since '16. You've worked downstairs. Do you wear a dry suit very often?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): Yes, sir. When the water temp is below 60 or outside air temps or windshield adjusted is below 32. And/or.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): How do you know to wear a dry suit? Does ODO brief you that or

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): ODO generally briefs it to one of the senior air crew. If he doesn't brief it, then I will make him brief it.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): Where are the references that guide you to wear a dry suit?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): It's in the SEANAVINST, formally known as the OPNAV instruction.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): 3710.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): Okay. What does it say about dry suits, just generally. I mean I know we're not looking at tables, but,
just generally, what does it say?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): It says if the water temperature is below 50 degrees, you shall be afforded the opportunity to wear one.

There is never a "shall" in there.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): What does it say about search and rescue capabilities in that section?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): As far as on station time and everything?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): Yes.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): I know there's the chart for height-weight body fat --

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): No. No. What does it say about how long it takes to get somebody picked up if you pull the handle in that section?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): Are you saying, like, a time it should take or you shall not fly if it takes longer? I don't know, sir.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): Okay. That's a good answer.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): What do you know about the search and rescue capabilities here at Iwakuni before the mishap?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): I knew a lot because I was involved in the 2016 Class A mishap when Red Stripe passed away.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): Tell me about that.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): I was airborne the night that it happened and I
was in a different air space about 180 miles away. But I heard the guard call go out.

: Tell me more.

: I landed. I had about 15 to 20 minutes of fuel left. I was close to a field and I landed. I went through the pits, topped off, and then sat stripler awaiting the call to launch, but it never came. I ended up shutting down after about an hour and a half of sitting stripler that night. And then, over the ensuing weeks, we got CAPES brief from the CHASDIV from their US-1, US-2, and all of their EO, IR, DF capability and everything they had. So that was pretty familiar with all of their capabilities, sir.

: So how long did it take to find the mishap crew to whom you refer?

: They found his body at about 20 hours later, sir.

: Two zero hours?

: Yes, sir. He crashed at about 1900 on the -- I can't remember what night of the week it was. But he went down about 1900. And it was about 1400 or 1500 the next day when they found his body.

: Did aircraft locate his body or was it a ship?
I think it was a Japanese sea plane. I don't know. None of MAG-12 actually located him.

So based on that experience, was that mishap was a similar distance and a similar air space to this one?

The exact same air space.

Based on that experience, do you have the impression that it could take about 20 hours before you could be recovered if you had ejected?

No, sir.

So how long do you think it would take you to get recovery if you ejected?

If I was responsive and able to talk in my radio or make something, I would say probably about 3 or 4 hours.

3 to 4 hours if you could push to talk on your radio or whatever.

From best assessments, the ejection killed him.

Okay.

He was not responsive at all. If the assumption being you could get on your Sea-Cell radio or whatever and hit IMO or talk to somebody then yeah. Because there were assets on station within 2 to 3 hours at the previous mishap.

Okay. How long do you think you would
survive in 68 degree water without a dry suit or an exasperation suit based on your training? Based on your Navy aviation/Marine Corps training?

[0] (3) (A), (b) (6): I'd say probably around 30 minutes tops. Depending on if you couldn't get in your raft.

[0] (3) (A), (b) (6): Yeah. Let's say you couldn't get in your raft.

[0] (3) (A), (b) (6): I'd say 30 minutes tops, sir.

[0] (3) (A), (b) (6): 30 minutes. So 30 minutes until you're unconscious I think is what you mean. And how many minutes do you think until you're dead?

[0] (3) (A), (b) (6): Decreased heart rate and everything with cold water, you may last about 10 to 15 minutes. I don't know.

[0] (3) (A), (b) (6): So it's just your impression that you would die within about an hour in 68 degree water without a dry suit. Is that, kind of, like, your rough impression?

[0] (3) (A), (b) (6): Give or take a little bit, sir.

[0] (3) (A), (b) (6): And is it also your impression that it would take 2 or 3 hours for somebody to find you and get you out of the water, based on about what you previously said about SAR assets in Iwakuni?

[0] (3) (A), (b) (6): If you're going purely off of organic SAR
assets, yeah I'd say a good rule of thumb would be a couple hours. Now if you get lucky and there's a boat or there happens to be a US-1 already in the air, they divert and it may be sooner. But generally, all things being equal, you're looking at a couple of hours.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): Okay. So what I'm hearing you say is it's your general impression that if you eject and intrasouth without a dry suit in 68 degree water, you are going to die.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): If you can't get in your raft?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): Yeah. If you can't get in your raft, you are going to die. I'm just trying to figure out as the senior guy how you would brief that. Informed by your experience and informed by your training,

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): 68 degree water. I would have to look at a chart. That's just me guessing right here off the hip, sir. But I'd say you got an hour or so, tops. And then, incapacitation sets in.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): So you have about this much time to live and this much time to get picked up. And I'm not trying to be flippant with you, but I'm trying to, kind of, role play if I was a new Captain at 242 and you and I were having this discussion on whether to wear the dry suit.
If the discussion went much like ours is now, would you be inclined to tell a guy "wear your dry suit. You're probably not going to live long enough for somebody to pick you up?"

: Not at 68, I mean, if he gets in his raft. And I know for a fact you can live for 4 to 5 hours without a dry suit in 68 degree water.

: If you get in a raft?

: If you get in a raft.

: But if you don't get in the raft then it's a lot less than what you'd think.

: I don't think it's of certainty, but I think your chances.

: So I'm a captain in your squadron and I just checked in. So what I just took from that conversation was either wear your dry suit or make sure you get in the raft.

: Okay. That's fair. I'm just trying to understand perception. It's not an ATOPS quiz. I'm not counseling you.

: Truthfully, I've never thought of that aspect of it too much.

: So you wouldn't wear a dry suit in those conditions?
68 degree water, no.

In the intra south? No.

At night? No.

Even if it was in the context of this mishap, so 2 a.m., 200 miles offshore you would also not be wearing a dry suit?

No. 68 degree water, I wouldn't wear it.

Okay.

You've been to MCRD. You've probably worn one, sir.

Yeah.

They're a huge pain. Do you know what I mean?

Yeah, I get it. I didn't like it either.

Let's talk about night vision goggles. What's your total time in the hornet?

About 13 or 1400, sir.

And roughly, how much time do you have on the goggles?

Probably between 150 to 200 hours.

Of those 200 hours, roughly how much time
wearing the ANVS-11?

The ANVS-11, that's the new AMCD's, correct?

It is.

That's the newer mod?

It is.

I've probably got a third of my time in those.

So maybe 60 hours or so?

Yeah. Give or take. Yes, sir.

When you transitioned from the ANVS-9 to the ANVS-11, what kind of training did you receive?

We got the brief from the MAG AMPSO, the full brief, with -- I'm trying to remember what it was. It was two years ago. We were required to get the full brief from the MAG AMPSO about the illusions and hazards. The differences, really the biggest take away, was hey you're visual QD is a little bit less when the NBCD's are the PBS-9's. And there was the briefed potential of inverted symbology that had been noted in the hornet community, like, twice at the time.

What about -- were you briefed about anything different about the capabilities of the two goggles and low-light level conditions. If one performed better in low light.

Yeah. I'm pretty sure it was the older model
that performed better in low light and, generally, had better QD overall.

Okay.

I prefer the 9's over the 11's, but the 11's obviously give you the symbology and weapons queuing. All of that stuff.

So naturally -- and I understand that you're a WISSO -- but naturally you've been in the tanker many times at night.

What kind of lighting integration do you normally see from the tanker at night? Overt, covert, or lights off?

Generally, it will be overt during the join.

Overt.

And then once we get stabilized in echelon, then depending on flight lead, you know it's pilot dependent. I'm a WISSO. It doesn't matter to me. I don't care if you say goggles on or goggles off. Whatever you feel most comfortable with.

All right.

And generally, once you get stabilized in echelon, then we'll talk about it and the pilot will make the call like, hey. We request covert or we request overt.

Okay.
Either way, we'll tank. Most guys like covert while they're in. And then, once we're stabilized by the tanker I generally won't let guys join with covert lighting because it let's you judge closure a little better, altitude, and -- plus if you've ever tanked off of covert, I'm sure you have.

I have.

Yeah. I'm sure you know what it looks like. It's hard to see until you get right up on a guy.

Yeah.

So overt until we get stabilized at about a .1, then go covert and drift back out to tank.

What about -- what do you know about the external lights on the C-130 as far as what kind of lights they have to aid in tanking? Marine Corps KC-130J?

I mean, we've got the overt. They've got the covert. We've got the light at the back of the casket that you should be able to see when you push the basket in. You should be able to see that in overt and covert.

Does a C-130 have white lights on the leading edge of the horizontal stabilizer that they can turn on and illuminate the back of the tanker? Have you ever heard or seen those used?
If they do, I've never seen them used, sir.

Okay. And how many hours do you have on the hornet?

Like 13 or 1400, sir.

And how many times do you think you've been in the night tanker in 1300 hours? How many times do you think you've been in the Marine Corps KC130-J night tanker in your whole career?

I couldn't even count. Dozens.

Twenty? Fifty?

Probably fifty at least. If not, then one hundred.

So in about fifty times, you don't have any recollection of anybody turning on the lights in the horizontal stabilizer to illuminate the back of a C-130 -- that shine forward and illuminate the flaps and the basket and the whole area behind the wing of the C-130 for the aid of the crew receiving fuel?

When you say shine forward, so it's on the horizontal stab?

Yep. It's like a landing light on the horizontal stab that shines forward.

But the basket sits out behind the horizontal
stab.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): The stab does.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): So if it shines forward -- you said it lights the basket up?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): It doesn't. It lights up the flaps in the wing route and the back of the wing of a C-130. Have you ever heard of anything like that?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): I don't recall it, sir.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): Okay.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): Most of the time I've got goggles on and we're covert when we're tanking off.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): Okay.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): What is the field of view of the night vision goggles? How many degrees?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): 40.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): And what's the field of view of the naked eye roughly?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): I think it's about 270. No, not 270. It's out to here --

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): Does 210 sound familiar?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): It sounds about right. I know you're QD goes down, you know, from like 20/20 here to 20 whatever -- 200 out here.
: Yep.

Any discussions about go pills and no-go pills for the MAG ULT?

: I remember -- I was sitting at home and somebody asked the question over text and I remember the flight doctor came back quickly with a, hey. This is the order, whatever. This is the order and not approved and whatnot. I didn't think too much about it because I was like, "Dude, we're only flying two nights in a row. Like it's not like we're doing sustained combat ops." And I never engaged any more than that other than seeing that one message, sir.

: Do you think it's unusual that they went to the tanker that night? Were you expecting to take that night, the mishap air crew, based on your knowledge of what was going on with the ULT?

: Truth be told, that night I just knew those guys were scheduled to fly that night. I did not know that night what exactly they were scheduled for because I had been out and I flew -- I ended up flying three flights that day to. So I went to. We were not allowed to land there. We were told to do low approach only. When we came back to Iwakuni, I was told to hit the pits. And whoever outside the squadron was able to
coordinate us to be able to land at \( \text{coordinate us to be able to land at} \) to go back and try again.

So I went back to \( \text{I landed.} \) I landed. We were allowed to land that time. We had Marines staged over there. I ran through the high pits and I topped off. And then, I flew a third flight back here to Iwakuni. And by that time, I had been in the jet for who knows how long. I think I flew like --

\[ \text{(b) (3) (A), (b) (6)} \]

: So you flew three flights, but it was really four laps right?

It was there and -- so it was there, back, there, back. But the first time was just a low pass, so that's why you're saying three.

\[ \text{(b) (3) (A), (b) (6)} \]

: Yes, sir.

\[ \text{(b) (3) (A), (b) (6)} \]

: Okay. I got it.

So you land -- you went up there once and didn't land and came back. Another time you went there and landed. So you had three landings.

\[ \text{(b) (3) (A), (b) (6)} \]

: Yes, sir. And they were all you know just nav-lags back and forth just to land at \( \text{and test out the fuel pits. But -- so I did not look at the flight schedule that day at all because I was gone pretty much all day briefing, debriefing, and flying three landings. So I knew those guys were flying at night.} \)
I didn't know exactly what they were doing.

: Is it common to go do something that's not on the flight schedule? Like, is it common to be scheduled for a FAM and then go to a tanker? Is that a common occurrence?

: No.

: Would you find it unusual if you showed up for a flight brief and the flight schedule said -- did not say tanker and did not have tanker notes, and only had FAM on there. Would you find that unusual that you're going to the tanker?

: It depends on who I was flying with.

: Well, you're flying with . He just starts briefing the tanker.

Would you find that unusual if it wasn't on the flight schedule?

: I may find it a little unusual, but based on the, I guess, on the exercise we were doing that week with, you know, the Sumo's and going down doing the air refueling and what not. I wouldn't have thought it because we were doing, you know, coordinating between squadrons and what not. I wouldn't have thought that it was that unusual. Especially when the guys were qualified, current, and not what I would consider junior guys. They
had all tanked at night. So I wouldn't have thought that was too outside the realm.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): Would you consider that a flight schedule change, adding a TNR code?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): Depends on what the code is.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): The code is tanking.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): Tanking 2011 code? He's already qualified and current on everything with the tanker.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): Yep.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): It's hard to say at this point. I mean, hindsight of me knowing what I know now, realtime at two in the morning, I may have tried to call the CO or the XO to get approval for it. But it was two in the morning and everybody is on --

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): Well, let's say your briefed and it's 2200?

I'm not asking you to throw darts at your squadron mates. I'm just trying to understand what the perception would be in [inaudible] that would be doing something that's not on the flight schedule and what constitutes a flight schedule change requiring CO approval and what doesn't.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): I would say adding a tanker for that mission would not -- I probably would have -- if I couldn't have got a hold
of the CO, I probably would have done it based on the crew that was flying that night. If the mission -- if we swap names for anybody, you know, different guys flying with different guys or name swaps or, I would say, any significant mission change like, "Hey. We're going out to do air-to-air and not we're going to go do night pop attacks, low altitude type stuff." Yeah, absolutely no.

Like any name changes, any significant mission changes, or significant time changes.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): So if you couldn't get a hold of the CO, who else in the squadron would you go to for a schedule change?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): I would go to the XO.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): And after that?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): Then it's down to me and the OPSO. But at that point, if I can't get a hold of the CO or the XO --

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): And what shift was the CO on?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): I think he was on morning shift.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): XO, OPSO?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): I was on the swing crew with the XO because I was flying with the XO that day.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): Okay.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): And then, the OPSO -- I don't remember.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): Is there any other field grades on the
swing shift?

[0] 22 (A), (b) (6) : Yeah. Me and the XO. I don't remember.

[0] 22 (A), (b) (6) : How about the night shift?

[0] 22 (A), (b) (6) : I don't remember either.

[0] 22 (A), (b) (6) : Okay.

[0] 22 (A), (b) (6) : Sorry.

[0] 22 (A), (b) (6) : Do you normally review the flight schedule?

[0] 22 (A), (b) (6) : Yes, sir.

[0] 22 (A), (b) (6) : By what means?

[0] 22 (A), (b) (6) : Usually the [inaudible] brings it down to my office. I will look at it. I will bring my MMCO in as well and maybe my maintenance chief -- maintenance control chief. I'll bring those guys in.

I, generally, got a pretty good handle on what jets are RBA numbers and what we're expecting, but I'll just bounce it off of him. Like, "Hey. Do you guys see anything on here we can't support like turn times, you know, or numbers we're expecting on RBA?"

Things like that. But, generally, I review it everyday, sir.

[0] 22 (A), (b) (6) : How do you document the fact that you reviewed it?
[O] (3) (A), (b) (6): Usually there is a sheet. It wasn't on the schedule itself, but the schedule writers have, like, their sheet and it was a separate piece of paper that I would initial that I had reviewed it.

[O] (3) (A), (b) (6): Okay.

[O] (3) (A), (b) (6): And that was a practice during the exercise?

[O] (3) (A), (b) (6): It has been practiced ever since I've been the maintenance officer.

[O] (3) (A), (b) (6): Okay.

[O] (3) (A), (b) (6): Is there anything you'd like to add about the mishap, circumstances of facts?

[O] (3) (A), (b) (6): No, sir.

[O] (3) (A), (b) (6): I mean, obviously, you guys have thought about it and talked about it a lot. Is there anything that you think the Marine Corps or the wing or the MAG could do different or better to reduce the probability of a like-incident in the future? Be frank.

[O] (3) (A), (b) (6): I would say, looking at the operational tempo -- and you, kind of, nailed it with everything you listed off before we even started talking, sir -- was looking at operational
tempo and being able to keep out aircraft healthy, which will then transfer to more proficiency and more flight ours.

So you feel like we're more like on the backside of the readiness generation curve because we're just living hand-to-mouth with flight hours generation down the barn.

I would say, I mean, our team this summer -- I mean we went to Australia. Our cargo did not show up for 31 days until after we arrived.

How did that affect your ability to operate as a maintenance department?

We had to get a significant amount of tools and support equipment from the 75 squadron. The AUS and the resinate raft squadron. We had to get a lot of support from those guys.

Did that reduce the efficiency of maintenance man hours?

I would say yes. I don't have the quantifiable data, sir. But, yeah, I had to send guys home.

Did it make it harder to do you job well?

Yes, sir.

Okay.

And then, of course, our cargo didn't arrive until 31 days after. And then, our tanker got delayed over -- I
think we ended up staying an extra three weeks down there.

And then, of course, that was driven by the typhoons. There was typhoons in Guam, typhoons in Hawaii, that delayed 2 or 3 other F-18 squadron's movements from -- I'm sure you probably remember from being in the G-5. There was one squadron that was retrograde back to Beaufort. Another one coming out of Mirimar when we were in Australia. So our tankers effectively got delayed for two and a half to three weeks while we were in Australia.

Everybody was expecting us to be gone. So the AUS pretty much cut loose all of their air-traffic controllers and most of their support agencies. And we were only able to fly, like, an FCF or a ConHop, one of the two flights a day for those two and a half weeks while we were just waiting on tankers.

And then, you know, we come back and we had maintenance inspections followed by, you know, visual aids being canceled. And then, it gets turned into another exercise.

: From a maintenance officer's perspective, when a visual aid, would it have been more effective for you to just spend that time grooming airplanes?

: Absolutely, sir.

: What kind of things would you have done to groom airplanes?
I would have, I mean, one I'm short on manpower right now, specifically air framers. And that's my big thing. Obviously, this jet is old. It takes air frames. That's probably the preponderance of my workload downstairs.

And I've been working with -- were you ever a maintenance officer, sir?

I was.

Okay. So I've had zero CDI's in my air frame shop for almost three months now.

So how do you get things signed up? Do you have to use the CDQ form?

I mean, I have three CDQ's. I've got two gunny's and a staff sergeant. One's my QAR, so that's not his primary job to be out there turning wrenches anymore. The other one is the division chief. And then, the third one -- he's getting ready to PCS and he was working in corrosion control. So really, my three guys are doing the work of corporal and sergeant CDI's most of the time. And the preponderance of my workload is air frames. So that's really been my hamstring over the last few months. But, yes, we would.

What do you contribute that to? Why do you think 242 has a low number of qualified maintenance personnel,
or is that true fleet wide or is it worse here?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6)

: I couldn't speak for the entire fleet, sir. I would say a lot -- I'm trying to think of how Headquarters, Marine Corps just fixed this problem in the last few months. So instead of sending Marines out on two-year orders, they are now sending them out on three-year orders. So it used to take about two years to make a CDI -- get them to corporal and make them a CDI. When they get that two-year mark, see you. I'm going to MAG-11. I'm going to Miramar. Now we get them for an extra year, but we haven't really got to see the benefits of that yet because it just went into place. So I think that's going to be a big help and I have a lot of Marines that want to extend out here. That's helping out a lot, but I think it's just getting guys out here with the overseas screening process and then just the stigma of --

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6)

: Stigma? What do you mean?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6)

: I mean, just, you come out here and, you know, it's living in a foreign country. You know, maybe you don't have all of the rights that you would have back in the states and the freedoms and what not. So, and then, plus being away from your family in the long term, sir.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6)

: Were you at Beaufort before?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6)

: I was at resident EWS before, sir. And then, I
was at MAG-31.

[0] [3] (A), (b) (6): Well, a lot of guys at MAG-31 there are fighting and trying to get out to MAG-12.

[0] [3] (A), (b) (6): I'd say find it.

[0] [3] (A), (b) (6): Making efforts for guys like call-in or MMOA or MMEA depending on who they were and then requesting orders from MAG-31 to MAG-12.

[0] [3] (A), (b) (6): I don't think I've ever heard of anybody requesting orders to come out to MAG-12.

[0] [3] (A), (b) (6): Why is that?

[0] [3] (A), (b) (6): Do people ever request to go from here to Miramar?

[0] [3] (A), (b) (6): Yes, sir.

[0] [3] (A), (b) (6): Why is that?

[0] [3] (A), (b) (6): Because you're in San Diego. You get more freedom and less --

[0] [3] (A), (b) (6): Do you think that as a second of fact in readiness in MAG-11? Do you think MAG-11 gets more and higher quality people because of their location and perhaps it's more difficult to get the right numbers to the right people in Iwakuni because of our location, overseas screening, and other topics which you've touched on?
I think it's got something to do with it, sir.

Okay. You checked into 242. I think I have June of 2016 written down here. Is that correct?

That's correct, sir.

Have you ever heard of 242 having a midair collision with a tanker before? Is it possible that on April the 28th, 2016, 242 had a midair collision with a tanker?

It's very possible.

Do you know much about that?

I think it happened, you know, like I said a couple months before I had checked in. I checked in and I was getting ready to be the training officer. I never got -- I read the SIR a little bit. It was briefed at some point at my first -- I don't remember. At some point since I've been in the squadron, it has been briefed, but yeah.

Who was the commanding officer when the accident took place?

Now, did initiate a field flight performance board on the mishap air crew?

Not to my knowledge.
Did he initiate a preliminary inquiry or a command investigation?

I do not know, sir.

Do you know if he initiated an aircraft mishap award or if that was later?

I think it was.

So do you have the impression that a mishap happened when was the CO and then a week or two later there was a change of command that took over, and, then, initiated an AMB.

Would that be your perception as you recall it being a member of the squadron at the time?

That's generally what -- I couldn't swear to it all being fact, sir. But, generally, from what my understanding was, that's kind of what I --

Did you know the mishap aircrew?

Yes, sir.

Were you working in the operations department in June and July of '16 and the months after the mishap?

No, sir.

Where were you working you said?

I showed up and I initially -- I did about a
month at the S-4 as the Alpha.

: Okay. You were the S-4 guy.

: I didn't mention that at first because I was only in there for like a month or a month and a half. And then, when the training officer PCS'd, they were like you're in.

: So that was like August of '16?

: About August or September is when I took over.

: So as a training officer, you would have had some role in aircrew scheduling. Are you aware of the mishap aircrew being on conditional flight status or something of that nature?

: No, sir.

: Did you ever see the aircraft, or photographs of the aircraft, after the mishap?

: Of April in '16, sir?

: I am.

: I may have.

: Nothing sticks out?

: Nothing sticks out, sir.

: Did you ever hear the mishap aircrew talk about what happened? Did they ever brief it or --

: I think they did. I was into it a little bit.
But bottom line, those guys screwed up. They hit the tanker and that could have been mitigated.

[O (3) (A), (B) (6)] What part of the hornet hit what part of the tanker as best as you recall?

[O (3) (A), (B) (6)] I think it was a left wing that took the hose off.

[O (3) (A), (B) (6)] When you say, "took a hose off," you mean like the hornet had its probe extended and it was effecting the fuel transfer and somehow underrun so far that the wing hit the hose and cut it?

[O (3) (A), (B) (6)] I think they were, at some point -- I think they were getting ready to depart the tanker in some form or fashion, just from my recollection. This is 50-50, but they were getting ready to depart the tanker and snatched the hose off with the left wing.

[O (3) (A), (B) (6)] So it's your recollection then that they were done with fuel transfer and were departing the tanker. And as they were departing the tanker, they struck one of the hoses -- one of the hornets struck one of the hoses and cut the hose?

[O (3) (A), (B) (6)] That's my recollection, sir.

[O (3) (A), (B) (6)] And the hose fell into the sea?

[O (3) (A), (B) (6)] I never asked that question. I would assume it
Okay. Do you know or do you recall the mishap pilot's name?

It was.

Does have a call sign?

Yes, he does.

What is call sign?

Fish to C-130 airborne.

Fish to C-130.

So you think we had a midair collision and we did an AMB and you gave him that call sign and just kind of pressed? Is that typically your perception?

That's what happened, sir.

What specific procedural changes were put in place at MAG-12 after that accident?

I don't know if it was anything put in procedural place in MAG-12, but I know our UCL at the time, now retired, was very adamant. He put it in the squadron SOP that a round tanker is within 10 nautical miles of a tanker. You will do nothing but tanking. You will do no tanking
admin procedures. You will do no admin procedures. You will be focused on the tanker.

[Redacted]: So [Redacted] made an effort to mitigate that risk by the ways he just described?

[Redacted]: I saw him fail a guy in night vision check ride one night because he didn't do anything safe around the tanker, but he did something nonstandard with the radios. And he failed a guy on his night vision check ride.

[Redacted]: So it sounds like [Redacted] took the situation very seriously.

[Redacted]: He was very serious. And I know -- I can't remember the specifics -- but I know he hurt some young pilots feelings for fooling around by a tanker. That's why this whole scenario, or situation, is beyond me on how it happened because I've been here the whole time. I've seen these guys get beat up for it for two and a half years.

[Redacted]: Was there any discussion about -- I assume that the April 2016 incident was at night in low light conditions with the use of night vision goggles and the tanker was in the covert lighting position. I've heard other people tell me that and I believe that to be true.

And I also believe that to be true for the 2018 mishap.
So it's the same squadrons doing the same thing with the same lighting conditions with similar night vision goggles.

With that in mind, was there ever a discussion about adjusting the lighting condition of the C-130, or ever a discussion about doing tanking with goggles up to mitigate risk?

So after the 2016 mishap that was strikingly similar to the 2018 mishap, were there any procedural changes aside from Lieutenant Colonel's direction of no tack admin around the tanker?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Nothing procedural. I mean, I've heard it briefed my whole career with the guys and I've briefed the guys before we go to the tanker like take an assessment, put the goggles down. If they're working for you and it's increasing your situational awareness or your ability to tank then use them.

But it's always been stressed to especially younger guys like, hey if the goggles -- they're sensored. If they're not helping you on the tanker or they're getting in your way or degrading you SA or whatnot, flip them up and tell the tanker to turn his lights on. I mean, we've always briefed that guys have that option.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Is there anything you'd like to add or clarify on what we talked about?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : No, sir.
was sworn.]

[The investigative interview closed at 1713, 24 January 2019.]
Okay. We'll get going. This is about 1430 on the -- what is today? The 16th --

Yes, sir.

-- of February -- or January rather.

The 16th of January 2019. I'm . I'm assisted by , the court reporter, and we're interviewing .

, could you, please, state your full name, spelling your last name for the record.

Full name is . Last name is .

Outstanding. And, what is your Military Occupational Specialty?

I am a 7525. That is a F-18 weapons systems officer.

Awesome. And, what do you go by? How would you like to be called during this interview?

Call sign .

Okay. I'm going to call you if you're okay with that. I think you're -- you can call me or sir or whatever you like. Okay?

Yes, sir.

What is your current billet? What do you do right now in the Marine Corps? What's your job?

I am the MATSS, Iwakuni, Officer in Charge. MATSS is Marine Aviation Training Systems Site.
Okay. So that's like the signaling building and the ground training facility that supports all the squadrons here in Iwakuni?

Yes, sir.

And what are some of the key functions that you complete in that role?

So we do flat lead standardization. We do -- we support training. We provide any training that could effect the MAG or the specific type model series. We also have been required to operationalism the operational training complex. So a new building -- so integrating all the different stakeholders to get a product to the customer in the form of training -- aviation training assets.

Okay. Where were you in the month of December 2018? Were you here in Iwakuni?

I was.

Were you involved in the unit level training that was conducted by 242?

As in flying, sir? Or, --

No. Just in general. Like, I understand that there was a MAG operation center stood-up, a Wing operation center stood up. That 225, 242, and 152 are all doing a coordinated exercises that the classified aspects of which, we'll not touch on. But just to understand that there were multiple squadrons flying cooperatively. Did you have any role in that?
From when the scenario was built to go to the ITRA -- I apologize, I don't know the acronym, but the --

Airspace?

-- the air space.

When you say Thursday, Friday, you mean the week prior?

The week prior.

Okay. Is that one of your jobs at MATSS to develop white cell support to develop scenarios for training?

Not necessarily, but we have in the past.

Okay.

So there's a chrome palmerhead wanted to do -- throughout his tenure here or his command, there was a thing called "Exercises and Aces High." And "Exercises Aces High" was a -- is a basically chrome palmerhead would general be a no notice tasking to the squadrons to conduct some type of OPLAN mission. So in that, based on the different squadrons -- sometimes they occur in floods, sometimes they occur in the
simulator, it varies. But we have developed what we believe was the realist lay down of that specific mission.

And have -- some of the squadrons have done it on their own and we basically dropped a couple points of targets they would attack. So one went down and occurred in November. So approaching that Friday it was like what are they doing? So they elected to use that same scenario that would then -- had just previously been conducted about three to four weeks prior.

[redacted]: So I think what I'm hearing from you is that during the unit level training exercise conducted by the MAG and the Wing in the first week of December 2018 during the mishap, there is a suppression of enemy area defense scenario that was to be used again?

[redacted]: Yes.

[redacted]: Okay. And what role did you have in communicating and supporting that scenario or did you just provide power [inaudible]?

[redacted]: It was basically three to four weeks prior we conducted that in the squadron; specifically, 242. So they had what we'll call "the threat" layed down about that.

[redacted]: Okay.

[redacted]: Approaching, you know, Friday, there was no communication. And then the tasking that occurred on Monday I went over to the squadron to see if they did a mission planning drop, a scenario drop. And was there and, basically, they used the same scenario that MATSS had developed three to four weeks
prior. And then -- so I was there at the initial coordination. That would have been for Sunday -- that occurred on Sunday, I apologize, for the Monday flight or training day one flight. So I went to that and assisted on anywhere I could -- if there were questions about having known what that scenario was built off of.

: Okay. And was that what the mishap aircrew were doing that night or what is your perception of made the VMFA-242 believe their mission to be on the night of the mishap?

: I am, sir, as I, part of the FAPV process. So my --

: Can we talk to that? I don't think we want him talking about things that's still under the FAPV. Please don't discuss information you have about the FAPV. I'm asking the question for the context of the week of execution. So I'm trying to understand if you patriciate in scenario drop, I think that would have been the second of December -- I don't have a calender in front of me -- but on Sunday, this first Sunday in December, were you part of the socialization or the communication of the VMFA-542 all weather's mission on the night of the mishap as it related to what we are discussing right here?

: So were you involved in ULT?

: I was supporting into -- one was, gave that scenario and what was determined from Ops was, if they go to the ITRA South, the plan was to do a seed mission. Those mission planning factors that were developed were based off of a larger
force package, F-35s, F-18s, potentially C-130s.

[Redacted]: And, sir, --

[Redacted]: My perception on Tuesday for the training day three or Wednesday night/Thursday morning flight, the flight of the mishap. All I knew was that they were doing a -- they were going to the sought and that the assumption was that it was going to be a seed mission. However, I was unclear based off of the events that occurred on Tuesday between -- basically from 1100 until about 1600.

[Redacted]: What happened on Tuesday from 1100 to 1600 that changed the nature of the mission?

[Redacted]: So I was working at the OTC and had found out that the -- President Trump had put out information -- put out a National day of Mourning for former President Bush and there was questions regarding if that was a day off for military/civilians and how that would affect operations there.

So I was focused on how that affects the simulator building. Came over here --

[Redacted]: And that's important I guess because you have civilian employees at the simulator building and other support agencies; perhaps the air fields, ATC, fuels. That if those guys don't come to work then we can't operate? Is that what you're getting at?

[Redacted]: Yes, sir. And there was questions of contractors versus government employees and then how that affects the military. There was -- we were seeking guidance on what that
National day of Mourning.

: So what guidance did you receive and through whom?

: So for the sim building, we basically contacted -- I researched the on OSD website to determine what that exactly meant. Or, correction. Not OSD --

: OMP maybe?

: OPM. So Office Personnel Management. I read into that. I tried to figure out what that meant, and then developed what those fallen factors were affecting the sim building. Knowing that it affected the sim building, came over here at about noon because on part of the daily MAG Ops cycle, they would do a --

: Hey, so the fire alarm just went off, but we'll keep going here for a few minutes. If any body smells smoke or similar indications of a fire, we will announce that.

Okay. So let's get back to the exercise. I think what we're talking about right now is the affect of the National day or Mourning being announced on Tuesday. It would have affected a day off on Wednesday. And you spent Tuesday afternoon determining what impact that would have on the rest of the exercise?

: -- on the sim building came over here and at 1500 part of the cycle is -- wanted a brief of what the squadrons were doing for the next training day. So I came in at noon to pull that information based on the flow put
out by Ops and whatever imputes the specific flow head leads had for that.

At around noon, I came over here and at the MAG Ops center it was still to be determined if people were going to fly and then how that affected the airfield itself. What I believe -- what was ultimately determined around 13 to 1400 was that there was only flight to the [b](6). would go. And then there was an outlaying question of whether there was going to be night Ops. Specifically, does this National day of Mourning affect anything past 2359 on Wednesday?

So there was a significant amount of question about that and then in my recall I believe was questions about the prior permission --

[b](3) (A), (b) (6) : All right. Stop.

[The interview recessed at 1446, 16 January 2019.]

[The interview was called to order at 1504, 16 January 2019.]

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6) : We're back on the record. I'm [b] (3) (A), (b) (6) . We've relocated to another building due to a fire alarm being pulled in MAG Headquarters. I'm still with [b] (3) (A), (b) (6) , [b] (3) (A), (b) (6) , and [b] (3) (A), (b) (6) as our court reporter. And the time now is 1504.

What I seek to understand through this line of questions with [b] (3) (A), (b) is in part what role [b] (3) (A), (b) had in the Wing ULT or MAG ULT -- whatever we're calling it for the first week of December -- and what he knows about the circumstances surrounding it. And the circumstances that I am
probing for is the affect of the day or mourning, the effect it had on the flow of communication and what I am really driving at, for simplicity is, I want to know what the mishap aircrew knew and when about what and where they were being tasked to and what time was available to do proper planning and briefing for the same. So with that in mind, you were talking about Tuesday the -- which I believe is the 2nd or 3rd of December.

(b)(3)(A)(b): Yes, sir. So roughly around 12, 1300 there was questions about what is actually happening on training day three. The effects of what flights can actually launch on training day three. I believe it was only -- there was discussions happening from that 12 to 1600 -- 1500 period there. I believe there was issues with the PPR's, Prior Permission Required into Poeing [ph], and then there was also questions about if the National day or Mourning would apply after 2359 on Wednesday and continue on to the rest of training day three -- as training day three's cycle started at 0600 local until effectively 0559 the next day.

At around 1400, I was trying to consolidate the inputs into this MAG brief, however, things continued to change inside the Marine Aircraft Group Operations Center where operations -- they were trying to determine that. I believe several operation officers as well as commanding officers came in. There was some -- I believe some closed-door-meetings between the COs. And around 1400 or so I was not able to identify what was going to happen on training day three. I was also called out momentarily to run back over to the operational training complex. There was
a non-related issues that needed my attention there.

So when that happened, that brief, basically left there with [b](3) (A), (b) (6). And said I'm not sure what's going to happen. And that's basically the extent that I had. I was gone for about two hours dealing with the separate issue here and came back around 1600. I don't remember -- or I don't know what the final discussions was, but the flows were updated and basically went off the flows that came out of there. And the flows -- all I knew was, from the flows, I believe, there was a couple flights going to PEN and then there was -- I believe there was a section tasked to fly after 20 -- or 0001 --

[b](3) (A), (b) (6): The mishap section?

[b](3) (A), (b): -- the mishap section. And then the --

[b](3) (A), (b) (6): What do you know about their mission?

[b](3) (A), (b): What was --

[b](3) (A), (b) (6): Their assigned mission or their flows? Do you recall?

[b](3) (A), (b): I believe it was seed based off the flows.

[b](3) (A), (b) (6): And what would seed look like, you know, simulated of course seed. That if you were doing seed in the [b](3) (A), (b) (6), which I'm sure you've done, what would that kind of look like? What would you be doing?

[b](3) (A), (b): It varies based on the number of assists available. At the two ship level, it could simply be a designated point on the water and roughly 40 to 50 miles away. Two plans would simulate a missile launch on the point with a
specific amount of timing there. So the idea being there is a
time window in which you shoot missiles so that a specific system
would be suppressed there. So how that would pan out on a two
ship is fly out to the area, find a launch point, find the target
and then it can be conducted out of a formation -- a one
formation with them next to each other. And, basically, they set
a --

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6): Don't get to far into the tactics. I
was just asking. Like, you have to go out, drop a way point, fly
a specific thing.

[b] (3) (A), (b): Yes, sir.

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6): Okay. Without it really seeing
ordnance of any type, right?

[b] (3) (A), (b): No, sir.

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6): Okay. So the (3) (A), (b) (6) -- I noticed
on the flight schedule and speaking with others that I've
interviewed that the (3) (A), (b) proper was actually not
available for scheduling do to a schedule radar outage. In that
case, the crews were directed to operate in the (3) (A), (b) due
regard?

[b] (3) (A), (b): Yes, sir.

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6): Have you ever operated in the (3)
(A), (b) (6) Due regard?

[b] (3) (A), (b): I have not.

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6): Do you have any idea what that would
mean if you were asked to do that?
So what would that mean? Would you be operating VMC in those conditions? Would it be acceptable to operate VMC?

Yes, sir.

Really? So you could fly through a cloud, due regard.

VMC, sir.

VMC?

Yes, sir.

I'm sorry. Yes. VMC. IMC would be acceptable? Operate IMC, that's what I meant to say. Can you fly through the clouds?

No. You should not be able --

So you should maintain VFR and VMC?

Yes, sir.

Okay. What -- and the flight took place at night. What considerations would involve lighting? Would going midnight or covert be acceptable or do you know?

Is this with the assumption that there is a
tanker out there or --

Yes. I'm sorry. Now, you've gone to the tanker so as we know the mishap involved air refueling and we had two F-18s twined up with a Marine Corps C-130. What kind of restrictions from your qualification designation level would you expect if you were offering flight supervision of that flight, what lighting conditions would be appropriate or acceptable; or would there be any limits?

There would be -- I would execute both overt and covert operations potentially. So it could be -- there wouldn't necessarily be restrictions, sir, as long as both the tanker as well as the other aircraft were -- had coordinated or were on the same page.

