ORIGINAL

N0. 2018-04586J

IN THE INTEREST OF IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF


CHARLOTTE BRIGHT JUDICIAL DISTRICT 1" I
MASON BRIGHT .C

73% Ragga?
CHILDREN HARRIS COUNTY, 

 

On October 3, 2018, Respondents Melissa Bright (?Melissa?) and Michael

and collectively (?The Brights?), ?led motions asking this Court to impose
sanctions against Petitioner, Texas Department of Family and Protective Services 
alleging violations of Rule 13 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure. Among other allegations,
The Brights accuse of unlawfully removing their children Charlotte Bright (?Charlotte?)
and Mason Bright (?Mason?) (collectively ?children?), from their home on September 19, 2018.
Moreover, they accuse of deceiving this Court and the parties involved by improperly
approaching this Court ex parts on September 19, 2018, in order to seek groundless temporary
managing conservatorship of their children. The Brights allege that on September 19, 2018,
knew that the allegations and factual contentions contained in their pleading had no
evidentiary support and contained several false factual assertions. The Brights also claimed
intentionally waited until after close of business to remove the children in order to
prevent the Brights from contacting the court or legal counsel to prevent the removal. The
Brights further alleged that failed to provide them a Notice of Removal or any legal
paperwork evidencing the grounds for removal or which court had authorized the removal order,

within the time limits established in the Texas Family Code. They likewise seek recovery of

reasonable and necessary expenses and legal fees and any other relief appropriate to prevent the
alleged conduct from occurring in the future.

In their response to The Bright?s Motion for Sanctions, argues the following: 1)
is immune from Rule 13 Sanctions; 2) did not sign any pleadings, so they may
not be sanctioned under Rule 13; 3) brought their pleading in good faith; 4) the
Brights failed to prove the elements required for Rule 13 sanctions; and 5) the TOP PS suit was
not brought for purposes of harassment.

A hearing on the Motion for Sanctions was held on October 26, October 29, November 5,
November 7, and November 8, 2018.

After considering the Bright?s Motions for Sanctions, the response ?led by to
said Motion and following an exhaustive review of the record, the law and the guiding rules
and principles thereof, along with the arguments of counsel, the Court hereby GRANTS Melissa
Bright?s Motion for Sanctions and Michael Bright?s Motion for Sanctions for actions

on September 19, 2018.

I. APPLICABLE LAW
A. THE POWER TO SANCTION
Rule 3.30 of the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct entitled ?Candor

Toward the Tribunal? imposes on an attorney the duty of candor toward a tribunal. See TEX.
DISCIPLTNARY R. PROF. CONDUCT 3.03. Courts presume that litigants and attorneys act in
good faith and are forthcoming with necessary information. When litigants and their attorneys
are not candid with a tribunal and intentionally obstruct the process, their actions signi?cantly

interfere with the court?s core functions in the administration of cases, the exercise of its

jurisdiction, the administration of justice, and the preservation of the independence and integrity
of the court and thejudiciary as a whole.
Melissa and Michael Bright, seek sanctions under Rule 13 and Rule 215.2 of the Texas
Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 13 states that the "signatures of attorneys . . . constitute a
certi?cate by them that they have read the pleading, motion or other paper; that to the best of
their knowledge, information, and belief formed after reasonable inquiry the instrument is not
groundless and brought in bad faith or groundless and brought for purpose of harassment." Tex.
R. Civ. P. 13 (emphasis added). A groundless pleading is one that has no basis in law or fact
and is not warranted by a good faith argument for the extension, modi?cation, or reversal of
existing law. Tex. R. Civ. P. 13; GTE Comms. Sys. V. Tanner, 856 725, 730 (Tex. 1993).
A groundless pleading is not sanctionable under Tex. R. Civ. P. 13 unless it was brought
in bad faith or for the purpose of harassment. TE, 856 at 731. Bad faith is not simply
had judgment or negligence; rather, it is the conscious doing of a wrong for dishonest,
discriminatory, or malicious purposes. See Parker v. Walton, 233 535, 540 (Tex.App.-
Houston [14th Dist.] 2007, no pet). Improper motive is an essential element of bad faith. Id.
If a tribunal ?nds a party has ?led with the court an instrument that violates Rule 13 of the
Rules of Civil Procedure, the court "shall impose an appropriate sanction available under
Rule 215." See Tex. R. Civ. P. 13.
Additionally, this Court has "all powers necessary for the exercise of its jurisdiction."
TEX. CODE This Court has the duty to ensure that all "proceedings be
conducted with dignity and in an orderly and expeditious manner and to control the proceedings
so thatjustice is done." TEX. CODE ?2l.00 In exercising its inherent
powers this Court may assess monetary sanctions, and/or order the parties and counsel to take

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certain actions, and/or use its criminal and coercive contempt powers.

