Opening Statement of Ambassador William

Mr
. Chairman,

B . Taylor - October 22 , 2019

appreciate the opportunity to appear today to providemy

perspective on the events that are the subjectof the Committees' inquiry. My sole
purpose isto provide the Committees with my views about the strategic
importance ofUkraineto theUnited States aswell as additional information about
the incidents in question.
I havededicated my life to serving U. S . interests at homeand abroad in both
military and civilian roles. Mybackground and experience arenonpartisan and I
havebeen honored to serve under every administration , Republican and
Democratic, since 1985.
For 50 years , I have served the country , starting as a cadet at West Point, then as an
infantry officer for six years , including with the
Division in
Vietnam ; then at the Department of Energy; then as a member of a Senate staff ;
then at NATO ; then with the State Department here and abroad
in Afghanistan ,
Iraq, Jerusalem , and Ukraine; andmore recently , as Executive Vice President of
the nonpartisan United States Institute of Peace.

While I have served in many places and in different capacities, I have a particular
interest in and respect for the importanceof our country' s relationship with
Ukraine. Our nationalsecurity demands that this relationship remain strong
However, in August and Septemberof this year, I becameincreasingly concerned
that our relationship with Ukraine was being fundamentally undermined by an
irregular, informalchannel of U . S.
making and by the withholding of vital
security assistance for domestic politicalreasons. I hopemyremarkstoday will
help the Committees understand why I believed that to be the case

At the outset, I would like to convey severalkey points. First, Ukraine is a
strategic partner of the United States, important for the security of our country as
well as Europe. Second , Ukraine is, rightat this moment- while we sit in this
room
for the last five years, under armed attack from Russia. Third , the
security assistancewe provide is crucialto Ukraine' s defense against Russian
aggression, and, more importantly, sends a signal to Ukrainians
Russians
that we are Ukraine' s reliable strategic partner. And finally, as the Committees are
now aware, I said on September 9 in a message to Ambassador Gordon Sondland
that withholding security assistance in exchange for help with a domestic political
campaign in the United States would be crazy
I believed that then , and I still
believe that

 Letmenow provide the Committees a chronology of the events that led to my
concern
On May 28 of this year, Imet with Secretary Mike Pompeo who askedmeto
criticaltimein
return to Kyiv to lead our embassy in Ukraine. Itwas— and is
U . S. -Ukraine relations: VolodymyrZelenskyy had just been elected presidentand
Ukraine remainedatwar with Russia. As the summer approached, a new
Ukrainian governmentwould be seated, parliamentary electionswere imminent,
and the Ukrainian politicaltrajectory would be set for the next severalyears.

I had served as Ambassador to Ukraine from 2006 to 2009, having been nominated
by George W . Bush, and, in the intervening 10 years, I have stayed engaged with
Ukraine, visiting frequently since 2013 as a boardmember of a smallUkrainian
non- governmental organization supporting good governance and reform . Across
the responsibilities I have had in public service, Ukraine is special for me, and
Secretary Pompeo' s offer to return as Chiefof Mission was compelling. I am
convinced of the profound importance ofUkraineto the security of the United
States and Europe for two related reasons:

First, if Ukrainesucceeds in breakingfree ofRussian influence, it is possible for
Europeto bewhole, free, democratic, and at peace. In contrast, ifRussia
dominates Ukraine, Russia will again becomean empire, oppressing its people,
and threatening its neighborsand the rest of the world .

Second , with the annexation of the Crimea in 2014 and the continued aggression in
Donbas, Russia violated countless treaties , ignored all commitments , and
dismissed all the principles that have kept the peace and contributed to prosperity
in Europe since World War II. To restore Ukraine s independence , Russia must
leave Ukraine . This has been and should continue to be a bipartisan U . S . foreign
policy goal
When I was serving outside of government during the Obama ad ninistration and
after the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2014 , I joined two other former
ambassadors to Ukraine in urging Obama administration officials at the State
Department , Defense Department , and other agencies to provide lethal defensive
weapons to Ukraine in order to deter further Russian aggression . I also supported
much stronger sanctions against Russia .