Okay. And you're an F-18 WISSO, I'm sure you've been to the tanker before?

Yes, sir.

Day and night?

Yes.

ANVS-9 and ANVS-11?

Only ANVS-9s.

ANVS-9. When going to the tanker at night and wearing the ANVS-9 for a, you know, goggle flight, which of course we do pretty much every time you fly at night. What kind of briefing items, procedures, and considerations would be associated with the wear of night vision goggles while conducting night system air refueling?
So specific to night system air refueling. Lighting would be a discussion and then tanker procedures as well there. I'd probably talk a little bit about the potential uniqueness to a join on a tanker as opposed to a joining on another fighter aircraft. It's just this is abnormal, in that, we don't do it very often -- or I haven't done it as often in more recent years. So that's probably what I would discuss?

Would it be normal to have the goggles down and on your face or would you maybe flip them up when you're tanking or -- what have you seen more often?

I've -- generally, I've seen them flipped down. And personally I kind of work both. I don't flip them up, but using a --

An under goggle scan?

Yes, sir.

Under goggle scan outside the cockpit?

Yes, sir.

What's the benefit of a under goggle scan outside the cockpit during night systems air refueling?

I just like to QA my scan. So if, based on the lighting, I can just make sure that hey, that's not another star that I'm looking at. So I just kind of -- I just try to maintain the big picture and develop all the inputs that I can to insure that my situational awareness is correct.

What's the effective light level on the effectiveness of you're under goggle scan? Is it effective
between a full moon and a no moon?

[b] (3) (A). (b) : It's decreased. Decrease of light level.

[b] (3) (A). (b) (6) : Yes. So if it's really, really dark outside, how well is your under goggle scan compared to --

[b] (3) (A). (b) : Oh, it's not good depending on if there's lights out there or not.

[b] (3) (A). (b) (6) : Yes.

[b] (3) (A). (b) : Not that -- lux versus artificial lighting, sir.

[b] (3) (A). (b) (6) : And then of course, aircraft lighting as well, right?

[b] (3) (A). (b) : Yes, sir.

[b] (3) (A). (b) (6) : So this reminds us to say if it was low light level and you were on the tanker and the tanker was covert only, what kind of under goggle scan would you have --

[b] (3) (A). (b) : I'd probably not. It'd probably internal to the cockpit itself.

[b] (3) (A). (b) (6) : Very little outside light?

[b] (3) (A). (b) : Yes. Primarily through the goggles. So yes, sir.

[b] (3) (A). (b) (6) : So what is the -- and stop me if you're not super familiar with these technical questions, but what do you understand the field of view to be of the ANVS-9 and ANVS-11?

[b] (3) (A). (b) : Forty degrees of field of view.

[b] (3) (A). (b) (6) : Circular or rectangular field of view?

[b] (3) (A). (b) : Circular.
Forty degrees circular field of view. And roughly, what do you understand to be the naked eye field of view, roughly, for the average human?

Plus or minus -- Feel free to test it while you're doing that. So you get -- the witness has his hands out and is moving them back.

Like peripheral? All the way, the field of view, probably about plus or minus 70 of centerline, I believe, roughly.

Okay.

Maybe farther.

Okay. Would you be surprised if I told you it was 210 degrees? So this is 180, right?

Yes.

So this is 180 and then you go back just a smidge more.

I'd buy that, sir. Yes, sir.

It depends on the person. I have a skinny head so maybe I'm a little --

Yes. Probably just after 90, plus or minus 90. Yes, that makes sense, sir.

So 40 is going to be like plus or minus 20 and then we're going to be way back here.

Yes, sir.

Okay. As a Hornet back seater as a
WISSO, and we've talked about TCC, Tactical Crew Coordination, that's the inter-cockpit communication between the front and the back seater in the hornet. What are some times when a WISSO might be particularly quiet and when are some times when a WISSO might be particular oral with his pilot?

(b)(3)(A),(b): Quiet is high concentration items or when there is close proximity of aircraft where things are going as planned or as expected, I'll probably be more quiet to allow him to focus on the specific task. Other times that I'd speak more is being directive in more -- in missions. There are certain missions where there is much more back and forth. Where it's less of piloting skills but more of a integrating with external agencies and coordination of other aircraft and then insuring that our aircraft our -- when we're dynamically maneuvering there may be times where I'll be a little bit more assertive, if you will, sir.

(b)(3)(A),(b) (6): So it'd be fair to say that in general the conduct of night systems lowlight level air refueling while in the basket that would be a high concentration task in a time when the WISSO might be a little more quiet?

(b)(3)(A),(b): Yes, sir.

(b)(3)(A),(b) (6): Okay. When you're in the back seat of a Hornet and the pilot got's the probe in the basket and you're taking gas, what would be a typical workload? What would you being doing? What would be some tasks that you would be accomplishing? What would you be monitoring?
I'd pull up my fuel page as well as our -- verifying the engine instruments, kind of scanning that back and forth. And then potentially queuing the math of insuring that we've got the expected pre-load -- or expected off-load of what were -- and then calculating how that's going to effect the follow-on mission post that tanking. So assessing, hey, how's he doing in there? How's he tanking? Kind of looking outside. How's everybody else doing? And then queuing my internal aircraft parameters. And then subsequently also thinking, kind of, moving -- thinking forward as well. So multiple aspects there.

And if your pilot was in the basket as night, lowlight level, goggled, and it sounds like you would probably have your goggles on; would it be true to say you would probably put a lot of your attention outside the cockpit to the C-130 on your right side, to just keep sight of that?

Yes, sir. I believe I -- I haven't flow at night and tanked in four, probably four years, five years, but --

How long have you been here?

I've been here for about a year and a half. Since July of 2017, sir.

Are you DIFOP [ph] and flying right now?

I am. Yes, sir.

Whens the last time you flew?

I flew last Thursday.
Okay. And you haven't been to the night Tanking in several years?

Yes, sir.

What did you do before you came here?

I was an instructor at Top Gun.

And you guys didn't go to the night tanker at Top Gun?

No, sir. We don't fly at night there based off currency requirements and syllabus requirements there -- or there are no syllabus events directed at night.

It's a day show at Top Gun?

Yes, sir. And then we'll get some night currency on occasion, but that is outside the syllabus there and generally administrative in nature if we are.

So with your time at Navy Fighter Weapons School in Fallon, Nevada, what differences did you note between the big Navy's use in night visions goggles and Marine tac use in night vision goggles; anything?

No, sir. Not only because I did not -- I was not current --

So they don't even fly with goggles at Top Gun?

No. Because they don't fly at night.

Okay.

There's another unit there, Strike, which does the air wing training. And they do the majority of the night
systems training.

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6): Did you ever fly with those guys at all?

[b] (3) (A), (b): I did, but not at night, sir. But I did for currency and what not there, sir. But that being said, back to the original question. I forgot the original question, sir.

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6): I just asked you how many times you've been to the tanker at night. And you said it has been four years.

[b] (3) (A), (b): It's been quite sometime, sir.

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6): Were you flying in the back of a rhino at Top Gun?

[b] (3) (A), (b): Yes, sir.

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6): Nice. And since you've been here for a year and a half, DIVFOP [ph], you mainly with 242? I see you're wearing the patch. Or do you fly with the UDP squadrons or just whatever you can get?

[b] (3) (A), (b): Whatever I can get. Generally, I think, it's been -- if I pulled out my logbook, the majority would be the UDP squadrons, sir.

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6): That's because 242's readiness or why is that?

[b] (3) (A), (b): Since May, it's been readiness. And then prior to that there was some readiness issues. And then there was a little bit of -- it was just difficult to get a flight with 242.

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6): What happened after May in terms of
readiness? Was there a change in degradation readiness this summer, 2018?

I think -- well, they went down to -- in June to July timeframe, they went down to Australia. And based on myself and [ph] supporting different squadrons, he was still fulfilling some training officer duties there. So we sent him down there and I went to Hawaii to support 533. But I think, as I understand it, they struggled throughout Australia based off of delivery of maintenance pack up to Australia. As they returned in roughly October time frame, I believe a lot of aircraft went to -- I believe they went into phase. I believe there was some issues with inspections and there was some downing discrepancies. And they've been trying to revitalize their maintenance since then, sir.

What is your definition of a hazard in regards to aviation? Like when I say, what's a hazard, how -- in your own words?

Any situation or factor that can cause danger to aircraft or people.

Okay. And then how would you define a risk?

A risk is -- I'd say it's pretty similar.

Hazard and risk, kind of the same?

Yes, sir.

What's a mitigation?

One is identifying what that specific risk is
and then, based on that scenario -- or based on that specific factor, applying something that prevents it or decreases the severity and/or probability. Probably both there. So a mitigation is implementing some type of control to prevent that risk from occurring.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): Do you consider flying in the wee hours of night to be a hazard?

(b) (3) (A), (b): Yes.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): And what would be some mitigations you would put in place if you were planning to fly in the wee hours of the night?

(b) (3) (A), (b): We call it a "ramp," but insuring that our circadian rhythm gets on step -- being used to staying up at those hour there. There's also crew day limitations. Per our SOP it's any flight between midnight to 0600 -- I believe it's 0600 off the top of my head, or 0700 -- your crew day decreases to ten hours there. And then, I think, as a flight lead it's just -- potentially being, you know, deliberate with communications and operations in my own personal -- inside the cockpit just not necessarily doing things out of muscle memory, but slowing things down for lack of a better term, sir.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): What about crew pairing in a delta Hornet, you know a section of a delta Hornet. You've got four aviators to pick from. In the context and maybe stepping aside necessarily from I'm going to go ahead and call flying in the middle of the night a medium risk or a risk mission. Not extreme
or anything, but there is additional risk compared to day; however you want to quantify that. If you knew that you were flying those wee hour of night and let's say you were a PTO or an OPSO, how might you think you might try to address that?

One is you got to look at currency and proficiency. So, one, are they night current? Two, based on what crews I have available, you know, who is -- who has either experience flying at night in the grand scheme of things, as well as who's been flying at night recently and who's more recently. Also, when it comes to crew pairing, is that in terms of pilot WISSO, sir?

Yeah, sure. Or throughout the section. You know, if you knew you had a really strong section leader or a really strong WISSO or, perhaps, someone with some human factors or who's demonstrated, you know, performance concerns. How do you address that in a delta squadron?

It varies from command to command. One method is to put a more senior person with -- let's say you got a pilot who's -- has a lower performance. There's a potential to put in a more senior or more -- not necessarily senior, but, I guess, senior and flight leadership experience to help them potentially, get through that. There's that option in that scenario. Other commands kind of think about the crew zero concept. Crew zero concept is that if you put equal experience levels in the cockpit they develop, potentially, better together. So there's different views on how to do that and I think commands vary. I'd say less
about -- I've seen probably about thirty percent lean towards crew zero. And then I'd say seventy percent would put a different varying level of experience if there's a decrease capability or proficiency level.


(b)(3)(A),(b): My NATOPS [ph] jacket is held at -- well its currently here at MATS, however, it is held at MAG DOS. So it's at MAG DOS. It's checked in there. We've just borrowed it to -- just to clean up some items.

(b)(3)(A),(b)(6): Where's your flight gear?

(b)(3)(A),(b): My flight gear is at 242, sir.

(b)(3)(A),(b)(6): So are you assigned to 242 or are you not really assigned to a squadron?

(b)(3)(A),(b): I'm assigned to MATS with regards to M-SHARP.


(b)(3)(A),(b): And then MAG DOS holds the NATOPS [ph] jackets and uses the logbooks. And then I basically augment aircrew/flight gear at 242.

(b)(3)(A),(b)(6): How does 242 account for your personal human factors? Are you on their human factors counsel?


(b)(3)(A),(b)(6): Are you on their Force Preservation Council?


(b)(3)(A),(b)(6): Do you complete, read, and initial at
225, the current UDP squadron or 242 the current squadron?

So I do my RNI at 242 and then usually that's where I'll do it. And then whenever I go to a squadron and fly with them I'll just check their RNIs and make sure if there's any unique ones, potentially like a squadron RNI. So I make sure I'm good with them there. So making sure -- and squadron specific standardization items or I read and initial items I cover down on.

What -- have you read the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing Order 3710, SOP for flight operations?

I have. Yes.

Okay. Where did you find that?

I found it on the MAW Sharepoint.

Okay. And was that a PDF document?

It's a Word document, sir.

It's a Word document. So it's a Word document, does it have a signature on it?

It does not.

Is it a draft document? I don't understand.

So I kind of when -- that was the question I had when I took over and looked at the historicals up to a certain time. I don't have the date. There was an actual formal PDF document that was signed. And then --

Signed by General Weidley you think? The current --
No. I believe it was prior to General Weidley. Maybe?
Potentially or prior to.
Maybe?
Okay.
I believe it was prior to General Weidley. In searching for that document, I found something -- I believe it was on the Sharpoint that I had that wrote the flight operations because things change. It's going to maintained on the Sharepoint side and it -- rather than -- the justification was rather than having to reroute a whole SOP change, it would be like a living document on the Sharepoint. That was my understanding.

So the Wing, the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, Wing SOP, as you understand it, is a Marine Aviation training systems site OIC is an editable electronic document?
I don't know if it is editable, but it is definitely a word document. Whether they put a lot on it or -- it could be. Yes, sir. I don't know that the constraints are.
So you said that it can -- it's a word document so it can be changed by somebody. So how were you notified of those changes?
I'm not.
Do you receive a read and initial update or does the Wing send out something to you that says, hey,
see page -- there's like a change order on a Marine Corps order when there's a change notice or Naytops [ph] change notice. Is there a process like that in place?

\[\text{No, sir. I have not seen one since for a year and a half.}\]

So in the year and a half you've been here, it's -- I don't know if you have any specific instances of it, but it is possible that there could be drastic policy changes in the Wing SOP that governs flight operations that you would not be immediately aware of?

\[\text{No, sir.}\]

\[\text{That's interesting. What other SOPs govern operations of the F-18 at MAG-12?}\]

\[\text{There's the MAG-12 flight operations SOP.}\]

\[\text{There's the F-18 admin SOP.}\]

\[\text{Let's talk about the MAG-12 SOP.}\]

\[\text{Yes, sir.}\]

\[\text{Is that a Word document on the Sharepoint?}\]

\[\text{It is a PDF document, sir.}\]

\[\text{It's a PDF document with the signature on it?}\]

\[\text{Yes, sir.}\]

\[\text{From the current or previous MAG CO?}\]

\[\text{Current.}\]

\[\text{Okay. So that's not -- the characters}\]
in that document are not editable. It's not going to change because it's a PDF, right?

[black]

[b] (3) (A). (b) : No, sir.
[b] (3) (A). (b) (6): And then the F-18 TYCOM admin SOP. Is that a Word document?
[b] (3) (A). (b) : That is a PDF document.
[b] (3) (A). (b) (6): That's a PDF document. Ands who signs that? What, the MAG skippers with hornets or what?
[b] (3) (A). (b) : Yes, sir. All four MAG COs sign it. Yes, sir.
[b] (3) (A). (b) (6): So if that document were to change or evolve, then you'd be notified some how or another that we've got a new hornet admin SOP and here's a copy?
[b] (3) (A). (b) : Yes, sir.
[b] (3) (A). (b) (6): Okay.
[b] (3) (A). (b) : That prevision cycle is every two to three years and it's primarily held with the MATs OICs in creating and amending that.
[b] (3) (A). (b) (6): So that's interesting. So as a MATs OIC, you're intimately involved with the SOP revision process --
[b] (3) (A). (b) : Yes, sir.
[b] (3) (A). (b) (6): -- and change process. And make sure as a flight leadership standardization evaluator, as a FLSE, that folks are in compliance with the latest and greatest standard operating procedures?
[b] (3) (A). (b) : Yes, sir.
[b] (3) (A). (b) (6): So it's essential to your duties, in
fact --

[b](3) (A), (b): Yes, sir.

[b](3) (A), (b) (6): -- standardization? When you came here and you noticed that the Wing SOP was a Word document, did that give you pause or do you think that was normal?

[b](3) (A), (b): I'd say I found it abnormal, but I didn't see any -- I did find it abnormal.

[b](3) (A), (b) (6): Did you -- what was the last Marine Aircraft Wing? Are you a 3d MAW guy, 2nd MAW?

[b](3) (A), (b): 3d MAW, sir.

[b](3) (A), (b) (6): So when you were at 3d MAW, did the 3d MAW have a Wing order 3710?

[b](3) (A), (b): I believe they did, but it's been since -- I left in 2014, sir. So it's been --

[b](3) (A), (b) (6): And you're more of a JO then. Let's go to Top Gun. When you were at fighter weapons school, did they have a SOP?

[b](3) (A), (b): They did, sir.

[b](3) (A), (b) (6): Was it a Word document on Sharepoint?

[b](3) (A), (b): No, sir. It was a PDF document, sir.

[b](3) (A), (b) (6): With the signature of some captain or admiral on it?

[b](3) (A), (b): Yes, sir.

[b](3) (A), (b) (6): Okay. So as a standardization guy, when you got that Wing SOP and noticed it was a Word document, did you reach out to anybody and ask any questions about that?
I did not. Based off of the disclaimer that was on there.

What was the disclaimer?

That changes will be made directly to this -- or if there's any changes at the MAW level, it will be made in this document and that's why it is a Word document. But I can't remember if there was any, hey, we're going to send out a notice or anything. But there was some disclaimer on there, sir.

Okay. All right. I've got unlimited time to listen to any thoughts you might have about communication, leadership, risk management, command pressure. Any factors that could possibly have surrounded this mishap. As the MATs OIC and a flight lead standardization evaluator here at MAG-12, I know you see a lot of that and you're heavily involved in the operations aspects to that.

Any thoughts about how we can prevent something like this happening in the future or any thoughts about some contributing factors that might exist?

I think the --

Speak frankly.

Yes, sir. I'm just trying not to get the A and B stuff. But separate if -- I think there was a lot of confusion in the exercise at the squadron level versus the MAG level there.

So confusion. And confusing results normally from miss or incomplete communication.

Yes, sir.
(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : So are you referencing improve communication between higher headquarters might be something that would be helpful? I don't want to lead you to much, but I'm just kind of reading your gestures and your facial expressions.

(b) (3) (A), (b) : Yes. I think the increased communication, specific to the exercise itself, you know, a determined -- this is what we're going to do like an ATO. These are -- you know, if this is in the context of the specific O-plan we're doing. There's a -- that five day planning process is built through there. So I think there was a lot of confusion of who was going where, what actual airspace do we have, what was the missions. That aspect was -- I think it was a little confusing watching it from my end as well, sir.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : So I like to put the "who" into things a little bit. So the MAG operation office, (b) (3) (A), -- (b) (3) (A), (b) [ph], who we've previously interviewed, would he be a central node of information for that or would it be the Wing G-3, (b) (3) (A), (b) (6) [ph]? Who are the guy -- I mean this is a Wing level exercise, I guess, but it's really a MAG exercise. But it's -- I don't know if it's a squadron exercise. But, like, how is that information coming down and who are the spokesmen?

(b) (3) (A), (b) : I think there was the exercise planner, you know, I was helping out a little bit. MAG Ops, I think there was one question that really was, you know, a question was asked and it was very difficult, like, who's doing what? It was like a
week or maybe two weeks prior -- or prior to that it was like, is there an LOI? Like, hey, who's doing what? You know, there was questions about that and the answer was there is not.

[Redacted]: LOI you said. So an LOI is a letter of instruction. So I think what you're saying is the question was asked a few weeks out if the MAG would provide a LOI?

[Redacted]: Yes, sir.

[Redacted]: And the answer was, no, we're going to just brief it up or communicate by other means?

[Redacted]: Yes, sir. I know that was a little -- that was confusing. There was --

[Redacted]: I mean, do you consider air refueling a complex mission?

[Redacted]: No, sir. And, particular to this incident, I'd say between 1200 to 1600 there was so many questions being tossed out --

[Redacted]: 1200 to 1600 on the Wednesday --

[Redacted]: Correction, on Tuesday.

[Redacted]: Tuesday. Okay. So like 26 hours before the accident?

[Redacted]: Yes, sir. Because the training day three -- the accident happened on training day three but it occurred on the fourth day -- morning of the fourth day of the exercise. So in -- on that Tuesday between, I'd say, 12 to 16, there were a lot of -- there was nothing definite that I knew. I had to step out, but there were a lot of decisions being discussed --
Discussed at the MAG operations center?

Yes, sir. There was -- frankly, you know, you had Ops Os injecting this, we want to do this. We had COs come in, like, you know, there was discussion with the, I believe, the MAG CO and CG of, you know, what can they do? There was coordination between station of, you know, what are their limitations to support it. And I was just trying to keep up. In watching it, I couldn't keep up with all the --

So you said there were Ops Os and COs coming in. Do you feel like 242 would have been represented at some point in some of those conversations?

I believe so. Yes, sir.

Did you ever personally observe the commanding officer of 242 or the operations officer of 242 and engage in any of those conversations?

Were they present?

I believe they were there and I was more of just observing everything that was going on in that. I think there was a couple discussions between, you know, Ops -- Squadron Ops to MAG Ops. And then I believe there was, you know, the 242 CO may have walked out and went and had a discussion with the MAG CO. So I believe there was discussions. I don't know, you know, what the outcome, specifically or what they specifically discussed, but I believe it had to do with, hey, what are we going to -- what are we authorized to do tomorrow? Or what --
either being tasked or authorized to do; one or the other.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): And, sir, this was on Tuesday the 4th?

(b) (3) (A), (b): Yes, sir.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): And when you're saying you observed, where did you observe this? Was that the MAG operations center?

(b) (3) (A), (b): I was at the MAG operations center just working on a power point.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): And if it's not classified, where was that located?

(b) (3) (A), (b): I'm sorry?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): He's asking, where's the MOC? What building is the MOC?

(b) (3) (A), (b): Building 6000.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): So that's the headquarters?

(b) (3) (A), (b): Headquarters building, second story. Yes, sir.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): No these conversations, did it happen like in an open operations floor or was this like you just bouncing around the office spaces and observing this?

(b) (3) (A), (b): No. It was -- so inside the MAG operations center, there's the watch stander and then behind that there's a small operations office there. Some of those discussions were happening in the back end of that there. And then I believe there was a few -- sometimes the CO has discussion inside his own classified room in there or it could have happened in his office.
Okay. So it wasn't in a conference room where everybody was seated and people were talking? It was in operations center and multiple conversations were happening?

At least from 1300 to about 1400. There was an expectation that everyday there would be a 1500 meeting. I believe that meeting did happen.

And you weren't present for that because you came back to the MOTS building?

[inaudible]

Have you ever worked at the squadron level in the operations department?

Yes, as a [inaudible].

You have. So you have experience writing the flight schedule for a Delta Hornet Squadron?

Yes, sir.

Would it be normal to include a training code for night systems air refueling on a squadron flight schedule?

Sir, I believe it's 2202 off the top of my head.

Okay. Would it be normal to include that or is it optional? Tanker code?

I would add a tanker code if I was planning on it.

And you think the tanker code is 2202?

Off the top of my head, Yes, sir.

I'm impressed by that recall. So if
you were taking off to go do SEED and night systems AR, you would have a SEED code. I'm going to quiz you, what's the SEED code? Not 2202. So you would have a four digit code that ment SEED, maybe night systems SEED or, CI, if we're calling it that. And then you would have another code that meant night systems AR; is that correct?

Yes, sir. I would have all the expected TNR codes that would -- that is expected to be completed on that flight --

And as a MATS guy and some what of a MSHARK expert as well, what's the importance of including those codes in the flight schedule?

Well because when you build a flight schedule enforcement off of MSHARK, you put in all those codes so that they can properly get tracked and when they return -- well, one it tells what the mission planners are expected to, but for the aircrew when they come back that they are properly logging everything in accordance with the training plan, the projections, you know, as the training office/operations office attempted to maintain readiness with it's assest, we need to keep track of that so that we can ensure that everybody's properly being trained or fill any gaps and deficiencies.

Does it provide any role for risk management or confirming prerequisites?

It does, sir. In the --

So if you were to schedule me for a
night systems AR code and I hadn't done that in two years, would that provide feedback?

[(b)(3)(A),(b)(6)]: It would. There's an MSHARK validation tool and there's a -- it's a gap tracker and a validation tool. And what that does is it tells you conflicts with regards to any prerequisites and it would also provide conflicts -- time conflicts, things of that nature.

[(b)(3)(A),(b)(6)]: Would, in you're time as a schedule writer, did you ever print off those documents and route them with the flight schedule?

[(b)(3)(A),(b)(6)]: I did, sir. And I'd say that -- yes.

[(b)(3)(A),(b)(6)]: Would it be normal for other personnel to review the flight schedule aside from the commanding officer who signs it to authorize flight?

[(b)(3)(A),(b)]: Yes, sir.

[(b)(3)(A),(b)(6)]: Who would be some of those people?

[(b)(3)(A),(b)]: In my previous command, it would get routed through the Ops O to the AMO and then the DOSS, director of safety and standardization. And in that squadron it was either the DOSS -- basically an ASO to review that.

[(b)(3)(A),(b)(6)]: And what's the ASO, the aviation safety office? What is he or she looking for?

[(b)(3)(A),(b)]: I'd say currency. Just an outside perspective that's not, you know, tied to -- that doesn't necessarily have a conflicted interest in accomplishing, you know, meeting specific objectives there. So it's simply someone who's trained in
aviation safety practices, knows the respective SOPs, but also, one flying in accordance with the SOPs, but also, two is just to have -- see if it makes sense just to assess the risks and see if we're taking any unnecessary risks in that.

: Did you -- so you were at MAG-11 before, right?

: Yes, sir.

: While you were at MAG-11, did you ever hear or use a document called a operation risk assessment worksheet?

: Yes, sir.

: Tell me about the MAG-11 ORM worksheet and what, you know, your familiarity with it.

: It basically talks -- it places several inputs. And I believe there's three categories. The first category is associated with mission planning where currency is taken into account, whether ordnance is expected to employ. Whether there's a day-night consideration. Local area -- basically assessing the mission it self. Then there's another portion of that, this is done for every flight. The CO has some inputs there and that is developed throughout the schedule writing process and if there's any things that trip a certain thresh hold that, let's say that if it was a medium risk then that would require a squadron commanding officer to approve it or not, to determine that, and then if it goes to high potential extreme that may go to the next echelon of command.
So in extreme cases a MAG commanding officer might be required to sign a operational risk assessment worksheet?

I believe so, but at least -- but yeah. That could potentially could happen. Now, only because I'm semi-familiar with MAG-11 now. Four years ago, I don't remember it ever going to the MAG CO there.

So tell me about the -- so you've flown with 242?

Yes, sir.

So can you -- tell me about 242's ORM worksheet.

They don't have one, sir.

So when you go to fly with VMFA-242 at MAG-12, and you get -- you get an ODO brief, right?

Yes, sir.

And that's a weather brief and what not. And then you do a flight brief, right?

Yes, sir.

But before you walk to the jet, is there like a one page document that the flight lead reviews and does like, hey, everybody get plenty of sleep. I am safe. And then checks some boxes and sign, initial some stuff and sign some stuff or --

I don't believe so. Not that I know of. Generally, it's conducted within the brief, the ORM portion of
the brief of the flights that I have flown with them, sir.

: Okay. So in lieu of a worksheet that maybe the ODO would have with the flight schedule, you guys cover it in some tactical briefing items or some administrative briefing items rather?

: It's definitely discussing administrative briefing items, but I don't know if any additional ORM is conducted throughout their internal processes.

: So when you were at MAG-11 did you guys not cover ORM in the brief?

: We did, sir.

: Okay. So when you were at MAG-11 you covered ORM in the brief, but you also had this ORM worksheet?

: Yes, sir.

: So you had two things?

: [nonverbal response].

: What about when you were at Top Gun? How did you guys do that at Top Gun? Do you recall?

: We definitely did it in the flight -- or correction, in the brief. I don't recall if the ODO actually -- I don't recall, sir.

: Fair enough. Did you find it a useful tool at MAG-11 or was it just more pencil whipped BS?

: As a schedule writer I found it beneficial because I would -- when I was writing the schedule I could just kind of QA. It would help me -- it'd be an additional
verification throughout my process until I got to the end of the day and the MSHARK output there. So it helped me pre-lead those tasks so that I didn't have to make last minute changes on there. So I found it useful in the scheduling process. And then I think it varied on a personal level once it got to, I think, the MAG-11. There about five inputs that the flight lead conducts prior to him walking. I don't want to say that it was pencil whipped, but it was all stuff that was already doing there. So it was repetitive and yeah. That's it.

[b] (b) (3) (A), (b) (6) [b] (3) (A), (b) (6) [b] (3) (A), (b) (6) [b] (3) (A), (b) (6) [b] (3) (A), (b) (6) [b] (3) (A), (b) (6): Okay.

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6): Sir, did it surprise you when you first flew with 242 that they didn't do an ORM worksheet? Was it note worthy to you?

[b] (3) (A), (b): No. Not necessarily. No. Otherwise I probably would have brought it up earlier than that.

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6): When you were a daily schedule writer at your previous gun squadron, did the flight schedule include initials for the CO, XO, Ops O, AMO or anybody?

[b] (3) (A), (b): It was maintenance, DOSS, and Ops, and then the CO.

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6): Do you know if 242 scheduling includes that or not, are you familiar?

[b] (3) (A), (b): It does not now. It did probably last year -- or I believe it did include it prior to the change of command.

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6): So that interesting. So ?42 had a change of command in the summer of 18?
...: Yes, sir.
(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): So I think that you're saying is the previous squadron commander had some initial blocks on the flight schedule document. And then after the change of command they were removed?
(b) (3) (A), (b): Yes, sir.
(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): Do you have any knowledge as to why that was done or the benefit of that?
(b) (3) (A), (b): No, sir. And frankly I didn't notice a change. Really it was just kind of recently that I really recognized that change there.
(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): But you're not routing the flight schedule, you're just executing it once in a blue moon, right?
(b) (3) (A), (b): Yes, sir.
(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): Okay.
(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): How many squadrons have you seen that with where it's just the CO signing the flight schedule?
(b) (3) (A), (b): I believe just 242 of, like, of all the other -- yeah. I think just 242.
(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): Did they put out a flight schedule at Top Gun?
(b) (3) (A), (b): They did. Yes, sir.
(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): Did it have, do you recall if it just had the CO signature on it or did it have an XO, Ops O, AMO, ASO?
(b) (3) (A), (b): Didn't have an -- I can't recall, sir.
(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): Fair enough. But you're previous
Marine Hornet squadron definitely did. When you wrote schedule, do you remember going to see folks to get them to initial a flight schedule before the commanding officer's signature?


(b)(3)(A)(b): In your process of writing a flight schedule at your previous command, did you ever go to operations officer or a maintenance officer or a safety officer who had concerns with what was documented on the schedule?


(b)(3)(A)(b): And what would that lead to?

(b)(3)(A)(b): Schedule change or potential mitigation like an additional control put on there. So potently changing the event, changing the crew pairing or the crew itself, and then potential restrictions like limited maneuvering or some additional restriction.

(b)(3)(A)(b): What do you think we could have done to prevent this mishap?

(b)(3)(A)(b): I'm having trouble since I'm on the FOPB, sir.


(b)(3)(A)(b): Anything else you would like to add?


(b)(3)(A)(b): Judge -- okay the judge will swear you out. And we'll be done.

(b)(3)(A)(b) was warned, sworn, and excused.
Good afternoon, the time is 1135. We are in Iwakuni, Japan, on Thursday, January the 17th. Present in the room are, 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, Staff Judge Advocate, 1st MAW, the court reporter.

This is an interview for the witness, United States Marine Corps. And, please, state your full name for the record, spelling your last name.

I'm a KC-130J aircraft commander. Since 2007.

2007? Roughly, how many flight hours do you have in the C-130?

Just about three -- in the C-130, about 2,800.

What is your qualification and designation level in the C-130?

I'm a weapon and tactics instructor.

So you're authorized to provide instruction?
[b](3) (A), [b] (6): Yes.
[b](3) (A): Okay. Where were you in November and December of 2018?
[b](3) (A), [b] (6): I was probably on a couple of -- I was on one TAD trip I believe in November just for two days down to Okinawa. And then in December of 2018, I was here the entire month and participating in MAG ULT.
[b](3) (A): MAG ULT. So that was the exercise that took place, that was ongoing during the mishap. Tell me a little bit about the MAG ULT. The purpose of it, and how it went down, and what it was supposed to look like.
[b](3) (A), [b] (6): The purpose of MAG ULT had evolved from a different flavor of exercise that wasn't just going to involve MAG-12 aircraft for 1st MAW aircraft. It was going to involve joint aircraft in the beginning. Over time, due to political, geographic availability issues, the exercise changed in flavor dramatically.

We had allocated, assuming that I was a big joint level exercise, that there were going to be a total of five KC-130J's allocated to it, and we received our tasking also supported that. So as other assets and services fell out of the exercise, we retained five aircraft in support of the MAG-12 exercise and then decided to make it as replicative as we could of certain scenarios to get maximum training value out of the exercise as other players fell out of it.
[b](3) (A): Okay. Did you attend any meetings at Enclosure 140
the MAG Operations Center?

[b](3)(A), (b) (6): I did. I came to meetings routinely. The way our squadron typically works when we're talking about exercises for detachments, we have a detachment lead planner, which is one of my captains in the operations department. I am involved with them through planning for the exercises and get involved where I need to whenever they come to roadblocks or we need to have OPSO participation.

This was a unique exercise in that a lot of the planning, eventually, was being done here at MAG-12. Where as, typically, that's done at FPC's and NPC's, which I just answer and make sure I'm involved remotely with my reps who we send to those meetings.

So as the flavor of MAG-12 ULT changed, I was coming to pretty much all of the meetings over at MAG-12 where either the MAG-12 OPSO was going to be there, or we were at a friction point I knew that I needed inject myself into. And also just as opportune timeline it allows, it was, kind of, just prioritizing my time, but making sure I was really at all the meetings where they were being run by MAG OPSO proper, rather than the lower level planners across the squadrons.

[b](3)(A): Okay. Were you surprised that air refueling was being conducted at the time and place it was at the mishap, or did you expect that?

[b](3)(A), (b) (6): No, I expected it and we scheduled it that night.
Okay.

The plan had changed dramatically that day due to the national day of mourning for George H. W. Bush. We were planning on flying pre established flows through the whole exercise. We had flown those flows from the squadron level on Monday and Tuesday completely, and it was a huge confidence builder for our squadron. Generated 37 SORTY's over the course of two days, which was amazing.

You're smiling as you speak, so that sounds like that's good stuff for an OPSO?

It was awesome stuff and we were so fired up. And then we got told that we could not fly air to air refueling SORTY's on Wednesday and our schedule got changed due to the national day of mourning. And we were only allowed to flight assault transport SORTY's into that day; however, we were clear to resume air to air refueling operations after midnight on the night into morning of the fifth into the sixth on Wednesday.

So then you launched aircraft at 0030 on December the 6th, 2018 to conduct a night systems air refueling?

Yes, sir. And that flight was scheduled on a 5 December flight schedule due to the crew's showtime being before midnight on that day.

Okay. Was that executed, roughly, as scheduled in terms of crew, and take off time, and mission?
Absolutely, to my knowledge on our end. I mean, not being able, obviously, to talk to those guys, but getting their take off time from tower, knowing what time that crew showed up to work that day, that everything was going. And talking to our duty officers, everything was going as planned.

And this I your squadron obviously, so have you flown with any of the members of the mishap crew before in your life?

Absolutely, both, I mean was one of the FRD East instructors. He was junior to me, but I didn't fly with him out here in this AO yet because he had recently PCS'd out over the Summer time. But, in the past, he was -- me being a NATOPS instructor, they were the KC-130J model managers. So I had been familiar with him in our community for a long time. I think he had given me personally one or two of my NATOPS check rides annually.

And then, great friends with him. I worked at MOTS with him for a little over two years. Shared many, many flights with him. Flew as his wingman, I flew as his lead numerous times throughout our career.

Would you consider those to be highly qualified C-130 aircrew?

Absolutely.

Did you ever observe those men to do anything reckless?

No.
Do you -- did you see any of the mishap aircrew earlier in the day?

I did not and I was actually really, really happy about that because, who I had most direct, you know, just because of his job as the Executive Officer and just by nature of us being really good friends in the squadron. We'd be talking all day, everyday as our ground duties and personal situations would dictate. I was really -- and he's a just complete workaholic.

So I knew that it was going to be tough for him not to show up at work until way later to facilitate a 0300 or 0400 -- 0330 land time, whatever we had it scheduled as. And I was glad because that day was a national day of mourning. His wife's job got called off and then his kids weren't allowed to go to school.

So I was, like, sweet. I was, like, they get to have a day together as a family, I'm really glad that he's not in at work. And then I left work that night on 5 December at 1845ish and he was not at work yet. And I know that because I didn't see him and his parking spot is right next to mine.

So it would be --

And I didn't see either because he was my AOPSO and was not in operations when I left.

So that leads you to believe that the opportunity was provided for sufficient crew rest and appropriate crew day for the execution of the mission of the crews?

Absolutely. There was no question for our
KC-130 crew that they knew that they were not showing up at work in the daytime prior to -- they had a ten hour crew day limit. So, technically, we apply one hour post flight to our land time. So if land time was 0430, they wouldn't have been able to come into work legally until 1830 at the earliest on 5 December.

(b) (3) (A): How is that policy codified?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): So that was codified. For KC-130, our crew day, if it involves, if it's after a midnight land time, we're limited to 15 hours. In the planning for the 24 hour ops that were going to be accomplished on the Wednesday and Thursday of the MAG ULT, it was passed via CUB or -- it wasn't necessarily -- I can't remember if it was a CUB or a confirmation brief by that crew days were limited to 12 hours if terminating before midnight and ten hours post midnight. So we took that for action. It actually -- I don't know if it was in a CUB or, like I said, a confirmation brief. I took that for action and I gave our squadron level MAG ULT confirmation brief to all aircrew and then all staff NCO's as well, besides aircrew of some maintenance department, was fully spooled up on what we were doing. And that was a secret briefing that I gave in the afternoon of the Friday of the week before it started. So that would have been on --

(b) (3) (A): The 30th maybe?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): -- 30 November. And I gave the brief for what the fly windows were going to be and what the crew days were going to be to the squadron, and briefed everyone on that and
said -- and I remember making, no offense, sir, I made the smart ass response I think to [b](3)(A). like, well, that's more conservative than our typical crew day, this is easy. You just whittled down our NATOPS crew day by two-thirds, like, I'll take it.

[b](3)(A): Yes, right. Okay.

How do you interface with VMFA-all weather-242? What's the mechanism by which those two operations departments communicate?

[b](3)(A),(b)(6): Well, for normal operations we communicate via the ASR process. So, I mean, we're not operationally controlled by MAG-12. So our tasking routinely in support of 242 has to come via the ASR process whenever an assigned ASR is assigned to us, then we give that ASR out, schedule it for the crew. And then, whatever crew has direct responsibility for that ASR, then they're calling the operations department, first, at 242 and then getting down into the flight leads for the detailed coordination prior to that mission. If it involves fixing air to air refueling.