This Court's power to assess sanctions against attorneys and parties for interfering
with the core functions of the Court and for abuse of the legal process is not limited to those
sanctions listed in Rule 215.2. In fact, the Court's power to assess sanctions for abuse of the
legal process is not limited to that speci?cally conveyed in rules and statutes. Such power
may be implicit in a particular rule or statute. Koslow's v. Mackie, 796 700, 703
(Tex. 1990). Trial courts also have inherent powers on which they may call to administer
justice and preserve their dignity and integrity. Public Util. Comm ?nv. Cofer, 754 121,
124 (Tex. 1988);Eichelberger v. Eichelberger, 582 395, 398 (Tex. 1979). This power
includes the ability to sanction bad faith conduct that occurs during the course of litigation.
Lam?ence v. Kohl. 853 697, 700 (Tex. App. - Houston [1 Dist], no writ); Kutch v.
Del Mar College, 831 506, 509 (Tex. App. - Corpus Christi 1992, no writ). In
Kutch, the court speci?cally held that Texas trial courts have the inherent power to sanction
for abuses of the judicial process which may not be covered by rule or statute. See Kutch,
831 at 510. If a pleading, motion, or other paper is signed in violation of Rule 13, the
court, upon motion or upon its own initiative, after notice and hearing, shall impose an appropriate
sanction. TEX. R. CIV. P. 13, 215.2-b.

The choice of authorized sanctions is within the sound discretion of the trial court.
TransAmerican Natural Gas Corp. v. Powell, 811 913, 917 (Tex.1991) (orig.
proceeding). However, any sanction imposed by the trial court must bejust. See TEX. R. CIV.
P. 215(b); TransAmerican. 811 S.W. 2d at 917. There is a two prong standard for determining
whether an imposition of sanctions is ?just." First, a direct relationship must exist between the
offensive conduct and the sanction imposed. This means that ajust sanction must be directed

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against the abuse and toward remedying the prejudice caused the innocent party. Depending on
the individual to whom the offensive conduct is attributable, either the attorney or the party may
be sanctioned. Second, just sanctions must not be excessive. A sanction should be no more
severe than necessary to satisfy its legitimate purposes. The court must consider the availability
of less stringent sanctions and whether such lesser sanctions would fully promote compliance.

A trial court's decision to impose sanctions will not be overruled on appeal unless an
abuse of discretion is shown. Randolph v. Walker, 29 271, 274-75 (Tex.App.-Houston
[14th Dist.] 2000, pet. denied), quoting Folk Ma?eldL.L.P. v. Molzan, 974 821, 824
(Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1998, pet. denied); see also Zarsky v. Zurich Management,
Inc, 829 398, 399 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, no writ). The test for abuse
of discretion is "whether the court acted without reference to any guiding rules and principles,"
or "whether the act was arbitrary or unreasonable." Downer v. Aquamarine Operators, Inc, 701
238, 241-42 (Tex.l985).

B. CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTIONS
1) Courts have singled out for heightened protection that "most essential and basic
aspect of familial privacy - the right of the family to remain together without the
coercive interference of the awesome power of the state.? Hodorowsld v. Ray, 844

F.2d 1210, 1216 (5th Cir. 1988) (quoting Duchesne v. Sagarman, 566 F.2d 817,
825 (2d Cir.1977));

2) To ensure the rights of parents are protected when the safety of a child is at stake,
Texas law has held that "[a]ctions which break the ties between a parent and child
'can never' be justi?ed without the most solid and substantial reasons." Wiley v.
Spratan, 543 349, 352 (Tex. 1976) (quoting State v. Demon, 54 S.W. 901
(Tex. 1900));

3) The fourth amendment to the United States Constitution protects pe0ple from
warrantiess government intrusions and warrantless searches and seizures and are
presumptively unreasonable unless there is consent or exigent circumstances. United
States v. Genres-Moreno, 479 F.3d 350, 354 (5?h Cir. 2007);

4) The fourth amendment to the United States Constitution regulates social workers?
civil investigations. Roe v. Tex. Dept. of Protective and Regulatory Services, 299
F.3d 395, 401 (5"1 Cir. 2002).

S) In a due process context, ?emergency circumstances mean circumstances in which the
child is immediately threatened with harm. [T]he mere possibility of danger is not
enough.? Gates v. Texas Department of Protective and Regulatory Services, 537
F.3d 404 (5?1 Cir. 2008).

C. TEXAS FAMILY CODE

1) Texas Family Code Sec. 262.101, entitled PETITION BEFORE TAKING
POSSESSION OF A permits to seek an emergency order authorizing

it to take possession of children when there is an immediate danger to the safety of the child.

2) Section 262.201 of the Texas Family Code requires that for to retain
possession of a child it must present suf?cient evidence to satisfy a person of ordinary
prudence and caution that: (1) there was a danger to the physical health or safety of
the child which was caused by an act or failure to act of the person entitled to
possession and for the child to remain in the home is contrary to the welfare of the
child; (2) the urgent need for protection required the immediate removal of the child
and reasonable efforts, consistent with the circumstances and providing for the safety
of the child, were made to eliminate or prevent the child's removal; and (3) reasonable
efforts have been made to enable the child to return home, but there is a substantial
risk of a continuing danger if the child is returned home;

FINDINGS OF FACT
The Court has reviewed the evidence and assessed the weight and credibility of each
witness?s testimony and each admitted exhibit. Additionally, after careful consideration of the
applicable law and guiding rules and principles thereof along with the arguments of counsel, the
Court FINDS as follows:
A. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
1) The Texas Department of Family and Protective Services is a state agency charged

with protecting children, the elderly, and people with disabilities from abuse,
neglect, and exploitation;

