1

1

2
J

4
5

PERMANENT SELECT COMI,IITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE,

6

j oi

7

COI4MITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND REFORM

8

and the

9

COMM]TTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,

nt w'ith the

l0

U.S.

ll

WASHINGTON, D.C.

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

t2

l3
14

l5

DEPOSIT]ON

OF:

WILLIAM

B. TAYLOR

t6
t7

l8

l9
20

Tuesday, 0ctober 22, 2019
Washi

2t

ngton,

D. C.

22
23

24
25

The depos'iti on i n the above matter was held i n
HVC-304, Capi tol Vj si

tor Center,

commenci

ng at 9:50

Room

a. m.

 Present: Representatjves Schiff, Himes, Sewe11, Carson,

I
2

Speier, Quigley,

3

Demi

4

Stefani

5

6
7
8

Swa1we11,

Castro, Heck, We1ch, Maloney,

ngs, Kri shnamoorthi , Nunes, Conaway, Wenstrup, Stewart,

k, Hurd, and Ratcli ffe.

Also Present: Representatives Clay, Cooper, DeSaulnier,

ce, Ke11y, Khanna, Kri shnamoorthi , Lawrence, Lynch,
Maloney, Plaskett, Raski n, Rouda, Sarbanes, Tlai b, Wasserman
Schultz, Bass, Bera, Cicilline, Deutch, Espaillat, Keating,

Gomez, Hi

l0

Levin, Lieu, 14alinowski, l'leeks, 0mar, Phil1ips, Titus, Trone,
Jordan, Armstrong, C1oud, Gibbs, Grothman, Higgins, Keller,

11

Meadows,

l2

Fitzpatrick, Guest, Mast, Perry, Rooney,

l3

Zeldin.

9

t4
l5

l6
t7

l8

l9
20

2t
22

Z)
24
25

Mi11er, Norman, Roy, McCaul, Buck, Burchett, Curtis,
Wagner, Watkins, and

 3

I

Appearances:

2
J
4
5

6
7
8

9

l0

ll
t2
t3

t4

l5

l6
t7

l8
l9
20

2t
22
23

24
25

FoT

the

PERMANENT SELECT COMMITTEE

ON INTELLIGENCE:

 4

I
2
5

4

For the

COMMITTEE 0N OVERSIGHT AND REFORM:

5

6

SUSANNE SACHSMAN GROOMS, CHIEF COUNSEL

7
8

9

l0
l1

t2

For the

l

C0MMITTEE 0N FOREIGN AFF IRS:

l3
t4
l5

l6
t7

l8
l9

For WILLIAM B.

TAYL0R:

20

H.

2t

JEFFREY

22

JOHN

23

ARNOLD

24

601 Massachusetts Avenue,

25

Washington, D.C.

B.

SMITH

BELLINGER

&

IlI

PORTER
NW

2000 L-37 43

 5

AtI ri ght. Let's come to order.
Good morning, Ambassador Taylor. And welcome to
THE CHAIRMAN:

I

2
J

House Permanent SeIect Committee on

the

Intelligence, which along

7

with the Foreign Affairs and Oversight Committees is
conducting this'investigatjon as part of the offjcial
impeachment inquiry of the House of Representatives. Today's
deposjtion is being conducted as part of the impeachment

8

i nqui

4
5

6

ry.

l3

In light of attempts by the State Department and the
administratjon to direct witnesses not to cooperate with the
inqui ry, 'including ef forts to timit witness testimony, the
committee had no choice but to compel your appearance today.
We thank you for complying with the duly authorjzed

t4

congressional subpoena.

9

l0

ll
t2

t5

Ambassador

Taylor has served our country as

a

l6

distinguished diplomat and Ambassador. Prior to returning to

t7

Embassy

l8

Taylor served as executive vice president of the

t9

Inst'i tute f or

20

Kyiv as Charge d'affaires in June 2019, Ambassador
U.S.

Peace.

From 2005

to 2009, he served as U.5.

Ambassador to

2l

Ukraine and also held important positions across the State

22

Department coordi nati ng

23

24
25

U.

S. assi stance efforts, i ncludi ng to

is also a
West Po'int grad, I bel i eve, and a Vi etnam veteran. And we' re
very grateful for your lifetime of service.
Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. He

 6

J

to introduce yourself
and your career experience more fulty at the outset of
today's interview for the benefit of the record and at1 those

4

present.

1

2

Ambassador

Fi

5

6

na11y,

Taylor,

we wj11 ask you

to restate what I

other i ntervi ews, Congress

wj

and others have emphas'ized i n

11 not tolerate any repri

sa1

,

8

threat of repri sa1, or attempt to retali ate agai nst any U. S.
Government offi ci aI for testi fyi ng before CongreSS, i ncludi ng

9

you

7

l0

ll

or any of your colleagues.
It js disturbing that the State Department in
coordination with the White House has sought to prohibit

t4

with the inquiry and
have tried to limit what they can say. This is unacceptable.
Thankfully, consummate professionals have demonstrated

15

remarkable courage

l6

truth.

t2
13

Department employees from cooperating

in

coming forward

to testify

and te11 the

l8

I turn to committee counsel to begin the
interview, I invjte Ranking Member Nunes to make any opening

l9

rema

t7

20

2t

Before

rks

.

I thank the gentleman.
Once agai n , we' re here for what you' re cat 1 i ng an
t'lR. NUNES:

22

impeachment

23

impeachment

inquiry, but there are no rules governing

an

24

inquiry. There's been no organizat'ion Qf thjs
impeachment inqui ry, and so we're essentially operating under

25

a lawless si tuat'ion.

 7

1

We

sent a letter last week to the majority requesting

a

10

of things, but that is to be notified with documents
to at least all three committees under the structure. 0n1y
two of the three committees continue to get the documents for
some odd reason that's not explainable.
But in addition to that, now typical customs of this
comm j ttee 'in review of the transcripts are now being put
under tock so that no one has access to the transcripts. And
I want to make a request to the court reporters to ensure
that no tapes disappear being that we have no access to these

ll

transcri pts.

t2

20

th that, I'11 yi e1d to ['{r. Jordan.
I"lR. J0RDAN: I thank the gentleman for yielding.
I would just too echo the notice that we got yesterday
that the minority witl not be given access to the transcript,
and even members of this committee or these three committees
can only view the transcript in the presence of someone from
the majority. I don't know that I've seen that happen
before. And just when I thought this process coutdn't get
any more unfair, we find out how the transcripts are going to

2t

be treated.

2
J

4
5

6
7
8

9

l3
t4
l5

l6
t7

l8
t9

22
23

24
25

number

And,

wj

I want to thank you for being here. I
want to thank you for your service to our country.
Ambassador,

0n September 24th, Speaker Pelosi un'ilaterally

that the House was beginning a so-ca11ed

also

announced

impeachment inquiry.

 B

1

0n 0ctober 2nd, Speaker Pelosi promised

2

impeachment

J

fai rness. However, Speaker Pelosi ,

4

Democrats are

5

Democrats are conducting

6

unprecedented i mpeachment i nqui ry.