[b](3)(A): So you said ASR. I think that's an Assault Support Request. And the ASR as a C-130 and I think it might be traditional in other Wings in the Marine Corps, C-130's are actually controlled at the Wing level, not at the MAG level. Do I understand that correctly?

[b](3)(A),(b)(6): Yes, sir.

[b](3)(A): Okay. So if 242 wanted a Tank, they
would submit an Assault Support Request to the MAG, that would actually go up to the Wing --

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Yes.

(b) (3) (A), : -- for approval, could then come back down through the MAG and then back down to you for assignment?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : It would come direct from MAW to us for assignment.

(b) (3) (A), : Okay. And who's the staff officer at the MAW that your operations department might receive such assignments from typically?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : The Air Transport Coordination Officer.

(b) (3) (A), : The ATCO? What's the name and rank of the person currently serving that capacity?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : (b) (3) (A), .

(b) (3) (A), : ? Is that Breather?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Yes, sir.

(b) (3) (A), : Okay. So what about for this exercise? Was the ATCO engaged, or was this a different because we're doing, like, a MAG ULT?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Yes. So for teeped exercises, and this exercise was teeped, although, it changed in flavor, for whenever we allocate aircraft to that exercise, that if they're being used within those exercise dates. That we have been told by Wing to teep those aircraft for, then whatever is happening inside of those windows do not need to go through the ASR process.

(b) (3) (A), : So it's like duraloth, kind of, right?
Yes, sir.

Between supporting and supported units, and in this case you would be the supporting unit, and 242 the supported?

Yes, sir.

Okay. So getting to the exercise then, so, now, answering the question in a different way, how were you interfacing with 242 so that they understood what type of air refueling, specifically, not assault support transport, but air refueling, was taking place? When, and where, and how much give? How was that information exchanged?

So all of that, because they are the planned missions for the TAC air, we could drastically change due to where they were flying, what ranges were available, and the fact that other joint assets had fallen out. So the way I understood it, it had been told to the TAC air squadrons that, yes, we are still going to fly the flow contracted times.

But, what the squadrons decided to do with that was over to their discretion in order to maximize the training value that was afforded to them for having the airspace, and the time, and the aircraft allocated to those SORTY's. So -- and then we were given from the MAG level, from, we were given by him the airspace that we were afforded to do these operations. So I knew whether it was VMFA-225, whether or not it was 225, 242, or 121. What squadron the receivers were coming from, and then I knew what airspace we had to do the Tanking.
And then our, [b](3)(A)., would work with the operations departments, the scheduling departments, to find the appropriate points of contacts for the flight leads for whatever, whoever we were supporting out there to hash out the final flight details for the air to air refueling.

[b](3)(A).: Okay. Would it be -- would you expect to see air refueling on -- air refueling TNR codes on your flight schedule?

[b](3)(A).: Absolutely.

[b](3)(A).: Would you expect to see those similar codes on the fighter schedule?

[b](3)(A).: Yes, sir. But, I do not check their schedule.

[b](3)(A).: I understand. Lets talk a little about your experience as a C-130 instructor and a night systems air refueling SOP's. Can we do that?

[b](3)(A).: Yes, sir.

[b](3)(A).: So I assume at your experience level, you've conducted fixed wing air refueling as a C-130 Tanker instructor pilot a few times?

[b](3)(A).: Yes, sir.

[b](3)(A).: And your probably done it at night?

[b](3)(A).: Yes, sir.

[b](3)(A).: Is there a TNR code for night air refueling?

[b](3)(A).: There is not for the pilot side. But, there
is for our observer side.


(b)(3)(A), (b)(6): So on the pilot side, whether it's day or night, fixed wing or tilt rotor air to air refueling, it's the same TNR event, AAR 3600. That's because our TTP's, generally as pilots, we're in a Tanker orbit and we're expecting receivers to come in and them to effect the rendezvous on us.

And we need to have knowledge based off of the appropriate procedures per the ATP 3342, also known as ATP 56(c). And then we also need to have detailed knowledge of the air to air refueling system, how to run the hoses, and fuel knowledge, and planning.

(b)(3)(A): Okay. So you've conducted at night. Have you ever done it at night while wearing night vision goggles?

(b)(3)(A), (b)(6): Yes, sir. Anytime we do fixed wing air to air refueling, post EENT, the expectation is we schedule it and we brief it, that the entire crew is going to be aided.

(b)(3)(A): Okay. What would the typical flow look like if a section of Hornets joined up on you? Kind of, can you briefly walk me through -- don't build a watch. Can you briefly walk me through what that looks like? You know, what altitude they would arrive at, what type of instructions you would give, and then what altitude and from what side of the C-130 they would depart?
So they should be contacting us, depending on line of sight issues with the radios. They'll contact us well before their visual. And before their visual, at least 10 to 15 minutes prior to the ARCT, we'll be monitoring the AR primary frequency that has been pre coordinated via the AR card with the receivers. And then we'll also have your pre-designated air to air TAC hand selected for receivers to find us, knowing full well that Harriers need that a little bit more than what F-35's and Hornets typically do with the capabilities of their radar system. So they'll check in with us.

We'll tell them the altitude that we're at, because it could have changed for the Tanking altitude given cloud layers. And we'll issue them an altimeter setting, and expect them, and tell them to maintain their join-up altitude, which is 1,000 feet for fixed wing, below the AR altitude until visual. Then we'll wait to hear the receiver's visual.

Once they call us visual, we'll clear them to join. They'll come in low and left and we'll clear them to join in echelon left. From there, the standard would typically -- unless the flight lead dictates otherwise due to crew comfort or fuel state, from there we'll typically clear the lead aircraft over in to the right of astern position. And the dash 2 aircraft into the astern left position. We can move them simultaneously for fixed wing, we're allowed to do that.

And once our observers in the back say that they're stabilizing astern position, approximately 5 feet behind the
basket with no closure, we'll clear them to contact. We can clear fixed wing receivers to contact simultaneously. Contact will give them gas. Our offload rate is typically about 2,000 pounds per hour for the receivers. Get them their pre brief fuel. If their fuel state requires more and we have it, we'll give them additional fuel based on our comms.

And then after they are complete, if -- it doesn't matter who's complete first, like, if the guy in the left basket is complete first, we'll clear them to disconnect and go echelon right. Even if the right hand guy is still in the basket. At that point, they're all members of our flight. They have essay for everyone who's in and around the Herc. And we'll clear them over to the echelon right position, as that is the standard position for departure.

Once they're in the echelon position for departure and both complete, they say they're ready to go, we, as Tankers, through that time are assumed to have the best essay for the airspace picture because we're typically monitoring more radios than the receivers are capable of. And then we'll clear them to depart based off of a couple of factors. If we know more about traffic, we'll give them directed departure instructions. If it's all just based on their discretion, we'll ask which way they want to depart and then clear them to depart.

The standard for departure, per the ATP, is level or climbing departure. Based off -- and this is something technique-wise. Can't tell you how many people in the squadron
I've given this brief to, or I gave the brief to while I was at MOTS and training NSI's, but as a result of the 242 mishap in 2016, which I was not here in this AO for. I was at MOTS during the time. Where they cleared the receivers to depart and they ended up running into a basket.

I state all of the time to receivers to tell them to get to an altitude, at least 500 feet above the Tankers altitude, prior to initiating any turns. So for example, it would be that 4142, you're cleared to depart high and right. Attain flight level 18.5 prior to initiating any turns. And that was just, you know, a practice that I had developed and briefed over time as a result of something that had happened recently in our community.

But, imperative as an instructor, for me, always, whether or not it's a single Tanker or whether or not it's a Tanker formation, that joins are always from low and left and departures are always high and right.

(b)(3)(A): That's an excellent description, thank you. One thing that I just want to correct for the record. You said alt flow rate is 200 pounds per hour, you mean minute?

(b)(3)(A), (b)(6): Two thousand. Two thousand pounds per hour.

(b)(3)(A): Two thousand pounds per minute?

(b)(3)(A), (b)(6): Two thousand pounds per minute. Yes, sir.

(b)(3)(A): Yes. I think I said 200, and you said hour and I said minutes, but about 2,000 pounds per minute depending on the aircraft the receivers are in.

(b)(3)(A), (b)(6): Yes, sir.
Okay. And that's great. Let's talk about lighting stuff. And you and I have already talked about this a little bit, but let's talk about it on the record.

When the -- after the receivers are established in formation with the Tanker at night, so after the receivers have found you and joined on you, be that left echelon or perhaps even cleared in to the stern position as appropriate, have you ever had receivers ask you to adjust your external lighting system as their refueling aircraft commander?

Yes, sir. All the time.

What would be a typical request? And what would be a typical response?

It would be, hey Sumo, can you go covert?

Okay. And then what would you do?

And then, for me, and this is not standardized anywhere across our publications. And legality wise, every kind of environmental and airspace that you're operating in and country would be different. But, if I felt at that point that I was within the intent of the regulations to be within special use airspace and other traffic was not an issue, I would tell them I will go covert when you're in the astern position.

Okay. And when you go covert, what external lights are illuminated on the C-130?

On the C-130 -- on unaided or aided, sir?

Covert.
So to other traffic, if you do not have night vision goggles on. When I switch my --

That's not the question. Okay. What actual light bulbs are burning? What systems on the C-130 are receiving electrical power to be illuminated when you switch to covert?

To covert? The top strobe.

Okay. A covert strobe?

A covert strobe.

Okay. What else?

Covert navigation position lights.

Okay.

And IR formation lights. Strip lights.

IR strip lights?

Yes, sir.

What is a --

And the pod status lights, as long as my hoses are extended.

Okay. And what is a covert position light? Tell me about your covert position lights.

There are one on each wing, one on the tail, one on the top, and one on the bottom of the aircraft.

And those are called covert position lights?

Well, those are called navigation.

Covert nav? So they're nav lights?
They're nav lights that have a covert setting available to them.

Okay. So when they're overt, are those the red, green, and white lights?

Yes, sir.

And then when you switch to covert, they all go, like, green?

Yes, sir. Well, they go green on the goggles, but invisible to the naked eye.

Okay. Awesome. And if I was looking at a C-130 at night, particularly in low light level conditions, through the naked eye in the position that you described, what would I see?

With the covert light set?

Yes.

You would see nothing.

Okay. It would be a black hole, potentially?

Yes, sir.

And then, in what type of lighting configuration would you expect the receiver, specifically F-18 receivers, to be in? If that's what was going down?

I would expect them to have, at a minimum, their navigation lights on and for the trail receiver to have his strobe on.

By strobe, you mean --
Overt. Overt anti collision light.

Overt anti collision light? And for navigation lights, do you mean covert anti collision lights on the F-18 or do you mean red, gree, and white lights, visible to the naked eye?

Red, green, and white lights visible to the naked eye.

And what other lights would you expect to see on the F-18, with his probe extended and receiving fuel?

I would expect to see their probe light.

Okay. So you have a white light in the front, in the probe. And a white light on the tail. And then red and greens on the wing tip as appropriate?

Yes, sir. And then I would expect it, as long as their systems were normal, although not required, I would expect to see formation lights, strip lights, on them as well. Just being familiar with the F-18.

Overt green strip lights?

Yes, sir.

Okay. Awesome. Lets talk a little bit about 2016. You brought up, I'm not super tracking, but you said due to something that happened in 2016 when you were an instructor at MOTS one, which is Marine Aviation Weapons and Tactics Squadron One, which is a standardization body and a weapons school for the Marine Corps. You were an instructor there. Something happened out here with airplanes coming and
going from the Tanker? I'm not --

[redacted]: Yes, sir.

[redacted]: What? Tell me about that.

[redacted]: So I was not in the squadron, like I said at that time. I know two of the individuals who were on that flight. At the time, I did not know those individuals. I only received the haz rep and was using it as a CRM instructional tool --

[redacted]: Okay.

[redacted]: -- or CRM classes based off of that. And also for my certification, external lighting, and NSI considerations when I was certifying new NSI's in my job at MAWTS.

[redacted]: Okay.

[redacted]: So what happened there, they were refueling somewhere in Japan. They had completed the refueling evolution. The Tanker crew had cleared the receivers to depart with no specific departure instructions. Unknown whether or not the observers kept an eye on them in the front, the pilots did not have sight on the receivers departing the formation in the front. Which we typically do, you start with visibility on them in the right seat. The left seat pilot cannot see where receivers are in the echelon right position.

However, from the right seat, you can kind of see over there behind the wing line. And as a pilot, when we clear the receivers to depart, the observers have them first and then they
pass forward to the wing line. And then as the pilot is up
front, then you're watching them comply with the departure
procedures and making sure that we're not hitting them because
they're going to accelerate and climb away from us.

On this particular flight, they cleared the receivers
to depart without any specific departure instructions. They
thought that the receivers were getting ready to depart, and one
of the receivers lost essay and ended up actually striking the
trail, the hose. Which he should have been nowhere near the
hose. After he was clear to depart off the echelon right, struck
the hose and put a hole, I believe, through his leading edge on
his Hornet.

And he ended up diverting, instead of coming back into
Iwakuni. Ended up diverting into Okinawa. But, from our
community perspective, that was fairly scary because when we
clear receivers to depart, we expect them to depart, and climb,
and use their air speed differential to get away from us. Not to
hang around us or lose essay and bump into part of our aircraft.

[b](3)(A): So the receiver, which was an F-18, it
struck, like, the basket of the -- do you know which basket, or
if both the baskets were out?

[b](3)(A), (b) (6): I don't know, sir.

[b](3)(A): Do you know if the basket or the hose
assembly was damaged or separated?

[b](3)(A), (b) (6): I think it was pulled off the plane for us.

[b](3)(A): You think the C-130 lost the basket
and the hose?

Yes, sir.

So --

But I'm not sure. I mean, the haz rep says a lot of that, but I just -- that's what I remember from briefing it.

Yes. Okay. So what -- so since you're teaching, you said you're teaching ORM stuff, or CRM, or what were you teaching specifically?

Yes, sir. CRM.

CRM?

It was like CRM refresher classes and used as a discussion point on NSI certs.

Okay. And so what were some of those key briefing points, other than just telling the story you told? What were some of the things that you would instruct your students?

That when you clear receivers to depart, that you put them at an altitude different from ours, prior to making any turn. And that everyone in our KC-130 maintains visual with the receivers as they're departing until we are confident that they're completely clear altitude wise and turning away.

And whether or not that's just the observers in the back or the pilots up front, whether or not it's daytime or nighttime, that we're doing that. That I think a lot of trust in
the past in our community has been given to receivers. Hey, these are jets, they fly formation on us, you know, routinely. They know what they're doing. They're not going to hit us. Well, they proved it wrong, they did hit us in that time. And use that --

(b) (3) (A): And that was 2.5 years before the fatal mishap we are investigating now?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): Yes, sir.

(b) (3) (A): What type of procedures or policies were put in place to mitigate the risk associated with what you just described?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): So I know from the Hornet perspective after that, and I don' know the specifics with it, I just remember hearing the talk that was happening because at MAWTS, the Tac Air department, our desks were right next to the Hornets. That they said that there was some discrepancy with that pilot. With regard to how he was scheduled and his ability to, per the TNR, complete that event with the way that it was being tracked and recorded for the night aided Tanking TNR code on the Hornet side. And then --

(b) (3) (A): So you --

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): From the Herc side, sir, there's a policy in place with the ATP, at or above. We just amplified the above status of that to our community. But, in the end, the revision cycle for the ATP isn't just controlled by the United States. And it's controlled by the NATO STANAG entities. And we provide
recommendations to them for changes in the future. And those are all very, very slow from my experience of also serving as our community's model manager to the authorities for that publication.

\[b\] (3) (A): So let's go back to what you overheard when you were at MAWT. So you made a comment about the Hornet pilot not being qualified and proficient. So I think what I'm hearing is maybe the Hornet pilot didn't have all the prerequisites for what he was doing, wasn't properly scheduled.

\[b\] (3) (A), (b) (6): Yes. Agreed. And I know that, I mean, from our end on the Herc perspective, single KC-130 night Tanking, like I said, the pilots, we don't have a specific TNR code for that. That's not a difficult task intensive event for us. It requires a couple of different considerations to accomplish at nighttime, but nothing that would make us need to do another TNR event for it.

And I remember hearing that in the Hornet community, I believe that code is a 2,000 level code, but that it's not looked at something that they would expect people to typically struggle with or felt like they needed to -- it was a very administrative TNR event is what I'm trying to say.

\[b\] (3) (A): Sure. Do you have any knowledge about what happened in -- I mean, I was unfortunately diffed in at the time, and so I missed out on this whole thing. In '16 I was at school. But, the -- was there, like, a big Marine Corps wide safety stand down after the 2016 or, I mean, you knew about it.
because you were at MAWTS and you sat next to the Tac Air guys and you pulled the haz rep, doing do diligence. You said there's, so there's a safety investigation that produced a haz rep or soemthing --

[b](3) (A), (b) (6): Yes, sir.

[b](3) (A), __________: -- that you read, OPNAV 3750. Was there any other --

[b](3) (A), (b) (6): There were -- I don't remember any restrictions coming down on the KC-130 community as a result of it.

[b](3) (A), __________: Yes.

[b](3) (A), __________: I know that the Hornet community had to do a deep dive into their TNR, and I don't know if they got told to fix it before they could resume night Tanking or not. I honestly, I don't know.

[b](3) (A), __________: Not tracking? Fair enough. Okay.

[b](3) (A), __________: Ma'am, when you're doing air refueling, what are the responsibilities of your observers in the back? Do you have two in the back or just one?

[b](3) (A), (b) (6): We typically have two in the back. We are only required to have an observer on a basket --

[b](3) (A), __________: Okay.

[b](3) (A), (b) (6): -- really, as it's extended to watch refueling operations. I could really have a Hornet, kind of, come up and join on me without having a hose extended, and be perfectly legal to do that without any eyes looking out the back
of our aircraft. But, on a night where we routinely schedule two qualified observers in the back because we're anticipating using both hoses.

And their responsibilities are once they get visual of the receivers coming in, to give a running commentary over ICS to the pilots up front regarding the location of the receivers. They are trained to know what excessive closure looks like. They are cleared to, you know, instructed to know what a proper plug in the basket looks like. What excessive fuel leak would look like, or any type of hose malfunction, as well as, the refueling range that the receiver are supposed to be in when they plug into the basket.

[d] [3] (A): How about post refueling, prior to departure?

[d] [3] (A), (b) (6): They are, like I said, after those receivers are out of the basket and technically after we bring our hoses in, there's nothing TNR wise or requirements wise for them to keep an eye on it. Granted we do have them. And their never -- we never talk about that as pilots and observers, but they are keeping an eye on the location of the receiver aircraft until they have departed the formation.

Or until something comes up in the cargo department, where their crew duties dictate otherwise. Such as walking around to check for hydraulic leaks after we finished up bringing the hoses in, because at that point, there's nothing back there anymore that they are -- we are required to have aft visibility
on.

(b) (3) (A): So the observer had to be on the hose, if you have a jet plugging. But, if you're just dragging the hoses, and the jet's done, and the jet's leaving. The observer is not required to be on the hose; is that correct?

(b) (3) (A). (b) (6): No. If the hose is extended.

(b) (3) (A): It is to be observed?

(b) (3) (A). (b) (6): It is to be observed.

(b) (3) (A): Okay.

(b) (3) (A). (b) (6): And there isn't -- the only thing that we have, like, so it's not, like, explicitly written on that. I would say except for the pre air to air refueling checklist, it says observers in position before we extend hoses. So implied in that is that the observers stay in position and they have visibility until that hose is no longer trailed.

(b) (3) (A): So you talked about the ATP-56 and I'm sure you're familiar with the document.

(b) (3) (A). (b) (6): Yes, sir.

(b) (3) (A): Where in the ATP-56 does it talk about night systems air refueling of a fixed wing aircraft?

(b) (3) (A). (b) (6): In the U.S. standards related document portion of that, it includes specifics on every type, model, series within the Navy and Marine Corps regarding lighting configurations for both overt and covert light settings on that. And that's really --

(b) (3) (A): So that's the SRD, which is actually
like an appendix, right?

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6): Yes, sir.

[b] (3) (A): Is there a section on night systems helicopter air refueling?

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6): I would have to go back and review it, sir.

[b] (3) (A): Okay.

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6): Which, I mean, I do routinely, but I can't pull that off the top of my head.

[b] (3) (A): It's alright. Have you -- does VMGR-152 have a squadron order 3710 SOP for flight operations?

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6): Yes, sir.

[b] (3) (A): Are you familiar with it?

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6): Yes, sir.

[b] (3) (A): Do you know who signed the most recent copy?

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6): [b] (3) (A), (b) (6).

[b] (3) (A): Okay. What about MAG-12? Does it have an SOP?

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6): Yes, sir.

[b] (3) (A): Okay.

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6): I don't know what the most current version is and if you look around Sharepoint, it's very difficult to find what the most current version is.

[b] (3) (A): That's interesting. What do you mean?

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6): Well, I mean, I've gone -- so the MAG-12 SOP is very specific to Tac Air aircraft and they are on a lot of
specifics In there for us. And a lot of the MCAS Iwakuni Station Order actually applies to us much more SOP wise in the local area than the MAG-12 SOP does. So I remember I've been -- I looked for it a couple times when I first got out here, and I think the most recent version it is not within the past couple years that I was ever able to find. I remember perusing it when I first got out here and being like, there's nothing in here that really is above what my squadron SOP says and what the station order says for local procedures. And I never looked for --

(b)(3)(A): Anything in the MAG-12 SOP about night system, or air refueling a fixed wing aircraft, or NVG use, or anything like that?


(b)(3)(A): Have you -- do you know if the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing has a Wing order 3710 SOP for flight operations?

(b)(3)(A): (b)(6): I have not checked for that for the previous six months, but I do remember looking at that document and finding it very odd that that document was separated in chapters of Word documents, instead of a PDF that appeared to be modifiable at the time. So I was confused about whether or not that document was under edit and a new one was coming out, or not. So I remember --

(b)(3)(A): So have you ever served in any other Marine Aircraft Wing?

(b)(3)(A): (b)(6): Yes, sir. 3rd MAW.
[b](3)(A): Did 3rd MAW have numerous Word documents on, like, a Sharepoint site, or do they have, like, a single PDF with the commanding general's signature?

[b](3)(A), (b) (6): They had a single PDF with the commanding general's signature on it, sir.

[b](3)(A): So static, unedible document?

[b](3)(A), (b) (6): Yes, sir. In my time there, and that was in the 2007 to 2013 timeframe.

[b](3)(A): What about you were on staff at MAWTS One. Did MAWTS One have any kind of SOP's?

[b](3)(A), (b) (6): Yes, sir.

[b](3)(A): Was that a Word document on Sharpoint?

[b](3)(A), (b) (6): No. It was a PDF document and then it was also printed out hard copies and distributed before every class.

[b](3)(A): And did it have the CO of MAWTS One signature on it?

[b](3)(A), (b) (6): Yes, sir.

[b](3)(A): [ph], or whoever?

[b](3)(A), (b) (6): Yes, sir.

[b](3)(A): So you were clear that what was expected of you based on that document?

[b](3)(A), (b) (6): Yes, sir.

[b](3)(A): And your inference from your facial expressions that the 1st MAW document being an electronic Word document on a Sharepoint that looked like something under revision, you aren't -- it was less clear to you how directive
that document may or may not have been?

[b] (3) (A). (b) (6): Yes, sir.

[b] (3) (A). (b) (6): Is that a fair assessment?

[b] (3) (A). (b) (6): Yes, sir.

[b] (3) (A). (b) (6): Did you find that odd?

[b] (3) (A). (b) (6): Yes. And I remember talking to the new Wing ASO when he visited the squadron last summer about that, and said that it was in the process of revision. That they needed to fix that.

[b] (3) (A). (b) (6): The Wing ASO, do you remember his rank and name?

[b] (3) (A). (b) (6): I just remember he was a tall, bald, Major, [inaudible] guy. I'm sorry, sir.


Is there anything else about this mishap, command climate, safety culture, standardization that you feel is germane to the contributing factors of this mishap that you'd like to share with us today for the record?

[b] (3) (A). (b) (6): I had given in the past a -- this -- we were doing MAG-12 war fighting discussions on Friday afternoons at 1500, under [d](3) (A). direction for squadrons to all take turns rotating around briefs that would be, hopefully, applicable everyone in the room. And it's pretty hard to do that, to be applicable to Hornets, F-35's, MWSS, and VMGR. But, so we had gone around some air to air discussions and, you know,
capabilities of CAS. A bunch of stuff, which is all good PME for everyone. And then I had given in the February, I think February to March timeframe an area refueling brief, specifically for fixed wing receivers to the MAG-12 audience that was available that day.

With the end state goal of being for MAG-12 to be able to move from full comm Tanker formation procedures -- and this is aside from single ship. But, move from day full comm Tanker formation procedures for an LFE, or for whatever required it. To be able to move that towards being able to accomplish night Tanker MCON evolution. And we were going to take baby steps towards that.

And part of giving this brief and exposing MAG-12 whenever we could for aircraft allocation here at Iwakuni. And for me also, to build my flight leadership designations of both section leads and Tac racks within the squadron. That we had -- were moving towards that direction to try to get ourselves better and more tactical and ready to accomplish whatever this AOR would demand.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): How'd that go?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): We executed day MCON a couple times with just the two ship Tanker formation. From my perspective, it's hard coming from a job at MAWTS where you're giving confirmation briefs and flying with all very proficient pilots on these missions. And for me, I didn't see what was so hard about it, being a Tanker formation pilot.
But, from the receiver's perspective, seeing the lack of exposure, I think, out here that Marine receivers have with Tankers was pretty eye opening. And made me realize that there was no way our squadron could go straight to night MCON Tanker formations, that we need to do it in baby steps.

[3] (3) (A): So it sounds like you're describing a fighter receiver that showed up behind your C-130 Tanker with low proficiency and exhibited skill was, like, struggling.

[3] (3) (A), (6): Yes. Or just lack of -- I think that the receiver pilots in 3rd and 2nd MAW's Tank more routinely on KC-130's than elsewhere. And it's also by nature of the FRAGS that they support, in support of EWTG-LANT or PAC. There's a lot more Tanker evolutions and also KC-130 availability because you're used much more in an air to air refueling capability and tasked to that in the United States. Versus in this AOR, we accomplish assault transport much more often just due to AOR size and lack of rotes.


[3] (3) (A): All right. Thank you for your candid discussion.

Judge?

[3] (3) (A): Ma'am, one last piece. Rough estimate, how many ariel refueling missions have you conducted?

[3] (3) (A): 2800 hours. One thousand? Day/night, from your first one to your last one, what do you think?
SORTY's or receivers?

Let's go receivers, that'll be a bigger number.

Holy crap!

Yes. Fixed wing.

 Receivers? It would be probably -- fixed wing receivers? I'm confident it's over 1,000.

And how common is it that you, after the refueling, that you had put an aircraft echelon left, vise echelon right?

I would not do it, unless it had either been pre briefed, or thoroughly coordinated over AR primary on the radio with the flight lead.

And how many times has that happened?

Zero.

How many times have you split a section of F-18's? So one echelon left and one echelon right.

Zero.

Thank you, Ma'am.

For the departure, right?

Correct.

Yes, for departure.

Zero.

Would it be normal or acceptable for the Hornet section leader to direct his wingman to go to a position on the Tanker. Or it would be more appropriate for the
refueling area commander to do that?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): The refueling area commander should do that. At that point, with the Hornet flight lead still as a member of the formation, he is not the formation lead at that point. The Tanker is still assuming control of the receivers around our aircraft.

(b) (3) (A): So if you had a couple of Hornets joined up on you and lead was done Tanking and he was in right echelon and as dash 2 became satisfied on the left basket and the flight lead, the Hornet flight lead told his Hornet wingmen to go to left echelon, would you be okay with that?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): Well, if he told him to do that on their Hornet inner plane frequency, I wouldn't know that had happened.

(b) (3) (A): No. Lets say he says it on Tanker primary.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): Then I would tell him, why do you want to do that? I prefer you to go right echelon. It would be a back-and-forth interrogative and to find out what the reason for it was.

(b) (3) (A): Would you consider yourself to be the flight lead at that time. Or the Hornet section leader to be the flight lead?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): Myself until they were out of the echelon position and departing the formation by a difference than one mile and 100 feet.

(b) (3) (A): Thank you.
[b] (3) (A):  No further question.

[b] (3) (A):  Judge will swear you out.

[b] (3) was warned, sworn, and departed.]
[b] (3) (A): Today is Thursday the 24th of January 2019. We're in Iwakuni, Japan. I'm [b] (3) (A), [b] (b) (6) [b], I'm conducting a JAGMAN investigation into the 2018 mishap at MAG-12. I'm assisted by [b] (3) (A), [b] (b) (6), and [b] (3) (A), [b] who are present in the room. We are interviewing [b] (3) [b].

[b] (3) [b], please state your full name, spelling your last name for the record.

[b] (3) [b]: It's [b] (3) [b] [b]. That's [b] (3) (A), [b] (b) (6).

[b] (3) (A), [b]: [b] (3) [b], how would you like me to refer to you?

[b] (3) [b]: You can call me [b] (3) [b].

[b] (3) (A), [b]: Okay, [b] (3) [b]. You can call me [b] (3) [b] or sir.

[b] (3) [b]: Okay.

[b] (3) (A), [b]: [b], when did you get your wings?

[b] (3) [b]: June 17th, 2011.

[b] (3) (A), [b]: What was your first question gun squadron?

[b] (3) [b]: VMFA-AW533.

[b] (3) (A), [b]: Hey, I'm a little out of order. Where
did you go to the FRS?

[b] I went to the FRS in VFA-106, Oceania.

[b] What is your qualification and designation level?

[b] Currently I am a division lead. Do you want all qualifications and designations, or just the highest?

[b] Highest.

[b] Division lead currently. Additionally, I am a PMCF pilot, as well as an ASO.

[b] Are you an NSI?

[b] I am not an NSI.

[b] Are you an FAI?

[b] I am not an FAI.

[b] Are you night systems qualified?

[b] Yes, I am.

[b] Roughly, how many goggle hours do you have?

[b] Approximately 89ish.

[b] How many Hornet hours do you have?

[b] About 710, I believe.

[b] So you have 700, roughly 700 Hornet hours, and roughly 90 night vision goggle hours?
There seems a little disparity there. I couldn't recall off the top of my head, but --

Okay. How many hours do you have on the ANVS-11?

The NVCD's, probably --

Most of your time?

No. In 533, we didn't have them. So when -- I just got back to the fleet in 2017, so I probably have, I don't know, 20 hours in them.

So you checked in to 242 in about June of '17?

December of 2017.

Twelve of '17?

Yes.

Okay. Where were you in December of '18?

December of '18 I was at the -- I was in the squadron.

You were here?

Yes.

Okay so what role did you have in the MAG-ULT?

In the MAG-ULT I was assigned to the fay page as
a flight lead. Either being a section lead or a division lead for that. Pretty much being a flight lead during the day time, period.

That was pretty much it.

[0] (3) (A): Okay. What's your current ground job?

[0] (3): I am the AAMO. So Assistant Aircraft Maintenance Officer.

[0] (3) (A): Okay. Why were you selected for the day go, do you know?

[0] (3): I have no real reason why I was selected.

[0] (3) (A): Okay. Who were the other field grade officers on the day page?

[0] (3): The day page, I think it was Lieutenant Colonel, the CO, --

[0] (3) (A): Okay. What about the XO?

[0] (3): The XO was not. He was on the night page, I believe. I think the OPSO, so [0] (3) was on the day page as well. I think it was just myself.

[0] (3) (A): So the CO, OPSO, and the AA were the day field grade officers you think?

[0] (3): Yes, sir.

[0] (3) (A): Okay. What about the maintenance officer, the AMO?
He was on the -- I think he was on the swing page.

Okay.

So I think he came in late afternoon and left in the evening.

Have you ever been to the Tanker in the Hornet?

I have.

Day and night?

I have.

And when you went at night, did you wear your ANVS-9's or ANVS-11's?

ANVS-9's.

Okay. Did you go --

Correction, both actually. I have been on both.

Both, okay.

And are you talking about the KC-135 or the KC-130?

Both.

For the -- specifically for the KC-130, I've been on the ANVS-11's. Last time I was on a 135 at night, it was never, actually. It's only been on the TransPac.
And TranPacs are conducted in the day?

That's correct.

Okay. Have you ever worked in the DOSS before, as you said, you're an ASO?

I have.

In what squadron did you work in a Department of Safety and Standardization?

VMFA-W242.

Okay. So you're the DOSS here at 242?

I was the DOSS at 242. I turned over, roughly September 30ish, beginning of November with.

Okay. So you were the DOSS until just, like, six weeks before the mishap?

Yes.

Okay. As the DOSS, did you review the flight schedule?

I did.

How did you document that?

So we went from a period of transition, from signanturing [sic] on the schedule to review it, to a period of where they would bring around just a signature page attached to the
schedule.

[0] (3) (A): Like a routing sheet?

[0] (3): Like a -- not a routing sheet, per so much as that a -- just a -- it was a single page that was days of the month that when the schedule officer or schedule writer would hand it to you, you would just sign off that you reviewed the schedule. So I think they just took the signature off the schedule and just put it onto an additional addendum page that OPSEC maintained custody of.

[0] (3) (A): What's the purpose of that?

[0] (3): I think it's just to make sure everybody saw it.

[0] (3) (A): But what was the purpose of taking it off the schedule? Because it seems like some older schedules, like back in May, it was on. And then it seems like in June or July, around the change of command, it was taken off.

[0] (3): There was no requirement to have it on the schedule.

[0] (3) (A): I'm familiar with the requirements, I'm asking why you took it off.

[0] (3): I didn't take it off.

[0] (3) (A): I'm asking you why the squadron took it off. You were the DOSS at the time, you must have been part of the conversation when they took it off.
I believe that was just a decision by the headquarters or --

I don't know who made the specific "you shall take this off," whether that be the OPS, the safety, the CO, the XO, but I know at some point it just transitioned to not being on the schedule anymore to an addendum page.

Okay. What about ORM worksheets?

The risk management worksheets that we -- we didn't have any attached to the schedule for that. We would review the flights and for any sort of additional risk based on the currency of the pilots, based on the training that they were conducting, based on the time that they were conducting it. And then make it and then voice an opinion if we had any significant concerns on it.

You talking about in a brief, or in a schedule development process?

Just in the schedule development process.

So in the schedule development process it was never a practice at 242 to create a risk management worksheet or risk assessment worksheet or each line on the schedule?
That's correct.

So there's no documentation of your ORM?

We do not have -- besides the signature that has been passed through operations officer, the safety officer as well. It actually went through the ASO's hand more importantly, but the DOSS or the ASO would sign for the schedule as it was reviewed since I was ASO certified and trained as well. I could, pretty much, look at it and evaluate it, and it would go through that process. But, that was our way of as effectively -- as senior leadership as the risk management and the training to take a look at it. But, there was no official line-by-line based on currency of low, medium, or high.

So basically is just shows that you looked at it, but it doesn't show your analysis of.

Yes.

Okay.

So how did you provide recommendations to the commander as the ASO?

Well, during my time as the ASO, I would approach commander if there were any sort of crew pairing or anything like that. I seldom had them. I was new to the squadron,
so I still was understanding people's personalities, leadership abilities, and stuff. So I would take my opinion first the OPSO, and then just say hey, you know, based on, you know, currency or any sort of not qualified, which seldom ever happened, if any I recall, but -- and then just voices, hey, you know, this crew pairing right here, may be something to take a look at.

[b] (3) (A). [ ]: How do you define a hazard?

[b] (3). [ ]: How do I define a hazard or how does the squadron define a hazard?

[b] (3) (A). [ ]: Either answer would be acceptable.

[b] (3). [ ]: I think personally for me, I define a hazard as anything operating in the low to medium rine set, just as tac-air pilots, I think with the type of training that we do. I think anything outside of that, based on the crew proficiency, whether he's a -- or proficiency and currency go into that. So if it's his initial codes or if its a repeat code, I would assess hazard that way. That if, depending on how long we've -- it's been since we --

[b] (3) (A). [ ]: No, I'm just asking, in general, how do you define the word hazard in the context of aviation?

[b] (3). [ ]: Anything that could potentially cause a mishap or just a accident.

[b] (3) (A). [ ]: Okay. And then how do you define a risk?
How do I define a risk? I would say risk would more along the line be something that's going to contribute to a mishap or a hazard, in the sense that risk is -- it's on a graduated scale to me. That depending on what you're doing. So I guess it would depend on the risk how I would define it.

How you define risk would be dependent on the risk? I'm asking you to define risk.

It would depend on the situation.

Okay. So you're familiar with the term ORM I'm sure.

Correct.

What does that mean? Define the acronym.

So risk management, or operational risk management now is what we're talking about is purely a way to meet mission success for us. We have going from preflight mission planning through debrief, is how we're going to assess risk throughout the entire revolution. What I like to tell guys is the fact that what is the challenge today, or what is the biggest issue today? Whether that be the weather, whether that be the proficiency, whether that be the mission, or the currency. First talk about that, address that, which we do in the admin phase per the mods brief. We talk about hey who's -- when is the last time
you've flown, how many days? That kind of thing. And so risk management to me is understanding what are the factors at hand and how best to mitigate those.

[O] [3] (A), [O] [6]: What are the five steps to the ORM process?

[O] [3]: Identify the risk. First identify the risk, assess the risk, make a risk decision, implement the controls, and then supervise. I believe that's the way it is.

[O] [3] (A), [O] [6]: I'm impressed, very good. Pretty close.

[O] [3]: Somewhere to that circle.


Are you familiar with the acronym CRM?

[O] [3]: Yes, I am.

[O] [3] (A), [O] [6]: Can you define that for me?

[O] [3]: Yes, Crew Resource Management. Something that we effectively use in the cockpit. What I talk to guys about is there is that ther's no rank in the cockpit. CRM is the utilization between you and the other guy to successfully accomplish the mission. Whether that's communication, decision making, leadership, both inside and outside the cockpit, that's, kind of, how I discuss the CRM.

[O] [3] (A), [O] [6]: What are the seven components of CRM.
So you got the mix salad. So you got the decision making, adaptibility, flexibility, mission analysis, communication, leadership, assertiveness, and situational awareness.

And how is that integrated into operations at VMFA all weather 242?

I think we all assess different aspects of CRM as well. I think I've never had an issue with TCC or CRM in a cockpit so to speak. It's one of those things that I think we do a very good job, that we understand that we're one team, one fight when we get into the cockpit. And if I've ever had an issue with that we usually address it on the deck, but I don't think I've ever had an issue with that.