The Texas Department of Family and Protective Services is often this state?s last
beacon of hope and safety for our most vulnerable citizens -- abused children;

The Texas Department of Family and Protective Services has protected thousands
of abused children in this state;

The natural right which exists between parents and their children is one of
constitutional dimensions. See Wiley v. Sprattan, 543 349,352 (Tex.
1976);

A parent?s right to uninterrupted access to and care of her child ranks as ?far more
precious than property rights,? see Hoh?ck v. Smith, 685 18, 20 (Tex.1985),
and indeed is a ?fundamental liberty interest protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment.? See Stantosky v. Kramer, 455 US. 745, 753 (1982);

Courts have singled out for heightened protection that ?most essential and basic
aspect of familial privacy the right of the family to remain together without the
coercive interference of the awesome power of the state.? See Hodorowski v. Ray,
844 F.2d 1210, 1216 (5th Cir. 1988) (quoting Duchesne v. Sugarman, 566 F.2d 817,
825 (2d Cir.l977));

Texas Law recognizes that a parent?s right is not absolute. See Tex. Fam. Code,
Title 5;

If there is an immediate danger to the safety of a child, may seek an
emergency order authorizing it to take possession of the child. See Tex. Fam. Code
262.101; In situations in which there is an immediate danger to a child?s safety
and there is no time to seek a court order, Texas law provides that may, in
fact, take possession of a child without a court order. See Tex. Fam. Code 
262.104 

To ensure the rights of parents are protected when the safety of a child is at stake,
Texas law has held that ?[a]ctions which break the ties between a parent and child
?can never? be justi?ed without the most solid and substantial reasons.? See Wiley v.
Spra?an, 543 349, 352 (Tex. 1976) (quoting State v. Demon, 54 S.W. 901
(Tex. 1900));

10) Texas law guarantees parents the right to a full adversary hearing if has

obtained possession of their child. See Tex. Fam. Code 262.201;

11) Section 262.201 of the Texas Family Code requires that for to retain
possession of a child it must present suf?cient evidence to satisfy a person of
ordinary prudence and caution that: (1) there was a danger to the physical health or
safety of the child which was caused by an act or failure to act of the person entitled
to possession and for the child to remain in the home is contrary to the welfare of
the child; (2) the urgent need for protection required the immediate removal of the
child and reasonable efforts, consistent with the circumstances and providing for the
safety of the child, were made to eliminate or prevent the child's removal; and (3)
reasonable efforts have been made to enable the child to return home, but there is a
substantial risk of a continuing danger if the child is returned home;

12) On July 18 2018, Mason was injured after falling from a camping chair and hitting
his head on the driveway of the Bright? family home;

13) Melissa standing feet away helping 2 year old Charlotte, immediately began
providing ?rst aid to Mason;

l4)9ll was called and Mason was transported to Texas Children?s HOSpital The
Woodlands. From there, Mason was transferred to Texas Children?s HOSpital,
Medical Center 

15) On July 19, 2018 a CT scan of Mason?s head revealed two skull fractures. TCH
alerted of this result. An MRI and skeletal survey of Mason was
completed, without result;

16) initiated a safety plan by agreement with the Brights, listing Debra Verrill,
the maternal grandmother, Deloris Jester (?Deloris?) and Cierra Jester (?Cierra?),
the paternal great aunt and paternal 2'?l cousin, all as safety monitors in the Bright
home;

17) On July 20, 2018 the MRI results showed bilateral subdural hemorrhaging in Mason
skull, and con?rmed the 2 separate skull fracture sites. TCH requested an
Ophthalmology consult and also a hematology consult for Mason;

18) Ophthalmology testing was not able to be fully completed, but scattered
hemorrhaging was noted in Mason?s left eye;

19) TCH social worker noted to that the Brights are reacting appropriately to
the news their son is inured and are asking appropriate questions;

20) Upon request of Charlotte was brought to and given a complete
skeletal survey which showed no signs of fracture;

21)On July 23, 2018, TCH social worker contact supervisor Neisha Edwards

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(?Edwards?), and told her TCH was concerned Mason?s injury may be non-
accidental. The factors provided to for this concern were:

a. The subdural hemorrhaging had more blood than you would expect from such
a short fall;

b. The family reported one fall, but there are two fractures; and

c. Hematology testing reports have not been completed to justify the excessive
bleeding;

physician?s statement was signed on July 23, 2018, outlining the above concerns
and was provided to 

23) Edwards decided to change the agreed Safety plan that would have allowed the
children to remain in their home and the parents to stay with them, as long as the
safety monitor was present, to a Parental Child Safety Placement (PCSP). The
PCSP required placement of the children outside the home;

24) On July 24, 2018, while waiting for Mason to go into surgery at drill a hole
in his head to alleviate swelling), Edwards presented the PCSP to the Brights and
required them to name a placement that day, and required that the caseworker come
to the hospital immediately to also sign the placement;

25) Under the time constraints imposed by Edwards, the Brights chose Melissa Frazier
(?Frazier?) the paternal grandmother. The Frazier?s home is located approximately
an hour and a half drive away from the Bright?s home;

