No. 19A-486
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In The

Supreme Court of the United States
OCTOBER TERM 2019

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CHARLES RUSSELL RHINES,
Petitioner
v.
SOUTH DAKOTA DEPARTIMENT
OF CORRECTIONS, MIKE LEIDHOLT,
Secretary, South Dakota Department of
Corrections, DARIN YOUNG, Warden
South Dakota State Penitentiary.
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Application for Stay of Execution
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BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO APPLICATION FOR STAY OF EXECUTION
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JASON R. RAVNSBORG, South Dakota Attorney General
PAUL S. SWEDLUND, Assistant Attorney General
Counsel of Record
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
STATE OF SOUTH DAKOTA
1302 East Highway 14, Suite 1
Pierre, SD 57501-8501
Telephone: 605-773-3215
Facsimile: 605-773-4106
paul.swedlund@state.sd.us
Attorneys for Respondent Young
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 CAPITAL CASE – EXECUTION SET FOR
NOVEMBER 4, 2019, AT 1:30 P.M.
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QUESTION PRESENTED
Whether Rhines’ state law allegations implicate 14th
Amendment due process or other constitutional concerns.

 TABLE OF CONTENTS
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT............................................................................. 5
ARGUMENT ....................................................................................................... 5
Rhines’ Petition Raises A Question Of State Law That Does Not Implicate
14th Amendment Due Process Or Other Constitutional Concerns................. 6
The Trial Court Properly Found That Rhines’ Claims Were Barred By
Principles Of Res Judicata ............................................................................... 8
Rhines Had No Significant Possibility Of Succeeding On The Merits
Of His Claims ................................................................................................. 12
CONCLUSION .................................................................................................. 48
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE .......................................................................... 48

i

 APPENDIX
ERM A.12(B).C.1 ................................................................................ EXHIBIT 1
First Amended Petition ..................................................................... EXHIBIT 2
Dershwitz Testimony ......................................................................... EXHIBIT 3
Trimble Decision ................................................................................ EXHIBIT 4
Affirmance Order ............................................................................... EXHIBIT 5
Rhines Response to Federal Motion for Summary Judgment ......... EXHIBIT 6
Dershwitz Affidavit ............................................................................ EXHIBIT 7
Heath Rhines Testimony ................................................................... EXHIBIT 8
Heath Saar Deposition....................................................................... EXHIBIT 9
Heath Cooey Testimony ................................................................... EXHIBIT 10
Heath Smith Testimony................................................................... EXHIBIT 11
Weber 23AUG10 Affidavit (Page).................................................... EXHIBIT 12
Weber 22OCT12 Affidavit (Robert) ................................................. EXHIBIT 13
Weber 1NOV12 Affidavit (Moeller) ................................................. EXHIBIT 14
Glossip Excerpt ................................................................................ EXHIBIT 15
Antognini Report .............................................................................. EXHIBIT 16

ii

 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES CITED

PAGE

Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35 (2008) ............................................................ 27, 29,42
Bucklew v. Precythe, 139 S.Ct. 1112 (2019) ..................................................... 12
Beaty v. Brewer, 649 F.3d 1071 (9th Cir. 2011) .......................................... 15, 43
County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 846 (1998) ............................ 6, 7
Crowe v. Donald, 528 F.3d 1290 (11th Cir. 2008) ............................................. 44
Desmet Ins. of South Dakota v. Gibson, 1996 SD 102, 552 N.W.2d 98 ........... 39
Diaz v. McDonough, 472 F.3d 849 (11th Cir. 2006) .......................................... 44
Emmett v. Johnson, 511 F.Supp.2d 634 (E.D.Va. 2007).................................. 27
Ex Parte Aguilar, 2006 WL 1412666 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) ......................... 27
Farmer v. South Dakota Dept. of Rev., 2010 SD 35, 781 N.W.2d 655............. 11
Ferguson v. Florida State Prison, 493 Fed.Appx. 22 (11th Cir. 2012) ............. 16
Gissendaner v. Georgia Dept. of Corr., 779 F.3d 1275 (11th Cir. 2015) ........... 14
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 96 S.Ct. 2909 (1976) ..................................... 27
Glossip v. Gross, 135 S.Ct. 2726 (2015) .....................................................passim
Hamilton v. Jones, 472 F.3d 814 (10th Cir. 2007) ............................................ 27
Hill v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 573 (2006) ...................................................passim
Hill v. McDonough, 464 F.3d 1256 (11th Cir. 2006) ......................................... 44
In re Goerg, 844 F.2d 1562 (11th Cir. 1988)..................................................... 39
Jackson v. Danberg, 656 F.3d 157 (3rd Cir. 2011) ............................................ 15
Jones v. Allen, 485 F.3d 635 (11th Cir. 2007) ............................................. 44, 45
Jordan v. Fisher, 823 F.3d 805 (5th Cir. 2016) ............................................. 8, 16
Jordan v. State, 266 So.3d 986 (Miss. 2018) .................................................... 24
Ledford v. Georgia Dept. of Corr., 856 F.3d 1312 (11th Cir. 2017) 13, 14, 44, 45
Lippold v Meade Co. Bd. of Comm., 2018 SD 7, 906 N.W.2d 917 ................... 42
Loden v. State, 264 So.3d 707, 712 (Miss. 2018) ........................................ 23, 24
McNair v Allen, 515 F.3d 1168 (11th Cir. 2008) ............................................... 13
McGehee v. Hutchinson, 854 F.3d 488 (8th Cir. 2018)................................ 43, 44
Nelson v. Campbell, 541 U.S. 637 (2004) ......................................................... 12
Owens v. Hill, 758 S.E.2d 794 (Ga. 2014) .................................................. 33, 34
iii

 Pavatt v. Jones, 627 F.3d 1336 (10th Cir. 2010) ........................................passim
Powell v. Thomas, 641 F.3d 1255 (11th Cir. 2011) ........................................... 15
Powell v. Thomas, 643 F.3d 1300 (11th Cir. 2011) ........................................... 16
Reese v. Livingston, 453 F.3d 289 (5th Cir. 2006) ............................................. 43
Rhines v. S.D. Dept. of Corrections, 2019 SD 59 .............................................. 41
Ringo v. Lombardi, 677 F.3d 793 (8th Cir. 2012) ............................................. 14
Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995) ...................................................... 7
Schultz v. Louisianan Trailer Sales, Inc., 428 F.2d 61 (5th Cir. 1970) .......... 39
Sepulvado v. Jindal, 729 F.3d 413 (5th Cir. 2013) ........................................... 43
Smith v. Mont. Dept. of Corrections, 2015 WL 5827252 (Mont.Dist.1) ....passim
State v. Cameron, 1999 SD 70, 596 N.W.2d 49 ................................................ 39
State v. Smith, 705 P.2d 1087 (Mont. 1985)..................................................... 27
Swarthout v. Cooke, 562 U.S. 216, 222 (2011) ................................................... 7
Taylor v. Crawford, 487 F.3d 1072 (8th Cir. 2007) ........................................... 28
Valle v. Singer, 655 F.3d 1223 (11th Cir. 2011) .......................................... 16, 18
Walker v. Johnson, 448 F.Supp.2d 719 (E.D.Va. 2006) ................................... 27
Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 213 (2005) ................................................... 6
STATUTES CITED
SDCL 23A-27A-32 ......................................................................................passim
42 U.S.C. § 1983 .................................................................................................. 6
POLICY CITED
ERM A.12(B).C.1 ........................................................................................... 8, 10
JOURNALS/TREATISES CITED
Brenner and Stevens, PHARMACOLOGY (2018) ........................................... 36
Meredith, Pediatric Procedural Sedation And Analgesia, 1:2 JOURNAL
OF EMERGENCIES, TRAUMA AND SHOCK 88 (2008) ............................... 20
Miller, ANESTHESIA (1st Ed. 1981) ................................................................ 35
Todd, Drummond and Sang, Hemodynamic Effects of High Dose
Pentobarbital: Studies in Elective Neurosurgical Patients, 20
NEUROSURGERY 559 (1987) ......................................................................... 20