2

 All to say, I cared about Ukraine's future and the important U . S . interests there .
So , when Secretary Pompeo askedme to go back to Kyiv , I wanted to say “ yes.

Butitwas not an easy decision . The former Ambassador, Masha Yovanovitch,
had been treated poorly, caughtin a web of politicalmachinations both in Kyiv and
in Washington. I feared that those problemswere still present. When I talked to
her about accepting the offer, however, she urged meto go , both for policy reasons
and for themorale ofthe embassy.

Before answeringthe Secretary, I consulted both my wife and a respected former
senior Republican officialwhohasbeen a mentor to me. I will tell you thatmy
wife, in no uncertain terms, strongly opposed the idea. Thementor counseled: if
your country asks you to do something you do it
you can be effective.
I could be effective only if the U . S. policy of strong support for Ukraine strong
diplomatic support along with robust security, economic, and technical
assistance — were to continue and if I had the backingofthe Secretary of State to
implement thatpolicy. I worried aboutwhat I had heard concerning the role of
Rudolph Giuliani, who had made several high-profile statements aboutUkraine
and U . S . policy toward the country . So during mymeeting with Secretary Pompeo
on May 28, I made clear to him and the otherspresentthat if U . S . policy toward
Ukraine changed, he would not want me posted there and I could not stay He
assured me that the policy of strong support for Ukraine would continue and that
hewould supportme in defending that policy.
With that understanding, I agreed to go back to Kyiv . Because I was appointed by
the Secretary butnot reconfirmed by the Senate, myofficialposition was Chargé
d ' Affaires ad interim .

I returned to Kyiv on June 17, carrying the originalcopy of a letter President
Trump signed the day after I metwith the Secretary. In that letter, President
Trump congratulated PresidentZelenskyy on his election victory and invited him
to a meetingin the Oval Office. I also broughtwith me a framed copy of the
Secretary ' s declaration that the United States would never recognize the illegal
Russian annexation of Crimea.
But once

arrived in Kyiv, I discovered a weird combination of encouraging,
confusing, and ultimately alarming circumstances.

 First, the encouraging: President Zelenskyy was taking over Ukraine in a hurry.
Hehad appointed reformistministers and supported long- stalled anti- corruption
legislation. Hetook quick executiveaction, including opening Ukraine' s High
Anti- Corruption Court, which was established under the previous presidential
administration butnever allowed to operate. Hecalled snap parliamentary
elections his party was so new it had no representation in the Rada — and later
won an overwhelmingmandate, controlling 60 percent of the seats. With his new
parliamentarymajority, PresidentZelenskyy changed the Ukrainian constitution to
remove absolute immunity from Radadeputies, which had been the sourceof raw
corruption for two decades. Therewas much excitementin Kyiv that this time
things could be different- a new Ukrainemight finally be breaking from its
corrupt, post- Soviet past.
And yet, I found a confusingand unusual arrangementformaking U .S . policy
towards Ukraine. There appeared to be two channels of U .S . policy-makingand
implementation, one regular and one highly irregular. Asthe Chief of Mission, 1
had authority over the regular, formaldiplomatic processes, including the bulk of
the U . S . effort to support Ukraineagainst the Russian invasion and to help it defeat
corruption. This regular channel ofU . S . policy-makinghas consistently had
strong, bipartisan support both in Congressand in all administrations since
Ukraine' s independence from Russia in 1991.

