DOCUMENT 39
ELECTRONICALLY FILED
10/22/2019 11:39 AM
44-CC-2019-000476.00
CIRCUIT COURT OF
LIMESTONE COUNTY, ALABAMA
BRAD CURNUTT, CLERK

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF LIMESTONE COUNTY, ALABAMA
STATE OF ALABAMA,
PLAINTIFF,
vs.

CASE NO. CC19-476

BLAKELY, MICHAEL ANTHONY,
DEFENDANT.
MOTION TO DECLARE THE ALABAMA ETHICS ACT UNCONSTITUTIONAL AND
TO DISMISS THE INDICTMENT
Comes now the Defendant by and through counsel and hereby moves this Honorable
Court to declare the Alabama Ethics Act , §36-25-1 et seq. (“the Ethics Act”), unconstitutional
and unconstitutional in its application in this case, and to dismiss the indictment. As grounds the
Defendant states as follows:
1. The Ethics Act is unconstitutionally vague as charged in the indictment. The sections of the
Ethics Act charged in the indictment, and therefore the indictment itself, are void for vagueness.
In United States v. Wilson,553 U.S. 285, 304 (2008), the United States Supreme Curt noted that
“a conviction fails to comport with due process if the statute under which it is obtained fails to
provide a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice of what is prohibited, or is so standard that it
authorizes or encourages seriously discriminatory enforcement.
2. The Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals recently collected the fundamental principles of
vagueness as follows:
*
“The doctrine of vagueness . . . originates in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, see Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 59 S.Ct. 618, 83 L.Ed. 888(1939), and is
the basis fro striking down legislation which contains insufficient warning of what conduct is
unlawful, . . . “
*
“Void for vagueness simply means that criminal responsibility should not attach where one could
not reasonably understand that his contemplated conduct is proscribed. United States v. Harris,
347 U.S. 612, 617, 74 S.Ct. 808, 811, 98 L.Ed. 989, 996 (1954).”

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*
”A vague statute does not give adequate ‘notice of the required conduct to one who would avoid
its penalties,’ Boyce Motor Lines v. United States, 342 U.S. 337, 340, 72 S.Ct. 329, 330, 96
L.Ed. 367 (1952), is not ‘sufficiently focused to forewarn of both its reach and coverage’ United
States v. National Dairy Products Corporation, 372 U.S. at 33, 83 S. St. at 598, 9L.Ed. 2d at 566,
and ‘may trap the innocent by not providing a fair warning,’ Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408
U.S. 104, 108, 92 S. Ct. 2294, 2298, 33 L. Ed.2d 222, 227-28 (1972).”
*
“There must be ascertainable standards of guilt. Men of common intelligence cannot be required
to guess at the meaning of the enactment. The vagueness may be from uncertainty in regard to
persons within the scope of the act, or in regard to the applicable tests ascertain guilt.” Winters
v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 515-516 (1948).
*
“As generally stated, the void-for-vagfueness doctrine requires that a penal statute define the
criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is
prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory
enforcement.”Kolendar v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357, 103 S.Ct. 1855, 75 L.Ed. 2d 903 (1983).
A statute challenged of vagueness must therefore be scrutinized to determine whether it
provides both fair notice to the public that certain conduct is proscribed and minimal guidelines
to aid officials in the enforcement of that proscription. See Kolender, supra; Grayned v. City of
Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 92 S.Ct. 2294, 33 L.Ed. 2d 222 (1972).
State v. Baker, No. CR-13-0142, WL 6608394 (Ala. Crim. App. Nov. 21, 2014).

3. The Rule of Lenity mandates that the Ethics Act be strictly construed in favor of a defendant.
According to the United States Supreme Court, “The rule of lenity requires interpreters to
resolve ambiguity in criminal laws in favor of defendants.” Whitman v. United States, 135 S. Ct.
352 (2014). “Deferring to the prosecuting branch’s expansive views of these statutes ‘would turn
[their] normal construction . . . upside down, replacing the doctrine of lenity with a doctrine of
severity.’” Id at 353 (quoting Crandon v. United States, 494 U.S. 152 (1990) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in judgment)). [I]t is well established that criminal statutes should not be ‘extended
by construction’” Ex part Mutrie, 658 So.2d 347 (Ala.1993) (quoting Ex parterres, 434 So.2d
813 (Ala. 1983), quoting in turn Locklear v. State, 282 So.2d 116 (A;a. Crim. App. 1973)). the
basic rule when reviewing criminal cases is that the statutes are to be strictly construed in favor
of those persons sought to be subject to their operations: the defendants. Schooner v. State, 90
So.2d 234 cert. denied, 90 So.2d 238 (Ala. Ct. App. 1956). “No person is to be made subject to
penal statutes by implication and all doubts concerning their interpretation are to predominate in
favor of the accused.” Fuller v. State, 60 So.2d 202 (Ala. 1952) (quoting Scott v. State, 44 So.
544 (A;a. 1907). The fundamental rule is that criminal statutes must be strictly construed in
favor of the accused. Ex part Jackson, 614, So.2d 405, 406 (Ala. 1993). A person can not be

