1 1 2 J 4 ON INTELLIGENCE, 5 PERMANENT SELECT COMMITTEE 6 j oi 7 COMI4ITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND REFORM 8 and the 9 COI,IPlITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFA]R5, nt wi th the l0 U.S. l1 WASHINGTON, D.C. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, t2 t3 t4 l5 INTERVIEW OF: P. MICHAEL MCKINLEY t6 t7 l8 l9 Wednesday, 20 2l Washi 0ctober 15, ngton, 2019 D. C. 22 23 24 25 The 'intervi ew i n the above matter was held i n HVC-304, Cap'itol Vlsitor Center, commencing Room at L0:07 a.m. 2 I Present: Representatives Schiff, Himes, Sewe11, Carson, Castro, Heck, Maloney, 2 Speier, Quigley, J Krishnamoorthj, Nunes, Wenstrup, Stewart, Stefanik, 4 Ratcl i ffe. 5 Swa1we11, Demings, and Also Present: Representatives Wi1d, Lieu, Espaillat, 6 Deutch, Raskin, Khanna, Wasserman-Schu1tz, Bera, Malinowski, 7 Phi11ips, Rouda, Rooney, Bishop of Utah, 14u11in, 8 Jordan, 9 l0 ll t2 l3 t4 l5 t6 t7 l8 t9 20 2t 22 23 24 25 lvleadov^IS, Zeldin, Perry, Roy, Titus. McCaul, 3 I Appea rances: 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 l0 ll t2 l3 t4 l5 l6 t7 l8 l9 20 2t 22 23 24 25 FoT the PERMANENT SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE 4 I For the COMMITTEE 0N OVERSIGHT AND REFORM 2 J 4 5 6 7 8 9 FOT thC CONMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS: FoT P. 10 ll t2 l3 t4 l5 l6 t7 MICHAEL MCKINLEY: l8 t9 JOHN D. CELLA 20 JOHN B. BELLINGER 2l ARNOLD 22 601 Massachusetts Ave, 23 Washi 24 25 & III PORTER KAYE SCHOLER, LLP ngton, D. C. NW 20001 -3743 5 I z J 4 5 6 7 Alrighty, 1et's come to order. And before we begin, I just want to excuse me, members. Before I begin, I just want to confjrm that all of the members and staff in attendance are either members and staff of the three committees the 0versight Committee, the Inte1 Committee, or the Foreign Affairs Committee. Is anyone present who i s not a member or staff of those commi ttees? THE CHAIRMAN: 8 Okay. 9 Good morning, Ambassador McKinley, and welcome Seei ng no hands. l0 House Permanent Select Committee on ll along with the Foreign t2 conducti ng thi Affairs Intelligence, to which, and Oversight Committees, is l3 s i nvesti gati on as part of the offi ci al impeachment inquiry of the House of Representatives. t4 Today's voluntary transcri bed i ntervi ew i s bei ng l5 conducted as part t6 for the of the impeachment inquiry. We thank you t7 voluntarily with the committee's request on short notice that you provide testimony relevant to the l8 inqui l9 Department on Friday, 0ctober LL. 20 complying ry 'in light of your resignation Ambassador McKinley has served 2l di st'i ngui shed di plomat and 22 Most recently, 23 24 25 f rom the State our country as a four-time ambassador sj nce 1982. prior to resigning, he served since November 20L8 in a unique role as senior advisor to the Secretary of State, a position reflective of his seniority, experience, and role as dean of the career Foreign Servjce. 6 J will ask you to introduce yourself and your career experience more fully at the outset of today's interview for the benefit of the record and all of 4 those present. I 2 a 5 6 7 8 9 10 ll t2 13 t4 l5 t6 Ambassador McKinley, we Given your unique posit'ion and vantage point, we look to hearing your testimony today, includ'ing your knowledge of the sudden removal of Ambassador to Ukraj ne Yovanovitch; the treatment of Ambassador Yovanovitch, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State George Kent, and potentially others; and the Department's response to congress'ional forward investigations, including the impeachment inqui ry. We will also seek your perspective on evidence that has come to light in the course of the inquiry, inctuding the President's July 25,2019, call with Ukrainian President Zelensky, as well as the documentary record about efforts before and after the call to get the Ukrainjans to announce l8 publicly investigations into the two areas President Trump asked Zelensky to pursue: the Bidens and the conspiracy l9 theory about Ukraine's purported interference in the 20 election. t7 2t 22 2016 Finally, given your experience and to restate what I others have emphasized jn other interviews, Congress wilI and not 24 tolerate any reprisal, threat of reprisal, or attempt to retal i ate agai nst any U. S. Government offi ci a1 for testi fyi 25 before Congress. 23 ng 7 2 It is disturbing that the State Department, in coordination with the White House, has sought to prohibit J Department employees and discourage former employees from 4 cooperating with the inquiry and has 5 can 6 professionals have demonstrated remarkable courage in I tried to Iimit what they say. This is unacceptable. Thankfully, consummate coming 20 to testify and te11 the truth. Before I turn to committee counsel to begin the interview, I invite the rank'ing member or, in his absence, a minority member of the Foreign Affairs or Oversight Committees to make any opening remarks. MR. JORDAN: Thank you, Mr . Chai rman. Ambassador, thank you for appearing here today. Thank you for your service to our country. 0n September 24th, Speaker Pelosi unilaterally announced that the House was beginning a so-ca11ed impeachment inqui ry. 0n 0ctober 2nd, Speaker Pelosi promised that this so-ca11ed impeachment inquiry would treat the President with fairness. However, Speaker Pelosi , Chai rman Schi ff, and the Democrats are not 1 i vi ng up to that basi c promi se. Instead, Democrats 2l are conducting a rushed, closed-door, and unprecedented 22 i nqui ry. 7 8 9 l0 l1 t2 l3 t4 l5 l6 l7 l8 l9 23 24 25 forward are ignoring 45 years of bipartisan procedures designed to provide elements of fundamental fairness and due process. In past impeachment i nqui ri es, the maj ori ty and Democrats 8 2 minority had co-equa1 subpoena authority and the right to require a committee vote on all subpoenas. The President's 3 counsel had the I 8 right to attend all depositions and hearings, including those held in executive session. The Presjdent's counsel had the right to cross-examine witnesses and the right to propose witnesses. The President's counsel had the right to present evidence, object to the admission of evidence, and to review all evidence presented, both 9 favorable and unfavorable. Speaker Pelosi and Chairman 4 5 6 7 ff's so-ca11ed impeachment i nqui l0 Schi ll guarantees of ry has none of these fundamental fairness and due process. t4ost di sappoi nti ng, Democrats are conduct'ing thi l2 s l5 inquiry behind closed doors. We are conducting these deposi ti on i nterv'iews i n a SCIF, but Democrats are clear: These are unclassi f ied sess'ions. Thi s seems to be l6 nothing more than hiding th'is work from the American people. l3 t4 impeachment l9 If Democrats intend to undo the will of the American people just a year before the next election, they should at least do so transparently and be willing to be accountable for their 20 acti ons. t7 l8 wi th the 2t chairman's indulgence, our counsel has a couple 24 like to ra'ise on procedure as we1I. J ust, respectfully , we request copies of MR. CASTOR : the subpoenas, certi fi cates of servi ce. We don't know 25 whether these subpoenas have been authentically signed or 22 23 of poi nts we'd 9 I stamped. The House Clerk, House counsel requires that the 6 in ink, and the Clerk requires at least when we were in the majority for years, the Clerk requires that we comply with all the rules. We request sufficient not'ice. We need to prepare our members. And so, in the minority, we don't always have the 7 lead time that you do, and we don't know your queue. And so 8 we 9 witnesses So We can prepare 2 3 4 5 l0 chairman sign these personally just ask for a ljttle bit more notice for some of these in a meaningful way and so We can parti ci pate. And, you know, the word "consultation" i s di fferent from ll t4 "notice." It's a different word; it has a different meaning under House rules. And so, to the extent there is a 3-day conSultati on requi rement, we would i ust ask the maj ori ty to l5 honor that. t2 l3 l6 Thank you. t7 THE CHAIRMAN: I thank my colleagues. We can have the l8 opportunity to d'iscuss these issues without taking up the t9 wi 20 2l 22 tness' s ti me . that Republican members and staff are present and able to ask all the questions they want and have been for all of the prior The record should reflect, however, 24 interviews, notwithstanding what the Pres'ident and many of his supporters have been representing pub1ic1y. And that 25 will be the case today as wetl. 23 10 that, I recognize Mr. Goldman. 1 And, with 2 MR. MEAD0WS: J 4 pa Mr. Chai rman? Mr. Chai rman, I have a r1i amentary 'inqui ry. 0bviously, we've talked about confident'iality in here. t2 inquiry is, I am assuming that, based on the releases that some of my Democrat colleagues v{ere quoted in various newspaper articles yesterday with specific facts that came from the hearing yesterday, that those releases are not deemed a breach of House ru1es. Is that correct? THE CHAIRI'{AN: I would just say to my colleague, who has been present f or many of these 'intervi ews, as you know, I have repeatedly admonished members not to djscuss what takes l3 place during the deposi tions. 5 6 7 8 9 l0 ll t4 And my We have had of depositions l5 middle t6 who may t7 l8 a problem with members coming in in the and leaving before they're concluded not have been present for the advisories that they're not to discuss what takes place. But members should not be di scussi ng what takes place duri ng the deposi t'ions. l9 MR. 1'4EAD0WS: So 20 TH 2t I'lR. MEAD0V.IS: E CHAI RI,IAN : is that a violation of the House rules? I I mean, I just need to be listen, if 22 we're going to play by the same set of rules, Mr.Chairman, 23 we need 24 25 to know what is fair for everyone. And I think that you will attest that there has not been a leak of information from the Republican side that would be to our advantage 11 J tten i n any of the peri odi cals. THE CHAIRMAN: I could certainly never attest to that, Mr. I'leadows. And I thi nk qui te to the cont rary , qui te to the 4 contrary I 2 wri MR. MEADOWS: So 5 6 THE CHAIRMAN: Wel1, I will MR. MEAD0WS: We11, a11ow you indeed, you're the one that has il asking you to rule on that. 13 to rule on it. THE CHAIRMAN: And I thi nk, yesterday as well , 14 what takes place during the depositjons. And so l5 i nqui Mr. have stated, members my response if And so I'm you were here, I should not be d'i scussi ng to your parliamentary and I'm now recogni zi ng Mr. Goldman. I make an opening statement, THE CHAIRMAN: We were going to limit it to one open i ng MR. I"ICCAUL: And 2t 22 House Chai rman? t9 20 ry, that is MR. MCCAUL: Can t7 l8 to consult the House rules would say that, l0 l6 rules or ruIes. But I witl say once again 9 t2 House not, Mr. Chai rman? 7 8 is it a violation of I'11 keep i t very short. I want to echo Mr. Jordan's THE CHAIRMAN: Well 23 , j ust I wi 11 a11ow j t, 24 Mr. McCaul, but, in the future, one opening statement per 25 side. 12 I MR. MCCAUL: 0kay. 7 I'd like to echo the same concerns about the and I'm disappointed that the Speaker didn't proceed wjth a resolution so that this could be more transparent and open. I, fike my colleague here, share the concerns. We need clarification on the rules that apply to confidentiality. And, specifically, we've abjded by these rules, as the 8 chairman has requested. 2 5 4 5 6 9 Wel1, There's a tweet that came out yesterday from Jeremy Herb t7 that says: State Department Deputy Assistant Secretary George Kent told lawmakers that he was told by his supervisor to 1ay 1ow after he raised complaints about Rudy Giutiani's efforts 'in Ukraine undermining U.S. foreign policy, according to Representatjve Gerry Connolly on House Oversight. So do the rules apply or not? And what are the sanctions to violation of the rules? THE CHAIRMAN: I thank the gentleman for his opening l8 statement. l0 ll t2 l3 l4 l5 l6 t9 20 2t 22 23 24 25 to now move to the i ntervi ew of the wi tness. MR. I4CCAUL: I guess that' s a nonanswer. THE CHAIRMAN: Well, you said you wanted to make an ly,le' re goi ng opening statement, not frame a parliamentary inqui ry. MR. MCCAUL: I would like to know, from the chai rman's point of view, what the rules are. THE CHAIRMAN: Mr. Chairman, as I just said to your 13 I colleague, I have repeatedly now, you haven't been here 4 for all the interviews, but I have repeatedly admonished the members not to d'iscuss what takes place duri ng the depositjons, and I will admonish them again today not to 5 di scuss what takes place duri ng the deposi ti ons. 2 a J 8 I will say this, though, to my colleagues, on the point of the investigation, which is a distingu'ishing factor which my colleagues seem to be wi11fully ignoring. UnIike 9 Watergate and unl i ke the Cl i nton 'impeachment, there 'is 6 7 no l0 special counsel who has investigated the President's ll misconduct t2 do'it. l3 t7 in the Cfinton impeachment inquiry and the special cou nsel in the Watergate investigation did not conduct thei r i nvesti gati ons i n open sessi on. Congress di d af telit was ha nded to them. And, therefore, you cannot properly analogi ze this to either one of those prior l8 i mpeachmen ts t4 l5 l6 vis-a-vis Ukra'ine. We are, therefore, forced to The special co unsel . you a re recogn i zed . l9 Mr. GoIdman, 20 MR. MEADOWS: 2t THE CHAIRMAN: 22 MR. Mr. I MEADOWS: precedent, let's go Chai rman, i There will f re you' f you' re goi ng to make be to goi ng make ahead and make sure that reflecti 24 we' re accurate wi th 25 talking about special prosecutors on and I analogies to for the record that mean, when you what happened and start 14 happen, you, agai n, are w'i11f u11y selecti ng f acts and I d'idn't 2 omitting others. So if we want to have a debate and J colloquy about what happened and what didn't THE CHAIRMAN: 4 I",ICAdOWS -- -- 1et's do that, l\,lr. Chairman. THE CHAIRMAN: Mr. Meadows, I allowed two opening 6 statements on your side. 8 MR. MEADOWS: Wel1, 9 THE CHAIRMAN: l0 happen MR. I4EAD0WS: 5 7 Mr. a I but then you opined have allowed myself two opening statements, and I 'm now recogni zi ng Mr. l1 MR. G0LDMAN: Thank t2 Thi Goldman. you, Mr. Chairman. s i s a voluntary transcri bed 'interv j ew of Ambassador l3 Michael McKinley, conducted by the House Permanent Select t4 Commi l5 ttee on Intetli gence, pursuant to the impeachment inquiry announced by the Speaker of the House on 16 Septembe t7 l8 l9 r 24lh . Ambassador McK'inley, name and spe11 for the record? Peter Mi chael McKi nley. I go by Mi chael your last MR. MCKINLEY: could you please state your fu11 name 20 Mjke. McKinley, 14-c-K-i-n-1-e-y. 2l MR. G0LDMAN: Thank you 22 23 24 25 . with the other proceedings in furtherance of the inqu'i ry, this transcribed interview is part of a joint investigation led by the Permanent Select Committee on Intelli gence, i n coordi nation w'ith the Commi ttees on Forei gn Now, along , 15 l3 Affairs and 0versight and Reform. In the room today are majority staff and minority staff from all three committees, as well as members from the majority and minority from all three committees. This is a staff-1ed interview, but members, of course, may ask questions during their allotted time, as has been the consistent format for the inquiry thus far. My name is DanieI Goldman. I'm the director of 'investi gations f or the HPSCI ma jori ty staf f . And I want to thank you very much for coming in today for this interview on such short notice. We greatly appreciate that you are willing to speak wjth us. I wj11 now let my counterparts from the minority t4 i I 2 a J 4 5 6 7 8 9 l0 ll t2 ntroduce themselves. MR. CAST0R: Good morning, Ambassador. Thank you l5 for t7 today. I appreciate your cooperation. My name is Steve Castor, staffer with the Republican the Committee on l8 0versight and Government Reform. l6 being here t'lS. l9 20 2t 22 Casul CASULLI : Good morni ng, Ambassador. I 'm Laura , deputy gene ral counset for the HPSCI mi nor i ty. MR. K0REN: Professional staffer with House Oversight 1 i Republicans. What's your name, si r? 23 THE CHAIRI4AN: 24 I"lR. K0REN: 25 MR. G0LDMAN: Now, Pli chael Koren. th'is transcribed interview will be 16 I 2 J 4 5 6 7 8 9 entirely at the unclassified leveI. However, the transcribed interview is being conducted in HPSCI secure spaces and in the presence of staff wjth appropriate Security clearances. We also understand that your attorneys have the appropri ate securi ty clearance as wel1. It js the committee's expectation that neither questions asked of the wj tness nor answers by the wi tness or the wi tness's counsel wi 11 requi re di ScuSSi on of any i nformatj on that is currently or at any point could be properly conducted l0 classi f i ed under Executi ve 0rder 13525. ll t7 that, quote, "iI no case shall information be classified, continue to be maintained as classif ied, or fa'i1 to be dectassified," unquote, for the purpose of concealing any violations of law or preventing embarrassment of any person or entity. If any of our questions can only be answered with classified "information, please inform us of that, and we will l8 adj t2 l3 t4 l5 16 t9 20 2t 22 23 24 25 l4oreover, E0-13526 states ust accordi ngly. Today's transcri bed i ntervi ew i s not bei ng taken i n executive session, but because of the sensitive and of the topics and materials that will be discussed, access to the transcript of the transcribed interview will be limited to the three committees in attendance. You and your attorney will have an opportuni ty to revi ew the transcri pt as well confident'iaI nature of some . 17 1 2 J Before we begin, I'd like to go over some of the ground rules for this interview. The way that this interview is conducted will proceed as 7 will be given I hour to ask questions; then the minority will be given L hour to ask questions. Thereafter, we will alternate back and forth between majority and mjnority in 45-minute rounds until all questioning is 8 complete. 4 5 6 9 follows: We The majority will take periodic breaks, but if you need a break at l0 any time, please 1et us ll l5 to have an attorney present during this interview, and I see that you have brought two. At this time, I would like to ask counsel to state their appearances for the record. l'4R. BELLINGER: My name i s John Belli nger at Arnold & l6 Porter. t2 l3 t4 t7 know. You are permitted MR. CELLA: l"ly name i s John Cel1a, also at Arnold & l8 Porter. l9 is a stenographer taking down everything that is said and every question that's asked and every answer you give in order to make a written record for this jnterview. For the record to be clear, please wait until the questions are completed before you begin your answer, and we will ask that all members and staff wait until you fi ni sh your answers before aski ng another questi on. 20 2t 22 23 24 25 MR. G0LDMAN: There 18 I 2 The stenographer cannot record nonverbal answers such "uh-huh" as or shakjng of the head, so it's important that you 6 with an audible verbal answer. We ask that you give complete replies to questions based on your best recollection. If a question is unclear or you are uncertain in your response, please 1et us know. AIso, if 7 you do not know the answer 8 simply say so. J 4 5 answer each question to a question or cannot remember, l3 that you have received a letter from the State Department outlining some general concerns about privileges but that does not specifically invoke any privilege. You may only refuse to answer a question to preserve a privilege that js properly asserted and recognized l4 by the committee. l5 t6 If you refuse to answer a question on the basis of privitege, staff may either proceed with the interview or t7 seek a rul i ng f rom the chai rman on the 9 l0 ll l2 We understand ob j ect'ion, i n person l9 or otherwise, at a time of the majority staff's choosing. If the chair overrules any such object'ion, you should answer the 20 question. l8 2l 22 23 24 25 it is unlawful to deliberately provide false informat'ion to Members of Congress or staff. It is imperative that you not only answer our questions truthfully but that you give fu11 and complete answers to all questions asked of you. Omissions may also be And, fina11y, you are reminded that 19 I 2 3 4 5 consi dered As false statements. this jntervjew is under oath, Ambassador McKinIey, would you please stand and rajse your hand to be sworn? or affirm that the testimony you are about to give is the whole truth and nothing but the truth? Do you swear 6 MR. MCKiNLEY: Yes. 7 MR. G0LDMAN: Thank you. 8 And 9 right let the record reflect that the wi tness has been sworn. 23 that, Ambassador McKinIey, I will offer you the opportunity to make some opening remarks. 14R. I4CKINLEY: Thank you for your invitatjon to appear before you today. My understanding is that I could best be of assi stance by clari fyi ng the ci rcumstances of my resignation. The following is an account of what led to my decision to step down when I did. I want to make clear from the start that Ukraine was not among the issues I followed with Secretary Pompeo. I was not aware at the time of the efforts of Ambassadors Volker and Sondland to work with the Pres'ident's personal attorney, Rudy Giuliani, and I was not aware at the time of the President's phone call with President Zelensky. I do think I can shed some li ght on how events have 24 impacted State Department professionals and what motivated 25 resi gnati on. l0 ll t2 l3 t4 l5 l6 t7 l8 l9 20 2l 22 And, with my 20 I 2 the result of two overri di ng concerns: the f ai 1ure, 'in my vi ew, of the State The timing of my resignation was 5 to offer support to Foreign Service employees caught up in the impeachment inquiry; and, second, by what appearS to be the utilization of our ambassadorS overseas to 6 advance domesti 3 4 Department c pol i ti ca1 obj ecti ves. ll I have served my country loyatly for almost four decades in difficult environments. I've served as Ambassador to Some of our largest missions in the world, including Peru, Colombi a, Brazi 1 , and Afghani stan. All my confi rmati ons were unanimous, and I was nominated by both Democratic and t2 Republ i can admi ni 7 8 9 l0 l3 t4 l5 16 t7 18 t9 20 2t 22 23 24 25 strati ons. difficult choices and compromises to be made on many of the issues we work. I also know that, as a Foreign Service officer, it is my duty to serve the incumbent admin'istration faithfully, consistent with my oath to the Constitution. It was, therefore, also my duty to resign when I felt I could no longer do so. By way of background, when Secretary Pompeo first asked me in May 20L8 to return to the Department from my posting in Brazil as Ambassador, the pitch was to help rebuild the institution and restore State as the lead foreign affairs agency for the United States Government. Although I sti11 had 18 months to run in Brazil, and knowing ful1 well the challenges of returning to a building I know there are 21 I 2 a J 4 5 6 7 I decided I obligation to the Foreign Service to accept. many saw as broken and demoralized, had an Over the subsequent months, there were positive changes. to the Department workforce ended, and the hiring freeze was lifted, to include for family members Personnel cuts overseas. The Secretary selected di sti nguished Forei gn Service officers to serve as the Under Secretary for 20 of the Foreign Service. While the other senior positions in the Department conti nued to be overwhelmi ngly held by po1 i ti cal appoi ntees, dozens of career Foreign Service offjcers were successfully nomi nated for ambassadorshi ps. The recruitment of the next generation of Foreign Service officers began again, and promotions returned to normal levels. State once again played the lead role on pol i cy and i n seeki ng negotj ated soluti ons to long- runni ng conflicts and crises in different parts of the globe. There was certainly room for further improvement, but the holtowing out of the Department under Secretary Tillerson was reversed. lulorate never enti rely recovered, however. In 2t August 2019, the State Department's inspector general 8 9 l0 ll t2 l3 t4 l5 t6 t7 l8 l9 Political Affairs and the Director General 24 critical report about the leadership of the Bureau of International 0rganizations. It became apparent, however, that the Department would not be taking the key corrective 25 actions that 22 23 released a many employees had anticipated. 