So do you consider night systems low light level area fueling 200 miles off shore at two o'clock in morning to be a hazard?

Yes.

What -- how would that be reflected on the flight schedule in the process at place at 242?

I think that we would -- we would obviously identify first who is going to be leading it based on their experience and qualifications. And then we're going to look at the
crews who are going to go execute it. So what does that mean to me? I'm just going to look at the guys who are -- what's currency, what's their proficiency, when is the last time they flew at night, how long ago was the last time someone did the Tanker? You know, all those things that you look at.

Now, would I say that a guy who hasn't been to the Tanker in a long time is a high risk? Not necessarily. Depending on what it is, so C-130's in my opinion is that it's a low -- not low, but low to medium risk. Obviously there's a risk there because of what can occur, but it's an admin part of the flight for me. And what I would actually treat it to is an admin part of the flight because we're trying to be able to get gas at day or night, as required.

So your nonverbal communication with the word admin there, the shoulder shrug led me to indicate that you feel like administrative aspects of the flight are inherently less hazardous than tactical portions?

I would say in some regards, yes. But there's also been situations too where admin phases of flight, such as taking off and landing on an airfield, can be hazardous. Well, depending on the weather, depending on the time of day, depending on what's going on. So everything is situationally dependent at that point.
So you just said that you think a flight event similar to the mishap event would be considered a -- I didn't hear if you said low, medium, or high risk, but a risk event. A medium risk, perhaps?

Yes, I think all flight -- I think every flight that we do has inherent risk. Anytime we fly in formation or in close proximity to the area cloud, there's always a hazard for a mid-air. And we talk to it in the briefs. So it's one of those things that we discuss common that, you know, is part of the standard emergency contingencies is mid-air. You know, we always talk about hey, you know, mid-air, lets not do tonight. Keep, you know, keep your eyeballs out, always focusing, you know, into the formation and outside the formation.

So we talk about it, but I think anytime that you're flying a tactical mission or even -- I would only say probably the low risk flight is anytime you fly singleton, like go into the pie for a currency or something like that.

Even though it still has a risk just because based on the age of the aircraft, because you may never know when the aircraft decides that hey I have a flight control issue or something like that. But, I would say just generically in the general execution phase, that's pretty low risk to me. However, when you start adding
different -- when you start adding aircraft, you're going to elevate the risk.

(b) (3) (A): Do you agree that -- so now we're talking about the cumulative effects of risk, so would agree that a night Tanker is more, has more risk than a day Tanker?

(b) (3): No.

(b) (3) (A): You wouldn't? So you feel like going to the Tanker in the daytime is an identical risk than going to the Tanker in low light level?

(b) (3): I think they're different risks. But, I think they're probably the same risk level. So I think there's risk because that -- it's all about the factors that are affecting you. If you are -- what I'm saying by that is you can lose SA around Tanker, you can have an issue around the Tanker during the day just as easy as you can have during the night.

(b) (3) (A): Okay. So you feel like you're just as likely to collide into a Tanker in daylight conditions as you are to collide in a Tanker that's covert, under low light level conditions, while using the ANVS-11's? You feel that's an identical level of risk?

(b) (3): I don't believe it's an identical level of risk because the factors are different.
Tell me about the factors.

The factors are daytime nighttime, for one.

Okay. So then if you follow my line of thinking, would you agree that going to the Tanker at night has more risk than going to the Tanker at day? Because just previously you said it's the same risk, it doesn't. You just said it's exactly the same.

I didn't say it was the same risk, I said it was the same level of --

Okay. Tell me what you are saying.

What I would say about that is it's going to have, both are going to have their same risk. Identify the risk, what's the risk?

Okay. I'll play that with you. The risk is a collision with a Tanker.

Could you do that during the day and night?

Yes.

There we go. So the risk is the same, right?

No.

It's not the same?

No. What is your field of view? Let me ask you some questions. What's the field of view of the night
vision goggle?

[O (3)]: It's approximately, like, 40 degrees field of view.

[O (3) (A)]: How about 40 degrees circular. That's what it is. What's the field of view of the naked eye?

[O (3)]: It's about 100 and -- I'd probably take it at about 180.


[O (3)]: You have your peripherals.

[O (3) (A)]: So we agree that there's more peripheral vision available unaided than aided?

[O (3)]: No, there's no peripheral vision unaided, especially at night.

[O (3) (A)]: There's no peripheral vision unaided at night? You can't see anything?

[O (3)]: No, there is. I think what, excuse me, yes, there is. You have peripheral vision at night. Obviously, what you're looking for is a light source or anything like that that's going to illuminate itself.

[O (3) (A)]: Okay.

[O (3)]: Yes.

[O (3) (A)]: So is there peripheral vision unaided in
the daytime?

[O (3)]: Unaided in the daytime, yes.

[O (3) (A)]: During a day flight, correct?

[O (3)]: Yes.

[O (3) (A)]: So I think we can agree that -- and I by the way I've been to the Tanker if you were not tracking, so, I mean, I know that when I'm Tanking, either single seat or in the V-22, I can see a lot peripherally in the daytime that is not available to me at night. Particularly under low light level conditions with a covert Tanker and my goggles down.

[O (3)]: I would agree with that.

[O (3) (A)]: Have you had a different experience?

[O (3)]: No, I would agree with that.

[O (3) (A)]: Okay. Have I persuaded you that there's more risk for night systems low light level Tanking than there is for day unaided Tanking?

[O (3)]: Yes. I would agree with you.

[O (3) (A)]: Okay. So how is that captured in VMFA-242, all weather 242's flight schedule and the ORM process and the risk assessment process? How is that captured? How is that codified? What do we do about it?

[O (3)]: What do we do about --
Yes, what do you do about that at 242? What's the process?

I think, again, we'd have to go back to just your currency and your proficiency at night systems.

Okay.

And what does that mean is that we -- you have to assess, you know, based on the mission, based on the requirements. When was the last time this guy flew a night system first. And then -- and I think familiarity and proficiency would then lead into your decision.

So lets say hypothetically we are the deceased mishap pilot and we've only got less than 20 total goggle hours and single digit hours on the NVCD. Would that be something you would consider that would elevate the risk?

Yes.

Okay. Then how would you mitigate that? I would probably go into a discussion with him about, obviously, Tanking at night on NVCD's, talking about the covert lighting, talking about the sight picture of what you should be seeing, especially -- and if worst case scenario where, you know, loss of essay to talk about how -- if the Tanker is going to be covert, to how to request in, you know, Christmas tree lights back
on so we can maintain essay of all players at that point. I think it would just into the -- I think it would go into the brief because what we would -- what we would want to do is obviously talk about the risk prior to going flying.

(0)(3)(A): For sure.

(0)(3): Yes.

(0)(3)(A): I'm talking about the schedule writing process, but yes, you're into the flight. That's fine too. So in the schedule writing process, what would you do to mitigate the risk in the schedule writing process?

(0)(3): I think the conversation is -- so we are talking about flight leadership. Depending on who is --

(0)(3)(A): I'm not. I'm talking about risk management.

(0)(3): That's what I'm saying. But, I'm trying to get to is on the flight schedule, the flight lead that you would probably assign to that mission would probably be a guy that you're comfortable with given that appropriate level of brief or bring that into his brief.

(0)(3)(A): Would you, as a field grade officer in 242, would put in that category as one of the best flight leads?
Yes, sir.

Okay. Would you bring human factors into that discussion as an ASO?

Yes, sir.

Does have any human factors?

He has a few.

Is he passed over for promotion?

He has.

Is he going through a divorce?

I'm not sure if he's going through a divorce.

[b](3) (A), (b) ______: [b] ______ ______ [b] ______ ______ ______?

[b] ______: [b] ______ ______ ______ ______ ______ ______ ______ ______ ______.

[b] (3) (A), ______: Is he -- do you have any, I mean, you've -- I'm not asking you to disclose the class or, I mean, the private conversations of the human factor counsel, which I know you've attended. But, can we agree that has some level of human factors compared to other?

Yes.

Okay. What about ?

I'm sure he has human factors as well. I mean, I'm sure he's -- not every day is he going as everybody likes.
Okay. And, is that right?

He does.

Okay. So would you select who's. Would you put him on the night page and plan to fly in the middle of the night, if you were the ASO?

I think what it comes down to is hopefully the aircrew, if they're having an issue, would announce that, like, --

How would they announce that?

Just by coming to safety and talking or coming to ops and explaining that, you know, hey, I'm having a difficult night, difficult time transitioning to the night due to these factors.

So who is the DOSS right now at VMFA?

(b) (3) (A). Was he present for the ULT?

He -- I don't recall if he was or not.

Is it possible he was on leave in New Zealand?

I think. I'm not sure what days that he was gone. I know that he was on a trip in December, I don't know if
there was overlap days.

(b) (3) (A). [REDACTED]: Who was the ASO that reviewed flight schedule during the week of the ULT, are you familiar?

(b) (3). [REDACTED]: I am not familiar.

(b) (3) (A). [REDACTED]: Who is the acting DOSS, you said it was [REDACTED]?

(b) (3). [REDACTED]: What's that?

(b) (3) (A). [REDACTED]: You said --

(b) (3). [REDACTED]: He was the acting DOSS. so he was the --

(b) (3) (A). [REDACTED]: So who's, like, the assistant DOSS or whatever you guys call it?

(b) (3). [REDACTED]: I believe [REDACTED]. (b) (3) (A). [REDACTED] is the assigned ASO at the time.

(b) (3) (A). [REDACTED]: (b) (3) ? Okay.

(b) (3) (A). [REDACTED]: So he would have been the one who reviews the flight schedule and assesses -- did his analysis on the risk and on the teams?

(b) (3). [REDACTED]: I believe so.

(b) (3) (A). [REDACTED]: Okay.

(b) (3) (A). [REDACTED]: And so when you were the DOSS and you guys were reviewing flight schedules and doing the analysis, how did you show your work to the commanding officer?
(6) (3): Again, it would be the conversation. A lot of it, I think, would be injects to the schedule itself directly.

(6) (3) (A): So you would modify the flight schedule before it got to the CO?

(6): It would be the conversation with the schedule writers or the OPSO and I think that would be the change before it even got to the CO's level.

(6) (3) (A): Okay.

(6) (3): So the CO had a clean product to look at.

(6) (3) (A): Okay. Tell me about the search and rescue capabilities here in Iwakuni.

(6) (3): So I know they have -- so the JAS, the JMSJF. Obviously, they have, I think it's -- I forget the numbers of the U.S. ones, but the sea planes that can land in up to three meters seas I believe it is. Pretty good on station time with them, pretty good range as well. Additionally, they have the little [inaudible] as well that can look to track down people, or aircraft, or anything like that. They also have cutters, so Coast Guard, essentially the Navy, the Jap team, Japanese Maritime Force as well. They can send out for them. I believe that's pretty much what we have.

(6) (3) (A): So you've been at 242 about a year and a half, right? And you were the DOSS during about a year of that?
Where is the nearest airborne search and rescue asset and what is their response time to the middle of the Itras South?

(p) (3): The nearest one?

(p) (3) (A): Yes.

(p) (3): I think it -- I can't remember the name to be honest. I can't remember the name. It's just to the North of the Itras South one. I believe that's where they took Captain Reslar once they recovered him.

(p) (3) (A): Well, before the mishap, were you aware of that location?

(p) (3): What's that?

(p) (3) (A): Did you come to learn about that after the mishap?

(p) (3): I learned more about it after the mishap. I knew there was a SAR base there, additionally, our SAR-S that's here as well.

(p) (3) (A): Are you familiar with OPNAV-3710?

(p) (3): I am.

(p) (3) (A): Okay. Do you know what it says about the wear of anti exposure suits?

(p) (3): That it's, you know, required when the, I guess, the factors need it.
So what are some of those factors? I mean as the DOSS I'm sure you've reviewed that and had conversations with your CO about it and your previous CO.

Yes, I did. So 3710, depending on the outside air temperature and the water temperature, would be, would need requirements to wear anti exposure suits.

Okay. And would SAR response time be a part of that decision as well?

The SAR response?

Yes. The SAR capability.

Yes, it would go into a factor. Obviously, the range and their ability to arrive on scene prior to the, I guess, the little table they have in the 3710 for the anti exposure suites. If they can arrive on station prior to that.

And what is the rough response time from pulling the ejection handle to having an extraction capable SAR aircraft overhead you in the middle of the Itras South?

So if you're talking straight helo platforms, I think it's 16 minutes.

One hour?

Yes.

So you think a helicopter can fly -- you
think you can pull the handle and in one hour have a helicopter on top of you in the middle of the Itras South?

(b) (3) [redacted]: I would hope so. But --

(b) (3) (A), [redacted]: Okay. What gives you that impression?

(b) (3) [redacted]: Based on the range from the maritime base to the North of Itras South. We don't have any of the -- I think from here would be a much more, I think it's like two and a half hours from here.

(b) (3) (A), [redacted]: Two and a half hours?

(b) (3) [redacted]: Yes, to the Itras South from here, with them having to stop to get gas.

(b) (3) (A), [redacted]: Okay. Do you know what the time of useful consciousness would be for yourself, given your body composition in 68 degree water without your anti exposure suite?

(b) (3) [redacted]: I do not.

(b) (3) (A), [redacted]: So you were the DOSS for 242 and you're not familiar with how long --

(b) (3) [redacted]: I would have to look up the chart, sir.

(b) (3) (A), [redacted]: Okay. Do you know what the time until death would be in 68 degree water without your suite?

(b) (3) [redacted]: No, sir. I'd have to look up the time.

(b) (3) (A), [redacted]: Do you know what your survival time would
be with the anti exposure suite in 68 degree water and no wind?

(D) (3): Probably increased from without it.

(D) (3) (A): Okay. But you don't know --

(D) (3): I don't know off the top of my head, sir.

(D) (3) (A): Have you been through ASTC Aviation Survival Training at the HELO Dunker?

(D) (3): I have, sir.

(D) (3) (A): Have you been to SERE school?

(D) (3): I have, sir.

(D) (3) (A): Okay. Did they talk about hypothermia and cold weather survival?

(D) (3): They did.

(D) (3) (A): Do you know how much faster water extracts heat from the body core compared to air of the same temperature.

(D) (3): I remember them briefing that. I don't remember exactly what it is. At what rate, I don't remember what rate.

(D) (3) (A): Okay.

(D) (3): I remember them talking about, that's why you should keep your helmet on, because the heat on your head, so to keep it on so.

(D) (3) (A): Have you ever canceled a flight at 242?
Personally for myself, sir?

Yes.

I've been canceled for maintenance.

No. Have you ever canceled a flight for ORM, or CRM, or human factors?

No, sir.

Okay. Have you ever known of anyone to do that?

No, sir.

So nobody's ever looked at the weather and said it's icing, or there's thunderstorms, or there's a hazardous weather condition that prevents --

I apologize. Yes, we've canceled for --

I would call that ORM, right?

Yes, apology. So I thought you were talking about personal, like, human factors or anything like that.

No.

No. Yes, sir, I have for -- canceled flights for weather. Yes, sir.

I guess a better way I should have asked for weather requirements, okay.

Yes, sir.
Have you ever done that while was commanding officer?

Yes, sir.

And how did he respond?

He was absolutely like yes, no need to push it. Exact words.

Okay. Great.

Do you know what the currency interval is for air refueling? How many days?

I believe once every 180 days.

One hundred and eighty days? And do you know what it is for night Tanking?

I don't know if there's a -- I don't, sir.

You said that you're a division leader, right?

Yes, sir.

So you could take somebody out to get initial Tanker qual?

Yes, sir.

You could take a pilot who has never been to the Tanker and you could take him to the Tanker?
And you're an ASO and the DOSS and you used to review the flight schedule?

Yes, sir.

Okay. But you don't know what the currency interval for the day Tanker off the top of your head?

One hundred and eighty days.

You think it’s 180 days?

Yes, sir.

Okay. And do you know what the prerequisites are to go to the night Tanker?

I do not know off the top of my head, sir.

Do you know what activities someone has to complete to log the initial night Tanker code?

I do not know, sir, off the top of my head.

Okay. You don't have any idea?

Not off the top of my head.

Have you ever been to the -- you did your initial night Tanker when?

Initial night Tanker, probably 2012.

Where were you for that?

VMFA-W533.

You did it at -- you didn't do it at 106?
(3): You did a day Tanker?

(3): I did a day Tanker off a Super Hornet 106. I don't recall if it was daytime -- I don't remember -- I don't recall doing a nighttime one.

(3): So you went to the night Tanker out in Beaufort. Do you remember how many plugs you got?

(3): Probably, I think they wanted to do three plugs -- this is what I recall. I think it may have been, like, three plugs or something like that.

(3): Okay.

(3): A couple dry and then finally get gas.

(3): Okay. Do you feel like you're well qualified to be a division leader?

(3): Yes, sir.

(3): Why do you feel that?

(3): Based on my experience, maturity, decision making abilities, understanding the CRM process, and how I understand the risk process. I don't have any issues voicing my opinion or when risks are -- I don't feel that there is ever a negative connotation when you voice your risk opinion. So I feel
comfortable in being able to say, hey I don't think this is right.

(b) (3) (A): Was the Ambien authorized for the ULT?

(b) (3): I'm not sure.

(b) (3) (A): Go-no go pills?

(b) (3): I do not believe so.

(b) (3) (A): Do you ever recall any conversations about the use of go-no go pills in preparation for the MAG-ULT?

(b) (3): There was a discussion. Purely because I wasn't on the night page, I didn't pay anything about it. So I didn't really think about it. And I have never tried it and I don't prefer to try it so.

(b) (3) (A): Okay.

Judge, you have anything?

(b) (3) (A): No, sir.

(b) (3) (A): Is there anything else that you think is related to this mishap that I haven't touched on that you'd like to bring up? We've got plenty of time. If you could do it all over again, what would we do differently and why. Please, be frank.

(b) (3): To be honest, it was -- I didn't see Captain Reslar that week because I was on the day page and he came in at the evening page, so I was already gone out of work at that point. So I think the week prior to was the last time that I saw him so, I
guess, there was a, you know, there was a discussion of 24-hour operations from home station at some point.

I think more in just rhetoric in the ready room talking about, you know, what's going on, you know, who's doing what. And then when the crews came out for, to transition to the 24-hour operations, I was on the day page. Normal operations, normal come into work operations, low impact to my daily schedule, you know, because I was on the day page for everything. The weather leading up to the Wednesday evolution was just horrible the entire time, so not a lot of flying got done.

So we would go through the hot pit procedures and then that was about it. So a lot of that got canceled for, you know, for weather and stuff like that. So much was getting canceled. I think just the organization, you know, if we're going to be going to [b] (6), or not going to be going to [b] (6), was a little bit frustrating.

[b] (3) (A). [inaudible]: Tell me more about what you're talking about. Go to [b] (6), not go to [b] (6).

[b] (3). [inaudible]: I think it's because the ULT --

[b] (3) (A). [inaudible]: Like the [inaudible] you were talking about?

[b] (3). [inaudible]: Yes. Using the ranges, the R-74, using the Pilsung range, or, you know, that was a bit frustrating because if
it was going to be a MAG exercise, you would hope that they would implement -- they would take care of the scheduling for the range.

(b) (6) (A): By they, you mean higher headquarters?

(b) (3): Yes, higher headquarters would do that. So that -- it felt at that point it was just, kind of, frustrating. Again, it wasn't an impact on my day so I didn't spend too much time -- thought on it because then I -- with our -- looking at the weather on Monday and Tuesday, I knew that we had a very, probably not a very, but just a little probability of actually executing due to the weather and the ceilings and everything like that.

So we would brief and we would talk and discuss and we would, you know, we would go through the whole process with the [inaudible], like, hey be prepared to slide right if we have to. And at that point, that was it, so you get kind of frustrated with that too because you're doing all these mission planning cycles, you come in on Sunday, doing the whole mission planning cycles and stuff and you just don't get to go execute.

So that kind of stuff, but I think that was about it for the week and unfortunately, like I said, I didn't see Captain Reslar the week prior to it. I'd only flown with him probably twice, but it was just unfortunate.

And even when I found out about it, I came in at 0645
normal time and everybody was, kind of, in a tizzy, had no idea what was going on. And the CO said you don't know? And I said I have no idea what you're talking about, what's going on? And they said let me talk to you real quick, and that was it.

That was the first I heard about it, so just a lot of, I would hate to say normal day operations for me, but other things I wasn't privy to because I wasn't a part of those execution pieces.


[03(A): Nothing, sir.

[03(A): Judge will swear you out.

[The witness was warned, sworn, and excused.]
Today is Thursday the 24th of January. I am. I am assisted by and. We're interviewing.

, can you state your full name for the record, spelling your last name?

: You can just call me is fine.

: Okay. Can I just call you if that's okay.

: That will work.

: You can call me or sir.

: Sure.

: , how long have you been in 242?

: About two and a half years.

: Okay. So do the math for me, when did you check in?

: I checked into the squadron on November of 2016.
November of 2016? Where were you coming from?

I was at the MAG for a year when I first checked in here.

So you checked into the MAG --

I checked into the MAG in November of 15.

Roughly November of 15

Yep. And then I went on a IME to the 31st MEU for six months and then worked at the MAG for six months.

When did you get back from the 31st MEU?

May of 16 actually probably June, maybe June 2016.

May of 16? Sure. And then Okay. Great.

And what your MOS?

7523.

Where did you go to the FRS?

I've been to multiple different FRS' but my initial qualification was BFA 125 in Lamore, California.

Did you subsequently refresh?

Twice, yes. At 101 Human AT 101 Miramar.

When's the last time you were at 101?


Have you been to SERES school?
Have you been to the HELO dunker?
Yes.
When's the last time you went to the HELO dunker?
2015.
Okay. What are your qualifications and designation level under?
Section lead.
Do you have any high quals?
No.
Where were you in December of 2018?
I was in the SKIV DIV VMFA 242 [ph].
Were you here in Iwakuni participating in ULT?
That's correct; yes.
So you weren't TAD, you weren't on leave?
No. I was not.
Okay. How did you participate in the ULT? What was your role?
I was just a -- I was a pilot. Air crew, in it.
Okay.
So I flew day crew, night crew, I was mid crew.

Okay. So what time did you report for duty?

I think around -- probably like 11, 11 o'clock in the morning was my -- and then if I was flying it would adjust based off of my crew day. Required for my flight. I think the majority of my flights were scheduled to land no later than about 2100. So that gave me time to debrief.

Okay.

In accordance with the SOP.

Yeah. So by any chance -- what's the crew day for SOP if you're landing at night?

If you're landing after 2100? It's a ten hour day.

Was there any discussion about the use of Go or No Go pills in support of the exercise?

Not officially to my knowledge. I don't know. I was not personally privy to any conversations with higher about Go or No-Go pills.

Okay.

So that answers that.

Were you ever at any meetings with the CO
or leadership where it was discussed?

[b] (3) (A), (b) : No.

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6) : Okay. Do you have a dry suit?

[b] (3) (A), (b) : I do.

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6) : Do you wear it much?

[b] (3) (A), (b) : When the water's -- when it's required per op now.

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6) : Tell me about that.

[b] (3) (A), (b) : [inaudible] It's got a complex series of water temperature requirements etc. So I have to get inside and look at it. And usually the ODO tells us before we walk, you're going here, the water is here, dress as required.

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6) : Okay. Have ever stood ODO here?

[b] (3) (A), (b) : Not here. I have stood ODO in the BATCH but only when we're short ODO's like in Australia.

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6) : Okay.

[b] (3) (A), (b) : Other than that there's no fucking water in Australia. Sorry. I cursed internationally.

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6) : I'm tracking. What do you know about the search rescue capabilities here in Iwakuni?

[b] (3) (A), (b) : To my understanding it's pretty outstanding.

[b] (3) (A), (b) (6) : Do you know what the response time is?

[b] (3) (A), (b) : I don't know what they're advertised response time
is. I know what, historically, what I've seen from mishaps that have been out here since I've been in the squadron.

Tell me more about that.

The previous mishap was at 115 for Camp Frederick essentially patrol flying training kind of thing. Our squadron was flying at the time so we heard his wing was in trouble in regard, saying an aircraft in the water. So we knocked off what we were doing, tried to get as much information as we could, told to come back in for this training, we landed as a squadron, we all went through the pits waiting for commanding officer or authority or the MAG CO to let us know that we could go out and try to help before anyone was on station.

And just in the amount of time it took us all to to get out jets refueled in the pits, it was our understanding that we had a US1 or US2 in route. You know they're fairly slow, so a couple hours but I know they have newer jet, that they have the ability to launch pretty quickly from other bases so. And I guess they're here probably here too, I think I've seen them. I would say within an hour or two is probably their normal response time from what I've seen.

And so -- in about an hour or two, do you feel like a recovery asset can be overhead --
Yeah.

An aircrew in the central area of the inter south?

Yea. Probably more like two maybe two maybe three, I think just with the speeds that they fly and there were -- and they were just getting the jet fired up and, you know, getting the general search -- inter south is pretty big so. I think the majority of the incidents we've had have been luckily, kind of, or in the northern part of it which is obviously the closer -- it's apparent northern to me but the closest to Iwakuni when I look down at the map is where I was going?

The western most if you will. South Northwest limits.

Yeah but that makes sense. They haven't been to the far edges of the ITRA which would probably take another hour for a normal type of aircraft to get to if that makes sense.

Okay. It does. So we talked about OPNAV and you said its got a complex series of rules and regulations and shareable's in there. So have you ever been part of the decision making process about when to wear a dry suit and when not to?

No. I think it's -- I mean it's pretty -- No. I have not.

Okay.
I mean I guess I'm always part of the suiting wearing process of whether or not I choose to wear a dry suit or not. For previous commands, you know, tries and pack things like that where you may, potentially, fly over water. Temperature that is intermittently a degree or two cold enough that you would need one but the other end of the spectrum is that there is no SAAR effort within eight hours and you're going to die anyways. So if you want to wear a dry suit on a twelve hour flight to Spain from the East Coast of the United States. It's over to you what's more dangerous. Wearing a dry suit for twelve hours in the middle of the night and becoming dehydrated, essentially not being able to concentrate, or prolonging your time to death when you eject over the North Atlantic and nobodies going to get you anyways.

So in that perspective -- I guess I have, yeah.

And how did that, I mean, based on your body language and your tone, I assume that in the times you've done TRANSLANCE, you've elected not to wear your dry suit.

That is correct. It is very difficult to use the restroom, you sweat a lot. It just makes it difficult and theres some -- the longest flights I've ever done in my career have been over the water like that so --

How many hours do you have in the Hornet?
I have 1,000 hours in the Hornet.

How many hours do you have at night, roughly?

Probably 300 or so. I probably have more night time just because I did some night ops in Afghanistan. So probably more than the average person at night.

Did you wear night vision goggles doing that?

I did.

Did you wear ANVS-9's?

When I was in Afghanistan I wore ANVS-9's. Since I've come to the squadron here I've worn the other type of -- I'm having a brain fart. I can't remember what they're called.

ANVS-11 NVG.

Yeah. NVG.

Roughly how many hours do you have on the NVG?

Probably 60 hours on the NVG.

So when you came to Iwakuni, you were a ANVS-9 guy and then when you joined the BATS you got your JHMCS helmet and you were then issues, at some point, ANVS-11's?

Yes; NVG's. So I've always had a JHMCS helmet.
My squadron, my first two squadrons but first squadron got JHMCS. So we started out with it. I think even before they had like a program where you were -- I think at the time -- no, you could get it right when you joined the squadron. I think subsequently we have required people to, you know, have like 20 hours in the fleet or something like that before -- and it's usually just a matter of time before we get them a JHMCS helmet. Back in the day we didn't have a ton of them but our squadron had the most so.

We didn't have NVG and then we got out here and we were required to, yeah, have a certain amount of NVG time or JHMCS time and then take a class, go through the night lab with the NVGs. That's what I remember.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): So tell me about that. What did you learn about the NVG?

(b) (3) (A), (b): Just another night vision goggle.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): Did you -- are there any performance differences between the ANVS-9 and the ANVS-11 that you were trained on?

(b) (3) (A), (b): I think you can -- I mean the book answer is, yes. But the realistic answer is, flying at night is difficult and I don't notice a great difference between NVG's, ANVS-9's or ANVS-11 NVG's. To be honest I know you get a better field of view et
cetera, et cetera. And it's supposed to be a little better -- less scintillation there's some other random things you can look at in the book but for the most part flying with NVG's is flying with NVG's. It doesn't really matter what they are just like the -- I like the nominar [ph] of NVG's, it's not sticking out quite as far so it doesn't feel as heavy on your neck and I enjoy that.

[0 (3) (A), (b) (6)]: Okay. So you don't remember -- I mean the answer to the question is, aside from the benefit of the NBCD's of having the HUD display and being lighter, there's no appreciable differences in the performance of those two goggles.

[0 (3) (A), (b)]: Makes sense.

[0 (3) (A), (b) (6)]: In your training, your experiences is that what you believe to be true?

[0 (3) (A), (b)]: Yeah, I mean, yeah. Sure.

[0 (3) (A), (b) (6)]: Okay. have you ever heard of the term "IBOX" with regards to night vision goggles?

[0 (3) (A), (b)]: No.

[0 (3) (A), (b) (6)]: Okay. Have you been to the tanker at night?

[0 (3) (A), (b)]: Yes.

[0 (3) (A), (b) (6)]: Did you normally wear your night vision goggles?
[O3A, B]: I do.

[R]: So you leave you goggles down, looking through the tubes while conducting night systems air refueling?

[O3A, B]: That's correct.

[R]: Do you ever give consideration of flipping your goggles up?

[O3A, B]: I've experimented in my first fleet tour just based off of, like, environmental considerations, tanker illumination ability, things like that. I found -- and just my own external lighting. I found that it's easier to tank off of a tanker at night with your NVG's down from my own personal opinion.

[R]: Why do you feel that way?

[O3A, B]: I feel like depending on the side of the tanker that your on, you can actually get a better -- you get a better perspective of the whole entire aircraft. If you have your NVG's set up just right, you can still, kind of, monitor people down below the NVG's but you always have that ability to take the brightest source of light is on the C130 or 135 or whatever. And if you move it just outside of you NVG, it doesn't de-gain them. So you can still get that -- you can still see the wing -- sorry -- the outline of the wing. It gives you a good horizon.

As soon as you try to look, usually at the other aircraft
or at the tanker if they have a single light that isn't NVG compatible which I guess it's common in some way shape or form depending on how things work out, you usually have to Defense Exhibit -- gain your goggles and you have to, kind of, look away from the light. So in my experience, yeah. That's kind of my own thought on it.

: Okay.

: I've noticed they're difficult -- that certain sides of the tanker are more difficult to tank off of at night if you're talking C130 wise. Just based off of when you're on the left hand side you're generally, kind of, looking to the right. So you see the tanker itself when you're on the left -- or the right hand side. You're generally looking to the right so you only see the wing tip. So you kind of lose some of that giant perspective that you have of the aircraft movement itself.

: So when you go to the tanker at night, on the goggles, what do you like to with the lights on the hornet -- on your Hornet?

: So typically when I'm flying with, for my brief, it's typically -- I'll explain to them that obviously there's overt and covert lining for the C130's. So depending on what kind of -- what they choose to do sometimes will show up on the tanker and
their lights will be off, sometimes they will show up on the tanker and their lights will be on. It's our prerogative to turn them off or turn them on, whatever works the best for us.

: So it's pretty common to go to the tanker and the C130's lights will be completely off?

: I don't know what I would define common, but have I joined on tankers when they ask me to call visual and I was like: are your lights on and they're like no. I was like, okay, you need to turn your lights on so I can see. So yeah. I guess -- have I had incidents of that? Yes. Most defiantly.

: So when you say off and on, do you mean overt and covert?

: That's correct. Overt and covert.

: Okay. So when you say off you mean covert.

: I do, yeah.

: Okay. So when I use the word off I'm going to mean like midnight --

: Okay.

: Like not admitting.

: Yeah.

: So I'm going to say off, covert and
overt.

(o) (3) (A), (b): Yeah. So at range, overt in my opinion might as well be off. I'm sorry, covert might as well be off at range. So anyways, back to your original question.

(o) (3) (A), (b): So they normally go covert?

(o) (3) (A), (b): That is correct. Well, I mean I can't even say they normally go covert because when I was in Afghanistan we tanked overt. So my normal -- what I like to do is I have my pause lights turned all the way down so I just have my NVG formation lights on. That's for wingman consideration. It allows him to still see me but not be blinded by my jet. I will let them know that when the probe comes out, there is an NVG incompatible lighting that comes out. So you have the option, if you like, to potentially to pinky switch your lights completely off. That will make the light go away on the IFAR probe. It will allow you to see the basket and see a better delineation between the basket and the probe itself.

Typically I find that I leave that light on, I don't mind it but once I get into the basket, it makes judging distance from the hose, how far you reel the hose in prior to getting flow is sometimes a little bit difficult.

(o) (3) (A), (b): In that case you might give consideration to going midnight?
Potentially flicking your lights off for a second to get a good basis of size of where you're at in regards to the yellow lines on the basket and you can turn them back on or turn them back off.

How do you define a hazard?
A hazard is -- that's a good question. A hazard is probably anything that could cause loss of human life or -- yeah, a loss of human life can be considered a hazard.

How do you define a risk?
A risk is -- a risk is probably anything that could cause like injury or maybe damage to personal property but not risk of death. I don't know. That's probably how I would look at it. Yeah.

Have you ever heard the acronym ORM?
I have.
Can you define it for me?
Operational risk management.
Do you know how many steps there are in the ORM process?
I think it's like a five step process.
Can you tell me how that's integrated into operations at 242?
Yeah. So, I mean, it's one of those complex things from the brief on BAC. So initially when we get into the brief for any kind of flight, we'll -- one of the very first things that comes up in the briefing guide is whether or not anybody has any ORM issues. So we give everybody in the flight the opportunity to speak up if there's any reason they shouldn't be flying tonight or if there isn't anything that we should keep an eye out.

And usually that's a good thing or we'll tell people that, if I'm going to speak up during the ORM. I'll be like, hey, it's been a while since I've flown, it's been a while since I've flown at night, I haven't done this mission recently so I feel comfortable to fly and I feel like the brief will mitigate any kind of risk but keep an eye on me. That's something I would say but a majority of the time, most people if they've had an ORM issue for a flight, I would have heard about it or they would have -- we would expect. I think usually what we do is we would expect you to say something previous so we could get another air crew in.

So that's kind of at the brief level. And then obviously there's a whole series of risk mitigation that goes on when you're writing the flight schedule based off of currency requirements, when the last time you flew. Stuff like that. We mitigate risk and kind of apply that ORM process when we put air crew with select WISSO's.
and what events they've been flying. We look at their total flight time and the 30, 60, 90 flight time. Whether or not they are currently qualified for an event and whether or not they should go flying.

And then, obviously there's going to be some ORM applied when the CO signs the schedule and when it gets routed through safety and safety looks at it. Whether or not they agree with the schedule and how it's written. So from -- when you look at a schedule, when it gets routed through safety and maintenance, they all have their own little checklist. You know maintenance probably has what they're looking at whether or not there's a number of aircraft.

But you know, when the schedule goes through DOSS, obviously the DOSS, a hot minute ago, there was like fifteen step thing I would just set the schedule down, I would look at this little sheet that was tacked up on my board and it said, you know, is everybody current and qualified? It was just a standard checklist you went down and you could just quickly ask the schedule writer those questions. Do all these steps make sense and that would be suffice with me signing the schedule off as the DOSS.

So if that answers your question. That's kind of my summary of how ORM -- ORM is kind of a broad spectrum. I'm sure
there's probably even more levels of ORM where the MAG has to allow us to go flying or they probably get briefed at ops SYNCS or, you know, commander's update briefs and things like that on what the squadron execution is going to be for the week or for the month. And, you know, the MAG CO probably has some semblance of say on whether or not we're actually going to do that or not do that. Things like that. So I think it's kind of a broad term. I'd like to say it's applied at numerous levels.

: What is your current job in the squadron?

: I am the assistant operations officer.

: So is that, as you just alluded to, you assist or review the development of the flight schedule?

: I do. So I haven't been the OPSO very long or the AOPSO very long. So I found that technically the AOPSO is more of a future operations position. So I deal with outside of thirty days when the OPSO is out and the SCIZZO's need guidance. Typically what I'll do is try to lead them in the right direction but I like to think my job is more of long term planning. Vice current operations which is really what the OPSO.

: What role did you have in the planning of the ULT?

: None. I had just taken over as the AOPSO. I was
the assistant aviation maintenance prior to that so I didn't know anything about it.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): What role did you have in the preparation of the flight schedules?

(b) (3) (A), (b): For that day I didn't have any.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): Is it common to have a flight schedule that doesn't have something on it but you guys could do it anyway? Specifically air refueling?

(b) (3) (A), (b): Is it common for a flight schedule to have something on it that you go do anyways?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): Not have something on it.

(b) (3) (A), (b): Not have something on it.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): Is it common to do something not on the flight schedule?

(b) (3) (A), (b): Yeah. Yeah. I would say it is.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): Tell me about that.

(b) (3) (A), (b): Well, if I go on a cross country and I brief, I get approved by the MAG or from the CO through the MAG that I'm going to go do, you know, close air support in support of the 31st MEU's MEUX in Okinawa. And we get down there and we check in, we check in with the MEU AIRO and the weather is unworkable from two to ten thousand feet and he doesn't have any work for us. The JTECHS
are going home, as long as we can appropriately brief a back up plan, which that's a slide in our briefs. What's our back up plan for today? So we could potentially brief a 1 v 1 BFM high aspect where we'll go into the airspace that is already utilized and we'll execute the brief -- the back up brief game plan which is. So I would say, yeah. It's not uncommon as long as it's covered in the brief I don't think anybody would have any problems with that.

I know in previous squadrons every potential code that you could ever do is annotated on the flight schedule and our squadron is usually the primary code but there are times that you have to flex a little bit in order to get the proper train -- or get some semblance of training from a flight that could have potentially have gone south. Or you know, all the requirements to bring a flight together for execution have, kind of, slipped away via weather or maybe the JTECH just didn't show up. I've seen that before too.

: So in the context of this mishap and you as a section leader, if you for whatever reason were in position, it sounds like you would've done the same thing? : I would've. Yeah. Most definitely.

I mean as long as you mitigate that with -- yeah, I would have done the same thing. I would have gone flying as long as I knew about it prior to the brief and I could at least talk to it, to
mitigate, to apply ORM in that portion and let my wingman know, kind of, what I expect of him.

I will say that there's a slide on our brief that's what's different today? Is it night? Is it air refueling? Et etera. But, you know, air refueling is kind of admin. We reference things that are somewhat standard as administrative parts of the flight. Like I don't strictly -- I don't specifically cover how I want you to take off. I tell you, I want you on the runway and this is the kind of takeoff we're going to do but I don't tell you the stick and radar mec on how to do it. So that little quip it for air to air refueling, I may talk a little bit more about but I wouldn't necessarily anchor down on it. I would read the room somewhat and look at people's confidence and their comfort level.

