In the Supreme Court of Georgia

Decided: October 21, 2019
S18G1546. MOBLEY v. THE STATE.
BLACKWELL, Justice.
After he was tried and convicted of two vehicular homicides,
Victor Mobley appealed, claiming that the trial court erred when it
denied his pretrial motion to suppress evidence of data that law
enforcement officers retrieved without a warrant from an electronic
data recording device on his vehicle. In denying the motion to
suppress, the trial court had concluded that, whether or not the
retrieval of the data was an unlawful search and seizure, the
evidence was admissible in any event under the inevitable discovery
doctrine. In Mobley v. State, 346 Ga. App. 641 (816 SE2d 769)
(2018), a three-judge panel of the Court of Appeals affirmed, one
judge reasoning that the retrieval of data was not a search and
seizure at all, and two judges agreeing with the trial court that the

 inevitable discovery doctrine applied. We issued a writ of certiorari
to review the decision of the Court of Appeals, and for the reasons
that follow, we conclude that the trial court erred when it denied the
motion to suppress. The judgment of the Court of Appeals, therefore,
is reversed.
1. On the afternoon of December 15, 2014, Mobley was driving
a 2014 Dodge Charger on Flippen Road in Henry County. A 1999
Chevrolet Corvette pulled onto Flippen Road from a private
driveway, and the Charger collided with it. Mobley survived the
crash, but the two occupants of the Corvette did not. At first, the law
enforcement officers who responded to the scene of the collision
found no indication that Mobley had been driving too fast. Indeed,
based on their preliminary assessment of the scene and their initial
discussions with witnesses, the officers thought it likely that the
driver of the Corvette had caused the collision simply by driving into
the path of the Charger.
But before the vehicles were removed from the scene of the
collision, Sergeant David Gagnon—a supervisor in the Traffic
2

 Division of the Henry County Police Department—directed officers
to retrieve any available data from the airbag control modules
(ACM) on the Charger and Corvette.1 Investigator Jason Hatcher
entered the passenger compartments of both vehicles, attached a
crash data retrieval (CDR) device to data ports in the cars, and used
the CDR to download data from the ACMs. The data retrieved from
the Charger indicated that, moments before the collision, Mobley
was driving nearly 100 miles per hour. The officers subsequently

The record shows that an ACM, also known as an “event data recorder”
or “electronic control module,” is an onboard electronic data recording device
that is designed to preserve certain data about the operation of a vehicle in the
moments preceding certain occurrences, including any event that results in the
deployment of airbags. Although the precise data preserved varies from vehicle
to vehicle, the data retrieved from the Charger in this case included the speed
of the vehicle, the status of the brakes, the status of the brake switch, the time
from maximum deceleration to impact, the time from impact to airbag
deployment, the speed of the engine, the throttle position, the number of
crankshaft revolutions per minute, the status of the driver’s seatbelt, and a
diagnostic indicator about the functioning of the ACM.
The record in this case also shows that the data recorded by an ACM
upon the happening of some occurrences subsequently may be overwritten, but
the data is permanently recorded—and cannot be overwritten—when the
precipitating event is an airbag deployment. The collision on December 15,
2014, resulted in the deployment of airbags in both the Charger and the
Corvette.
1

3

 cleared the scene and had the Charger and Corvette both towed to
an impound lot for further investigation.
The next day, Investigator Bryan Thornton joined the team of
officers investigating the collision. 2 He discussed the case with the
officers who had responded to the crash, visited and personally
inspected the scene of the collision, and then applied for a warrant
to search the Charger and Corvette and to physically remove and
seize the ACMs from both vehicles. When Investigator Thornton
made his application for a warrant, he was aware that Investigator
Hatcher already had retrieved the data from the ACMs and that the
data indicated that the Charger had been traveling at an excessive
rate of speed.3 His application, however, did not rely on the data to

2

Investigator Thornton was off duty on the day of the collision.

At the hearing on the motion to suppress, Investigator Thornton
testified that he was aware that data already had been retrieved at the scene
of the collision. And although he did not testify explicitly about his knowledge
of the substance of that data at the time he applied for a warrant, he said that
the data was the basis for the conclusion that Mobley committed vehicular
homicide in the first degree (as opposed to some lesser offense or no offense at
all). In the warrant application, Investigator Thornton represented that the
ACMs likely contained evidence of vehicular homicide in the first degree. His
testimony at the hearing implies, therefore, that he had a meaningful
3

4

 establish probable cause for the seizure of the ACMs. A magistrate
issued the warrant, officers executed the warrant at the impound
lot, and the ACMs were removed from both vehicles. It appears,
however, that no additional data was retrieved from the ACMs
subsequent to the execution of the warrant. 4
In June 2015, a Henry County grand jury indicted Mobley,
charging him with two counts of vehicular homicide in the first
degree, reckless driving, and speeding. Mobley later filed a motion
pursuant to OCGA § 17-5-30 to suppress the evidence of the data
retrieved without a warrant from the ACM in his Charger, alleging
that the retrieval of data was an unreasonable search and seizure
forbidden by the Fourth Amendment. 5 The trial court held an

awareness of the substance of the data when he made the warrant application.
The warrant authorized the seizure of the ACMs but did not explicitly
authorize any retrieval of data from the ACMs.
4

Mobley also alleged that the retrieval of data was an unlawful search
and seizure under Article I, Section I, Paragraph XIII of the Georgia
Constitution of 1983. There are cases suggesting, however, that Paragraph
XIII is coextensive with the Fourth Amendment and provides no greater
protection against unreasonable searches and seizures. See, e.g., Wells v.
State, 180 Ga. App. 133, 134 (2) (348 SE2d 681) (1986). Whether or not those
5