At the same time, however, there was an irregular, informal channel of U . S .
policy -making with respect to Ukraine, one which included then - Special Envoy
Volker, Ambassador Sondland , Secretary of Energy Rick Perry, and as I
subsequently learned, Mr. Giuliani. I was clearly in the regular channel, but I was
also in the irregular one to the extent that Ambassadors Volker and Sondland
included me in certain conversations. Although this irregular channelwas well
connected in Washington , it operated mostly outside of official State Department
channels . This irregular channel began when Ambassador Volker, Ambassador
Sondland, Secretary Perry , and Senator Ron Johnson briefed President Trump on
May 23 upon their return from President Zelenskyy s inauguration. The delegation
returned to Washington enthusiastic about the new Ukrainian president and urged
the U . S . Ukraine
President Trump to meet with him early on to
relationship . Butfrom what I understood , President Trump did not share their
enthusias n for a meeting with Mr. Zelenskyy.

When I first arrived in Kyiv, in June and July , the actions of both the regular and
the irregular channels of foreign policy served the same goal - a strong U . S .

 Ukrainepartnership but it became clear tomeby August that the channelshad
diverged in their objectives. Asthis occurred, I becameincreasingly concerned.
In late June, onethe goals ofboth channels was to facilitate a visit by President
Zelenskyy to the White House for a meetingwith President Trump, which
PresidentTrump had promised in his congratulatory letter ofMay 29. The
Ukrainians were clearly eager for the meeting to happen . Duringa conference call
with Ambassador Volker, Acting Assistant Secretary of State for European and
Eurasian Affairs PhilReeker, Secretary Perry, Ambassador Sondland, and
Counselor of the U . S. Departmentof State Ulrich Brechbuhl on June 18, itwas
clear that a meeting between the two presidents was an agreed-upon goal.
But during mysubsequent communicationswith Ambassadors Volker and
Sondland, they relayed to methat the President wanted to hear from Zelenskyy "
before scheduling the meeting in the OvalOffice. Itwas not clear to me what this
meant.

On June 27 , Ambassador Sondland told me during a phone conversation that
President Zelenskyy needed to make clear to President Trump that he, President
Zelenskyy, was not standing in theway of “ investigations. "
I sensed something odd when Ambassador Sondland told me on June 28 that he
did not wish to includemost of the regular interagency participants in a call
planned with PresidentZelenskyy later that day. Ambassador Sondland,
Ambassador Volker, Secretary Perry, and I were on this call, dialing in from
different locations. However, Ambassador Sondland said that hewanted to make
sure no one was transcribing or monitoringas they added PresidentZelenskyy to
the call. Also , before PresidentZelenskyy joined the call, Ambassador Volker
separately told the U . S . participants that he, Ambassador Volker, planned to be
explicit with President Zelenskyy in a one-on- one meeting in Toronto on July 2
aboutwhat PresidentZelenskyy should do to get the White Housemeeting. Again ,
it was not clear to me on that call what this meant, but Ambassador Volker noted
that he would relay that President Trumpwanted to see rule of law , transparency ,
but also, specifically, cooperation on investigations to
to the bottom of
things.” Once PresidentZelenskyy joined the call, the conversation was focused
on energy policy and the Stanytsia - Luhanska bridge. PresidentZelenskyy also
said he looked forward to the White House visit President Trump had offered in his
May 29 letter.

 I reported on this call to Deputy AssistantSecretary of State George Kent, who had
responsibility for Ukraine, and I wrote a memo for the record dated June 30 that
summarized our conversationwith PresidentZelenskyy.
Bymid-July itwasbecoming clear to methatthemeeting PresidentZelenskyy
wanted was conditioned on the investigationsofBurisma and alleged Ukrainian
interference in the 2016 U . . elections. Itwas also clear that this condition was
driven by the irregularpolicy channel I had cometo understand was guided by Mr.
Giuliani.
On July 10, Ukrainianofficials AlexanderDanyliuk, the Ukrainian national
security advisor, and Andriy Yermak, an assistant to PresidentZelenskyy, and
Secretary Perry, then -NationalSecurity Advisor John Bolton, Ambassador Volker,
and Ambassador Sondlandmet atthe White House. I did notparticipate in the
meetingand did not receive a readout of ituntil speakingwith the National
Security Council' s (NSC' ) then- Senior Directorfor European and Russian
Affairs, Fiona Hill, and the NSC' s Director of EuropeanAffairs, Alex Vindman,
on July 19.