iv

 SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Rhines could have brought this challenge 8 years ago. Instead, he
waited until the end of the 11th day before the week scheduled for his
execution to raise this issue. The issue is barred by res judicata because
Rhines could have raised this issue in the method of execution challenge he
litigated back in 2011 (or brought a stand-alone claim at any time since).
The litigation below concerning the interpretation of SDCL 23A-27A32 does not implicate 14th Amendment due process or other constitutional
concerns.
Rhines is not entitled to a stay because he cannot show a significant
possibility of succeeding on the merits. Rhines’ argument rests on the
classification of pentobarbital as a short-acting barbiturate in a low-dosage,
clinical setting. Here the drug is not being administered in a low dose in a
clinical setting. Comparing the properties of low-dosage sodium thiopental or
pentobarbital in a clinical setting with high-dosage pentobarbital in an
execution setting is comparing apples to oranges. When used in a highdosage, execution setting, the properties of pentobarbital are identical to the
ultrashort-acting barbiturate sodium thiopental.
ARGUMENT
Rhines’ petition raises matters of strictly state law statutory
construction. The petition does not raise concerns of a federal constitutional
dimension. The trial court properly found that all of Rhines’ claims were
barred by principles of res judicata. In addition, the evidence in the record
5

 demonstrates that Rhines had no significant possibility of succeeding on his
claims. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying
Rhines’ motion for a stay of execution.
A. Rhines’ Petition Does Not Implicate 14th Amendment Due Process
Concerns
42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides a cause of action against state actors only
for plaintiffs who suffer a “deprivation of any rights, privileges or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws” of the United States at the hands of
those acting with the authority of state law. Here Rhines asserts that South
Dakota’s intention to execute him using pentobarbital violates the 14th
Amendment’s due process clause. The guarantee of due process enshrined in
the 14th Amendment has two components – (1) a guarantee of procedural
protections when a state seeks to deprive an individual of protected liberty or
property interests, and (2) a substantive protection against conduct that
“shocks the conscience.” County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 846
(1998).
The first component requires a two-step analysis; first a court must
determine whether the plaintiff has a protected liberty or property interest
and then the court must determine whether the state has provided adequate
procedures for the vindication of that interest. Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S.
209, 213 (2005). The second component does not rest on state law. This
component provides substantive rather than merely procedural protections
and comes into play when “the behavior of the governmental officer is so
6

 egregious, so outrageous, that it may fairly be said to shock the contemporary
conscience” regardless of whether the behavior in question conforms or fails
to conform to state laws. Sacramento, 523 U.S. at 862, n. 8.
Rhines argues that he has a liberty interest created by state law that
prevents the state from executing him using any drug other than “an ultrashort acting barbiturate” as the first drug in a two-drug cocktail. However,
even assuming that the use of pentobarbital does not conform to SDCL 23A27-32, “a mere error of state law is not a denial of due process.” Swarthout v.
Cooke, 562 U.S. 216, 222 (2011). In order to establish a liberty interest
arising from SDCL 23A-27-32, Rhines must show that execution with
pentobarbital would “impose [an] atypical and significant hardship” on him
beyond the ordinary for those facing execution. Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S.
472, 484 (1995).
Here, South Dakota’s statutory requirements and the associated
lethal injection protocol are not “atypical . . . in relation to the ordinary” in
comparison to other states’ execution protocols. Most states now use
pentobarbital, a drug that has been repeatedly approved by multiple federal
courts. Use of pentobarbital does not shock the conscious. Rather, as
discussed below, multiple experts, including Rhines’ own, have testified that
there is no difference between sodium thiopental and pentobarbital and that
execution by pentobarbital is humane as humanly possible.

7

 Since Rhines has failed to demonstrate South Dakota’s intent to
“impose atypical and significant hardship on [Rhines] in relation to the
ordinary incident of prison life,” he has not established that the state’s
revised protocol invades a protected liberty interest. Also, South Dakota
provided an adequate forum for the vindication of Rhines’ rights that arise
from state law. If Rhines had wanted to protest that South Dakota’s lethal
injection protocol is an unlawful deviation from statute, South Dakota’s
courts provided an appropriate venue for that suit. Jordan v. Fisher, 823
F.3d 805, 812 (5th Cir. 2016).
B. Rhines’ Claims Are Barred By Res Judicata
Eight years ago, Rhines was served with formal notice of the adoption
of a revised execution protocol. ERM A.12(B).C.1, Exhibit 1. The protocol
designated either sodium thiopental or pentobarbital as the barbiturate to be
used in the 2-drug protocol that Rhines has elected. ERM A.12(B).C.1,
Exhibit 1. Specifically, it informed Rhines that if he elected the 2-drug
protocol, he would “be executed by the 2-drug protocol set forth herein.” The
protocol specifically informed Rhines that the barbiturate used would be
either sodium thiopental or pentobarbital. ERM A.12(B).C.1/4, Exhibit 1.
The notice was served on Rhines in the context of a then-pending challenge to
his method of execution before Judge Trimble in the 7th Circuit Court.

8

 Rhines filed his challenge on February 21, 2008. FIRST AMENDED
PETITION, Exhibit 2. Then, as now, Rhines requested declaratory and
injunctive relief. Then, Rhines’ complaints were:
a. That 23A-27A-32 “as codified on the date of Charles R. Rhines’
convictions” gave “no guidance as to the type of substances used or the
quality of substances used for the punishment of death.” FIRST
AMENDED PETITION at Page 11, ¶¶ 37, 39.a, Exhibit 2.
b. About “the two chemical[s] specified in SDCL 23A-27A-32 in effect at the
time [of] Charles R. Rhines’ conviction.” FIRST AMENDED PETITION at
Page 12, ¶ 6, Exhibit 2.
c. That “[a]n execution pursuant to SDCL 23A-27A-32 as codified on the
date of Charles R. Rhines’ conviction violates the constitutions of the State
of South Dakota and the United States prohibition against cruel and
unusual punishment and is therefore unconstitutional.” FIRST
AMENDED PETITION at Page 13, ¶ 7, Exhibit 2.
d. That “a[n] execution carried out by means of the two-drug cocktail
provided in SDCL 23A-27A-32 in effect at the time of Charles R. Rhines’
conviction constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the
constitution of the State of South Dakota and the United States as well as
depriving Rhines of his right to due process of law.” FIRST AMENDED
PETITION at Page 13, ¶ 3, Exhibit 2 (emphasis added).

9

 Though he had been served with a copy of ERM A.12(B) on October 24,
2011, which contained explicit notice of the state’s intention to use
pentobarbital in the 2-drug protocol that Rhines has elected, and though
Rhines’ then-pending complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief
contained general arguments that ERM A.12(B).C.1 denied him process that
he felt was due to him under SDCL 23A-27A-32 and in opposition to the “two
chemical[s]” that would be used, Rhines never raised a claim that
pentobarbital is not an ultrashort-acting barbiturate within the meaning of
SDCL 23A-27A-32 as codified on the date of his convictions.
During the litigation of Rhines’ method of execution claims, the state
had its expert opine on whether a 2-drug protocol of pentobarbital and a
paralytic agent would provide a painless and humane death for an inmate.
DERSHWITZ TESTIMONY at 21/22, excerpt attached as Exhibit 3. In
addition to the ERM A.12(B).C.1. itself, this questioning put Rhines on
further notice of the state’s intent to use pentobarbital in carrying out the 2drug protocol that he has chosen.
Judge Trimble ruled against Rhines. TRIMBLE DECISION, Exhibit
4. The South Dakota Supreme Court affirmed. AFFIRMANCE ORDER,
Exhibit 5.
During Rhines’ subsequent federal proceedings, the state expected
Rhines to amend his complaint to further challenge the state’s method of
execution in federal court. The state moved peremptorily to dismiss the

10

 claim (along with all of Rhines’ other pending claims) anticipating that
Rhines would continue his method of execution challenge. Remarkably,
Rhines did not do so. Instead Rhines inexplicably threw in the towel on
further challenging the method of his execution, brusquely stating that “the
issue of the manner of execution, which was included in the latest litigation
in the state court, and which was discussed at such length in respondent’s
brief, is not before this court and this court cannot issue any sort of judgment
concerning that issue.” RHINES RESPONSE TO FEDERAL MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT, CIV # 00-5020 [DOCKET 232] at 6, excerpt
attached as Exhibit 6.
“The doctrine of res judicata disallows reconsidering an issue that was
actually litigated or which could have been raised and decided in a prior
action. Farmer v. South Dakota Dept. of Rev., 2010 SD 35, ¶ 7, 781 N.W.2d
655, 659. The factual predicate for Rhines’ theory that pentobarbital is not
an ultrashort-acting barbiturate existed 8 years ago and fell under the
umbrella of challenges to the statute and the process allegedly due him under
state law contained in the complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief.
Because Rhines certainly could have brought a specific challenge to the use of
pentobarbital to carry out the 2-drug protocol as part of his then-pending
complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief 8 years ago, his current claims,
and dependent claim for equitable injunction, are firmly barred by principles
of res judicata.