5

 evidentiary hearing on the motion in June 2017, and at that hearing,
the prosecuting attorney presented the testimony of Sergeant
Gagnon, Investigator Hatcher, and Investigator Thornton.
Following the presentation of evidence, the prosecuting
attorney argued that the motion to suppress should be denied for
several reasons. More specifically, she argued that:
• Mobley had no reasonable expectation of privacy with respect
to the data, and for that reason, the retrieval of that data was
not a search and seizure for purposes of the Fourth
Amendment;
• Even if the retrieval of the data was a search and seizure, a
warrant was unnecessary because the search was directed to
an automobile;
• Exigent circumstances—namely, the possibility that the data
could be lost or corrupted when the vehicles were towed away
from the scene—permitted a warrantless search;
• Investigator Hatcher retrieved the data without a warrant in
good faith reliance on his understanding that no warrant is
cases are right, see Elliott v. State, 305 Ga. 179, 187-188 (II) (C) (824 SE2d
265) (2019), Mobley has made no argument based on constitutional text,
context, or history that Paragraph XIII offers greater protection than the
Fourth Amendment. Cf. Grady v. Unified Gov’t of Athens-Clarke County, 289
Ga. 726, 731 n.3 (2) (b) (715 SE2d 148) (2011). Accordingly, for the purposes of
this opinion, we will treat Paragraph XIII and the Fourth Amendment as
coextensive, and for the sake of simplicity, we will refer only to the Fourth
Amendment as the basis for the motion to suppress.
6

 required to retrieve data from an ACM at the scene of a serious
crash; and
• The subsequent issuance of a warrant to seize the ACMs made
the discovery of the data inevitable.
On the day after the hearing, the trial court entered an order
denying the motion to suppress. Without deciding whether the
retrieval of data at the scene of the collision was a search and seizure
that ordinarily would require a warrant, and without determining
whether any established exception to the warrant requirement
applied, the trial court concluded that the subsequent issuance of a
warrant to seize the ACMs rendered the evidence admissible under
the inevitable discovery exception to the exclusionary rule:
The Court finds that it does not have to reach the decision
on the appropriateness of the actions of the officers on the
scene because a search warrant was obtained the next
day. [Investigator] Thornton testified that he always
seeks such a warrant in accidents involving fatalities. A
review of the warrant application and supporting
affidavit shows that neither the application nor the
affidavit relied upon information obtained from the onthe-scene download. The Court finds that the data
contained in the ACM would have certainly been
available to law enforcement when the ACMs were
properly removed from the vehicles pursuant to the
7

 search warrant[], and thus would have inevitably been
discovered by investigators.
Mobley then stipulated to the relevant facts for purposes of a bench
trial, and the trial court found him guilty on all counts. He was
sentenced to concurrent terms of 15 years—with 7 years to be served
in prison, followed by 8 years on probation—on two counts of
vehicular homicide in the first degree.6
Mobley appealed, challenging the denial of his motion to
suppress. The Court of Appeals issued a split panel decision,
rejecting the claim that the trial court erred when it denied the
motion and affirming the judgment of conviction. Judge Mercier
wrote the lead opinion, although she wrote only for herself. Judge
Mercier concluded that the trial court properly denied the motion to
suppress because the data retrieved from the ACM in the Charger
was not of a sort in which Mobley could have a reasonable
expectation of privacy. See Mobley, 346 Ga. App. at 646 (1). Noting
that the data simply reflected the operation and movements of the
The trial court merged the reckless driving and speeding with the
vehicular homicides.
6

8

 Charger in the moments immediately preceding the collision, Judge
Mercier explained that “[a] person traveling in an automobile on
public thoroughfares has no reasonable expectation of privacy in his
movements from one place to another.” Id. at 645 (1) (citation and
punctuation omitted). Although Judge Mercier conceded that “an
outside observer cannot ascertain the information regarding the use
and functioning of a vehicle with the same level of precision as that
captured by the ACM,” she said that most of the information that
could be gleaned from the data was, in fact, ascertainable by any
observer, albeit with less precision:
For example, a member of the public can observe a
vehicle’s approximate speed; observe whether a vehicle’s
brakes are being employed by seeing the vehicle slow
down or stop or the brake lights come on, [or] by hearing
the sounds of sudden braking; and observe whether the
driver is wearing a seatbelt. There is no reasonable
expectation of privacy in such information because an
individual knowingly exposes such information to the
public.

9

 Id. at 646 (1).7 Because Mobley had no reasonable expectation of
privacy in the data, Judge Mercier concluded, its retrieval at the
scene of the collision did not amount to a search and seizure and did
not, therefore, implicate the Fourth Amendment. See id. at 644 (1).
Then-Chief Judge Dillard and Presiding Judge Doyle wrote
separately, both resting their concurrences on the inevitable
discovery exception to the exclusionary rule. Judge Dillard focused
on the testimony of the officers at the hearing on the motion to
suppress about the usual course of investigation in cases involving
a fatality accident. Specifically, Judge Dillard pointed to evidence
that the retrieval of data from ACMs is routine in such
investigations, as well as the testimony of Investigator Thornton

Judge Mercier distinguished the data retrieved from the ACM in this
case from the data routinely stored on cell phones, Global Positioning Satellite
(GPS) location data, and data reflecting vehicular operations and movements
over much more substantial periods of time. See 346 Ga. App. at 646-647 (1).
She acknowledged that obtaining those other sorts of data would or could
implicate the Fourth Amendment, and she urged “law enforcement officers
faced with an investigative need to obtain data from a vehicle’s ACM to err on
the side of caution by obtaining a search warrant before retrieving that
information.” Id. at 647 (1).
7

10

 that, if data had not been retrieved from the ACM at the scene, he
would have sought a warrant and obtained the same data later. See
id. at 648-649 (Dillard, C.J., concurring specially). 8 Judge Doyle
focused more on the warrant that was issued on the day following
the collision, reasoning that it was obtained in the ordinary course
of investigation, it did not rest on any information gleaned from the
data retrieved without a warrant, and the data “inevitably would
have been available to police pursuant to the warrant they later
lawfully obtained.” Id. at 652 (Doyle, P.J., concurring specially).
Mobley then filed a petition for a writ of certiorari. We granted
his petition not only to consider the alternative grounds upon which
the judges below concluded that the motion to suppress properly was
denied, but also to decide whether OCGA § 17-5-30 categorically
Judge Dillard correctly noted—as we will discuss shortly—that
whether the retrieval of the data amounted to a search and seizure is not
resolved simply by the conclusion that Mobley had no expectation of privacy in
the data, inasmuch as a trespass upon private property may implicate the
Fourth Amendment irrespective of reasonable expectations of privacy. See
Mobley, 346 Ga. App. at 650 (Dillard, C.J., concurring specially). And although
Judge Dillard did not attempt to definitively decide whether the retrieval of
data in this case was a search and seizure, he—like Judge Mercier, see note 7
supra—urged officers in an abundance of caution to obtain warrants to retrieve
ACM data. See id. at 651.
8