7

that the so-ca11ed

inquiry would, quote, treat the President with
Chai rman Schi

ff,

and the

not living up to that basic promise. Instead,

Democrats

a rushed, closed-door,

are i gnori ng 45 years of

bi

and

parti san procedures

12

to provide elements of fundamental fairness and due
process in past impeachment inquiries: The majority and
mi nori ty had coequal subpoena authori ty, the ri ght to requi re
a committee vote on all subpoenas. The President's counsel
had a ri ght to attend all deposi tions and heari ngs, i ncludi ng

l3

those held 'in executive sessions. The President's counsel

t4

had the

l5

propose wi tnesses. The Presi dent's counsel had the ri

l6

present evi dence, ob j ect

t7

review all evjdence presented, both favorable

l8

unfavorable.

8

9

l0

ll

t9

designed

right to

cross-examine witnesses and the

to

ght to

to the adm'issi on of ev'idence, and to

Speaker Pelosi and Chai rman Schi

inquiry has

right

none

ff's

of these

and

so-ca11ed

guarantees of

20

impeachment

2l

fundamental fai rness and due process. Most di sappoi nti ng,

22

Democrats are conducti ng thi

23

24
25

s so-ca11ed impeachment i nqui ry
behind closed doors, and as the ranking member of the
I ntel 1 i gence Commi ttee j ust suggested, wj th no access gi ven
to the no transcripts given to the minori ty party.

 I

I

2
J

4
5

6

to be nothing more than hiding this work from
the American people. If Democrats intend to undo the witl of
the American people just a year before the next electjon,
they should at least do so transparently and be willing to be
accountable for thei r acti ons.
Wi th that, l\4r. Chai rman, I yi e1d back.
This

seems

7

THE CHAIRHAN:

8

I

9

Mr.

t.{cCaul

.

would only say, because

I don't want to get into

extended debate, and we can discuss th'is without taking

of three

up

l0

the witness' time, that

il

access

t2

to be finafized.
The one transcript that the mjnority was able to
download and print was leaked to the press promptly. That's
a problem, and that is part of the reason we have to maintain
the secu r i ty of the t ransc r i pts.

l3
t4
l5

l6
l7
l8
19

20

2l
22
23

24
25

members

to the transcripts

when

committees have

the transcripts are completed

and they have had a chance

Fina11y, unlike the past impeachments where there was

special counsel doing these proceedings before the

a

grand

jury, there js no special counsel here because the Department
of Justice decfined to even investigate the matter so we have
to do that work ourselves.
I'11 now turn to commi ttee counsel.
MR. NUNES: Mr. McCaul had an opening statement.

I'11 just be very brjef.
To your point, the Foreign Affairs Committee has
MR. MCCAUL:

 10

I
2
J
4
5

6
7
8

9

l0

ll
t2
13

l4
l5
l6
t7

l8

jurisdiction over the majority of these witnesses. We have a
SCIF at the Foreign Affairs Committee that can handle
classified information and electronically as we11. And I
would ask that you reconsider this new rule that you've
issued to a1low us to have those documents in the Foreign
Affairs SCIF and to make it more accessible.
I agree with my colleagues, there's no House rule or
resoluti on authori zi ng thi s. I talked to Ken Starr last
weekend. There's a way to do this right, and I think we
should do it the same way we did the Clinton and Nixon
administratjon. I think, in your words, you'11 say that
IDi

sruption j n hearing

is not in order -- you will
say that there's no special counsel. So I guess my question
is, are you the special counsel, slash, prosecutor and the
grand j ury of thi s i nqui ry?
MR. MCCAUL: The committee

THE CHAIRMAN:

Are you finished with your opening

remarks?

t9

MR. MCCAUL: Yes.

20

THE CHAIRMAN:

2l

Mr.

22

 VlR. GOLDI'IAN: Thank

23

24
25

room. ]

0kay.

Then

let's

proceed.

Goldman.

you, Mr. Chairman. This is

a

deposition of a -THE CHAIRMAN: No

further

this time. l'4r. Goldman.

remarks

will be entertained

at

 11

MR. GOLDMAN:

I

This is a depos'ition of

Ambassador William

2

B. Taylor, )r., conducted by the House Permanent Select

3

Committee on

4

Intelligence pursuant to the impeachment inquiry
announced by the Speaker of the House on September 24th.

5

Ambassador Taylor

6

l4R. ROY: There are members

of thi s commi ttee that

are

13

to parti ci pate
THE CHAIRMAN: If the gentleman wi 11 suspend.
MR. ROY: I'm going to have to be in the Subcomm'i ttee
THE CHAIRMAN: The gentleman will
 \4R. ROY:
instead of being in here. And then I've
got to schedule access to get access as a Member of
Congress to transcripts on a committee on which I sit when

t4

rules have never been put forward?

7
8

9

l0

ll
t2

unable

If the gentleman wi 11 suspend.
MR. ROY: What is th'is?
THE CHAIRMAN: The gentleman is not recognized.
THE CHAIRMAN:

l5
t6
t7

l8

You can

take your comments outside, si r.
MR. ROY: Take them outside

l9

to

whom? You're the judge

2t

jury sitting in here decjding who can see this clown
show. When can we actually when can my colleagues who

22

aren't on thj s commi ttee see the

20

23
24
25

and

materi a1s i n questi

all the way
from Ukraine. if you could suspend so we can get to the
matter at hand.
THE CHAIRMAN:

Sjr, thjs wjtness

on?

has come

 12

I

 \4R.

2

concerns

ROY: We11, why won't you address the legi timate

of this

a

J

VOICES: Out

of order.

4

MR. ROY: Thi

s whole heari ng i s out of order. We've got

5

wi

l0

ll

don't want to hear from thi s

tness, do you?
MR.

8

9

committee

MRS. DEMINGS: You rea11y

6
7

of this

members

thi s

ROY:

I

would

like the entire

Congress

to hear from

wi tness.

THE CHAIRI4AN: Members

will suspend.

Members

will

suspend.

t2

Mr. Goldman, you' re recogni

l3

MR. ROY: What

rules are

zed.

we even operating under?

l6

Taylor, could you please state
your fu11 name and spell your last name for the record?
AMBASSADOR TAYLOR: Wi 11 i am Brochenbrough Taylor, Jr .

t7

T- a-y-

t4

l5

l8

MR. GOLDMAN: Ambassador

,

1

-o- r .

MR. G0LDMAN: Thank you.

2t

with other proceedings in furtherance of the
i nqu'i ry, thi s deposi ti on i s part of a j oi nt i nvesti gati on 1ed
by the Intel1 i gence Commi ttee i n coordi nati on wi th the

22

Committees on Foreign

t9
20

23

24
25

Now, along

Affairs

and Oversight and Reform.