11

 C. Rhines Did Not Present Clear Evidence Of A Significant
Possibility Of Prevailing On The Merits
Recently, in Bucklew v. Precythe, 139 S.Ct. 1112, 1134 (2019), this
Court condemned the practice of reflexively entering stays of execution.
Stays of execution “should be the extreme exception, not the norm.” Bucklew,
139 S.Ct. at 1134. Bucklew reaffirmed the longstanding principle that the
mere fact that an inmate has filed some claim for relief – even a potentially
meritorious one – “does not warrant the entry of a stay as a matter of right.”
Nelson v. Campbell, 541 U.S. 637, 649 (2004).
“[A] stay of execution is an equitable remedy. It is not available as a
matter of right, and equity must be sensitive to the state’s strong interest in
enforcing its criminal judgments.” Hill v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 573, 584
(2006). Before a court grants a stay, it must consider “the relative harms to
the parties,” “the likelihood of success on the merits,” and “the extent to
which the inmate has delayed in bringing the claim.” Nelson, 541 U.S. at
649-50. A “preliminary injunction [for a stay of execution is] not granted
unless the movant, by a clear showing, carries the burden of persuasion.”
Hill, 547 U.S. at 584. Rhines has not carried his burden with clear evidence
that the relative harms weigh in his favor, that he is likely to succeed on the
merits and that he has not been purposefully and strategically dilatory in
bringing his claim.

12

 i. Relative Harms
A court considers the relative harms to the parties by balancing the
competing interests of Rhines and South Dakota; specifically, Rhines’ interest
in being executed with sodium thiopental versus pentobarbital. Ledford v.
Georgia Dept. of Corr., 856 F.3d 1312, 1315 (11th Cir. 2017). “A defendant’s
interest in being free from cruel and unusual punishment is primary;
however, a state’s interest in effectuating its judgment remains significant.”
McNair v. Allen, 515 F.3d 1168, 1172 (11th Cir. 2008). Victims of crime also
“have an important interest in the timely enforcement of a sentence.” Hill,
547 U.S. at 584.
As detailed below, courts have uniformly found that sodium thiopental
and pentobarbital perform exactly the same and that substituting
pentobarbital for sodium thiopental does not materially alter an execution
protocol. Given that there is no difference between the two drugs when
administered in an execution setting, Rhines’ interest in being executed with
sodium thiopental instead of pentobarbital is far outweighed by the state’s
interest in effecting its judgment and the victims’ interest in justice (after 27
years) for their murdered son. Ledford, 856 F.3d at 1315.
ii. Likelihood Of Success On The Merits
“[L]ike other stay applicants, inmates seeking time to challenge the
manner in which the state plans to execute them must satisfy all of the
requirements for a stay including a showing of a significant possibility of

13

 success on the merits.” Hill, 547 U.S. at 584. Rhines cannot demonstrate a
significant probability of success on the merits because his claim is barred by
res judicata and because pentobarbital meets the classification of an
ultrashort-acting barbiturate in an execution setting.
Just as “[a] time-barred complaint cannot justify a stay of execution,
regardless of whether its claims have merit,” a claim barred by res judicata
will not justify a stay of execution, even if it may have had merit had it been
timely litigated. Gissendaner v. Georgia Dept. of Corr., 779 F.3d 1275, 1284
(11th Cir. 2015); Ledford, 856 F.3d at 1315. Because Rhines’ complaint is
barred by res judicata, he cannot show a substantial likelihood of success on
the merits and a stay of execution is not warranted. Ledford, 856 F.3d at
1316.
Nor is there a “significant possibility” that Rhines can succeed in
proving that pentobarbital does not meet the classification of an ultrashortacting barbiturate as contemplated by SDCL 23A-27A-32 as codified at the
time Rhines was convicted. Hill, 547 U.S. at 584.
SDCL 23A-27A-32 does not specify sodium thiopental. It permits the
use of any drug that meets the classification of an ultrashort-acting
barbiturate. Courts have consistently found that there is no material
difference between sodium thiopental and pentobarbital:
a. In Ringo v. Lombardi, 677 F.3d 793 (8th Cir. 2012), the court observed that
“each court to consider the issue has uniformly held that the use of

14

 pentobarbital in lieu of sodium thiopental” is not a material alteration to
an execution protocol.
b. In Powell v. Thomas, 641 F.3d 1255, 1258 (11th Cir. 2011) the court stated
that “[t]he replacement of sodium thiopental with pentobarbital does not
constitute a significant alteration in the lethal injection protocol.”
c. In Pavatt v. Jones, 627 F.3d 1336, 1338 (10th Cir. 2010), the court rejected
an 8th Amendment challenge to Oklahoma’s lethal injection protocol based
on the state’s substitution of pentobarbital for sodium thiopental. Though
Oklahoma’s statute, like South Dakota’s, expressly required the use of an
ultrashort-acting barbiturate, the Pavatt court found that the change was
not sufficiently substantial to rise to the level of a legitimate claim of
entitlement protected by due process. The Pavatt court also noted that
Oklahoma’s statute was “not entirely clear” whether the legislature used
the term “ultrashort-acting” in the sense of how quickly the drug took
effect or the duration of effect. Pavatt, 627 F.3d at 1340, n. 3.
d. In Jackson v. Danberg, 656 F.3d 157, 160 (3rd Cir. 2011), the court
observed that “[p]entobarbital is a barbiturate commonly used to
euthanize terminally ill patients who seek death with dignity in states
such as Oregon and Washington.” Quoting Beaty, 649 F.3d at 1075
(denying rehearing en banc because inmate had no likelihood of success on
8th Amendment claim based on switch to pentobarbital).

15

 e. In Ferguson v. Florida State Prison, 493 Fed.Appx. 22, *2 (11th Cir. 2012),
the court stated that “the use of sodium pentobarbital as the first drug in
the three-drug sequence does not constitute a substantial change” to
Florida’s execution protocol. Valle v. Singer, 655 F.3d 1223, 1230 (11th Cir.
2011)(replacement of sodium thiopental with pentobarbital does not
constitute a significant alteration of the execution protocol).
f. Powell v. Thomas, 643 F.3d 1300, 1304 (11th Cir. 2011), noted the minimal
differences between sodium thiopental and sodium pentobarbital, both
being “classified as barbituates” and differing only “in their length of
effect,” which “simply means [that pentobarbital’s] effect lasts longer than
that of sodium thiopental.”
g. In Jordan v. Fisher, 823 F.3d 805, 811 (5th Cir. 2016), where the state
planned to use pentobarbital in the execution of three inmates, the
inmates, like Rhines, complained that state law “prevent[ed] the state
from executing them using any drugs other than ‘an ultrashort-acting
barbiturate.’” The court ruled that switching from sodium thiopental to
pentobarbital did not implicate any liberty interest.
The cases finding no significant difference between sodium thiopental
and pentobarbital are consistent with the testimony of the experts who
testified in Rhines’ method of execution challenge (including Rhines’ own
expert, Dr. Heath) and the state’s experiences with sodium thiopental and
pentobarbital in prior executions.

16

 Dr. Alan Dershwitz, an anesthesiologist, testified on behalf of the state.
According to Dr. Dershwitz:
a. “[O]nce 5,000 mg [5g] of pentobarbital have been administered
intravenously to an inmate, there is, to a reasonable degree of medical
certainty, an exceedingly remote chance that the inmate could experience
the effects of the subsequently administered pancuronium bromide . . . . A
dose of 5,000 mg of pentobarbital will cause virtually all persons to stop
breathing. In addition, a dose of 5,000 mg of pentobarbital will cause the
blood pressure to decrease to such a degree that perfusion of blood to
organs will cease or decline such that it is inadequate to sustain life . . . .
[V]irtually every person given 5,000 mg of pentobarbital will have stopped
breathing prior to the administration of pancuronium bromide. Thus,
even in the absence of the administration of pancuronium bromide . . . the
administration of 5,000 mg of pentobarbital by itself would cause death in
almost everyone.” DERSHWITZ AFFIDAVIT at ¶¶ 12-13, Exhibit 7.
b. In finding no significant difference between sodium thiopental and
pentobarbital, the Pavatt court stated Dr. Dershwitz’s similar testimony
in that case “persuasively characterized a 5,000 milligram dose of
pentobarbital as ‘an enormous overdose’ that ‘would cause a flat line of the
EEG, which is the deepest measurable effect of a central nervous system
depressant’ and ‘would be lethal as a result of two physiological
responses:’ the cessation of respiration and the drop in blood pressure ‘to