11

 precludes the application of the inevitable discovery doctrine—or
any other exception to the exclusionary rule—in Georgia. We now
proceed to consider these issues in turn, addressing whether the
retrieval of data from the ACM on the Charger was a search and
seizure that implicates the Fourth Amendment; if so, whether the
retrieval of the data without a warrant was an unreasonable search
and seizure forbidden by the Fourth Amendment; if so, whether
OCGA § 17-5-30 forecloses consideration of any exception to the
exclusionary rule; and if not, whether the inevitable discovery
doctrine is applicable on the facts before us. Along the way, we also
will consider whether any of the other grounds that the State urged
in the trial court for denying the motion to suppress, but upon which
none of the judges below relied, require a remand for further
proceedings in the trial court.
2. To begin, we consider whether the retrieval of data from the
ACM of the Charger at the scene of the collision was a search and
seizure that implicates the Fourth Amendment. In pertinent part,
the Fourth Amendment provides that “[t]he right of the people to be
12

 secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated.” U.S.
Const. amend. IV. The State argued in the trial court and the Court
of Appeals that the retrieval of data was not a search and seizure at
all because Mobley had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the
data. Although the trial court did not decide that question, Judge
Mercier agreed that Mobley had no reasonable expectation of
privacy in the data, and she concluded as a result that the motion to
suppress properly was denied. In this Court, however, the State
concedes that its argument below was based on a faulty premise.
The State is right to make that concession.
For much of our history, the Fourth Amendment was
understood to be concerned only with government trespasses upon
the rights of individuals under the common law to be secure in their
“persons, houses, papers, and effects.” See United States v. Jones,
565 U.S. 400, 406 (II) (A) (132 SCt 945, 181 LE2d 911) (2012). See
also Carpenter v. United States, 585 U.S. ___ (II) (A) (138 SCt 2206,
201 LE2d 507) (2018). Accordingly, to determine whether a
13

 government act amounted to a search, American courts traditionally
asked whether the act was to “obtain[] information by physically
intruding on a constitutionally protected area.” Jones, 565 U.S. at
406 n.3 (II) (A). But “[m]ore recently, the [United States Supreme]
Court has recognized that property rights are not the sole measure
of Fourth Amendment violations.” Carpenter, 585 U.S. at ___ (II) (A)
(citation and punctuation omitted). Beginning in Katz v. United
States, 389 U.S. 347 (88 SCt 507, 19 LE2d 576) (1967), the Supreme
Court has held in a number of cases that government intrusion into
a private sphere marked by a “reasonable expectation of privacy”
generally qualifies as a search and, therefore, implicates the Fourth
Amendment, irrespective of whether the intrusion amounts to a
trespass upon private rights under the common law. See Carpenter,
585 U.S. at ___ (II) (A). See also Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735,
739 (II) (A) (99 SCt 2577, 61 LE2d 220) (1979); Katz, 389 U.S. at
360-361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
In this case, the State pressed an argument in the trial court
and Court of Appeals premised on the misguided notion that
14

 “reasonable expectations of privacy” have supplanted private rights
under the common law as the sole standard by which we determine
whether a government act amounts to a search. But as the United
States Supreme Court has made perfectly clear, “the Katz
reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test has been added to, not
substituted for, the common-law trespassory test.” Jones, 565 U.S.
at 409 (II) (A) (emphasis in original). See also id. at 414 (Sotomayor,
J., concurring) (“Katz’s reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test
augmented, but did not displace or diminish, the common-law
trespassory test that preceded it.”). If either standard is satisfied,
the government act in question generally will amount to a search
that implicates the Fourth Amendment. See id. at 409 (II) (A).
Although Mobley disputes the idea that he had no reasonable
expectation of privacy in the data retrieved from the ACM on the
Charger, we find it unnecessary to resolve that question. 9 To retrieve

Even so, we note that it strikes us as a close question. As Judge Mercier
acknowledged in her opinion below, although an observer independently could
ascertain some of the information that readily can be gleaned from the data
recorded on the ACM, an ordinary observer would not be able to ascertain all
9

15

 the data, Investigator Hatcher entered the passenger compartment
of the Charger and connected a CDR device with the ACM by way of
an onboard data port. A personal motor vehicle is plainly among the
“effects” with which the Fourth Amendment—as it historically was
understood—is concerned, see United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S.
1, 12 (4) (97 SCt 2476, 53 LE2d 538) (1977), and a physical intrusion
into a personal motor vehicle for the purpose of obtaining
information for a law enforcement investigation generally is a
search for purposes of the Fourth Amendment under the traditional
common law trespass standard. See Jones, 565 U.S. at 404 (II) (A)
(installation of tracking device on private vehicle and subsequent

of that information, much less with anything approaching the precision
reflected in the ACM data.
We also note that an ACM often will not be the only electronic data
storage device on a vehicle, and the record does not disclose whether other
devices sometimes may be integrated with ACMs or whether the same data
ports used to access ACMs also can be used to access other devices. To the
extent that other devices contain, for instance, Global Positioning Satellite
(GPS) location data or data shared between an onboard device and a cellular
telephone, accessing data through an onboard data port may implicate the
Fourth Amendment, regardless of whether anyone has a reasonable
expectation of privacy in ACM data alone, and even in the absence of a trespass
under the common law. See, e.g., Carpenter, 585 U.S. at ___ (III) (obtaining
seven days of cell phone location data from wireless carrier is a search).
16

 use of device to monitor vehicle movements is a search). See also
Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 5 (II) (133 SCt 1409, 185 LE2d 495)
(2013). The retrieval of data without a warrant at the scene of the
collision was a search and seizure that implicates the Fourth
Amendment, regardless of any reasonable expectations of privacy.
3. We next consider whether the retrieval of data was an
unreasonable search and seizure forbidden by the Fourth
Amendment, and we conclude that it was. The Fourth Amendment
evinces a “strong preference for searches conducted pursuant to a
warrant.” Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 236 (III) (103 SCt 2317, 76
LE2d 527) (1983). Indeed, the constitutional preference for warrants
is so strong that searches and seizures without a warrant “are per
se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment—subject only to a
few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.” State v.
Slaughter, 252 Ga. 435, 436 (315 SE2d 865) (1984) (citation and
punctuation omitted). See also Davis v. State, 262 Ga. 578, 580 (1)
(422 SE2d 546) (1992). Here, Investigator Hatcher retrieved the
data from the ACM on the Charger at the scene of the collision
17