22 6 in this environment that the whistleblower account appeared in the press. I was disturbed by the implication that foreign governments were being approached to procure negative information on political opponents. I was convinced that this would also have a serious impact on Foreign Service morale and the integrity of our work 7 overseas. It 2 J 4 5 was 9 initial reports were followed on September 25 by the release of the transcript of the President's telephone l0 conversation with President Zelensky, which included negative ll comments on Ambassador t2 career diplomat doing her job was unacceptable to 8 l3 t4 15 l6 t7 l8 t9 20 2l 22 23 24 25 The Yovanovitch. The disparagement of a me. Inside the building, meanwhile, there was no discuss'ion whatsoever, at least in my presence, by sen'ior State ng. At th'is poi nt and over the coming days, I suggested to senior 1evels of the Department that a statement of support for Ambassador Yovanovitch's professionafism should be released. I received a polite hearing from officials I spoke to but no substantive response to the concern I was raising. 0n Saturday, Septembe r 28, I sent an emai 1 to sen'ior officials proposing a strong and immediate statement of support for Ambassador Yovanovi tch' s professi onal i sm and courage, particularly to send a message to Department employees that leadership stood behjnd its employees in this Department leadershi p on what was developi 23 difficult moment. I 2 3 was told that the decision was not to issue a statement. It was also that weekend of September 28-29 when 4 spoke with Ambassador Yovanov'itch about the situation. 5 Ambassador Yovanovitch confirmed I first t7 that she would welcome more pubtic support from the Department, that no one had reached out to her from senior levels of the Department, and that she had retained private counsel. I spoke with EUR Deputy Assistant Secretary George Kent, who had been deputy ch'ief of mi ss j on i n Ukrai ne under Ambassador Yovanov,itch and who stated he, too, would welcome more Department support. He also noted that I was the first senior Department off icial to reach out to him. Realizing that there was no change in the handling of the situation and that there was unlikely to be one, I dec'ided to step down. I i nf ormed the Secretary on September 30 before he left for a trip to Italy and Greece, l8 suggesting mid-November as the departure date. 6 7 8 9 l0 ll t2 l3 t4 l5 l6 l9 Duri ng to me the Secretary's absence, however, I conti nued to 2t with other senior Department officials. At a meeting with the Deputy Secretary and under secretaries, I 22 mentioned the impact on Department morale 20 23 24 25 raise my concerns of unfolding events. I also had conversations with the Under Secretary for Poli tical Affai rs, the counselor, and the Under Secretary for Management. They listened, but, again, I do not remember 24 receiving a substantive response. t2 I met with EUR Deputy Assi stant Secretary Kent j ust after he had fi ni shed chai ri ng a bureau meeting on how to collect the data requested by Congress. Kent noted his unhappiness with the tenor of the meeting in which a Department lawyer attended. He later wrote a memorandum to the file summarizing his experiences that day and sent i t to me. I forwarded it to the Under Secretary for Political Affai rs, the Department's acti ng lega1 advi sor, and the Deputy Secretary. I noted the seriousness of what was reported in the memorandum and raised the significant legal l3 costs being incurred by our Department colleagues through t4 l8 fault of thqir own. No one answered me. Although my original intention had been to transjtion quietly out of the Department by mid-November, by the week of October 7th I no longer felt that I could be effect'ive as the liaison to the seventh floor of the Foreign Service. I l9 accelerated my departure, informing the Secretary that 20 0ctober lLth would be my last day. 2 5 4 5 6 7 8 9 l0 ll l5 t6 t7 0n Thursday, 0ctober 3rd, no 24 In closing, I would like to say that no one wants to end a career on thi s note. I repeat: Si nce I began my careelin L982, I have served my country and every President loyally. Under current circumstances, however, I could no longer look 25 the other way as colleagues are denied the professional 2t 22 23 25 I support and respect they deserve from us 2 Thank you. J IThe statement of Mr. McK'inley f o11ows:] 4 5 6 7 8 9 l0 ll T2 l3 t4 l5 l6 t7 l8 t9 20 2t 22 23 24 25 ******** INSERT L_1. all. ******** 26 BY MR. I 2 a GOLDMAN: Thank you very much, Ambassador McKinley. 18 of the Foreign Service, so I would ljke to just go through briefly your career, di sti ngui shed career, wi th the State Department. You mentioned you joined in 1982. What various posts have you served in during that time? A If I can summarize, I have served about L0 years of my career in Washington, D.C., in the Department, and I've served the rest of those years overseas. Unusual f or a Forei gn Serv'ice of f i cer career, I haven' t concentrated on one or two regions. I've spent a lot of time in Latin America, I've spent a lot of time working on Africa, I've spent a lot of time working in Europe, and I've spent the time in Afghanistan and in the Department, and so perhaps have had wjder experience of policies and issues than i might otherwise have had if I'd stayed in one bureau. I have also worked on jssues related to supporting t9 free-trade agreements across the years, particularly 20 Colombia and Peru, support'ing our companies overseas in 2t almost every posti ng I 've been. I 've worked on confl i ct 22 negotiations in Afrjca, in Lat'in America, and most recently J 4 5 6 7 8 9 l0 ll t2 l3 l4 15 t6 t7 23 24 25 There are some that have called you the dean wi th in Afghanistan, and placed a great deal of emphasis, as all of us as diplomats should, on supporting the American people overseas in the communities that live overseas in the 27 I countri es I 've served, but also protecti ng thei 2 whatever way a A a J 4 5 6 7 8 9 l0 that presents itself When we re I you 'i n r i nterests i n overseas. Af ghan i s tan? to 2016, almost 3-L/ 2 years. And as we understand it, you also served as the deputy chief of mission and charge d'affaires at the U.S. Mission to the European Union. Is that right? A That 'is correct, between 2004 and 2007 a And at the time that 'is that the same office was there from 2013 . that Ambassador A a ll Gordon Sondland now oversees? That's correct. in 20 to come back to Washington. And what role were you asked to serve? A If I can make a correction, I was approached i n l"lay of 2018 a Thank you. A and i ntervi ewed wi th the Sec retary i n l"lay of 2018. And starting in June of 2018, I alternated between Braz'i1 and Washi ngton on a roughly 55/35 percent basi s, as I did the ful1 transition back to Washington in November of 2t 2018. 12 l3 t4 t5 l6 t7 l8 t9 22 23 24 25 And then to fill was reflective of the moment the Department was Iiving. Under Secretary Tjllerson, somewhere jn the region of 20 percent of our senior Foreign Service 0fficer Corps either left or was forced to leave the The role I November 20L8 you were asked was asked 28 I State Department, and the building really did not have senior 2 positions fj11ed. This has been well-publicized J discussed over the months and 8 of Secretary Tillerson's tenure. And Secretary Pompeo came in with a mission of staffing up senior leadership in the Department as quickly as possible. He wanted Foreign Service officers to be part of that senior leadership. He reached out to me, he reached out to others, to come back to the Department, work wi th him, 9 rebui 1d the bui ldi ng. 4 5 6 7 l0 ll t2 l3 t4 particular case, it was not a question of being brought back to be chief of staff. He wanted me in the capacity as an advisory role and, I belieVe, a connection to the building. And it was made clear from the start that, with my varied background, I could feel free to work on a In my t7 of issues and provide advice. I was not meant to be operational. I made clear to the Secretary at the time that, as assistant SecretarieS Were l8 confirmed and under Secretaries were confirmed, the l'ine of l9 24 icy, developing policy came f rom other offices. And so, at no stage during the time I was senior advi sor, di d I envi sage an operati onal role wi th hjm. a So, as the sen'ior adv'i sor, you were the 1i nk between the seventh floor, which is common parlance for the leadershi p floor, and the Forei gn Servi ce off i cers. I s that 25 ri ght? l5 t6 20 2t 22 23 range implement'ing pof 29 I 2 J 4 5 6 7 8 9 at the time, as I said, there were few Foreign Service officers at the senior leve1s of the Department. That began to change over the months, but during that period I was indeed someone that people in the Service, career people in the Service felt they could come and talk to. a And over the course of your slightly less than a A It became an informal reality. Because, year there, other than the issues that you raised as causing concern and ultimately your resignation, how did your role l0 develop? Explain a 1itt1e bit about what your day-to-day ll activit'ies were like. l5 A The day-to-day work i did was related to staying on top of events. So I read voraciously to be able to see where there might be an interest in input or different thoughts or adv'ice that I could provide the Secretary on what was t6 happening around the wor1d. t2 l3 t4 t7 l8 t9 20 2t 22 23 24 25 I didn't have a formal structure to the day other attendi ng the Secretary's morni ng meeti ngs, whi than ch are held jn his office with different constellations of seni or offi ci a1s. I di d not parti ci pate i n most of the Secretary's meetings, for example, with foreign dignitaries. That's just something I did not do. But as the Secretary settled in and began defining issues he was working on, one of the areas that became a central focus of the work I did was with the special envoys almost every day 30 I 2 J 4 5 6 7 8 9 l0 ll that were being appointed to work different conflicts or crjses in the world, including North Korea, Afghanistan. I did not do work on Syria or Iran. But when a special envoy was named for Venezuela, I worked on Venezuela as well and felt I had some added va1ue, given my history working on negotjations and conflicts throughout my career. I was also interested in seeing the Department regain some of the focus on economic policy which it had lost under Secretary Tillerson and trying to see areas where the Department could again have a seat at the table jnternationally, both in supporting our businesses overseas, l3 but as we gret,,, concerned, f or example, about Chi na's growi ng i nf luence 'in d'if f erent regi ons of the wor1d, what would be t4 the proactive response to trying to develop a different l5 paradigm l6 t8 islands, deating with offers that were being made in different Latin American countries that faced diff"icult financial ci rcumstances and were being approached t9 by t2 t7 Pacific Ch for engaging, for example, with Southeast Asia, with Compact i na. 24 I'm mentioning that at some length because it's actually something I was interested'in and took on and discussed and worked with the Secretary. But in the early months, I was also a person whom acting ass1stant secretaries came to to get a sense of, should we be 25 presenting paperwork 20 2t 22 23 this way? How do we approach certain 31 1 2 3 4 5 6 poljcy issues for the Secretary? fact is, what happening was the Secretary was restoring process to the And the was building, and paperwork just began to flow the way I've largely been familiar with throughout my career. But I played that sort of informal counsel role. And, fi na11y, I supported him on hi s tri ps overseas, 8 again, in the capacity of staying abreast of breaking news in different parts of the wor1d, but also joining him in a 9 number l0 a 7 of the meetings he might have in djfferent locations. And other than the Secretary, was there anyone else ll jn leadership that you had regular t2 dai l3 communication with on a 1y basi s? A a I'd have to say the answer js probably no. t7 that you were particularly i nvolved wlth some of the speci a1 envoys. I'm sure you're aware that Ukraine also has a special envoy, Kurt Volker. Did you engage with Ambassador Volker in any way in his role l8 as the special envoy to address the eastern Crimea area of l9 Ukrai ne? t4 l5 l6 Now, you mentjoned 22 A Although Kurt Volker and I were colleagues when we were in Brussels together in the 2000s he was at NAT0, I was at the European Union mission I never saw Kurt when I 23 returned to Washington. 20 2l 24 25 a A Did You I never spoke to Kurt. I never saw him. I may 32 I have shaken 2 That hjs hand is it. a Uh-huh. A No, no. in the corridor a year and a half ago. 6 that your desire, or was that his? What I'm trying to suggest, again, is I wasn't operational. As the Secretary put in place or empowered what the Secretary also did was to empower 7 acti ng assi stant secretari es. 3 4 5 Was t4 Tillerson, there Were queStions about whether these ind'ividuals could actually take charge of their bureaus and carry forward the business of 5tate, under Pompeo, while awaiting Senate confi rmations of assistant secretari es that were bei ng nomi nated, fu11 authori ty was being given to front offices of bureaus to go ahead and do the business of the diplomacy 'in the regions and issues they l5 were responsi b1e for. t6 t7 I wasn't out there, you know, checking on bureaus, seeing what they were doing. There Was a natural empowerment l8 taking place over 8 9 l0 ll t2 13 So, whereas, under So months. 0n the European issues, l9 I rea11y didn't engage much on 22 of them, but I certainly never engaged on Ukraine across the t'imef rame I was there. a So you view it as a good thing that you didn't have /.) much engagement wi 20 2t 24 25 many th Ambassador Volker? No. It certainly wasn't a conscious decision at A aI1. It just never came across my desk. I never ran into 33 13 t worki ng Ukrai ne. The issues I gravitated to, as I mentioned, were more focused on supporting the conflict negotiations that were developing in different parts of the world and particularly on national economic policy questions. And I also continued to work on issues like trying to support the reforms that were being put into place to strengthen the Foreign Service. a You said in your opening statement and you just re'iterated that you were not parti cularly i nvolved or had much vi si bi 1 i ty i nto matters relati ng to Ukrai ne i n your role as sen i or advi sor At any poi nt over the last year or So, d'id you know i n real-time, d'id you fo11ow in real-time anything that was t4 goi ng l5 t7 in April and May? A I followed it in the sense that I was aware of what was happening in d'ifferent parts of the wor1d. In any given l8 month, you could ask me, do you know what's happening l9 I would've read about it. Did I work on it? Did I take any active stance on jt? The short answer is no. a What do you remember knowing at the time about Ambassador Yovanov'i tch' s reca11? A Onty what I saw in the media. I never spoke about her recall with anyone in the Department. I did run into her sometime after she returned to 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 l0 ll t2 l6 20 2l 22 23 24 25 hj m, and I wasn' . on, i nclud'ing, perhaps, wi th Ambassador Yovanovi tch's reca11 somewhere, and 34 J offer -- you know, we ran into each other, and we spoke about her transi ti on. I offered her moral support. And that's where it stayed until the developments over the last few 4 weeks. I 2 a 5 6 Back in the spring, did you know why she was being recal led? ll I can sit here and speculate, but it would be speculation. I saw nothing in wri ti ng. I heard nothi ng. I heard no Department offi ci a1 speaking about the reasons for her reca11. a Duri ng the begi nni ng part of thi s year, i n the t2 J 13 news accounts and the media about nongovernment actors and t4 i 7 8 9 10 l5 t6 t7 l8 t9 A 0n1y from media accounts. So anuary-through-March/Apri 1 timeframe, were you followi nterests i n Ukrai ne? A a A I certainly that being reported, yes. And i n parti cular, Rudy Gi u1 i ani ? At the time, I -- you know, if you're going to take me back 6 months ago, I can't remember exactly who I was focusing on. But if his name was in the media at the tjme, saw 2t of course I focused of course I noticed it. a V{ithout necessarily placing a time on it, 22 aware of 20 23 24 25 ng A a A were you Yes. 's efforts? I was reading absolutely. I Rudy Giulian'i was reading the 35 I media, and a 2 5 Di was very evident. d you have any d'iscussi ons wi th anyone at the State Department about Mr . A a A 4 5 6 7 it Gj ul i ani ' s - - I don't thi nk public pronouncements? I don't think his name ever crossed my 1ips. And no one spoke to me about Rudy Giuliani. a 8 5o when did you become aware of the reason for t2 tch's reca11? A The details of it, I became aware as the 'information began to flow after the whistleblower account, and jt became very evident just how much was political in her l3 removal. 9 l0 ll Ambassador Yovanovi a t4 Were you aware of any documents that were submitted l7 to the State Department's Inspector General's 0ffice in or about May of this year related to A No, I was not. And the first time I was aware that l8 these documents had surfaced was when Inspector General l9 Li l5 t6 20 n'ick approached the comm'ittees a A a wi th a package of documents. And have you reviewed those documents? Z) at all. So what did you descri be the c'i rcumstances around your coming to understand why Ambassador Yovanovitch 24 was recal 1ed. 25 A 2t 22 No, not Wel1, it was a question of putting the pieces 36 I together. 5 after the whi stleblower account came out and I started reading in much greater depth what was happening in the media, it became evident to me that Masha had been caught up in something that had nothing to do with the way she 6 performed her duties 'in Kyiv. 2 3 4 7 8 9 l0 l1 t2 l3 14 l5 l6 t7 l8 t9 20 2t 22 Z) 24 25 So When the transcript of the call was released I'm just to state it clearly as a Foreign Service officer, to see the impugning of somebody I know to be a serious, committed colleague in the manner that it was done raised alarm bel1s for me. It absolutely did. wjth the chronology And that's when I became, I think I've tried to give you. And I've done the chronology mostly from recollection. I, frankly, became very concerned that we had to do someth'ing f or her. That's when I took i t on. Masha had not reached out to me, for example, in the preceding weeks or even months. So this was very much a reaction to what was being revealed in the media. going a Former Ambassador Yovanovitch actually has been with the Foreign Service almost as long as you had. A Yeah. Yeah. a A Did you come across her Yes, I did, but we were in your career? not close fri ends. And I think we interceded most when we were both i n Europe in the 2000s. But, you know, I didn't go back and look up what her 37 I career track was, but I was certainly aware of her for a long 2 t'i me . a J 4 And what was her reputation as a foreign professi onal? A 5 Her reputation was as an excellent, serious, t2 in the earlier years before of us had ambassadorial or DCM positions. I certainly remember her being one of those people who seemed to be desti ned for greater thi ngs. a And you said that the call record raised alarm bells for you. What do you mean by that? A S'imply the reference to the Ambassador jn a l3 disparaging form t4 that. 6 7 8 9 l0 ll t5 committed, up-and-coming back When any in the call transcript. It's as simple as you're working overseas, every President has the z4 right to remove an ambassador they don't have confidence in. And this is standard, and it's part of Department practice ever si nce I 've come i n . So, whatever the rati onaIe, Presidents have the right to remove ambassadors and select other envoys for the post in question. It was the issue of suggesting that she wasn't I don't have the transcript in front of me. All of you know what's jn the transcript, so f'm not even going to try to paraphrase it. I mean, what is it? 0ne sentence? Two 25 sentences? l6 t7 l8 l9 20 2l 22 23 38 But the fact of the matter is, as a Foreign Service I J officer who's worked'in difficult situations, worked in difficult environments, where we have to deal w'i th ugly 4 people on the ground and where you're dealing with 5 challengeS, where you're dealing w'ith threats that can 6 personal 2 7 8 9 , when you' re deal i ng wi th confl i cts, become when you' re to the security and welfare of Americans or the peopte who work for you in a miss'ion, the one thi ng you don' t want to have 'is questi ons bei ng rai sed deafing with issues related l0 about how you're doing your job with the foreign government ll l5 in question from your own government. a Right. And just so the record is c1ear, we will get into the call transcript, but I believe what you're referring to is the statement by President Trump in the July 25th call record where he says, quote, "The former l6 Ambassador from t7 And the people she was dealing t2 l3 t4 the Un'ited States, the woman, was bad news. t9 with in the Ukraine were bad news. 5o I just want to let you know that." And then, later on, the President says, "We11, she's 20 going l8 What 2t 22 23 24 25 to go through some things. did you understand him to mean when to go th rough some th i ngs " A I didn't try to read into it or words themselves spoke for themselves. " She ' s go'i ng And my reaction was, we11, you read' ? understand it. The there's a simple solution for 39 th'is. 4 think she's a strong, professional career diplomat who's sti1l on the ro11s, who's sti11 a fu11-tjme Department employee. It shouldn't be djfficult to put out a short statement that's not poti tica1, stating clearly that we 5 respect the professionalism, the tenure 6 Yovanov'i 1 2 a J of Ambassador tch i n the Ukra'ine. Thank you. That's pretty much as straightforward and simple a 7 8 We statement as I was proposing. Did you view that comment as a threat to Ambassador 9 a l0 Yovanovi tch? ll 12 I'm not going to interpret it. What I want to is that a statement like that to a foreign government l3 officiat creates difficulties for the Ambassador on the 14 ground. l5 a l6 morale t7 De pa A the thi s poi nt, I 'm goi ng to gi ve you my opi n'ion t9 based, obvi 20 ac 2t weeks. 