17

 an unsurvivable level.’” Pavatt, 627 F.3d at 1339. The Pavatt court also
stated that Dr. Dershwitz “credibly testified . . . that the 5,000 milligram
dosage will give rise . . . to a virtually nil likelihood that the inmate will
feel the effects of the subsequently administered vecuronium bromide.”
Pavatt, 627 F.3d at 1339. See also Valle, 655 F.3d at 1230 (finding Dr.
Dershwitz’s testimony that a massive dose of pentobarbital will reliably
and swiftly produce death convincing).
c. In his videotaped testimony in Rhines’ method of execution challenge, Dr.
Dershwitz stated that:
i. “When pentobarbital is injected intravenously, it has an onset of effect
that is almost immediate. Within thirty to forty-five seconds after the
drug reaches the brain, the person would be expected to lose
consciousness. DERSHWITZ TESTIMONY at 9/20, excerpt attached
as Exhibit 3.
ii. “[P]entobarbital will have this profound effect to decrease circulation,
it will stop breathing within a minute or two of its administration.”
DERSHWITZ TESTIMONY at 11/5, excerpt attached as Exhibit 3.
iii. When asked whether a 2-drug protocol of pentobarbital and a paralytic
would have the same effect as he described above, Dr. Dershwitz
testified that it would. DERSHWITZ TESTIMONY at 21/22, excerpt
attached as Exhibit 3.

18

 iv. When asked whether the descriptions provided by the warden of how
Eric Robert and Donald Moeller had responded to a 5 gram (5,000 mg)
dose of pentobarbital were consistent with the effects that he had
previously described, Dr. Dershwitz testified “[y]es, and in fact, the
warden’s description, although given by a medical layperson, does not
differ from what [he] observe[s] when [he] give[s] patients an
intravenous drug to cause them to enter a general anesthetic state.”
DERSHWITZ TESTIMONY at 21/22, excerpt attached as Exhibit 3.
Dr. Mark Heath, an anesthesiologist, testified for Rhines in his method
of execution challenge (and for the inmate in Smith v. Mont. Dept. of
Corrections, 2015 WL 5827252 (Mont.Dist.1)). Dr Heath’s prior testimony
supports the state’s position that pentobarbital meets the same classification
standards as sodium thiopental (which likely explains his conspicuous
absence here at the end stage of Rhines’ litigation):
a. Dr. Heath testified that, while “barbiturates are typically divided into
classes, depending on how rapidly they exert their action and for how long
the exert their action . . . there are different ways that people do it.”
According to Dr. Heath, “pentobarbital is typically put into the short- or
medium-acting categories depending on which author is referring to it.”
Dr. Heath’s testimony in Rhines’ case (like his testimony in the Smith
case) reflects that there are “different ways” to classify the same

19

 barbiturate depending on performance factors and application. HEATH
RHINES TESTIMONY at 21/10, excerpt attached as Exhibit 8.
b. Dr. Heath, Rhines’ own erstwhile expert, fudges noticeable with the
adverb typically. “Typically” is hardly categorical, inherently admitting of
contexts where it can meet the ultrashort-acting classification depending
on recognized medical variables. One such context is in procedural
sedation and analgesia in pediatric emergency medicine where physicians
regard “[p]entobarbital [a]s an ultra-short acting barbiturate” that is “very
useful for sedation prior to diagnostic imaging procedures” when “given
intravenously.” Meredith, Pediatric Procedural Sedation And Analgesia,
1:2 JOURNAL OF EMERGENCIES, TRAUMA AND SHOCK 88 (2008).
In a high-dosage context, “pentobarbital – like the ‘ultrashort-acting’
drugs thiopental and methohexital – is both a myocardial depressant (a
decrease in SVI with unchanging PCWP) and a vasodilator (a decrease in
SVRI and evidence for venodilation).” Todd, Drummond and Sang,
Hemodynamic Effects of High Dose Pentobarbital: Studies in Elective
Neurosurgical Patients, 20 NEUROSURGERY 559 (1987).
c. According to Dr. Heath, “[i]f the intended dose of pentobarbital were to be
successfully delivered into the circulation of a person and carried to their
brain in this dose [5,000 mg] it would cause complete depression of all the
brain activity such that there would be no electrical activity in the brain
whatsoever. The electrical activity of the brain sustains many important

20

 bodily functions, but in particular it sustain[s] respiration, the rhythmic
breathing, that we do all the time and when pentobarbital or any
barbiturate would stop all activity in the brain . . . [i]t would stop
breathing from occurring.” HEATH RHINES TESTIMONY at 23/3,
excerpt attached as Exhibit 8.
d. In testimony given by Dr. Heath in the Saar case (which was used to
impeach his testimony in Rhines’ method of execution challenge) Dr.
Heath testified that sodium thiopental, like pentobarbital, will produce
death in 60 seconds. HEATH SAAR TESTIMONY at 70/16, 71/13, excerpt
attached as Exhibit 9.
e. In Rhines’ method of execution challenge, Dr. Heath testified that, like
sodium thiopental, the respiratory arrest secondary to brain inactivity
secondary to pentobarbital administration occurs within “60 seconds.”
HEATH RHINES TESTIMONY at 81/19, 87/4, excerpt attached as
Exhibit 8.
f. In the Cooey case, when asked how long an execution would take using
massive doses of sodium thiopental, Dr. Heath (in the context of a
discussion concerning the efficacy of pentobarbital) stated that it “would
be the same as using massive doses of some other anesthetic.” HEATH
COOEY TESTIMONY at 40, excerpt attached as Exhibit 10. In fact,
believing that Ohio could not carry out an execution because it did not
have pentobarbital, Dr. Heath extolled pentobarbital as superior to

21

 sodium thiopental and testified that it should be used instead. As an
example, Dr. Heath referenced an execution using sodium thiopental that
had taken 14 minutes start to finish and opined that “if you give a
massive dose of pentobarbital, which can be done very quickly, in all
likelihood the person is going to be dead in less time than that [e.g. less
than 14 minutes].” HEATH COOEY TESTIMONY at 41, excerpt attached
as Exhibit 10. When asked to describe the difference between
administering pentobarbital and sodium thiopental, Dr. Heath testified
that “[sodium] thiopental is given in large volumes, and so it takes a long
time. It can take longer to get it in. One can give a comparable or a
larger dose of pentobarbital more quickly.” HEATH COOEY
TESTIMONY at 41, excerpt attached as Exhibit 10. Dr. Heath even went
so far as to state that, if states would simply use pentobarbital instead of
sodium thiopental “there would be no litigation, or at least I would not
participate in the litigation, or I would work for your [the state’s] side to
say that I think this is a safe and humane procedure.” HEATH COOEY
TESTIMONY at 70, excerpt attached as Exhibit 10.
g. Dr. Heath, of course, did not testify for Montana when it switched to
pentobarbital. Instead, in Smith (again on behalf of the inmate) Dr.
Heath testified to the exact opposite of his testimony in Cooey, claiming
that pentobarbital is not the “same as” sodium thiopental and is slower.
Apparently not aware of Dr. Heath’s Saar and Cooey testimony, the Smith

22

 court credited his testimony over the state’s expert, Dr. Evans, because it
believed Dr. Heath’s Smith testimony was “consistent” with his testimony
in certain, undescribed prior cases while Dr. Evans’ allegedly was not.
Smith, 2015 WL 58827252 at *4. The Smith court’s lack of awareness of
Dr. Heath’s testimonial prevarication over the years undoubtedly
influenced the court to believe that barbiturate classifications are stricter
than they really are, and probably changed the outcome of the case. One
wonders if the Smith court would have been so enamored of Dr. Heath if it
had been aware of the sweeping inconsistencies in his testimony over the
years and the widespread rejection of his opinions and testimony as a
basis for holding a lethal injection protocol unconstitutional or for staying
an execution by state and federal courts.
h. While Rhines’ current expert, Dr. Craig Stevens, lacks Dr. Heath’s
breadth of experience, he does not appear to lack the zeal for distorting
science in service of thwarting the implementation of the death penalty.
In one of the 5 death penalty cases he appears to have participated in to
date, the court ruled that Dr. Stevens’ testimony was a “sham” because of
the same methodological error underlying his testimony in this case – his
classification structure and data are based on “clinical doses.” Loden v.
State, 264 So.3d 707, 712 (Miss. 2018). In Loden, Dr. Stevens testified to
the alleged “ceiling effect” of midazolam. The Loden court criticized Dr.
Stevens’ methodology for extrapolating this “ceiling effect” “from studies