 without a warrant, and the State has failed to identify any
recognized exception to the warrant requirement that is applicable
to the facts that are established in the record. 10 Accordingly, the
In the trial court, the State argued two exceptions to the warrant
requirement—the “automobile” exception and the “exigent circumstances”
exception. It is quite clear, however, that the State failed to adduce evidence
at the hearing on the motion to suppress sufficient to establish the predicates
for application of either of those exceptions. The State bears the burden to show
an exception to the warrant requirement, see Kennebrew v. State, 304 Ga. 406,
409 (1) (819 SE2d 37) (2018), and the record in this case forecloses both
exceptions as a matter of law.
The automobile exception is inapplicable because the evidence is
undisputed that, at the time Investigator Hatcher retrieved the data from the
crashed Charger, the Charger not only was already in the custody and control
of law enforcement officers but, more importantly, was not operable. See
United States v. Delva, 922 F3d 1228, 1243 (IV) (A) (11th Cir. 2019)
(automobile exception applies only when vehicle in question is “readily
mobile”). See also State v. LeJeune, 276 Ga. 179, 182 (2) (576 SE2d 888) (2003)
(automobile exception did not apply where suspect and his cohort did not have
access to vehicle and officers impounded vehicle and had it towed away).
As for the exigent circumstances exception, the State argued that an
immediate retrieval of data at the scene was necessary because of an imminent
danger that the data would be lost or damaged. The evidence at the hearing on
the motion to suppress, however, fails to establish any real exigency. There
was no evidence that mere delay alone—the time it might take, for instance,
to procure a warrant—would have caused the loss or corruption of any data.
And although the officers said there was a danger of data corruption if the
vehicle were removed from the scene, they clarified that the danger to which
they referred was the risk that some data on the ACM could be overwritten
with subsequent ignition starts—although the data concerning the crash in
this case would not be overwritten, see note 1 supra—as well as a risk that the
ACM itself could be damaged when removed from the vehicle. Consequently,
there also was no evidence in this case that towing the vehicle from the scene
would present a meaningful risk that the data pertaining to this crash would
be lost or corrupted. See Davis, 262 Ga. at 583 (3) (prospective loss of evidence
10

18

 retrieval of data from the ACM in the Charger at the scene of the
crash without a warrant was an unreasonable search and seizure
that violated the Fourth Amendment.
4. We turn now to the remedy for this violation of the Fourth
Amendment. In a long line of decisions beginning with Weeks v.
United States, 232 U.S. 383 (34 SCt 341, 58 LE 652) (1914), the
United States Supreme Court has developed and refined an
exclusionary rule as the federal constitutional remedy for Fourth
Amendment violations. Although applicable at first only in federal
courts, this exclusionary rule was made applicable in criminal

is exigent circumstance only if there is threat that evidence will be destroyed
if search is not commenced right away). See also Crocker v. Beatty, 886 F3d
1132, 1136 (III) (A) (11th Cir. 2018) (exigent circumstances exception applies
when there is danger of “imminent destruction of evidence,” such that “a
reasonable, experienced agent . . . believe[s] that [the] evidence might be
destroyed before a warrant could be secured”).
We recognize that neither the trial court nor the Court of Appeals opined
on the applicability of these exceptions. But because the evidence presented at
the hearing on the motion to suppress forecloses both exceptions as a matter
of law, there is no reason for us to remand for consideration of these exceptions.
We caution, however, that these exceptions perhaps could apply to the retrieval
of ACM data at the scene of an accident in a case with different facts and a
different record. Our decision today is based on the record before us.
19

 proceedings in the state courts by the decision in Mapp v. Ohio, 367
U.S. 643 (81 SCt 1684, 6 LE2d 1081) (1961).
“When evidence is obtained in violation of the Fourth
Amendment, the judicially developed exclusionary rule usually
precludes its use in a criminal proceeding against the victim of the
illegal search and seizure.” Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 347 (II)
(A) (107 SCt 1160, 94 LE2d 364) (1987) (citations omitted). “The
purpose of the exclusionary rule is not to redress the injury to the
privacy of the search victim,” however, but instead “to deter future
unlawful police conduct and thereby effectuate the guarantee of the
Fourth Amendment against unreasonable searches and seizures.”
United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 347 (III) (94 SCt 613, 38
LE2d

561)

(1974).

Consequently,

the

judicially

developed

exclusionary rule has been limited to “those situations in which its
remedial purpose is effectively achieved,” Krull, 480 U.S. at 347 (II)
(A), and the courts have identified a number of exceptions to the
usual rule of exclusion. At the urging of the State, the trial court and
two judges of the Court of Appeals concluded that one such
20

 exception—the inevitable discovery exception—applies here and
would allow the admission into evidence of the data retrieved from
the Charger at the scene of the collision, even if its retrieval violated
the Fourth Amendment. Mobley says that this conclusion was error.
(a) Before we address whether the judges below were right to
conclude that the inevitable discovery exception applies on the facts
of this case, we must consider a threshold question. Mobley contends
that OCGA § 17-5-30 is a statutory exclusionary rule that—unlike
its federal counterpart, which developed and has been refined
judicially—admits of no exceptions. According to Mobley, OCGA §
17-5-30 categorically precludes the recognition in Georgia of any
exception to the exclusionary rule, and in support of this argument,
he relies principally on our decision in Gary v. State, 262 Ga. 573
(422 SE2d 426) (1992). And because the inevitable discovery
exception is not cognizable in Georgia, Mobley says, we need not
decide whether the facts of this case fit within the exception. For the
reasons that follow, we are unpersuaded.

21

 As we have explained before, “[w]hen we consider the meaning
of a statute, we must presume that the General Assembly meant
what it said and said what it meant.” Deal v. Coleman, 294 Ga. 170,
172 (1) (a) (751 SE2d 337) (2013) (citation and punctuation omitted).
“To that end, we must afford the statutory text its plain and ordinary
meaning, we must view the statutory text in the context in which it
appears, and we must read the statutory text in its most natural and
reasonable way, as an ordinary speaker of the English language
would.” Id. at 172-173 (1) (a) (citations and punctuation omitted).
“The common and customary usages of the words are important, but
so is their context.” Zaldivar v. Prickett, 297 Ga. 589, 591 (1) (774
SE2d 688) (2015) (citation and punctuation omitted). “For context,
we may look to other provisions of the same statute, the structure
and history of the whole statute, and the other law—constitutional,
statutory, and common law alike—that forms the legal background
of the statutory provision in question.” May v. State, 295 Ga. 388,
391-392 (761 SE2d 38) (2014) (citations omitted). Our consideration