[O] [3] (A), [b] (6) [O] [3] (A), (b) [6]: So you would expect the mishap pilot to been able to go out and complete air refueling without any specific guidance?

[O] [3] (A), (b): I would have expected him to be able to do that, yes. It turns out, I mean, I won't guess. I don't know what happened so.

But I would expect that both aircraft could safely go out and do air refueling and come back and land and have nothing freaking happen.
Okay. And you don't consider doing a 1 v 1 BFM when the flight schedule says do CAS? You don't consider that to be a deviation from the flight schedule?

No, I do not.

And you don't consider going to the tanker when there's no tanker code or tanker notes in the flight schedule? You don't consider that to be a deviation from the flight schedule?

No, I do not. I wouldn't consider it. I mean in the context of what we're discussing, I guess you have to bring it up. And I would expect anybody to bring it up but no it's not uncommon to go out and do something different. It's not uncommon in a combat area -- you know, in Afghanistan or Iraq to go out with the plan of doing one thing and the next thing, you're intercepting a bougie. Like, you may not brief that but you go do it because you can rely on the training and the experience you have in someway shape or form to get the job done.

Did you intercept a lot of bougies in Afghanistan?

One.

Really?

Yeah. It was a UAV that lost its data link, we
were supposed to shoot it down.

: Okay. Do you consider flying out of Iwakuni to be combat operations?

: No, I do not.

: Okay. Do you have any idea of what your survival time would be in 68-degree-water without a dry suit?

: 5 hours.

: Is that survivable -- is that until you or until you go unconscious?

: I don't know. I'm just throwing a number out there.

: That's fine. I'm asking your gut instinct, that's the question.

: In 68-degree-water, am I in a raft or am I floating in the water?

: You're submerged in water, you're not in the raft.

: Am I conscious or unconscious?

: I'm asking you how long until you go unconscious and I'm asking how long until you die?

: Okay. I would probably go unconscious -- I don't know. I'm pretty tough and I've got low body fat. I'd say I'd
probably go unconscious in 5 hours. I'd probably die in 7 hour.

: Okay. Good guess.

Do you fly with much as your wingman?

: I have flown with as my wingman before.

: How did he do?

: I won't say he was an above average pilot, I won't say he's a below pilot. He was probably average at best.

: Did you ever fly with in your trunk?

: I did.

: How did he do?

: He's and above average WISSO.

: You ever fly with ?

: Yes.

: How did he do?

: He's above average.

When you guys prepare the flight schedule at 224, do you have the XO, OPSO, AMO, ASO, ORDINANCEO or anyone else review the schedule prior to the CO's signature?

: The OPSO, the DOSS and the AMO all review it and then it's not uncommon for, say, the PTO to have some injects prior
to going to the OPSO for a quick review before it gets up the process.

Tell me about that process.

They walk around with a clipboard and ask them to review it for their portion of the flight schedule. They sometimes

Caviar, I'm not interested in name changes for maintenance, I'm interested can you support the air -- can you support the flight schedule with the any number of aircraft that we're showing in DOSS. I'm not interested in you to say, hey, I sure would like to fly this flight. I'm interested in you to look at the schedule from a safety and aspect and does it look and see safe.

And sir, how is the CO to know that all of those section heads have looked at the flight schedule?

I think there is -- well, I mean, with one-hundred-percent uncertainty, I don't know. I've had different squadrons do different things and I've never been in the routing process. I used to sign it as the DOSS, put my initials on it as the DOSS to say that I agreed with what the schedule invoked in regards to safety. I think that is not a requirement. I think it has been a recommendation and its came and gone over the, you know, thirteen years I've flown the hornet so.

Is it done at VMFA 242?
To my understanding, right now it does. Yeah.

So to your understanding, the flight schedules are signed off by the Doss?

Yeah.

And the AMO?

Yeah. I would argue that the DOSS and the aviation safety officer probably have -- the ASO has more knowledge in regards to safety than the DOSS does. So I would argue that if -- in absence of the DOSS if the DOSS is gone, they would probably either put a dash or typically what we would do, when I was gone, we would have the safety officer review it because he was super smart on all things safety. As they should because they're actually school trained aviation safety officers.

So about the time of the mishap, who would be signing off on the flight schedule before it gets to the CO?

It would have been the OPSO. Probably or who is the DOSS/ASO. It would have been the AMO or maybe as the AAMO.

And they'd be initialing on the flight schedule?
Yeah.

Okay.

Did you guys ever use anything called an ORM or risk assessment worksheet at 242?

The actual sheet before you go flying?

Yeah.

No. We use those, I think it was a requirement for, I don't know, a year at my previous command and then it went away so.

What was your previous command?

VMFA 122 East Coast Hornet Squadron.

So when you were back at MAG 31 you guys did it for a while and then you stopped?

Yeah. Yep. We did it. It was MAG guidance from -- it was directed by the MAG to do it and then they recended the requirement. It wasn't -- because it wasn't written anywhere outside of the MAG SOP and I think they changed the MAG SOP.

So like a new MAG CO came in and got rid of it?

That's correct. Yep.

Was there any -- were you around when that happened, do you know why they got rid of that requirement?
No, I do not.

Just know it was taken care of?

Yeah.

Okay. So is there anything about the mishap, the facts, the circumstances about this that you think that I need to know?

To be honest with you I don't know -- I probably know just as much about this as you do. I know that somebody died and we had people survive and it's unfortunate all the way around but I don't really know.

You know what, is there anything different that the Marine Corps could do to reduce the probability of a mishap like this in the future?

Is everybody getting plenty of flight time?

Yes and no. I would say some months flight times are abundant and some months -- this is common knowledge, I'm not saying anything everybody doesn't already know. Flight time can sometimes be hurting. I would say generally speaking in my time in 242, our flight time has been above average. Since I've been here over two and half years. We're kind of in a dry spell unfortunately over the past five months which strictly, kind of, based off of TEEP.
And you know we surge all of our aircraft to go on a detachment somewhere for two months and we come back with deferred maintenance that we have to do so we surge to execute the detachment and then it hurts on the backside with maintenance because we're catching up on the deferred maintenance that we had. So the things we could do, we could lower the TEEP, yeah we could change how much we're doing detachments out here.

You know the other end of the spectrum is we need those detachments in order to get certain types of currency we can't get here on mainland Japan.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : Have you ever heard of anything like this happening before?

(b) (3) (A), (b) : I have never fucking heard of another aircraft -- I have never heard of a fighter crashing into a tanker and having a catastrophic mid-air. No. Has there ever been one?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) : That's what I'm asking. Are you familiar with -- yeah. Are you familiar with the receiver -- a fighter receiver striking a tanker in the history of air refueling? I mean or in recent -- or obviously in recent history. Not in Vietnam Air Force off the chart but like --

(b) (3) (A), (b) : No, I get what you're saying. I know we had -- well I mean before I joined the squadron we had a jet clip the
basket.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): Tell me about that.

(b) (3) (A), (b): He clipped the basket.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): And what month and year was that?

(b) (3) (A), (b): It was like 2015, 2014, 2015. Something like that.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): How did he -- when you say clipped the basket, so he was effecting a fuel transfer --

(b) (3) (A), (b): No, it was my understanding --

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): -- and it plugged in and the basket broke off and flew home the basket on the probe?

(b) (3) (A), (b): I think it was my understanding that he got situational awareness when they were departing the tanker. He was unsure on his position relative to his flight lead and his wingman and he -- I think he clipped a basket.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): I'm sorry. I just don't know what you mean by clipped a basket.

(b) (3) (A), (b): Well I think -- I mean I don't -- I was never -- I wasn't in the squadron when it happened and I didn't get a full debrief on it but I think his aircraft struck the refueling hose that comes out of the back of a C130.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): With what part of his airplane, like the
wing or something?

: I don't know. I literally don't know.

: So that -- did the basket, like, fall off into the ocean or what?

: I don't know.

: You don't know anything about it is what you're saying?

Not really, no. I just know it happened.

: And you got here in May of 16?

: In the squadron of May of 16 that is correct. No. November of 16.

: So were you on the 31st MEU during April of 2016?

: Yes.

: And when did you get back from the 31st MEU, November?

: We got off the ship mid May and I came back to the MAG in mid June.

: So you're in the MAG in June of 16?

: That's correct.

: So you're on MAG 12 staff in June of 16?

: That's correct.
You were there for four or five months and then you made your way over to the BATS?

Yeah.

So in June of 2016, you were not part of any conversation about a mid air collision between a 242 and 152?

No.

Okay.

What was your position at the MAG at that time, sir?

I was the plans officer. So I worked KTO planning down in the vault downstairs.

And sir, during the swing shift, who was the senior officer in the swing shift for the ULT?

I feel like our XO was on the swing shift as well so I would have to say the XO.

How many field grade officers were on the swing shift?

I don't know.

Was it more than you and the XO?

I cannot say with a hundred percent certainty. Yes. Maybe. I don't know. Like -- I don't know.

Do you remember if there was any field
grade officers on the night shift.

[0] (3) (A), (b): I don't think there were any field grade officers on the night shift, no.

[0] (3) (A), (b) (6): Okay.

[0] (3) (A), (b) (6): So you feel like the night shift was kind of the captains and the new guys, which are all captains. And it seemed like the day shift had like the CO and the mid shift had the XO and then we had basically the new guys on the night shift. Is that kind of how you remember it?

[0] (3) (A), (b): I mean, while being only a captain is one of the most experienced pilots we have in the squadron. So.

[0] (3) (A), (b) (6): How can he be a captain and be one of the most experienced pilots in the squadron? You're a major.

[0] (3) (A), (b): Yeah. Well, he's -- I mean he came fleet to fleet so his currency -- you know he did, like, a second Iraq deployment if you will. So we consider him experienced because he, you know, he's been to combat and he dropped ordinance recently, and then he came straight from a deployed combat squadron to our squadron. So he didn't have any time out of the cockpit of the hornet, if you will. And just his qualification level. He's a super qualified captain.

[0] (3) (A), (b) (6): Okay.
So I don't remember -- I don't know what the planning -- I don't know what the thought process was in regards on how we broke down the flight crews at all but I'm assuming we probably had like two crews or three on each schedule depending on how many people we had. I wouldn't be surprised if was the most experienced guy on the night crew. Maybe we -- I don't know. Maybe our OPSO tried to divvy up our WTI's and is almost a WTI. So tried to divvy up some experience based off of what was going to happen.

Okay. Is there anything that you'd like to add?

Not that I can think of.

Judge, anything?

No, sir.

Judge will swear you out.

[The witness was warned, sworn, and excused.]
Fuku Air Traffic Control Transcription

2 April 2019

Taken from:
- F02 1558-1604mono.mp3
- F02 1821-1832.ver2mono.mp3
- F08 1603-1612.ver2mono.mp3
- F08 1647-1822mono.mp3

Listed Chronologically:
- Profane 11 checked in with Fuku Control at 0059 passing 13,300’ for 15,000’
- Profane 11 contacted Fuku Control at 0100 and was cleared direct the SUC VORTAC at 17,000’
- Profane 11 contacted Fuku Control at 0102 and was cleared to switch frequency 300.2
- Profane 11 contacted Fuku Control at 0104 level at FL270
- Profane 11 contacted Fuku Control at 0110 to cancel radar services and request local altimeter setting
- Profane 11 contacted Fuku Control at 0147 to report an emergency
- Profane 11 contacted Fuku Control at 0150 and passed the crash location as N32 38.6268 E134 38.1244
- Profane 11 contacted Fuku Control at 0153 and asked the question “Looking for confirmation that search and rescue has been notified?”
- Profane 11 was contacted by Fuku Control at 0203 to confirm which aircraft were in the water. Profane 11 responded with “Profane 12 is in the water. Sumo 41 is in the water”
- That Profane 11 was contacted by Fuku Control at 0207 asking “to confirm there was a collision between Profane 12 and Sumo 41” To which Profane 11 responded “Affirmative”
- Profane 11 contacted Fuku Control at 0213 asking for “update and search and rescue assets” To which Fuku control responded with “say again” and then “search and rescue should be coming”
- Profane 11 contacted Fuku Control at 0227 asking for “status of search and rescue”
- Profane 11 attempted to contact Profane 12 on 121.5 at 0241 with no audible response
- Profane 11 attempted to contact Sumo 41 on 121.5 at 0243 with no audible response
- Fuku Control contacted Profane 11 at 0248 requesting Profane 11’s fuel status to which Profane 11 responded with “15 minutes”
- Fuku Control contacted Profane 11 at 0251 requesting survivor location to which Profane responded with “Negative. Searching at 10,000”
- Profane 11 contacted Fuku Control at 0252 advising that they observe a “strobe beacon in the water”
- Profane 11 contacted Fuku Control at 0254 with a latitude and longitude of a possible survivor
- Profane 11 contacted Fuku Control at 0256 and provided the beacon location as N32 37.78 E135 03.16
- Fuku Control contacted Profane 11 asking if Profane 11 had observed a parachute or liferaft to which Profane 11 responded “negative”
- Profane 11 contacted Fuku Control at 0311 at flight level 260 requesting to return to Iwakuni direct
- Fuku Control contacted Profane 11 at 0312 with squawk 1735, radar contact and cleared Profane direct to Iwakuni at FL330
- Fuku Control contacted Profane 11 at 0314 with clearance to FL360
- Fuku Control contacted Profane 11 at 0321 with clearance to change to frequency 227.2
From: [Redacted] USMC
To: Commanding General, 1st Marine Aircraft Wing

Subj: SECOND REQUEST FOR EXTENSION ICO 6 DECEMBER 2018 MID-AIR COLLISION MISHAP COMMAND INVESTIGATION

Ref: (a) IO Appointment Letter 5830/CG dated 10 Dec 18

1. I request an extension of time for completing the command investigation for which I have been appointed by the reference. I request a new submission date of 31 May 2019.

2. The reason for this request is to allow the transcription service provider to complete transcriptions for the interviews.

Copy to:
SJA, 1st MAW

Enclosure 144
From: Commanding General, 1st Marine Aircraft Wing
To: (b) (3) (A), (b) (6) USMC

Subj: SECOND REQUEST FOR EXTENSION ICO 6 DECEMBER 2018 MID-AIR COLLISION MISHAP COMMAND INVESTIGATION

1. Returned. Your request for an extension is granted. Your investigation is now due 31 May 2019

T. D. WEIDLEY

Copy to:
SJA, 1st MAW

Enclosure 144
## MAG-31 ORM SHEET USAGE SUMMARY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Squadron</th>
<th>ORM Sheets</th>
<th>Flight Sched Signature</th>
<th>Flight Leads Review/Sign ORM?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>115</td>
<td>In use. &quot;Threat and error management worksheet&quot; signed by AMO/OPSO/DOSS and CO when routed.</td>
<td>CO only</td>
<td>No. ORM review conducted in brief.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>In use. Signed by OpsO/DOSS/CO when schedule is routed.</td>
<td>CO only</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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<tr>
<td>251</td>
<td>In use. Signed by OpsO/DOSS/CO when schedule is routed.</td>
<td>CO only</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>312</td>
<td>In use. Reviewed by Mx Cntl. Signed by OpsO/DOSS/CO when schedule is routed.</td>
<td>CO only</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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<tr>
<td>533</td>
<td>In use. Signed by OpsO/DOSS/CO when schedule is routed.</td>
<td>CO only</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Latent Failures

- Leadership
- Funding constraints
  - Poor crew pairing
  - Inadequate training
  - Inexperience
  - Fatigue and distractions
  - Violating SOPs
  - Pushing limitations

Active Failures
VMFA(AW)-242
Profane 11
6 December 2018

No Field Grade Officers scheduled or engaged in execution
No aircrew had met flight hour proficiency goals
NVCD’s not properly fielded
MP1, MP2, and MWSO2 all have HFC concerns
MP2 not trained, qualified, or current.
MP2 NVG inexperience
MP2 NSAAR inexperience
0030 take-off 0145 mishap
BUNO number request
Not scheduled – not approved
Not experienced or proficient NSAAR

Orders Violations:
- Use of Ambien/cold meds
- T&R non-compliance
- Incomplete Flight Schedule
- Late Publication
- XO not assigned safety program oversight

Enclosure 146
Today is January the 24th, 2019. We're in Iwakuni, Japan. 

and are present in the room with the next witness.

Please state your name for the record, spelling your last name.

Last name is How would you like for me to refer to you?

is fine. Is that your call sign?

Yes, sir. It's a play on your last name, I guess?

Yes. I like it. They call me school, so I can relate to that.

Okay. with a because of my poor spelling skills and my poor education.

Where were you on August of 2018 -- I'm sorry. December of 2018?
Okay. Did you participate in the ULT?

Yes.

What was your role and responsibility?

I was on the night page with the mishap crew.

Okay. What is your military occupational specialty?

7523.

Okay. So you're a hornet pilot?

A hornet pilot, correct.

Okay. When did you get your wings?

February of 2012. It was February 17th.

When did you complete the FRS?

February of 2000 -- it was either January or February of 2013.

When did you check-in to 242?

September of 2017.

September of 17. So you've been in the squadron almost a year and a half.

A year and a half, correct.

What squadron were you in before?
224 on the East Coast.

How are 224 and 242 different?

They're both two-seat squadrons.

Honestly, it wasn't too much different, I guess.

Okay.

Both had pretty good ready rooms.

Okay.

Follow-up procedures.

Where you in the squadron space during the mishap?

Yes.

What were you doing?

I was doing some ground job work.

What is you ground job?

Airframes OIC.

So you're downstairs with two guys?

With maintenance, correct.

Okay.

I don't remember exactly. I was probably working on ASN reviews or something like that.

Did you attend any confirmation briefs about the whole exercise?
No, just in the squadron itself the Thursday prior.

Tell me about that.

So the OPSO, had all of the aircrew available come in. They had some slides of what to expect and then talked about the three crews. So morning slash day crew, mid crew. That was about 10 til 10, I guess. And then the night crew which started about 8 or 10 at night. And then I found out I was on the night crew for the next week. He had kind of set the flows of what we were doing and when we were expected to fly.

So you knew that you were expected to fly at the same time the mishap crew was flying?

I was on the schedule to fly the next day, so Thursday morning, I believe. So the morning of the 7th.

Like 24 hours later?

24 hours later than the mishap, correct.

Okay. The earlier morning hours and periods of darkness.

Correct. Probably -- I don't remember the schedule exactly. I know that the night of the mishap, they were told to start their engines after midnight, like, after the clock rolled over past 00.
We're you guys authorized the use of go or no-go pills?

No. It was asked for by some of the aircrew.

How was it asked?

I know it was mentioned in chats, like, officer chats on WhatsApp.

What's that about? What is WhatsApp?

It's a messaging software.

Oh like on your cell phone. Like on an iPhone?

Yes. Correct.

Okay. And you guys have like a chat room where you guys just talk about like what time the next brief is and what's going on in the squadron?

Right. Yeah.

Social stuff as well as probably official stuff?

Correct. There's like an officer's official one and then there's one that's, like, social.

Do you have like a JOPA one too?

Correct.
Junior officers. So how many different chat rooms are you aware of?

Three for the squadron.

So official, social, and JOPA?

Correct.

I just made up JOPA. Is that what you guys call it?

Something along those lines, sir.

Okay.

It's all captains and below.

Okay. That's cool.

I think it may have been used to ask the person as well?

Who?

About the go, no-go pills.

Who did they ask?

A doctor.

Oh, the flight surgeon.

Correct.

Is the flight surgeon on that chat with you guys?

Yes.
Does he or she respond to any questions about go or no-go pills on the app?

Yes. He said that we weren't authorized. I guess somebody mentioned, I forget who. If it was him or OFSO that the MEF general said no.

The MEF CG said no?

Correct.

General Smith?

Either him or Weidley.

The wing CG?

Yeah. I think it might have been the wing CG.

Okay. So did you take go or no-go pills?

I did not.

Why not?

Well, they said we could not.

Did you have some?

I have a trial I still have not taken.

When were you given a trial?

By the previous flight deck about a year ago.

At 242?
Correct. Correct.

So the flight surgeon at 242 issued out no-go pills for a ground trial in approximately December of 2017? You said about a year ago. January of '17?

I can't remember the exact date, but sometime around then.

What was the purpose of that?

He just noticed on my paperwork that I hadn't done the trial yet.

Oh, I see.

So he wanted to see if I wanted to do the trial. So most air crew do the trial at some point. I just hadn't done it.

And what's the purpose of the trial?

Just to see how you react to taking the go pill and no-go pill.

And how did you react?

I hadn't taken it, so I don't know.

So you were provided them a year ago, but you never consumed them?

Correct.

And you didn't turn them in?
No. I still have them.

Okay. Are you familiar with OPNAV 3710?

Have you read it?

I've read through it. I haven't read, like, the whole thing.

Have you read the part that talks about go, no-go pills?

The doctor sent that out.

What does it say?

I can't remember.

How did the doctor send it out?

Like a picture on his phone.

Like he screenshots the phone. Did he put it on the WhatsApp?

Correct.

Okay. What is OPNAV 3710 say about dry suits? Anti-exposure suits?

So if water temp is below 60 or the windchill, the air temperature and windchill is below 32, it's mandatory. Above that, it's at the CO's discretion.

Okay. What did your CO say about dry suits during the week of the wing ULT?
I think he mentioned, like, to follow OPNAV.

Okay.

I don't remember exactly if he mentioned specifically --

What was the forecast sea-surface temperature during the wing ULT in December of 2018? Was it briefed?

I'm pretty sure the flights look at it. I didn't look at it because I wasn't going to be flying that night.

But you were flying the next night?

Correct.

And we'd assume that the sea-surface temperature would be reasonably stable.

Right. I hadn't looked at it yet.

Okay.

But I'm pretty sure it was actually on the warmer side, like 70's.

And you think the sea-surface temperature was above 70 degrees --

I think so.

-- in the intra south. Were you
scheduled to go to the intra south as well?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) Next night, correct.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) Okay. So you would have been flying in

the same air space over the similar waters 24 hours later?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) Right.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) And you believe the sea-surface

temperature to be 70 degrees?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) I don't know exactly. I'd have to look

at it.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) Okay. Were you planning to wear your dry

suit the next night?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) Depending on the temperature.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) How many times have you worn your dry

suit at 242?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) In 242, I think twice.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) Twice?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) Last winter. Yeah. I've worn it a

bunch in my previous squadron.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) Why did you wear it a bunch in your

previous squadron.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) We flew up to [inaudible], Japan. So in

January, that's all the way up north. It's pretty much the same
latitude as Vermont. So if you eject, you're not surviving, especially without a dry suit.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6)

Got you. Did your previous commander, at VMFA-242, ever discuss that with you guys in the ready room?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6)

Yeah.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6)

How did he discuss it?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6)

Same thing. We'd follow procedures.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6)

When you say follow procedures, you mean fly with OPNAV?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6)

Correct. Comply with OPNAV.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6)

Have you ever conducted air refueling in the hornet?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6)

Many times.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6)

When was the last time?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6)

This past summer. We were in Australia. In August?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6)

Coming back from Australia would actually be the last. And that was --

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6)

And was that behind a STRAT tanker or behind a C130?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6)

STRAT tanker.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6)

Day or night?
Day.

When was the last time you did it at night?

During pitch-black in Australia.

What month and year was that?

Probably August in the past year, 2018.

And what kind of tanker was it?

Cl30. Both Marine Corps from 152 as well as a Canadian Cl30.

Okay. What was the light level condition, do you remember?

Those were mostly at pretty low light level.

Low light level.

How late in the day was it, or late in the night? Was it 2300 or was it like 1900? Was it pinky or was it super dark?

No it was definitely dark. It was well after.

It was well after Double ENT?

Correct.

What type of night vision goggles were you wearing, do you remember?
(b) (3) (A), (b) (6)

NVCs.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6)

So ANVS-11s?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6)

Correct.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6)

How many hours do you think you have, roughly, on the ballparks, in the airplane?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6)

I'd say about 70 or 80.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6)

How many hours do you think you have on the old goggles?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6)

About the same. Probably a little bit more, honestly.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6)

So maybe 100 hours on the ANVS-9s back at 224. And then, you came here.

Did you ever fly with the 9s at 242?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6)

Yes. I did before my JHMCS was fit?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6)

Okay. So after you came here you were flying on the 9s. Your JHMCS was fit and you got your ANVS-11s here in Iwakuni, right?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6)

Correct.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6)

Approximately what month and year was that that you actually received custody of the ANVS-11s for your use?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6)

Well, they check them out each flight.
When was your helmet good to go though?

It was pretty early on. Probably -- this is just purely a guess. Probably October, November of 2017.

So a little over a year ago. A year and a few months ago.

Correct.

So you were flying with 9s for a couple years. You had 100 hours or so. You came here and you flew with 9s for a little bit. And then, the eventually got your JHMCS helmet fit. And then, you became ANVS-11 capable.

So tell me what you did before your first ANVS-11 flight that was different.

It's a different focusing technique.

Let me ask the question differently.

What specific training did you receive on the ANVS-11?

When I was in 101, we went through -- part of my refresh coming out here -- we went through night lab and they talked about the differences there.

Okay. So you went to night lab at 101?

Correct.

What month and year was that most recently?
September, either August or September — I think it was September of 2017.

September of ’17. Like right before you came here?

Right. Correct.

Okay. And when you were at the night lab at 101, what were you taught about ANVS-11 differences?

You'll have a shorter lens. You'll tend to have maybe a little bit more glare. But you'll have more visual QD. And then, obviously, you'll have the imagery from the JHMCS in your right eye, which you wouldn't have in the 9s at all because they were in your old helmet.

Okay. We're back on. We were interrupted by a phone call of administrative nature. The line of questioning taking place right now is about ANVS-11 training.

So what I'm attempting to learn from the witnesses is what type of training he received transitioning from the ANVS-9 goggles to the And so far, I've got that you attended the night lab in Miramar. And then, when you came to 242, did you have any other specific training associated with the ANVS-11 that you can recall aside from how to put them on your helmet?

No.
Any talk about the capabilities or limitations differences, aside from the HUD display?

A little bit.

What are some of those?

I know that there is a little bit of differences. I can't recall off the top of my head. I know they have a little bit better clarity. But then, you also have more of a halo effect.

More halo with the ANVS-11?

Correct.

Okay. Any other characteristics differences that jump out in your mind from your training?

No.

Are you a night systems instructor?

I started the training in the fall of 2017. But then, I got pneumonia and dropped out of that.

Sorry.

Back on, hopefully for the last time. Let me just ask you one question. Did you receive specific formal training on the differences between the ANVS-9 and the ANVS-11 with regard to their capabilities and limitations in flight?

I did at 101.
Tell me what they taught you in brief.

As far as focusing, so the 9 you get the outer-inner-outer for the adapter lens and I forget what the other one is called. And then, for the ANVS-11s, you only have the adjustment cluster to you eye.

Do they talk about the capability differences?

They did. I honestly can't remember exactly --

Did they talk about performance differences between high-light level and low-light level between the two different systems and why?

I believe they did. I honestly can't remember.

Are you familiar with the term "eyebox" and as it applies to night vision goggles?

Eyebox as far as focusing them like in the Hoffman?

No. Not the Hoffman box. But have you ever heard the word --

Like the visual field of view?

No.
Okay.

If I say one set of goggles has one size eye box and another set of goggles has another size eyebox.

What does that mean to you? Have you heard that term?

I don't think -- I'm thinking it's the distance as far as the length of the tube. Obviously, I don't -- I haven't heard that term and if I did I can't recall.

Have you been in the tanker at night?

Correct.

C-130?

Yes.

Did the tanker go covert?

Marine Corps tankers do.

Why do the Marine tankers go covert?

To help with your -- so you're not washing out your goggles in close with all of their external lights.

Okay. Are there any specific rules and regulations that govern the wear of night vision goggles while conducting air refueling in the Marine Corps that you're aware of?

Not that I'm aware of. It's my understanding that it's up to the wearer or the user. So it's allowed to tank with or without goggles.
Okay. Okay.

Can you define a hazard? What's a hazard in aviation terms?

Something that affects the safety of flight or damage to aircraft.

Can you define risk?

Risk what you're willing to accept to conduct a safe mission, but has potential hazards.

Have you heard the acronym ORM?

Correct. Yes.

Do you know what it stands for?

Operational risk management.

Do you know how many steps there are in the ORM process?

I believe there's five.

Can you list them?

Not off the top of my head right now.

At your best guess?

I kind of like, BAMCIS, I guess. Or analyze -- recognize the problem, analyze the problem, develop COAs, war-game if you're able to, and then enact whichever COA is best. And then, adjust throughout.
What is your qualification and designation level in the F-18?

Division lead.

So you're an F-18 division leader?

Correct.

So you could take off with three other horns and lead as the division of four F-18s to prosecute a target under day or night conditions?

Correct.

You could take four horns and go to the tanker?

Yes.

You could take four horns and drop live ordinance to danger forces or friendly forces engaged in combat with appropriate 9-Line brief?

Yes.

In your not familiar with the term eyebox?

No.

Justin?

Nothing, sir. But as you mentioned, with your WhatsApp conversations, would you just be will to send us
over the conversations? Both the official, the unofficial, and then the Captain and below chats that you guys have maybe two to three weeks prior to the mishap up until the present day?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) I don't have those anymore.
(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) What happened with them?
(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) I cleared them out.
(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) When did you clear them out?
(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) I just purged them.
(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) When did you purge them?
(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) Recently within the past week. Nothing to do with this at all.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) Okay.
(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) I can't send them to you.
(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) Okay.

Is there anything that you feel you did during this mishap that could have significantly tributed to it or been caused on the mishap that I haven't touched on that you'd like to discuss?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) I think CAS factor was getting put through the CLT, whereas we had -- like working in maintenance, we had up aircraft since we got back from Australia. Two, plus or minus one, if that operational at a time.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6) So that allowed for limited proficiency?
Proficiency is way down.

So low proficiency.

And then, we were put into a MAG ULT or told to fly special late night hours that nobodies I don't think ever flown before. I, personally, haven't flown --

So let's break those down for a second, okay?

Okay.

So how many hours have you flown in the last six months in the F-18?

I mean, a rough guess?

Yes, please.

Okay.

Six months?

You should be getting 16 hours a month, so that would be 75 hours.

Have you flown about 75 hours?

No. I would say like 30.

60 hours?

30 to 40.

30. So and 6, so you're flying like 5 hours a month or 7 hours a month.
Well, if we're going back to like August -- I flew a bunch in August in Australia.

Okay.

Quite a bit.

Okay.

But then once we got back in October, I think I flew two or three times prior to the mishap.

Okay.

And then, so that would effect a pilot's proficiency then and their ability to do basic maneuvers if you will?

Correct.

Basic -- manipulating the controls of the aircraft to maintain proper separation and those types of maneuvers, right?

Correct.

Okay. The point's well taken.

The other point you made was flying in the middle of the night. So how many times in Iwakuni have you briefed at 2200, taken off at midnight, and landed at 0500?

Never.

Never. Why is that?

We would always land -- maybe the latest
I had landed was midnight thirty or so. But most night flights, you'd brief maybe 1800 or so and then take off at 2000 when it's dark. So do you believe that flying between midnight and 5 a.m. is more hazardous than flying --

Definitely. Why is that?

I mean, just leading up to the mishap, we were trying to get on the night page, trying to sleep in as much as possible, going against are circadian rhythm, and then staying up every night before the mishap about one to two to three in the morning. You just don't feel right. Everybody is walking around a little loopy.

We just came back from the East Coast from the seven-day and it's basically the same thing being on the opposite side of the clock. you just don't feel right. It takes a long time for the jet lag to wear off.

Are you familiar with wing order 3710? No.

Are you familiar with 1st Marine Aircraft Wing Order 3710, SOP for flight operations? Of the SOP, yes.
Have you read it?

Yes. Not recently.

Okay. What does it say about when you travel to 1st MAW, like when you fly here from CONUS, what does it say about how many days until you can fly again?

72 hours.

Why is that?

To get your body adjusted.

So the Wing order acknowledges the need to adjust a pilot's circadian rhythms?

Yes.

How many days notice did your squadron have before they started night operations?

We were briefed on the Thursday prior.

So Thursday. So you had Friday, Saturday, Sunday, Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday -- six days?

Correct.

Maybe five, depending on how you look at that. Five or six days?
Did you have any mandatory all-hands events during the daytime on Monday, Tuesday, or Wednesday?

No.

So it's suffice to say that the air crew on the night page, which you were on, had at least Saturday, Sunday, Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday, five days to shift their clocks from day to night?

Correct.

Okay. Were you able to do that?

I think by Wednesday, I was feeling better. Sunday and Monday were definitely rough.

So it's suffice to say that high headquarters recognized the risk and mitigated it with advanced scheduling and providing you guys the opportunity to shift your clocks? Or do you not feel that way?

I'm just trying to understand why -- I mean, I get it. We're flying in the middle of the night and that's hazardous. I've one to understand that and that's come up a lot. So I'd normally try to address it in these interviews. So for me as an outside investigator looking in. I, obviously, with 4000 hours and seven combat deployments, have done a lot of night flying in various aircraft. So I understand what you're saying and that is an issue.
I'm not debating you. I want to understand your point.

I see that the crews for scheduled from midnight to 5 a.m. That's a hazardous time to fly. That's the witching hour, so that's a risk.

Right.

So the risk is recognized. And then in my mind from what I understand, the risk was mitigated by everybody getting the word on Thursday or Friday before, who was on what crew, and when to come to work on Monday and Tuesday. Additively, having your personal time on Saturday and Sunday to adjust your personal schedule to provide.

Yourself, to include the mishap aircrew, would have had Saturday, Sunday, Monday, Tuesday, and Wednesday, five days, to move their clocks.

Do you feel like that's not enough time?

I think that would be enough time. For me, personally, it was very difficult. I have and

So you have and you were on the night crew?

Correct.
Do you think your commanding officer knows you have

They do. Yes.

Okay. We're back on the record after a brief intermission.

as he's asked to be called, was just telling me he has and he was scheduled for the night page.

The question is does your commanding officer know you have

Yes.

Does -- are there any pilots in your squadron that do not have young children?

There is a couple.

Were any of those guys scheduled on the day page?

Yes. Some of the newer guys. As far as pilots go -- actually, let me see.

So let me ask it this way. Do you feel like the individual pilot's personal situation, i.e. being single or married, having young children, not having young children, was an act of consideration on the part of the operations department and your commanding officer for selecting which crews would fly in the
day and which crews would fly in the night?

I think there was some consideration.

So why do you think you were on the night page with

I think just because of my seniority and experience.

Were you the senior pilot on the night page?

No.

How is he -- how much senior to you is he? Like three years, two years?

I would say about a year.

About a year senior to you?

Correct.

How does his qualification and designation level compare to yours?

He is a division lead mission commander.

So you're like the number two pilot on the night page kind of?

Correct.

I think, is also about the same as me.

Okay. Did you know that was going
to the tanker that night?

Yes.

How did you know that?

I answered a phone call from 152 when

they offered gas for them.

Did you --

So I relayed it to him and then I killed the MAG.

Okay. About what time was that?

I believe 9 or 10. I don't know.

So about 2100, the tanker crew called your ready room and said we're your tanker crew tonight basically?

Yeah. Maybe an hour before that they offered -- I guess they had similar FRADS. I didn't see their schedule, but I guess they were just told to fly in the same timeframe, so they offered.

Okay. And you feel that telephone call -- and then you referenced your squadron flight schedule?

I talked to the flight lead, which was

And you talked to

So you talked to 152, then you talked to

31
Did you and \((b)(3)(A),(b)(6)\) reference the 242 flight schedule together?

- **(b)(3)(A), (b)(6)**: I left it up to him as the flight lead.
- **(b)(3)(A), (b)(6)**: So you basically just passed the word?
- **Correct.**
- **Hey, (b)(3)(A), (b)(6)**: you got a tanker-ish?
- **I told him what they offered for the tanker.**
- **(b)(3)(A), (b)(6)**: Okay. **(b)(3)(A), (b)(6)**: was offered a tanker?
- **Correct.**
- Did -- were you also aware of whether or not the tanker code was on or not on the flight schedule at that time?
- **(b)(3)(A), (b)(6)**: It wasn't on the schedule.
- **(b)(3)(A), (b)(6)**: So you were aware that it was not on the schedule?
- **Correct.**
- **Were you aware if a tanker note was or was not on the schedule at that time?**
- **(b)(3)(A), (b)(6)**: If they were not previously scheduled, they would not have been on the schedule.
- **(b)(3)(A), (b)(6)**: Are you aware of the discussions between
yourself, and the ODO about that?

No. I didn't discuss that.

Are you aware of your commanding officer being called and asked for a flight schedule change?

I was not aware of that.

Were you present?

After I had passed the word, I went down to the maintenance spaces to work.

Or just downstairs and isolated from or the isolated from the ready room.

Correct.

Okay. Do you routinely do things at 242 that are not on the flight schedule?

I would say, potentially, yes.

Give me an example.

If you are going to do an air-to-ground code --

Okay.

-- but the weather could be bad, you'd brief an alternate mission, which the alternate mission would not be on the flight schedule.

What's an example?
So if you were going to do close-air support, or roll-ins, let's say in the R-567, the pie -- but there's always potentially that for weather given Japan. And then, they'd say all right we're going to do a one v. one intercept or if you're BFN current, you can do ACM or basic fighting maneuvers.

Okay. And would that include a BFM code on the flight schedule?

It wouldn't be on the flight schedule.

Would you do air-to-air training roles before you went out?

Correct. Yes.

How would you do that and why?

It's required and it's part of your -- if that's something you briefed as a back up day plan, you would definitely brief air-to-air training roles.

Does 1 v. 1 BMF have code?

Yes.

So if you were scheduled for a CAS and you briefed 1 v. 1 BFM as an alternate mission, and you went out to the pie and it had a low level cloud deck which prevented you from doing role-ins, and then you did 1 v. 1 BFMs, would you come back and log BFM?
Yes. How would you know the crew was current and qualified for BFM before you executed it?

You would ask them. And then, if you didn't trust -- I mean we're all officers, so you should trust their word. But if you didn't trust it, you could always go to ops and verify there last flights. And ODO has a tracker of the last flight within 7, 12, and 14.

Okay. So if I was to say the tanker falls into the same category as a backup mission if you were scheduled for a FAM and a tanker popped up, you could go hit the tanker without a flight schedule change?

Yes. Assuming everybody has done it before and has had the initial code.

So you're telling me that it's an accepted practice at VMFA-242 to go out and do things that are not on the flight schedule. That's what you're telling me?

No. I'm not saying it's -- I wouldn't say that.

Well, you just said that you can go do 1 v. 1 BFM, air-combat maneuvering if you're scheduled for CAS. So the commanding officer signed a flight schedule for CAS and you can
brief a backup plan and go do BFM if you log a BFM code. You just said that.