On July 10 in Kyiv, metwith PresidentZelenskyy' s chief of staff, Andrei
Bohdan, and then -foreign policy advisor to the president and now Foreign Minister
Vadym Prystaiko, who told methat they had heard from Mr. Giulianithat the
phonecall between the two presidentswas unlikely to happen and that they were
alarned and disappointed . I relayedtheir concernsto Counselor Brechbuhl.
In a regularNSC secure video -conference call on July 18, heard a staff person
from the Office ofManagementand Budget (OMB) say that there was a hold on
security assistance to Ukraine but could not say why. Toward the end of an
- said
otherwise normalmeeting, a voice on the call the person was off-screen
that she was from OMB and thather boss had instructed her notto approve any
additionalspending of security assistance for Ukraineuntil further notice. and
Ukrainians were fighting the Russians and counted
others sat in astonishment
on not only the training and weapons, butalso the assuranceof U . S . support. All
that the OMB staffperson said was that thedirectivehad come from the President
to the Chief of Staff to OMB. In an instant, I realized that one of the key pillars of
our strong support for Ukrainewas threatened. Theirregular policy channel was
goals of longstanding U . S . policy.
running contrary to

led interagencymeetings , starting at the staff level
There followed a series of
and quickly reaching the levelof Cabinet secretaries. At every meeting, the

 unanimous conclusion was that the security assistance should be resumed, the hold
lifted. Atone point, the Defense Department was asked to perform an analysis of
the effectiveness of the assistance. Within a day , the Defense Departmentcame
back with the determination that the assistance was effective and should be
resumed . My understandingwas that the Secretaries ofDefense and State, the CIA
Director, and the National Security Advisor sought a jointmeeting with the
President to convince him to release the hold, but such a meeting was hard to
schedule and the hold lastedwell into September.

The next day on the phone, Dr. Hill and Mr
. Vindman tried to reassuremethat
they were not aware of any official change in U . . policy toward Ukraine, OMB' s
announcement notwithstanding. They did confirm that the hold on security
assistance for Ukraine came from Chief of Staff Mick Mulvaney and that the Chief
of Staff maintained a skeptical view of Ukraine.

In the same July 19 phone call, they gaveme an account ofthe July 10 meeting
with the Ukrainian officials at the White House. Specifically , they toldmethat
Ambassador Sondland had connected “ investigations with an OvalOfficemeeting
for PresidentZelenskyy, which so irritated Ambassador Bolton that he abruptly
ended the meeting, telling Dr. Hill and Mr
. Vindman that they should havenothing
to do with domestic politics. Healso directed Dr. Hill to
the lawyers. Dr.
Hill said that

Bolton referred to this as a " drug deal” after the July 10

meeting. Ambassador Bolton opposed a call between PresidentZelenskyy and
President Trump out ofconcern that it “ would be a disaster.
Needless to say, the Ukrainians in themeetings were confused . Ambassador
Bolton , in the regular Ukraine policy decision -making channel, wanted to talk
about security , energy , and reform ; Ambassador Sondland, a participant in the
irregular channel, wanted to talk about the connection between a White House
meeting and Ukrainian investigations.

Also during our July 19 call, Dr. Hill informed methat Ambassador Volker had
met with Mr. Giuliani to discuss Ukraine . This caught meby surprise. The next
day I asked Ambassador Volker about that meeting , but received no response . I
began to sense that the two decision making channels the regular and irregular
were separate and at odds.
Later on July 19 and in the earlymorningofJuly 20 (Kyiv time), I receivedtext
messageson a three- way WhatsApp textconversation with Ambassadors Volker
and Sondland, a record ofwhich I understandhas already been provided to the

 Committeesby Ambassador Volker. Ambassador Sondland said that a call
between President Trump and PresidentZelenskyy would take place soon .
ost impt is for Zelensky to say thathe
Ambassador Volkersaid that whatwas
there are
willhelp investigation- and addressany specific personnel issues
any "