22

 of OCGA § 17-5-30 begins with a brief discussion of the legal context
in which the statute was adopted.
Before Mapp, there was no exclusionary rule in Georgia courts
for unlawful searches and seizures. As early as 1897, this Court
squarely rejected an exclusionary rule as a matter of state law in
Williams v. State, 100 Ga. 511, 521 (28 SE 624) (1897), a decision
that we reaffirmed in Calhoun v. State, 144 Ga. 679, 682 (87 SE 893)
(1916). Although Georgia law provided other remedies for unlawful
searches and seizures, the exclusion of evidence in criminal
proceedings was not among them.11 After Mapp was decided, the
Georgia courts promptly acknowledged the federal exclusionary
rule. See, e.g., Raif v. State, 109 Ga. App. 354, 361 (1) (136 SE2d
169) (1964). Our laws of criminal procedure, however, were not
designed to facilitate the application of such a rule. In particular,

See, e.g., Shafer v. State, 193 Ga. 748, 755 (2) (20 SE2d 34) (1942)
(execution of search warrant issued without probable cause is a trespass);
Smoot v. State, 160 Ga. 744, 744-745 (128 SE 909) (1925) (citizen may resist
execution of unlawful search warrant); Walker v. Whittle, 83 Ga. App. 445,
450-451 (1) (64 SE2d 87) (1951) (aggrieved homeowner has right of action in
tort for unlawful arrest inside home).
11

23

 the trial courts in Georgia had no procedural mechanism by which
they properly could entertain and resolve a motion to suppress
evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment prior to
trial. See generally Donald E. Wilkes, Jr., “A Most Deplorable
Paradox”: Admitting Illegally Obtained Evidence in Georgia, 11 GA.
L. REV. 105, 130-131 (1976). See also J. Robert Sparks, Search and
Seizure, 1 GA. ST. B.J. 427, 429 (1965).
Five years after Mapp, the General Assembly enacted the
Search and Seizure Act of 1966, “[a]n Act to provide procedures for
searches and seizures and for suppression of evidence illegally
seized.” Ga. L. 1966, p. 567. Section 13 of the Act—now codified in
the Criminal Procedure Code as OCGA § 17-5-3012—established a
procedure for the filing, consideration, and resolution of motions to
suppress. In pertinent part, it provides:
(a) A defendant aggrieved by an unlawful search and
seizure may move the court for the return of property, the
possession of which is not otherwise unlawful, and to
suppress as evidence anything so obtained on the grounds
that:
12

The statute has not been amended since its original enactment in 1966.
24

 (1) The search and seizure without a
warrant was illegal; or
(2) The search and seizure with a warrant
was illegal because the warrant is insufficient
on its face, there was not probable cause for the
issuance of the warrant, or the warrant was
illegally executed.
(b) The motion shall be in writing and state facts
showing that the search and seizure were unlawful. The
judge shall receive evidence out of the presence of the jury
on any issue of fact necessary to determine the motion;
the burden of proving that the search and seizure were
lawful shall be on the state. If the motion is granted the
property shall be restored, unless otherwise subject to
lawful detention, and it shall not be admissible in
evidence against the movant in any trial.
The text of OCGA § 17-5-30 was borrowed substantially from
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41 (e),13 something of which our

13

part:

When OCGA § 17-5-30 was enacted, Rule 41 (e) provided in pertinent
A person aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure may move
the district court for the district in which the property was
seized for the return of the property and to suppress for the use
as evidence anything so obtained on the ground that (1) the
property was illegally seized without a warrant, or (2) the
warrant is insufficient on its face, or (3) the property seized is
not that described in the warrant, or (4) there was not probable
cause for believing the existence of the grounds on which the
warrant was issued, or (5) the warrant was illegally executed.
The judge shall receive evidence on any issue of fact necessary
25

 Court of Appeals took notice shortly after the enactment of the
statute. See Thomas v. State, 118 Ga. App. 359, 360 (2) (163 SE2d
850) (1968). And that version of Rule 41 (e) was understood to be “no
broader than the constitutional [exclusionary] rule” and not to
amount to “a statutory expansion of the exclusionary rule.” 14
Calandra, 414 U.S. at 348 n.6 (III) (citing Alderman v. United
States, 394 U.S. 165 (89 SCt 961, 22 LE2d 176) (1969), and Jones v.
United States, 362 U.S. 257 (80 SCt 725, 4 LE2d 697) (1960)).
Mobley urges that OCGA § 17-5-30 should be understood to
absolutely and without exception require the suppression of any
evidence obtained by way of any search and seizure that is described

to the decision of the motion. If the motion is granted the
property shall be restored unless otherwise subject to lawful
detention and it shall not be admissible in evidence at any
hearing or trial. . . .
Fed. R. Crim. P. 41 (e) (1964). See also John H. Harper, Evidence—Illegally
Obtained by State Officers, Inadmissible in Federal and State Courts, 23 Ga.
B.J. 383, 386-387 (1961) (discussing Rule 41 (e) and the need for similar
provision in Georgia in the wake of Mapp).
We note that the inevitable discovery exception had been recognized
in the federal courts—in which Rule 41 (e) was the law—before our General
Assembly borrowed from Rule 41 (e) to enact OCGA § 17-5-30. See, e.g., Wayne
v. United States, 318 F2d 205, 209 (3) (a) (D.C. Cir. 1963).
14

26

 in paragraph (a) (1) or (a) (2) of the statute—a search without a
warrant that is unlawful for any reason, a search pursuant to a
warrant that is unlawful because “the warrant is insufficient on its
face,” a search pursuant to a warrant that is unlawful because “there
was not probable cause for the issuance of the warrant,” or a search
pursuant to a warrant that is “illegally executed”—irrespective of
whether the federal constitutional exclusionary rule would require
its suppression. Read without regard to its context, perhaps that
would be the most reasonable understanding of OCGA § 17-5-30,
although it is not the only way in which the statute reasonably could
be understood. 15 But we do not endeavor to give meaning to statutes