23

 conducted on cells in laboratory dishes (in vitro) and studies examining
the blood concentration of midazolam in humans who were administered
clinical doses of midazolam at five to fifteen milligrams.” Loden, 264
So.3d at 712 (emphasis added). Dr. Stevens’ persistence in testifying to
midazolam’s alleged “ceiling effect” according to clinical dosages is
remarkable given that the Loden court found him guilty of the exact same
“sham” midazolam methodology that Glossip had explicitly and soundly
rejected three years earlier. Another court simply dismissed his
testimony because he had failed to “cite probative support for his
conclusions” about midazolam. Jordan v. State, 266 So.3d 986 (Miss.
2018).
i. Dr. Heath’s tactic in Smith (and basically all cases in which he testifies),
is to assert that a state should be using the drug it doesn’t have. When
Ohio had sodium thiopental, Dr. Heath claimed in Cooey that
pentobarbital was superior; when Montana had pentobarbital, Dr. Heath
claimed sodium thiopental was superior. Dr. Heath is an avowed antideath penalty zealot whose testimonial track record reveals more devotion
to that cause than to objective medical science. HEATH RHINES
TESTIMONY at 63/5-67/10, excerpt attached as Exhibit 8; HEATH
SMITH DEPOSITION at 13/12, excerpt attached as Exhibit 11 (Dr. Heath
wrote of his “strong opposition to the imposition of the death penalty”).

24

 Eyewitness accounts of executions conducted in South Dakota confirm
that, as Dr. Heath himself has reported, pentobarbital is the “same as”
sodium thiopental:
a. During the execution of Elijah Page (who tortured Chester Poage for
hours – beating and kicking him, poisoning him, stabbing him, drowning
him and ultimately beating his skull in with a rock), Warden Weber and
other witnesses reported that the execution was performed “like
clockwork” and that “it was just a matter of seconds” after the
administration of sodium thiopental that Page started “snoring, and his
chest heaved a couple times.” WEBER 23AUG10 AFFIDAVIT at ¶ 7,
Exhibit 12. Page’s “death occurred within a matter of minutes.” WEBER
23AUG10 AFFIDAVIT at ¶ 10, Exhibit 12.
b. As with Page, Eric Robert (who bludgeoned Correctional Officer Ron
Johnson with a lead pipe, breaking his bones, amputating a finger,
cracking his skull open and exposing his brain before suffocating him with
plastic wrap) was “conscious for only 45 seconds” following the
administration of a massive dose of pentobarbital. Robert “expelled his
last breath approximately 90 seconds” after administration of the drug.
“Robert exhibited virtually no signs of pain or physical distress during
either the seconds he remained conscious after the injection commenced or
during the period of unconsciousness before he died. WEBER 22OCT12
AFFIDAVIT at ¶¶ 3, 4, Exhibit 13.

25

 c. During the execution of Donald Moeller (who kidnapped, beat, stabbed,
raped and cut the throat of 9-year-old Becky O’Connell), Moeller uttered a
final sentence about 30 seconds after the warden signaled to commence
the administration of the drugs. Moeller lost consciousness about 15
seconds later and “expelled a few last deep breaths approximately 60
seconds after [the warden] signaled to commence the injection.” WEBER
1NOV12 AFFIDAVIT at ¶ 4, Exhibit 14. Media witnesses described the
process as “very quick” and that Moeller was “gone” in “a matter of [a]
minute.” WEBER 1NOV12 AFFIDAVIT at ¶ 5, Exhibit 14.
The performance of pentobarbital during the executions of Robert and
Moeller conform to Dr Heath’s description in Saar of the performance of
sodium thiopental in an execution setting – that sodium thiopental will
produce death in 60 seconds. HEATH SAAR TESTIMONY at 70/16, 71/13,
excerpt attached as Exhibit 9.
Which brings us to the debacle of facile statutory construction and
result-oriented reasoning that is the Smith decision. As here, the inmate in
Smith claimed that the use of pentobarbital for his execution did not conform
to a statute requiring an “ultrashort-acting barbiturate.” Applying a literal
interpretation of the statute and rigid approach to general barbiturate
classifications, the Smith court agreed and shamefully enjoined the use of

26

 pentobarbital for the execution of a vicious killer.1
a. The Smith court’s decision rests on the central fallacy that the
classification or performance of an ultrashort-acting barbiturate that the
legislature had in mind was according to its use “in a clinical setting.”
Courts have consistently rejected the proposition that an execution is a
medical procedure subject to medical or clinical standards. 2 In Baze v.
Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 60 (2008), the Court rejected the application of medical
standards of practice to the execution context. Because medical standards
are “drawn from a different context,” they are not applicable in an
execution setting. Baze, 553 U.S. at 60. See also Walker v. Johnson, 448
F.Supp.2d 719, 723 (E.D.Va. 2006) (“execution by lethal injection is not a
medical procedure and does not require the same standard of care as
one”). Even before Baze, Emmett v. Johnson, 511 F.Supp.2d 634, 642
(E.D.Va. 2007), ruled that making an “analogy to clinical medical
standards in evaluating the methods used for conducting executions is
without constitutional basis” because “surgery and execution have the
polar opposite medical objectives.” Emmett, 511 F.Supp.2d at 642.

State v. Smith, 705 P.2d 1087 (Mont. 1985)(Smith shot two men in the head point
blank with a sawed-off .22 rifle in order to steal their car and “eliminate any witnesses”
to his theft).
1

See also Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173, 96 S.Ct. 2909 (1976)(constitution does
not require the use of medically optimal standards in executions); Ex parte Aguilar,
2006 WL 1412666 (Tex.Crim.App. 2006)(doctors do not ordinarily prepare fluids for
injection or insert or monitor IV lines in hospital settings); Hamilton v. Jones, 472 F.3d
814, 817 (10th Cir. 2007)(anesthetic monitoring as done in a surgical suite is not
necessary in execution setting given the massive dosages of anesthetic administered).
2

27

 b. For statutes, like SDCL 23A-27A-32, that are written to meet
constitutional standards, the analogy to clinical medical standards is
equally inapposite. Lethal injection is “designed to ensure a quick, indeed
a painless death, and thus there is no need for” standards applicable to “a
hospital surgery suite” where the goal “is to ensure that the patient will
wake up at the end of the procedure.” Taylor v. Crawford, 487 F.3d 1072,
1084 (8th Cir. 2007).
c. Despite the acknowledged discrepancy between clinical and execution
standards, the Smith opinion repeatedly referenced clinical sources –
testimony from Dr. Heath founded on the performance of “both
pentobarbital and thiopental” “in a clinical setting,” “significant research
that classifies thiopental as being ultrashort-acting” when used in a
clinical setting, some 28,600 search engine results describing sodium
thiopental as ultrashort-acting in a clinical setting, a package insert
classifying pentobarbital that had been manufactured for use in a clinical
setting as short-acting. Smith, 2015 WL 5827252 at *3. Smith found
clinical-based data such as these to be “[o]f significant import” to its
decision. Smith, 2015 WL 5827252 at *3.
d. Smith’s premise is flawed at its core. The Smith court apparently was
oblivious to the then-recent decision of this Court in Glossip v. Gross, 135
S.Ct. 2726 (2015), in which the court expressly rejected measuring
execution drug performance according to clinical standards. In Glossip,

28

 the inmate’s expert, applying a clinical standard, opined that midazolam
would not serve as a suitable anesthetic. To this Justice Alito replied:
Petitioners emphasize that midazolam is not recommended or
approved for use as the sole anesthetic during painful surgery, but
there are two reasons why this is not dispositive. First, as the District
Court found, the 500-milligram dose at issue here “is many times
higher than a normal therapeutic does of midazolam.” The effect of a
small dose of midazolam has minimal probative value about the effect
of a 500-milligram dose. Second, the fact that a low dose of midazolam
is not the best drug for maintaining unconsciousness during surgery
says little about whether a 500-milligram dose of midazolam is
constitutionally adequate for purposes of conducting an execution. We
recognized this point in Baze, where we concluded that although the
medical standard of care might require the use of a blood pressure cuff
and an electrocardiogram during surgeries, this does not mean those
procedures are required for an execution to pass Eighth Amendment
scrutiny.
Glossip, 135 S.Ct. at 2742, excerpt attached as Exhibit 15. Unlike the
Glossip court, Smith failed to appreciate that the Montana legislature
was not prescribing a barbiturate for use in a clinical setting; it was
prescribing a drug for use in an execution setting. Comparing one to the
other is comparing apples to oranges . . . cheese to chalk . . . donuts to
dumptrucks. Glossip, 135 S.Ct. at 2742, Exhibit 15.
e. As Smith correctly points out, and which is not disputed here,
barbiturates are typically classified according to how quickly they wear
off. Thus, “ultrashort-acting” and “short-acting” refer not, as the names
might suggest to a layman, to the time it takes for the barbiturate to act
on the system but to how long before it wears off. How quickly a
barbiturate takes effect is described as “ultrafast-acting” or “fast-acting.”