Later on July 20, I had a phone conversation with Ambassador Sondland while he
was on a train from Paris to London Ambassador Sondland told me that hehad
recommended to President Zelenskyy that heuse the phrase , “ I will leave no stone
unturned with regard to investigations when President Zelenskyy spoke with
President Trump .
Also on July 20, I liad a phone conversation with Mr. Danyliuk, duringwhich he
conveyed to methatPresidentZelenskyy did notwant to be used as a pawn in a
U . . re- election campaign. The nextday I texted both Ambassadors Volker and
Sondland about PresidentZelenskyy s concern.

On July 25, PresidentTrump and PresidentZelenskyy had the long-awaited phone
conversation. Strangely, even though I was ChiefofMission and was scheduled to
meetwith PresidentZelenskyy along with Ambassador Volker the followingday, I
receivedno readoutof the call from the White House. The Ukrainian government
issued a short, cryptic summary.

During a previously planned July 26 meeting , President Zelenskyy told
Ambassador Volker and me that he was happy with the call but did not elaborate .
President Zelenskyy then asked about the face -to - face meeting in the Oval Office
as promised in the May 29 letter from President Trump.
After our meetingwith PresidentZelenskyy, Ambassador Volker and I traveled to
the front line in northern Donbasto receive a briefingfrom the commander of the
forces on the lineof contact. Arriving for the briefingin themilitary headquarters,
the commanderthanked us for securityassistance, butI was aware that this
uncomfortable.
assistancewas on hold , which made

andhostile Russian-led forces on
Ambassador Volker and I could see the
the other side ofthe damaged bridgeacross the lineof contact. Over 13,000
Ukrainianshadbeen killed in thewar, one or two a week . More Ukrainianswould
undoubtedly die withoutthe U .S . assistance.

 Although I spent themorning of July 26 with President Zelenskyy and other
Ukrainian officials, the first summary of the Trump- Zelenskyy callthat I heard
from anybody inside the U . S . government was during a phonecall had with Tim
Morrison, Dr. Hill' s recentreplacement at the NSC, on July 28 . Mr. Morrison told
methat the call " could have been better and that President Trump had suggested
that President Zelenskyy or his staff meet with Mr. Giuliani and Attorney General
William Barr. I did not see any official readout of the call untilitwas publicly
released on September 25 .
OnAugust 16 ,

exchanged textmessages with Ambassador Volker in which I

learned thatMr.
had asked that the United States submit an official request
for an investigation into Burisma' s alleged violations of Ukrainian law , ifthat is
what the United States desired

A formal U . S . request to the Ukrainiansto conduct

an investigation based on violations of their own law struck meas improper, and I
recommended to Ambassador Volker thatwe stay clear.
find out the legal
aspects of the question, however, I gave him the nameof a Deputy Assistant
Attorney General whom I thought would be the proper point of contact for seeking
a U . S . referral for a foreign investigation .

Bymid- August, because the security assistance had been held for over a month for
no reason that I could discern , I was beginning to fear that the longstanding U . S .
policy of strong support for Ukraine was shifting. I called Counselor Brechbuhlto
discuss this on August 21. He said that he was not aware of a change of U . S
policy butwould check on the status of the security assistance. Myconcerns
deepened the nextday, on August 22 , during a phone conversation with Mr.
Morrison. I asked him if there had been a change in policy of strong support for
Ukraine, to which he responded, “ itremains to beseen . Healso told meduring
this call that the President doesn ' t want to provideany assistance at all.” That
was extremely troubling to me. As I had told Secretary Pompeo in May, if the
policy of strong support for Ukraine were to change, I would have to resign. Based
on my callwith Mr. Morrison, I was preparing to do so .