The statute provides that the circumstances enumerated in
paragraphs (a) (1) and (a) (2) are “grounds” for “[a] defendant aggrieved by an
unlawful search and seizure” to file a motion to suppress. Perhaps the statute
could be understood to mean that those circumstances are, without more, also
grounds for a court to grant such a motion, although the statute does not say
so explicitly. But other statutory exclusionary rules are far less equivocal. See,
e.g., OCGA §§ 16-11-67 (“No evidence obtained in a manner which violates any
of the provisions of this part shall be admissible in any court of this state except
to prove violations of this part.”), 24-8-824 (“To make a confession admissible,
it shall have been made voluntarily, without being induced by another by the
slightest hope of benefit or remotest fear of injury.”).
Moreover, even without an appreciation of the broader context of OCGA
§ 17-5-30, it is not unreasonable to understand the provisions of subsection (a)
15

27

 without consideration of their context. See Zaldivar, 297 Ga. at 591
(1).
The legal context of OCGA § 17-5-30 points to a different
understanding. The Georgia courts consistently rejected an
exclusionary rule for violations of the Fourth Amendment until
Mapp left our courts with no choice but to recognize such a rule. The
existing laws of criminal procedure, however, made no provision for
a procedure by which the exclusionary rule could be applied before
trial, a problem that was widely acknowledged in the contemporary
legal scholarship. Within a short time, the General Assembly acted
to adopt a law “to provide procedures for search and seizures and for
the suppression of evidence,” Ga. L. 1966, p. 567 (emphasis added),
and in particular, to provide “procedures . . . for the suppression of
in a more limited sense to mean just what they say—that the enumerated
circumstances are merely “grounds” for the filing of a motion to suppress. After
all, although a defendant aggrieved by a search and seizure reasonably can be
made responsible for ascertaining whether the search and seizure was
unlawful—and put to the burden of filing a motion to suppress on the ground
that it was—the defendant commonly will be without knowledge of the sorts of
circumstances that commonly form the basis for the established exceptions to
the judicially developed exclusionary rule; it would, therefore, make little sense
to limit the grounds upon which a motion properly can be filed by reference to
those circumstances.
28

 evidence,” the General Assembly borrowed from Federal Rule of
Evidence 41 (e), a rule that was understood to confer no greater right
to exclude evidence than the constitutional exclusionary rule. This
context leads to the conclusion that OCGA § 17-5-30 is most
naturally and reasonably understood to be merely a procedural
statute, establishing a mechanism for the application of an
exclusionary rule, the scope and limits of which must be ascertained
from the decisional law by which it developed.
Against this understanding of the statute, however, stands our
decision in Gary. In that case, we were confronted with evidence
obtained by way of a search pursuant to a warrant that was issued
without probable cause. See Gary, 262 Ga. at 577. The Court of
Appeals had held that the evidence nevertheless was admissible
under an exception to the exclusionary rule for warrants issued
without probable cause but executed by officers relying in good faith
on the validity of the warrants, an exception that the United States

29

 Supreme Court had adopted in United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897
(104 SCt 3405, 82 LE2d 677) (1984). See Gary, 262 Ga. at 574. 16
In Gary, we issued a writ of certiorari and reversed, holding
that recognition of the Leon exception is foreclosed in Georgia by
OCGA § 17-5-30. We began our analysis of the statute with the
notion that it was enacted “‘to provide for searches and seizures and
for suppression of evidence illegally seized,’”17 id., and we then said
(without further analysis) that the adoption of the statute reflected
the determination of the General Assembly to “impose greater
requirements upon its law enforcement officers than that required
by the U.S. Constitution, as interpreted by the U.S. Supreme Court.”
Id. at 574-575. After reciting the relevant (in the context of that case)
provisions of OCGA § 17-5-30 (a) (2) and (b), we summarily
concluded: “OCGA § 17-5-30 is the legislature’s unequivocal

16

See also State v. Gary, 201 Ga. App. 556, 556 (411 SE2d 536) (1991).

Notably, Gary misquoted the preamble to the Search and Seizure Act
of 1966, omitting the word “procedures.” Compare Ga. L. 1966, p. 567 (“An Act
to provide procedures for searches and seizures and for suppression of evidence
illegally seized . . . .”).
17

30

 expression of its desire that evidence seized by means of a warrant
that is not supported by probable cause be suppressed.” Id. at 575.
From this broad understanding of the statute, we then reasoned that
the statute more specifically forecloses the application in Georgia of
the Leon exception. Id. at 575-576. 18 We gave no consideration in

In a footnote, we said that “[t]he Leon good-faith exception has been
rejected by the appellate courts of other states which have statutory
exclusionary rules.” Gary, 262 Ga. at 575 n.7. The cases cited in the Gary
footnote to support this proposition, however, hardly support the notion that
exceptions to the exclusionary rule are inconsistent with OCGA § 17-5-30.
Indeed, each of the cited cases from other jurisdictions either involved a statute
requiring suppression in far more unequivocal terms than OCGA § 17-5-30 or
the application of an exclusionary rule developed judicially under a state
constitution or statute. See, e.g., State v. Garcia, 547 S2d 628, 630 (Fla. 1989)
(rejecting Leon exception in face of statute providing that, “[w]henever any
wire or oral communication has been intercepted, no part of the contents of
such communication and no evidence derived therefrom may be received in
evidence in any trial, hearing, or other proceeding in or before any court . . . if
the disclosure of the information would be in violation of this chapter”);
Commonwealth v. Upton, 476 NE2d 548, 551-553 (1), 554 (2) (Mass. 1985)
(relying on exclusionary rule adopted judicially in Commonwealth v.
Monosson, 221 NE2d 220 (Mass. 1966), for violations of statute prescribing
necessary form and content of applications for search warrants); State v.
Carter, 370 SE2d 553, 555 (N.C. 1988) (construing exclusionary rule
recognized judicially for violations of state constitution as inconsistent with
Leon exception); Davis v. State, 831 SW2d 426, 441 (Tex. App. 1992) (rejecting
Leon exception as incompatible with statute providing that “[n]o evidence
obtained by an officer or other person in violation of any provisions of the
Constitution or laws of the State of Texas or of the Constitution or laws of the
United States of America, shall be admitted in evidence against the accused on
the trial of any criminal case”).
Remarkably, Gary did not cite State v. Marsala, 579 A2d 58 (Conn.
18

31

 Gary to the legal context of OCGA § 17-5-30, including the
background law of Georgia at the time of its enactment and the
understanding of Rule 41 (e), from which its provisions were
substantially borrowed. Because Gary failed to consider this
important context, we conclude that its broader reasoning is
unsound, and its understanding of OCGA § 17-5-30 is simply
incorrect.
The question, therefore, is what to do with Gary. In the nearly
30 years since that decision, this Court has relied on it in only three
cases to reject an exception to the exclusionary rule, all involving
claims that evidence obtained by officers relying in good faith on the
validity of a search warrant should be admitted, notwithstanding