22 would a statement r tmen t? AAt l8 like this affect the career Foreign Service workers jn the State And how of ross It ously, on the evoluti had on my experience and on speaking of developments 'in the last to people several a very significant effect on morale. And the Z) si lence from the Department was viewed as puzzling and 24 baffling. 25 say a Approximately how many Foreign Service officers did 40 t7 to about thjs transcriPt? A I don't know. I spoke to 8, 10, a dozen. You know, I need to make c1ear, I also saw the sensitivity of my position. And so, when you take a look at my decision to resign, I wasn't sitting there broadcasting it and I wasn't throughout the bui 1di ng. The fact i s broadcasting the specific steps that I was proposing for support for her. Because, at the end of the day, what I wanted to see was a statement to come out. Moreover, I wasn't interested, because of all the posit'ive work that has been done i n the bui ldi ng, to See morale 'in the bui 1di ng sort of conflicted, decline, be confused about what was going on. 5o I wasn't si tt'ing there goi ng down the corridor, what do you think, what do you think about what has happened? I did speak to, you know, a couple of acting deputy assi stant Secretari es. It was that sort of i nformal corri dor conversation, but I asked them, did they think this was l8 havi ng an impact on I 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 l0 ll t2 l3 t4 l5 l6 you speak the bui ldi ng. I djd not go out and sort of broadcast, you know, "Let's t9 20 go out and Support Ambassador Yovanovitch." That's not the 2l way 24 I work. That's not the way I was going to work for Secretary Pompeo, who I agreed to work w'ith and serve. And I was looking for a solution, I thought, that could meet what was required without getting jnto the broader politics of the 25 unfoldi ng i nvesti gati on. 22 23 41 I 2 3 O From those conversations and those questjons that you asked, what sense did you get about the impact on morale? A that the impact was significant,'in were expecting some kind of statement of support My sense was l3 that people for Yovanovi tch. i was not I repeat: It would've been unprofessional of me to go out there and start digging, "What do you mean? for example, And what are you hearing?" I never go there's these chat rooms or, you know, Foreign Service people or others, you know, people talk, people wri te, everythi ng. I never go on them. I never read them. No one brings them to my attentjon. I went on instinct also on this. But I think it's very clear that this was an jssue that needed to t4 be addressed. l5 l6 let's talk about that proposed statement. Who did you speak to first about the possibility of making a t7 statement? l8 to the Secretary first. And I did so in the manner I normally do. I'11 sort of raise an issue, and he'11 decide whether he wants to react or not. So he listened. There was no pushback, no comment. It was just an acknowledgement that I was raising it. a Approximately how long do you th'ink thi s conversation was, the f i rst conversat'ion wi th the Secretary? A Three minutes. It was very short. The way I 4 5 6 7 8 9 l0 ll t2 t9 20 2l 22 23 24 25 O A So I spoke 42 2 with the Secretary, I tended to be very crisp. He works very hard. He works on multiple issues. And I'm very J conci se when I 'm presenti ng thi ngs. I worked 13 a What did you say to him? A I said: We've seen the situation that's developing outside. Wouldn't it be good to put out a statement on Yovanovjtch? Since my impression is the Department, you know, at least tried to keep her in Ukraine. I had gotten that from the newspapers. a What was his response? A He 1i stened. That was i t. Sort of , "Thank yotl. " That was the fimit of the conversation. a Did you get the sense that he agreed that the t4 Department was supportive or 4 5 6 7 8 9 l0 ll t2 l5 l6 t7 18 A a A a I did not. I did Sorry, not. one Apolog'ies. Did you get the sense that he agreed with your that the t9 assessment 20 Yovanov i tch? Department had supported Ambassador 23 A I did not get a sense one way or the other. I really did not. a 0kay. And do you remember approximately what date 24 thi s conversati on was? 2t 22 25 A It was towards the end of UNGA week sorry the 43 I U.N. General Assembly week a A a A a A 2 J 4 5 6 7 8 So the transcri it Ri came in pt New York. was publ i ci zed out on the 25th ght. which was while we were 0kay. And so And that's what I in New was reacting York, I guess. to, on a personal 1eve1. l6 recall whethelit was that was a Wednesday. Do you recall whether it was the Thursday or the Friday that you had this conversation wjth the Secretary? A It was probably Thursday. a 0kaY. After this conversation with the Secretary, what did you do next, in terms of advocating for TH E CHAI RI4AN If I could just interject with a couple l7 questions. 9 l0 ll t2 l3 l4 l5 a And so do you : l8 MR. MCKINLEY: Sure. l9 THE CHAIRMAN: At 20 Pompeo, were you aware 2t call? MR. MCKINLEY: 22 25 that Secretary did with Secretary Pompeo had been on the No. Not At all. this jssue with hjm, he give any indication that, in fact, he was on the call? THE CHAIRMAN: And when 23 24 the time you spoke l'lR. MCKINLEY: No. you raised 44 1 THE CHAIRMAN: And, if 2 us exactly what you relayed J at all in 4 5 6 7 you cou1d, as best you can, to him. And tell did he say anything response or did not on I was raising issues related to, why can't we go out w'ith a statement? Thi s seems like an easy issue to address. My impression that Yovanov'itch had received a 1eve1 of support, because she did MR. MCKINLEY: No, he ll to the Department. And my understanding was that she was also extended or people were looking to extend her at one point. By the way, I didn't know any of that until very recently, but it was just my impression. And so I put it in t2 those terms. 8 9 l0 come back 2t I wasn't, f rankly and, aga'in, I'lr goi ng to be very di rect on this. I'm a career Foreign Service officer. This has been, as many adminjstrations have been there's many moments that are highly political that spi11 over into, you know, sort of, State Department corridor gossip or discussions. The one thing I knew above anything when i accepted this job was I wasn't going to sjt and become part of the pol i ti cal envi ronment. So I didn't sit and have discussions with Secretary 22 Pompeo 23 you know, White House approaches. And 24 going to make a comment, one way or the other, about things 25 the President did. That's s'imp1y not the way I was working. t3 t4 l5 l6 t7 l8 t9 20 about what was happening with White House politics, I certainly was not 45 I 2 J 4 5 6 7 8 9 It was, I wanted to focus and did focus on issues that needed to be addressed in the foreign policy arena or in the bui ldi ng. But I did not i ni ti ate conversations wi th him nor did he volunteer to me political comments on ongoing situations at any po'int in the time I worked wjth him. THE CHAIRMAN: Ambassador, I understand, but I just want to get as clear a record as we can on what you said to the Secretary and what he said in response. MR. MCKI NLEY: Yeah . I n response THE CHAIRMAN: Can l0 you go back and, as best you can, l3 told the Secretary? I'm sure MR. MCKINLEY: I said, are you aware of you're f o11owi ng what i s happeni ng. Wouldn't i t be good 'if l4 we ll t2 l5 l6 t7 te11 us exactly what you put out a statement on Ambassador THE CHAIRMAN: When Yovanovi tch? you said, I'm sure you're aware of what's happeni ng MR. MCKINLEY: That's ri ght. 0f course he said, it's that kind of exchange. I l8 You know, t9 it as something mean, yeah. to formalize more 22 no. I 'm j ust I 'm not tryi ng to formatize it. I'm just trying to get exactly what was said during the meeting. So you asked him if he was aware of the 23 si tuati on, and he i nd'icated 20 2t 24 25 THE CHAIRMAN: No, that he was. MR. MCKINLEY: Yeah, that he was following it. THE CHAIRMAN: That he was following it. 46 f'4R. MCKINLEY: I 0kay? And I said, we11, in this context, 2 wouldn't jt be a good thing if, you know, we say something 3 quickly about, you know, Yovanovitch, given what was said 4 about her in the transcriPt? 6 I don't know whether he said he'd think about it. I don't even think I even got that level of response. It was a 7 passi ng conversati on. 5 8 9 l0 ll And think this is appropriate or not, but across the t'ime I'Ve Worked on the seventh f loor i n this latest iteration, I made a very conscious decision not to talk about anyth'ing that was pol i ti cal And I repeat, whether you . THE CHAIRNAN: t2 No, sure we understand l3 make t4 conversati on. of what was go'ing on Yovanovitch. He said that he was aware, So you asked hi m i f he was aware l5 t6 with r7 indicated he was aware. 18 t9 20 21 22 23 24 25 I understand. But I just want to the fu11 contours of the Ambassador said, wouldn't it be nice if the State Department issued a statement of support. Did you relate anything else to him in the context of "wouldn't it be nice" -You No. No. THE CHAIRMAN: -- about the attacks on her or the impact on morale in the Department of the attacks on her. Did you MR. MCKINLEY: relate anything along those lines? MR. MCKINLEY: I don't believe I did it at that stage. 47 THE CHAIRMAN: 1 2 w'i th Did you have a subsequent conversation hi m about that? MR. MCKINLEY: Not a J that week. 27tn. whatever, the 26th, 5 the 28th, there were numerous 6 Yovanovitch, and, 8 9 l0 E : t2 MR. I{CKINLEY: And THE CHAIRMAN: have l6 l8 l9 20 2t 22 23 24 25 CHAI RI4AN 5o that is why, that weekend, I raised the issue again, but not with the Secretary. t4 t7 I said in my statement, by media artjcles appearing about professionaljsm. TH l5 been frankly, I did grow concerned that we needed to say something forceful on her behalf. Because I worried that there would be a mischaracterization of what she had done, and we needed to be forceful, supporting her 1l 13 that would've And as 4 7 So 0kay. How many conversations did with the Secretary about this matter? MR. MCKINLEY: Three probably. And the you subsequent ones if I can remind, I presented my resignat'ion on Monday, September 30th. 5o it wasn't very long after the initial conversation. And i n presenti ng my resi gnat'ion, I made clear that I was looking to leave the Department, I wasn't looking to create any news story out of it, but that he should be aware that, of course, part of the reason, people were very aware that I was concerned about what I saw as the lack of public support for Department employees. were in the context of because, 48 I The 2 THE CHAIRMAN: And what was J when you 5 6 7 8 9 l0 ll t2 l3 t4 l5 t6 t7 l8 all, response said that? MR. MCKINLEY: 4 the Secretary's 0n that subject, he did not respond at agai n. I -- 'if this is d'ifficult to fathom or believe. Across the 8 or 9 days, whatever period it was, that I was seeking to raise this, nobody ever real1y said anything to me. It was, like, receive mode. And I just continued to raise the question in different ways, and I stil1 would not receive a reaction. I think once or twice somebody once said, "But we are protecting the staff. We're providing 1ega1 guidelines, wh'ich atlows them the time to prepare thei r testimony, collect documents. We're looking at how to work with the congressional requests." And it would be left at that. But the central question I was raising about say something publ i cly j ust was not add ressed. What I know the 1ega1 support l9 And on 20 THE CHAIRI4AN: Ambassador, 2t 1"1R. MCKI NLEY: Yeah . if I cou1d, because I 'm sor ry . 24 I'm going to turn it back to my colleague to go through the timeline in more deta'i1, but I just want to make sure that we're clear on your conversation with the 25 Sec 22 23 THE CHAIRMAN: reta ry . 49 I 2 J 4 5 In the f i rst conversat'ion you had you essentially got no response with the Secretary, to the request for a statement. Is that accurate? MR. MCKINLEY: That's accurate. THE CHAIRMAN: And in the final conversation with the 6 Secretary where you raised the matter again, you again got 7 speci f i c response 8 Secretary. Is that correct? 9 l0 ll t2 l3 t4 to that MR. MCKINLEY: That 'issue when you rai sed 'i t wi th no the js correct, yeah. THE CHAIRT'{AN: And was there a thi rd conversation? Yeah. So I presented my resignatjon on September 30th. I spoke with the Secretary again when he cal1ed from Europe to discuss my resignation. And I think at that point I said, we11, you know, we really I was pretty MR. MCKINLEY: l8 direct. I said, you know, th'is situation 'isn't acceptable. you know, I've already made my recommendatjon, We need to but I do I am resigning. And that was the conversat'ion. Agai n, I di dn' t get a l9 reaction on that point. l5 l6 t7 20 THE CHAiRMAN: BY MR. 2t 22 23 24 25 a Okay. I yield back to Mr. Goldman. GOLDMAN: So you i ni ti a1ly submi tted your resi gnati on on the 30th, which was 5 days after the calt was released. A a That's correct. Okay. And this in'itial conversation w'ith Secretary 50 4 either on the 25th or 27tn. A Yeah. Probably on the 25th. a After thi s i nj tj a1 conversati on wi th Secretary Pompeo, what did you do next in your efforts to procure a 5 statement? I 2 a J Pompeo was A 6 7 8 So a number of articles began to appear on Yovanovitch. I, frankly, grew concerned that, depending on circLlmstances, this kind of attention could Ambassador l5 attract negative commentary from people who were perhaps i ncl i ned to v"iew her i n a negati ve 1i ght. And so it was, I do remember very clear1y, a Saturday, and I just sat down and sent an emai1 to four people, "We rea1ly need to do thi s. " O Before we get to that emai1, did you jndicate to Secretary Pompeo what the proposed substance of a statement l6 mi 9 l0 ll t2 l3 l4 t7 l8 19 ght be? A a A a No. Just a statement of Yeah, I suPPort? no. 2I Okay. And did you learn from the media that Ambassador Yovanovitch had been offered an extension, or did 22 you learn from the Department? 20 23 24 25 A No, I learned i t about it at all. a Who did you f rom the med'ia. I di d not know 51 A a A I She didn't tell me. t2 in the ha1Is back 'in No. We11, when I saw her whenever she got back I don't know whether we ran jnto each other in June or July. But, ho, no, we d"idn't discuss that, not to my recollection. a Focusing on this email on September 28th, who did you write it to? A I wrote it to the Under Secretary for Political Affai rs, Davi d a Davi d Hale? Ha1e. I wrote it to Carol Perez, the Di rector A General of the Forei gn Serv'ice. I wrote i t to Morgan r3 0rtagus, the Department spokesperson, and Lisa Kenna, the t4 Executive Secretary. 2 a J 4 5 6 7 8 9 l0 ll l6 bureau t7 Phi l9 20 2t 22 23 24 25 you saw her I 'm tryi ng l5 l8 When offi to thi nk. 0h, Phi 1 , the acti ng the sen i or ci a1, the Acti ng Assi stant Secretary for Europe, 1 Reeker. a I'm sure you realize by now that no documents from the State Department, A a A Ri so ght. don't have thj s emai 1 But I'm tetling you the date that I sent it. we don ' t have Depa rtment documents. a A we have received No, we understand that. Yeah. . I 52 10 we'll get to that in a minute. But, because we don't have it, I need to ask you to summarize what you said in it. A Yeah. So I wrote it deliberately, decided it was time to start creating a paper trail of my concern, and kept it short. It was, sort of, I think we need to issue an immediate statement of support for Masha's professjonaljsm and courage because, frankly, I beljeve a lot of courage has been involved in dealing with the situation she has faced and send a message to the Foreign Service that we ll respect prof ess'ional i sm. I 2 J 4 5 6 7 8 9 t2 13 t4 l5 t6 l7 l8 l9 20 2l 22 23 24 25 a And 53 I 2 3 4 5 6 [].1:LL a.m.l I knew that putting it on paper was enough. I d'idn' t have to go i nto, yotl know, a 10-paragraph sort of justification. Everybody knew what i was talking about. And I believe I tried to talk to a couple of them on the telephone as well to reinforce the point. MR. MCKINLEY: And 1 8 9 10 ll t2 l3 t4 l5 16 t7 l8 t9 20 2l 22 23 24 25 BY I"1R. a So so GOLDI*,IAN: we'1I get to that in a second. receive do you reca1l anything else about what you said jn the emajl? D'id you A No it was really short. a Did you receive any response from A I did. At that point I d'id. I received support from in writing I think Carol and Ph'i1 Reeker supported. And I think others were supportive of it as we11. And so the idea was presented to the Secretary. a Let's wait. Let's just go through this step by step if we could. A Su re. a So you received an email in support from Ambassador Perez in support of the idea? A Yeah, absolutely, and Reeker as welI. a Do you reca11 what Ambassador Perez sa'id? A It was like, okay, yes, I agree. I mean, it was that ki nd of conversati onal. 54 2 everythi ng. A O 3 4 5 the the response from Acting Assistant The same. Maybe there were three more words, but same. And you sai d you a From whom l0 A ll agreed, also recei ved addi t'iona1 support. did you receive additjonal support? We11, add'it'ional support, you know, Lisa Kenna I thi nk l'lorgan 0rtagus agreed. a So everyone that you wrote to on that t2 13 And what was A 8 9 Absolutely. Secretary Reeker? 6 7 Understood. I just want to make sure we cover a I Davi d what about Hale? l9 A I did not get an answer from David HaIe. a Okay. You didn't get anything from David Hale. So four of the five responded in support of your idea? A Positive terms. O Atl right. Who did you reach out to on the phone from that group of 20 five? t4 l5 l6 t7 l8 2t 22 LJ 24 25 A From That's what I a A accept that, I think it was only Carol and Phi1. remember. 0kay. Agai n, i t's goi ng to be di ffi cult for everyone to this, I wasn't taking notes the whole time I was going 55 l6 s. I was not envi si oni ng si tti ng i n thi s committee. I was not sort of compiling a record. I was trying to address a situation and I was also making a dec i s'i on to l eave a Now, were you aware at this time that Ambassador Volker had resigned on that Friday, the 27tn? A If I was, it never crossed my mind. Was I following the news? Yes, I was. Do I remember that? It di dn't matter to me. You know, I wasn't focused on Volker. Volker left the Department over L0 years ago. And, you know, as js his right, he had become political in what he did. So, you know, I didn't sit there and th'ink: 0h, Kurt's another Foreign Servi ce offi cer. I didn't thi nk of him i n those terms at all. a AII ri ght. Let's go back to thls ema'il. Do you l7 reca11 anything about the conversation l8 Ambassador Perez I 2 J 4 5 6 7 8 9 l0 ll t2 l3 t4 l5 l9 20 2l through thi . that you had with followjng this email? No. I j ust sai d thi s 'is rea1ly bad. You know, it's the kjnd of conversation where you're just mutually rei nforci ng. So you're si tti ng there not si tti ng there, A 23 you're on the phone, you know. Reeker and Perez absolutely agree, we've got to say something, we've got to do something, 24 thi s i s 22 25 to impact the bui 1di ng. That's approach. And we have to support Ambassador Yovanovitch. thi s i s goi ng the 56 Di a 2 4 or Li sa Kenna ) I A d you speak w1 th any of the others on the l'{organ 0rtagus? may have spoken to I spoke to Li sa and I eventually spoke with Morgan. 5 a All that weekend of the 28th? 6 A No, that day. 7 a 0n the 28th? 8 A Yeah. 9 a What l0 A Just supportive, ll any t2 get 13 sendi ng did Lisa Kenna say to you? that's it. You know, it was not she rea11y wasn't in the line of authority to done. I v,,as j ust lett'ing her know that I was any somethi ng a t4 l5 phone, th'is. And, Ambassador McKi n1ey, questions to come up loaded. We're I don't mean for these just trying to understand l6 A a A a r7 l8 l9 20 2t No, no as many of the facts as we can here. We11, If yeah. Certainly. SorrY. we had the documents and a 1ot easier for the emails i t would be us. 24 Yeah. Yeah. But, anyway, so I sent an emai1. I got a one-word answer or a fjve-word answer. And then I get on the phone and say: This is rea1ly important. Yeah, i t 25 i 22 23 A s , we need to do someth'i ng. 57 a I 2 other than Davi d Hale there was unan'imous agreement? A a 3 4 5 And Yes. You sa'id that you also spoke wi th Ambassador Yovanovitch that weekend. Do you remember when? t2 A I don't know if it was on Saturday or Sunday, but I spoke to her. I wasn't going to bother her. But the answer came back that it was probably better not to issue a statement because it would draw further attention to Yovanovitch and wouldn't it be better to try to let this die down. 5o that was the response I got. a And so it was after you received a response that 13 you reached out to Ambassador Yovanovi tch? 6 7 8 9 l0 ll A a t4 That's correct. t7 let's go back then and figure out. So we understand that you had emai1ed five people. Four responded positively. You spoke to all four and they all l8 responded pos'iti l5 l6 A a A l9 20 2l So vely about a statement. Yeah. What happened next? Probably a couple hours later l"lorgan reached out to by phone and told me that the Secretary had decided that 22 me 24 it was better not to release a statement at this time and that it would be in part to protect Ambassador Yovanovitch not draw undue attention to her. I dropped it. 25 58 a I So do you know who was involved in this 2 conversation with the Secretary on that Saturday, September J 28th? 4 5 I don't know who was in the room with him. press people are i t's l4organ 0rtagus and I thi nk I A No, a Do you know The 6 7 8 9 l0 ll t2 l3 l4 l5 l6 t7 l8 t9 20 2l 22 23 24 25 if the counselor Ulrich Brechbuhl was involved in any of these discussions? A No. I didn't even no. a And you d'idn't include him? A No. a Why not? A I was going my appeal at that point, frankly, was to mostly career people and to the spokesperson who would have to, you know, sort of issue a statement, get approval for it. That was my rationale at that point. It wasn't because I was thinking: 0h, they are going to say this, that, or the other. I was j ust tryi ng to bureaucrati ca11y create a group of support for an idea to move forward. a Had you spoken to Ms. 0rtagus before she reported back to you about the Secretary's wishes? A No. a So you just received an email for her in support? A Yeah, I received an emai1. And then and then and then and then a request to speak by telephone. 59 I a 2 you J prospect 4 5 can A d to you, i n as much deta'i1 as reca11, about what Secretary Pompeo said about the So what di d she sai of a statement? It was simply the Secretary th'inks that a statement would draw undue attentjon to Ambassador Yovanovitch right t7 now unwanted attention and it would be better to 1et this d'ie down. I didn't have a long conversation. I didn't talk a Did you respond to her? A I just said -- at that point, I just accepted it as given. And that's when I got off the phone and reached out to Yovanovi tch. a l,{hat d'id you say to Ambassador Yovanovi tch? A I said, I'm under the I've been told that perhaps a statement is not something you would welcome. What is your view on that? And a Wait. I'm sorry. 