Case 1:19-cr-00304-LMB *SEALED* Document 1 Filed 10/08/19 Page 1of 8 PagelD# 19 lN 'l llE t iNl'l'l:D S'l';\'l l;S DIS I RIC'l' (:( )tJlt'l' l:o l:AS I i:.ltN l)lS' RI(' l' !r.! n-:-' ' ')T OMI{(;INIA Alexandria l)ivision {INl-lliD S'I'AT[S Oil ANII:ltlCA ) (rinrinrrl No. i: l9-CI{-304 (1,\.18) ) ) ) I II:NItl' KYLF. Irl{l:Sll ) Oxr: ltl tJ.S.C. is 793(d) \\/il I f ul' l'ransmission o1' National I)clense lnlbrrnatiorr Cloux't ) Dclr;ndant ) C'ouvr"l'u'o: 18 l.l.S.C:. $ 79:j(d) ) \\'ilItirl 'l ransmissiun c,f ) National I)cl'ensc INI)lC l'i\,IlrN]' I rt lbrnratit:rr UruffiTR $ffit OC'IOBEI{ 20i9'flil{N.I -- At Alcxandria TIIIi GITAND .IURY CIIAIT(iIiS'IHA'I': At all tirrrcs nraterial to this Incliclnrcnt. ..1ccpt as olhcnvisc indicatcd: (leneral Allcsations 'l'he Del'cndrnt l, I)clcndant Henq' K1'lc l,'rcsc ("FIlllSE") r:csidccl in ther l:iastern District ol' Virginia. ?. FI{IISli thc llaslr:rn I )istricl o \\'as iirl ct.uplor,ce ol'tlte Dtr(crtsc lntclligrncr: i\ucrrcl'("1)lA").lor-:atctl in l' Vir:ginia, Cllssilicd Inlirrrnation 3. Pursuattt lixecutivc Orcler I::92 to llxccr"rtivc. Onlcl l?95tt signecl un April 17. 1995. as anrcnclccl tr1, r:n i\4arch 25. 100:1. and l'lxcr:utivc Orcler ruttiortal su:curity inlbrnratiorr \\ils classillcrl as '''l'OI) li516 on l)ruember Sl1(llt 29. l(XX). lll'"'' "SliCltl:'l'"" or Case 1:19-cr-00304-LMB *SEALED* Document 1 Filed L0/08/19 Page 2.of 8 PagelD# 20 'CONFIDENTIAL." National security information was infonnation owned by, prodgced by, produced for, and under the control of the United States govemment that was classified as follows: Infomration was classifiod as TOP SECRET if the unauthorized disclosure of tlat information reasonably could be expected to cause exoeptionally grave damage to the national security that the origrnsl classification authority was able to ideutift and describe. b. Ioformatiou was classified as SECRET if the rmauthorized disclosure of that information reasonably could be expected to cause serious damage to the national security that the original classification authority was able to identif, and describe. c. 4. Information was classified as CONFIDENTIAL if the unauthorized disolosure of that information reasonably could be expected to. cause demrge to the national security thrt the origioal classification authority. was able to identift and describe. Access to national security information classified at any level could be fi:rther resticted through compartuentation categories. Only individuals in Sensitive Compartmented Information ('SCP) with the appropriate security clearance and additional SCI permissions could have authorized access to zuch classified national security information. 5. Classified information, including SCI, was marked according to its classiftcition and applicable SCI compartnents, fotiowing standard. forrrats for different types of rnedia" including headen and footers stating the highest classificatiou level and SCI compartnents of information a document contained and individual classifications markings for each paragraph. 6. Infon:ration classified at any level could only be lawfirlly accessed by persons detemined by an appropriate united states government official to be eligible for access to classified iaformation, who had siped an approved non-disclosure agreement, who received a security clearance, and who had a "need to tnowl' the classified information. classified information could only be stored in an approved facility and container. 2 Case 1:19-cr-00304-LMB *SEALED* Document 1 Filed L0/08/19 Page 3 of I PagelD# 21 FRESE'g Access to Classifred National Defense Information 7. From in or about January 2017 until in or about February 2018, tr'RESE was a cofiract employee with DIA, assigned to a facility in ihe Eastem District of Virginia, and held a Top Secret//Sensitive Comparturented Infomration ("TS//SCI") clearance. 