Right. But the intent is to not do that. The intent is to do the code per the schedule.

I understand that. So the code per the schedule would be the priority tasking.

Correct.

But if that code was unobtainable due to weather or some other condition, then the section leader or the mission commander or the flight leader, whichever is appropriate for the size flight, could switch to another point. And at that point, the flight leader would have the responsibility of ensuring that all members of the flight were proficient and qualified?

Correct.

So the commanding officer no longer really has that because he signed a flight schedule for you to go do CAS. And you've determined you can't do CAS, so now you're going to go do BFM and that's all good?

As far as my understanding, yes.

I mean, it sounds like you've done that or you've been a part of a flight where that took place.

Not very often. Usually it's a 1 v. 1
Okay. 1 v. 1 OUWY. And then, weather intercepts. And then, you would come back and you would log that code. And would you like go tell the skipper, like, hey, man. The weather sucks so we did an OUWY and a 1 v. 1 and logged it.

I mean, ops would know.

Okay.

We talk with the operations department.

Would going to the tanker fall under the same category of that?

I believe so. I mean, tanker is hard to come by, especially when you want it. So if it's offered -- it's good training for everybody to have.

So if you had been, which you easily could have been with you designation and qualification level, do you feel you would have made the same decision at night even though it's not on the flight schedule?

I would have, yes.

How would you verify that yourself and Captain Resiland were current for night tanking?

Verbally ask him.

What's the currency interval for night
tanking?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): As far as I know, you performed it before.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): So it's a one-time code?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): I believe so.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): It's not a 365-day code?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): I'm not sure. I mean, if he had not done it within the year then I would not have done it. No.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): Okay.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): But I know that we all did it in August with everyone in Australia.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): On a night tanker?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): Correct.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): The whole squadron did night tanking in August?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): I mean, I can't verify that. But I would verify that with him prior to going. I mean I would take that time to brief it thoroughly.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): Okay. Judge?

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): No, sir.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (6): Thanks. The judge will swear you out?

[The witness was warned, sworn, and excused.]
[The investigative interview opened at 11:18, 23 January 2019.]

(b) (6) Okay. We're on the record. The time is a little after 11:15 on Wednesday, the 23 of January, 2019.

Present in the is (b) (3) (A), (b) (6) and (b) (3) (A), (b) (6) as court reporter.

We are interviewing (b) (3) (A), (b) (6), would you, please, state your full name, spelling your last name for the record.

(b) (6) (b) (3) (A), (b) (6) normally.

(b) (6) (b) (3) Is it okay if I call you (b) (3) (A)

(b) (6) Yes, sir.

(b) (6) Okay. You can call me (b) (3) (A) or sir, which ever you like.

Where were you in December of 2018?

(b) (6) In December of 2018, I was -- just the whole month essentially, I was at the -- here in Iwakuni basically with the squadron. I had just checked in a month prior.

(b) (6) So when did you check in to 242?

(b) (6) It was October 26ish. The end of October timeframe.

(b) (6) Okay. Great. And so, are you a replacement pilot? Did you just come from 101?
Yes, sir. I just came from 106 actually.

Nice. So you earned the MOS 7523 then in what September-ish?

Yes, sir. Right around then.

Okay.

I'm trying to remember when the boat was. It would have been September, sir.

Why did you choose to come to Iwakuni?

This is something my wife and I had talked about pretty much as soon as we got into the Marine Corps. Like, kind of, the whole, like, see the world thing essentially. So it's funny. Most guys didn't want to go to Japan. We actually had to, kind of, like, fight to get out here because of her medical clearance and stuff.

Oh yeah.

I'm glad it worked out.

Yeah, I've lived that. Getting the overseas clearance for your dependents can be a painful experience and is definitely a barrier to an assignment overseas for Okinawa and Iwakuni.

Yes, sir.

So I commend you for working through that. You said most guys didn't want to come to Iwakuni.

Why is that? Is it not popular at 106 to try to get
orders to Iwakuni?

There aren't many Marine at 106. But the Navy side also trying to get Iwakuni, I think it's a lot of it. You know, most people don't want to live overseas. They like to visit overseas, but they don't want to actually spend all of their time there. And most of the experience there is with my Navy counterparts, and, for them, CAC-5 is extremely demanding.

Going back to Maridian where there were more Marines there, I think most guys wanted the Mirimar. It was, kind of, the most desirable, especially for the single guys. I think it was just because of the -- outside the squadron life, you know. Guys want to live in Southern California, that sort of thing.

Japan, I guess, living there is probably -- I don't know if they're intimidated by it. They don't think it would be as fun. But like I said, my wife and I had never been outside the country so we wanted to do something different.

Did you conduct air refueling as a student at the FRS?

I did.

What type of tanker?

It was off of a super hornet actually.

Day, night, both?

Both.
How did that go?

It went pretty for me actually. My experience is very limited. It's only two flights. I think it's the same at 101 when they do a unit day flight and a night flight with another F-18 flying as, like, a tanker coach. So he's, kind of, off to your side and, you know --

So you launched three jets. A rhino with a basket, you're in a D- or B- hornet, I guess. And then another hornet as your section lead.

Yes, sir. We're actually solo when we do it. So I was in a Charlie and they probably launched. The way they worked it, and I'm sure it's different with the KC-130's, I'm sure, at 101. But for 106, yeah, they launch the ARS super hornet. And then, they'd probably have two or three students. We'd launch, like, five minutes after each other, essentially, so we're arriving into the area. And then, they have another lead either in the legacy or in a super hornet out there, who's the coach.

So as we come up and join in on the tanker, go and do our plugs essentially once were complete and we, kind of, get cleared off right side. And then, usually, head back and shoot some approaches or something if we need them for currency.

So for your night tanking, do you wear night vision
goggles?

No. At that point -- actually, we're not qualified, I guess, to do that. We get one NVG flight in the FRS. That's dueled up in a Delta with a stick in the back, and it has to be with -- I'm not sure the exact name of the qual on the Navy side -- but it's with some sort of, like, NSI instructor equivalent, who actually takes you up on your first and only FRS NVG flight. So I have one flight on NVGs. I haven't flown with NVG's here.

MJ: Were those probably ANVS-9s or do you think they were ANVS-11s?

They were the ANVS-9s. The older ones.

So you went to the -- so your only night tanker experience is night unaided.

Yes, sir.

How did it go? You said it went good?

It went pretty well.

No big deal. How many times have you flown at 242 roughly?

This past weekend, I got in seven flights. Prior to that, I had flown three.

So you've had ten flights in 242 and today is January 19. So November, December, and January, you've been almost here for 90
days.

(b) 6 Yes, sir.

(b) 6 You've had ten flights, but seven of them were this weekend.

(b) 6 Yes, sir. I had one flight prior to the mishap.

(b) 6 Okay. During the week of the exercise, what were you doing?

(b) 6 I was standing a shift of ODO, essentially every day.

(b) 6 Okay. That's good.

(b) 6 So were you on ODO at the time of the mishap?

(b) 6 No, I was not. I believe I turned over with (b) 3 (A), (b) 3 (A), maybe two hours prior to the mishap.

(b) 6 What are some -- as a qualified ODO at 242 -- what are some of your key responsibilities as you stand duty?

(b) 6 So the big one is we are obviously responsible for the general, I guess, conduct of the flight schedule and making sure things are progressing as expected. Coordinating with maintenance, getting side numbers, checking weather, essentially providing their air crew with just, sort of, the safety of flight, kind of, stuff that they need.

You are there as the initial point of contact with the base ops during the exercise, particularly with the MAG as to things
like passing information of who's taking off. If there is any sort of contingencies or anything that happens, which nothing happened during my time. In fact most of my time as ODO, there weren't flight ops being conducted at the moment. I was just on ODO because I guess we were conducting twenty-four hour keeping the MAG OP. MOCK was running twenty-four hours, so I think they wanted that duty covered.

When you do stand ODO and actual flights are taking place, do you maintain an original flight schedule?

Yes, sir.

Tell me how you do that.

So there is a paper copy that's actually put by ops. We have a folder. It essentially goes into there and that's the signed schedule that is given for that day. And then, one of the responsibilities as ODO is if any changes do arise, get them approved by the CO if necessary. And in red pen, write in on that paper schedule to indicate what got changed. They had to slide their take off times, were there air space issues, did they have to go to a different area, that sort of thing.

Do you note the take off and land times, the actual -- you have the scheduled take off and land time --

Yes, sir.
And obviously the actual is usually a few minutes off that, even on the best day.

Do you make a note of that?

Yes, sir. They call their taxi and that's usually -- taxi plus, like, five minutes til take off is usually what they'll say. And then, they'll call safe on deck. I'll note that. It may not be exact with what ends up getting logged in UMA, which is what -- they hand us their UMA NAVFLERE. And that's the, I guess, the authoritative down to the minute time. And that's what I'll log in MSHARP as the ODO as well.

So what are some examples of some flight schedule changes that you may have made at 242?

The ones I've experienced have usually been, like, range space issues. So there may be some kind of conflict or weather is poor in one area. So that will essentially go on decast and then potentially talking to base ops about a different clearance to send them maybe, you know, to the PIE instead of the intra south or something like that.

Other ones, obviously, you have time slides which I guess are not a huge deal generally as long as they don't effect follow on flow. I'm trying to think of what other ones I've actually personally experienced.
Have you ever routed a schedule change to your commanding officer?

I have had one that had to get approved. I'm trying to remember what it was. It was a mission change and I think it was -- I don't know if the intent was to fly a PRO, or something like that, but the weather was precluding that, and they ended up launching just straight into the GCA pattern to knock out some approaches for currency. And that was the one think that I had to get approved.

What is your guidance on what is necessary to get approved and what's not?

I'm not really sure. I'd have to -- I never heard of anything specific as in this would require a change and this wouldn't. I mean, there's obviously bigger items like if your launching a flight that wasn't originally planned or an aircrew change would be a pretty significant because that would require looking into the aircrew currently. Aircrew change, a mission change is something we've typically done.

When you say change the mission, do you mean like changing a TMR code?

Like a TNR code. Yes, sir.

And adding a TNR code that would also constitute a change in mission in your mind?
I would. Yeah, I guess so.

Like if you're scheduled for a FAM and you added like a CAS and a FAM or something like that or an OES or whatever?

I think it would if there was a change like if the change would significantly effect, like, alter the conduct of the flight, it would make sense to have to route up.

Okay.

I don't know if I've ever seen specific guidance on what does and does not need to be routed. I've generally aired on the side of being the new guy, don't have a secret ask somebody, at least talk to ops about it. And then, they can give you guidance as far as --

And what's your understanding of who's authorized to approve a change to the flight schedule?

I mean, it's all through the CO. If I had a question, though, I'd probably go talk to OPSO or assistant OPSO first just to, you know, QA that and see if I do actually need to bug the skipper with it or to verify that, yeah, you need to go get the sign-off.

Okay.

What was your ODO change during the exercise?

What times did we change? 2200 or 2300, I think.
So you came off ODO at 2200 or 2300 on the fifth of December?

If that was during the week of the exercise, then yeah. It was the same time every day.

Okay. Did you make any changes the flight schedule regarding the mishap flight?

Not that I'm -- no.

There was no changes to the flight schedule that you were aware of? A change in mission?

There wasn't, no.

Okay.

You said you worked primarily during the day?

It was in the evenings.

So tell me your shift time again.

We did an eight hour two hours prior.

Roughly.

Getting there probably, like, early to midafternoon. I think I got there about 1400 like 14 -- it was a twelve-hour shift. 14 to -- 0200 is when I left. But then we actually covered ODO -- it was like -- it might have been 1600 to midnight I think is when I was actually at the desk. And then, we had two hours of just overlap time in case somebody needed assistance with anything else.
So I'm confused. So you were not on duty during the mishap?

No, I was not.

You were available to be on duty at that time and day, but someone else was covering it on that day. Because the mishap was 2200, which means you had been on duty.

Am I confused?

He would either have been coming off of duty, but he would have been there for the change in the schedule.

That's what I'm getting at.

The mishap was at 2200?

The brief time was.

Oh, the brief time.

The mishap was at 0200. They took off at midnight.

Oh, they did brief while I was on duty.

Okay. So you were the ODO that gave them their preflight brief.

Yes. The brief regarding their weather and their air space.

Okay. That was our question.

Oh, sorry about that.

What was your understanding of what their mission was that
night?

(b)(6) I had heard that they were going to go tank. I didn't know what they were doing beyond that.

(b)(6) What that noted on the flight schedule that you had at the ODO desk?

(b)(6) I don't recall what the -- whenever the flight schedule was signed that was what we had.

(b)(6) Okay.

(b)(6) I'm not super familiar with what the codes were, especially at the time. I hadn't started really much TNR training.

(b)(6) Okay. So how did you find out that they were going to the tanker? Did the tanker guys call you or did (b)(3)(A), (b)(6) tell you that he was going to the tanker? How did you come to learn about the tanker.

(b)(6) The tanker guys had called and I had put them on the phone with (b)(3)(A), (b)(6) and he had coordinated something with them. I'm not really sure.

(b)(6) That was like 9 p.m., 10 p.m.-ish?

(b)(6) I don't recall what time they called, but they did call while I was on duty. It could have been that. I think it was probably early than that, but --

(b)(6) Okay. Did (b)(3)(A), (b)(6) talk to you about any change in
the flight schedule or anything like that?

(b) (6) No, sir.

(b) (6) Who else was in the squadron spaces? Was the CO, XO, AMO, any department heads around?

(b) (6) I believe the XO was around at that time.

(b) (6) What's his name?

(b) (6) (b) (3) (A), (b) (6) I'm not one-hundred percent sure that he was, but I know that he was around a lot of times during the exercise while I was there. It was because he was that kind of the shift -- it was when his shift worked out. I'm trying to think who else would have been around, department head-wise.

I don't believe the XO was there, but I'm not certain of that. (b) (3) (A), (b) (6) is the only, I guess, O-4 or above that I'm -- think was there.

(b) (6) But you don't remember seeing him that night?

(b) (6) Not specifically that night. I remember seeing him some of the nights. I don't know if it would have been that night.

(b) (6) Do you remember specifically on that night who was there?

(b) (6) Other the mishap four aircrew -- who else was there?

(b) (6) Did you talk to (b) (3) (A), (b) (6) at all that night?

(b) (5) (b) (3) (A), (b) (6) I'm sure I did. Obviously, I gave them,
like, their weather before their flight, or before their brief.

(b) (6) How did everybody seem? Tired or awake?

(b) (6) They seemed awake. We didn't really start flying nights until I think three days into it. No one seemed overly tired. You know, it's obviously like a kind of shift in time for everybody. But they seemed normal.

(b) (6) Okay.

(b) (6) Did -- do you remember if you guys were taking go pills or no-go pills, or anything like that?

(b) (6) Go pills and no-go pills, from what I had heard, were specifically not authorized. And that came from, I heard, as high up as the wing. They did not want any performance enhancing drugs used. It wasn't a huge concern for me just standing ODO, but I know some of the aircrew had mentioned that, like, they would have liked them in that scenario.

But I had heard that it had come down from higher that they weren't authorized.

(b) (6) Who did you hear mention that they would like to take go-no-go pills?

(b) (6) I know a lot of guys were talking about it. I know some of the air -- I don't remember specifically who. It was mostly for the no-go pills to try and readjust their schedule. So it would
have been the guys probably flying nights who had mentioned it would make it easier for the transition. I guess they attempted to mitigate -- the endeavor to mitigate that with the three days of no night flying.

It was three days of no night flying, but everyone had to be there for their shift. So essentially, while I was sitting at the ODO desk, no flights were in the air and they were, I guess, mission planning, studying, doing what ground jobs they could, essentially during that time.

(b) (6) So you're talking about, like, Monday night and Tuesday night everybody had to come in at that time of day --

(b) (6) Yes, sir. We established it initially.

(b) (6) -- to adjust their clocks.

(b) (6) Yes, sir. And that was established by our ops at I assume at the direction of MAG or somebody that yeah we establish essentially three overlapping twelve hour shifts.

(b) (6) How is that communicated?

(b) (6) It was communicated in a brief probably the week prior. It's an AMO conducted by SPOOL or OPSO. And that was -- they mentioned that these are the three shifts and these are the air crew that will be on the shifts. These are the ODOs for each shift.

(b) (6) Who was the flight crew for the night shift?
It was the four mishap aircrew and then I'm trying to think if there was anyone else. There were definitely other aircrew assisting. I mean one or two more. It may have been, I'm not certain. The only four that are stuck in my head obviously are the four mishap air crew. But there were more than them.

Monday and Tuesday, how much did you interact with them and talk with them during your shift?

I talked a fair amount mostly because they go and try to do there ground jobs and then it's the middle of the night so you kind of -- you send out all of your emails and you're waiting for people to respond back. So they would be in and out of the ready room pretty regularly studying, getting coffee, that sort of thing.

And they were the ones who expressed that they would have liked to have had no-go pills.

Yeah. Some of the air crew definitely expressed it. I don't remember specifically who.

Okay.

It's something that was talked about.

All right. Anything else?

No, sir.

[The witness was warned, sworn, and excused.]
From: Commanding General, 1st Marine Aircraft Wing
To: File

Subj: COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING A MID-AIR COLLISION OF A F/A-18D FROM MARINE ALL-WEATHER FIGHTER ATTACK SQUADRON 242 AND A KC-130J FROM MARINE AERIAL REFUELER TRANSPORT SQUADRON 152 ON 28 APRIL 2016 OFF THE COAST OF JAPAN


1. I have reviewed the subject command investigation.

2. The investigating officer’s findings of fact, opinions, and recommendations are approved, with the exception of the following findings of fact, opinions, and recommendations.

3. The following findings of fact are disapproved:
   a. FF 10.
   b. FF 14.
   c. FF 15.
   d. FF 17.
   e. FF 23.
   f. FF 25.
   g. FF 43.
   h. FF 57.

4. The following findings of fact are modified:
   a. FF 16 is modified to read: "USMC (CO of VMFA(AW)-242 during the mishap) provided a statement to the IO on 7 March 2019. The IO conducted an interview with [b] (3) (A), [b] (6) (C) on 2 April 2019. [Encl (26-28)]"
   b. FF 75 is modified to read: "The MT aircrew confirmed no visible damage to the tanker other than the sheared fuel hose and missing drogue, and the MT aircrew and crash fire rescue..."
Subj: COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING A MID-AIR COLLISION OF A F/A-18D FROM MARINE ALL-WEATHER FIGHTER ATTACK SQUADRON 242 AND A KC-130J FROM MARINE AERIAL REFUELER TRANSPORT SQUADRON 152 ON 28 APRIL 2016 OFF THE COAST OF JAPAN

confirmed no fire before the MT taxied to the lower ramp and shut down. [Encl (16-21), (24-25)]"

5. The following findings of fact are added:

a. FF 138 – There is no evidence of a schedule change or modification for 28 April 2016. [Encl (62)]

b. FF 139 – The sortie pre-requisites to execute AAR-2202 are AAR-2201, FAM-2102, and SFAM 2101. [Ref (h)]

c. FF 140 – The definition of “currency” is: “Currency. A control measure used to provide an additional margin of safety based on exposure frequency to a particular skill. It is a measure of time since the last event demanding that specific skill. For example, currency determines minimum altitudes in rules of conduct based upon the most recent low altitude fly date. Specific currency requirements for aircrew individual type mission profiles can be found in Chapter 3 of the Program Manual.” [Ref (h)]

d. FF 141 – The M-SHARP 2.0 Software User Manual describes the “Log Book Adjustments” feature of M-SHARP that contains a tool used to “baseline” a Marine’s log book in order to ensure the accuracy of training logged in M-SHARP, which is accomplished by “adjusting the flight hour totals in an aircrew log book” and “entering T&R events into a flying squadron or a ground unit log book.” [Ref (k)]

e. FF 142 – The Event Proficiency Audit Report of the mishap pilot (MP) was provided to the investigating officer (IO). [Encl (68)]

f. FF 143 – The MP’s Event Proficiency Audit Report depicts that the code for day aerial refueling (AAR-2201) was “Chain Updated” for Method on 22 February 2016 for the Environment of “HLL” and a Parent Method of “Mirrored.” [Encl (68)]

 g. FF 144 – The MP’s Event Proficiency Audit Report depicts that the code for night aerial refueling (AAR-2202) was “Mirrored” for Method on 22 February 2016 for the Environment of “HLL” and a Parent Method of “Baselined.” [Encl (68)]

h. FF 145 – The MP stated in his e-mail correspondence with the IO that his “Last Tanker: 3/28/16 (I believe it was a KC-135 on the way home from a detachment).” [Encl (66)]

i. FF 146 – The MP’s Event Proficiency Audit Report depicts that the code for day aerial refueling (AAR-2201) was “Mirrored” for Method on 28 March 2016 for the Environment of “Day” and a Parent Method of “Logged.” [Encl (68)]
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j. FF 147 – The MP’s Event Proficiency Audit Report depicts that the code for night aerial refueling (AAR-2202) was “Chain Updated” for Method on 28 March 2016 for the Environment of “Day” and a Parent Method of “Mirrored.” [Encl (68)]

k. FF 148 – As of 5 May 2016, the flight hours with night vision goggles (NVGs) for the MP over the proceeding 30/60/90 days were respectively 2.0 hours/3.2 hours/7.7 hours and 12.0 hours for his total career NVG hours. [Encl (65)]

l. FF 149 – As of 5 May 2016, the flight hours with NVGs for the MWSO over the proceeding 30/60/90 days were respectively 2.0 hours/4.9 hours/6.5 hours and 22.6 hours for his total career NVG hours. [Encl (65)]

m. FF 150 – Per M-SHARP, the MP met the sortie pre-requisites to execute AAR-2202. [Encls (67), (68)]

n. FF 151 – The MP was not “current” to execute AAR-2202. [Encls (67), (68)]

o. FF 152 – The MP and mishap flight lead (MFL) were not authorized to conduct night aerial refueling missions because the daily flight schedule did not include AAR-2202. [Encl (62)]

p. FF 153 – Because tanker support was coordinated and VMGR-152 accurately reflected the request for night aerial refueling on their flight schedule, some form of coordination took place between VMGR-152 and VMFA(AW)-242 prior to the mission brief on 28 April 2016. [Encls (58-59)]

q. FF 154 – Reference (j) is the NATO Standard for “Air-to-Air Refueling” published by the NATO Standardization Agency in November 2013. [Ref (j)]

r. FF 155 – Paragraph 2.5 of Reference (j) describes the standard NATO “Joining – Probe and Drogue Tankers” from the “Echelon Left Position” as the following: “The left-hand side of the tanker is allocated for joining aircraft, unless the lead tanker directs otherwise. The exact location of the Echelon Left position is dependent upon the availability of rearward facing observers or boom operators that can monitor receivers; see the Tanker’s National SRD for tanker configuration.” [Ref (j)]

s. FF 156 – Paragraph 2.6.d of Reference (j) states under “Collision Avoidance” the following: “Receivers are responsible for ensuring that the airspace they are moving into is clear of other aircraft. In addition, moving receivers are mutually responsible for ensuring that they do not collide with the other repositioning aircraft.” [Ref (j)]

t. FF 157 – Paragraph 2.28.e.4 of Reference (j) states under “Contacts/Disconnects – Straight and Level” the following: “There is considerable potential for receiver pilot disorientation during AAR, particularly at night or when horizons are ill defined; this can be exacerbated by the wing
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Anhedral/dihedral of some tankers giving false horizontal cues. Ideally, all contacts and disconnects should occur in straight and level flight, although by day experienced pilots may make contacts/disconnects in steady turns, climbs and descents providing the formation is clear of cloud and the drogues are stable.” [Ref (j)]

u. FF 158 – Paragraph 2.28.e.7 of Reference (j) states under “Contacts/Disconnects – Night” the following: “By night, extra caution is needed to guard against disorientation. Therefore, with due regard to prevailing visual conditions, the tanker may permit contacts and disconnects at night whilst in a steady turn/climb/descent. Where a receiver pilot subsequently elects to make contact or disconnect only in straight and level flight, they should, if possible, inform the tanker. Some nations will not permit night contacts or disconnects in a steady turn/climb/descent unless operationally necessary.” [Ref (j)]

v. FF 159 – The VMFA(AW)-242 standard operating procedures (SOP) for air-to-air refueling states the following: “When tanking in a MOA, ensure entry altitude is at or below the tanker block (post canceling IFR and proceeding VFR, take your rate of descent as required to meet altitude adherence).” [Encl (71)]

w. FF 160 – The VMFA(AW)-242 SOP does not address the use of Night Vision Goggles (NVGs). [Encl (71)]

x. FF 161 – The VMFA(AW)-242 SOP does not address the lighting configurations while conducting night aerial refueling. [Encl (71)]

y. FF 162 – A “Midair Collision (MIDAIR)” is defined as the following: “Collision between aircraft or UAV when intent for flight exists. Flight, UAV. Includes: Mishaps resulting from collision between aircraft or UAV when intent for flight exists. Includes inadvertent contact during formation takeoffs and air-refueling operations.” [Encl (95); Ref (c), Chapter 3, Para. 315.m]

z. FF 163 – Reference (e) is OPNAVINST 5102.1D / MCO P5102.1B – “Navy & Marine Corps Mishap and Safety Investigation, Reporting, and Record Keeping Manual” of 5 October 2010. [Ref (e)]

aa. FF 164 – Paragraph 3004 of Reference (e) defines “Reportable Mishaps.” [Ref (e)]

bb. FF 165 – Within the “Reportable Mishaps” section of Reference (e), paragraph 3004.1 states the following: “Class A, B and C government property damage mishaps. This includes property damage caused by a government evolution, operation or vehicle to other government or non-government property.” [Ref (e)]

6. The following opinion is disapproved:

7. The following opinions are modified:

   a. Opinion 1 is modified to read: “The Mishap Pilot (MP) lost spatial awareness in the low light level on the night of 28 April 2016 while wearing AN/AVS-9 Night Vision Goggles (NVGs). The F/A-18D he was flying impacted the tanker’s right refueling basket, wedged the tanker’s right refueling hose between the leading edge of the F/A-18D’s right wing and LAU, and ultimately sheared off the refueling hose. [FF (5-11), (15-15), (17-18), (20), (22), (23-27), (34-37), (41-44), (45-52), (53-64), (65-67)]”

   b. Opinion 4 is modified to read: “Operational Risk Management: For the mishap flight (MF), the process of aircrew training management and schedule writing by Operations, DoSS, and the CO was inadequate as all levels of supervision failed to identify that the MF would be the MP’s first night aerial refueling since the Fleet Replacement Squadron. Mitigation measures should have been implemented 72-hours ahead of the planned sortie, rather than handing an unidentified risk to the event Flight Lead to be deciphered during event planning the day prior to or the day of the mission. VMFA(AW)-242 leadership failed to identify potential currency and proficiency risks. [FF (5-11), (15-15), (17-18), (20), (22), (23-27), (34-37), (39), (41-44), (45-52), (53-64), (65-67), (151)]”

   c. Opinion 7 is modified to read: “The timeline for the stand-up of the joint VMGR-152 and VMFA(AW)-242 Aviation Mishap Board (AMB) was not in accordance with References (a) and (e) and contributed to the confusion of the classification of the mishap. Once initiated, the joint AMB prepared and released the Safety Investigation Report (SIR). [FF (87-89), (91), (93-94), (96-103), (111), (121-125), (162-165)]”

8. The following opinions are added:

   a. Opinion 14 – The flight control inputs of the MP caused the MA to turn into the MT, make contact with the fuel drogue, and shear off a portion of the MT hose and the fuel drogue. [FF (59-62)]

   b. Opinion 15 – Mission Planning: VMFA(AW)-242 leadership failed to supervise mission planning. The commanding officer (CO), executive officer (XO), department of safety and standardization (DoSS), and operations officer of VMFA(AW)-242 did not thoroughly review the daily flight schedule. These failures are evident in the fact that AAR-2202 was not included in the daily flight schedule. A close air support (CAS) mission in Okinawa, Japan, where the F/A-18D aircraft depart from and return to MCAS Iwakuni, requires a refueling event. This refueling event is a coded event (AAR-2202). The daily flight schedule should have included either AAR-2202 or AAR-2202X for the MP. There was also a failure of understanding by the VMFA(AW)-242 aircrews of what missions they were authorized to conduct. This is evident in the fact that the MP and MFL planned for and conducted a mission (AAR-2202) that was not authorized on the daily flight schedule for 28 April 2016. [FF (5-9), (12), (18-24), (34), (138-139), (152-153)]
c. Opinion 16 – **Risk Assessment:** VMFA(AW)-242 leadership failed to conduct detailed risk assessment in coordination with the daily flight schedules. The CO, XO, DoSS, and operations officer also failed to identify that the MP would be conducting his first night aerial refueling mission since arriving from the Fleet Replacement Squadron. There is no evidence to demonstrate that VMFA(AW)-242 used a Risk Assessment Worksheet in their ORM process. [FF (5), (9), (13), (16), (18), (19-24), (138-151)]

d. Opinion 17 – When VMFA(AW)-242 identified illogical chaining of codes in M-SHARP, the VMFA(AW)-242 leadership should have, at a minimum, submitted a hazard report (HAZREP) in order to identify the illogical chaining. [FF (23), (26-27)]

e. Opinion 18 – There are significant irregularities within the MP’s Event Proficiency Audit Report for the event codes proceeding 28 April 2016. Both “baselined” and illogically “chained” event codes likely caused M-SHARP to depict the MP as current for AAR-2202 (night aerial refueling) as of 28 March 2016. The MP improperly received a “baselined” event code of AAR-2202 (night aerial refueling) on 22 February 2016 because of the “chained” event code of RQD-6109 (Day or Night Strategic Aerial Refueling (DC-10)) on either 11 February 2016 or 21 February 2016. There was also an illogical chaining of the MP’s “logged” event codes on 28 March 2016. The “logged” event code of AAR-2201 (day aerial refueling) on 28 March 2016 “chained” the two event codes of RQD-6109 (Day or Night Strategic Aerial Refueling (DC-10)) and RQD-6111 (Day or Night Strategic Aerial Refueling (KC-135)). The two event codes of RQD-6109 and RQD-6111 then illogically “chained” the MP’s AAR-2202 (night aerial refueling) on 28 March 2016. Despite having only conducted day aerial refueling event codes after joining VMFA(AW)-242, M-SHARP credited him for night aerial refueling event codes on both 22 February 2016 and 28 March 2016. [FF (23), (26-27), (139-150)]

f. Opinion 19 – There is an appearance that the organizational culture within VMFA(AW)-242 prevented junior naval aviators from bringing issues with training and mission planning to the attention of their leadership. Despite acknowledging the manpower shortfalls in the squadron during the quarterly training plan, VMFA(AW)-242 did not empower junior naval aviators like the MP to bring to the attention of squadron leadership his lack of experience in night aerial refueling or the fact that the daily schedule did not include AAR-2202. The MP, as a naval aviator and Marine Corps officer, should have volunteered the fact that this was going to be his first night aerial refueling mission in a low light level (LLL) environment. [FF (5), (18-22), (26-27), (145)]

g. Opinion 20 – Unless necessary, the MP and MFL should not have requested non-standard joins/departures during the aerial refueling control times (ARCTs). Unless necessary, the MT TPC should not have authorized non-standard joins/departures. The VMFA(AW)-242 SOP was insufficient in providing standardization for aircrews conducting air-to-air refueling. [FF (49), (154-161)]
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h. Opinion 21 – There are significantly different versions of the departure instructions requested and granted in ARCT-2. Based on the multiple versions of the events as recounted by witnesses and the significant amount of time that has passed since the Class C flight mishap, there is no clear description of the series of events that resulted in the F/A-18D shearing off the hose drogue of the KC-130J on 28 April 2016. Generally, two versions of the events were described by the witnesses. The first version of the event, as indicated by the statements of the VMGR-152 aircrew and the MWSO, involved the MP making contact with the right MT hose drogue while moving from the left hose to the reform position on the right side of the MT and MFL. The witnesses describe what appeared to be two contacts with the right hose drogue: the first contact was with the canopy of the MA and the second contact was with the wing of the MA that resulted in the hose drogue being wedged between the right wing and LAU. The second version of the event, as indicated by the statements of the VMFA(AW)-242 aircrews, involve the MP in the right reform formation, moving out of the right reform formation for departure, and then making contact with the right hose drogue while moving out of the right reform formation. [FF (53-56), (58-67), (162)]

i. Opinion 22 – The MP was using his AN-AVS-9 NVGs during the ARCT-2. His lack of experience with the NVGs, the covert lighting configuration of the MT, and LLL environment contributed to the MP’s loss of situational awareness. The VMFA(AW)-242’s SOP was insufficient in addressing whether NVGs were to be used by aircrews during night ARCT missions, insufficient in addressing the lighting configurations to be used during night aerial refueling missions, and insufficient in addressing standard joining and departing procedures to be used during aerial refueling missions. Both the MP and MWSO should have remained focused on the evolution of night aerial refueling prior to joining the MT and until completing their departure from the MT. In the conduct of ARCTs, sole focus for the TACAIR crew should be the ARCT mission. Compounding his lack of experience, the MP rushing because of low fuel states contributed to the mishap. [FF (50-51), (54-55), (59), (65-67), (141-149), (154-161)]

j. Opinion 23 – The two separate aircrews involved in the MIDAIR subjected themselves to post-flight medical examinations in the early morning hours of 29 April 2016 because they were either (1) directed by their chains of command to undergo the post-mishap medical examination or (2) the aircrew members considered the flight mishap to have been such a significant event that they independently understood the importance of documenting their own medical readiness within hours of the flight mishap. Both aircrews took steps that are only required in the aftermath of a significant flight mishap. [FF (29), (79-80), (85), (86), (88)]

k. Opinion 24 – On 6 May 2016, the CO of MAG-12 informed the Commanding General of 1st MAW that the MIDAIR collision cost analysis crossed the threshold of a Class D flight mishap. Given the potential magnitude and severity of the MIDAIR, and though not explicitly required, the CO of MAG-12 should have directed an administrative investigation as a tool to gather, analyze, and record relevant information about the flight mishap. At a minimum, there should not have been a delay in initiating an AMB until 11 June 2016. The CO of MAG-12 should not have waited on the analysis of the Naval Safety Center to convene the AMB. The
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uncertainty related to the initial reporting of the incident further justified the importance of a prompt, neutral, and thorough examination of the flight mishap. It is evident through some of the actions of the squadrons (submission to medical examinations, taking pictures of the damage, reporting to the SDO, and estimating damage costs) that momentum at some point had begun towards conducting an administrative investigation. However, no administrative investigation was completed prior to this current investigation. [FF (68-69), (71-96), (123), (99-103), (162-165)]

1. Opinion 25 – Based on the timelines, the immediate actions of mishap aircrews, the concurrent efforts of cost analysis, and the statements regarding costs made by the CO of VMFA(AW)-242 in the days after the Class C flight mishap, the COs of MAG-12, VMFA(AW)-242, and VMGR-152 consistently undervalued the cost estimates of the flight mishap. Regardless, after the Naval Safety Center confirmed the actual threshold of the classification, the failure to order an administrative investigation into the underlying causes of the Class C flight mishap demonstrated a significant departure from a prudent and careful investigation of events. [FF (68-69), (71-96), (162-165)]

m. Opinion 26 – A Human Factors Board (HFB) is not designed to hold Marines accountable. Therefore, the convening of a HFB was insufficient to hold the aircrews and their leadership responsible for the aviation mishap. The VMFA(AW)-242 squadron leadership, MAG-12 leadership, or the 1st MAW leadership should have convened a Field Flight Performance Board for the aircrews. [FF (99), (104-110), (126-129), Ref (g)]

n. Opinion 27 – Some of the actions of and statements by members of VMGR-152 indicate that an administrative investigation was likely started by VMGR-152. However, it is unclear whether this administrative investigation was formally started by VMGR-152 and why the initial investigative steps were not followed up by either the squadron or MAG-12 leadership. [FF (79-80), (82-86), (90-94), (126-129)]

o. Opinion 28 – The COs and staffs of MAG-12, VMFA(AW)-242, and VMGR-152 failed to address the underlying issues identified in the Class C Mishap. The illogical chaining of events on M-SHARP was identified, but there is no evidence to demonstrate that the commands requested this issue be corrected. Though updates were made to the VMFA(AW)-242 SOP, the VMFA(AW)-242 leadership did not improve the efficacy of ORM, to include the use of RAWs, and detailed mission planning. Also, VMFA(AW)-242, VMGR-152, and MAG-12 failed to capture the Class C flight mishap in their command chronologies. Though the squadrons indicated that a joint squadron debrief occurred, there was no institutional knowledge captured about the Class C flight mishap. The command chronologies of VMFA(AW)-242, VMGR-152, and MAG-12 should have indicated the 28 April 2016 Class C flight mishap alongside any other Class A, B, C, or D flight mishaps in order to ensure proper situational awareness for squadrons of recent flight mishaps. [FF (26-27), (130-137), (141), (143-144), (146-147)]
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9. The recommendations are approved, with the exception of the following:

   a. Recommendation 1 is approved with the following modification: “MAG-12” should replace “VMFA(AW)-242.”

   b. Recommendation 4 is disapproved.

10. The supervisory and leadership failures described above in Opinions 3, 4, 6, 15, 16, 17, 18, 21, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, and 28 involve personnel who are no longer members of the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing. As such, I intend to forward this investigation to the appropriate General Court-Martial Convening Authorities for their review and determination of appropriate administrative or disciplinary action.