26) The PCSP contained the following requirements:

a. All contact between the Brights and their children must be supervised, to
include requiring Frazier to accompany the Brights to all doctor appointments
of the children; and

b. would make contact with the Bright family every 10 days;

c. would make face-to-face contact with the children every 30 days;

27) On August 2"[1 Mason was readmitted to TCH due to his wound not healing and
swelling in his head. was notified;

28) On August the Brights noti?ed caseworker Lavarvia Jones (?Jones?)
while he conducted his ?rst visit to see the family since release form the hospital,
that they needed to change the PCSP placement to the home of Deloris Jester;

29) Jones was told that the current PCSP was a hardship because of the distance
between their home and the Frazier home; that the distance presented problems
allowing Melissa to breastfeed Mason; that Mason?s health has not improved and

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that if they cannot get Mason calmed when he is upset, that it may cause Mason to
need another surgery to have a permanent shunt place in his head;

30) On August 14, 2018, Jones and Edwards came to the Jester home to participate in a
Family Team Meeting 

31) During the FTM, Edwards and Jones were provided the results of Mason?s
hematology testing, which were dated July 24, 2018 and showed that Mason had a
blood disorder that caused him to bleed excessively;

32) Fraizier explained to Edwards that she wanted the PSCP to change because she did
not have any help to take care of Mason, and that Mason required round the clock
monitoring. Frazier told Edwards and Jones the doctors warned that if Mason gets
upset and is not immediately calmed down, the pressure will build up in his head
and cause his condition to worsen. The Brights echoed these problems to Edwards;

33) Melissa also complained that her ability to breastfeed was being hampered with the
current PCSP, and that breastfeeding was always the easiest way to soothe Mason
when he is upset. Melissa said that the stored breast milk supply was nearly
depleted, and requested that she be allowed to stay overnight with Mason to help
soothe him when he awakes upset;

34) Edwards and Jones agreed to the change of the PCSP, and approved the Jester home
pending approval of the Program Director, Lashonna Beaudoin (?Beaudoin?);

35) The FTM agreement, which was signed by Edwards and Jones, gave a
deadline on August 17, 2018 to approve the PCSP placement change, and August
19, 2018 as the deadline to effectuate the move of the children to the Jester? home;

36) Edwards and Jones saw Mason and Charlotte during the 

37) failed to approve the PCSP change on August 17, 2018;

38) The Bright, Frazier, and Jester families diligently contacted on multiple
occasions about the PCSP placement change over the period of time from August
17, 2018 until August 28, 2018;

39) never approved the change of placement. never communicated to
the Bright, Frazier, or Jester families that the change of PCSP was denied; only that

Beaudoin had not yet approved change;

40) On August 22, 2018, Jones sent a text message to Melissa stating the following:

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?We did consult with legal and we do not have grounds for a removal, but
we do have to offer you services. Would you guys be willing to work
services through family base??

41)On August 28, 2018, Michael Bright notified Jones that due to continued 
inaction on the PCSP placement change, the fact did not have legal grounds
to remove the children; and the continued hardship the Frazier placement had on
Mason and the Brights, that Bright family would no longer agree to follow the
PCSP and were bringing their children back home;

42) According to Jones, he told his supervisor, Ms. Edwards, about Michael Bright?s
refusal to follow the PCSP. Jonesalso admitted he knew that the children had
returned home back on ?August 24?11 

had no contact with the Bright family from August 28?h 2018 until
September 18, 2018;

44) On September 18, 2018, Jones sent a text message to Melissa asking how Mason
was doing. Melissa replied with an update on Mason?s medical condition and sent
photos of him to Jones. Jones then asked whether Mason was with the Brights or
with Frazier. Melissa replied that both children had been back with the Brights
since August just as Jones had been told on that date;

45) Jones also set up a time with Melissa to come to their home to see the children at
5pm the following day, September 19, 2018;

46) Unbeknownst to Melissa, Jones and Edwards had staffed the case for removal with
Beaudoin, who approved an emergency removal of both children. Beaudoin
directed Jones to be at the legal department ?rst thing on the morning of September
19, 2018;

47) On September 19, 2018 Jones went to the Harris County Attorneys Of?ce (I-ICAO)
to present his af?davit for removal of the children. While at the HCAO Jones
logged into the IMPACT database and either created or altered entries for
events that occurred on August 20 and August 28, 2018;

48) The August 20 entry on the removal af?davit stated that Jones had informed
Melissa on that date that the PCSP change would not be approved due to ?concerns
moving the child who has suffered multiple serious injuries.?

49) The August 28 entry on the removal af?davit mentioned that Mr. Bright alerted
Jones that ?the family would no longer be cooperating with the agency,? but made
no mention of the crucial fact that Jones knew the children had been back in the
Bright household for weeks and that, as Jones would later admit in direct

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contradiction of his sworn af?davit, there was no danger to the children in the
home.

50) Jones testi?ed he intentionally did not inform the Brights he was going to court to
seek an ex parte removal order of the Bright children.

5 I The Brights credibly testi?ed if they had known about the court hearing, they would
have attended it and would have informed the court the children had been at home
for 22 days, and that was aware of those facts.

52) On September 19, 2018, ?led a Originai Petition for Protection of a Chiid
for Conservatorship and for Termination in Suit Affecting the Parent-Chiid
Reiotionship with a supporting af?davit and appeared, ex parte, before Visiting
Master Judge Brian Fischer seeking an order granting Temporary Managing
Conservatorship of Mason and Charlotte Bright.