Just days later, on August 27, Ambassador Bolton arrived in Kyiv and met with
President Zelenskyy. During their meeting, security assistance was not
discussed - amazingly , newsofthehold did notleak out untilAugust 29.
on the
other hand, was all too aware of and still troubled by the hold. Near the end of
Ambassador Bolton ' s visit, I asked to meet him privately , during which I
expressed to him myserious concern about the withholding ofmilitary assistance
to Ukraine while theUkrainianswere defending their country from Russian
aggression . Ambassador Bolton recommended that I send a first-person cable to

 Secretary Pompeo directly , relayingmy concerns. I wrote and transmitted such a
in withholdingmilitary aid to
cable on August 29 describing the “ folly
Ukraine at a timewhen hostilitieswere still active in the east and when Russia was
watching closely to gauge the levelof American support for the Ukrainian
government. I told the Secretary that I could not and would not defend such a
policy. Although I received no specific response, I heard thatsoon thereafter, the
Secretary carried the cable with him to a meetingat the White House focused on
security assistance for Ukraine.
The same day that I sentmycable to the Secretary, August 29, Mr. Yermak
contactedme and was very concerned , asking aboutthe withheld security
assistance. The hold that the White House had placed on the assistance had just
been made public that day in a Politico story. At thatpoint, I was embarrassed that
I could give him no explanation for why itwas withheld

Ithad stillnot occurred to methat the hold on security assistance could be related
to the investigations .” That , however , would soon change .
On September 1, just three days after my cable to Secretary Pompeo, President
Zelenskyy met Vice President Pence at a bilateralmeeting in Warsaw . President
had cancelled
Trump had planned to travel to Warsaw but at the last
because of Hurricane Dorian . Just hours before the Pence-Zelenskyy meeting, I
contacted Mr. Danyliuk to let him know that the delay of U . . security assistance
was an " all or nothing” proposition, in the sense that if the White House did not lift
the hold prior to the end of the fiscal year (September 30 ), the funds would expire
and Ukrainewould receive nothing. I washopeful that at the bilateralmeeting or
shortly thereafter, the White House would lift the hold, butthis was notto be
Indeed, I received a readout of the Pence- Zelenskyy meeting over the phone from
Mr
. Morrison, during which he told mePresident Zelenskyy had opened the
meeting by asking the Vice President about security cooperation . The Vice
President did not respond substantively, but said that he would talk to President
Trump that night. The Vice President did say that President Trump wanted the
Europeans to do more to support Ukraine and thathe wanted the Ukrainians to do
more to fight corruption .

During this same phone call had with Mr Morrison , he went on to describe a
conversation Ambassador Sondland had with Mr. Yermak at Warsaw .
security assistance money would
Ambassador Sondland told Mr. Yermak that
not come until President Zelenskyy committed to pursue the Burisma investigation .
I was alarmed by what Mr. Morrison told me about the Sondland -Yermak
10

 conversation . This was the first time I had heard that the security assistance
just the White Housemeeting — was conditioned on the investigations.

not

Very concerned, on that sameday I sent Ambassador Sondland a textmessage
asking if
now sayingthat security assistance and [a ] WH meeting are
conditioned on investigations? Ambassador Sondland responded askingme to
call him , which I did . During that phonecall, Ambassador Sondland told me that
President Trump had told him that hewants PresidentZelenskyy to state publicly
that Ukrainewill investigate Burismaand alleged Ukrainian interference in the
2016 U . S . election.
Ambassador Sondland also told me that he now recognized that he had made a
mistakeby earlier telling the Ukrainian officials to whom he spoke that a White
Housemeeting with PresidentZelenskyy was dependenton a public announcement
of investigations
fact, Ambassador Sondland said , everything
dependent
on such an announcement, including security assistance. Hesaid that President
Trumpwanted PresidentZelenskyy " in a public box” by making a public statement
aboutordering such investigations.
In the same September 1 call, told Ambassador Sondland that President Trump
should have more respect for another head of state and that what he described was
not in the interest of either President Trump or President Zelenskyy . At that point
asked Ambassador Sondland to push back on President Trump s demand.
Ambassador Sondlandpledged to try . We also discussed the possibility that the
Ukrainian Prosecutor General, rather than PresidentZelenskyy , would make a
statement about investigations, potentially in coordination with Attorney General
Barr's probe into the investigation of interference in the 2016 elections.