8. employed by From in or about February 2018 through in or about October 2019, trRESE was DIA' assigred to a facility in the Eastem.Distict of Virginia- In connection with his employment, f,RESE held a TOP SECRET//SCI security clearance. g. f,RESE received taining regardi{g classified hfomration, including the definitions of classified information, the levels of classification, and SCI, as well as the proper handling, markhg, transportation, and storage of classified materials. FRESE received taining on his duty to protect classified materials from uauthorized disclosure, which included complying with handliog tansportatioD, and storage requirements. X'RESE knew that unauthorized tansmissiotr of classified National Defense Infomration ('NDI") could endanger the national security ofthe United States and the safety of its citizens. In particular, X'RESE had been advised that (a) unauthorized disclosure ofTOP SECRET information reasonably could be expected to cause exceptionally grave damage to the national security of the United States; (b) unauthorized disclosure of SECRET infomration reasonably could be expected to cause serious damage to the national security ofthe United States; and (c) that violation of nrles governing the handling of classified information could result in crimi:ral prosecution. fRESE's Transmission of National Defense Infomation 10. Because FRESE held a security clearance and was assigued first as a contractor to and then an employee of DlA, the United states govemment entrusted tr'RESE with access to sensitive government materials, inciudi"g information relating to the national defense that was closely held by the govemment ('National Defense Information" or documents and materials. J "NDI') and classified Case 1:19-cr-00304-LMB *SEALED* Document 11. 1 Filed 10/08/19 Page 4 of 8 PagelD# 22 In or about mid-April to early May 2018, I'RESE accessed an int€lligsnce ropot unreiated to his job duties on multiple occasions, which contained NDI classified at the TOP SECRET//SCI level, which related to a certain foreign county's weapons systems ("Intelligeuce Report l"). 12. A week after X'RESE accessed Intelligence Report received an April 27, 2018 Twitter Direct Message I for the second time, FRESE ("DM) ftom a joumalist ('Joumalist 1') with a certain news outlet (t{ews Outlet 1'). Joumalist I asked whether FRESE would be rvilling to speak with a second joumalist ('Joumalist 2'), who worked with a second news outlet (News Outlet 2'). trRESE stated that I because he wanted to see Journalist 13. a he was "down" to help Joumalist 2 if it hetped Joumalist I "progress." During the same Apnl27,2018llwitter exchange, Journalist 1 also indicated that certain United States military official told Joumalist 2 that the official was not aware of the statod subject matter of a story Journalist 1 was working on, the subject matter being the topio of Intelligence Report 1. trRESE characterized the official's denial as 'lreird" and commented on the source of information contained wirhin htelligence Report 1. 14. Several days after the April 27 Twitter exchange, FRESE searched on a classified United States govemment computer system for terms related to the topics contained in lntelligence Report 1. 15. A few hours after searohing for terms rrlatod to the topio of lntelligence Report l, f,'RESE spoke by telephone with Joumalist 1 for seven minutes. Several hours later, BRESE spoke by telephone with Joumalist 2 for over half an hour. knmediately after the call with Joumalist 2, Joumalist I called FRESE. Approximately half an hour after X'RESE spoke with the two joumalists, Joumalist 1 published an article C'Article 1') through News Outlet contained NDI from lntelligence Report 1 classified at the TOP SECRET//SCI level. 4 i, which Case 1:1,9-cr-00304-LMB *SEALED* Document 16. Joumalist I Pursuant Filed 10/08/19 Page 5 of later Tweeted a link to Article to l. I PagelD# 23 FRESE subsequently re-Tweeted l. Journalist 1's Tweet ofArticle 17. L court-authorized Tifle III interception of wire and el6ctronic communications to and from tr'RESE's ce.llular.telephone, the Federal Bureau of Investigation ('FBI") intercepted certain lortions of f,'RESE's text 18. I On Septenrber l l, 2019, the FBI intercepted a call betweeu FRESE and Joumalist