B. 0N SEPTEMBER 19, 2018, KNOWINGLY FILED A GROUNDLESS
PETITION FOR PROTECTION OF A CHILD FOR CONSERVATORSHIP AND
FOR TERMINATION IN SUIT AFFECTING THE PARENT CHILD
RELATIONSHIP AND MADE NO CLAIM THAT THE PLEADING WAS
WARRANTEDTO CHANGE OR MODIFY EXISTING LAW.

1) The Originai Petition for Protection of a Child for Conservatorship and for
Termination in Suit A?ecting the Parent-Child Relationship ?led on September 19,
2018, states ?the child the subject of this suit was taken into the possession of the
Department in compliance with Sec. 262.101, Texas Family Code? and alleges that

?There is an immediate danger to the physical health or safety of the
children, Continuation in the home would be contrary to the children?s
welfare. There is no time consistent with the physical health or safety of
the children for a full adversary hearing, and reasonable efforts, consistent
with the circumstances and providing for the safety of the children were
made to prevent or eliminate the need for removal of the children.?

2) At the time of the removal and at the time the pleading was prepared and ?led,
had direct knowledge through their own investigation of the facts and the
childrens? circumstances at the time.

3) The sworn af?davit that accompanied and is incorporated into the Originai Petition
for Protection ofa Child for onservatorship and for Termination in Sitit A??ecting
the Parent-Child ReIationship contains no information indicating any imminent
danger to either child on September 19, 2018.

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4) Jones testi?ed he had a copy of the signed order removal the Bright children by
12:30 pm. on September 19, 2018.

5) Jones testi?ed he waited until after 7:30 pm. to effectuate the removal of the
Bright children.

6) later admitted that there was no danger to either child at the time they were
removed on September 19, 2018.

7) The Original Petition for Protection of a ChiId for Conservatorship and for
Termination in Suit A?ecting the Parent-Chiid Relationship ?led on September 19,
2018, alleges that reasonable efforts were made to prevent removal.

8) There were no reasonable efforts made on September 19, 2018, to prevent the
Bright children?s removal or placement into a foster home.

9) At the time of the removal, the Brights asked what they could do to prevent the
children from being taken.

10) Deloris Jester was present during the removal of the children and requested the
children be allowed to be placed into her home. Jones declined.

11) Edwards testi?ed she believes made a mistake in not placing the children
with the Fraziers on the night of the removal.

12) TDF PS inexplicably placed the children in not only in foster homes, but in separate
foster care placements, late in the night on September 19, 2018.

13) Jones failed to provide the Brights with a notice of removal as required by Texas
Family Code section 262.109 nor a copy of the removal order. Jones did not
provide the notice of removal until after 12 pm. on September 21, 2018, and only
after the lawyer for Melissa Bright requested a copy of the document.

14) The children were placed in the Jester home on September 22, 2018, after 5p.m.

15)Upon placement of the children with the Jesters, it was discovered that Charlotte
had ?acidic? bums on her diaper area, and also that she had a large red mark with
bruising around her left eye.

16) could not explain the injuries to Charlotte. But for the illegal, fraudulent,
and unreasonable acts of Charlotte would not have sustained such injuries
or the trauma of removal, the latter being evident by recordings played to the court
in the adversary hearing.

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17) A mediation was held on September 25, 2018 with the Brights and At the
mediation, the Brights offered that if would dismiss their lawsuit and return
the children to them, they would not seek sanctions against the agency. The agency
had a chance to avoid sanctions but chose to force the Brights to accrue otherwise
unnecessary legal, expert witness, and other expenses.

18) The Brights, through Melissa?s counsel provided their evidence to so that
the offer could be fully evaluated and contemplated by The offer
remained Open until began the show cause hearing on October 3, 2018.

I9) did not claim that the relief they sought in their Original Petition for
Protection ofa Chiidfor onservarorship andfor Termination in Suit A ?eeting the
Parent-Child Relationship was warranted by a good faith argument for the
extension, modi?cation or reversal of Section 262.101 of the Texas Family Code.

C. TDF PS KNOWINGLY MISLED THE COURT WITH STATEMENTS IN THE
SWORN AFFIDAVIT AND WITH SWORN TESTIMONY
AT THE SEPTEMBER 19, 2018 EX PARTE HEARING.

1) Lavarvia Jones prepared the af?davit and testi?ed for on September 19,
2018.

2) failed to disclose to the court the critical fact that the children had been
home with the parents since August 28, 2018.

3) failed to disclose to the court the critical fact that it had no contact with the
Bright family for 22 days prior to removal of the children.

4) failed to disclose to the court the critical that it had not seen the children in
person for 35 days prior to removal.

5) failed to disclose to the Court the critical fact that hematology reports
contained in the ?le showed Mason had a blood disorder that explained his
excessive bleeding.

6) admitted to implying to the court in the sworn af?davit that doctors had
reviewed the prior physicians statement dated July 23, 2018, and still believed
Mason was abused on the date of removal.

7) admitted that no physician had reviewed the medical records of Mason in

over 60 days prior to removal, and that had never asked a physician to
review them.