In the room today are majority staff and minority staff
from both the Foreign Affairs Committee and Oversight
Committee, as well as majority and minority staff from the

 13

I
2

Intelligence Committee. This is a staff-1ed deposition, but
members, of course, may ask questions during their allotted

6

time, as has been the case for every deposition and interview
since the inception of th'is investigation.
My name i s Dan j e1 Goldman. I 'm the d'i rector of
jnvestigations for the HPSCI majority staff, and I want to

7

thank you very much for traveling from Ukraine

J
4
5

8

9

l0

lt
t2
l3
t4

l5

l6
t7

this deposition today.
I would like to do some brief introductions. To my
right js Daniet Nob1e, senior investigative counsel for
HPSCI. l'lr. Noble and I wi 11 be conduct'ing most of the
'intervi ew f or the ma j ori ty.
And I w'i11 now 1et my counterparts f rom the mi nori ty
staff introduce themselves who wj11 be conducting the
i nterv'iew f or the mi nori ty.
f"lR. CAST0R: Morni ng, Ambassador. Steve Castor wi th the
Republican staff of the Oversight Committee.
MS. CASULLI: Good morning. Laura

t8
t9

general counsel, mjnority on the

22

commi

Casulli,

deputy

HPSCI.

MR. K0REN: 14ichael Koren, House

20

2l

to appear for

0versight, Republican

ttee staff.
MR. G0LDMAN: Thank you.

24

s depos'iti on w j 11 be conducted enti rely at the
unclassj fi ed 1eve1 . However, the deposi ti on i s bei ng

25

conducted

Z3

Thi

in

HPSCI's secure spaces and

in the presence of

 14

I
2
J
4

staff with appropriate security clearances.

We also

that your attorneys have the appropriate security
clearances as we11. Is that correct?
understand

AMBASSAD0R

TAYL0R: That

is correct.

8

0kay. I t i s the commi ttee' s expectati
however, that neither the questions asked of you nor the
answers provided by you will require discussjon of any
information that is currently or at any point could be

9

properly classified under Executive 0rder L3526.

5

6
7

 \,lR. G0LDI'4AN:

on,

22

that E.0. L3525 states that, quote, in
no case shall i nformati on be classi fi ed, conti nue to be
mai ntai ned as classi f i ed, or fai 1 to be declassi fi ed,
unquote, for the purpose of concealing any violations of law
or preventing embarrassment of any person or entity.
If any of our questions can only be answered with
classified jnformation, please inform us of that before you
answer the question and we will adjust accordingly.
Today's deposition is not being taken in executive
seSSi on, but because of the sensi ti ve and confi denti a1 nature
of some of the topics and materials that wj11 be discussed
access to the transcript of the deposition wiIl be limited to
the three committees in attendance, wh'ich we have mentioned

23

before.

l0

ll
t2

l3
t4

l5

l6
t7

l8
t9
20

2t

24
25

You are reminded

Under the House deposi t'ion ru1es, no Member of Congress

nor any staff

member can

discuss the substance

of

the

 '15

7

or the media.
You and your attorney will have an opportunity to review the
transcript'if we can figure out an arrangement, given that
you are in post in Ukraine.
Before we begin, I'd fike to go over some of the ground
rules for this deposition. We will be follow'ing the House
regulatjons for deposi tions, whjch we have previously

8

provided to your counsel.

I
2
J
4
5

6

testimony you provide today with the public

The deposi

9

ti on wi 1t proceed as follows: The maj ori ty

t2

to ask quest'ions, and then the mi nori ty
wj11 be given l- hour to ask questions. Thereafter, we will
alternate back and forth between majority and minority in

l3

45-m'inute rounds unti 1 questi oni ng i s complete.

t4

witl take periodic breaks, but if you need a break at
any time, please do let us know.
Under the House deposition ru1es, counsel for other
persons or government agencies may not attend. You are
allowed to have an attorney present of your own during this
deposition, and I see that you have brought two. Would
counsel please now state their appearance for the record?
MR. SMITH: Jeffrey Smj th, Arnold & Porter.

l0

ll

l5

l6
t7
18

l9
20

2l

wi

11 be gi ven L hour

We

22

MR. BELLINGER: John Belli nger, Arnold & Porter.

23

MR. G0LDMAN: Thank you.

24
25

is a stenographer to your left taking down
everything that is said in this depositjon in order to
There

make

a

 16

1

written record. For that record to be c1ear, please wait

is

2

until

3

answer, and we wi 11 wai t unti 1 you

4

before asking you the next question.

5

each question

nj sh

your response

of your head, so it is important that you answer

as a shaking

7

each question

9

fi

The stenographer cannot record nonverbal answers, such

6

8

completed before you begin your

with an audible, verbal answer.
We ask that you give complete replies to questions based
on your best recollection. If a question is unclear or you

ll

are uncertain in your response, please let us know. And if
you do not know the answer to a question or cannot remember,

t2

simply say so.

l3

l6

only refuse to answer a question to preserve a
privi lege that i s recogni zed by the commi ttee. 1f you refuse
to answer a question on the basis of privilege, staff may
either proceed with the deposition or seek a ruling from the

t7

chairman on any objection

10

t4
l5

l8
t9
20

2t
22
23

24
25

You may

in person or by telephone during
the deposition at a time of the majority staff's choosing.
If the chair overrules any such objection, you are required
to answer the question.
And, finally, you are reminded that jt is unlawful to
defiberately provide false information to Members of Congress
or staff. It is imperative that you not only answer our
questions truthfully but that you give fu11 and complete
answers to all questions asked of you. Omissions may also be

 17

cons'idered as f alse statements.

As

2

this deposition is

under oath, Ambassador Taylor,

J

would you please stand and raise your

4

Do you swear

hand

to be sworn.

7

that the test'imony you are about to
give js the whole truth and nothing but the truth?
AMBASSADOR TAYLOR: I do.
MR. G0LDMAN: Thank you. Let the record reflect that

8

the

5

6

wi

or

right

af f i rm

tness has been sworn.

t4

that, Ambassador Taylor, jf you have any
opening remarks to make, now js the time.
AMBASSAD0R TAYL0R: Mr. Chairman, members, I appreciate
the opportunity to appear here today to provide my
perspectjve on the events that are the subject of the
commi ttees' inqui ry. My sole purpose is to provide the

l5

committees

9

l0

ll
t2

l3

And, with

l6

with my views about the strategic importance of
Ukra"ine to the United States, as well as additional

t7

'inf ormati on about

I

the

i nci

dents i n questi on.