5o l\4s. Ortagus told you that the l8 Secretary 6 7 8 9 l0 ll t2 13 l4 l5 l6 t9 20 2t 22 23 24 25 A a was Pardon? Sorry. Just to be c1ear. Ms. 0rtagus that Secretary was concerned A Not a J ust 1 mi nute. A I 'm sorry. a Was concerned that Ambassador told you Yovanov'itch would not 60 in support? Where did you get that idea I want a statement 2 that you understood 3 4 Probably from the conversation with Morgan. But -- A I can't you know, remember exactly how I phrased it. Yeah, I 7 think I did have the impression from Morgan, but I -- I repeat, I'm not sitting there taking notes, so I'm giving a recollection. All I know is my direct question to 8 Ambassador Yovanovitch was, you know, you would 5 6 you l0 be would you or wouldn't you be interested in a statement of support? a And just to be clear, we're just asking for your ll best recollection. 9 t2 13 t4 l5 t6 t7 18 l9 20 2t 22 24 25 A Yeah, flo, because that's what i t's go'ing to be, I'11 tel1 you. a And we understand that when you were hav'ing these conversations you were not expecting to have to reca11 word for word transcriptions of them. What was Ambassador Yovanovitch's response when you asked her that question? well, you've had her here, so you know she's very carefut in the way she speaks and presents. And she said: Yes, I would welcome jt. And it was pretty much that. But also I asked whether others in the building had reached out to her in the preceding days or weeks, and A She she's the answer was no. And I said: What are you doing? And I remember her 61 I 2 J talking about private counsel. I never thought I'd have private counsel. And so I didn't follow up, ask questions about 'it, thi nk about i t. 4 a 5 Did she indicate to you how she reacted to reading the 6 7 8 9 Understood. transcript? No. 0h, there's one thi ng that I 'd also learned over the years. I'm not sure, what stage did you send out the request for information sorry, the request for A l0 depositions? ll O Do you remember I think it the date? was the 27th, so it would have been on t2 the Friday? l3 t7 A Okay. So I would have been aware of that. And I want to underscore, and we can get into it 1ater, I never asked Yovanovitch or Kent what they were going to say, because I realized I shouldn't be talking to them since they were embarking on a lega1 process. What I focused on in my t8 conversations with them was, you know, what's the system t9 23 for you? a What else do you remember from that conversation? A Not much. I t wasn' t a long conversati on. a Did she indicate whether she had spoken to any other career Foreign Service offjcers and had any sense of 24 the morale with the Department? t4 l5 t6 20 2t 22 25 doi ng A No. No. I mean, I was focused on her. 62 6 a What did you do after you got off the phone wi th her in connection with this matter? A I befieve, and that's the term I 'm us'i ng, I don' t know whether I reached out to George Kent that evening or Sunday, but I reached out to George Kent. I think I probably got a hold of him on the Sunday. But I don't remember 7 exactly. I 2 5 4 5 9 D'id you report back a 8 Yovanov i A a A O A l0 ll t2 13 t4 to Ms. 0rtagus that Ambassador tch No, I did not. would welcome a statement? No, I did not. Sorry. No, I did not. Why not? To me, the writing was beginning l5 And also was regrouping. And, 16 that I t7 Monday made frankly, it to be on the wall. was that weekend the decision to inform the Secretary on the l9 teaving. So I was focused on that, too. a Were you aware that the commi ttees i ssued a subpoena to the State Department on that Friday, the 27th, 20 the 18 2t 22 23 24 25 that I was by A I may I may have been, but it's not something that I was sitting there thinking about at all. It wasn't you know, was I watchi ng the net,,Is every ni ght, readi ng medi a reports? I was, but not with any design. a So you reca11 speaking to George Kent on the 29th, 63 I you bel i eve? 2 A 28th a J a But 4 A Yes. 5 a 0ver the weekend? A a Yes. A I 6 7 8 So or 29th. I can't before the remember exactly. l"londay? tel1 us about that. Why did you reach out to him? ll oh, out to him because I think by then thanks to the requests f or deposi t'ions, I real i zed other Department people were being roped in. Ca11 me na'ive, but I t2 did not 9 l0 reached know. And then the t3 out in list of way, people you were asking to interview and George was on the fist. And so I 14 came l5 t7 out to George. And the conversation was extremely short, because we don't know each other. We hadn't met unti 1 a few days later l8 And so he wasn't goi ng to open up 19 necessari 1y. l6 some reached And 20 I just sajd: Has anybody reached 2t you welcome an expression 22 much 23 24 25 to somebody he didn't of support? And know out to you? Would that was pretty the extent of the conversation. a A a And was that the purpose of reaching out to Yes. Just to express some support? him? 64 A a I 2 J What whether anyone A a 4 5 6 Absolutely. did he say in response to your questjon as to had reached out to him? No. Did he give you any opinion about how he felt There may have been a throwaway comment, but, no, about that? A 7 did not have a -- you know, 8 we 9 conversation about we did not have a detailed t9 it, no. I mean, it was so obvious that no one reaching out to him was unusual. a You thought that was unusual? A I thought that was unusual, absolutely. a What did you think should have occurred? A I think a One second, sorry. Just so the record is clear, i t's easi er to A i apologi ze. a No, that's fine. What did you think should have what did you think the 20 State Department should have done with regard to 2t Yovanovi l0 ll t2 l3 t4 l5 l6 t7 l8 22 23 24 25 tch and George Ambassador Kent? A I believe when -- you see, it's very easy with hi ndsi ght. So si nce I dj dn't pay attenti on, di dn't focus on it part'icularly when events were developing in the tate spring into early summer, I don't want to engage in hindsight 65 of this. I don't know what was done. And I I gaming 2 asked specifically about what was done. have not 7 So and I don't want to clearly someone thought highly of her if she was being asked to extend only a month or two before she wasn't. So I'm not going to do the hindsight game. What I do believe is that as this developed over this 8 very short period, the appropriate thing would have been for a J 4 5 6 23 out. Whether it was the legal advisor, the under secretary for management, the under secretary who was responsible for Europe, there should have been at least tet us know if there is or we can't help you because, whatever. Some sort of conversation. So, you know, I was flying so1o, I didn't know what the rules of engagement were. But I did know that, as a Foreign Service officer, I would be feeljng pretty alone at this point. And so I reached out. I was surprised when I found out that I was the fjrst senior person they had been in touch with. a Did you discuss with anyone else in leadership that weekend any about this matter? A No. a And then September 30th you gave in your you 24 gave your resignat'ion notice. 9 l0 ll t2 l3 t4 l5 l6 t7 l8 t9 20 21 22 25 senjor A management to reach That's correct. 66 I 2 a A a A Is that right? Yeah. 7 did that. I think it was less than a 5-minute conversation. I saw the Secretary. At the time, I wasn't prepared to go into any great details. I said: It's time to move on, look at a next phase of my life, I don't befieve thjs will have 8 any major impact, but you are aware J 4 5 6 Descri be how you that people are aware about what is the lack of support t2 that I've been concerned for Department offi ci a1s. And I gave the mid-November sort of exit date, thinking, you know, transition out, do my paperwork in a reasonable 13 ti meframe, 9 l0 l1 l4 a and so on. this meeting in person on Monday? Was Yes, t6 A a t7 A No. l5 l8 t9 i sa'id: As you're aware, also been concerned about these D'id he respond i n any a I have been 2t a 22 A No. 23 a How thi s i ssue. way to that comment? did he respond to your resignation? I mean, there it was disappointment that I resigning. So, you know, I can't on the resignation A I 've No. A 25 WAS did you bring up the statement agai n? And 20 24 it was 67 t's typi cal of di scussi ons that anybody has when I di scussi ons i 2 they've worked with somebody. And I went in and made my J point. It 4 very short conversation. a 5 6 was obviously Did you make a surprise. And as I said, it was a it clear that part of the reason you were resigning was your concerns over -- t7 A At that point -a Sorry, L second. Over thi s Ukrai ne matter? A No. As I menti oned, I made the consci ous deci si on to go jn and to just say: Time for me to go, time for me to look at something else to do with my life. As you're aware. I have expressed my views on the tack of support for Foreign Servi ce of f icers i n th'is si tuati on. That may be part of the story at some point. And, you know, w€'d figure out how we'd announce my you know, do the usual little Department two-liner "thank you for your service" and out the door. a And he didn't address your concerns at all or this l8 'i 7 8 9 l0 ll t2 l3 t4 l5 l6 ssue wi th Ambassador Yovanovi tch 2l A a A 22 MR. t9 20 23 mi nor i No. i n any substant'ive way? No. G0LDt"lAN: I believe our time is up, so yield to ty. 24 THE CHAI RMAN: 25 MR. MCKI N L EY: Ambassador, do you need No, I 'm fi ne. Thanks. a break? the 68 BY lvlR. I CASTOR: 6 for your service. We're honored to be here with you today. By my calculation, 37 years w'ith the State Department. That i s truly an extraordinary career. We appreciate your willingness to participate jn the oversight process. This may come as a 7 surpri se to you, but not always are adm'ini strati on of f j ci als 8 willing to participate eagerly in the congressional oversight 9 process. 2 J 4 5 a A l0 ll Ambassador, thank you again So you are I assumed I was going to be up here one way or the othe r . a t2 You indicated in your opening statement that you l3 were encouraged when Secretary Pompeo took over the State t4 Department. Could you just walk us through that a l5 bit, your thinking, l6 the deci sions he made j n the wake of Secretary Ti llerson's t7 exit? l8 24 A I'm happy to, but please stop me when I get too much into the weeds. What happened in the year of Secretary or L5 months of Secretary Ti llerson's tenure was an extraordi nary hollowing out of the building. Not only did we lose 20 percent of our senior leadership, not only dld he freeze hi ring, he announced an intent'ion to reach an 8 percent cut 25 in t9 20 2t 22 23 staffi ng 1eve1s. little and how you were encouraged by some of 69 He I froze what we call employee family ch affects about 2 ,000-plus member obs. hiring These are 2 overseas, J jobs that are fi1led by family members, usually spouses or 4 partners, in embassies oversees that otherwise you would 5 hi 6 sensi 7 requirements, and had a devastating impact on morale in 8 embassies around the wor1d, as 9 whi ring loca1ly for, tive j be and which sometimes even involved posi t'ions wi th at least 1ow leve1 clearance families had to begin 'in the modern world many couples both look to have some kind of l0 career ll l5 It's not just a question of money. It's a question of life goals and fulfillment. And that one was -- I was sitting as ambassador in Brazil and we were looking at filling, I can't remember the exact number, but it was dozens of positions, and all of a sudden we d"idn't have authority to t6 move ahead. t7 20 all the positions around the world that were being frozen, we were running in into the hundreds of jobs that were disappearing that had become a central part of how we staff, work our embassies, but also how we support the 2l modern Ameri can fami 1y oversees i n deployment. t2 l3 t4 l8 t9 22 23 24 25 movi ng forward. And you add cut by 40 to 50 percent. This was devastating to mid-1evet officers. M'id-1eve1 officers, because of a hi ri ng surge "in the 2000s , al ready had a very slow promotion track. By cutting back the number of Promotions were 70 slots for I avai 1ab1e 2 condemning J 4 5 6 7 8 9 promoti on, you were essenti ally a generation of next leadersh'ip Foreign Service to toiling at a certain leve1 when they would obviously have reached the point where they were ready to work in positions of greater responsi bi 1i ty. If I remember correctly, only L out of 9 Under Secretary positions were filled in that 15 months in a confjrmed position. 0ut of 23 equivalent assistant secretary equivalent positions, I think we were at 3. And so senior l0 leadershi p i n the bui 1di ng was nonexi stent. ll in the Latin America Bureau, but the experiences was mirrored in other bureaus, in which no one felt any authority to move paperwork forward or initiatives and were constantly rethjnking, looking over their shoulder, how to work and what to do. I could go on, but I think you get the picture. sorry, not the when I came And so when I came in in 1et me make this c1ear, when Secretary Pompeo came in, he came in with a completely djfferent optic and it was 1et's make the Department work. And many of the initiatives I enumerated in my statement were products of the work he did. I never had anything to do with that. It just began to work with the people he was working with. And he does deserve credit for rebuilding the institut'ion, processes, creating opportunities, and, frankly, ambitjons for the Foreign t2 l3 t4 l5 l6 t7 l8 l9 20 2t 22 /.3 24 25 I worked 71 1 Service. And so 2 that was the envi ronment I came into. It wasn't 6 I sti 11 fett i n the fi rst 3 to 4 months: Are we going to get there or aren't we? But by the fa11, by late 2018, i t was beginning to have a rea1ly posi tive impact. a And the job that he asked you to do, what were the 7 duti J 4 5 immediate. es? 20 duties. When i i nterviewed w1 th him, I said: What i s i t you expect me to do? Because there wasn't going to be a chief of staff position. And traditionalty the advisor kind of position is the counselor position in the Department, so I was wondering, we11, there's a counselor, and once you start filling the positions, what am I rea11y there to do? And he made clear that I would have the freedom to raise j ssues wi th h'im d i rectly, anyth i ng I saw that should be focused on or that was of concern, and to fol1ow what was happening in the world. And what became the pattern of work was I did exactly that and where I thought I had added value with an op'inion 2l and 22 participated. 8 9 l0 ll t2 l3 14 l5 l6 t7 t8 l9 23 24 25 A There weren't any specific or working with bureaus or working with special envoys I to help out. I remember during the DRC Congo electoral transition I ended up representing the Africa Bureau at the deputies meeting at I, a couple of times, was asked by bureaus 72 the White House. I was asked by in 2 0rtegas J di alogue. Nicaragua to see'if to go talk to we could But those were few and far. 4 WHA I the restart a national was approached by the 7 that supports educational exchanges around the world to make a case for funding, greater funding for the 'ini ti atives they were proposi ng. But I really didn't become 8 operational very often. 5 6 bureau a 9 l0 ll t2 l3 l4 15 t6 t7 l8 t9 20 2l 22 23 24 25 And you mentioned that you in part became a liaison or the career Fore'ign Servi ce? A Yeah. I mean, 'it's a grand term. I don't want to make this sound like it was formal. People came and talked to me. If I can just go back to my career. I have been in f ront offices s'ince L994. 1994 was my first deputy chief of m'ission job in Maputo, Mozambique. And so I have been in front offices cont'inuously probably longer -- I don't know anybody who's been as long as that. And you meet a 1ot of people. And you meet a 1ot of peopte throughout the career. And so I knew a lot of people, and people woutd come talk to ffie, of all ranks. a And the Secretary of State travels more than any other U.5. official. How did you, during the rollout of your new j ob, i nfluence the Secretary and i nfluence hi s i nner circle? Which may just be Mr. Brechbuhl. But how did you go f 73 I about bri ngi ng yourself i nto thei A 2 J 4 5 6 7 8 9 l0 ll t2 r sphere of j nfluence? 0n the travel schedules and decisions on where to go? The bu reaus. a A a A go on all Just in the management. I mean, you No, on the management, zero. OkaY. I was invited to join most of the trips. I didn't of them, but I think maybe 65, 70 percent. But I never got into the management, the scheduling, who was being met, preparation of paperwork. I went on as staff support, i f you w'i11 , on keepi ng abreast of events. And then, depending on the places we were, if I had l5 the jssues that were being worked, you know, I might be in a meeting and you're sjtting around talking, what did you think of that, what did you think of this, and give a l6 view. t7 a You mentioned that you weren't going to be the chief of staff, but you were brought in to be a senior voice within hopefully the inner circle of the Secretary? A 0n the seventh floor, yes. And I repeat, at the in the early beginning I think I was in the early stages I was, I think, the only person in that capacity from the Forei gn Servi ce. That changed. a Right. And part of your duties were to help the Secretary and Mr. Brechbuhl understand the viewpoints of the l3 t4 l8 l9 20 2t 22 23 24 25 added value on 74 I career Forei gn Servi ce offi cers? 20 A If I can suggest -a If concerns were I never had the formalization of duties. But, A yes, I thought it was what I should do, is as they worked on di fferent i ssues. I want to emphasize, they were very proactive in pushing for many of the measures that I've outlined. a And with a Cabinet secretary that didn't travel as much as the Secretary of State, if you were there engaging with the Secretary on a daity basis, you'd be able to develop a rapport, an ability to influence the decisions of the day' but not as much with the Secretary of State given his travel schedule. Is that fair to saY? A I don't 1i ke the word, you know, i nfluenci ng i n one way or the other. a Help i nform A You know, help inform the decisions is a much better way to describe it. So, you know, depending on the issues, where I thought I had something of value to offer I'd 2t speak up. 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 l0 1l t2 l3 t4 l5 t6 t7 18 t9 22 23 24 25 a And did you have success in imparting your the information you were receiving from the building to the Secretary and Mr. Brechbuhl? A I absolutely believe I did. But I want to repeat, knowledge and 75 ll of what I did was, you know, focus, say, as we're getting ready to build up towards the beginning of negotiations on Afghanistan, having spent 3-t/2 years there, having spent a lot of my career on conflict negotiations, I'd si t i n meeti ngs wi th Ambassador Khal i lzad (ph) or w'ith the Secretary, what are we going to do, how are we going to game this, that sort of thing. So there was that part of my work, which took up a 1ot of the t'ime. I didn't spend my day worrying about the bu'ildi ng every day. And especi a1ly once all these changes were carried out, it seemed to me the instjtution was moving t2 ahead. I 2 J 4 5 6 7 8 9 l0 13 t4 l5 l6 t7 l8 t9 20 2l 22 23 24 25 you know, a 1ot I'd also like to underscore the work that was done by the Secretary, by Mr. Brechbuhl, by others, to push Foreign Servi ce offi cers for ambassadorshi p posi t'i ons overseas. They absolutely were engaged on a direct and personal level in maki ng th'ings happen and go f orward f or the Forei gn Servi ce. So my appearance here today isn't to sit and slam the Secretary. That's not what I 'm here for. I 've talked about a specific'instance which 1ed me to a conclusion. a To the contrary, you've been very complimentary of the Secretary. I think we can note that for the record. Did you have regular telephone conversations with Mr. Brechbuhl? A No. But he's a person who I spoke to on a regular 76 8 basis. He's very approachable. So we worked a lot on a couple of issues together. But we're on the Same corridor, So you run across each other, you Say hi, you have a corridor conversati on on whatever the 'issue i s of the day. But we didn't have weekly formal I didn't have weekly formal meeti ngs wi th anyone. a 0kay. When you decided to formalize your concerns in the email you mentioned that you transmitted to Under 9 Secretary Ha1e, Director General Perez, Lisa Kenna, Phil I 2 J 4 5 6 7 that you kept it to the career senior l0 Reeker, you mentioned ll l3 didn't loop in Mr. Brechbuhl. And I just wonder what your -- like why you decided not to A I wanted to take the temperature with people who I 14 knew. t2 people and you l5 a l6 A t7 peopl e l8 Ca I knew well from previous years. These aren't I had just met. In the case of Reeker, i n the case of Who And so a be in 2t ag r eemen 23 the other. a that I think you said four of wi th group Rlght. the five seemed to you And perhaps David Hale was as what I said was j ust 24 t Yeah. A 22 25 ght. rol Perez, David Ha1e, we knew each other. t9 20 Ri wel1. I didn't get a response I'm one way or And so was there ever a discussion among 77 I 2 J A a A a No. of trying to No. 7 s i ssue to Mr. Brechbuhl's attention that maybe the Secretary needed to think this through from a number of different vantage points? A Not certainly in that group. I don't know if jt 8 happened separately. I simply l0 a time, it at this was not a good idea, the Secretary thought it wasn't ll a good t2 l6 A words -a A a t7 conversations with that group to maybe overturn l8 the decision? 4 5 6 9 l3 t4 l5 19 20 2t 22 23 24 25 A a A a bri ng thi have no idea. So the communjcation back was right now, i dea? That's what I was told. I'm not going to put this was not communicated to me by the Secretary. And who It was communicated by spokesperson 0rtagus. Okay. And did you have any additional or revisjt No. Okay. And jn hindsight, do you which you did? INonverbal response. I ] mean, i f the communi cati ons offi cer, the press for tack of a better term, comes back and says, oo,we're not ready to do the statement, the Secretary is not interested in that, did you have any discussjons person essentially 78 I wi th 8 A That's an excellent questi on. But, agai n, flo, I di dn't do i t. 0 Okay. A And jf I can suggest that everybody was working in their own, I won't say si1os, on their issues, and I did feel I was trying to drive this more than others. a Right. And did you get any feedback from Perez, 9 Kenna, Reeker, other than what you've described so far? 2 J 4 5 6 7 A a l0 ll Not real ly. Okay. And did you have any phone conversations l5 with them, any of the other folks? A No, not that weekend. No, not at all. a Into the next week, did You? A The next week and I'm now beginning to get l6 conf t2 l3 l4 t7 l8 19 20 2l 22 23 24 25 used, so bear w'ith a A 0h, me. okaY. But the next week would have been the week of 30th. Yeah, that week, I remember -- that week was the week that I presented my res'ignati on. And at that poi nt I did by that point I did 1et the under secretary I 1et everybody know not everybody I 1et the counselor, Brechbuhl, know, the under secretary for management, Bulatao, know that I was resigning, I let David Hale know. And I believe on all three occasions, because the September 79 I 6 d, you know, that I , as I said in my opening statement, I was looking to resign at a slightly later date, but the situation, the lack of support, that I really believed the statement should go out, that it sti11 wasn't too late to put a statement out, that this was critjcal for the Foreign Service, this was having an impact 7 on morale. I 2 J 4 5 8 9 t0 ll t2 l3 t4 l5 l6 t7 l8 l9 20 2t 22 23 24 25 questi on i nev'itably was why, and sai I talked to each of them individually during that week. And I also remember just in a general staff meeting of under secretaries when the issue didn't come up at all I said: And by the way, there's a lot of news out there and this is having a real1y negative impact inside the building. So And the response was essentially we do have a large in supporting American diplomacy overseas, which is a legitimate point, but'i t didn't answer the question of why don't we also do something to signal that we're supporting our people. a Did any of the fotks that you signaled your intent to resign, did any of the folks express alarm, dismay? A Everybody expressed regret. Nobody asked me to stay. And at the time, I was expecting some form of traditional State Department, a 1ittle message, thank you for your service, out the door. But that but there were questions about why was I leaving. O One of the thi ngs that' s puzzl i ng, I thi nk, 'is mission to continue working on 80 I you've spent your almost 40 years working complex, worthwhile 2 issues, many of which certainly in your ambassador posts take 3 time to work, correct? And th'is sort of seems 1i ke came 4 together so quickly. 