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8) intentionally and with no credible or valid reason, failed to notify the
Brights of the ex parte emergency hearing on September 19, 2018.

9) The Brights credibly testified that had they known about the hearing on September
19, 2018, they would have attended.

10) Had the court been made aware of the above facts (speci?cally 3-7), it would have
neither granted conservatorship to on September 19 2018, nor set the case
for an adversary hearing. Nor would the Brights have had to hire counsel or expend
any further time or money.

PS intentionally mislead the court by stating that Melissa Bright had been told
the PCSP change request was denied on August 20, 2018 and the reasons for the
denial.

12) intentionally refused to answer questions during the adversary hearing
about discrepancies in the sworn removal af?davit and testimony proffered during
the ex parle hearing.

13) investigator Jones invoked his Fifth Amendment right not to incriminate
himself criminally when asked why his testimony about knowing the Bright
children had been at home since August was different from his sworn af?davit. It
can be inferred from the context of Mr. Jones?s other testimony that he invoked his
Fifth Amendment at the adversary hearing to avoid admitting to prior perjury.

D. THE FOLLOWING ACTIONS TAKEN BY EXCEED SIMPLE BAD
JUDGMENT OR NEGLIGENCE, AND EACH, TAKEN INDIVIDUALLY,
DEMONSTRATES THE CONSCIOUS DOING OF A WRONG FOR
DISHONEST, DISCRIMINATORY, OR MALICIOUS PURPOSES:

l) Knowingly ?ling a groundless lawsuit when had direct knowledge of the
circumstances that existed regarding the children at the time they were removed;

2) Intentionally making dishonest statements the Court during the September 19, 2018
ex parte hearing regarding the timeframe of when found out the children
returned home with the Brights;

3) Intentionally misleading the Court in the sworn af?davit that accompanied the
petition that Melissa Bright had been told the PCSP change to the Jester home was
not approved.

4) Consciously, intentionally and in bad faith failing to inform the Brights about the
ex parte hearing on September 19, 2018.

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5)

6)

7)

3)

9)

Intentionally omitting from the caseworker?s sworn af?davit that knew the
children had returned home with the Brights on August 28, 2018.

Intentionally making a false statement in the caseworker?s sworn af?davit that
there is no evidence of hematology issues that would explain Mason?s injuries.

Intentionally omitting from the caseworker?s sworn af?davit that had been
provided Mason's hematology test results.

Intentionally omitting from the caseworker?s sworn af?davit that the hematology
reports showed Mason does have a blood disorder that explains the excessive
bleeding in Mason?s skull.

Omitting from the sworn af?davit that had not seen the children in 35 days
prior to removal;

10) Omitting from the sworn af?davit that had no contact with the Bright

family for 22 days prior to removal;

11)Failing to conduct a reasonable inquiry and relying on information allegedly

provided by a hospital social worker to conclude the injuries were abusive; and

12) Intentionally waiting until after business hours to remove the children when

suf?cient time existed to remove them after obtaining the removal order.

E. THE FOLLOWING ACTIONS TAKEN BY EXCEED SIMPLE BAD
JUDGMENT OR NEGLIGENCE, AND EACH, TAKEN INDIVIDUALLY,
DEMONSTRATES THE CONSCIOUS DOING OF A WRONG FOR
DISCRIMINATORY PURPOSES:

1)

2)

3)

Knowingly ?ling a groundless lawsuit when had direct knowledge of the
circumstances that existed regarding the children at the time they were removed;

Intentionally making dishonest statements the Court during the September 19, 2018
ex-pmte hearing regarding the timeframe of when found out the children
returned home with the Brights;

Intentionally misleading the Court in the sworn af?davit that accompanied the

petition that Melissa Bright had been told the PCSP change to the Jester home was
not approved.

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4)

5)

6)

7)

3)

9)

Consciously failing to inform the Brights about the ex parte hearing on September
19, 2018.

Intentionally omitting from the caseworker?s sworn af?davit that knew the
children had returned home with the Brights on August 28, 2018.

Intentionally making a false statement in the caseworker?s sworn af?davit that
there is no evidence of hematology issues that would explain Mason?s injuries.

Intentionally omitting from the caseworker?s sworn af?davit that had been
provided Mason's hematology test results.

Intentionally omitting from the caseworker?s sworn af?davit that the hematology
reports showed Mason does have a blood disorder that explains the excessive
bleeding in Mason?s skull.

Omitting from the sworn af?davit that had not seen the children in 35 days
prior to removal;

IO) Omitting from the sworn af?davit that had no contact with the Bright

family for 22 days prior to removal;

11)Failing to conduct a reasonable inquiry and relying on information allegedly

provided by a hospital social worker to conclude the injuries were abusive; and

12) Intentionally waiting until after business hours to remove the children when

suf?cient time existed to remove them after obtaining the removal order.

F. THE FOLLOWING ACTIONS TAKEN BY EXCEED SIMPLE BAD
JUDGMENT OR NEGLIGENCE, AND EACH, TAKEN INDIVIDUALLY,
DEMONSTRATES THE CONSCIOUS DOING OF A WRONG FOR MALICIOUS
PURPOSES:

1)

3)

Knowingly ?ling a groundless lawsuit when had direct knowledge of the
circumstances that existed regarding the children at the time they were removed;

Intentionally making dishonest statements the Court during the September 19, 2018
ex parte hearing regarding the timeframe of when found out the children

returned home with the Brights;

Intentionally misleading the Court in the sworn af?davit that accompanied the

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petition that Melissa Bright had been told the PCSP change to the Jester home was
not approved.