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subjected to penalty unless the words of the statute plainly impose that penalty. Keppel v. Tiffin
Savings Bank, 197 U.S. 356, 362 (1905). In determining the proper application of a statute, the
Court has a duty to “ascertain and effectuate legislative intent expressed in the statute, which
may be gleaned from language used, the reason and necessity for the act, and the purpose sought
to be obtained.” Hunt v. State, 642 So.2d 1060 (Ala.Crim. App. 1993) aff'd sub nom. Ex part
Hunt, 642 So.2d 1060 (Ala. 1994) (quoting Ex part Holliday, 466 So. 2d 956, 960 (Ala.1985));
see also Rutledge v. State, 745 So.2d 912 (Ala. Crime. App. 1999). “Words used in the statute
must be given their natural, plain, ordinary and commonly understood meaning.” Alabama Farm
bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v.City of Hartselle, 460 So.2d 1219, 1213 (Ala. 1984).
4. The general rule of construction for the provision of the Alabama Code is found in Ala. Code
§ 13A-1-6 which clearly states that: “All provisions of this title shall be construed according to
the fair import of their terms to promote justice and to effect the objects of the law, including the
purposes stated in § 13A-1-3.” Among the purposes stated in §13A-1-3, subsection (2) requires
the State: “To give fair warning of the nature of the conduct processed.” the Ethics Commission
has agreed with the purpose of construing criminal laws: “In order to prohibit activity, it must be
clearly spelled out so that the affected individuals can easily understand what is and is not
prohibited.” emphasis added. Ethics Commission Advisory Opinion No. 2011-09 at 8.
5. The Ethics Act, As charged, is unconstitutionally over broad. The sections of the Ethics Act
charged in the indictment, and therefore the indictment itself, are unconstitutionally overlord in
that relevant portions of the Ethics Act Prohibit constitutionally protected conduct. “A cleat and
precise enactment may nonetheless be ‘over broad’ if in its reach it prohibits constitutionally
protected conduct . . . Because overlord laws, like vague ones, deter privileged activity, our cases
firmly establish appellant’s standing to raise an over broad challenge. The crucial question, then,
is whether the ordinance sews within its prohibitions that what may not be punished under the
First and Fourteenth Amendments.” Grained v. city of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 114-115 (1972).
6. An over broad statute is one that is designed to burden or punish activities that are not
constitutionally protected, but which also includes within its scope activities that are protected. 3
Rotunda, Nowak, Young, Treatise on Constitutional Law, Substance and Procedure,§20.8 (1986);
NCAA v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 432, 83 S. Ct. 328, 337, 9 L.Ed. 2d 405(1963). However, the
over breadth of a statute must be not only real, but substantial as well, judged in relationship to
the statute’s plainly legitimate sweep. Broad wick v. Oklahoma, 413, U.S. 601, 615, 93 S. Ct.
2908. 2917, 37 L.Ed. 2d 830 (1973).
7. A statute is void for vagueness when its prohibition is so vague as to include protected
conduct or as to leave an individual without knowledge as to the nature of conduct that is
prohibited. See Kolenderv. Lawson, 461, U.S. 352, 103 S. Ct. 1855, 75 L.Ed. 2d 405 (1963);
NAACP v. button, 371, U.S. 415, 432,433, *3 L.Ed.2d 405(1963; Rotunda, Nowak, Young,
Treatise on Constitutional Lae Substance and Procedure, §20.9 (1986). Clear guidelines must
exist regarding what is illegal so that there will be no “chilling effect” on the exercise of
protected actions.

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8. In the indictment, sub judice, the Defendant is charged in counts 7, 8, 10, 12 and 13 with
using his official position or office for personal gain in violation of §36-25-5(a). No where in the
statute does it specify what conduct is prohibited. Nor does it specifically explain the term
“using” or “personal gain”.
9. The Defendant is charged in count 11 of the indictment with soliciting a thing of value from a
subordinate in violation of §36-25-(e). Likewise, this statute does not specifically explain what
conducts are prohibited and leaves it to a best guess as to what "solicitation” and “thing of value”
mean.
10. The Defendant concedes that in similar cases, Alabama appellate courts have upheld the
Alabama Ethics Act. However, identical issues are before the Alabama Supreme Court in
Hubbard v. State, CC14-565 and CR-16-0012 from the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals.
Wherefore, the Defendant respectfully moves this Honorable Court to declare the
Alabama Ethics Act §35-5-1 et seq. unconstitutionally vague on its face and unconstitutionally
broad in its application to this Defendant.
Respectfully submitted this the 22nd day of October, 2019.

/s/ Robert B. Tuten

/s/ Marcus Helstowski

ROBERT B. TUTEN (TUT002)
ASB # asb-4036-e56r
Attorney for Defendant
TUTEN LAW OFFICES
256-536-6009

MARCUS HELSTOWSKI
Co-Attorney for Defendant
223 Eastside Square
Huntsville, Alabama 35801
256-534-3018

Alafilerbt@tutenlaw.com

mhelstowski@yahoo.com

Of Council:
Mark McDaniel
McDaniel and McDaniel, LLC
223 Eastside Sq
Huntsville, AL 35801
256-534-3018

 DOCUMENT 39

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
This document has been filed electronically and served upon opposing counsel pursuant
to the Administrative Procedure for Filing Signing and Verifying Documents by Electronic
Means in the Alabama Judicial System. For any opposing counsel or unrepresented parties who
are not registered to file electronically, a copy of this pleading shall be served via the U.S. mail,
postage pre-paid, to the litigant’s address as maintained in the office of the Circuit Clerk.
Done this 22nd day of October, 2019.

/s/ Robert B. Tuten
ROBERT B. TUTEN