5 6 7 8 A a A If didn't come together so quickly. And I -I mean, it was 8 days, right? That's ri ght. And I 'm goi ng to be very di rect a A Yeah. here. 9 l5 It wasn't just the situation ins'ide the building and the lack of a statement of support. a Ri ght. A I read the news. I read what is happening. I think I tried to say clearly in my statement that i think I used the words "deeply disturbed" or "disturbed" by the l6 implication that foreign governments were being approached to t7 procure negative information on poli l0 ll t2 l3 t4 and one 20 I 2t the United States 22 overseas. It 25 of concern that threw into question exactly what you're l9 24 opponents. Wel1, actually that was another issue l8 23 tical to me saying. have spent 37 years bei ng a d'ip1omat. Bei ng a di plomat f or means means supporting millions of Americans supporting our companies to create jobs at home. It means resolving conflicts that impact the United States. It means keeping the homeland safe. It means working with our military, the agency, all of our civilian 81 I agenci 2 It es on proj ect'i ng our i nterests and i nfluence overSeaS. means projecting American values. In Afghanistan I J worked with three four-star generals, 4 with General Dunford, General CampbelI, General Nicholson. 5 I've 6 diplomats doing what they do overseas, they help keep this 7 country secure and prosperous and also offer us the worked in confljct areas the world over. And by l0 possibility of being linked to the outside world. In terms of supporting our values, we're also the front line in promoting issues of human rights, democracy, and ll cooperatj on i nternati ona11y. t2 l8 In this context, frankly, to see the emerging information on the engagement of our missions to procure negative political information for domestic purposes, combined with the failure I saw in the building to provide support for our professional cadre in a particularly trying time, I think the combination was a pretty good reason to decide enough, that I had I had no longer a useful role to l9 play. 8 9 l3 14 l5 l6 t7 20 2t 22 23 24 25 Is it possjble that the Secretary and his people hadn't fully come to grips with how they were going to respond to this inquiry? A It is enti rely possible. Since I never had a conversation with any of them about the Ukraine it would be sil1y of me to try to speculate what the reasons for their a 82 All I I approach was. 2 thi s approach was not ) impact. 4 a knew was, in terms of the building, that producing was having a negative 5 of impeaching the President has been at the forefront of political dialogue s'ince the moment the 6 President took offi ce, correct? The 7 A 8 comments on If I 9 f 'm issue not going to make I'm not going to make the poli t'ica1 si tuati on. can underscore, throughout my career, and l0 in ll controversial I came in 1982 under President Ronald Reagan, there have been t2 right the way through that. There have been controversial domestic political moments. There have 13 been moments when American moments cit'izens, Foreign Service t9 offj cers, anyone si ts there and questi ons what's happeni ng, what's the impact of this or that development. In my experience in the Foreign Service, and I don't need to go back 37 years, I don't remember occas'ions when 'in the workplace, certainly since I've been a front office person si nce L994, I don't remember people rai si ng pol i ti cs, 20 questi oni ng who was Presi dent. t4 l5 t6 t7 l8 21 What everyone focused on, where they sat was supporting 24 look at the role the State Department has played over the last 3 years'in supporting the Pres'ident's agenda, I think we have a pretty 25 strong record of positive engagement supporting the 22 23 the agenda of the admi ni strat'ion. And 'i f we agenda. 83 I 2 J 4 5 6 7 8 9 l0 ll t2 r3 l4 l5 re not s'itti ng around talki ng about 'impeachment, impeachment inquiries. In fact, when I was raising these issues, you think I was just saying, "0h, yeah, and the President's going to be impeached or they're talking about" no one was doing that sort of thing. So we' a No, I understand. It took the White House a 1ittle bi t of t'ime to develop thei r posi ti on. They wrote to the Hitl on 0ctober 8th, I think, which was after you had already those 8 or 9 days had already elapsed. And I'm just wondering whether the Secretary was hamstrung by decisionmaking that was out of his control? A And it could well be. I can't comment on that since I didn't speak with him about it and he didn't speak about 'it wi th me. I also I tried to put what in the context of what happened in the Bureau mentioned in my statement, l6 was happening t7 of International 0rgan'izatjons. You may reca1l that that t9 investigation was sparked by complaints, allegations of politic'ization, improper personnel practices, whatever. 20 There's a big 2t general. 18 22 When title on the report that report came out, produced by the inspector and the expectation was that 23 there'd be change i n the leadershi p of the Internat'iona1 24 0rganization Bureau, it was as simple as that. When'it 25 didn't happen, it certainly had a knock on effect on the 84 I 2 3 4 5 6 7 Bu reau. don't have to take my word for i t because somebody sat there and leaked a townhall that the deputy secretary and the under secretary doing the right thing, by the way, and being open and honest -- it was stil1 leaked. But they also made clear that it would be difficult to move ahead with certain changes that had been expected; for example, the You ll of the assistant secretary in charge. 5o when you took at the tjmeframe I'm talking about, I'm not working from sort of, you know, I woke up one morning and gee, you know, no statement for Masha Yovanovitch, I wonder t2 what's happeni ng? 8 9 10 removal l8 I0 saga since I came into the Department in the summer -- since I began to work with the Secretary in the summer of 2018. I also came into the Department with the cumulative impact of watching what Secretary Tillerson did to the building. You do reach a point, and I'm 65 years o1d, where maybe, just maybe I should 19 consider doing something else. 13 t4 l5 l6 t7 20 2t 22 I've been following the So you combine everything, but jt wasn't it real1y shouldn't be cast i n I woke up one day. I was concerned about the building. I was concerned about how they handled 24 the I0 investigation. I raised my concern about the impact of the I0 report and the failure to follow through with more 25 obvi ous courses 23 of acti on. 85 And so I 2 J 4 5 6 7 8 9 l0 ll I was already developing the sense of, we11, I reatly effective anymore inside the buitding in one of the two key jobs I think I have here, so perhaps maybe i t's t'ime to move on. guess I'm not ght. of the j nteresti ng and compl i cated i ssues faci ng i nterbranch confl i ct, whether i t relates to jn the context of a congressional investigation, is that, you know, every matter presents d'if f erent f acts. Every si ngle oversight 'injtiative develops its own rules of engagement, rules of the road, and there's reasons for that. The courts a Ri One t2 re accommodatjons, accommodati ons process requi res understanding each side's interests, whether it be protecting 13 del i berat'ive material t4 l5 l6 l7 18 19 requi s or the 1i ke. at the outset of any congressional paralysis might investigative matter, there is a period of be a good word to describe it, where each side is trying to figure out how they are going to get to what they need to do thej r j ob. And so consequently, And th'is matter j s di f f erent f rom Benghazi and I'm sure 24 it's different from Iran-Contra and some of the other high profile, important congressional inqui ries. Some of the embassy bombings had some extraordinary back and forth. And eventually a, you know, back and forth does settle in. I mean, when the Congress sends a subpoena, you know, it's not 25 an "easy" button, the documents don't j ust 20 2l 22 23 magi ca1ly appear. 86 J even if the State Department don't appear in wanted to turn over all the documents, it's not as simple as collecti ng them, photocopyi ng them, and turni ng them over. 4 They have I 2 And they ll to review the documents, they have to understand what posi ti ons they' re goi ng to take. And so consequently, I mean, 'is 'it fair to say jn your experience that it just takes a fittle bit of time for these conflicts to settle into a point where each side can begin to work wi th each other? A You've raised a number of issues here, and perhaps if I can answer it coming at it with a slightly different 12 opti c. 5 6 7 8 9 10 l3 t4 l5 l6 t7 l8 t9 20 2t 22 23 24 25 different rules of the road. We11, let's expand that and suggest that everybody who's involved in an issue has a different level of experience with what is happening and has a different view on what is happening. And then some peopte have more facts or different facts about what is happening. If I can come back to why I did what I did, which is why I'm here, I may not know everything that was being thought through on the seventh f1oor. It's absolutely obvious I did not. But what I do know is that good commanders support thei r troops i n moments of cri si s. And the cumulative impact of what I'd seen in the bui ldi ng, notwi thstandi ng everythi ng else that i s happeni ng You suggest that every engagement has 87 'in l6 th thi s i nqui ry, seemed to di ctate what was a very simple course of action: Say something. As f or the i ssue you rai se about settl i ng 'into j n ef f ect a battle rhythm and figuring out, especially over a long-term sort of set of engagement, whether it's on the foreign policy issue, to answer your question, or whether it's with the work of the committee at this moment, you're absolutely right, of course it takes time. a Do you feel like you would have been able to influence things if you stayed a little longer? A No. That's why if I can sort of be clear on this, it's not that I got a reaction or a particularly negati ve reacti on. I di dn' t get a reactj on. And so to me it was very clear that I rea11y didn't have a role to play on this. But that's fine. I don't run the Department. I don't make the deci si ons on how pol i cy should t7 be handled. And but I 2 J 4 5 6 7 8 9 l0 ll t2 l3 t4 l5 l8 wi a A But your viewpoint is so valuable? 2t WelI, I don't make the decisions on how issues should be handled. But I felt that on the central question on whi ch I 've bu'i1t much of my career, wh j ch i s supporti ng 22 our peopte in the Department, if I wasn't able to 23 sort of impact in arguing for something I 24 extremety straightforward and rather 25 there were questions about whether I could continue to l9 20 saw make any that is limited, then perhaps 88 I influence things, and so I decided to separate. a J you. He wanted 7 A a A a 8 A 9 o l0 A 4 5 6 ll I to do a statement fike you suggested, right? Yes. And Carol Perez? Yes. And Li sa Kenna? Yeah, but she doesn't get i nvolved i n I'm j ust talki ng about Yeah, yeah. But, yeah, I mean you po1 i cy. talk to people. mean, yeah. t2 l3 You ment'ioned Ph'i1 Reeker was i n agreement wi th a 2 But you sent your email a to to these fo1ks, you talked them. t4 A l5 a That's ri ght. And thi s 'is the begi nni ng of a consensus-bui 1di ng 20 of taki ng everyone's temperature, these senior people, that collectively if you you would hope you'd have an ability to combine yourselves to maybe talk to Mr. Brechbuhl and maybe reverse the decjsion. And I'm just wondering, it just sort of seems lining a disconnect that you 2t sent thi t6 t7 l8 t9 22 exe rc i se s A We11, it's since I did speak with Mr. Brechbuhl and 24 I did speak to Mr. Bulatao on the following day. I don't quite see the disconnect. Did I gather a group 25 together? 23 89 I Let me say another thing. l'ly experience in bureaucracy 2l is that people don't tend to speak out on certain issues or don't raise their heads on certain issues. And so if it was clear that there was a decision to see how things developed, to use the approach you're suggesting, see how things settle into place, perhaps their view was, wel1, you know, let's see how far Mike gets. And I've been in the bureaucracy long enough to know that you don't put guns to people's heads to try to generate support for an initiatjve. So that was that. Now, what you're suggesting, why would I not say it's not the sensible approach, of course it is. a I'm not let me just be I'm not suggesting you should do one th'ing or the other. You've been wi th the State Department for 37 years, you've served our country, you can do whatever you want to do. So whatever course, you know, you took I'm not questi oni ng that. I 'm j ust tryi ng to ask you some questions to see A Sure. about your thought process, because it seems a like you could have been an influential voice to help the 22 State Department move through thj s challengi ng time. 2 J 4 5 6 7 8 9 l0 ll t2 l3 t4 l5 l6 t7 l8 t9 20 23 24 25 clearly the President can remove an ambassador at any time for any reason or no reason. When Ambassador Yovanovitch was recal1ed, did you I forget if You sa'id rather 90 I 2 ) 4 5 6 7 8 9 l0 ll t2 l3 l4 l5 t6 t7 l8 l9 20 2l 22 23 24 25 to her or have any communications with her when she was recalled in April or May when you first learned about -A No, I did not. a Did any other State Department Foreign Service officers come to you? I mean, you had sort of you were in a role that sounds like a bit of an ombudsman. Is that a fai r characteri zati on? A I don't know. No, I don't you know, if I remember anything, maybe somebody would mention in passing, terrible what happened to Masha, it would be that level of conversati on. Nobody came to me f ormally on thi s quest'ion. a OkaY. A No. you mentioned it, but did you like reach out 91 I [L2: ].0 p.m. l BY MR. 2 a 3 Was CASTOR: your concern primarily then when you saw the t9 call transcript and you saw the A That's correct. Yeah. You know, because i f you take a look at the history of the State Department, you know, across time, people do get removed for d'ifferent reasons. And what you do want to ensure is that, you know, their careers aren't ended by a decision like that, that there is a soft landing or some support. And so it seemed, when I ran into Masha, that she was getting on with her 1ife. 5o I djd not engage on that at the time,ro, I did not. May I should have, but I didn't. I can't go back and rewrite that chapter. a The fact that she was recalled, had that jssue begun to pass, or was i t st'i11 a bubbl i ng A No. I mean, I don't remember it being raised wjth me one way or the other. a When did you first learn about the call? Was it 20 when 4 5 6 7 8 9 t0 ll t2 l3 t4 l5 l6 t7 l8 the transcript was made public? 2t A 22 aso 23 A That's correct. We1l, you know, whenever I think, you know, if in the newspapers, everything that 24 we go back and look 25 out from the whistlebtower account onwards. 0h, but came when did 92 6 I learn about the reference to Ambassador Yovanovitch? a Ri ght. through the A Through the call seen the transcript in the news? O release of the transcript, yeah, that's correct. A a And was there any before the transcript was 7 released, was there any State Department meeting where 8 discussed I 2 J 4 5 you this is a big news story No, not at all. So you probably read it the same time we did? t2 A a A Absolutety. And maybe not even then because we were at the U.N., and there were lots of meetings taking l3 place and work throughout the day. 9 l0 ll a t4 And I think you've told us about aII your l5 communications with Ambassador Yovanovitch, and then I l6 understand you also spoke with Deputy Assistant Secretary t7 Kent? A a l8 t9 20 2t 22 /.J 24 25 told Yes. And could you relate to us what he totd you and you h'im? I decided it was time to meet the person I'd talked to on the phone. I think I'd anyways, so, you know, because I remember I did the try phone call the previous weekend. So I went down to his office and sat with him, and what A 0n 0ctober 3rd, you know, 93 I 2 J 4 5 that he had been in the starting throes of pu11 i ng together documentati on, whatever. I di dn' t pay attention exactly, you know, data, documentation, whatever that had come with a congressional request for documents. And he told me there were 1.0 or 1.5 people i n the room he told me was ll that among those who participated was a lawyer from the but I 1ega1 office. I don't have the memo because I don't can tetl you, he sent it to me that night, okay. But in the memo forget the memo. I mean, he told it to me and then he wrote it up. And if I remember correctly, he challenged the deadline t2 they were working against, why weren't they given the request l3 for t4 pu11 together whatever they were l5 the congressional request had come in. 6 7 8 9 l0 l6 and documents on He a timely basis and why were they also raised what he saw hav i ng to pulling together days after there was a response, 20 I never read, from State Department to Congress on parameters for the whatever you were going to do. And he also raised that there were inaccuracies in there, in particular about protecting or providing legal support or 2t servi ces. 22 And 23 remember 24 you know, the lack t7 t8 l9 25 which you're going to have to bear with me. I'm trying to the chronology on this. I th'ink we also discussed, of financial support for paying for private counsel, which appalled me. It absolutely appatled 94 I me. 22 to, you know, we'11 see what happens, you know, when we when, you know I think he bas'ically said he would have to wai t f or a subpoena f rom the commi ttee before he could appear but that he had been engaged in trying to support Ambassador Yovanovitch earlier in the year. He also mentioned that he thought that the lawyer was trying to shut him up, and so I didn't tel1 him to wrjte it up. He wrote it up as a memorandum to the fites, and he sent it to me. That was that Thursday night. And I felt absolutely obliged to send it to other people on the 7th f1oor. I thought it was a serious memorandum. I thought it indicated a lack of support that was broader than simply a questi on of statements. What was going to happen to other State Department people who might be drawn into the inquiry? it seemed that it was urgent to address the allegations that there was bullying tactics, et cetera. So I passed the memo on, and I didn't get any answer from anybody. a Is the letter that Deputy Assistant Secretary Kent was referring to, was that a letter that the Secretary had 23 sent? 2 J 4 5 6 7 8 9 l0 1l t2 13 t4 l5 l6 17 l8 l9 20 2t 24 25 And he made a passing reference A a It It was a memo. was a memo? 95 2 A Yeah. Yeah. You know, it's simply, you know, you write up: This happened. Thi s happened. Thi s happened. J Thjs I And i t 4 5 9 a 12 l3 you related concerned about i naccu rac i es A ll a memorandum to the files. Right. But he a 8 t0 was You just have 5ec to us that he was that the That's correct. Department had. And was that a letter that the reta ry had sent? Yeah. I thi nk i t's A what was sent sorry. I don't have the timeline on that, di dn't you say up but here I 'm I think, 14 a The Secretary had sent a Ietter. l5 A Had sent a letter to you. Was it the Secretary l6 sent a letter t7 a l8 A t9 a 20 A 2t a record. 6 7 happened. s u bpoen Yeah. on condi tj ons and expressi ng hi s concern Ri ght. over how individuals were being bullied and aed Correct. 22 a 23 A and 24 a Uh-huh. 25 A Okay. So I believe what Kent was referring to all thi s? Ri ght? was 96 I that letter. ) 4 5 Okay. And did a A 0 2 he I never read that letter. 0ther than identifying the fact that he believed there were inaccuracies, did he te11 you what they were? 7 A Not in any detail, no. And, frankty, to me, the mere fact that somebody feels strongly enough about what 8 they've heard and what they're sensing about what they're 9 saying 6 to somebody who's working on the impeachment inquiry a record of what was d was si gni fi cant enough. And he defj n'i tely characteri zed te i t l0 that they need to ll sai t2 l6 t as bullyi ng tacti cs. a So I think you said that was 0ctober -- nobody's hold'i ng you to these dates A Yeah. No, 0ctober 3rd I actually remember. The days I remember is when I actually put something on paper, t7 which l8 a Thursday, the 3rd? A Thursday, the 3rd, it was sent to me. I think my email I don't believe I sent it that I don't think I even saw that night. I think I -- I don't remember when I I sent it on Friday, October 4. saw it. a Okay. So j ust unpacki ng the ti me1 i ne, the call transcript is put out, I think, hlednesday, September 25th. The committees evinced an interest in taking depositjons on l3 t4 l5 l9 20 2t 22 23 24 25 wri down and have i . 