4) Consciously failing to inform the Brights about the ex-parte hearing on September
19, 2018.

5) Intentionally omitting from the caseworker?s sworn af?davit that knew the
children had returned home with the Brights on August 28, 2018.

6) Intentionally making a false statement in the caseworker?s sworn af?davit that
there is no evidence of hematology issues that would explain Mason?s injuries.

7) Intentionally omitting from the caseworker?s sworn af?davit that had been
provided Mason's hematology test results.

8) Intentionally omitting from the caseworker?s sworn af?davit that the hematology
reports showed Mason does have a blood disorder that explains the excessive
bleeding in Mason?s skull.

9) Omitting from the sworn af?davit that had not seen the children in 35 days
prior to removal;

10) Omitting from the sworn af?davit that had no contact with the Bright
family for 22 days prior to removal;

11)Failing to conduct a reasonable inquiry and relying on information allegedly
provided by a hospital social worker to conclude the injuries were abusive; and

12) Intentionally waiting until after business hours to remove the children when
suf?cient time existed to remove them after obtaining the removal order.

G. ATTORNEYS FEES AND COSTS DIRECTLY RELATED TO RULE 13
VIOLATIONS OF 

1) The Court FINDS that Melissa Bright and Michael Bright expended attorney?s
fees solely as a result of dishonest and bad faith conduct.

2) The Court FINDS that Melissa Bright expended $56,781.00 in attorney?s fees
solely as a result of dishonest and bad faith conduct.

3) The Court FINDS that Melissa Bright?s attorney?s fees of $56,781.00 are

reasonable and necessary and but for the dishonest and bad faith conduct of
would not have been incurred.

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4)

5)

6)

7)

3)

9)

The Court FINDS that Michael Bright expended $42,459.13 in attorney?s fees
solely as a result of dishonest and bad faith conduct.

The Court FINDS that Michael Bright?s attorney?s fees of $42,459.13 are
reasonable and necessary and but for the dishonest and bad faith conduct of
would not have been incurred.

The Court FINDS that Melissa Bright reasonably expended $5,014.35 in costs
associated with defending herself from the dishonest and unnecessary cause of
action ?led by 

The Court FINDS that Melissa Bright reasonably expended $11,077.91 in costs
associated with hiring Lisa McCartney as an expert witness to defend herself
from the dishonest and unnecessary cause of action ?led by 

The Court FINDS that Michael Bright reasonably expended $965.00 in costs
associated for outside-of-network medical care of Charlotte at the direction of
when no emergency existed.

The Court FINDS that Michael Bright reasonably expended $1,540.00 in
childcare costs that were incurred only due to ?ling this dishonest and
unnecessary cause of action.

10) The Court FINDS that Michael Bright lost $9,720 in wages due directly to

missing work because initially ?led this dishonest and unnecessary cause
of action and forced the Brights to endure an adversary hearing also prosecuted in
bad faith.

[11. CONCLUSIONS

1) Based on the record, the arguments of counsel and the Court's ?ndings there were

3)

no facts thatjusti?ed removal under 262.201(b) (1) (2) or (3) of the Texas Family
Code;

Based on the record, the arguments of counsel and the Court's ?ndings there was
no credible evidence presented that there was an urgent need for protection
requiring the immediate removal of the children or for to be appointed
temporary managing conservator;

Based on the record, the arguments of counsel and the Court's ?ndings there was
no credible evidence presented that made reasonable efforts to eliminate or
prevent the removal of the Bright children;

4) Based on the record, the arguments of counsel and the Court's ?ndings there was no

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evidence presented that made reasonable efforts to enable the children to
return home;

5) Based on the record, the arguments of counsel and the Court's ?ndings the evidence
presented showed that was unreasonable in their efforts to enable the
children to return home

6) Based on the record, the arguments of counsel and the Court?s ?ndings, 
deliberately misled the Court in the caseworkers removal af?davit.

7) Based on the record, the arguments of counsel and the Court?s findings, 

deliberately misled the Court in the ex parte removal hearing held on September 19,
2018.

8) Based on the record, the arguments of counsel and the Court?s ?ndings, good cause
exists to ?nd that has abused the legal process by removing children based on
false representations to the Court and failing to comply with the statutory
requirements of Chapter 262 of the Texas Family Code.

9) has caused Melissa and Michael Bright and the taxpayers of the State of Texas
to expend unwarranted time, effort and expense on a groundless cause of action
against the Brights.

10) In skipping vital steps mandated by our law to protect the rights of parents, the safety
of children, and the integrity of thejudicial system, has needlessly wasted the
parties? and this Court?s time and has caused the unnecessary expenditure of taxpayer
and private citizen ?lnds.

11) actions have needlessly increased the cost of litigation by ?ling pleadings
that included misstatements of fact, material omissions, as well as claims that were
either frivolous or not warranted by existing law.

12) Rule 13 provides no ?best interest of the children defense? nor any ?best interest of
the child? exception that would allow a party in bad faith to interfere with the
?undamental rights of parents.

