Filing # 96724681 E-Filed 10/03/2019 05:04:25 PM

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
FOR THE FIRST DISTRICT, STATE OF FLORIDA
LEONARDO LYNCH,
Petitioner,
v.

Case No. 1D19-3106

FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF
LAW ENFORCEMENT,
Respondent.

/

RESPONSE TO MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS FEES AND COSTS
Pursuant to Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure 9.300(a) and 9.400(b),
Respondent, Florida Department of Law Enforcement (“FDLE”), hereby responds
to Petitioner’s Motion for Attorneys Fees and Costs and avers as follows.
“Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.400 contemplates an allowance of
attorney’s fees only if otherwise authorized by substantive law.” Nationwide Mut.
Ins. Co. v. Nu-Best Diagnostic Labs, Inc., 810 So. 2d 514, 515 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002)
(citations omitted). Moreover, “the supreme court has reiterated that attorney’s fees
statutes should be strictly construed.” Id. at 516 (citations omitted).
Petitioner asserts that he is entitled to attorneys’ fees pursuant to section
120.595(5), Florida Statutes (2019), because the actions of FDLE precipitating his
Petition was a gross abuse of discretion. Petitioner argues that FDLE has no good
faith basis in either fact or law for failing to render a final decision. However,

 Petitioner has failed to pursue the next step in the administrative process under both
Florida and Federal regulations, which is to contact the agency that submitted the
record that disqualified him from purchasing a firearm. See Fla. Admin. Code R.
11C-8.001(5) and 28 C.F.R. §25.10(c). Since the administrative process has not been
completed, FDLE cannot issue a final decision.
Furthermore, FDLE has a good faith basis to consider its actions pursuant to
section 790.065, Florida Statutes (2018), to be ministerial acts because its role under
section 790.065 is similar to its role under section 943.059, Florida Statutes (2019),
which was held to be a ministerial act, See Rowell v. State, Florida Dept. of Law
Enf’t, 700 So. 2d 1242, 1243 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997), and because the legislature defines
the criteria that disqualifies a potential purchaser of a firearm. See Solomon v.
Sanitarians’ Registration Bd., 155 So. 2d 353, 356 (Fla. 1963) (“[O]fficial action is
considered ministerial when it is arrived at as the result of the performance of a
specific duty arising from legislatively designated facts. A ministerial duty is one
which is positively imposed by law to be performed at a time and in a manner or
upon conditions which are specifically designated by the law itself absent any
authorization of discretion to the agency.”) (citation omitted). Ministerial acts by an
agency are not final orders, as defined by section 120.52(7), Florida Statutes (2019).
Rowell, 700 So. 2d at 1243. Thus, FDLE cannot render a “final order” in this matter
if it is merely performing a ministerial act. Moreover, while this Court has held that

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 agencies have a clear legal duty to file “final orders” with the agency clerk, FDLE
has not found or received any legal authority that suggests that it has a clear legal
duty to file documents that are not “final orders” with the agency clerk.
Since the administrative process has not been completed, FDLE has a good
faith basis to consider actions pursuant to section 790.065 to be ministerial acts, and
ministerial acts are not “final orders” pursuant to section 120.52(7), FDLE cannot
be found to have committed a gross abuse of discretion by deferring its final decision
in this matter or by failing to render a “final order” by filing it with the agency clerk.
Petitioner also argues that FDLE failed to render a final order for the improper
purposes of avoiding judicial review and obfuscating the process. However, the
process is clear and Petitioner merely chooses not to follow it. Moreover, Petitioner
is not foreclosed from pursuing judicial review if a non-approval by the FDLE is
considered a ministerial act because he may file petition for writ of mandamus in the
trial court or an action against FDLE, the appropriate New York agency, or the
United States to resolve the matter. See Rowell, 700 So. 2d at 1244-45; 18 U.S.C.
§925A; 28 C.F.R. §25.10(f). Therefore, the FDLE’s interpretation of its duties is not
designed to avoid judicial review or obfuscate the process.
CONCLUSION
WHEREFORE, Respondent requests that this Court deny the Motion for
Attorneys Fees and Costs.

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 Respectfully submitted,
ASHLEY MOODY
Attorney General
/s/ Bilal Ahmed Faruqui
BILAL AHMED FARUQUI
Senior Assistant Attorney General
Florida Bar Number 15212
Office of the Attorney General
General Civil Litigation Section
State Programs Bureau
PL – 01 The Capitol
Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050
(850) 414-3757
Bilal.Faruqui@myfloridalegal.com
Maia.Rogers@myfloridalegal.com
COUNSEL FOR RESPONDENT
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that, on October 3, 2019, I electronically filed this
document by using the Florida Courts E-Filing Portal and that I served a copy of this
document through the E-Filing Portal upon the following:
Eric J. Friday
Kingry & Friday
1919 Atlantic Boulevard
Jacksonville, Florida 32207
service@ericfriday.com
efriday@ericfriday.com
Counsel for Petitioner
/s/ Bilal Ahmed Faruqui
Bilal Ahmed Faruqui

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