97 1 Friday, September 27 . Presumably, Deputy Assi stant Secretary 2 Kent developed his concerns on, you know, l{onday, Tuesday, or J Wednesday 4 5 A of that week. What he was reacting day but also how he to was the meeting he had that felt he had been treated by the 8 to that point. a Ri ght. And do you remember, was he di sappo'inted mistreated because he was unable to provide documents or 9 testi mony or 6 7 Department up or 22 A No. No. I don't remember at all. To me, the key issue at that point was he fett that he was being bu1lied. To me, you know, I took the headline a Ri ght. A because if we can go back to why I did what I did, I didn't need to sit there and, you know, memorize the details for a simple reason, because once I heard it, once I read the memorandum -- by the way, having it in writing in the system it was already a record wh'ich should cause concern to the legat adviser's office and to management in the bui ldi ng. And so, for me, that was enough. Thi s j s happening. You know, the issues I've been trying to raise about impact on the Department are real. We need to do 23 somethi ng. l0 ll t2 l3 t4 l5 l6 l7 l8 l9 20 2t 24 25 Okay. But, as you sit here today, you don't remember whether he was d'isaffected by not being able to a 98 1 produce documents or 8 No. No, I don' t even bel i eve oh , di saffected? No, sorry, but that's not the word. O Angry? A No. 0n the documents, sorry, it was whatever they were being asked to do, all right, that they weren't going to have enough time to do whatevelit is they were being asked to do. That's what he was angry about, okay, concerned 9 abou 2 J 4 5 6 7 l0 ll A t . a Okay. But they had tried to set up a tight timeline? t2 A 0h, I don't 13 a Okay. t4 l5 l6 17 l8 l9 20 2t 22 23 24 25 know. I 'm j ust tryi ng to understand I understand the quest'ions, and I wi sh I had better answers. I wish -- but I don't because I don't remember the details on that. What I do remember is what he saw as accusatory behavior from the L lawyer in questjon, and he put it on paper. That is an usual thing to do. a Ri ght. So wri t'ing a memo to f i le about an interaction like that, is there relative A He di dn't j ust talk abou t the i nteracti on. He talked about the letter, the content of the letter, and then A Yeah. No, the i nteracti on, yeah. There was a 1ot on the i nteracti a So that would be an ex t remely rare occurrence A Yes, absolutetY. on. 99 for someone I a 2 A J a 4 A Yes. 5 o And so the 6 i t to create a memo Absolutely. to the fjle about something of that sort? fact that he did that caused you very seriously? 7 A That's correct. 8 a And when you pass that information 9 to take remembe r who on, do you you passed i t to? l5 Yes. I passed it on to the Under Secretary For Political Affairs and to the legal advisor. That was my first step. And then I decided to add the Deputy Secretary And no one, I mean, 1itera1ly, not one word was sa'id to me about i t. a Okay. 5o you passed it on Thursday, the 3rd, or l6 Friday, the t7 A l0 1l t2 I3 t4 A 4tn? I think it was Friday, the 4th. I'm pretty sure it l8 was Friday, the 4th. t9 a Okay. And so nobody from the lega1 adviser's office called you? A Nobody contacted me. I called the acting lega1 advi sor on Thursday to or dld I call him on I can't. I apologize. Wait a minute. No. I tried all day Friday to reach to get a mi nute wi th the act'ing 1ega1 advi sor. And so I did let him know this was coming. I thought it was 20 2t 22 23 24 25 100 cou r tesy a 2 J 4 . Okay. And did you relate your concerns to the other group of officials that you had A I put i t 'in wri ti ng. been 14 talk to Ph11 Reeker, Li sa Kenna? No. By that stage sorry, by that stage, I'd already decided, wel1, this is the way it is. Whatever is going to happen is going to happen, but I'm not going to be in the building much longer. So I'm passing on the concern for general review. a We just have a couple of minutes 1eft. A Please. a Before our round is out, I like to pivot to our members to see if they have anything they want to ask you. l5 That's what we've been 5 6 7 8 9 10 ll t2 l3 a A l8 2t 22 23 24 25 n these. Yeah. Sure. Sorry. t'4R. J0RDAN: What exactly did you put in wri ting? MR. MCKiNLEY: So get the memo to the fi1es, right, the t7 20 doi ng i A l6 l9 But d'id you to the files that was sent to me. And so, on top of it, I sai d, I 'm f orwardi ng the f o11owi ng report, whi ch 'i s of concern on a number of 1eve1s. It includes allegations of intimidation and bullying and questions accuracy I don't know whether I used the word and ralses questi ons about whether there are lies in statements, you know. And then I said: And this is why we really need to do something memo 101 I 2 J 4 5 6 7 8 9 l0 ll forcefully for our colleagues in the Foreign Service. And I also mentioned, frankly, the 1ega1 fees concern that I had. MR. J0RDAN: Yeah. Because you were going to have to hire outside counsel, and you woutd not be able MR. MCKINLEY: 0h, yeah, we11, that's a nice question, but, no, absolutely not. Until I received when was it got the note from Mr. Noble? It was Saturday, midday, afternoon, I hadn't talked to any lawyer. You can check with anybody who knows me. l'lR. JORDAN: I'm not I t7 to be talked into approaching a lawyer. I didn't want to deat with 1ega1. My approach to coming to this was I saw the request. I answered it before I even talked to any legal counsel. And my approach was, why should I need 1egal counsel to come here and talk about this? But that's not the way Washington works, l8 appa ren t2 t3 t4 l5 l6 MR. MCKINLEY: tly had . No, I understand that. l9 MR. J0RDAN: 20 In your opening statement, Ambassador, just so I 2t MR. MCKINLEY: Sure. 22 23 24 25 know -- -- third paragraph, you talk about the State Department Foreign Service employees caught up in the inquiry on Ukraine. And so jt's plural, and I just -- and we've ta1 ked about Ms . Ambassador Yovanovi tch. You ' ve tal ked MR. JORDAN: 102 I about Secretary 2 that Kent. Is there a bigger f ist there? J MR. MCKINLEY: 4 MR. JORDAN: 5 8 9 I just want to about when you say "emPloYees. MR. MCKINLEY: 6 7 Apparently, there is. know who Sorry. Is Apologies. you're talking " WelI, I understand Bi 11 Taylor i s comi ng in Ukraine. And, you know, by the way, to show you that I wasn't s'itting there trying to look at every document that was coming out, I hadn't looked at what was back, our Charge l0 sent over by the committee, that George Kent referenced, ll he showed me the communication from the committee, and t2 glanced and I just l6 at i t and I saw Taylor's name on 'it and the suggestion that there might be others. And so that's why I put that there . Sor rY. MR. JORDAN: 0kay. 5o your concern with State Department employees is that the employees refers to folks t7 that 13 t4 l5 have been subpoenaed bY That's correct, si r. l8 MR. MCKINLEY: t9 MR. JORDAN: 20 just want to be clear. 2t 22 23 24 25 -- and asked to come testify? Okay. I earlier on, I believe you were testifying with regards to a hollowing out of the State Department under Secretary Ti 1lerson. Is i t ',lR. ZELDIN: Ambassador McKinley, acqurate did you USe the term "forced tO leave" Or "for6ed out" in describ'ing that hollowing out? I just want to 103 I understand your earlier testimony. MR. MCKINLEY: Yeah, 2 I did. And my understanding is J there were peopte -- do I know firsthand that people 4 sort of sa'id, "Your services are no longer 5 6 7 8 were here"? I probably don't. But, you know, I heard, you know, stories of people sort of being told, "Your services are not needed," particularly at the more senior levels. So that's what that was a reference to. If 9 needed you want me to take the word back and say everybody principle l5 sorry. Actual1y, I don't take it back. I remember when I first started using the term, when they cut the promotion rates 40 to 50 percent for senior ranks. Yep, that's a way to get people to 1eave. And it's just using the system by changing the rules of engagement, and there's nothing illegal about jt, but you can certainly l6 bring numbers down very quickly. l0 ll t2 l3 t4 resigned on MR. ZELDIN: But you t7 l8 of any individual t9 forced out? members don't have any firsthand knowledge of the State Department being 22 I could go and dig, but right now, given that we're talk'ing about a process that took place some tjme ago, [o, I don't, and I'm not going to try to gild 23 that. 20 2t MR. MCKINLEY: You know, VlR. 25 THE CHAIRMAN: you. I re out of ti me. t./hy don't we take a half-hour lunch break ZELDIN: Thank 24 bel i eve we' 104 I 2 J 4 5 6 7 8 9 l0 l1 t2 l3 l4 l5 t6 t7 l8 l9 20 2l 22 23 24 25 and resume at 1 o'c1ock? MR. MCKINLEY: Sure. 105 I [1.:L0 p.m.] 5 Let's go back on the record. Mr. Ambassador, I want to briefly fo1low up on some of the questions that my colleagues on the minority asked, and then I'11 hand it back to Mr. Goldman to continue through the 6 timefine. 2 J 4 7 8 9 THE CHAIRMAN: to an inspector general report whose recommendations were not fol1owed. Can you te11 us a little bit about what that inspector general investigation was You made reference l0 about, what the inspector general found, and what their ll recommendati ons were? t2 t7 to the, I think, summer of 2018 there were allegations that indjviduats, particularly from'in front office of the International 0rganizations Bureau, were being targeted on political grounds by the Assistant Secretary, 'if not the Assi stant Secretary, one of hi s key assistants, somebody if I remember correctly, her name is l8 Mari Stuhl (ph). l9 2t at the time, that was when I was coming into the bui Idi ng, and at least two of the three Deputy Ass'istant Secretari es I spoke wi th and ra'ised the i ssue. But i t was an 22 issue which was already well known insjde the bu'i1ding, 23 there was a dec'isi on to ref er the matter to the i nspector 24 gene r al l3 14 t5 l6 20 25 MR MCKINLEY: Going back And and . My impression across the many months that followed was 106 ll in the Bureau and perhaps throughout the building, we're stil1 waiting for the second iteration of the inspector general's report on the similar subj ect, that concerns about po1 i ti ci zati on pretty much disappeared and with the focus on returning to systems and profess'ionalism in the management of the building. That was my i mpressi on. That's what I 'm suggestj ng to you. When the report came out, I will be frank, I just glanced at the headlines, but the assumption was that the Assistant Secretary would be asked to step down. THE CHAiRMAN: And I'm sorry, who was that assistant t2 sec re 1 2 J 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 whatever had happened before MR MCKINLEY: l3 14 tary? happen there was Moley, Kevi n Mo1ey. And when that di dn't a significant reaction among people jn the t7 building. I repeat, jt's not me saying so. This came across in the townhal1, which Under Secretary Hale and Deputy Secretary Sullivan held wi th an International 0rgani zat'ion 18 staf f l5 l6 t9 20 2l 22 23 24 25 . Marie Stuh1, I think, was long gone from the building at to be able to have a completely clean sheet going forward, that it would be helpful for the Assistant Secretary to move on. And when that di dn't happen, thi s reacti on set i n. I'm going to say again: I worked on many different issues. I took the headline of the report, whjch is that that point, but the expectation was 107 I 2 J 4 5 6 7 8 9 l0 ll t2 13 t4 l5 t6 t7 t8 t9 20 2l 22 /.J 24 25 there were indeed improper personnel practices and targeting I djdn't sit and look at and basjcally organize offices differently or meetings differently, that sort of th'ing, you know, I didn't get i nto that level of detai 1. Sorry I di dn' t. THE CHAIRMAN: When you say that individuals were targeted improperly or polit'ica1ly, what do you mean by that? MR MCKINLEY: We11, that's what the report's enti tIed. So what I was aware of when I first came into the building and started speaking to my colleagues at the time, back jn the June/Ju1y timeframe of 2018, and I spoke to colleagues in the International 0rganization Bureau, they felt that tabs were being kept on them in terms of whether they were loya1, whatever that means, to the admi ni strati on or not. I can't get more specific than that because the spec'ifics might be related to individual policies and questjons of how policies were being pursued, but that was of certainly the very strong impression I think of aIl three of the Deputy Assistant Secretaries, career Deputy Assi stant Secretari es who were i n posi ti on at the time. And that was the documented both in the media before the report came out. When the initial report started coming out on this was sometime last year, and it was documented jn the report. Now, but I -- so I'm sorry, again of individuals, and THE CHAI RI4AN: Yeah . 108 I 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 l0 ll t2 l3 t4 l5 MCKINLEY: - - I can't gi ve you the speci fj cs. THE CHAIRMAN: That's fi ne. I j ust want to understand what you knew of this report and the recommendations. MR MCKINLEY: Could I underscore that when the issue at least two of the came to light last summer, one of the indiv'iduals, one of them stayed on in the front office. 5o I want to underscore that under Secretary Pompeo, there wasn't an effort to remove anybody that was involved in raising the concerns and were supported for ambassadorships and so on. So I want to make a clean break, if you wiI1. What I can't make a clean break on is that the expectation, however long the inspection would take, was that there would be a conclusion that would lead to a decision to retire the Assi stant Secretary. That di dn't happen, and that certai nly made people, agai n, thi nk, what' s goi ng on? \4R THE CHAIRMAN: t6 So, when the Assi stant Secretary runni ng 20 that bureau, that 0ffi ce of Internati onal 0rganj zati ons, wasn't removed notwj thstandi ng the i nspector general's findings of politicization or targeting of individuals'in political way, was it your sense that this was having an 2t adverse impact on morale t7 l8 l9 in the Department? MR MCKINLEY: Absolutely. And it wasn't only my sense; 22 23 24 25 a a sense shared by the di rector general and the Under Secretary For Poli tical Affaj rs. THE CHAIRMAN: Now, yotl raised at least a couple issues, i t was certai n1y 109 1ike, with the 7th floor you've talked about today. I it 2 One J supporti ng th'is career publ i c servant, Ambassador 4 Yovanovitch. And I think 5 essentially you got from the Secretary himself was si lence 6 Is that fair to 7 8 9 l0 ll t2 l3 sounds of them was obviously your concern about MR you said that the a statement response say? It i s. MCKINLEY: I d'id not get anything that would approach a substant'ive response f rom anyone. THE CHAIRMAN: And, likewise, when you raised with the 7tn floor the seriousness of what Ambassador Kent or Secretary Kent put in a memo complaining about, among other things, false statements by the State Department in response to Congress, that was also met with silence, wasn't it? l6 is to the best of my recollection. We'd have to look at the memo again, but it is to the best of my recollection, and, yes, 'it was met wi th l7 s'i l ence t4 l5 l8 l9 20 2t 22 23 24 25 MR MCKINLEY: That characterization . THE CHAIRMAN: And of itself, isn't it, silence is a kind of response in and raise a serious issue and there's no action taken and you're not given an adequate explanation for why no action was taken? MR MCKINLEY: when you Yes, i t i s. And i f you'11 allow me, I don't want to leave the impression here that the dec'ision to resign was a sudden one based on 72 or 95 hours or, you know, I don't get a response, and, therefore, I decide to take off 110 I without allowing the tjme for resolution. The reason I 2 mentioned the iG report was 8 this was definitely something that was already hanging over the Department in that period. But, second, I don't need weeks to recognize what the impact of having the Pres'ident of our country state certain things about one of the career officers to know what the impact of that can be on the service without some kind of correction or reaffi rmation from the leadership of the 9 Department. J 4 5 6 7 l2 I want to ask you more about that, but before I do, I want to ask you a litt1e bit more about the di scussi on wi th Secretary Kent. And, you know, you' re l3 hamstrung and we're hamstrung because the State Department l0 ll THE CHAIRMAN: 20 to give us the memo that he wrote. Otherwise, we would show it to you and ask you about it. But let me ask you about thi s because you ment'ioned that he was concerned about bul1ying. One of the representations apparently made in that letter from the State Department was that State Department witnesses like Mr. Kent or perhaps yourself or others v,,ere being bullied, not by the State 2t Department but by Congress. But what Mr. Kent was raising t4 l5 l6 t7 l8 l9 22 23 24 25 has refused with you was his concern that he was being bullied by the State Department. Is that correct? MR MCKINLEY: That's correct. THE CHAIRMAN: And he felt that what the State 111 I Department had represented 2 that he thought to Congress included something was a 1ie. r0 is the term I'11 use because, again, without looking back at the memo word for word, I do want to be, on a subject like that, as accurate as poss'ib1e. He did question the way it was being presented, absolutely. THE CHAIRMAN: And I think you sajd he conveyed to you that he thought that the State Department lawyer, perhaps among others, was trying to shut him up. Is that right? 14R MCKINLEY: He did, and he focused specifically on the ll lawyer. J 4 5 6 7 8 9 t2 MR MCKINLEY: "Inaccurate" THE CHAIRT'1AN: Just a couple of questions about your l3 resignation, and I don't think anyone here is under the t4 that this was a hasty decision that you made but a principled decision. And I think at the outset of your testimony, you said that this was not how you expected or had hoped to end a decades-1ong career in the Foreign Service. Is that right? l5 t6 t7 l8 l9 20 impression That's accurate. THE CHAIRMAN: And I think you've articulated a couple MR MCKINLEY: 24 of reasons, but I want to make sure that I understand them, f or why you made thls deci si on af ter 30 or 40 years. And i s it fair to say a significant part of the reason you made that decjsjon was the failure of the State Department to back a 25 dedicated public servant, Ambassador Yovanovjtch, when 2t 22 23 she 112 I was bei ng unfai MR MCKINLEY: 2 J 4 5 6 7 8 9 rly ma1 i gned? That i s correct. I think you've also said that part of the reason why you decided to resign was that you couldn't be blind to what was happen'ing, and what was happening was efforts to use the State Department to dig up dirt on a poli tical opponent. Is that faj r as well? And if I can underscore, in l4R l.4CKINLEY: That is fair. 37 years in the Foreign Service and different parts of the THE CHAIRMAN: l0 globe and working on many controversial issues, working ll J.0 years back in Washington, THE CHAIRMAN: And t2 I had never seen that. I think you've just said also that t7 didn't consider these two acts or motivations in isolation but rather in the context of a department that also wasn' t adequately respondi ng to pol i ti ci zati on wi thi n one of i ts bureaus? MR MCKINLEY: I would like to recast that because I do l8 believe the Secretary substantially changed the environment l9 20 inside the building. Following the start of the inspector general's i nvesti gati ons, as far as I can te11 , because once 2l these'investigations start, you're not talked to again and 22 you shouldn' 23 i r3 14 l5 l6 24 25 you t be. I t' s a very separate, i ndependent nsti tuti on wi thi n the bui 1di ng. But what was clear to Bureau began me across the months was that the to return to functionali ty wi thout complai nts 113 5 to me djrectly or indjrectly about poli ticization, that the individuals who are I betieve were i nterv'iewed f or and ref erenced i n the report, di d not suffer consequences and, in fact, were supported in either stayi ng i n posi ti on or movi ng onto posi ti ons of greater 6 responsibility. I 2 J 4 coming back up t7 I do want to make very clear, in my timeframe with the Secretary in the building, I have not seen politicizat'ion of the building per se. What I was trying to reference in my statement -- and we do have to speak about special envoys and an ambassador in the fie1d, and I'm referring to Ambassadors Volker and Sondland, as part of the State Department. And it's certainly nothing I knew about before the revelations began, but once they did, it was extremely clear to everyone I don't think it's jn dispute on any side of the debate that they were State Department officials being used in a way that certainly didn't fit into any past example l8 we can 7 8 9 l0 ll t2 l3 t4 l5 l6 So THE CHAIRMAN: Because t9 20 think of. That's correct. MR MCKINLEY: 22 THE CHAIRMAN: And 24 25 up political dirt on an opponent? 2l 23 they're being used to dig just to summarize then, is it fair to that, but for those actions, the use of State Department personnet to dig up dirt on an opponent and the failure to come to the defense of a dedicated public servant, but for say 114 I those two factors, you would have been very happy 2 your career -- 3 4 5 6 7 8 I would have THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you. Mr. l0 Goldman. ll BY NR GOLDMAN: you, Mr. t2 a Thank l3 Just SO to WC Chai rman. all understand the sort of framework, I j ust to ki nd of the sequence of events. I won't l4 want l5 rei terate some of the things you covered, i ncludi l6 Mr. Kent t7 0ctober t9 20 2l 22 23 24 25 continue considered no, I wouldn't have considered. i was planning to stay until the end of the year. I was planning to retire before the end of the year, absolutely. I thought that I did need to start thinking about other parts of my life. But, no, I had no intention of resi gni ng when I resi gned, no. MR. MCKINLEY: 9 l8 to go bac k 3 your meeting rd meeti ng on . But where we left Secretary with Mr. Kent and the ng Pompeo off last round was your meeti ng wi th on September 30th when you notified him of yourintent to resign. And I bel jeve, correct me if I'm wrong, that you testified that he gave no meaningful or substantive response to your concerns about the support for Ambassador Yovanovitch or Mr. Kent. Is that right? A That's correct. But I don't remember usi ng names. Speci fica11y, i t was support for our career professionals. I 115 I made a generi c poi nt. 2 a J Did you meet with anyone else or speak to anyone else 4 Understood. that day about thjs issue on September 3Oth? Do you reca11? 8 No. 0n the resignation I only told two people because I had to begin, you know, sort of looking at processing paperwork. So I spoke to the director general, and I spoke to the executive secretary, who I worked with and 9 saw every day. 5 6 7 A l5 a Li sa Kenna? A Yeah. But I did not teII other people at that poi nt. When I real i zed I don' t have to real j ze. I t' s like any bureaucracy. 0nce the paperwork begins to f1ow, people begin to talk. And certainly by the end of the week, that's when I made the decision to talk to the counselor of l6 the Department, l.ilr. Brechbuhl, and the Under Secretary For t7 Management and l0 ll t2 l3 t4 l8 l9 20 2t 22 23 24 25 1et them know as wel1, and the Under Secretary For Political Affairs. a Okay. Did you explain to Lisa Kenna or Director Generat Perez why you were resigning? A Yeah. I made the po'int that I didn't f eel I could continue and be effective, a A a no. I made point about the The same point, yeah. The same And what was thei r the point, yes. statement? response? 