13) actions on September 19, 2018, both verbally and in writing demonstrate a
willingness to mislead this Court in violation of their duty of candor and in violation
of the oath they swore to ?demean themselves honestly.?

1) actions deprived this Court of the ability to prOperly exercise its duties
under Texas Family Code 262.101.

2) actions on September 19, 2018 significantly interfered with the legitimate

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exercise of the traditional core ?Jnctions of this Court.

3) intentional and offensive conduct on September 19, 2018 adversely affected
the resources available to this Court to address the needs of other cases.

4) The sanctions in this Order are necessary to ensure reSpect for the enforcement

of the lawful orders of this Court, this Court's ability to administer justice, and to
ensure that this Court's proceedings are conducted with dignity and in an orderly and
expeditious manner.

5) These sanctions are reasonable to enforce the trial court judge's control over all
court proceedings, the administration of justice and to ensure that justice is done
without undue delay.

6) The sanctions in this Order are issued pursuant to Melissa Bright?s and Michael
Bright?s Motions for Sanctions under Rule 13 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure.

7) The sanctions in this Order are issued pursuant to the Court's inherent authority to
sanction bad faith conduct during litigation pursuant to violations of the Texas Rules of
Civil Procedure.

8) The monetary sanctions against are reasonable and just and assessed in
relation to the expenses, time, and abuse of judicial process caused by their
conduct.

9) These sanctions have a direct relationship to the offensive conduct of and are
assessed against the actual offender, 

10) These sanctions are designed to educate and to deter further violations by 
and to attempt to make whole the victims of such offenses, the Bright family.

Il)In issuing this Order, the Court has imposed a punishment appropriate to the
offenses committed. The punishment is no more severe than is necessary to satisfy the
legitimate purposes of the sanctions.

12) Less stringent sanctions are not appropriate, will not remedy the needless ?nancial
burdens accrued by the Brights, and will not deter conduct.

ORDER

For the foregoing reasons, the Court hereby ORDERS the following sanctions:

1) The Court ORDERS to reimburse Melissa Brights?s attorneys fees, costs and
costs of the expert witness in the amount of 72,873.26. These fees are to be paid to

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Dennis Slate, at 112 E. Forrest Lane, Deer Park, Texas 77536 within fourteen (14)
days of this Order.

The Court ORDERS to reimburse Michael Bright?s attorneys fees, costs and
lost wages in the amount of 54,684.13. These fees are to be paid to Stephanie
Prof?tt, at 917 Franklin St. Houston Texas 77002 within fourteen (14) days of this
Order.

The Court ORDERS to ?le with this Court proof that such attomey?s fees
have been paid no later than twenty (20) days of this Order.

If unsuccessfully seeks intermediate appellate review of this Order, the Court
ORDERS to pay reasonable and necessary attorney?s fees of $20,000 to
Melissa Bright.

If TDF PS unsuccessfully seeks intermediate appellate review of this Order, the Court
ORDERS to pay reasonable and necessary attorney?s fees of $20,000 to
Michael Bright.

If unsuccessfully seeks appellate review of this Order to the Texas Supreme
Court, the Court ORDERS to pay reasonable and necessary attomey?s fees of
$20,000 to Melissa Bright.

If unsuccessfully seeks intermediate appellate review of this Order, the Court
ORDERS to pay reasonable and necessary attomey?s fees of $20,000 to
Michael Bright.

If makes any ?nding of a ?reason to believe? against Melissa Bright, who
then is successful in an appeal of that ?ndings by changing the ?nding to either
?unable to determine? or ?ruled out,? then is ordered to pay to Melissa Bright
$5,000.00 as reasonable and necessary attorney?s fees.

If makes any ?nding of a ?reason to believe? against Michael Bright, who
then is successful in an appeal of that findings by changing the finding to either
?unable to determine? or ?ruled out,? then is ordered to pay to Michael Bright
$5,000.00 as reasonable and necessary attorney?s fees.

10) The Court ORDERS to develop a training program that will educate all

investigative workers, investigative supervisors, investigative program directors, and
investigative program administrators on all aspect of the investigative process,
including but not limited to the legal requirements for before and a?er removal of
children, the fundamental rights of parents to raise their children without

22

governmental interference, the requirements of truthfulness and honesty to the Courts,
the need to provide parents notice of ex-parte removal hearings unless circumstances
justify waiver, and the necessity of full candor of the facts and circumstances of the
children and parents in the removal af?davit to allow the Courts a full understanding
of the need to impair the parents fundamental rights.

11)The Court ORDERS to attend a hearing set of December 3, 2018 at 9:30 am.
to provide the Court, the Brights, and their attorneys full details of the proposed
training program. If in the view of the Court, or upon proper objection of the Brights
the proposed training program fails to meet the expectations of the Court, the Court
will provide its own details for the training.

12) The Court ORDERS to complete the training requirements of this program no
later than December 27, 2018, and to ?le with this Court and provide a copy to
counsel for the Brights, proof of the completion of the training program.

This Order is effective immediately and shall remain in effect until further orders of this
Court or subsequent orders of an appellate court.

Wm WZX

DATE

 

JUDGE MIKE sduprEIDER
315TH DISTRICT COURT

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