1990), a case in which the Connecticut Supreme Court—two years before Gary
was decided—considered whether the good faith exception was compatible
with a state statute governing motions to suppress. Like OCGA § 17-5-30, the
Connecticut statute was adopted in the wake of Mapp—in part to address the
lack of any procedural mechanism in Connecticut for addressing motions to
suppress before trial—and was based in significant part on former Federal
Rule of Criminal Procedure 41 (e). See Marsala, 579 A2d at 60-62 (I).
Considering the context of the statute, the Connecticut Supreme Court
concluded that it was “procedural rather than substantive and, therefore,
do[es] not define the extent of the exclusionary rule under Connecticut law.”
Id. at 61 (I).
32

 the unlawfulness of the search and seizure. 19 See Beck v. State, 283
Ga. 352, 353 (1) (658 SE2d 577) (2008) (officers relied on search
warrant issued by person not authorized to issue warrants); Harper
v. State, 283 Ga. 102, 107 (2) (657 SE2d 213) (2008) (officers relied
on search warrant issued without probable cause); Miley v. State,
279 Ga. 420, 422 (614 SE2d 744) (2005) (officers relied on search
warrant issued without probable cause). We never have extended
Gary and its construction of OCGA § 17-5-30 to foreclose application
of any other established exception to the exclusionary rule. To the
contrary, we and the Court of Appeals have applied other exceptions
in a number of cases without mention of Gary. See, e.g., Teal v.
State, 282 Ga. 319, 325 (2) (647 SE2d 15) (2007) (inevitable
discovery exception); Taylor v. State, 274 Ga. 269, 274-275 (3) (553
SE2d 598) (2001) (inevitable discovery exception); Stephens v. State,
346 Ga. App. 686, 691-693 (2) (816 SE2d 748) (2018) (independent
source exception); Pinkney v. State, 332 Ga. App. 727, 731 (2) (774

In a handful of other cases, we have cited Gary in passing or for other
propositions. In none of those other cases have we relied on Gary and its
construction of OCGA § 17-5-30 to reject an exception to the exclusionary rule.
19

33

 SE2d 770) (2015) (independent source exception); Ansley v. State,
325 Ga. App. 226, 231 (1) (b) (750 SE2d 484) (2013) (independent
source exception); Schweitzer v. State, 319 Ga. App. 837, 840 (738
SE2d 669) (2013) (inevitable discovery exception); Williams v. State,
308 Ga. App. 464, 468 (2) (708 SE2d 32) (2011) (inevitable discovery
exception); Cunningham v. State, 284 Ga. App. 739, 742 (644 SE2d
878) (2007) (inevitable discovery exception). And before this case, no
case appears to have ever suggested that OCGA § 17-5-30 could be
understood to foreclose the inevitable discovery or any other
exception, although we must concede in fairness to Mobley that a
logical extension of the broad reasoning of Gary—that OCGA § 175-30 is a statutory exclusionary rule that admits of no exceptions—
would seemingly lead to that conclusion. 20
In Harvey v. State, 266 Ga. 671 (469 SE2d 176) (1996), this Court was
confronted with a motion to suppress evidence obtained in a search incident to
arrest, where the arrest was premised on the reliance of an officer in good faith
on the existence of a bench warrant. The officer had been told that the bench
warrant was outstanding and valid, but in fact, it had been recalled prior to
the arrest. See id. at 671. The trial court denied the motion to suppress, the
Court of Appeals affirmed, and after issuing a writ of certiorari, this Court
affirmed. We did so by acknowledging that Gary foreclosed the application of
the Leon exception, see id. at 672, but we then re-characterized the issue
20

34

 Gary involved the admission of evidence obtained by way of a
search conducted by officers relying in good faith on the validity of a
search warrant issued without probable cause, and the three cases
in which we have relied on Gary all involved officers relying in good
faith on the validity of search warrants. Whether the holdings of
Gary and its progeny should be squarely overruled is a question that
would require a consideration of the doctrine of stare decisis, see
State v. Jackson, 287 Ga. 646, 658 (5) (697 SE2d 757) (2010), but
that is not a question that we must answer to resolve this case. This
case does not involve good faith reliance on the validity of a search

presented as whether the officer had probable cause to believe that the accused
had committed a crime, so as to authorize an arrest without a warrant (rather
than the good faith reliance of the officer on the existence of a warrant). See id.
And we held that his belief in the existence of the bench warrant gave the
officer probable cause. See id. at 672-673. The analysis in Harvey seems
strained, especially since a bench warrant issued for a failure to appear in court
is no ground for believing that the subject of the bench warrant has committed
any crime (other than the crime for which he already was arrested and for
which he subsequently failed to appear in court). The author of Gary dissented
in Harvey, suggesting that the Harvey decision “amount[ed] to a sub silentio
overruling of Gary.” Id. at 675 (Benham, C.J., dissenting). We agree that
Harvey could be fairly understood to imply a retreat from the broad reasoning
of Gary. We note, however, that under our view of OCGA § 17-5-30, the Harvey
court likely would have reached the same result but without the need to recharacterize the issue as it did.
35

 warrant, and we never have relied on the broader reasoning of Gary
to foreclose consideration of an exception to the exclusionary rule in
any other context, including with respect to the inevitable discovery
exception. Today, we disavow the unsound reasoning of Gary, hold
that it does not extend to any context other than the reliance of an
officer in good faith upon the validity of a search warrant, and
conclude that, in all other contexts, OCGA § 17-5-30 means what it
most naturally and reasonably is understood in context to mean—it
establishes a procedure for applying the exclusionary rule but does
not itself require the suppression of any evidence. It does not,
therefore, categorically foreclose the application of any other
exception to the exclusionary rule. 21
(b) We turn at last to consider whether the inevitable discovery
exception applies on the facts of this case, and we conclude that it

Whether stare decisis compels the retention of the particular holding
in Gary that OCGA § 17-5-30 forecloses application of the Leon exception,
notwithstanding the unsound reasoning from which that holding followed, is a
question that will have to await a case involving the reliance of an officer in
good faith on the validity of a search warrant.
21

36

 does not. This Court has explained that, for the inevitable discovery
exception to apply, “there must be a reasonable probability that the
evidence in question would have been discovered by lawful means,
and the prosecution must demonstrate that the lawful means which
made discovery inevitable were possessed by the police and were
being actively pursued prior to the occurrence of the illegal conduct.”
Taylor v. State, 274 Ga. 269, 274-275 (3) (553 SE2d 598) (2001)
(citation and punctuation omitted), disapproved in part on other
grounds in State v. Chulpayev, 296 Ga. 764, 783 (3) (b) (770 SE2d
808) (2015).22 See also Teal v. State, 282 Ga. 319, 325 (2) (647 SE2d
15) (2007). In this case, the State urges that, if Investigator Hatcher
had not retrieved the ACM data from the Charger at the scene of the
collision, the data would have been discovered in any event pursuant
to a search warrant, as illustrated by the search warrant that
Investigator Thornton obtained on the day after the crash.