2t

life to serving U.S. interests at
home and abroad, jn both military and civitian ro1es. My
background and experience are nonpartisan, and I have been
honored to serve under every admr'n'istrat'ion, Republican and

22

Democrat'ic, si nce 1985.

l8
l9
20

23

24
25

have dedicated my

I've served the country starting as a
cadet at West Point; then as an infantry officer for 6 years,
jncluding with the 1.0Lst Ai rborne Division in Vietnami. then
For 50 years,

 18

I
2
J

4
5

6
7
8

9

l0

ll

at the Department of Energy; then as a member of a Senate
staff I then at NATO; then with the State Department here and
abroad in Afghanistan, Iraq, Jerusalem, and Ukraine; and,
more recently, aS executi ve vi ce presi dent of the nonparti san
United States Institute of Peace.
While I have served in many places and in different
capacities, I have a particular interest in and respect for
the importance of our country's relationship with Ukraine.
0ur nati onal securi ty demands that thi s relati onshi p remai n
strong.
However,

in

of this year' I became
that our relati onshi p wi th Ukrai ne was

August and September

ngly concerned

t2

i ncreasi

l3

bei ng fundamentally undermi ned

t4

channel

l5

l6
t7

l8
t9
20

2t
22
23

24
25

by an i rregular, i nformal

of U. S. poli cymaki ng and by the wi thholdi ng of vi tal
securi ty assi stance for domestic poli tical reasons. i hope
my remarks today will help the committees understand why I
believed that to be the case.
At the outset, I would like to convey several key
poi nts: F'i rst, Ukrai ne i s a strategi c partner of the Uni ted
States, important for the security of our country as well as
Europe; second, Ukrai ne i s, ri ght at thi s moment, whi 1e we
sit in this room, and for the last 5 years, under armed
attack from Russj a; thi rd, the securi ty assi stance we provi de
i s cruci al to Ukrai ne'S defense agai nst Russi an aggressi on,
and, more importantly, sends a signal to Ukrainians and

 19

I

Russi ans

that we are Ukrai ne's re1 i able strategi c partner;

l3

finally, as the committees are now aware, I said on
September 9th, in a message to Ambassador Gordon Sondland,
that wi thholdi ng securi ty assi stance i n exchange for help
with a domestic political campaign in the United States would
be crazy. I beljeved that then, and I still believe that.
Let me now provide the committees a chronology of the
events that 1ed to my concern. 0n l'4ay 28th of thi s year, I
met with Secretary Mike Pompeo who asked me to return to Kyiv
to lead our Embassy in Ukraine. It was and is a critical
time in the U.S.-Ukraine relations.
Volodymyr Zelensky had just been elected President, and
Ukrai ne remai ned at war wi th Russi a. As the summer

t4

approached, a new Ukrain'ian Government would be seated,

l5

partiamentary elections were imminent, and the Ukrainian

t6

20

political trajectory would be set for the next several years.
I had served as Ambassador to Ukraine from 2005 to 2009,
having been nominated by George W. Bush. And in the
intervening L0 years, I have stayed engaged with Ukrajne
visiting frequently since 2013 as a board member of a smal1

2t

Ukrai n'i an, nongovernmental organi zati on supporti ng good

22

governance and reform.

2
J

4
5

6
7
8

9

l0

ll
t2

t7
t8
t9

23

24
25

and,

Across the responsi bi 1 i ti es

I

have had i n publ i c

al for me, and Secretary Pompeo's
offer to return as chjef of mission was compelf ing. I am
servi ce, Ukrai ne i s speci

 20

I
2
J
4
5

6
7
8

9

of the profound importance of Ukraine to the
security of the United States and Europe for two related
reasons: Fi rst, i f Ukrai ne succeeds i n breaki ng free of
Russi an i nfluence, i t j s possi b1e for Europe to be whole,
free, democratic, and at peace. In contrast, if Russia
dominates Ukraine, Russia will again become an empi re,
oppressing its people, and threatening its neighbors and the
rest of the wor1d.
Second, with the annexation of Crimea in 20L4 and the

convinced

l0

cont'i nued aggressi on i n Donbas, Russi a vi olated countless

ll
t2

treati es, i gnored all commi tments, di smi ssed all the
principles that have kept the peace and contributed to

l3

prosperi

t4

Ukraine's independence, Russia must leave Ukrajne. This

l5

been and should continue

t6

po1 i

ty i n Europe si nce World War I I . To restore

cy goal
When

t7

has

to be a bipartjsan U.S. foreign

.

I

was serving outside

of

government during the

20

strati on and after the Russi an i nvasi on of
Ukraine in 20L4, I joined two other former Ambassadors to
Ukrai ne i n urgi ng 0bama adm'i ni strati on offi ci als at the State

2l

Department, Defense Department, and other agenci es

22

lethal defensive

23

Russian aggreSsion.

24

agai

l8
l9

25

0bama admi ni

nst

weapons

to provi de

to Ukraine in order to deter further

I also Supported

much

stronger sanctions

Russi a.

All to say I cared about Ukraine's future

and the

 21

i mportant U. S. i

nterests there. So, when Secretary Pompeo

20

to go back to Kyiv, I wanted to say yes. But it was
not an easy decision. The former Ambassador, l'lasha
Yovanovitch, had been treated poorly, caught in a web of
political machinations, both in Kyiv and in Washington. I
feared that those problems were stjtl present. When I talked
to her about accepting the offer, however, she urged me to go
for both policy reasons and for the morale of the Embassy.
Before answering the Secretary, I consulted both my wife
and a respected former senjor Republican official who has
been a mentor to me. I will tel1 you, my wife, in no
uncertai n terms, strongly opposed the idea. The mentor
counseled: If your country asks you to do something, you do
it
if you can be effective.
I could be effective only if the U.S. policy of strong
support for Ukrai ne, strong di plomati c support, along wi th
robust security, economic, and technical assistance were to
continue, and if I had the backing of the Secretary of State
to implement that policy. I worried about what I had heard
concerning the rote of Rudolph Giuliani, who had made several

2l

hi

22

the country.

2
J

4
5

6
7
8

9
10

ll
t2

l3

l4
l5
t6
t7

l8
t9

asked me

gh-profi 1e statements about Ukrai ne and U.5.

25

cy toward

So, during my meeting with Secretary Pompeo, on

23

24

po1 i

clear to him and the others present that if
U . S. pol i cy toward Ukra'ine changed, he would not want me

May

28th, I

made

 22

I
2
a

J

4
5

6
7
8

9

l0

ll
t2

l3
t4

l5
l6
t7

l8
t9
20

2t
22
23

24
25

I coutd not stay. He assured me that the
policy of strong support for Ukraine would continue and that
he would support me in defending that policy.
With that understanding, I agreed to go back to Kyiv.
Because I was appointed by the Secretary but not reconfirmed
by the Senate, my official position was Charge d'affaires ad
interim. I returned to Kyiv on June l-7th carrying the
original copy of a letter President Trump signed the day
after I met with the SecretarY.
In that letter, President Trump congratulated Presjdent
Zelensky on his election victory and invited him to a meeting
in the 0val Office. I also brought with me a framed copy of
the Secretary's declaration that the United States would
never recognize the illegal Russian annexation of Crimea.
But once I arrived in Kyiv, I discovered a wej rd
combjnation of encouraging, confusing, and ultimately
alarmi ng ci rcumstances. Fi rst, encouragi ng: Presi dent
Zelensky was taki ng over Ukra j ne 'in a hurry. He had
appoi nted reformi st mi ni sters and supported long-sta1led
anti corrupti on legi slati on. He took qui ck executi ve acti on,

posted there and

including opening Ukraine's High Anti-Corruption Court, which
was establ i shed under previ ous Presi denti al admi ni strati on
but was never allowed to oPerate.
He ca11ed snap parliamentary elections

his party was
So new it had no representation in the Rada and later won

 ZJ

I

an overwhelming mandate

2

Wj

controlling 50 percent of the seats.