Thenext day, September 2, Mr. Morrison called to inform methat Mr. Danyliuk
had asked him to come to his hotel room in Warsaw , where Mr. Danyliuk
expressed concern about the possible loss of U .S .
for Ukraine. In
particular, Mr. Morrisonrelayed to me that the inability of any U . S . officials to
respond to the Ukrainians explicit questions aboutsecurity assistance was
troubling them . I was experiencing the sametension in my dealings with the
Ukrainians, including during a meeting I had had with Ukrainian DefenseMinister
Andriy Zagordnyuk that day.
Duringmy call with Mr. Morrison on September 2 , I also briefed Mr. Morrison on
what Ambassador Sondland had told me during our call the day prior.

 On September5 , I hosted Senators Johnson andMurphy for a visit to Kyiv
Duringtheir visit, wemet with PresidentZelenskyy . His first question to the
senators was about the withheld security assistance. Myrecollection of the
meeting is that both senators stressed that bipartisan support for Ukraine in
Washington was Ukraine' s most important strategic asset and that President
Zelenskyy should notjeopardize that bipartisan support by getting drawn into U . S .
domestic politics.

I had been making ( and continue to make this point to all ofmy Ukrainian official
contacts . But the push to make President Zelenskyy publicly commit to
investigations ofBurisma and alleged interference in the 2016 election showed
how the official foreign policy of the United States was undercut by the irregular
efforts led byMr. Giuliani.
Two days later, on September 7, I had a conversation with Mr.Morrison in which
he described a phone conversation earlier that day between Ambassador Sondland
and President Trump. Mr. Morrison said that he had a " sinking feeling after
learning about this conversation from Ambassador Sondland. According to Mr.
Morrison, President Trump told Ambassador Sondland that hewas notasking for a
"
pro quo. But President Trump did insist thatPresidentZelenskyy go to a
microphone and say he is opening investigations of Biden and 2016 election
interference, and that President Zelenskyy should wantto do this himself. Mr.
Morrison said that he told Ambassador Bolton and the NSC lawyers of this phone
and Ambassador Sondland.
callbetween President
The following day, on September 8 , Ambassador Sondland and I spoke on the
phone. He said he had talked to President Trump as I had suggested a week
earlier, but that PresidentTrump was adamant that PresidentZelenskyy, himself,
had to “ clear things up and do it in public .” President Trump said itwas not a
" quid pro quo ." Ambassador Sondland said that he had talked to President
Zelenskyy and Mr. Yermak and told them that, although this was not a quid pro
public, wewould be at a
quo , if PresidentZelenskyy did not clear things up
mean that Ukrainewould not receive
understood a stalemate
stalemate.
the much -needed military assistance . Ambassador Sondland said that this
conversation concluded with PresidentZelenskyy agreeing to make a public
statementin an interview with CNN .

After the call with Ambassador Sondland on September , I expressed my strong
reservations in a textmessage to Ambassador Sondland, stating that my

 nightmare is they the Ukrainians) give the interview and don ' t get the security
assistance. TheRussians love it. (And I quit .). ” I was serious.

Thenextday , I said to Ambassadors Sondland and Volker that " t ]he message to
the Ukrainians ( and Russians) we send with the decision on security assistance is
key. With the hold , wehave already shaken their faith in . " I also said, " think
it s crazy to withhold security assistance forhelp with a political campaign.
Ambassador Sondland responded about five hours later that I was " incorrectabout
President Trump' s intentions. The Presidenthasbeen crystal clear no quid pro
quo s of any kind ."