11. This investigation is closed.

12. The point of contact for this matter is the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing Staff Judge Advocate, available at DSN (b) (3) (A), (b) (6) and (b) (3) (A), (b) (6)

T. D. WEIDLEY

Copy to:
CG, III MEF
CO, MAG-12
From: [Redacted] USMC
To: Commanding General, 1st Marine Aircraft Wing

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Ref: (a) JAGINST 5800.7F, Manual of the Judge Advocate General
(b) OPNAVINST 3710.7U, Naval Air Training and Operating Procedures Standardization General Flight and Operating Instructions
(c) OPNAVINST 3750.6S, Naval Aviation Safety Management System
(d) MCO 5100.29B, Marine Corps Safety Program
(e) OPNAVINST 5102.1D CH-2 / MCO P5102.1B Ch 2, Navy and Marine Corps Mishap and Safety Investigation, Reporting, and Record Keeping
(f) COMNAVAIRFORINST 5420.1G, Field Naval Aviator Evaluation Board (FNAEB) Procedures
(g) MCO 1000.6, Assignment, Classification, and Travel System Manual (ACTSMAN)
(h) NAVMC 3500.50C, F/A18A/B/C/D Training and Readiness (T&R) Manual
(i) NAVMC 3500.53B, KC-130J Training and Readiness (T&R) Manual
(j) ATP-3.3.4.2, NATO Standard Air-to-Air Refueling ATP-56

Encl: (1) Appointing Order dtd 23 Jan 2019
(2) Command Investigation Contacts - 28 April 16 VMFA(AW)-242 - VMGR-152 Incident/Aviation Mishap
(3) E-mail Correspondence (Subject: MAW CI) - Command Investigation Introduction to the Marines and Chains-of-Command involved with the 28 Apr 2016 VMFA(AW)-242 - VMGR-152 Aerial Refueling Incident dtd 7 and 24 Mar 2019
(4) E-mail Correspondence (Subject: MAW CI - Written Statement Prep) - Command Investigation Introduction - Written Statement Preparation for the Marines and Chains-of-Command involved with the 28 April 16 VMFA(AW)-242 - VMGR-152 Aerial Refueling Incident dtd 8 and 24 Mar 2019
(5) Command Investigation Interview - Intent and Questions for the Marines and Chains-of-Command involved with the 28 Apr 2016 VMFA(AW)-242 - VMGR-152 Aerial Refueling Incident dtd 9 Mar 2019
(6) Command Investigation Extension Request dtd 19 Mar 2019
(7) Command Investigation Extension Approval dtd 19 Mar 2019
(8) Command Investigation Extension Request dtd 5 Apr 2019
(9) Command Investigation Extension Approval dtd 5 Apr 2019
(10) Command Investigation Extension Request dtd 24 Apr 2019
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(11) Command Investigation Extension Approval dtd 30 Apr 2019
(12) Privacy Act Statement of (b) (3) (A), (b) (6) USMC dtd 12 Mar 2019
(13) Statement of (b) (3) (A), (b) (6) USMC dtd 12 Mar 2019
(14) Summary of Interview with (b) (3) (A), (b) (6) USMC dtd 25 Mar 2019
(15) Interview follow-up from (b) (3) (A), (b) (6) USMC dtd 1 Apr 2019
(16) Privacy Act Statement of (b) (3) (A), (b) (6) USMC dtd 24 Mar 2019
(17) Original Statement provided in April 2016 of (b) (3) (A), (b) (6) USMC dtd 24 Mar 2019
(18) Statement of (b) (3) (A), (b) (6) USMC dtd 24 Mar 2019
(19) Summary of Interview with (b) (3) (A), (b) (6) USMC dtd 4 Apr 2019
(20) Privacy Act Statement of (b) (3) (A), (b) (6) USMC, dtd 13 Mar 2019
(21) Summary of Interview with (b) (3) (A), (b) (6) USMC, dtd 20 Mar 2019
(22) Privacy Act Statement of (b) (3) (A), (b) (6) USMC, dtd 13 Mar 2019
(23) Response to Questions from (b) (3) (A), (b) (6) USMC, dtd 3 Apr 2019
(24) Privacy Act Statement of (b) (3) (A), (b) (6) USMC, dtd 12 Mar 2019
(25) Statement of (b) (3) (A), (b) (6) USMC, dtd 12 Mar 2019
(26) Privacy Act Statement of (b) (3) (A), (b) (6) USMC, dtd 7 Mar 2019
(27) Statement of (b) (3) (A), (b) (6) USMC, dtd 7 Mar 2019
(28) Summary of Interview with (b) (3) (A), (b) (6) USMC, dtd 2 Apr 2019
(29) Privacy Act Statement of (b) (3) (A), (b) (6) USMC, dtd 15 Mar 2019
(30) Statement of (b) (3) (A), (b) (6) USMC, dtd 26 Mar 2019
(31) Summary of Interview with (b) (3) (A), (b) (6) USMC, dtd 2 Apr 2019
(32) Privacy Act Statement of (b) (3) (A), (b) (6) USMC, dtd 8 Mar 2019
(33) Statement of (b) (3) (A), (b) (6) USMC, dtd 8 Mar 2019
(34) Summary of Interview with (b) (3) (A), (b) (6) USMC, dtd 1 Apr 2019
(35) Privacy Act Statement of (b) (3) (A), (b) (6) USMC, dtd 15 Mar 2019
(36) Statement of (b) (3) (A), (b) (6) USMC, dtd 30 Mar 2019
(37) Summary of Interview with (b) (3) (A), (b) (6) USMC, dtd 1 Apr 2019
(38) Privacy Act Statement of (b) (3) (A), (b) (6) USMC, dtd 3 Apr 2019
(39) Statement of (b) (3) (A), (b) (6) USMC, dtd 3 Apr 2019
(40) Privacy Act Statement of (b) (3) (A), (b) (6) USMC, dtd 28 Mar 2019
(41) Statement of (b) (3) (A), (b) (6) USMC, dtd 1 Apr 2019
(42) Summary of Interview with (b) (3) (A), (b) (6) USMC, dtd 2 Apr 2019
(43) Privacy Act Statement of (b) (3) (A), (b) (6) USMC, dtd 27 Mar 2019
(44) Statement of (b) (3) (A), (b) (6) USMC, dtd 1 Apr 2016
(45) Privacy Act Statement of (b) (3) (A), (b) (6) USMC, dtd 26 Mar 2019
(46) Statement of (b) (3) (A), (b) (6) USMC, dtd 26 Mar 2019
(47) Summary of Interview with (b) (3) (A), (b) (6) USMC, dtd 30 Mar 2019
(48) Privacy Act Statement of (b) (3) (A), (b) (6) USMC, dtd 26 Mar 2019
(49) Statement of (b) (3) (A), (b) (6) USMC, dtd 28 Mar 2019
(50) Privacy Act Statement of (b) (3) (A), (b) (6) USMC, dtd 26 Mar 2019
(51) Statement of (b) (3) (A), (b) (6) USMC, dtd 1 Apr 2019
(52) Summary of Interview with (b) (3) (A), (b) (6) USMC, dtd 20 Apr 2019
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(53) Privacy Act Statement of USMC, dtd 26 Mar 2019
(54) Statement of USMC, dtd 26 Mar 2019
(55) Summary of Interview with USMC, dtd 28 Mar 2019
(56) E-mail Correspondence - Request for Information (RFI) and Responses - VMGR-152 Schedule, Operational Risk Management - Risk Assessment Worksheet (RAW), Qualification, Currency, and Tanker Special Instructions (SPINS) RFI, dtd 8 Mar 2019
(57) E-mail Correspondence - Request for Information (RFI) with Responses - VMFA(AW)-242 Schedule, Operational Risk Management - Risk Assessment Worksheet (RAW), Qualification, Currency, and Tanker SPINS RFI, dtd 8 Mar 2019
(58) VMGR-152 Flight Schedule dtd 28 Apr 2016
(59) VMGR-152 Risk Assessment Worksheet dtd 28 Apr 2016
(60) VMGR-152 Transport Pilot in Command Hotboard dtd 28 Apr 2016
(61) VMGR-152 Transport Second Pilot Hotboard dtd 28 Apr 2016
(63) VMFA(AW)-242 Squadron Aircrew Qualifications dtd 20 Jan 2016
(64) VMFA(AW)-242 Quarterly Training Plan for April-June 2016 dtd 16 Apr 2016
(65) VMFA(AW)-242 Hotboard dtd 5 May 2016
(66) Response to Currency Questions by USMC dtd 3 Apr 2019
(67) MSHARP Log Book Report for 5/1/2015-12/1/2018 dtd 1 Apr 2019
(68) MSHARP Air-to-Air Refueling (AAR) Event Proficiency Audit Report for as of 04/01/2019
(69) Air to Air Refueling Card - Sumo 04 dtd 28 Apr 2016
(70) Lite Level Planning Calendar for Kadena AB for April 27-30 2016
(72) E-mail Correspondence (Subject: Flash Report) - Incident Description to from dtd 2247 28 Apr 2016
(73) 28 Apr 2016 VMFA(AW)-242 In-Flight Emergency Incident Report, 1st MAW Incident Report System Database
(74) VMFA(AW)-242 F/A-18D Pictures after recovery to Kadena Airbase from dtd 28 Apr 2016
(75) VMFA(AW)-242 F/A-18D Pictures after recovery to Kadena Airbase from dtd 29 Apr 2016
(76) E-mail Correspondence (Subject: information about April 2016) from introducing four e-mails (Enclosures 69, 72, 74, and 75) discussing the Mishap Determination (of the 28 Apr 2016 VMFA(AW)-242 - VMGR-152 Aerial Refueling Incident) dtd 13 Mar 2019
(77) E-mail Correspondence (Subject: Aileron on 00) discussing Initial Cost Breakdown (for the 28 Apr 2016 VMFA(AW)-242 - VMGR-152 Aerial Refueling Incident) dtd 1654 4 May 2016
(78) E-mail Correspondence (Subject: Pictures of F/A-18 Damage) - Pictures of the VMFA(AW)-242 F/A-18D involved in the 28 Apr 2016 VMFA(AW)-242 - VMGR-
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152 Aerial Refueling Incident to (b) (3) (A), (b) (6) from his Aide-de-Camp dtd 5 May 2016

(79) E-mail Correspondence (Subject: 242 Aileron aircraft) discussing Initial Cost Estimate and Mishap Determination (for the 28 Apr 2016 VMFA(AW)-242 - VMGR-152 Aerial Refueling Incident) dtd 0306 6 May 2016

(80) E-mail Correspondence (Subject: Class D SIR) discussing the Incident Cost and Mishap Determination (for the 28 Apr 2016 VMFA(AW)-242 - VMGR-152 Aerial Refueling Incident) dtd 1231 6 May 2016

(81) E-mail Correspondence (Subject: RFI Answers) discussing the Maintenance and Supply Cost Determination, Mishap Determination, and Reporting Requirements (for the 28 Apr 2016 VMFA(AW)-242 - VMGR-152 Aerial Refueling Incident) dtd 0723 11 May 2016

(82) E-mail Correspondence (Subject: CLASS D: $48,364) discussing the final Maintenance and Supply Cost Determination (for the 28 Apr 2016 VMFA(AW)-242 - VMGR-152 Aerial Refueling Incident) dtd 1259 11 May 2016

(83) E-mail Correspondence (Subject: VMFA(AW)-242 Mishap Upgrade) discussing the Class C Mishap Determination and Mishap Board Identification (for the 28 Apr 16 VMFA(AW)-242 - VMGR-152 Aerial Refueling Incident) dtd 0107 1 June 2016

(84) E-mail Correspondence (Subject: Safety Center Email) discussing the Class C Mishap Determination and the Command Responsible for the Mishap Board (for the 28 Apr 2016 VMFA(AW)-242 - VMGR-152 Aerial Refueling Incident) dtd 2127 1 June 2016

(85) E-mail Correspondence (Subject: AMB) discussing the Class C Mishap Aviation Mishap Board Member COAs (for the 28 Apr 2016 VMFA(AW)-242 - VMGR-152 Aerial Refueling Incident) dtd 1305 9 Jun 2016

(86) E-mail Correspondence (Subject: 242 AMB) discussing the Class C Mishap Aviation Mishap Board Member Composition and Way Forward (for the 28 Apr 2016 VMFA(AW)-242 - VMGR-152 Aerial Refueling Incident) dtd 1352 16 Jun 2016

(87) E-mail Correspondence (Subject: 152/242 AMB Composition Decision) discussing the Class C Mishap Aviation Mishap Board Member Composition and Way Forward (for the 28 Apr 2016 VMFA(AW)-242 - VMGR-152 Aerial Refueling Incident) dtd 1526 16 Jun 2016

(88) VMFA(AW)-242 SOP rev 5 Draft dtd 18 Jul 2016

(89) VMFA(AW)-242 SOP dtd 1 May 2018

(90) VMFA(AW)-242 Risk Assessment Worksheet Blank dtd 25 Mar 2019

(91) Recall Letter (b) (3) (A), (b) (6) USMC, dtd 6 May 2016

(92) MAG-12 Command Chronology (April-September 2016) dtd 28 Feb 17

(93) VMFA(AW)-242 Command Chronology (April-September 2016) dtd 12 Sep 16

(94) VMGR-152 Command Chronology (April-September 2016) dtd 18 Nov 16

(95) Marine Corps, Navy and Naval Aviation Safety, Aircrew Performance and Administrative References and Definitions

4

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Preliminary Statement

1. In the research and writing of this Command Investigation report three years after the 28 April 2016 VMFA(AW)-242 - VMGR-152 Air-to-Air Refueling Incident which was subsequently identified as a Class C Flight Mishap, the Investigating Officer recognized and repeatedly communicated to all witnesses that an objective inquiry into the incident was required. Isolating the associated facts of the April 2016 incident was extremely challenging given the December 2018 VMFA(AW)-242 – VMGR-152 Class A Flight Mishap which occurred in a strikingly similar environment. Repeatedly, it was vital to strive to isolate facts from opinion and hearsay understanding this administrative report will be scrutinized by those searching for an answer to why the December 2018 mishap occurred. Many of those interviewed took a step back once they understood fact based statements and interviews were required. However, passion still crept into statements and conversations. This passion is quite evident in much of the original e-mail communication referenced in this report. This report’s findings of fact and enclosures must be understood in their entirety to effectively separate not fully informed conjecture and passionate opinions. The intent of this investigation is to evaluate all evidence with an aim to find the commonality in the statements and interviews in order to identify the unimpeached facts of the 28 April 2016 Class C Flight Mishap and provide relevant opinions and salient recommendations.

2. This command investigation acknowledged the sentiments and perceptions of all interviewed witnesses about the 28 April 2016 Class C flight mishap and subsequent reporting. However, this command investigation relied on findings of fact supported by the evidence gathered during the course of the investigation. In accordance with Reference (a), a command investigation “shall arrive at findings of fact only if supported by a preponderance of the evidence, i.e., more likely than not” as the standard of proof. Further, an investigation “may not speculate on the causes of an incident. Reasonable inferences drawn from evidentiary enclosures or personal observations, however, are permissible.”

3. At approximately 2015 on 28 Apr 2016 upon completion of low-light air-to-air refueling, the Mishap Pilot (MP) rejoined in the right echelon position. Subsequently as the F/A-18D section departed the tanker, the MP lost spatial awareness. In flight, the Mishap Aircraft (MA) canopy impacted the KC-130J’s refueling basket before the refueling hose wedged between the leading edge of the F/A-18’s right wing and LAU-7; ultimately the basket and 6-8 feet of refueling hose sheared off and was retained between the F-18D wing and LAU-7. During scheduling, VMFA(AW)-242 failed to properly identify the night aerial refueling event as the MP’s initial night air-to-air refueling event in the fleet and subsequently did not adequately assess the associated risk nor facilitate relevant and appropriate risk decisions to be made at the appropriate level. During execution, the MP’s lack of experience and the Mishap Flight Lead’s (MFL) insufficient supervision contributed to the mishap.

4. Post-mishap reporting was efficient, but the subsequent timeline of the investigation was sub-optimal. While the incident’s cost determination was in development, VMFA(AW)-242
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conducted a Human Factors Board (HFB) on 6 May 2019 with a report provided to the AMB on 10 May 2016. This HFB report was turned over to the AMB in conjunction with the 13 May 2016 VMFA(AW)-242 Change-of-Command. Due to slow cost determination at the squadron level and review by the Naval Safety Center, the stand-up of the Aviation Mishap Board (AMB) was not timely. Although slow to form, once initiated, the AMB efficiently prepared and released the Safety Investigation Report (SIR). The combined VMGR-152 and VMFA(AW)-242 AMB formed 17 June 2016 and completed 8 August 2016.

5. In accordance with reference (a) and as directed by enclosure (1), a 1st Marine Air Wing (1st MAW) Commanding General (CG) directed Command Investigation (CI) was conducted to inquire into the facts and circumstances surrounding a mid-air collision of an F/A-18D from Marine All-Weather Fighter Attack Squadron 242 (VMFA(AW)-242) and a KC-130J from Marine Aerial Refueler Transport Squadron 152 (VMGR-152) off the coast of Okinawa, Japan on 28 April 2016. The directives and special requirements stated in enclosure (1) were met.

6. The 23 March 2019 deadline for the CI was not met. Extension requests were submitted and approved on 19 March, 5 April, and 24 April 2019. [Encls (6-10)]

7. In order to understand this command investigation, a reader must first understand the references. A list of pertinent direction and definitions was consolidated from Marine Corps, Navy, and Naval Aviation Safety, Aircrew Performance and Administrative orders and definitions to provide a baseline of relevant Aviation Mishap investigation and reporting requirements. Therefore, a thorough review of Enclosure (95) is required to create a common understanding of interrelated references that apply to the command investigation of a flight mishap. The references and definitions in Enclosure (95) will assist the reader in understanding key terms used throughout the investigation.

8. The deliberate process pursued to investigate the incident was (1) an initial e-mail introduction providing notice of the 1st MAW CG directed CI; (2) a follow-up phone call once contact was established; (3) a follow-up e-mail request for a factual statement accompanied by a Privacy Act Statement for signature and an explanation of the difference between statements provided to an AMB and a CI; (4) a subsequent interview when appropriate; and (5) follow-up actions as deemed necessary from facts communicated in the written statements and/or during interviews. [Encls (2-5)]

9. Imbedded in the request for a written statement was an explanation of why a JAGMAN is conducted; a review of the Privacy Act Statement; and a detailed review of the privileged nature of an AMB Investigation and the privileged information in the AMB produced Safety Investigation Report (SIR).

10. After the first General Officer in the Chain of Command was notified of the investigation by the current 1st MAW CG, initial contact was made with fifteen (15) individuals. After receipt of
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initial statements and conduct of initial interviews, the contact list expanded to twenty-four (24) persons.

11. The final contact list comprised of twenty (20) Officers, one (1) Staff Non-Commissioned Officer (SNCO), and three (3) Non-Commissioned Officers (NCOs), is broken into three identifiable groups:
   a. those directly involved in the 28 April 2016 mishap, inclusive of ten (10) Marine Officers, SNCO, and NCOs in VMGR-152 and VMFA(AW)-242;
   b. the VMGR-152 and VMFA(AW)-242 Chains-of-Command, inclusive of six (6) Marine Officers; and
   c. those with direct knowledge of immediate and follow-on actions taken by the Chains-of-Command, inclusive of nine (9) Marine Officers in VMGR-152, VMFA(AW)-242 and MAG-12.

12. Receipt of the voluntary statements initiated coordination of twelve (12) interviews. The intent of the interviews was to amplify facts and provide professional perspective of the incident, incident reporting, and the subsequent investigations. The interviews focused on six topics: (1) Incident/Mishap Details; (2) Immediate Actions Taken (Incident Report and Initial Damage Assessment); (3) Continuing Actions Taken (Investigations initiated, the extent of the damage, and subsequent maintenance repairs); (4) External Influence (real or perceived); (5) Procedures/Lessons Learned; and (6) Accountability. In the wrap-up of each interview, the individual interviewed was asked for recommendations of additional questions that should be asked and for any additional facts of which the Investigating Officer (IO) should be made aware.

13. During the course of the investigation, contact and availability with the individuals involved with the 28 April 2016 incident now dispersed to commands world-wide challenged efficiency. The first statement was received 7 March 2019 and the final statement was received 11 April 2019. The first phone interview was conducted 20 March 2019 and final phone interview was conducted 22 April 2019.

14. The Mishap Pilot (MP) and the Mishap Weapons Systems Officer (MWSO) chose not to provide a voluntary statement. One SNCO, two NCOs, and two Officers were unreachable and/or chose to ignore the voluntary statement request.

15. Tragically, the VMGR-152 Commanding Officer (CO) at the time of the incident passed away in January 2019 and was therefore unable to provide a statement nor available to interview.

16. Both COs for VMFA(AW)-242 and VMGR-152 turned over Command (13 May 2016 and 27 May 2016 respectively) during the period between the incident (28 April 2016); the conduct of the VMFA(AW)-242 Human Factors Board (6 May 2016); and the combined VMFA(AW)-242 and VMGR-152 AMB (initiated on 17 June 2016 and completed on 8 August 2016).

17. In the aftermath of a flight mishap, two or three simultaneous investigations are conducted. For administrative investigations, the governing reference is Reference (a). For safety
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investigations, the governing reference is Reference (c). An important dimension of safety investigations is the concept of safety privilege. Members of the Aviation Mishap Board (AMB) may give promises of confidentiality. However, statements provided to members of the command outside of the members of the AMB are not privileged communications. On 6 May 2016, the MWSO confided in his commanding officer his memory of the Class C flight mishap on 28 April 2016 through a written statement. However, this statement is not a safety privileged communication. The AMB was not formed until 17 June 2016. Therefore, the MWSO's signed and written statement, provided to his commanding officer, maintained in the turnover documents between commanding officers of VMFA(AW)-242, and provided to the investigating officer by the post-mishap CO of VMFA(AW)-242 is a statement outside of the safety investigation and included in this administrative investigation.

18. As a Marine Officer and Fixed Wing Attack Pilot, the IO maintains intermittent professional and personal relationship with several individuals who provided statements and were interviewed during the investigation to include the COs of VMFA(AW)-242, VMGR-152, and Marine Aircraft Group 12 (MAG-12) and the Commanding General of 1st MAW at the time of the incident. There are no conflicts of interest that precluded the IO from conducting a thorough and unbiased investigation.

Findings of Fact

Scheduling, Qualifications, Currency, and Event Pre-Requisites

1. On 28 April 2016 VMGR-152 Flight Schedule, "Event 2, Sumo 04" USMC (hereinafter referred to as "Mishap Tanker Transport Pilot in Command (MT TPC)") and USMC (hereinafter referred to as "Mishap Tanker Transport Second Pilot (MT T2P)") of VMGR-152 were scheduled for AAR-3602 (Air to Air Refueling (AAR) System / Panel Procedures), AAR-3600 (Fixed Wing Air to Air Refueling (FWAAR) / Tilt-Rotor Air to Air Refueling (TAAR)), and NS(H)-2151 (Night Systems (High) Low Light Level (LLL) Night Vision Device (NVD) Procedures). [Encl (58)]

2. VMGR-152 crewmembers included USMC (hereinafter referred to as "Mishan Tanker Crewmaster One (MT CM 1)"), USMC (MT CM 2), USMC (MT CM 3), and USMC (MT CM 4). [Encl (58)]

3. All VMGR-152 members were qualified, current and complete with required sortie pre-requisites to execute the Night Air-to-Air Refueling event. [Ref (i), Encls (16-21), (24-25), (57-61)]

4. The VMGR-152 Risk Assessment Worksheet for 28 April 2016 was completed. [Encl (59)]
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5. On the 28 April 2016 VMFA(AW)-242 flight schedule, “Event 6-1, Profane 61” USMC (hereinafter referred to as “Mishap Pilot (MP)”) and VMFA(AW)-242 were scheduled for SL-6307 (Section Leader Standardization and Designation (SL) Night CAS), CAS-3106 (Night CAS - Type 1, 2, and 3), CAS-3105 (Urban CAS), and NS-2402 (Night System Formation Flying). [Encl (62)]

6. On the 28 April 2016 VMFA(AW)-242 flight schedule, “Event 6-2, Profane 62” USMC (hereinafter referred to as “Mishap Flight Lead (MFL)”) and VMFA(AW)-242 were scheduled for CAS-3106 (Night CAS - Type 1, 2, and 3), CAS-3105 (Urban CAS), and NS-2402 (Night System Formation Flying). [Encl (62)]

7. On the VMFA(AW)-242 flight schedule, “Event 6 (Profane 61 and 62)” was scheduled for a 4 hour Night Close Air Support (CAS) event. The mission was a Section Lead (SL) work-up with departure from Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Iwakuni, a CAS vulnerability (VUL) window in support of 5th ANGLICO/3rd RECON overhead Camp Courtney, and a return to MCAS Iwakuni. [Encl (63)]

8. Based on distances traveled, CAS missions originating from MCAS Iwakuni executed in Okinawa airspace require a tank-CAS-tank mission profile or a refueling stop on Okinawa (Kadena Airbase or MCAS Futenma). [Encl (63)]

9. On the 28 April 2016 VMFA(AW)-242 flight schedule, “Event 6, Profane 61 and Profane 62” were not scheduled for AAR-2202 (Night Aerial Refueling). [Encl 63]

10. While not scheduled for AAR-2202, the MP was qualified, current and complete with required sortie pre-requisites to execute a Pre-mission Air-to-Air Refueling – Night CAS – Post-mission Night Air-to-Air Refueling event. [Encls (63-68)]

11. While not scheduled for AAR-2202, the MFL was qualified and current to execute as the designated Flight Lead for a Pre-mission Air-to-Air Refueling – Night CAS – Post-mission Night Air-to-Air Refueling event. [Encls (63-65)]

12. The 28 April 2016 VMGR-152 Air-to-Air Refueling support for VMFA(AW)-242 was coordinated in early April. [Encl (13-21), (45-47), (53-55)]

13. There is no record of the VMFA(AW)-242 Risk Assessment Worksheet for 28 April 2016. [Encls (58)]

14. During event planning for the 28 April 2016, VMGR-152 and VMFA(AW)-242 Day and subsequent night Air-to-Air Refueling events, MT T2P and MP executed detailed coordination under the supervision of MT TPC and MFL. [Encl (13-21)]
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15. In review of the daily flight schedule with the accompanying Hotboards and RAW; the VMFA(AW)-242 Operations Officer, Safety and Standardization Officer, and the Commanding Officer did not recognize that the scheduled event was the MP's initial Night Aerial Refueling look in the Fleet. [Encls (62-69)]

16. USMC (CO of VMFA(AW)-242 during the mishap) provided a statement to the IO on 7 Mar 2016. The IO conducted an interview with on 2 April 2016. [Encl (26-28)]

17. During the interview, when asked about ORM and Risk Assessment Worksheets used alongside the flight schedule, communicated that ORM was continuous in the squadron. Though did not recall specific risk assessment worksheets used, he did comment in his interview that he knew ORM associated with ‘things that could get us in trouble’ was a steady conversation within the Squadron Operations, Maintenance, and Safety and Standardization Departments. Commenting specifically on flight events in execution, “the brief captured the risks and the de-briefs assessed the ORM for the executed mission.” [Encls (26-28)]

18. On 16 April 2016, the VMFA(AW)-242 “QUARTERLY AIRCREW TRAINING PLAN FOR APRIL-JUNE 2016” discussed combat readiness in depth. The training plan stated that “[t]he training department’s focus is to maintain combat readiness in the near and distant future. Due to significant loss of highly qualified aircrew in the spring of 2016, the squadron will not have the instructor qualifications, combat leadership designations, and available aircrew (especially WSOs) required by [the F/A-18 T&R Manual] to execute all METs.” [Encl (64)]

19. On 30 March 2019, USMC (post-mishap VMFA(AW)-242 CO) provided a statement to the IO. On 2 April 2019, the IO conducted an interview with . [Encls (35-37)]

20. During his interview on 2 April 2019, commented on the aircrew qualification build process in VMFA(AW)-242. He perceived that there was an overtone of “Qual inflation and over reporting, over-reporting readiness” in the squadron and the “squadron pushed guys towards quals before they may have been ready.” [Encl (37)]

21. USMC (VMFA(AW)-242) was a Squadron Pilot from January 2016 until mid-May of 2016 before he turned over with the VMFA(AW)-242 Aviation Maintenance Officer (AMO) in late May 2016. provided a statement to the IO on 1 April 2019. The IO conducted an interview with on 18 April 2019. [Encl (50-52)]

22. During his interview, commented broadly on his initial perceptions of VMFA(AW)-242 scheduling and the impact it had on pre-mission planning. commented that “[i]t was open knowledge amongst the aircrew that the squadron did not plan adequately due to the lack of aircraft available.” expressed that it seemed “that many
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times the flight schedule may have been written with no anticipation of being achievable.” He perceived that the result was “stress amongst younger aircrew preparing for evaluated events with little lead time for preparation.” [Encl (52)]

Air-to-Air Refueling Qualification and Currency

23. An Event Proficiency Audit conducted on MP’s flight history utilizing MSHARP identified that AAR-2202 (Night Aerial Refueling) was chained on 21 February 2016 when he tanked during the day on a Strategic Tanker and logged RQD-6109 (Day or Night Strategic Aerial Refueling). [Encls (67-68)]

24. Prior to 28 April 2016, the only previous night tanking evolution MP completed was a 1000-level unaided Night Aerial Refueling sortie while at the Fleet Replacement Squadron. [Encls (66-68)]

25. During weekly and daily flight schedule builds in April 2016, MSHARP chaining MP’s AAR-2202 after he logged RQD-6109 on 21 February 2016 caused VMFA(AW)-242 Squadron Operations to not recognize that the MP had not completed AAR-2202. On 28 April 2016, MP flew the night Air-to-Air refueling portion of the event as a perceived AAR-2202R (Refresh) when in actuality it was an AAR-2202X (initial 2000-level night qualification). [Encls (66-68)]

26. When asked during the 2 April 2019 interview, [b](3)(A). commented on the chaining of codes: “I don’t remember any specific issues with MSHARP . . . [however] I remember complaints in Ops of illogical chaining.” [Encl (28)]

27. When asked during the 2 April 2019 interview, [b](3)(A). commented that as a learning organization, VMFA(AW)-242 learned from the 28 April 2016 incident and subsequently understood that MSHARP didn’t properly track Air-to-Air refueling codes and therefore had to be watched and tracked carefully until MSHARP was fixed. [Encl (37)]

Flight Planning, Air-to-Air Refueling (AAR) Coordination, and Brief

28. On 12 March 2019, the MFL provided a written statement to the IO. An interview was conducted on 25 March 2019 and a follow-up statement was provided on 1 April 2019. [Encls (12-15)]

29. On 24 March 2019, the MT TPC provided a written statement to the IO along with a copy of the original statement that he previously provided to the VMGR-152 ASO in April 2016. A follow-up interview was conducted on 4 Apr 2019. [Encls (16-19)]

30. On 20 March 2019, an interview with MT T2P was conducted by the IO. [Encls (20-21)]
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31. On 3 April 2019, the MFL WSO provided a written response to the IO after receiving the investigation interview question template. [Encls (22-23)]

32. On 12 March 2019, MT CM 4 provided a written statement to the IO. [Encls (24-25)]

33. On 2 April 2016, (b) (3) (A), (b) (6) provided the IO a statement from the MWSO dated 6 May 2016. The statement was found by, (b) (6) (A), (b) in personal historical files maintained from his VMFA(AW)-242 Command tour. [Encl (91)]

34. During planning, a 24,000 pound off-load was coordinated between the MT T2P and MP. MT TPC directly supervised the coordination; MT TPC and MFL directly reviewed the planning prior to the Mission Briefs. [Encls (12-23), (58-62), (69)]

35. The initial Aerial Refueling Control Time (ARCT) was 1830. The second ARCT planned for 1915. [Encl (69)]

36. In Okinawa, sunset was at 1851, End of Evening Nautical Twilight (EENT) was 1949, with Low Light Level from 1950 to 0100. [Encl (70)]

37. The weather forecast was clear with no anticipated cloud cover nor turbulence in the working area. [Encls (12-13)]

38. The VMGR-152 brief was at 1445, with a 1615 take-off and 2130 land. [Encls (16-21), (58-62), (69)]

39. The VMFA(AW)-242 brief was at 1530, with a 1730 take-off and 2130 land. [Encls (12-15), (62)]

40. The VMGR-152 brief given by MT TPC, was standard with no significant issues highlighted as remembered by TPC, T2P, or CM 4. [Ref (b), (i); Encls (17-21), (24-25), (58-61), (69-70)]

41. The VMFA(AW)-242 brief was given by the MP. [Ref (b), (h); Encls (12-15)]

42. MFL recalled the brief was ‘solid’; strong administration, tactical administration, tactical, and tanker administration. [Ref (b), (h); Encls (12-15)]

43. MFL led the discussion of night tanking considerations to include a tanker administration conversation and lighting given the utilization of Night Vision Devices (NVDs). [Ref (b), (h), Encls (12-15)]

44. MFL WSO, a Weapons and Tactics Instructor, stated the brief was in accordance with Appendix B, the F/A-18 Briefing Guide. [Reference (b), (h); Encls (12-15), (22-23)]
Flight Execution: Take-off, transit, and first ARCT

45. VMFA(AW)-242 aircraft take-off and transit was uneventful after departing approximately 30 minutes behind schedule due to maintenance issues. [Encls (12-15), (91)]

46. MFL statement of 12 March 2019 identified weather as “Wx: Overcast/broken 10’k, clear skies above, 0% illumination (no moon above the horizon). [Encls (12-13)]

47. MT TPC communicated during the 4 April 2019 interview, the “weather was clear...no turbulence was encountered, no cloud layers were observed” in vicinity of the refueling track. [Encl (19)]

48. The MT TPC indicated in his statement and interview that “Profane requested that we make a right turn to assist their join as they conducted an underrun of our aircraft due to what likely was misjudging closure rate.” [Encl (17), (19)]

49. MT TPC also commented that “They requested to join on the right, but I declined their request and told them to join on the left as originally cleared.” [Encl (17), (19)]

50. The MT TPC indicated that “Profane requested extra fuel on the front side due to lower than expected fuel state for their upcoming mission.” [Encl (17), (19)]

51. The F/A-18 section took 18,000 pounds of the 24,000 pounds of fuel during the initial ARCT. [Encls (18-19), (21)]

52. The MT TPC commented “post fueling, Profane flight was cleared right reform and once they were established they were cleared straight ahead and above.” Profane’s “departure was uneventful.” [Encl (18-19)]

In-flight Mishap

53. MFL indicated in his statement and interview that during the second ARCT rendezvous, “Profane 61” had radar issues – difficulties finding/obtaining SA to the C-130/tanker. “Profane 62” had radar SA – range to the tanker is beginning to get tight (decreasing), so Profane 62 took Tac-Lead [Tactical (TAC) Lead] on the right and executed an uneventful tanker join.” Due to the swap of TAC Lead to facilitate the tanker join, the Profane call-signs swapped as the section joined the MT’s ‘Echelon Left’ position. [Encls (12-15)]

54. MT TPC’s statement from 24 March 2019 commented that Profane “requested a join on the left and simultaneous plugging due to low fuel states.” [Encls (17-18)]

55. The MT TPC indicated that Profane “also requested we come to a 330 heading to assist in dragging them towards the northwest boundary of the Warning Area.” [Encls (17-18)]
56. The scheduled ‘2 or Wing’ F/A-18D (MFL in TAC Lead position) was complete with refueling on the right hose, moved to, and stabilized in the ‘Echelon Right’ position. [Encls (12-25), (91)]

57. The MFL, MFL WSO, and MWSO corroborated that as the MFL coordinated departure high with intent for a slight left turn (with vertical deconfliction established towards the filed route of flight from the Tiger Tanker Track to MCAS Iwakuni), the MP backed out of the left basket to the ‘Left Astern’ position, then proceeded to the ‘Echelon Right’ position (Post Air to Air Refueling Reform Position) joining outside (right) of the MFL. [Encls (12-15), (22-23), (91)]

58. At approximately 2015 on 28 April 2016, the scheduled VMFA(AW)-242 ‘Lead’ F/A-18D aircraft (MA in the TAC Wing position) completed tanking on the left hose of the VMGR-152 KC-130J (Mishap Tanker (MT)). [Encls (12-25), (91)]

59. The MWSO’s statement from 6 May 2016 described the following: “At this point Sumo was covert lighting. Once we had good fuel flow I switched our AUX frequency to Naha Control to work our clearance, and I turned down the boom freq in PRI. For the next couple minutes I only heard bits and pieces of the comm between Sumo and Profane, but I heard the departure instructions: high and to the left. Profane 61 [MFL] was satisfied first, and they went to starboard observation. About 30 seconds later Profane 62 [MP] was satisfied. We backed out, crossed under the C-130, and joined on the right hand side of Profane 61. I was looking through the goggles at this point, and I could see both Profane 61 and Sumo. Once we were to the right of Profane 61 we began to accelerate to depart. At this point I stopped scanning outside, and instead came inside the aircraft to set up the nav and comm. I wanted to make sure we had everything in order when the lead got passed back to us. I knew it would be a quick transition because we were on the northern border of the Tiger airspace. Profane 61 began a left hand turn per the departure instructions. I was still looking inside the aircraft, but I felt our jet turn to the left. At this point I thought we were in front of and above Sumo. As we were turning there was a sudden and loud whack on the canopy, followed by a substantial yaw to the right. I looked at the canopy, and then at the right wing. Through the goggles, I saw a tanker hosewedged in between the leading edge flap and the LAU on the right wing. The basket was still attached to the hose. We began an immediate climb and I gained a visual of Sumo below us at our right 2 o’clock. I alerted Profane 61 that we had a tanker hose and basket attached to our wing. From there we turned towards Kadena, since it was about 300 miles closer than Iwakuni.” [Encl (91)]

60. The MFL’s statement from 12 March 2019 described the following: “Profane 61/62 are now joined in normal starboard side ops (61 right of the C-130, 62 right of 61). Profane 61 [TAC Lead] Pilot and WSO both confirm over ICS they are visual of Profane 62 [TAC Wing] (stepped down low, not too sucked).