J

th hi s new parl i amentary maj ori ty, Presi dent Zelensky
changed the Ukrainian constitut'ion to remove absolute

4

immunity from Rada deputies, which had been the source

5

corruption for decades. There was much excitement in Kyiv

of

raw

l0

that this time things could be different. A new Ukraine
might finally be breaking from its corrupt, post-Soviet past.
And, yet, I found a confusing and unusual arrangement
for making U.S. policy towards Ukraine. There appeared to be
two channels of U.5. policymaking and implementation, one

ll

regular and one hi ghly i rregular.

6
7
8

9

As the chief

t2

l3
t4

of mission, I

had authority over the

regular, formal diplomatjc processes, including the bulk of
the U.S. effort to support Ukraine against the Russian

2t

to help i t defeat corruption.
Thj s regular channel of U. 5. pol i cymaki ng has
consi stently had strong bi parti san support, both i n Congress
and in all adminjstrations sjnce Ukraine's independence from
Russia in 1991.
At the same time, however, there was an irregular,
i nformal channel of U. 5 . pol i cymaki ng wi th respect to

22

Ukrai

23

Ambassador Sondland,

24

subsequently learned, Mr.

l5

l6
l7
l8
t9
20

25

i

nvasion and

ne, one

whi

ch j ncluded then-5peci a1 Envoy Kurt Volker,
5ecretary

of

Energy Rick Perry, and as I

. I

clearly i n the
regular channel, but I was also in the irregular one to the
Gj u1i

ani

was

 24

1

2

extent that

Ambassadors

Volker and Sondland included me in

certai n conversations.

5

well connected i n
Washi ngton, i t operated mostly outside of offici a1 State
Department channels. Thi s i rregular channel began when

6

Ambassador

7

Senator Ron Johnson briefed President Trump on May 23rd upon

8

thei r .return from Presi dent Zelensky's i nauguratj on.

J

4

Although thi

s i rregular

Volker,

Ambassador Sondland,

The delegation returned

9

channel was

to

Secretary Perry,

and

Washington enthusiastic about

Ukrainian President and urged President Trump to

l0

the

ll
t2

with him early on to cement the U.S. Ukraine relationship.
But from what I understood, President Trump did not share

l3

thei

t4

I first arrived in Kyiv in June and Ju1y, the
actions of both the regular and irregular channels of foreign

l5

new

r

enthusi asm f or a meeti ng w'ith Mr. Zelensky.

When

t7

policy served the same goa1, a strong U.S.-Ukraine
partnership, but it became clear to me by August that

l8

channels had diverged

t9

I

l6

20

2t
22
23

24
25

meet

became

in the'ir objectives. As this

the

occurred,

increasingly concerned.

In late June, one of the goals of both channels was to
faciljtate a visit by President Zelensky to the White House
for a meeting wjth President Trump, which President Trump had
promised in his congratulatory letter of May 29th.
Ukrainians were clearly eager for the meeting to happen.
During a conference call with Ambassador Volker, Acting

 25

Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian
2
3

4
5

Affairs Phjl Reeker, Secretary Perry, Ambassador Sondland,
and Counselor of the U.S. Department of State Ulrich
Brechbuhl on June 18th, it was clear that a meeting between
the two Presidents was an agreed-on agreed-upon goa1.
But during my subsequent communications wjth

6

Ambassadors

7

Volker and Sondland, they relayed to me that the President

8

wanted

1l

to hear from Zelensky before scheduling the meeting in
the 0val Office. It was not clear to me what this meant.
0n June 27tn, Ambassador Sondland told me during a phone
conversation that President Zelensky needed to make clear to

t2

President Trump that he, President Zelensky, was not standing

l3

i

9

l0

n the way of i nvesti gati

I

t4
15

t6
t7

ons.

sensed something odd when Ambassador Sondland

told

me

to i nclude most of the
regular interagency participants in a call planned with
President Zelensky later that day.

on June 28th that he d'id not

wi

sh

Ambassador Sondland, Ambassador

l8

I

Volker, Secretary Perry,

20

this call dialing in from different locations.
However, Ambassador Sondland said that he wanted to make sure

2l

no one was transcribing

22

Zelensky

23

the caI 1 ,
Ambassador Volker separately told the U.S. part'icipants that
he, Ambassador Volker, planned to be explicit with President

l9

24
25

and

were on

A1

or monjtoring as they added President

to the ca11.

so, before

Presi dent Zelensky j oi ned

 26

4

in a one-on-one meeting in Toronto on July 2nd about
what President Zelensky should do to get the meeting in the
Whi te House.
Again, jt was not clear to me on that call what this

5

meant, but Ambassador Volker noted

6

President Trump wanted

7

a1so, specifically, cooperation on jnvestigatjons

8

the bottom of things.

I
2
3

Zelensky

that he would relay that

to see rule of

1aw, transparency, but

9

0nce President Zelensky io'ined the ca11, the

l0

conversation was focused on energy policy and the

ll

Stanystsia-Luhanska bridge

to get to

l8

in Donbas. President Zelensky
also said that he looked forward to the White House visit
Presjdent Trump had offered in his May 29th letter.
I reported on this call to Deputy Assistant Secretary of
State George Kent who had responsibjlity for Ukraine, and I
wrote a memo for the record, dated June 3Oth, that summarized
our conversation w'i th President Zelensky.
By mid-Ju1y, it was becoming clear to me that the

t9

meeting President Zelensky wanted was condjtioned

t2

l3
t4

l5

l6
t7

on

24

of Buri sma and alleged Ukrai ni an i nfluence i n
the 20L6 elections. It was also clear that this condition
was driven by the irregular policy channel I had come to
understand was guided by l'lr. Giuliani.
0n July 10, Ukra'inian officials Alexander Danyliuk, the

25

Ukrainian National Security Advisor; Andrey Yermak,

20

2l
22
23

i nvesti

gations

an

 27

I

assistant to Presjdent Zelensky; and Secretary Perry;

2

then-Natjonal Security Advisor John Bolton;

J

Volker; and Ambassador Sondland met at the White House. I

4

did not participate in the meeting

and

Ambassador

did not receive

a

t7

of i t unti 1 speaki ng wi th the Natj onal Securi ty
Counci 1's then-senior dj rector for European and Russj an
affai rs, Fiona Hi 11, and the NSC's di rector for European
affai rs, Alex Vi ndman, on J u1y 19th
0n July 10, in Kyiv, I met with Pres'ident Zelensky's
Chief of Staff, Andrei Bohdan, and then-foreign policy
adviser to the President and now Foreign Minister Vadym
Prystaiko, who told me that they had heard from Mr. Giuliani
that the phone call between the two Presidents was unlikely
to happen and that they were alarmed and disappointed. I
relayed thei r concerns to Counselor Brechbuhl.
In a regular, NSC secure video conference call on
July L8th, I heard a staff person from the Office of

l8

Management and Budget

t9

23

to Ukraine but could not say why. Toward the end
of thi s otherwi se normal meeti ng, a vo"ice on the call , the
person who was off screen, said that she was from OMB and her
boss had instructed her not to approve any additional
spendi ng of securi ty assi stance for Ukraj ne unti 1 further

24

not i ce.