Before
textmessages, during our call on September 8 , Ambassador Sondland
tried to explain to methat President Trump is a businessman. When a businessman
is about to sign a check to someone who owes him something, he said, the
businessman asks that person to pay up before signing the check . Ambassador
Volker used the saine terms several days later while wewere together at the Yalta
European Strategy Conference. I argued to both that the explanation made no
sense : the Ukrainiansdid not
” President Trump anything, and holding up
security assistance for domestic politicalgain was " crazy, " as I had said in mytext
messageto Ambassadors Sondland and Volker on September 9 .

Finally, I learned on September11that the hold had been lifted and thatthe
security assistancewould be provided.
After I learned thatthe security assistance was released on September 11, I
personally conveyed the newsto President Zelenskyy and ForeignMinister
Prystaiko. And I again reminded Mr. Yermak of the high strategic value of
bipartisan support for Ukraine and the importance of notgetting involved in other
countries' elections. My fear at the time was that since Ambassador Sondland had
told me President Zelenskyy already agreed to do a CNN interview , President
Zelenskyy would make a statement regarding investigations” that would have
played into domestic U . S . politics. I sought to confirm through Mr. Danyliuk that
President Zelenskyy was notplanning to give such an interview to themedia .
While Mr. Danyliuk initially confirmed that on September 12, I noticed during a
meeting on the morning of September 13 at President Zelenskyy' s office thatMr.
Yermak looked uncomfortable in response to the question . Again , I askedMr.
Danyliuk to confirm that there would beno CNN interview , which he did.

 On September 25 at the UN GeneralAssembly session in New York City,
President Trumpmet PresidentZelenskyy face-to - face . Healso released the
transcriptof the July 25 call. The United States gave the Ukrainians virtually no
noticeof the release, and they were livid . Although this was the first time I had
seen the details of President Trump' s July 25 call with PresidentZelenskyy , in
which hementioned Vice PresidentBiden, had come to understand wellbefore
then that “ investigations was a term that Ambassadors Volker and Sondland used
to mean matters related to the 2016 elections, and to investigations of Burismaand
the Bidens

I recognize that this is a rather lengthy recitation ofthe events of the past few
recognize the importance
months told from my vantage point in Kyiv But I
of thematters your Committees are investigating , and I hope that this chronology
will provide some framework for your questions .
. Ukraine is
wish to conclude by returning to the points I madeat the
importantto the security of the United States. Ithas been attacked by Russia ,
which continues its aggression against Ukraine. Ifwe believe in the principle of
sovereignty of nationson which our security and the security of our friends and
allies depends, we must support Ukraine in its fight against its bullyingneighbor.
Russian aggression cannot stand.

There are two Ukraine stories today. The first is the onewe are discussingthis
morningand that you have been hearing for the pasttwo weeks. It is a rancorous
story aboutwhistleblowers, Mr. Giuliani, side channels, quid pro quos, corruption,
and interference in elections. In this story Ukraineis an object.
But there is another Ukraine story a positive, bipartisan one. In this second story,
Ukraine is the subject. This one is about young peoplein a young nation ,
struggling to break free ofits past, hopefulthat their new governinent will finally
in new Ukraine, proud ofits independence from Russia, eager to join
Western institutions and enjoy a moresecure and prosperouslife. This story
describes a nation developing an inclusive, democratic nationalism , not unlike
whatwe in America, in our best moments, feelabout our diverse country - less
concerned about what languagewe speak , what religion if any wepractice, where
ourparents and grandparents came from ; more concerned about buildinga new
country

 Because of the strategic importance ofUkraine in our effort to create a whole, free
Europe, we, throughRepublican and Democratic administrationsover three
decades, have supported Ukraine. Congress has been generous over the years with
assistance funding, both civilian and military, and political support. With
overwhelming bipartisan majorities, Congress has supported Ukraine with harsh
sanctions on Russia for invading and occupying Ukraine. Wecan be proud of that
support and that we have stood up to a dictator' s aggression against a democratic
neighbor
It is this second story that I would like to leave you with today .

And I am glad to answer your questions.