116 4 didn't want to see me leave. But, I mean, these conversations were no longer -- I was just talki ng wi th colleagues. The dec'isi on 'is made. I 'm not si tti ng there re-debati ng, you know, can we do th'i s, can we 5 do that. A 2 3 6 7 8 We1l, they pretty clear to me that and they certainly weren't going to be the decisionmakers if I did continue to pursue i t, whi ch I di d i n the conversati ons wi th Brechbuhl, It was l0 Bulatao, and Ha1e. But I pursued it in short conversations. I mean, you know, you can read when you're not going to ll get a response. And you can sit there and grandstand, or t2 can sort l3 beyond t4 move 9 on, of accept the decision is my concerns have been made, and it's now listened to, and I need to make my own deci s'ions. t7 a You described bringing up the idea of the concerns bringing up the concerns about support and the idea of a statement at an Under Secretary's meeting. Is l8 that l5 l6 t9 20 2t 22 23 24 25 you Yeah. But I did it in exactly the way I told you, a throwaway sentence and on you know, look at what's happening out there. It's having a dramatic impact on the morale of the building. That was the extent of my statement. And the Deputy Secretary sort of underscored the importance A of continuing to have people focus on the mission of State, that that continued regardtess of what was happening. That 117 1 was the end a A 2 J 4 5 of the conversation. Do you I mean, i t' s a leg'i ti mate thi ng f or the Deputy Secretary of State to say. I'm not questioning that. a Just so we get the timeline, do you remember when 8 that meeting was? A I don't know if it was -- I think it was 0ctober Lst, or was 'it September 30th. I don't remember. 9 It's 6 7 l0 u t2 l3 t4 l5 l6 t7 l8 t9 20 2t 22 23 24 25 one a of those 2 days. Okay. And before you met with Mr. Kent on the 3rd, did you have any additional conversations where you advocated for a statement of support or something simitar? trying to recollect last ni ght, you know, how many times d'id I ra'ise i t? And when i say "raised," I wasn't sitting there, you know, sort of comi ng i n w'i th a sledgehammer to, you know, belabor the point. I was ra'ising it just consistently. But that 0ctober 3rd is also the day I believe I spoke wjth Brechbuhl and Bulatao as well as Kent. That's my recollection. a And did you speak with Brechbuhl and Bulatao together or separately? A Separately. And it was first jn the context of "I'm resigning, by the way, " and then, you know, they questioned why. And then I went over what I beljeved needed to happen. And, you know, I think I don't know whjch one A No. No. So, you know, I was 118 both suggested that the steps that were being taken I or 2 were the appropriate ones maybe 4 for providing support given an evolving si tuation, whatever -- nothing specific but not addressing the immediate concern, which I felt very strongly, 5 which was needing 6 the J 7 8 9 i ndj vi to message duals i n questi the Department as a whole and on. They weren't hosti 1e di scussi ons. They were perfectly friendly, in the sense that there was no berating me for my decision to step down, just questions about it. So that's r0 the context those took place in. ll 16 a Do you remember if those meetings were before or after you met wi th l,lr. Kent? A f 'm pretty convi nced I 'm sor rY. a Don't apologize. To the best of your recollection. A To the best of my recollect'ion, they were before. a Okay. And are what was Mr. Brechbuhl's response to t7 you reiterating your concerns? t2 l3 t4 l5 l8 l9 20 2l 22 23 24 25 just listened carefully. That's all. Did he empathize at all or sympathize? No, there were no expressjons one way or the another. Like I said, I can't remember who said, you know: We're trying to, you know, make sure people have time to do thi ngs, thi s, that. But I'm not going to put since I can't remember who said it to me, somebody said it to me in the context of those A a A He 119 I two conversations. And so 2 was being belligerent with but, you know, agai n, me about J a 4 Were there any spec'ifics as 5 6 7 8 9 l0 1l t2 l3 t4 l5 t6 t7 l8 t9 20 2t 22 23 24 25 nobody it. Understood. to what those other that they were referencing? A No. I mean, I think it was just a variatjon on the theme: G j ve people t'ime to get organi zed and prepare f or the testimon'ies to come, et cetera. It was pretty much what's already been sajd publicly, I procedures were thi nk. a Did you know about the subpoena f or documents before you met wi th Mr. Kent on the 3rd? A I think I tried to answer that I knew from the news about the subpoenas, right. And I'm sure I assumed that it included requests for documents as well as for depositions. i had not seen it. And so George had a copy of the I guess it's the subpoena. I didn't even sit there and look. He just showed me. a Ri ght. A You know, and that's where I saw the additional names that you were intending to cal1. a And were you aware that the committees had sent a letter to the Department on September 9th just requesting A No, not at all. documents? a Before lunch break, 120 at all. I A Not 2 a So you J A In fact, I just learned that 4 a said that that you sent your memo or , sor ry, you Kent's memo to Mr Ha1e, the lega1 advi sor, Mark You said 5 sent 6 String, and Deputy Secretary Su11ivan, Mr. now, so, okay. ri ght? Di d you do l6 that all at once or No. I sent to Hale and String fi rst, and then A thought about i t and figured the Deputy Secretary should have i t too. a And just so we are c1ear, none of the three actually responded to your emajl? A They didn't respond to the emai 1 . They di dn't talk to me about i t. They di dn't telephone. a Okay. And you said that, on the 4th, you were trying to get a minute of time with Mr. String. Is that t7 right? 7 8 9 l0 ll l2 l3 t4 l5 t8 l9 20 2t 22 23 24 25 to te1l him that I would be sending that. I f orwarded the document, but I d'idn' t So I sent f orward i t unt'i1 I had a chance to tetl the lega1 advi sor I was sending it because I thought that was courtesy. a Were you able to get jn touch with him? A Yes, eventually. I think that day I was able to reach him 1ate, late in the afternoon. By the way, he wasn't avoiding me; we were missing each other on calls and so on. A Sorry. 0n1y 121 I 2 J 4 5 6 7 8 a 0kay. were sendi ng thi And what djd he say when you indicated you s? Just that he would have preferred to have jt in hard copy, and I sa'id I preferred to send it electronically. a Why did you prefer to send it electronically? A A O I a record. And did you get the sense that he djdn't want Because wanted a record? t2 No. I'm not goi ng to characterj ze because I don't know, and so but I certainly felt it was important to have this on record. a Did you expect a followup to referring this memo to l3 these 9 t0 ll t4 t5 l6 A 'i nd A O A i v i dual s? No, I did not. Why not? Because my assumpti on and, yes, j t's a of t'ime, but when people are not rea1ly t7 concentrated period l8 willing to talk to you about an issue you're raising, people are not rea11y willing to respond as you explain the reasons for your resignation. And I had good personal good professional relationships, I think, wj th all of these individuals. 5o I am not here to, you know, question whether there's second Iayers of how they dealt with me. So I interpreted the lack of a response as a response, that this wasn't something they t9 20 2t 22 23 24 25 122 I were going to engage on me with. J did you have any further conversations on Friday, 0ctober 4th, before the weekend that you can reca11 4 on this topic? 2 a And ll A No. a All right. Just so we understand clearly, from the or from September 25th or 27 n, when you fist time that had the conversation with Secretary Pompeo, until October 4th, you made your feelings known about your desire for a statement to support Ambassador Yovanovi tch because of your concerns about morale to Secretary Pompeo, Deputy t2 Secretary Sullivan, Counselor Brechbuhl, Executive Secretary l3 Kenna, Under Secretary t4 communi l5 Under Secretary Hale, correct? l6 2t A INonverbal response. ] a And at no point did you receive a -- sorry. Can you say you nodded. A I said that's the list is correct, but the I Carol I th'ink I al ready sa j d earl i er that a certai nly number of people were absolutely supportive of doing a 22 statement. 5 6 7 8 9 l0 t7 l8 l9 20 Z3 24 25 a A for Management catj ons di rector 0rtega, Fa'i r Di Bulatao, the rector General Perez, and enough. And doing a statement. I focused on statement. I mean, you know, we're was looking at expressions of 123 l9 support. It can take many forms. It can take townhalls. It can take just a message inside the building. It doesn't have to be a press release. It's just a signal that the building has the back of jts employees. a Would an internal email from the Secretary have been meaningful to you? A Yes. a And even that wasn't done? A No. a Did you have any additional conversations over that weekend of 0ctober 5th or 5th wlth anyone? A I had one phone call, October 5th, Sunday evening with the Under Secretary For Management, who said, you know, did I, you know, want to perhaps put on paper some ideas of how thi s mi ght be approached 'in terms of messagi ng, and that he was prepared to perhaps raise this wjth the Secretary. I decided not to put it on paper because I thought it was an unusual request, and I just discussed it with him the f o1lowi ng morni ng, 0ctober 7th, 'in the same terms, a message 20 which says, you know, got your back, you 1 2 J 4 5 6 7 8 9 l0 ll t2 l3 t4 l5 l6 t7 18 2t 22 23 24 25 know. at that point, and our policy on Ukraine js well known. We support, you know you know, I I may have mentioned think the Department, Secretary Pompeo has been very forthright over the time he has been there in supporting Ukraine against Russia, you know, just simple things, a 124 1 2 J 4 5 that was it. It 2-minute conversation. And that was probably couple of things like that. So was another Just before we move on, you mentjoned a a few there were a few other things as welt that you might No. Well, to me, I A would have thought it have important 7 to cooperate with a congressional inquiry, but anyways -- but that's simply that's a personal view, and, obviously, the 8 Department has a 1ega1 position on 6 9 So it would have been the support l0 know, perhaps looking ll ri ght thi ng on l2 l3 t4 l5 l6 t7 l8 t9 20 2t 22 23 24 25 this. po1 i for the troops, you at, you know, yeah, we're doing the cy, and we wi 11 work methodi ca11y on to Congress within, you know, the rule of 1aw. It was generic, I mean, taking as long as I'm saying it now. It wasn't somethi ng I was si tti ng there: And thi s i s why and this is why and this is why. It was simply, you know, a quick, short list of suggesti ons. That was 'it. a Why did you not want to put that in writing on the evening of the 6th? A Well, I'd spent a week with people not answering me, and so I've been a bureaucrat tong enough. That's a message, and I'm not going to be the one initiating again a trai 1. For what purpose? a Were you A And i had already explained to people I was responding 125 4 I think it was, perhaps, you know, just a legitimate outreach, but that's the way I handled'it. a Were you frustrated at the lack of response? A I don't have emotions fike that anymore. It was a 5 real i ty I 2 J 6 resigning. a You know, and You've been i n a bureaucracy too 1ong. l0 I'11 repeat of the matter js what I said earlier I don ' t get to dec i de, make the f i na1 decisions. I can present a point of view. It can be accepted or not accepted, but I think I can read when it's ll not accepted. t2 23 I, in this case, for some of the reasons we've already discussed, I fett that it required a more forceful reaction. And jf I can also repeat, I do feel that inside the building there was an expectation of, sorry, not a -- a dismay that there was no reaction from anybody in the career Foreign Service at senior ranks to do something more public in support of our colleagues. a D'id you f ee1 that an emai 1 would be f uti le? A I didn't think about jt. I just dec'ided: Not tonight, and I'11 talk about it in the morning. a You mentioned one thing about the rule of law and comply'ing w j th the subpoena 'in your conversat j on wi th 24 lvlr. Bulatao on Monday. Was - - 7 8 9 l3 t4 l5 l6 l7 l8 l9 20 2t ?2 25 A And so the fact And then A But it was a throwaway, you know. It's, yeah, 126 I shouldn't we respond, yorJ know. I can't bui 1d thi s up i nto 2 somethi ng i 3 t i sn't, you know. It's a throwaway thought, that sort of, doesn't it make sense to just sort of work through 4 the i ssues and see how we can move forward i n response to 5 Congress. That's i t. ll a A a A a A t2 but that did l3 that was my next question, is, was that the first time that you had rajsed A The congressi onal thi ng, that di rectly, yeah. 6 7 8 9 l0 Understood. Yeah. It's just the first time you had mentioned Yeah, okay. rai si ng And, frankly, I'm just remembering And l6 a And do you know what prompted you t7 matter? l8 A t9 reaf i zing thi l5 20 2t 22 23 24 25 a to raj se that Just 37 years of being in the government and s i sn't goi ng And had you come away. That's i t. to Department had not complied A a A a now, happen. a l4 that right understand with the that the State subpoena -- I di dn't Sorry. Just one second. Can I fi ni sh? 0h, sorry. Sorry. Just so the record is clear. Had you come to No, 127 I 2 J 4 5 6 7 8 9 l0 ll t2 l3 t4 l5 t6 t7 l8 l9 20 2t 22 24 25 that the State Department had not complied w1th the subpoena deadline of 0ctober 4th? A No, I di dn't know that. a Okay. Di d You A I didn't focus on jt. To say I didn't know, I don't know. It j ust wasn't the top of my mi nd, no. a But were you aware that the Department -A I knew there was a deadf i ne because that was part of the conversation with George Kent about the short timeframe he had to pul1 together whatever it was. And so I assumed there was a deadljne. Did I know by October 7th that the Department had not responded to the subpoena, no, I wasn't focused on that at at1. a Did you know that the Department was either resisting the subpoena or intended not to comply? A No, I did not know, and nobody ever said anything of the sort to me. a Okay. You had said in your opening statement that, I believe it was on 0ctober 7tn that you decided to expedite your departure. Is that ri ght? A Yes. a And what happened on that day, or what prompted that deci sion? A It was over the weekend I just decided that the lack of interactjon or response to me demonstrated that this understand 128 I 2 J 4 5 role to play even in the timeframe I had posjted from our reti rement up was Up, that I didn't have anymore a meaningful to, you know, sometime in November And so I just wanted out, if I can be f rank. So 'it was within a week that you ultimately decided a l0 that your original plan was not goi ng to work? A Wel1, that I di dn' t want to conti nue worki ng i n thi s envi ronment, that' s correct. a 0kay. Were there anymore discussions that week before you left about w'ith well, did you have anymore 1l conversati ons wi th Secretary 6 7 8 9 A t2 Pompeo? Just regarding the resignation and, you know, l5 I've raised aga'in but, again, you know, I don't want to dress it up. So I said, "You know that one of the reaSons WaS" -- it was that kind Of conVerSation, but nothing l6 substantive on that score. t7 did he respond? Again, nothing. There was no substantive response at any point to the issues I raised. a Di d you fi nd that surpri si ng and remarkable? l3 t4 l8 l9 20 2t 22 23 24 25 the and a A And how is one of the reasons I decided it's time to move on. But I know I'm belaboring the point. I've been in 37 years, as I keep getting reminded. I know that I'm supposed to follow you know, that, in the State Department, we do have a fairly open system about people A Yes, which 129 I 2 J 4 5 6 7 8 9 retrjbution, having the djscussion, but then decisions get made. This decision was made. It happened to be ori t seemed let me reph rase that seemed to me to be made. I take your point about perhaps there has been discussions about an evolving response. If so, I wasn't part of it. But it seemed to me a decision had been made. And because of the other reasons I 've outl j ned, whi ch 'is my pushing back, not facing l0 concern about the silence impact on the building and the ll t2 perception that the State Department overseas was being used 'in a certai n way i t was, you know, what was I sti cki ng l3 around for? t4 l5 t6 t7 l8 t9 20 2t 22 23 24 25 130 I [1.:50 p.m.] BY MR. 2 J 4 GOLDMAN: of experience, and much of that overseas, do you believe that there are any nat'ional Based on your a four decades 6 security concerns or consequences from these attacks on the career diplomats or the politicization of the State 7 Depa r tmen t? 5 t7 is the specif ic instance we're dealing with but the reason I mentioned the I0 Bureau and what -the reason I can't be more specific about the I0 Bureau is because everything that happened that led to the investigation happened before I arrived last summer to work with the Secretary. And, within a month or two of having arrived, the issue had already been referred to an inspector general for i nvesti gati on. But it was very clear to me at the time that the investigation was'into the allegations of politicization of l8 the Department. l9 20 the transcript was released and, frankly, the information that just poured out every day from the media, 2t when the VoIker-Sondland emails were released, 22 clear to 8 9 l0 ll t2 l3 t4 l5 t6 23 24 25 A Since th'is When it became that State Department officials, if not the State Department itself, were being drawn again into the domestic political arena in some way. And I repeat: I feel that this is not the way we maintain the integrity of the work we do me 131 I beyond our 2 overSeas. borders. We're meant to project nonpartisanship 20 in an increasingly an atmosphere where we debate issues more openly as a society and we're not the only country that does so jt's stjll important within the professional Foreign Service to be able to come across as representi ng the admi ni stration, whomever j s President, but also to do so professionally on foreign policy issues i mpacti ng ei ther bi lateral relati ons, regi onal questi ons, multi lateral i ssues, economi c i ssues. But we cannot mi x i t wi th the 'internal concerns. 50, yes, I th'ink anybody you speak to i n the Forei gn I can't take a po11 of Forei gn Servi ce offi cers, Servj ce but I thi nk my impression i s the overwhelmi ng majori ty would feel the same way I do. a And just because you are, sort of, the dean of the Foreign Service, can you explain to us what risks might accompany the po1 i ti ci zati on of the Department that you've referenced in those text messages or reading the Presidential conversation in the call record? How does that actually have 21 an impact on the United States abroad or on the Foreign 22 Service officers who are serving around the world? a J 4 5 6 7 8 9 l0 ll t2 l3 t4 l5 t6 l7 l8 l9 And even 24 A We11, first of all, I don't consider myself dean of the Forei gn Servi ce. I th'ink there's many 25 di sti ngui shed Forei gn Servi ce 23 offi cers who conti nue to the 132 1 provi de leadershi p i n the bui ldi ng and i n the fi e1d. 5 ljved this and aI ready sai d, I don't be1 i eve that because, there has been any further politicization of the building in the time I was with the Secretary, it's a potential impact 6 down 2 3 4 is I thi nk I've The impact the road. And 7 because we haven't I have seen other Foreign Services where it's very 14 clear what peopte's political leanings are and, the more senior those bureaucrats are, how they play the game with different governments that are elected in their countries. The beauty of the Foreign Service, the Foreign Service that I've known through some i ncredi bty di fficult moments for our country and i n bi laterat relations wi th di fferent places, is I don't know the politicat views of the vast majority of l5 my 8 9 l0 ll t2 l3 20 colleagues. They certainly don't know mine. And we are able to work together and project working for the admi ni stration of the day. That's absolutely central to our work. The day we begin to identify ourselves as partisan, that capacity to project support for the interests of the Unjted States and to do our 2t work 22 administration that has been elected by the Amerjcan people. 23 But you begin 24 po1 i l6 t7 l8 t9 25 for administrations to break that we are bound down to work for the if you begin to inject ti cs i nto the equati on. a You were in the front offjce of various posts for 133 2 the better part of 25 years, and you would have had an opportunity to review, I assume, or be present for J heads-of-state meeti ngs or revi ew transcri pts and memoranda. I When 4 5 to 6 been you read this caIl transcript, any other heads-of-state conversations privy how d'id it compare that you've ever to? l0 to retreat to the classic as a former State Department official, the classic State Department language. Everybody expresses themselves in their own way. What you hone in on jn the transcript is, you know, ll the t2 t4 of what was going on in that conversation, I'm like anybody else; I'm waiting to see what the committee produces, what else emerges, how this is l5 explained t6 t7 what about the parts of a But what about the call the call that you have referenced to be about digging up dirt l8 on pot i ti cal opponents? t9 A WeII, ho, the part of the call that I referenced the call is about Ambassador Yovanovitch the comments about Ambassador Yovanovitch. I have not made comments on any other aspect of it. a Well A I have ref erenced the Sondland-VoIker ema'i1s, because, frankly, you know, it very much looked tike they 7 8 9 l3 20 2t 22 Z) 24 25 A 0n that one, I'ffi going comments that were made about Ambassador Yovanovitch. But on the broaderissue 134 of I were discussing some form ) 3 I repeat: I'm looking at the news like everyone else and seei ng where thi s goes. But I'm not goi ng to s'it 4 there and draw the conclusion instantly about what was being 5 di exchange. Now, scussed. I'm sorry. 