5

6
7
8

9

l0

ll
t2

l3
t4
l5
t6

20

2t
22

25

readout

.

say that there was a hold on security

assistance

I

and the others on the

call sat in astonishment.

The

 28

I
2
J
4
5

6
7
8

9

l0

ll
t2

l3
t4

l5

l6
t7

Ukrainians were

fighting the Russians

and counted on not only

the training and weapons but also the assurance of U.5.
support. All that the OMB staff person said was that the

directive had come from the President to the Chief of Staff
to OMB. In an jnstant, I realized that one of the key

pillars of our strong support for Ukrajne was threatened.
The irregular policy channet was running contrary to the
goals of longstandi ng U. S. pol i cy. There followed a seri es
of NSC-1ed interagency meetings starting at the staff Ievel
and qui ckly reachi ng the level of Cabi net Secretari es. At
every meeting, the unanimous conclusion was that the security
ass'istance should be reassumed, the hold lifted.
At one point the Defense Department was asked to perform
an analysis of the effectiveness of the assistance. Within a
day, the Defense Department came back with the determination
that the assistance was effect'ive and should be resumed.
My understanding was

that the Secretaries of

Defense and

20

State, the CIA Director, and the National Security Advisor,
sought a joint meeting with the President to convince him to
release the ho1d, but such meeting was hard to schedule, and

2t

the hold lasted well into

l8
t9

22
23

24
25

September.

The next day on the phone, Dr . H'i11 and Mr. Vi ndman

tried to reassure me that they were not aware of any official
change in U.S. policy toward Ukraine, 0MB's announcement
notwithstanding. They did confirm that the hold on security

 29

2

for Ukraine came from Chief of Staff Mick Mulvaney
and that the Chief of Staff maintained a skeptical view of

3

Ukraine.

I

assjstance

6

In the same July L9th phone call, they gave me an
account of the July L0th meeting w'ith the Ukrainian offic'ia1s
at the White House. Specifically, they told me that

7

Ambassador Sondland had connected

4
5

investigations with an 0val

l9

for President Zelensky, which so irritated
Ambassador Bolton that he abruptly ended the meeting, telling
Dr . i 11 and Mr . Vl ndman that they should have noth i ng to do
w'i th domesti c pol i ti cs.
He also directed Dr. Hill to brief the lawyers.
Dr. Hitt said that Ambassador Bolton referred to this as a
drug deal after the July l-0th meeting. Ambassador BoIton
opposed a call between President Zelensky and President Trump
out of concern that it would be a disaster.
Needless to say, the two Ukrai ni ans 'in the meeti ngs were
confused. Ambassador Bolton, in the regular Ukraine poticy
decisionmakjng channel, wanted to talk about security,

20

energy, and reform. Ambassador Sondland, a participant in

2t

the irregular channel, wanted to talk about the connectjon

22

between a

8

9

l0

ll
t2

l3
t4
l5

l6
l7
l8

23

24
25

0ffice

meeting

H

Whi

te

House meeti ng and Ukra'i ni an i nvesti gati ons.

Also, duri ng our JuIy L9th cal1, Dr.

Hi

11 i nformed

me

that Ambassador Volker had met wi th Mr . Gi uf iani to d'iscuss
Ukraine. This caught me by surprise. The next day, I asked

 30

Volker about that meeting but received

I

Ambassador

2

response. I began to sense that the two decisionmaking

J

channels, regular and irregular, were separate and at odds.

4

no

Later on J uly 19th and i n the early morni ng of

6

July 20th, Kyiv time, I received text messages on a three-way
WhatsApp text conversation with Ambassadors Volker and

7

Sondland, a record

8

provided

5

9

of which I

understand has already been

to the committees by Ambassador Volker.
Ambassador Sondland said that a call between President

r0

Trump and President Zelensky would take place soon.

ll

Ambassador

t2

Volker said that jt was most important for
Zelensky to say that he will help 'investigation and address

13

any speci fi

t4

c personnel i ssues, i f there are any.
Later on July 20th, I had a phone conversation with
while he was on a train from Paris to

l5

Ambassador Sondland

l6

London. Ambassador Sondland told me that he had

t7

l8

to Presjdent Zelensky that he use the phrase, "I will
no stone unturned" with regard to investigations when

l9

President Zelensky spoke wjth President

recommended

leave

Trump.

22

Also, on July 20th, I had a phone conversation wjth
Mr. Danyf iuk, during which he conveyed to me that President
Zelensky did not want to be used as a pav,,n in a U.S.

23

reelect'ion campaign. The next day, I texted both

24

Volker and Sondland about President Zelensky's concern.

20

2l

25

Ambassadors

0n July 25th, President Trump and President Zelensky

had

 31

I

the long-awai ted phone conversation. Strangely, even though

J

chief of mission and was scheduled to meet with
Pres'ident Zelensky along wjth Ambassador Volker the following

4

day, I received no readout of the call from the White

5

The Ukrainian Government issued a

2
a

6
7
8

9

l0

ll
t2

I

was

House.

short, cryptic summary.
During a previously planned July 25th meeting, Pres'ident
Zelensky told Ambassador Volker and me that he was happy wi th
the ca1l, but he did not elaborate. President Zelensky then
asked me about the face-to-face meeting in the 0va1 Office as
promised

in the May 29th letter from President Trump.

After our meeting with President Zelensky,

Ambassador

Volker and I traveled to the frontline in northern Donbas to

l6

of the forces on the
line of contact. Arriving for the briefing in the military
headquarters, the commander thanked us for security
assistance, but I was aware that this assistance was on hold,

t7

which made me uncomfortable.

13

t4

l5

l8
t9

receive a briefing from the

Ambassador

commander

Volker and I could see the armed and hosti le

Russian-1ed forces on the other side

of the damaged

bridge

2t

line of contact. Over 13,000 Ukrainians had been
kj11ed in the war, one or two a week. To this day, that

22

cont'inues. More Ukrai ni ans would undoubtedly

Z)

U.5. assistance.