29

 Smith found that pentobarbital was short- and fast-acting based on its
clinical classification and enjoined its use in Smith’s execution. Smith,
2015 WL 5827252 at *5.
f. This was a glaring error. According to Glossip, the “probative” question is
how a drug will perform in an execution. Glossip, 135 S.Ct. at 2742,
Exhibit 15. According to Glossip, “[t]he relevant question” was whether
midazolam was suitable in “the huge dose administered in the Oklahoma
protocol.” Glossip, 135 S.Ct. at 2743, Exhibit 15.
g. Smith did not address “[t]he relevant question;” instead it fixed on
standards having “minimal probative value” to high-dosage
administrations of pentobarbital. Glossip, 135 S.Ct. at 2743, Exhibit 15.
Clearly the Montana legislature was not contemplating the clinical
classification or properties of the barbiturate that it was prescribing for
use in an execution. Prescribing a barbiturate for execution based on a
clinical propensity to wear off quickly (ultrashort-acting) would defeat the
purpose of the execution. To administer a clinical dosage of sodium
thiopental only to have Smith wake up 5-8 minutes later would thwart the
purpose of execution and frustrate the statute. Thus, the Montana
legislature clearly was not prescribing a barbiturate for execution
purposes based on its ultrashort-acting properties in a clinical setting.
The legislature clearly contemplated that any drug used would meet the

30

 performance criteria of an ultrafast-/ultrashort-acting drug in a highdosage, execution setting.
h. In a clinical setting, an ultrafast-/ultrashort-acting barbiturate (according
to Rhines’ current expert, Dr. Stevens) will take effect “within 10-30”
seconds.” According to the testimony of Rhines’ former expert, Dr. Heath,
in Saar, an ultrafast-/ultrashort-acting barbiturate will take effect and
shut down respiration in 60 seconds. According to Dr. Heath’s deposition
testimony in Smith, an ultrafast-/ultrashort-acting barbiturate takes
effect in “20 to 30 seconds.” HEATH SMITH DEPOSITION at 26/19,
Exhibit 11. Elsewhere in his Smith testimony, Dr. Heath states that
sodium thiopental administered at its “fastest possible” rate would still
take “some tens of seconds to transition from full consciousness to full and
deep unconsciousness.” HEATH SMITH DEPOSITION at 79/15, Exhibit
11. This is the same as pentobarbital in an execution setting, which,
according to Dr. Heath takes effect in “several tens” of seconds, “10, 20,
30” seconds depending on variables like heart rate or how good an
inmate’s circulatory system is. HEATH SMITH DEPOSITION at 39/11,
Exhibit 11.
i. Even if a clinical dose of pentobarbital would not act as fast as a clinical
dose of sodium thiopental, Dr. Heath admitted in Smith that “[i]f one gave
a dose [of pentobarbital] higher than, as with most drugs, the more one
gives, the more rapidly one sees the effects.” HEATH SMITH

31

 DEPOSITION at 30/9, Exhibit 11. According to Dr. Heath, the time it
takes to travel from the injection site to the brain is the same for a large
or small dose of a drug, but “all drugs that are used to produce sedation
and unconsciousness will exert their effects at a more rapid rate if you
give more.” HEATH SMITH DEPOSITION at 31/4, Exhibit 11. In other
words, high-dosage pentobarbital acts as fast or faster than a clinical dose
of sodium thiopental.
j. Ultimately, it is not necessary to extrapolate the matching performance of
clinical sodium thiopental and high-dosage pentobarbital from
comparisons between Dr. Heath’s vacillating testimony in his myriad
cases. Dr. Heath put a bow on it in his Smith deposition testimony; when
finally pushed to stop splitting hairs over clinical classifications and
speculative administration mishaps, Dr. Heath was forced to admit in
Smith that “[i]f proper administration of the drug occurs, whether it is
thiopental or pentobarbital, if proper administration occurs in the
intended multi-gram [execution setting] dose into the circulation and
carried to the brain, then there’s no difference between the drugs, because
both will produce deep unconsciousness that will outlast the duration of
the execution.” HEATH SMITH DEPOSITION at 89/22-90/5, Exhibit 11.
k. Just as a clinical dose of sodium thiopental would not be effective to
perform an execution, it is just as clear that, in the context of an
execution, sodium thiopental is not an ultrashort-acting barbiturate

32

 because it never wears off. In an execution setting, a 3-5 gram dose of
sodium thiopental will “outlast the duration of the execution.” HEATH
SMITH DEPOSITION at 89/22-90/5, Exhibit 11. Smith’s literal
application of clinical classifications to an execution statute renders the
statute inoperable; a clinical dose of sodium thiopental would not be
sufficient to produce death, and the duration of effect of a lethal dose
places the drug well outside the classification of ultrashort-acting.
l. Like Glossip, the Pavatt court noted the inherent contradiction of applying
a strict clinical classification in an execution setting. Pavatt found that it
was “not entirely clear” that Oklahoma’s statute used the term
“ultrashort-acting” in the clinical sense of how short it lasts. Pavatt, 627
F.3d at 1340 n. 3. Given that short action is not desirable in an execution
context, the Pavatt court sensibly believed that the statute used the term
ultrashort-acting “in a different sense, to refer to how quickly the
barbiturate takes effect.” Pavatt, 627 F.3d at 1340 n. 3. The Pavatt
court’s observation makes sense given the 8th Amendment mandate to
eliminate to the extent possible any conscious suffering secondary to
cessation of respiration.
m. Likewise, in Owens v. Hill, 758 S.E.2d 794, 802 (Ga. 2014), the court
rejected the clinical mainstay of sterilized drugs as having any application
in an execution setting. “[S]terility is simply a meaningless issue in an
execution where, as the record showed, unconsciousness will set in almost

33

 instantaneously from a massive overdose of anesthetic, death will follow
shortly afterward before consciousness is regained, and the prisoner will
never have an opportunity to suffer the negative medical effects from
infection or allergic reactions from a possibly non-sterile drug.
Particularly unpersuasive is Hill’s expert’s testimony that certain
contaminants also could have the following effect: ‘Their blood pressure
would drop precipitously, and ultimately its possible that they could die.’
Such a side effect obviously would be shockingly undesirable in the
practice of medicine, but it is certainly not a worry in an execution . . . .
[S]uch a side effect would be irrelevant in an execution inducing nearly
instantaneous unconsciousness and the rapid onset of death before
consciousness is regained.” Owens, 758 S.E.2d at 802.
In the Smith court’s defense, its decision could only be as good as the
evidence before it. The decision does not reflect that a Glossip argument was
squarely presented to the Smith court. Smith’s focus on clinical classifications
in texts, testimony, literature, manufacturer package inserts and other
sources, and the fact that Glossip is not even mentioned in the opinion, rather
affirmatively demonstrates that it was not. But, as Glossip found, clinical
performance has “minimal probative value;” “the relevant question” is the
drug’s performance in the dosage administered in an execution. Glossip, 135
S.Ct. at 2742. The evidence conclusively demonstrates that execution dosages
of pentobarbital meet the classifications of an ultrashort-acting barbiturate.

34

 Consistent with Glossip, Dr. Joseph Antognini, a distinguished
anesthesiologist, describes for the court how a “short-acting” drug can behave
like an “ultrashort-acting drug,” and vice-versa, depending on variables such
as dosage or method of administration:
a. In high dosages “the actions of pentobarbital . . . are consistent with the
actions of an ultra-fast acting/ultra-short acting barbiturate that is
administered in a large lethal dose.” ANTOGNINI REPORT at ¶ 11,
Exhibit 16.
b. Barbiturate “classification is not absolute, and depends in large part on
the dose of the drug and the route it is administered (oral versus
intravenous).” ANTOGNINI REPORT at ¶ 12, Exhibit 16.
c. A prevailing textbook at the time of SDCL 23A-27A-32’s codification
reported that the classifications of barbiturates are “often altered
depending on the route of administration (oral versus intravenous) [and]
dose.” ANTOGNINI REPORT at ¶ 13, Exhibit 16, citing Miller,
ANESTHESIA (1st Ed. 1981).
d. Studies report that classifications of barbiturates are so inexact, “dosedependent,” and archaic that “[i]t is surprising that th[ese]
classification[s] still persist in pharmacology textbooks.” ANTOGNINI
REPORT at ¶¶ 14, 15, Exhibit 16.
e. A textbook written by Rhines’ own expert in this case, Dr. Craig Stevens,
demonstrates the fluidity of barbiturate classification. Though Dr.