8 that's fi ne. And I guess just one last question before our round is over, is that at any point in any of your conversations with 9 any State Department employees from the time 6 7 a No, that you decided t4 to resign or you pressed this issue about a statement, did anyone reference to you the views or the thoughts of the Presi dent of the Un'ited States? A No. Not at all. MR. G0LDMAN: At1 right. Thank you. 0ur time is up. l5 yie1d. l0 ll t2 l3 t6 MR. MCKINLEY: Thank you. BY MR. t7 l8 t9 20 2t 22 23 24 25 a CASTOR: Under Secretary Bulatao, on Sunday the 5th, I beljeve that was the date. to put some asked you to A Asked me thoughts on paper. a A a But, by that point, you figured it was over? That's correct. did you send those 1ike, the email to Mr. String and the otherindividuals? ll{hen I 135 4th. I A Friday, 0c tobe r 2 a And you didn't do your J A No, 5 sir, 6 forwardi ng thi 8 own memo; you were just fo rwa rd i ng 4 7 Yeah I did not. I did you asked me, a A a Rl I you know, what did think you asked me or, I say. And i t was, I 'm s ght. Yeah. 24 told us, but when was the date that you sent the first email to Carol Perez and A The 28th of September. Sorry. a 0kay. So it had been A About 6 days earlier. a Okay. 5o, by the 5th, Sunday the 6th, you sort of saw where this was going? A That's how I felt, yes. a Did Bulatao, in his conversation with you, give you any'indication that perhaps he was asking you to do that so that he could sociafize the concern and A Yeah. He suggested, give me some ideas to work wi th. Yeah. a OkaY. A But, as I said, I decided not to put it on paper. a Do you thi nk he's 'inf Iuenti a1 enough to take that 25 i dea and 9 l0 ll t2 l3 t4 l5 t6 t7 l8 l9 20 2t 22 23 And you 136 8 Yes. And jf there's an impression I do not want to leave here, is I believed i had good relations w'ith vi rtually at1 the j nd'ivi duals I have ment'ioned. Thi s i sn' t a question of , sort of , a difficult working environment or difficult working relationships with the individuals concerned. I thi nk we had worked very well togethelin the time I'd been there on different questions. a Is it possible that the email that you sent to 9 Under Secretary Hale, Perez, 0rtagus, Kenna, Reeker, and then I 2 J 4 5 6 7 A String, all these officiats, is i t possible that l0 subsequently ll they, on their own, decided that, hey, let's have Bulatao t2 call the Ambassador and A I don't want to speculate, because I have no idea. a 0kay. A I don't want to impute motivations. a OkaY. A I believe the individuals I've referenced want the best for the Department. I'm not here to, you know, sort of, give them a bad name in that respect. I'm talking about how they approached an issue which I did see as central to the morale and well-being of the building. The arti cles whi ch were prol i ferati ng at a certai n point, first on Yovanovitch, then on embassy not embassy State Department morale, they don't come out of th'in ai r. And so, as you look at thi s, i t was j ust clear to l3 t4 15 l6 t7 l8 t9 20 2t 22 23 24 25 137 J this wasn't just my perception, there was a broader concern. And that's what I was trying to address. a One of the you know, you mentioned that you'd 4 concluded I 2 me, 6 that VoIker and Sondland were being used. A They were part of . I have no i dea 'if they were yes, I guess, bei ng used. I di d say "used, " meani ng 7 technically, they were being 5 a 8 9 used. 5o we spent some time with Ambassador know, he walked us through the conundrum of Volker. Rudy You Giulianj, l0 that this is ll t4 contributing to a negative narrative about the state of Ukraj ne, the state of Pres'i dent Zelensky's i ni ti ati ves to undo corruption. And Ambassador Volker, you know, gave his s'ide of the story, and he explai ned why he waded i nto the, l5 you know, Mayor Giuliani space. t2 13 somebody that had the President's ear that was And, you know, different people can reach a conclusjon l6 t7 that he should never have talked to Mr. Giuliani or l8 should've never taken any information he got from l9 Mr. Gi u1 i ani and talked to some he of the Ukrai ni an offi ci aIs. 2l But, you know, his side of the story hasn't been fu11y incorporated into some of the public news stories. Is 22 that 20 23 24 25 THE CHAIRI{AN: Counsel, do you have a question wi tness? MR. CASTOR: Yes. f or the 138 I THE CHAIRMAN: 0kay. Because and, agai n, we' re not 3 to be able to confirm whether the representations about Mr. VoIker's testimony are accurate or not accurate. So you 4 should j ust respond 2 going 5 MR. MCKINLEY: Sure. 6 THE CHAIRMAN: - - wi 7 MR. MCKINLEY: 0kay. BY MR. CASTOR: 8 9 thi n the confi nes of your knowledge. a So what I'm trying to get to is that, if you're in the newspaper, there could be other s'ides l0 reading accounts ll t7 of the story. A There could be. And every one of us individually decides how we're going to deal with a difficult s'ituation as we pursue objectives. I also know you can make decisions not to do things. So we'11 see how this washes out. But the fact of the matter is, and with the revelations which continue to come daily, it would seem that questions l8 should've been raised, even though the best intentions t9 involved, about continuing to pursue a certain initiative. 20 And so t2 l3 t4 l5 l6 2t 22 23 24 25 were that's my view. a If some of these officials felt that the President had developed an inaccurate view of the situation on the ground in Ukraine, isn't it in the interest of the United States to try to take some steps to correct the situation? A It depends on what the steps are. And untit I see 139 I the 2 Sondt and fu11 J 4 a story on what Ambassador Volker and Ambassador were doi ng, I '11 ref ra'in f rom comment on that. How often did you speak with the Secretary in your duties? 5 A Almost dai 1y. 6 a Secretary 7 A That's correct. But it would be short meetings in 8 the morni ng a A 9 l0 0kaY. you ll there's anything t2 wi l3 meet'ings wi th him t4 l5 l6 t7 18 l9 20 2t 22 23 24 25 th. a A a A a A a Pompeo? or L0 minutes . Go over, b reak i ng or pressi ng that had to know, 5 see if be deal t And then, you know, depend i ng on i ssues, I might be jn OkaY. that went on longer. So you had enough access to him Yes. Yes. And I certai nly can't complai n. The letter that the Secretary sent to Congress Ri ght. Deputy Assistant Secretary Kent, you know, I think, to you, the letter -A Yes, but I 'm maki ng c1ear, thi s i s my recollecti on. And so the spec'if i cs of what Deputy Assi stant Secretary Kent the comments he made, they're in hjs memorandum. You know, for me to try to paraphrase them would be misleading. evinced a view, 140 6 a You know, the language the Secretary used, you you know, he says, "I wi11 not tolerate such know, also tact'i cs, " talki ng about allegations of butlyi ng of State Department offj ci aIs, and, " I '11 use any means at my di sposal to present" MR. G0LDMAN: Mr . Castor, i f you' re goi ng to read, could 7 we provide the witness I 2 J 4 5 8 9 l0 ll t2 wjth a coPY? to listen. I'lR. CAST0R: We can make i t an exhi bi t. That's cool MR. MCKINLEY: No, but I'm happy to listen. i s thi s the f i rst t4R. CAST0R: We'11 make thi s MR. MCKINLEY: No, I'm happy exhi bi t? l3 MR. GOLDMAN: t4 MR. CASTOR: It'is, 0h, Yes. wow. ty l5 lMi nori t6 Was marked MR. GOLDMAN: Where l8 MR. CAST0R: Does anybody letter, or are we good? BY MR. 20 2t 22 23 24 25 a A a A O CASTOR: And take as much time No, I'm fine. or as litt1e I'm fine. to read i t. t No. L for identification.l are you reading from? t7 t9 Exhi bi time else need a copy of the . 141 I 2 J 4 5 6 7 8 A a No. Please. The Secretary writes, you know, "I with aspects of your request," the you're reachi ng out to MR. GOLDMAN: Where am concerned speed and the are you reading fact that from? I'm reading from the second paragraph here. "f am concerned with aspects of your request, described more fu11y below, that can be understood only as an attempt MR. CASTOR: ll to int'imidate, bu11y, and treat improperly the distinguished professionals of the Department of State, including several career Foreign Service 0fficers, whom the Committee is now t2 targeti ng. " 9 l0 BY MS. l3 CASTOR: l8 AndsoI th'ink a f ai r readi ng of that j s that the Secretary is trying to write to Congress and say, please, I 'm concerned with how you, Congress, are approachi ng th'i s i nvesti gati on. I s that a fair reading of it? A That's a f ai r reading of it. But I can tel1 you l9 that the two persons 20 depositions d'id not 2t Congress. 14 l5 16 t7 22 23 a a 0kay. I knew were coming up to give feel threatened or intjmidated bY And djd anyone try to prevent you from appea r i ng? 24 A No. 25 a 0kay And does anybody that are you aware of 142 offi ci als that they 2 appea bef i eved they were bei ng barred from ri ng? 8 at this time, no. 0kay. 5o you' re not aware of any of f i c'ia1s that i officials that wanted to testify haven't been able to mean, you know, there might have to be a subpoena and A Yeah, we11, a subpoena is a Wel1, a friendly subpoena is very different from a 9 subpoena J 4 5 6 7 l0 ll t2 A a Not Yeah. I 'm af rai d, for those of us who aren' t lawyers, a subpoena'is like "Nightmare on EIm Street," okay? A a A Okay. t7 lt's, you know, "What have I done wrong? Why am I being subpoenaed?" So I don't make the distinction between friendly or unfriendly subpoenas. a Okay. Did Kent evince to you that he wanted to come testify l8 and somebody was preventi ng him f rom do'ing that? t9 of my recoltection, he mentjoned it, but we didn't get jnto a discussion. a OkaY. A He said that he would not that, you know, the subpoena was going to be the deciding factor. a Okay. A I'm af ra1d I simply don't remember -- l3 t4 l5 l6 20 2t 22 23 24 25 A To the best 143 I 2 J 4 5 6 a A 0kaY. that. Again, I apologize, because I should have a better recollection for the purposes of answering your question properly, but a lot of things were happening at the t jme, and I was just rushing in one di rect'ion. But what alarmed me about what Kent sa'id to me and then 22 in the memo were the allegations of intimidation, were the question marks over this letter. I wasn't going to sit there and ask him a 0f course not. what part of the letter don't you agree wi th? A a Ri ght. No, I understand. And I 'm not A And and and I think the third part of yeah, that he didn't feel intimidated by the congressjonal outreach to him. And then and I repeat: I was quite impacted by, you know, the legal fees plight of him. a Did he identify other State Department officials that had wanted to cooperate and were perhaps urged not to? A No, we di dn't really get i nto that. No. a Okay. A No. a 5o was he advocating for others, I guess is my 23 question. 7 8 9 l0 lt t2 l3 t4 l5 l6 t7 l8 t9 20 2t 24 25 what was A a No, he It wasn't. was about hi No s own si tuati on? 144 A I 2 O Okay. And so his experience wjth the official rrLrr caused 5 6 7 8 9 l0 ll t2 t3 him, absolutely. J 4 This is a personat conversation with from him to A a A a A a A a Write the A a A Yes. memo. write thjs memo and reach out to you. That's correct. Was that the first -- Write the memo and send it to me. 0kay. Yeah. And was that the fjrst time you had interacted with him? t4 l5 So you had never met him before? 2l I shook his hand in passing during the week and, "Let's try to find a way to get together. " I 'm sorry, but I don't remember that. But this was the substantive conversation I had with him. a 0kaY. And other than Kent, did any other officials at the 22 Department 'i nvolved i n thi s communi cate arti culable concerns 23 to l6 l7 l8 l9 20 24 25 No. No. I don't you? A a No. Okay. remember whether 145 5 A And I'm just sorry, I was just lost in space, trying to remember, you know, my conversations with Kent. But, I mean, because, you know, like I say, that was the week I met him. I'd had a phone call with him the weekend before. But the conversation that's rea11y relevant to what we're 6 talking about was that ThursdaY. 1 2 J 4 a A 7 8 9 OkaY. But if I had another conversation with him, it rea11y wasn't about what was in the memo. it would've been l9 earlier one, you know, a "how are you coping, what are you doi ng" ki nd of conversati on. That' s i t. a You had a conversati on wi th Yovanovi tch duri ng thi s ti me peri od too, or was that earf i er? A That was on the weekend. And I may have talked to her one more time. I think I may have talked to her once or twice, but one of them was definitely to call her to te1l her I was stepping down. And it wasn't a tong conversation' It was just to 1et her know. a 0kay. And did she express any concerns to you 20 about the way the Department was handling her situatjon? l0 ll t2 t3 t4 l5 t6 t7 l8 an ls, 22 A a 23 And you haven' t had any conversat'ions wi th Volker or 2l 24 25 Sond 1a No detai OkaY. nd A no. None. 146 I 2 ) 4 5 6 a A a A a sj nce thi s? No. And so you don't have any firsthand information No. about the facts messages and of the emails and the text so forth? 7 A 8 And, you know, No. I know you're lawyers and I'm not, so ll I'11 try to couch what I said earlier properly. The Volker-SondIand emails, reading them, suggest that they were engaged in discussions with the Ukrainian Government on t2 something related 9 l0 to domestic polit'ics. t9 I don't know what else there is. I don't know whether there's Sondland emails. I don't know if there's documents. I don't know what other conversations took place. And, like everybody else, wa'iting to see what comes out in the public domajn to try and connect the dots. a Okay. A So I gave you my personal vjew of the reading of 20 those emails, but they did suggest there was an engagement 13 t4 l5 t6 t7 l8 23 with the Ukrainian Government for something related to domesti c purposes. a And you said you're skeptical, but if you did 24 the opportunity to hear everyone's fu11 account -- 2t 22 25 A Wel1, I have my own personal views, have but they don't 147 matter. 2 3 Ri a facts A 5 a 6 A 8 9 l0 ll t2 ght. But is what the facts are. we're in the process of f inding the and we' re 4 7 What matters Yeah. ta1 ki ng to Did being held A a A wi tnesses. of those emails would suggest goi ng on. Now, what was it? I don't know. you follow at all the discussion about the aid so But somethi ng was a these any reading up? I followed it, but The foreign assistance that And, you know, sometime was in the summer, I oh, assistance r3 been aware, you know, a passing remark about, t4 for the new Government of Ukraine. I think people l5 excited there was a new President there. l6 may have were But, you know, i t was i n passi ng. I wasn't worki ng i t. l8 It wasn't you know, there weren't conversations that I on it. And so where the assistance question began to l9 crystalize t7 20 2l 22 23 24 25 a A a was when at1 the revelations began -- OkaY. after the L8th of So between September. the Ju1y LSth and September LLth, there was a hold on the assistance. A O had Yeah. And there were 148 I A But I didn't know. t4 'if I can explai n somethi ng about the way the work or happens on the seventh floor, there are a happened on tremendous number of issues that are worked on every single day in all parts of the wor1d. And indjviduals, whether they're assistant secretaries or special envoys or under secretaries, are tasked with working different issues. And if you're going to be effective, you need to focus on the issues where you're going to have an impact. Second, the Secretary is extremely effective at streamlining his'interactions. He deals wjth the people he needs to get X done jn different areas. So, because I wasn't working on Ukraine, there was no reason for me to be part even of a general conversat'ion about what do we do now on l5 Ukraine. 2 J 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 ll t2 l3 l6 t7 And So, like I say, I a 19 Sometimes 2t 22 23 24 25 to learn a 1ot more once the whistleblower account came out. l8 20 began Ri ght. there's jssues with aid and it gets held up for a week, a month, longer than that. Isn't that true? A That is correct. a And that the period of time, the middle of July to the beginning of September, is a number of weeks, but ultjmately the aid was released, and that is representative of what happens sometimes. Isn't that fair to say? 149 A I 2 5 a a A a 7 9 l0 Okay. And people have different there's d'if f erent power centers. A That's correct. 6 8 has a very irregular pattern around the world. 3 4 I'd say that release of assistance is you know, The H'i11 weighs in. That's correct. 'in. s always a prospect of a hiccup with the release of aid. Isn't that fair to say? A There is. But I think I've been very I haven't OMB wei ghs DOD. And there' 20 careful. It's just a fact. I never even focused on the assi stance. So that 'isn't even someth'ing that comes i nto what I have tried to present as my concerns. My concerns aren't put in the context of our policy towards Ukrai ne whether we should gi ve a'id, who we should work with, and so on. It's the way the system was used in the context of Ukraine. a And the U.S.'s policy towards Ukraine in the administration is relatively unanimous in that we ought to be giving foreign assistance and we ought to be providing, you 21 know, letha1 defensive weaponry. ll t2 l3 t4 l5 l6 t7 l8 t9 22 23 24 25 been so, from all the back-and-forth over the Volker and Sondland issues, at the end of the day, the State Department, the National Security Council, the White House was unanimous in that we wanted to support Ukraine. Is that your And 150 I understandi A 2 ng? I don't know about J a State Department there 4 Ukrai 5 the White House. I know in the seemed to be the support for the ne, absolutely. a 0kay. l0 I yield back. BY MR. G0LDI'{AN: I just have two smal1 things to touch upon. You indicated right. I'11 ask a couple questions. And then l4embers are voting, and I think that some may have wanted to ask some ll questions. t2 able to come back. I don't thi nk 'it 13 regardless. 6 7 8 9 t4 \,lR. CAST0R: wi 11 be long, MR. MCKINLEY: 0kay. BY MR. l5 l6 So perhaps we'11 take a short break and then be a GOLDI,IAN: But you i ndi cated, as you've sai d a1 ready, that t7 there were, sort of, two primary reasons why you resigned l8 when you l9 23 of support for her and for Mr. Kent. And then the other one was the I thjnk you called the politicization of some of the State Department employees, which am I correct that you are referring primarily to the text messages that you've seen between 24 Ambassador Sondland and 20 2l 22 25 did. One was the handling of Ambassador Yovanovitch and the reca1l and the lack A Volker, when you say that? Yeah. But I'd like to just correct the record. I 151 2 t say pol i ti c'izati on, because I story behind what they were doing. J both Volker and Sondland were engaging the Ukrainian 4 Government i n conj uncti on wi th Rudy Gi u1 i ani on domesti 5 pol i I 6 7 8 9 l0 don' l3 t What know the ent'i re is clear is that c ti ca1 i ssues. I want to be careful on this for a reason. I saw nothing inside the buitding. And I also believe that the politicization which was alleged jn the Tillerson period, which 1ed to the investigation into the I0 Bureau, jt stopped. And so that's ll t2 don' a my experience over the past year. Understood. But it was one of two motivating factors for your resignation. A Absolutely. Absolutely. AbsoluteIy. The use of 20 with State Department titles, which conveys to the outside world that the State Department is being drawn i nto even i f i t' s j ust the two i ndi vi duals worki ng on a tangent separately. But it certainly conveys the impression of pol i ti cs bei ng i nj ected domesti c pol i ti cs bei ng injected into the work of foreign affairs. a You've test'if ied a 1ot today about your ef f orts to 2t encourage the Department 14 l5 l6 t7 l8 l9 persons 22 to 'issue a statement jn support of the Foreign Service off icers in particular, Ambassador 23 Yovanovi tch. Did you ever raise any concerns about the text 24 25 that you' re referri ng to messages 152 A a A a A I 2 J 4 No. up to the seventh floor? I did not. And why not? 8 I didn't want to get 'into a d jscussion about domestic American politics. I've sa'id earlier that throughout my tenure as senior advisor, I was and forget about senior advisor. Throughout my career, I've never 9 engaged my pol i 5 6 7 l0 ll t2 13 t4 l5 t6 t7 l8 l9 20 2t 22 23 24 25 To be f rank, ti cal leadershi p on pol i ti ca1 developments inside our country. It's not the right thing to do. And so, in this case, I felt if I started going down that line of inquiry, I'd be, first, talking about something but, second, since I believed it already had a pofitical component,'it was something that was not i ncumbent on me to deal wi th. a Djd you have any discussions with anyone in the State Department about what you read in those text messages? A Not to my recollecti on. And i f I d1 d, "0h, di d you see the Volker-Sondland emails?" But I don't think I even dld that. The period that we're reviewing is so concentrated, and I've tried to convey why 'it wasn't di f f icult f or me to reach certain conclusions quickly. But the other sensitivity I had as I was working through my decisions, I rea1ly only outside of the constellation of names I've started to I knew nothing about, 153 l6 didn't know I was leaving until the Thursday I started telfing people on Thursday, 0ctober 10th. That's when I started going around to front offices to say goodbye to assistant secretaries, to under secretaries, and so on, because I thought I wouldn't have time on Friday as I fi ni shed processi ng paperwork. But I was so sensitive to the implicatjons of me going and talking to people about my concerns other than the statement. That was an easy one to, you know but if you start raising other questions, you know, it's the wrong thing to do, especially if what you're trying to do is buttress both leadersh'ip support for the Department but also the confidence of State Department officjals in that leadership. 50, no, I did not. I was very caref u1 on th'is stuf f a You testified earlier today that Ambassador Volker had left the Department 10 years ago, and I thjnk you sajd t7 something about him being l8 l9 director I think it's no secret, he became one of the di rectors of the McCai n Inst'i tute, et 20 cetera. 2t a A I 2 J 4 5 6 7 8 9 l0 ll t2 t3 t4 l5 22 given you, the building . A l,nlell, he became Ri ght. So, you know, my assumpti on i s there's he's is entitled to go out and create a new 23 every one of us 24 jdentity 25 stating that, to place him and consider him a career when we leave the State Department. I'm just 154 I 2 J offi ci a1 no, he wasn't. And you atso said that a political , A 4 " Po1 i ti cal " in under -- 5 I 6 he named under the 7 envoy, speci a1 envoy? 8 9 l0 ll t2 13 know he came t6 Obama ng he was was ti ca1 appoi ntee he came i administration for n the under WAS position of MR. G0LDMAN: 0ne second. All right, if we could just take a 5-minute break, we'11 just check on the members. t7 MR. MCKINLEY: Sure. l8 lRecess. l t9 MR. G0LDI'4AN: We're back 20 Mr. Castor? and on the record. BY I,'IR. CASTOR: 2t 22 a r Just one question that was related to membe 24 hasn't been able I me by a that he wanted to ask, but, due to floor votes, ,t) 25 it pol i a a I think it was President Trump. A You th'ink i t was okay. I'm j ust sayi ng he's a political appointee. That's all I'm saying. a OkaY. A I don't mean anything else by that. a A11 ri ght. t4 l5 meani I believe you said he was to get back. just wanted to acknowledge and just he have you agree 155 I with the statement that the folks that you were emailing, 2 know, the Under Secretary you 4 all those key people, they're all real1y quite busy, and a 1ot of them were i nvolved wi th the U. N. General Assembly act'ivi ti es i n New 5 York that J of Management, week. 7 just wanted me to ask you, you know, is it fai r to say that they may have j ust not been able to get to 8 your 6 9 l0 ll t2 l3 t4 l5 t6 t7 And so he emaj 1s? A a A No, i t's not. OkaY. I do acknowledge the point that there are many other issues on the agenda. What started as a simple suggestjon which would've taken 15 minutes to clear off the table turned into something more. That said, because I di dn' t have substanti ve conversati ons, I 'm not i n a posi ti to speculate about a Okay. what their A on 22 for not responding to me on a substantive basis, and I have to acknowledge that. a 0kay. Thank you. l4R. GOLDI4AN: A11 right. Thank you, lvlr. Castor. Ambassador McKinley, we really appreciate you coming in 23 here agai n today on such short not'ice and f or your decades of l8 t9 20 2t 24 25 reasons were servjce. It is clear to us today why you are so revered within the Department, and we greatly appreciate it. 156 I And we are adjourned. 2 [Whereupon, J 4 5 6 7 8 9 l0 l1 t2 13 t4 15 t6 t7 l8 t9 20 2t 22 23 24 25 at 2:35 p. m the i ntervi ew was concluded. I