20

24
25

across the

di

e

wi

thout

I spent the morning of July 25th with President
Zelensky and other Ukrai ni an offi ci als, the fi rst summary of
Although

 32

I
2
J

4

the Trump-Zelensky call that I heard from anybody insjde the

call I had with Tim
Morrison, Dr. Hjll's recent replacement at the NSC, on
July 28th. 14r. Morrison told me that the call could have
U.S. Government was during a phone

8

better and that President Trump had suggested that
President Zelensky or his staff meet with Mr. Giulianj and
Attorney General William Barr. I djd not see any official
readout of the call until it was publicly released on

9

September 25th.

5

6
7

been

I

l3

text messages with Ambassador
Volker, in which I learned that Mr. Yermak had asked that the
Un'i ted States submi t an offi ci a1 request for an i nvesti gati on
'into Burisma's alleged violations of Ukrainian 1aw, if that's

t4

what the United States desired.

l5

2t

to the Ukrainians to conduct an
investigation based on violations of thej r own law struck me
as improper, and I recommended to Ambassador Volker that we
stay clear. To find out the legal aspects of the question,
however, I gave him the name of a Deputy Assistant Attorney
General whom I thought would be the proper poi nt of contact
for seeki ng a U. S . referral for a forei gn i nvesti gati on.

22

By mid-August, because the security assistance had been

10

ll
t2

t6
t7

l8
t9
20

0n August 1.5,

exchanged

A formal U.5. request

23

held for over a month for no reason that I could discern, I

24

was beginning

25

to fear that the longstanding U.S. policy of
strong support for Ukraine was shifting. I called Counselor

 JJ

1

2
5

4

to discuss this on August 21st. He said that he
was not aware of a change of U.S. policy but would check on
the status of the security assjstance.
Brechbuhl

My concern deepened

the next day, on August 22nd, during

6

a phone call wjth Mr. Morrison. I asked him if there had
been a change in policy of strong support for Ukraine, to

7

wh1ch he responded:

5

8

9

l0

ll
t2

l3
t4

It

to be seen.
He also told me during this call that the President
doesn't want to provide any assistance at all. That was
extremely troubling to me. As I had told Secretary Pompeo in
May, if the poticy of strong support for Ukraine were to
change, I woutd have to resign. Based on my call with
lvlr. Morri son, I was prepari ng to do so.
remains

Just days 1ater, on August 27th,

Ambassador Bolton

l6

arrived in Kyiv and met with Pres'ident Zelensky. During
thei r meeting, secur"ity assistance was not discussed.

t7

Amazingly, news

l5

23

of the hold on security assistance did not
leak out unt'i1 August 29th. I , on the other hand, was all
too aware of and sti1l troubled by the hold.
Near the end of Ambassador Botton's visit, I asked to
meet him privately, during which I expressed to him my
serious concern about the w'ithholding of military assistance
to Ukra'ine wh'ile the Ukrai ni ans were def endi ng thei r country

24

from Russian aggression.

18

t9
20

2l
22

25

Ambassador

Bolton

recommended

that I

send a fjrst-person

 34

to Secretary Pompeo directly, relaying my concerns. I

I

cable

2

wrote and transmitted such a cable on August 29th describing

4

the fol1y I saw in withholding mifitary ajd to Ukrajne at a
time when hostilities were still active'in the east and when

5

Russia was watching closely

J

to

gauge

the 1eve1 of

American

12

for the Ukrainjan Government.
I told the Secretary that I could not and would not
defend such a poI i cy. A1 though I recei ved no spec i f i c
response, I heard that, soon thereafter, the Secretary
carried the cable with him to a meeting at the White House
focused on securi ty assi stance for Ukrai ne.
The same day that I sent my cable to the Secretary,

l3

August 29, Mr. Yermak contacted me and was very concerned,

t4

ask'ing about the withheld security assistance. The hold that

l5

the White House had placed on the assistance had just

16

made

6
7
8

9
10

ll

support

been

t7

public that day in a politjcal story. At that point, I
was embarrassed that I could not give him any explanation for

18

why

20

it was w'ithheld.
It had sti11 not occurred to me that the hold on
security assjstance could be related to the investigations.

2t

That, however, would change.

22

0n September 1st,

t9

23

24
25

just 3 days after

my

cable to

Secretary Pompeo, Presjdent Zelensky met Vice Presjdent

at a bilateral meeting in Warsaw. President Trump had
planned to travel to Warsaw but at the last minute had

Pence

 35

I
2

canceted because

of

Hu

r ri

cane Dor i an .

Just hours before the Pence-Zelensky meeting, I

6

that the delay of U.S.
securi ty assi stance was an all-or-nothi ng proposi tion, j n the
sense that 'if the Whjte House did not lift the hold prior to
the end of the fiscal year, September 30th, the funds would

7

expire and Ukraine would receive nothing.

^J

4
5

contacted Mr. Danyliuk

I

to let

him know

1l

that, at the bilateral meeting or shortly
thereafter, the White House would lift the hold, but this was
not to be. lndeed, I received a readout of the
Pence-Zelensky meeti ng over the phone f or Mr. I''lorri son,

t2

during which he totd me President Zelensky had opened the

13

meeti ng

l4

cooperation.

8

9

l0

l5

was hopeful

by aski ng the V'ice Presi dent about securi ty

The Vice President

did not

respond substantively but

l6

said he would talk to President Trump that night. The Vice

t7

President did say that President Trump wanted the

l8

24

to do more to support Ukraine and that he wanted Ukrainians
to do more to fight corruption.
During this same phone. call I had wjth l'4r. Morrison, he
went on to describe a conversat'ion Ambassador Sondland had
with Mr. Yermak at Warsaw. Ambassador Sondland told
Mr. Yermak that the security assistance money would not come
until Presjdent Zelensky committed to pursue the Burisma

25

i nvesti gati on.

t9
20

2t
22
23

Europeans

 Jb

J

told me about the
Sondland-Yermak converSation. This was the first time I had
heard that security assistance, not just the White House

4

meeti

I

2

I

was alarmed by what Mr. Morrison

ng, was condi tjoned on the j nvesti gations.

l6

that same day, I sent Ambassador
Sondland a text message asking if we are now saying that
securi ty assi stance and a Whi te House meeti ng are condi ti oned
on investigations. Ambassador Sondland responded asking me
to call him, which i did.
During that phone ca11, Ambassador Sondland told me that
President Trump had told him that he wants President Zelensky
to state publicly that Ukraine wilt'investigate Burisma and
alleged Ukrai n'ian i nterf erence j n the 20L5 U. S . elect'ion.
Ambassador Sondland also told me that he now recognized
that he had made a mistake by earljer telling Ukrainian
officials to whom he spoke that a White House meeting with

t7

President Zelensky was dependent on a public announcement of

l8

investigations. In fact,

t9

was dependent on such an announcement,

20

assistance.

5

6
7
8

9

l0

ll
t2
l3
t4
l5

Very concerned, on

Ambassador Sondland

said everything

including security

2l

said that President Trump wanted President
Zelensky in a box by making public statement about ordering

22

such i nvesti gati ons.