35

 Stevens’s report states that there are only “two ultra-short-acting
barbiturates: sodium thiopental and methohexital,” his textbook identifies
both sodium thiopental and pentobarbital as short-acting. ANTOGNINI
REPORT at ¶ 16, Exhibit 16, citing Brenner and Stevens,
PHARMACOLOGY at 209, Table 19-1 (2018)(excerpt attached to
ANTOGNINI REPORT. Dr. Stevens’ table classifies pentobarbital
administered orally by pill for insomnia as a short-acting barbiturate. He
classifies the onset of the pill-form of the drug as fast. He does not have a
classification for pentobarbital administered intravenously. As Dr. Heath
has testified, drugs act faster when administered in higher dosages and,
when pentobarbital is administered intravenously in a high dosage, it is
no different than sodium thiopental. Dr. Stevens classifies an intravenous
administration of sodium thiopental as short-acting, not ultrashort-acting.
He classifies the onset of intravenous sodium thiopental as “very fast,” not
ultrafast. The fact that Dr. Stevens himself fails to use the allegedly fixed
and “widely accepted” nomenclature of “ultrafast” (or “ultrashort” when
referring to Zaleplon’s duration of action) is further evidence that, as Dr.
Heath stated, there “are different ways that people” classify drugs
“depending on which author is referring to it.”
f. It is worth noting that Dr. Stevens’ chart classifies every intravenouslyadministered drug as “very fast.” Under the circumstances, it is
reasonable to infer that he would likewise classify intravenously-

36

 administered pentobarbital as “very fast” or, in Dr. Heath’s words, “the
same as” sodium thiopental. Dr. Stevens’ classification of sodium
thiopental as “short,” rather than “ultrashort” acting belies his testimony
that barbiturate classifications are rigid and that there is any difference
between sodium thiopental and pentobarbital.
g. According to Dr. Stevens, duration of action, like duration of onset, is a
function of lipid solubility. Dr. Stevens testified that drugs that are more
lipid soluble wear off more quickly than drugs that are less lipid soluble.
Thus, the fact that Dr. Stevens classifies both sodium thiopental and
pentobarbital as “short” signifies that their lipid solubility is the same, at
least in his opinion when he approved this chart for publication in the
textbook he wrote. And the fact that Dr. Stevens classifies all
intravenously-administered drugs as “very fast” acting, and the fact that
intravenous pentobarbital would likewise be classified as “very fast,” is
further evidence that the lipid solubility of intravenous pentobarbital and
intravenous sodium thiopental are the same, particularly in high dosages
as Dr. Heath has said.
h. Barbiturates can meet different classification criteria depending on
dosage. ANTOGNINI REPORT at ¶ 17, Exhibit 16; HEATH SMITH
DEPOSITION at 89/22-90/5, Exhibit 11; HEATH COOEY TESTIMONY at
40, excerpt attached as Exhibit 10.

37

 i. In the execution context, classification of sodium thiopental as “ultra-short
acting” is “meaningless” because the drug’s duration of action at that
dosage would far exceed the time criterion for that classification.
ANTOGNINI REPORT at ¶ 18, Exhibit 16. High dosage, intravenous
administration alters pentobarbital’s properties to match those of sodium
thiopental in an execution setting. ANTOGNINI REPORT at ¶ 13,
Exhibit 16, citing Miller, ANESTHESIA (1st Ed. 1981).
j. As noted in Smith and by Dr. Heath, “the purpose of the development of
ultra-fast-acting barbiturates” is “a very quick transition from
consciousness to unconsciousness.” ANTOGNINI REPORT at ¶ 18,
Exhibit 16. “[P]entobarbital at the dose administered in the South Dakota
protocol (5 grams) would induce rapid unconscious within 20-30 seconds,”
consistent with the classification criteria of an ultrashort-acting
barbiturate. ANTOGNINI REPORT at ¶¶ 20, 21, Charts C and D, Exhibit
16.
k. “[A] drug that is typically considered ‘short-acting’ can be ‘ultra-short
acting,” and . . . an ‘ultra-short acting’ drug can be ‘short-acting’
depending on the variable of dosage” and route of administration.
ANTOGNINI REPORT at Charts C and D, Exhibit 16. “When a drug is
given intravenously, there is typically a vary rapid rise in the
concentration . . . . A typical clinical dose is the general baseline for
classifying drugs as ‘ultrashort-’ or ‘short-acting.’ But, since duration of

38

 action is a function of dosage, the classification can change if the dosage
changes.” ANTOGNINI REPORT at Charts C and D, Exhibit 16.
Here, the Smith decision was more instructive of what not to do than
what to do. “[I]t is . . . a well-established canon of statutory construction that
‘a statute susceptible of more than one meaning must be read in the manner
which effectuates rather than frustrates the major purpose of the legislative
draftsmen.’” In re Goerg, 844 F.2d 1562, 1567 (11th Cir. 1988), quoting
Schultz v. Louisianan Trailer Sales, Inc., 428 F.2d 61, 65 (5th Cir. 1970).
“‘[I]n cases where a literal approach would functionally annul the law, the
cardinal purpose of statutory construction – ascertain legislative intent –
ought not be limited to simply reading a statute’s bare language; we must also
reflect upon the purpose of the enactment, the matter sought to be corrected
and the goal to be attained.’” State v. Cameron, 1999 SD 70, ¶ 21, 596 N.W.2d
49, 54, quoting Desmet Ins. of South Dakota v. Gibson, 1996 SD 102, ¶ 7, 552
N.W.2d 98, 100.
As used in SDCL 23A-27A-32 as codified at the time of Rhines’
conviction, the term “ultrashort-acting barbiturate” is arguably susceptible of
two meanings – clinical or lethal. The state would argue that its meaning, in
the context of a lethal injection statute, is limited to its properties as a lethal
agent, but Smith demonstrates that minds can differ. Since “ultrashort-acting
barbiturate” is susceptible of two meanings, it must be given a construction
here that does not thwart the statute’s purpose or render it an absurdity.

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 a. Rhines’ interpretation of the statute is absurd for two reasons. First, a
clinical dosage of sodium thiopental would not effect death; he would wake
up in 5-8 minutes. Second, a lethal dosage of sodium thiopental is not
ultrashort-acting. As Dr. Heath points out, sodium thiopental in a lethal
dose will “outlast the duration of the execution.” HEATH SMITH
DEPOSITION at 89/22-90/5, Exhibit 11. As Dr. Antognini points out, this
duration would exceed the time-criterion for ultrashort-acting.
ANTOGNINI REPORT at ¶¶ 18, 20, Chart D, Exhibit 16. Rhines’ literal
interpretation would annul the statute because no drug could qualify.
Cameron, 1999 SD 70 at ¶ 21, 596 N.W.2d at 54.
b. The state’s interpretation is both logical and consistent with SDCL 23A27A-32’s purpose. In the context of a lethal injection statute, it makes
more sense, as Glossip points out, to classify drugs based on their lethal
rather than clinical properties. And, as Pavatt pointed out, the
performance metric of interest to the legislature was not how short the
drug lasted but how quickly it took effect. All evidence, Rhines’ own
especially, demonstrates that pentobarbital acts in an ultrafast manner in
an execution setting.
c. The legislature’s intent in drafting SDCL 23A-27A-32 was to meet
constitutional standards for execution and therefore must be interpreted
in light of the numerous cases which have held that there is no