In Taylor, we borrowed this standard from the United States Court of
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. See United States v. Terzado-Madruga, 897
F2d 1099, 1114 (11th Cir. 1990).
22

37

 The State is right that a search warrant issued upon probable
cause may be a “lawful means” to discover evidence. See Teal, 282
Ga. at 326 (2). See also Delva, 922 F3d at 1245-1246 (IV) (B). And
for the purposes of this opinion, we accept that the investigating
officers had the requisite probable cause to obtain a warrant even
before Investigator Hatcher retrieved the data from the Charger at
the scene of the collision. The record in this case, however, does not
show that the officers were “actively pursu[ing]” a search warrant at
the time Investigator Hatcher retrieved the data without a warrant.
Absent proof that the officers were actively pursuing a warrant at
that point in time, the mere fact that Investigator Thornton actually
obtained a warrant on the following day is not enough to bring this
case within the inevitable discovery exception. See United States v.
Satterfield, 743 F2d 827, 846 (IV) (B) (11th Cir. 1984). Cf. Delva, 922
F3d at 1245 (IV) (B) (“Here, in addition to obtaining a warrant to
search the Mercedes later that same day, the Agents were actively
pursuing that warrant before they initially searched the Mercedes.”
(Emphasis added)). Indeed, “[b]ecause a valid search warrant nearly
38

 always can be obtained after a search has occurred,” allowing law
enforcement to use a warrant from after-the-fact to justify an earlier
search would threaten to vitiate the warrant requirement.
Satterfield, 743 F2d at 846 (IV) (B). Cf. United States v. Johnson,
777 F3d 1270, 1276 (III) (A) (11th Cir. 2015).
There is no evidence that any of the investigating officers
applied for a warrant, were preparing an application for a warrant,
or even were contemplating a warrant before Investigator Hatcher
retrieved the data. Nor is there evidence that the Henry County
Police Department has a policy, standard operating procedure, or
consistent practice that leads officers to always or even routinely
obtain search warrants for ACM data in the investigation of fatality
crashes. See Davis, 262 Ga. at 583 (4) (“The state has not shown that
a warrant would have been sought as part of the inevitable, routine
procedure of the Douglas County Sheriff’s Department [in these
circumstances].”). To the contrary, the officers in this case testified
that the most common practice in such investigations is to retrieve
ACM data at the scene of a crash without a warrant. Not one of the
39

 officers suggested that they usually obtain warrants in cases like
this one.
In its order denying the motion to suppress, the trial court
concluded that an application for a warrant was inevitable, a
conclusion based entirely on its finding that Investigator Thornton
“always seeks such a warrant in accidents involving fatalities.”
Investigator Thornton, however, was off duty on the day of the
collision, and there is no evidence that his involvement in the case
was even contemplated until the next day. That a particular officer
always seeks a search warrant in similar circumstances cannot
logically show that a warrant was inevitable at a point in time prior
to that officer becoming involved in the case. Equally important,
Investigator Thornton did not actually testify that he always obtains
warrants in fatality crash investigations. To the contrary, he said
that he always retrieves ACM data in such investigations, most
commonly without a warrant at the scene of the crash. Investigator
Thornton testified that, if ACM data could not be retrieved at the
scene, he would seek a warrant, but that hardly suggests that
40

 warrants always or usually are sought, considering that the routine
practice is to retrieve data at the scene without a warrant. 23 The
finding of the trial court that Investigator Thornton always seeks a
warrant in cases like this one is clearly erroneous. See State v.
Rosenbaum, 305 Ga. 442, 449 (2) (826 SE2d 18) (2019) (when this
Court reviews a ruling on a motion to suppress, we defer to the
factual findings of the trial court unless clearly erroneous).
The State has failed to lay an evidentiary foundation for the
application of the inevitable discovery exception in this case. And
the State has failed to identify any other established exception to
the exclusionary rule that is applicable to the facts as shown by the
record in this case.24 Accordingly, the usual rule of exclusion holds,

On the day after the collision, Investigator Thornton sought a warrant
to remove and seize the ACMs from both vehicles, but he did not explain at the
hearing on the motion to suppress why he had done so. It could not have been
to retrieve data from the ACMs, considering that he knew that the data already
had been retrieved, and after the warrant was executed, no further effort was
made to retrieve data from the ACMs. Perhaps he sought the warrant simply
to ensure the preservation of the data in its original form pending resolution
of a prosecution that he already knew was likely to follow from the
investigation of the crash.
23

24

At the suppression hearing in the trial court, the prosecuting attorney
41

 and the trial court should have granted the motion to suppress. The
judgment of the Court of Appeals, affirming the decision of the trial
court, is reversed.
Judgment reversed. All the Justices concur, except Melton,
C.J., who concurs in judgment only.

argued that the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule that was
recognized in Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229 (131 SCt 2419, 180 LE2d
285) (2011), is applicable in this case. To begin, we note that the Davis good
faith exception is distinct from the Leon good faith exception and is not,
therefore, foreclosed by the specific holding of Gary. Even so, the Davis
exception does not apply in this case. The Davis exception only applies to
“searches conducted in objectively reasonable reliance on binding appellate
precedent.” 564 U.S. at 232. Here, the record reflects that Investigator
Hatcher, Sergeant Gagnon, and Investigator Thornton sincerely believed that
they did not need a warrant to download ACM data at the scene of a serious
crash, a belief that was based on advice that they received in the course of their
law enforcement training, as well as legal advice that the Henry County Police
Department apparently received at some point from an assistant district
attorney. It appears that they were not well advised. Even so, reliance on
training and the advice of a prosecuting attorney does not show that the officer
reasonably relied on “binding appellate precedent.”
42