- Profane 61 request to depart Sumo ‘up and left’
- Sumo 04 clears Profane Flight ‘up and left’
- Profane 61 initiates climb / departure instructions (up/high and to the left).
- Approximately 40-60 seconds later, Profane 62 informs Profane 61 they have a part of hose/basket hanging from their right wingtip.
- Profane 61 conducts a battle damage check and confirms what Profane 62 was reporting; visual of a hanging refueling hose with basket intact to the hose that is wedged between the right leading edge flap and the LAU/AIM-9 CATM.
- Profane 61 informs Sumo 04 of the incident
- Profane 61/62 divert to Kadena AFB uneventfully.” [Encls (12-13)]

61. The MT TPC statement from 24 March 2019 described the following: “With Profane 62 [MP] satisfied on the left he was cleared to disconnect left go right reform. Profane 61/62 flight was then cleared to depart forward and above. I witnessed Profane 61 [MFL] start to depart as tasked. Profane 62 [MP] was witnessed passing from left to right past the tail section via my left window observer [MT CM4]. Prior to the right window observer attaining full visual of Profane 62 [MP] the crew felt a violent shake of the aircraft like severe turbulence. A few seconds later I witnessed Profane 62 [MP] moving from under my aircraft from the center towards the outer left side and forward. As this was not their cleared departure I called Profane 61 [MFL] over the AAR primary. ‘Profane 61 this is Sumo 04, be advised I cleared both aircraft to depart from my right side to proceed forward and above. I have Profane 62 on my left and low can you explain?’ ‘Sumo this is Profane 61, let my check with my dash 2.’ Approximately 4-5 seconds later he [MFL] came back ‘Yeah, Sumo my dash 2 has something on his wing that belongs to you.’ I immediately sent my Plane Captain into the back to inspect our hoses.” [Encls (16-17)]

62. The statement from MT CM4 described the following: “I [MT CM4] was positioned in the left paratroop window... The left receiver [MP] began to move aft to disconnect with the hose. I then called disconnect when the receiver decoupled the drogue. As the left receiver [MP] began moving to the right echelon, he crossed under our aircraft, and I gave the call that the receiver was crossing our six from left to right, low. The receiver [MP] then passed under the aircraft heading to the right side. At that time I hear what sounded like a jet and our aircraft had a jerking movement to the right. I stayed position in the left paratroop window while we received a call from the receivers that they have our drogue. I was then instructed to make sure that the drogue was still attached on the left hose, which it was still intact... Both hose were difficult to see since it was [sic] low visibility and between the strobes on the NVG’s they then confirmed that the entire hose was gone on the right side.” [Encls (24-25)]

63. The MFL and MFL WSO commented that with departure coordination complete, the MFL added power, climbed straight ahead for ~6-800’ and then turned left 20-30 degrees to intercept the filed route of flight to MCAS Iwakuni. [Encls (12-15), (22-23)]

64. The MFL, MFL WSO, and MWSO commented that at that point where the MFL added power, the MP went from a Right Echelon position, heard/felt a thump on the canopy (the right tanker basket), experienced a right yaw (induced by the right tanker hose wedging between the mishap aircraft (MA) right wing and LAU) followed by a left yaw (as the right tanker hose and
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basket separated from the MT), and then smooth forward flight, climbing to where the MA viewed the MT low and right. [Encls (12-15), (22-23), (91)]

**Night Vision Devices and Lighting Package**

65. VMFA(AW)-242 used AN-AVS-9s during the event. [Encls (12-15), (22-23), (91)]

66. In the MFL’s statement from 12 March 2019, he indicated: “Lights: Overt on join, Covert once joined/AAR (this was requested by Profance 61/Tac-Lead).” [Encls (12-13)]

67. All members of the flight remember goggles being used throughout the second ARCT and did not communicate ‘de-goggling’ nor ‘goggling’ after completion of the ARCT. [Encls (12-25), (91)]

**Post Mishap Inflight Actions**

68. After realization that the MA had the MT’s right refueling basket trailing off of the right wingtip, the F/A-18D section and KC-130J separated, conducted the appropriate emergency procedure for their platform, and diverted as individual flights to Kadena Air Base (AB). [Encls (12-25)]

69. The VMFA(AW)-242 section conducted a visual ‘Battle Damage Check’ on the MA, executed a controllability check on the way to Kadena AB, and conducted an uneventful visual straight-in landing to runway 05 at Kadena AB. [Encls (12-15)]

70. Once the MA cleared the runway, the aircraft taxied to the standard Marine transient parking on the fighter ramp and shut-down. [Encls (12-15), (22-23), (91)]

71. The VMGR-152 aircraft trouble shot in the Warning Area. [Encls (16-21), (24-25)]

72. Unable to see the refueling hose due to the low light level, the MT executed the ‘landing with trailing hose’ emergency procedure, the most conservative emergency procedure given the uncertainty of damage to the refueling pod assembly, the possible fuel or hydraulic fuel spillage which could be ignited if the aircrew decided to pursue the ‘hose guillotine’ emergency procedure. [Encls (16-21), (24-25)]

73. With the emergency procedure complete, the MT conducted an ILS 05L approach to Kadena AB, minimized brakes and beta on landing, and stopped on the runway. [Encls (16-21), (24-25)]

74. The crew masters then exited the aircraft via the ramp, conducted a visual inspection, and FOD sweep. [Encls (16-21), (24-25)]
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75. The aircrew confirmed no visible damage and the aircrew and crash fire rescue confirmed no fire before the MT taxied to the lower ramp and shut down. [Encl (16-21), (24-25)]

**VMFA(AW)-242 Post-flight Actions**

76. After shutdown, VMFA(AW)-242 pilots and WSOs conducted a walk around and post flight aircraft inspection of the MA. [Encls (12-15), (91)]

77. The tanker hose was wedged between the leading edge of the wing and the LAU and the basket was hanging, just barely touching the ground. [Encls (12-15), (22-23), (91)]

78. According to the MFL, the “plane was in pretty good shape, hose was there, some paint damage, minor dings on the leading edge, nothing gross...CATM-9 trailing fins damaged. Canopy, some black smear marks.” [Encls (12-15)]

79. Immediately after the landing and post-flight inspection, the MFL WSO reported the incident to the chain of command: “Both F/A-18s were in right echelon (starboard reform) after refueling was completed. While departing the KC-130 aircraft, -2’s aircraft contacted a portion of one of the two refueling hoses on the back of the KC-130 which resulted in a portion of the hose becoming attached to -2’s aircraft right outboard wing.” [Encls (22-23)]

80. MWSO commented that he and the MP reported to the MCAS Futenma Medical Clinic for lab-work on the morning of 29 April 2016. [Encl (91)]

**VMGR-152 Post-flight Actions**

81. After shutdown, VMGR-152 pilots and aircrew conducted “a thorough walk around and post flight inspection of the KC-130J, secured the aircraft, and reported safe on deck and the incident to the Squadron Flight Duty Officer (FDO). [Encls (16-21), (24-25)]

82. The MT TPC reported the incident details to the VMGR-152 FDO along with where and what time the incident occurred. [Encls (16-21), (24-25)]

83. The MT TPC asked the FDO to let him know if the CO wanted to discuss the incident. [Encls (16-19)]

84. The VMGR-152 Aviation Safety Officer (ASO) contacted the crew. [Encls (16-19)]

85. MP TPC took pictures of damage to the VMFA(AW)-242 aircraft on the night of 28 April 2016 and during the day on 29 April 2016. [Encls (74-75)]
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86. VMGR-152 pilots and crew coordinated a post mishap medical examination after completion of required post-flight actions. The examinations and lab work was conducted at MCAS Futemna in the early morning hours of 29 April 2016. [Encls (16-21), (24-25)]

Mishap Reporting

87. The incident was reported to the 1st MAW CG by the VMFA(AW)-242 CO via the MAG-12 CO at 2247 28 April 2016. [Encl (72)]

88. The VMFA(AW)-242 CO provided the initial incident details, “the last F-18 backed out, post refueling, the tanker entered a right turn as the hornet went left. When the F-18 was in reform he noticed that the refueling hose was wrapped around the right wing of the LAU-7 … The F-18s landed in RODN (Kadena) uneventfully and post flight inspection didn’t indicate damage beyond black scuff marks from the hose. No physical damage was evident. A more detailed inspection will be conducted in daylight. A FLASH report is currently being written.” [Encl (72)]

89. The incident report (MAG-12, VMFA(AW)-242, Aviation, In-Flight Emergency, 04/28/2016, 2015) was filed by VMFA(AW)-242 as follows: “This is an Aviation, Non-Injury, Non-Alcohol related incident. While conducting a night Air-to-Air refueling mission in the Tiger airspace, the F/A-18 aircrew heard a loud bang and noticed that the refueling hose was wrapped around their wing tip and no longer attached to the tanker. The aircrew successfully diverted into Kadena Air Base. The incident and divert were conducted over water. This report has been reviewed by VMFA(AW)-242 CO.” [Encl (73)]

90. On 8 March 2019, USMC (post-mishap CO of VMGR-152) provided a written statement to the IO. A follow-up interview was conducted on 1 April 2019. [Encls (32-33)]

91. Stated that “I was told by a VMGR officer who went to begin the investigation in April, that when they went to get pictures of the F-18, despite obvious damage to the aircraft, the VMFA-242 maintainers were already taking it apart in order to fix it and were just treating it like a broken aircraft.” [Encl (33)]

92. On 3 April 2019, USMC (Executive Officer of VMFA(AW)-242 at the time of the mishap) provided a written statement to the IO. [Encls (38-39)]

93. In his 3 April 2019 statement, commented that he met with the VMFA(AW)-242 aircrew in the days following the incident in an effort to determine what happened, but there were gaps and variations in the story due to each person’s situational awareness and memory of the event.” [Encl (39)]
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94. [b] (3) (A), (b) (6) further commented in his statement that “I recall we were lacking aircraft data for
either one or both of the aircraft involved which is recorded through the manual depression of
the ‘POS REC’ button in the aircraft, so we weren’t initially able to piece the event together that
way.” [Encl (39)]

95. On 15 March 2019, [b] (3) (A), (b) (6) USMC (CO of MAG-12 at the time of the mishap)
provided a statement to the IO. [Encls (29-30)]

96. In his statement, [b] (3) (A), (b) (6) commented that “[t]he first time the incident came to my
attention was a day after the event occurred. I received either a phone call or email from the
Wing (either from the CG, [b] (3) (A), (b) (6) or his chief of staff) inquiring as to what occurred. The CG saw
the aircraft parked on the apron at Kadena AFB with the hose on the LAU. A picture was
eventually sent to me from the Wing (either from the CG or the COS). Once informed, I
immediately contacted the unit’s CO, [b] (3) (A), (b) (6) to find out what had occurred. He came to
my office to go over the incident.” [Encl (30)]

Cost Determination

97. On 4 May 2016, VMFA(AW)-242’s initial cost assessment of the F/A-18D damage was
$19,474.20. [Encl (77)]

98. On 4 May 2016, VMGR-152’s initial cost assessment of the KC-130J damage was
$16,682.27. [Encl (77)]

99. On 6 May 2016, the MAG-12 initial assessment of cost using the 15% rule was $21,976.54
—a Class D Mishap. [Encls (77), (79-80)]

100. On 11 May 2016, VMGR-152 and VMFA(AW)-242 met, reviewed costing data
requirements and derived the VMFA(AW)-242 cost as $28,072 and VMGR-152 cost as $20,292
for a total cost of $48,364—a Class D Mishap. [Encl (82)]

101. The total cost of $48,364 was submitted to the Naval Safety Center for review and final
direction. [Encls (81-82)]

102. On 1 June 2016, the Naval Safety Center directed the 15% rule is not appropriate for two
F/A-18D parts (ailerons and the aileron shroud). [Encl (79)]

103. With no facts identifying the final cost determination by the Naval Safety Center, MAG-12,
VMGR-152, or VMFA(AW)-242, the IO calculated the final cost determination. Adjusting the
F/A-18D aileron and aileron shroud to full cost, VMFA(AW)-242’s cost alongside the VMGR-
152 cost increased the incident’s total cost to $146,510—a Class C Flight Mishap. [Encl (95)]
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VMFA(AW)-242 Human Factors Board (HFB)

104. On 6 May 2016, VMFA(AW)-242 held a Human Factors Board (HFB). [Encls (35), (37), (95)]

105. The “Human Factors Board Results regarding the Flight Incident with VMGR-252 on 28 April 16 dtd 10 May 16” is maintained in the private files of the VMFA(AW)-242 Commanding Officer. [Encls (35), (37), (95)]

106. The does not recall directing the convening of the HFB, however he did turn over the HFB Results to as the recommendations and mitigation measures were not complete and/or not able to be completed in the short period of time before the VMFA(AW)-242 Change of Command. [Encls (26-28), (35), (37), (95)]

107. VMFA(AW)-242 personnel designated by the CO to convene the board were the VMFA(AW)-242 Executive Officer (Chairman), Aviation Safety Officer, Operations Officer (Senior WSO), and Flight Surgeon. [Encls (35), (37), (95)]

108. The MP, MWSO, MFL, and MFL WSO were the subjects of the HFB. [Encls (35), (37), (95)]

109. Applicable internal/external friction and mitigation measures were documented. [Encls (35), (37), (95)]
   a. High Squadron operational tempo was discussed as internal squadron friction and external friction with families. [Encls (35), (37), (95)]
   b. New jobs within the squadron without assistance was discussed as internal administrative friction. [Encls (35), (37), (95)]
   c. Crew Coordination was discussed as being an issue prior to and during the event. [Encls (35), (37), (95)]
   d. Night System proficiency, comfort with the goggles, and night tanking was discussed as an issue before and during the event. [Encls (35), (37), (95)]

110. Applicable scheduling and training recommendations and mitigation measures were documented and maintained in the private files of the VMFA(AW)-242 Commanding Officer, [Encls (35), (37), (95)]

VMFA(AW)-242 Change of Commands and Personnel Turnover

111. On 13 May 2016, the VMFA(AW)-242 Change of Command from USMC to USMC was conducted. [Encls (26-28), (35-37)]

112. The VMFA(AW)-242 Human Factors Board Report was left for review and use as the new Commanding Officer. [Encls (35-37)]

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113. After the mishap and change of command, implemented training recommendations and mitigation measures for VMFA(AW)-242. [Encls (35-37), (48-52)]

114. On 16 May 2016, at the initial All Officers Meeting (AOM), he directed an immediate review of flight administrative procedures while operating in the vicinity of a tanker in the VMFA(AW)-242’s Standard Operating Procedures (SOP). [Encls (35-37)]

115. Changes were intended to be an immediate implementation of a very deliberate, administratively focused process approaching, refueling, and departing the tanker. [Encls (35-37)]

116. The process was imbedded and published in the 3 September 2016 VMFA(AW)-242 Squadron SOP. [Encls (35-37), (48-52)]

117. On 16 May 2016, reduced the number of squadron personnel who had MSHARP Baseline privileges from fourteen (14) to approximately four (4). [Encl (35-37), (48-52)]

VMGR-152 Change of Commands and Personnel Turnover

118. The VMGR-152 Change of Command from USMC to USMC was 27 May 2016. [Encls (32-34)]

119. USMC (the VMGR-152 Executive Officer (XO) at the time of the incident) provided a written statement on 26 March 2019. [Encls (45-47)]

120. In his statement, commented that “I find it surprising that there was never a CI at either squadron, and actually think that one may have been done at 152, but it would now be irretrievable due to the unfortunate recent loss of the then-CO.” [Encls (45-46)]

Aviation Mishap Board (AMB)

121. On 9 June 2016, to ensure the appropriate mix of subject matter expertise in order to properly analyze the mishap, the MAG-12 Director of Safety and Standardization (DoSS) recommended a joint composition VMGR-152 and VMFA(AW)-242 AMB to the MAG CO. [Encl (85)]

122. On 16 June 2016, the MAG-12 CO decided and communicated the specific make-up of the AMB joint composition directed to investigate the 28 April 2016 VMFA(AW)-242 - VMGR-152 Aerial Refueling Class C Mishap. [Encls (86-87)]

123. On 17 June 2016, VMFA(AW)-242 released the Initial Notification of the mishap. [Encl (41)]
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124. The AMB composition was made up of the Senior Member – VMGR-152; ASO – VMFA(AW)-242; Maintenance Representative – VMGR-152; Operations Representative – VMFA(AW)-242; and Flight Surgeon – VMFA(AW)-242. [Encls (40-42), (82-87)]

125. On 8 August 2016, the AMB investigating the 28 April 2016 VMFA(AW)-242 - VMGR-152 Aerial Refueling Class C Mishap released the Safety Investigation Report. [Encls (40-42)]

Lessons Learned

126. [b](3) (A), (b) (6) USMC (post-mishap VMFA(AW)-242 DoSS), provided a statement on 26 March 2019. [Encls (48-49)]

127. In his statement, [b](3) (A), (b) commented that “I do not believe there was ever a Field Flight Performance Board or Command Investigation directed by [VMFA(AW)-242].” [Encls (48-49)]

128. [b](3) (A), (b) stated that “[b]ased on the results of the AMB, my Commanding Officer implemented the following procedural changes: baselining privileges for Training and Readiness (T&R) codes were significantly reduced and specific verbiage was included in the Squadron’s Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) regarding the conduct of air-to-air refueling.” [Encls (48-49)]

129. [b](3) (A), (b) stated that “a combined ‘lessons learned’ session was held between the two squadrons involved to discuss what occurred during the mishap and how to mitigate future air-to-air refueling issues.” [Encls (48-49)]

Command Chronologies

130. On 28 February 2017, MAG-12 published their Command Chronology for the time period of April 2016 through September 2016. [Encl (92)]

131. In the section labeled “Safety and Standardization,” the MAG-12 Command Chronology does not mention the Class C mishap that occurred on 28 April 2016. [Encl (92)]

132. On 12 September 2016, VMFA(AW)-242 published their Command Chronology for the time period of 1 April 2016 through 30 September 2016. [Encl (93)]

133. The MP was the Command Historian and point of contact for the VMFA(AW)-242 Command Chronology. [Encl (93)]

134. In the section labeled “Safety and Standardization,” the VMFA(AW)-242 Command Chronology does not mention the Class C mishap that occurred on 28 April 2016. [Encl (93)]
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135. On 18 November 2016, VMGR-152 published their Command Chronology for the time period of 1 April 2016 through 30 September 2016. [Encl (94)]

136. The VMGR-152 Command Chronology states that "[p]otential hazards were identified, analyzed, and mitigated resulting in zero aircraft flight related and ground mishaps from April to September 2016." [Encl (94)]

137. The VMGR-152 Command Chronology lists the last Class C Mishap to have occurred on 31 July 2015 and the last Class D Mishap to have occurred on 24 February 2015. [Encl (94)]

Opinions

Mishap Cause

1. The Mishap Pilot (MP) lost spatial awareness in the low light level on the night of 28 April 2016 while wearing AN/AVS-9 Night Vision Goggles (NVGs) which caused the F/A-18D he was flying to impact the tanker’s right refueling basket, further to wedge the tanker’s right refueling hose between the leading edge of the F/A-18D’s right wing and LAU, and ultimately shear off the refueling hose. [FF (5-11), (13-15), (17-18), (20), (22), (23-27), (34-37), (41-44), (45-52), (53-64), (65-67)]

2. Contributing factors to the mishap were (1) the limited proficiency and experience of the MP (10.0 NVG hours prior to 28 April 2016); (2) the low light level environment, (3) the resultant poor depth perception while using NVGs, and (4) the significant blooming of the MFL’s lights which amplified MFL’s movement as the MFL departed from the KC-130J’s right echelon as the MP had just settled into the re-join. Given the event description and training objectives as a section lead work-up, the MFL should have passed TAC Lead back to the MP, thus enabling the MP to continue the sortie as the lead aircraft focusing on flying his jet rather than overloading the MP’s bucket. [FF (5-11), (13-15), (17-18), (20), (22), (23-27), (34-37), (39), (41-44), (45-52), (53-64), (65-67)]

Supervision

3. VMFA(AW)-242’s insufficient monthly, weekly, and daily flight schedule planning and Operational Risk Management (ORM) contributed to the mishap. VMFA(AW)-242 leadership failed to (1) adequately address the concerns expressed in the Quarterly Training Plan through appropriate ORM; (2) properly plan for the air-to-air refueling mission (AAR-2202 (Night Aerial Refueling)) when it was not included in the daily flight schedule; and (3) schedule AAR-2202X (Night Air-to-Air Refueling - Initial) on the weekly nor daily schedule which resulted in insufficient ORM to be conducted for the mishap event. [FF (5-11), (13-15), (17-18), (20), (22), (23-27)]
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4. As VMFA(AW)-242 monthly flight schedules turned into weeklies and subsequently into daily schedules for execution, VMFA(AW)-242 leadership failed to identify potential currency and proficiency risks. For the MF event, the review of weekly and daily schedules by Operations, DoSS, and the CO was inadequate as all levels of supervision failed to identify that the MF would be the MP’s first night aerial refueling in the fleet. The aircrew portion of an effective Risk Assessment Worksheet (RAW) identifies potential currency and proficiency risks to unit Pilot Training Officers, Weapons System Training Officers, and Schedulers to ensure timely and appropriate risk mitigation. Flight Leads should be fully enabled by the Command in the execution of events affected by dynamic environmental considerations (light levels, weather, etc.) which affect aircrew performance no matter the experience level. Specific to this incident, mitigation measures should have been implemented 72-hours ahead of the planned sortie rather than handing a yet to be identified risk to the event Flight Lead to be deciphered during event planning the day prior to or the day of the mission. [FF (5-11), (13-15), (17-18), (20), (22), (23-27), (34-37), (39), (41-44), (45-52), (53-64), (65-67)]

Mishap Reporting

5. The significant amount of time that passed between the 28 April 2016 Class C flight mishap and this investigation created challenges for those interviewed to accurately recall events and reporting timeline specifics. Marines interviewed provided various descriptions of the Class C Flight Mishap based on each individuals' situational awareness, vantage point, and memory. [FF (53-64), (68-75), (76-80), (81-86), (87-89), (91), (93-94), (96)]

6. The incident cost determination was convoluted – incident costs should have initially been estimated at the worst case (highest cost) and then reduced as corrective maintenance and associated supply details developed. [FF (97-103)]

7. The stand-up of the joint VMGR-152 and VMFA(AW)-242 Aviation Mishap Board (AMB) was not timely. However, once initiated the AMB efficiently prepared and released the VMFA(AW)-242 - VMGR-152 Air-to-Air Refueling Class C Flight Mishap (FM) Safety Investigation Report (SIR). All required reports associated with the 28 April 2016 Class C Flight Mishap were ultimately released and given time, were effectively clarified to the chain of command. [FF (87-89), (91), (93-94), (96), (97-103), (111), (121-125)]

Accountability and Lessons Learned

8. The Mishap Pilot (MP), the Mishap Flight Lead (MFL), the Mishap Weapon Systems Officer (MWSO) and Mishap Flight Lead Weapon Systems Officer (MFL WSO) were held accountable by the VMFA(AW)-242 Commanding Officer. [FF (104-110), (120), (127), (129)]

9. The Human Factors Board conducted 6 May 2016 developed several training recommendations for the flight members as well as developed salient talking points for
Subj: COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING A MARINE ALL-WEATHER FIGHTER ATTACK SQUADRON 242 F/A-18D AND A MARINE AERIAL REFUELER TRANSPORT SQUADRON 152 KC-130J MID-AIR COLLISION ON 28 APRIL 2016 OFF THE COAST OF OKINAWA, JAPAN

subsequent All Officer Meetings where the flight members could share the lesson’s learned with peers, seniors, and subordinates. [FF (104-110)]

10. VMFA(AW)-242 pro-actively standardized proper administrative procedures utilized in the aerial refueling environment by adjusting the Squadron SOP to ensure deliberate, steady airwork and headwork during Air-to-Air Refueling Operations. [FF (113-117), (128-129)]

11. A contemporaneous Command Investigation was likely not conducted even after the Air-to-Air Refueling incident was determined to be a Class C Flight Mishap. [FF (120), (127)]

Process Improvement

12. MSHARP should not chain AAR-2202 (Night Air-to-Air Refueling) after RQD-6109 (Day or Night Strategic Aerial Refueling) is executed and logged. [FF (5), (23-25)]

13. The new VMFA(AW)-242 SOP implemented on 3 September 2016 sufficiently addressed the air-to-air refueling procedural deficiencies identified in this investigation. [FF (114-116)]

Recommendations

1. VMFA(AW)-242 conduct a comprehensive review of night aerial refueling procedures and best practices as well as internal planning methodology inclusive of Operational Risk Management (ORM) policies and procedures and scheduling quality assurance.

2. VMFA(AW)-242, MAG-12, and 1st MAW review deliberate Operational Risk Management (ORM) tools available within the USMC tactical fixed-wing communities to develop and implement a Risk Assessment Worksheet (RAW) that meets VMFA(AW)-242 requirements and needs.

3. No further investigation is required into the circumstances associated with the VMFA(AW)-242 F/A-18D and VMGR-152 KC-130J mid-air collision off the coast of Japan on 28 April 2016.

4. As no negligence existed nor was found during the investigation of the VMFA(AW)-242 F/A-18D and VMGR-152 KC-130J mid-air collision off the coast of Japan on 28 April 2016, no administrative action is required.
From: Commanding General, 1st Marine Aircraft Wing
To: [b] [3] [A], [b] [6] USMC

Subj: ANALYSIS OF FLIGHT/VOICE DATA RECORDERS FOR THE COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE AVIATION MISHAP OF A F/A-18D FROM MARINE ALL WEATHER FIGHTER ATTACK SQUADRON 242 AND A KC-130J FROM MARINE AERIAL REFUELER TRANSPORT SQUADRON 152 ON 6 DECEMBER 2018 OFF THE COAST OF JAPAN

Ref: (a) JAGIN09 5830 7F
(b) [b] [3] [A], [b] [6] Itr 5830/IO of 30 May 19

1. In accordance with reference (a), reference (b) is returned to the investigating officer for further investigation.

2. You are directed to investigate the information recovered on the flight data recorder (FDR) and the voice data recorder (VDR) from KC-130J, BUNO 167981.

3. Include any additional findings of fact, opinions, and recommendations in your original report of investigation and submit no later than 14 June 2019, unless an extension of time is granted.

4. You shall seek legal advice from the Staff Judge Advocate, 1st Marine Aircraft Wing prior to signing the mishap report.

5. By copy of this appointing order, all staff sections and subordinate commanders are directed to furnish all necessary assistance.

6. The point of contact for this matter is 1st Marine Aircraft Wing Staff Judge Advocate.

T. D. WEIDLEY

Copy to:
SJA, 1st MAW
From: USMC
To: Commanding General, 1st Marine Aircraft Wing

Subj: THIRD REQUEST FOR EXTENSION ICO 6 DECEMBER 2018 MID-AIR COLLISION MISHAP COMMAND INVESTIGATION

Ref: (a) IO Appointment Letter 5830/CG dated 10 Dec 18

1. I request an extension of time for completing the command investigation for which I have been appointed by the reference. I request a new submission date of 24 June 2019.

2. I am pending receipt of the analysis from the voice and flight data recorders from BUNO 167981.

Copy to:
SJA, 1st MAW
From: Commanding General, 1st Marine Aircraft Wing
To: [Redacted] USMC

Subj: THIRD REQUEST FOR EXTENSION ICO 6 DECEMBER 2018 MID-AIR COLLISION MISHAP COMMAND INVESTIGATION

1. Returned. Your request for an extension is granted. Your investigation is now due 24 June 2019.

T. D. WEIDLEY

Copy to:
SJA, 1st MAW
Cockpit Voice Data Recorder Transcript as recovered from VMGR-152
KC-130J Buno 167981 Callsign Sumo41

All three aircraft are joined at 15,000’, 242kts, and refueling is in progress. Profane 11 is refueling from the right hose. Profane 12 is refueling from the left hose.

01:06:54 Sumo41 intercom: “I wonder if I heard them take-off? He’s probably staying up in his room. There go my warriors. Ha-ha. I hope so.” [More friendly chuckles.]
01:07:08 Tanker Common: Profane 11, “Profane 11 request disconnect echelon right.”
01:07:11 Tanker Common: Sumo 41, “That is approved as requested.”
01:07:12 Tanker Common: Profane 11, “Profane 11” [serves as an affirmative and acknowledgment of clearance]
01:07:16 Sumo 41 intercom: “disconnect right” [likely from the right side observer positioned in the right side jump door window and wearing night vision goggles]
01:07:19 Sumo 41 intercom: “11 is moving to the right - echelon” [same voice as previous communication, consistent with right side observer position]
01:07:27 Tanker Common: Sumo 41, “And... 11, you have a buno for me?”
01:07:31 Tanker Common: Profane 11, “Affirm, Aircraft 9 buno 164662” [IO recognizes this voice to be from MWSO1, tone is loud, clear, and confident]
01:07:38 Tanker Common: Sumo 41, “copy”
01:07:41 Sumo 41 intercom: “...and... 11 is stable right echelon”
01:07:43 Sumo 41 TCAS traffic alert “Traffic. Traffic”
01:07:44 Sumo 41 intercom: “uh, there he is, cool”
01:08:17 Sumo 41 intercom: “disconnected left” [likely voice from left side observer positioned in the left side jump door window]
01:08:23 Tanker Common: Sumo 41, “Profane 12 looks like you are complete approved to echelon right.”
01:08:29 Sumo 41 intercom: “uh, oh, was it intentional?” [In reference to the disconnect, as if to ask, did he fall out or deliberately separate due to being satisfied]
01:08:31 Tanker Common: Profane 12, “request echelon left if able” [IO voice recognition consistent with MWSO2, voice is muffled but understandable]
01:08:34 Tanker Common: Sumo 41, “That’s approved. And, uh, what are you guys up to tonight?”
01:08:38 Tanker Common: Profane 11, “Whole lotta’ nothin’”
01:08:39 Sumo 41 intercom: “Same”
01:08:39 Tanker Common: Sumo 41, “yeah. Same-Same”
01:08:42 Tanker Common: Sumo 41, “Hey, uh, you guys coming back at all?”
01:08:44 Tanker Common: Profane 11, “Uh, we are thinking about it. Whatta ya think? You guys got enough gas for us?”
01:08:49 Tanker Common: Sumo 41, “[chuckles] we got a ton of gas, yeah, absolutely.”
01:08:51 Tanker Common: Profane 11, “Alright”
01:08:53 Sumo 41 intercom: “12 moving to the left side
01:08:54 Tanker Common: Profane 11, “We are gonna go blow the burners a little” [chuckling]
01:08:57 Tanker Common: Sumo 41, “Hey, uh, Profane 12, you got a, uh, bunot?”
01:08:59 Tanker Common: Profane 12, “yeah, uh Profane 12, side number 11, bunot 165416” [muffled voice, IO voice recognition consistent with MWSO2]
01:09:11 Tanker Common: Sumo 41, “ah, 41 copies”
01:09:12 Sumo 41 intercom: “What the hell do these guys….” [think they are doing?]
01:09:16 Tanker Common: Profane 11, “If you guys will go ahead and start a left turn the middle of the area we will give you a little show on the way out”
01:09:18 Sumo 41 intercom: “fuck yeah”
01:09:21 Tanker Common: Sumo 41, “ah, 41, left turn” [tone indicates executing the turn at this time]
01:09:23 – 01:09:55 Sumo 41 intercom “are they gonna fucking burn by both of us on each side? Dude I was about to ask like can they do something cool like we used to? Nobody does that shit anymore. Never. I fucking like it guys. Excited. [TCAS: Traffic. Traffic.] Whata you say a left turn to, uh back towards ah, actually this is perfect. 12 is crossing over the top from left to right. Oh.. sheeitt….what they gonna do? Visual on one. There you go”
01:10:00 Sumo 41 intercom: wind noise and non-descript hollering.
01:10:02 -End of data-
Encl 153. Sumo-41
Audio Recording CVR-H2 and CVR-H4 of 4 Dec 18
CASUALTY REPORT

Report Type: SUPP

Casualty Type: Nonhostile

Casualty Status: DECEASED

Casualty Category: Pending

Report Number: 1V218003Y

Personnel Type: Regular

Personnel Affiliation: Active Duty

Personnel Category: Obligated/Voluntary Service

Last Name:  
First Name:  
Middle Name:  

Service: United States Marine Corps

Military Rank:  

Military Unit of Assignment: VMGR-152

Date/Time of Incident (New/Old): 20181206/0150

Incident City: IWAKUNI

Incident Country: North Pacific Ocean

Circumstance: ON 6 DECEMBER 2018 AROUND 01:50, (b) (3) (A), (b) (6) WAS CREW ON THE VMGR-152 KC-130J OPERATING 200 NAUTICAL MILES SOUTH OF IWAKUNI CONDUCTING FIXED WING AIR-TO-AIR REFUELING WHEN AN AVIATION MISHAP OCCURRED. SEARCH AND RESCUE OPERATIONS ARE ON-GOING.

Died in/out of Medical Facility Treatment: Died Outside A Medical Treatment Facility

Date/Time of Death: 20181206/0150
Place of Death City: Iwakuni

Place of Death Country: Sea Of Japan

Duty Status: Present For Duty

Remarks: 16 June 2019: Analysis of recovered remains by the Armed Forces Medical Examiner has yielded a positive identification of 

Request the next of kin be notified for appropriate follow on disposition options.

***********************************************************************
****** CASUALTY REPORT *******
***********************************************************************

Report Type: SUPP

Casualty Type: Nonhostile

Casualty Status: DECEASED

Casualty Category: Pending

Report Number: 1V218002Y

Personnel Type: Regular

Personnel Affiliation: Active Duty

Personnel Category: Obligated/Voluntary Service

Last Name: 

First Name: 

Service: United States Marine Corps

Military Rank: 

Military Unit of Assignment: VMGR-152

Date/Time of Incident (New/Old): 20181206/0215

Incident City: IWAKUNI

Incident Country: Sea Of Japan
Circumstance: ON 6 DECEMBER 2018 AROUND 02:15, MAJ BROPHY WAS CREW ON THE VMGR-152 KC-130J OPERATING 200 NAUTICAL MILES SOUTH OF IWAKUNI CONDUCTING FIXED WING AERIAL REFUELING WHEN AN AVIATION MISHAP OCCURRED AND SEARCH AND RESCUE OPERATIONS ARE ON GOING.

Died in/out of Medical Facility Treatment: Died Outside A Medical Treatment Facility

Date/Time of Death: 20181206/0150

Place of Death City: IWAKUNI

Place of Death Country: Japan

Duty Status: Present For Duty

Remarks: 16 June 2019: Analysis of recovered remains by the Armed Forces Medical Examiner has yielded a positive identification of (b) (3) (A), (b) (6). Request the next of kin be notified for appropriate follow on disposition options.

******************************************************************************************************************************************
******** CASUALTY REPORT ********
******************************************************************************************************************************************

Report Type: SUPP

Casualty Type: Nonhostile

Casualty Status: DECEASED

Casualty Category: Pending

Report Number: 1V218004W

Personnel Type: Regular

Personnel Affiliation: Active Duty

Personnel Category: Obligated/Voluntary Service

Last Name: *(b) (3) (A), (b) (6)*

First Name: *(b) (3) (A), (b) (6)*

Middle Name: *(b) (3) (A), (b) (6)*

Enclosure 155
Service: United States Marine Corps

Military Rank: [b] (3) [A] (b)

Military Unit of Assignment: VMGR-152

Date/Time of Incident (New/Old): 20181206/0150

Incident City: IWAKUNI

Incident Country: North Pacific Ocean

Circumstance: ON 6 DECEMBER 2018 AROUND 01:50, [b] (3) (A). WAS CREW ON THE VMGR-152 KC-130J OPERATING 200 NAUTICAL MILES SOUTH OF IWAKUNI CONDUCTING FIXED WING AIR-TO-AIR REFUELING WHEN AN AVIATION MISHAP OCCURRED. SEARCH AND RESCUE OPERATIONS ARE ON GOING.

Died in/out of Medical Facility Treatment: Died Outside A Medical Treatment Facility

Date/Time of Death: 20181206/0150

Duty Status: Present For Duty

Remarks: 14 June 2019: Analysis of recovered remains by the Armed Forces Medical Examiner has yielded a positive identification of [b] (3) (A). [b] (3) [b] Request the next of kin be notified for appropriate follow on disposition options.

***********************************************************************************************
*************** CASUALTY REPORT ***************
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Report Type: SUPP

Casualty Type: Nonhostile

Casualty Status: DECEASED

Casualty Category: Pending

Report Number: 1V218005BB

Personnel Type: Regular
Personnel Affiliation: Active Duty

Personnel Category: Obligated/Voluntary Service

Last Name: (b) (3) (A), (b)

First Name: (b) (3) (A), (b)

Middle Name: (b) (3) (A), (b)

Service: United States Marine Corps

Military Rank: (b) (2)

Military Unit of Assignment: VMGR-152

Date/Time of Incident (New/Old): 20181206/0150

Incident City: IWAKUNI

Incident Country: North Pacific Ocean

Circumstance: ON 6 DECEMBER 2018 AROUND 01:50, CPL BAKER WAS CREW ON THE VMGR-152 KC-130J OPERATING 200 NAUTICAL MILES SOUTH OF IWAKUNI CONDUCTING FIXED WING AIR-TO-AIR REFUELING WHEN AN AVIATION MISHAP OCCURRED. SEARCH AND RESCUE OPERATIONS ARE ON-GOING.

Died in/out of Medical Facility Treatment: Died Outside A Medical Treatment Facility

Date/Time of Death: 20181206/0150

Duty Status: Present For Duty

Remarks: 19 June 19: To date, three Marines have been individually identified. Analysis of the recovered remains continues by the Armed Forces Medical Examiner. However, the Armed Forces Medical Examiner, in conjunction with the recovery team, has indicated the likelihood of identifying (b) (3) (A), (b) is extremely low based upon preliminary analysis of recovered remains and the location where the remains were retrieved relative to the positioning of the cockpit and others involved in the mishap during refueling operations. Request the next of kin be notified."
CASUALTY REPORT

Report Type: SUPP
Casualty Type: Nonhostile
Casualty Status: DECEASED
Casualty Category: Pending
Report Number: 1V218006BB
Personnel Type: Regular
Personnel Affiliation: Active Duty
Personnel Category: Obligated/Voluntary Service

Last Name: [redacted]
First Name: [redacted]
Middle Name: [redacted]
Service: United States Marine Corps
Military Rank: [redacted]
Military Unit of Assignment: VMGR-152
Date/Time of Incident (New/Old): 20181206/0150
Incident City: IWAKUNI
Incident Country: North Pacific Ocean

Circumstance: ON 6 DECEMBER 2018 AROUND 01:50, [redacted] WAS CREW ON THE VMGR-152 KC-130J OPERATING 200 NAUTICAL MILES SOUTH OF IWAKUNI CONDUCTING FIXED WING AIR-TO-AIR REFUELING WHEN AN AVIATION MISHAP OCCURRED. SEARCH AND RESCUE OPERATIONS ARE ON-GOING.

Died in/out of Medical Facility Treatment: Died Outside A Medical Treatment Facility
Date/Time of Death: 20181206/0150
Duty Status: Present For Duty

Remarks: 19 June 2019: To date, three Marines have been individually identified. Analysis of the recovered remains continues by the Armed Forces Medical Examiner. However, the Armed Forces Medical Examiner, in conjunction with the recovery team, has indicated the likelihood of identifying (b) (6), (b) (3) (A) is extremely low based upon preliminary analysis of recovered remains and the location where the remains were retrieved relative to the positioning of the cockpit and others involved in the mishap during refueling operations. Request the next of kin be notified."
Dec 2018 BuNo 167981 Entire Flight, Start time=15:24:36 End time=16:44:14, Longitudinal Parameters

- Pitch (Deg)
- LT & RT AOA (deg)
- Vert Accel (g)
- Radar Alt (ft)
- Elevator (deg)
- Airspeed (KCAS)

Time - Seconds
Dec 2018 BuNo 167981 Last 5 minutes, Start time=16:39:14 End time=16:44:14, Attitudes and Surface Positions

- Aileron (deg) with a noted rate of change
- Roll Att. (deg)
- Elevator (deg)
- Pitch (deg)
- Rudder (deg)
- Mag Heading (deg)

Time - Seconds
Dec 2018 BuNo 167981 Entire Flight, Start time=15:24:36 End time=16:44:14, Engine and Accelerations

Torque

Throttle Position - %

Long Accel - g

Lat Accel - g

Vert Accel - g

Pressure Alt - ft

Time - Seconds
Dec 2018 BuNo 167981 Last 5 minutes, Start time=16:39:14 End time=16:44:14, Engine and Accelerations

Torque

Throttle Position - %

Long Accel - g

Lat Accel - g

Vert Accel - g

Pressure Alt - ft

Time - Seconds

Enclosure 156