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 constitutional difference between sodium thiopental and pentobarbital. If
there is no constitutional difference, there is no statutory difference.
Rhines cannot demonstrate a “significant possibility” of succeeding on
the merits of his claim. Hill, 547 U.S. at 584.
a. The claim is barred by res judicata because Rhines could have litigated
this claim in the method of execution litigation before Judge Trimble in
2011. As noted just days ago by the South Dakota Supreme Court,
Rhines’ complaint for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief before
Judge Trimble “argued that the state’s protocols violated due process” and
that the issue of the process due Rhines under SDCL 23A-27A-32 as
codified on the date of his conviction was “fully litigated during a court
trial, which included expert medical testimony.” Rhines v. S.D. Dept. of
Corrections, 2019 SD 59, ¶ 3. The Supreme Court noted that the “circuit
court reviewed the parties’ evidence” and “made detailed findings of fact.”
Rhines, 2019 SD 59 at ¶ 4. Rhines filed a motion to appeal Judge
Trimble’s ruling but the Supreme Court “denied his motion, concluding
that he had not demonstrated probable cause that an appealable issue
existed.” Rhines, 2019 SD 59 at ¶ 4. Rhines had a full and fair
opportunity to litigate the state’s alleged non-compliance with the process
allegedly due him in his then-pending complaint for declaratory and
injunctive relief. Though Rhines certainly could have, he did not take
advantage of that opportunity to litigate this aspect of the method of his

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 execution. There has been a final judgment rendered on the process due
Rhines under the statute. Rhines, 2019 SD 59 at ¶ 4. Consequently,
Rhines’ claims are firmly barred by principles of res judicata. Lippold v
Meade Co. Bd. of Comm., 2018 SD 7, ¶ 28, 906 N.W.2d 917, 925.
b. Nor can Rhines prevail on the substance of his claims. Rhines’ gimmick of
applying clinical standards to the execution setting has been rejected by
this Court in Baze and Glossip. Rhines’ clinical interpretation of SDCL
23A-27A-32 would render the statute a nullity. Given the 8th Amendment
constraints that necessarily guide the legislature’s actions in this context,
the legislature’s selection of an ultrashort-acting barbiturate obviously
was driven by the speed with which the drug took effect, not by how
quickly it wears off. Pavatt, 627 F.3d at 1340 n. 3.
c. As Dr. Antognini points out, drugs can cross back and forth between
classification boundaries depending on the method of administration and
dosage given. Sodium thiopental administered in a low dosage at a slow
rate would take effect slowly and wear off over a longer period of time; as
such it could be considered slow-acting in terms of onset and short- or
intermediate-acting in terms of duration. Pentobarbital administered in a
massive dosage takes effect as fast as sodium thiopental or any other drug
in the ultrashort-acting classification. ANTOGNINI REPORT at ¶¶ 12,
16, 18, 20, Charts C and D, Exhibit 16.

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 d. According to Rhines’ own expert in the case before Judge Trimble, “there’s
no difference between the drugs.” HEATH SMITH DEPOSITION at 89/2290/5, Exhibit 11. Indeed, when Dr. Heath was on the warpath against
sodium thiopental in the Cooey case, he stated that “[o]ne can give a
comparable or a larger dose of pentobarbital more quickly” than sodium
thiopental. HEATH COOEY TESTIMONY at 41, excerpt attached as
Exhibit 10. Given this Court’s preference for measuring an execution
drug’s performance according to high-dosage metrics, the South Dakota
Supreme Court’s approval of the protocol as codified on the date of Rhines’
conviction 27 years ago, and the intrinsic absurdity of applying clinical
standards to a non-therapeutic process, Rhines stands no realistic chance
of succeeding on the merits of his claim.
iii. Delay
A prisoners’ long delay in pursuing a claim creates a strong equitable
presumption against the grant of a stay. McGehee v. Hutchinson, 854 F.3d
488, 491 (8th Cir. 2018). “Given the state’s significant interest in enforcing its
criminal judgments, there is a strong equitable presumption against the
grant of a stay where a claim could have been brought at such a time as to
allow consideration of the merits without requiring entry of a stay.” Nelson,
541 U.S. at 650. “[A] plaintiff cannot wait until a stay must be granted to
enable him to develop facts and take the case to trial – not when there is no
satisfactory explanation for the delay.” Sepulvado v. Jindal, 729 F.3d 413,

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 420 (5th Cir. 2013), quoting Reese v. Livingston, 453 F.3d 289, 291 (5th Cir.
2006). A prisoner is not entitled to a stay in order to conduct discovery to
make out a claim. Beaty v. Brewer, 649 F.3d 1071, 1075 (9th Cir. 2011).
Courts have often refused to grant a dilatory stay request sought on
the eve of an execution. For example, in McGehee, a group of prisoners
elected to forego certain federal claims and chose instead to challenge the
execution protocol exclusively in state court. Only after the state supreme
court rejected their state-law claims, and the Governor scheduled their
executions, did the prisoners present a claim in federal court. McGehee, 854
F.3d at 491. The McGehee court overturned the district court stay of the
scheduled executions because the 8th Amendment claims made in the federal
litigation could have been litigated at the same time as the earlier state
claims. Without specifically addressing whether the claims were technically
barred by res judicata, McGehee ruled that the prisoners’ use of “piecemeal
litigation” and dilatory tactics was sufficient reason by itself to deny a stay.
McGehee, 854 F.3d at 491, quoting Hill, 547 U.S. at 584-85.
In Ledford the court denied a stay despite the fact that the inmate’s
claims were not necessarily barred by the statute of limitations because he
had not been timely in waiting until five days before his execution to raise his
claim. Ledford, 856 F.3d at 1315; Crowe v. Donald, 528 F.3d 1290, 1292 (11th
Cir. 2008); Diaz v. McDonough, 472 F.3d 849, 851 (11th Cir. 2006); Hill v.
McDonough, 464 F.3d 1256, 1259-60 (11th Cir. 2006). Also, in Jones v. Allen,

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 485 F.3d 635 (11th Cir. 2007), an inmate facing imminent execution filed a
last-minute challenge to Alabama’s protocol, which had been adopted four
years earlier. The Allen court concluded that the inmate’s delay “leaves little
doubt that the real purpose behind his claim is to seek a delay of his
execution, not merely to effect an alteration of the manner in which it is
carried out.” Jones, 485 F.3d at 640.
Similarly, here, South Dakota identified pentobarbital as one of two
ultrashort-acting barbituates that would be used in its two-drug protocol 8
years ago. Rhines could have challenged the inclusion of pentobarbital in the
2-drug protocol 8 years ago. Yet, only 11 days from the week set for his
execution, Rhines raises this challenge for the first time.
Rhines has failed to show any equitable basis for excusing his delay
under these circumstances. Ledford, 856 F.3d at 1312. He has been
sentenced to death for 26 years and, only now, with his execution imminent,
has he decided to challenge this aspect of the procedure for lethal injection
that the state has had in place for the last 8 years. Jones, 485 F.3d at 640.
Though the Smith case held a full trial on the inmate’s statutory
compliance claim, the significant difference between this case and Smith is
that Smith did not wait until the last minute to bring his claim. A year ago,
Rhines, through the same lawyers that represent him here, brought a claim
challenging the enactment of the policy on the grounds that it had not been
promulgated by the APA. He should have brought this claim a year ago as

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 well. This sort of last-minute, stay-baiting litigation is extremely prejudicial
to the state because it forces the state to assemble a hasty defense and
inhibits the state from marshalling its full best evidence against the claim.
The injustice of further delay is a particularly intolerable here
considering that, because of his violent criminal history, Rhines would have
been sentenced to life in prison for the burglary and his first, non-fatal stab
wound to Donnivan Schaeffer’s stomach. Rhines’ capital sentence is his
punishment for pounding a hunting knife into the base of Donnivan
Schaeffer’s skull and killing him. But so far, all he has served is life in
prison, the same sentence he would be serving if he had walked out after
stabbing Donnivan just once and let him live. In other words, he has not yet
been punished for murdering Donnivan. It is time for him to be punished for
this killing. Equity howls against delay in this case.

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 CONCLUSION
Because Rhines failed to meet his burden of persuasion with a clear
showing that law and equity favored his request for a stay of execution, the
trial court and South Dakota Supreme Court did not err in denying the
motion. Rhines’ allegations implicate purely matters of state law; he has not
identified issues sufficient to implicate federal constitutional concerns.
Dated this 4th day of November 2019.
Respectfully submitted,
JASON R. RAVNSBORG
ATTORNEY GENERAL

_Paul_S._Swedlund____
Paul S. Swedlund
Assistant Attorney General
1302 East Highway 14, Suite 1
Pierre, SD 57501-8501
Telephone: 605-773-3215
E-Mail: atgservice@state.sd.us
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The undersigned hereby certifies that a true and correct copy of the
foregoing brief was served on Caroline Heller at hellerc@gtlaw.com.
Dated this 4th day of November 2019.

_Paul_S._Swedlund___
Paul S. Swedlund
Assistant Attorney General

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