.t)
24
25

He

In the same September Lst ca11, I told Ambassador
Sondland that Presjdent Trump should have more respect for
another head of state and that what he described was not in

 37

2

the interest of either President Trump or Presjdent Zelensky.
At that point, I asked Ambassador Sondland to push back on

J

President Trump's demand. Ambassador Sondland pledged to

4

try.

I

6

also discussed the possibility that Ukrainian
prosecutor general, rather than Pres'ident Zelensky, woutd

7

make

8

coordination with Attorney General Barr's probe jnto the

9

i nvesti gati on

5

l0

We

a statement about i nvesti gatjons, potenti a1ly

in

of j nterference j n the 2016 electi ons.

The next day, September 2nd, Mr. Morrjson ca11ed to

that

.

to

to

j

ll

i nf orm me

t2

hotel

l3

l8

. support f or Ukra'ine.
In parti cu1ar, Mr. Morri son relayed to me that the
i nabi 1 i ty of any U. S. offi ci als to respond to Ukrai ne's
explicit questions about security assistance was troubling
them. I was experiencing the same tension in my dealings
with the Ukrainians, including a meeting that I had had with

t9

Defense Minister Andriy Zagordnyuk

t4

l5
l6
t7

20

2t
22
23

24
25

room

in

Mr

Danyt i

uk had asked h'im

Warsaw where

about the possi ble loss

Duri ng my

call

wi

of

th

come

h

s

Mr. Danyliuk expressed concern
U.5

that

day.

["1r. l'lorri son on September 2nd, ]

also briefed Mr. Morrison on what Ambassador Sondland had
told me during our call the day prior.

I hosted Senators Johnson and t"lurphy
for a visit to Kyiv. During their visit, we met with
Presjdent Zelensky. His first question to the Senators was
0n September 5th,

 JO

thheld securi ty assi stance. My recollect'i on of

I

about the

2

the meeting is that both Senators stressed that bipartisan

J

support

4

important strategic asset and that President Zelensky should

5

not jeopardize that bipartisan support by getting drawn into

6

U.S. domestic politics.

wi

for Ukraine in

Washington was Ukraine's most

l5

I had been making, and continue to make, this point to
all of my Ukrain'ian official contacts. But the push to make
Pres'ident Zelensky publicly commit to investjgatjons of
Burisma and alleged interference in the 2016 elections showed
how the official foreign policy of the United States was
undercut by the irregular efforts 1ed by Mr. Giuljanj.
Two days 1ater, on September 7th, I had a conversation
wi th Mr. l'4orri son i n whi ch he descri bed a phone conversati on
earlier that day between Ambassadors Sondland and President

16

Trump. Mr. Morrison said that he had a sinking feeling after

7
8

9

l0

ll
t2

l3
t4

t7

l8
l9
20

2t
22
./.)

24
25

learning about this conversation f rom Ambassador Sondland.
According to Mr. Morrison, President Trump told
Ambassador Sondland that he was not asking for a quid pro

quo. But Presi dent Trump d'id i nsi st that Presi dent Zelensky
go to a m'icrophone and say he i s openi ng i nvest j gati ons of
B'iden and 2015 election interference, and that Pres'ident
Zelensky should want to do this himself. Mr. Morrison said
that he told Ambassador Bolton and the NSC lawyers of this
phone call between President Trump and Ambassador Sondland.

 39

The fol1ow'ing day, on September

I

I

8th,

Ambassador Sondland

spoke on the phone. He said he had talked

2

and

J

Trump, as

4

Trump was adamant

I

had suggested a week

to

earlier, but that

President

Presjdent

5

that President Zelensky himself had to
clear things up and do it in public. President Trump said it

6

was

7

not a quid pro quo.
Ambassador Sondland

said that he had talked to President

8

Zelensky and Mr. Yermak and told them

that, although this

9

not a quid pro quo, if President Zelensky did not clear

was

l0

things up in public, we would be at a stalemate.

ll

to mean that Ukraine would not receive
the much-needed military assistance. Ambassador Sondland
said that this conversation concluded with President Zelensky
agreei ng to make a publ i c statement i n an "intervi ew w'ith CNN.
After the call with Ambassador Sondland on
September 8th, I expressed my strong reservations in a text
message to Ambassador Sondtand stating: My nightmare is that
the Ukrajnjans give the interview and don't get the security
assj stance. The Russi ans love i t. And I qui t.
I was ser i ous
The next day I said to Ambassadors Sondland and Volker
that the message to the Ukrainians and Russians we send with
the dec'ision on securi ty ass j stance i s key. Wi th the hold,
we have already shaken their faith in us. I also said, I
thi nk i t's crazy to wi thhold securi ty ass'istance f or help

t2
l3
t4
l5
t6

l7
t8

l9
20

2l
22
23

24
25

understood a stalemate

.

I

 40

I

wi

th a pol i ti cal

campai gn.

Ambassador Sondland responded about

2

5 hours later that I

J

was i ncorrect about Presi dent Trump's i ntenti

4

President has been crystal

5

k'i nd

clear:

No

ons.

The

quid pro quos of

any

.

l0

text messages, during our call on
September 8th, Ambassador Sondland trjed to explain to me
that President Trump is a businessman. When a businessman is
about to sign a check to someone who owes him something, he
said, the businessman asks that person to pay up before

ll

s

6
7
8

9

Before these

i gn i ng

the check.

Ambassador

t2

Volker used the same terms several days later

together at the Yalta European Strategy

13

when we were

t4

Conference in

Kyiv. I

17

to both that the explanation
made no sense. The Ukrajnians did not owe President Trump
anythi ng, and holdi ng up securi ty assi stance for domesti c
political gain was crazy, as I had sa'id in my text message to

l8

Ambassador Sondland and

15

l6

Fina11y,

t9
20

2t
22
23

24
25

been

lifted

argued

Volker on September 9th.

I learned on September LLth that the hold had

and security assistance would be provided. After

I learned that the securi ty assi stance was released on
September LLth, I personally conveyed the news to Presjdent
Zelensky and Forei gn Mi ni ste r Pry stai ko. And I agai n
reminded Mr. Yermak of the high strategic value of bipartisan
support for Ukraine and the importance of not getting

 41

I

i nvolved i n

other countri es' electi

ons.

6

fear at the time was that, sjnce Ambassador Sondland
had told me President Zelensky had already agreed to do a CNN
interview, President Zelensky would make a statement
regardi ng i nvesti gati ons that would have played j nto domesti c
U.S. politics. i sought to confjrm through Mr. Danyliuk that

7

President Zelensky was not planning

8

to the media.

9

Whi

2
3

4
5

My

to give such an interview

1e Mr. Danyl i uk i ni ti a1ly confj rmed

that

on

t0

September

L2th, I noticed during a meeting on the morning of

lt

September

L3th, at Presi dent Zelensky's offi ce, that

t2

Mr. Yermak looked uncomfortable in response to the question.

l3

Again, I asked Mr. Danyliuk to confirm that there would be no

t4

CNN i

l5
l6
t7

l8
t9
20

2t
22
23

24
25

nterv'iew,

whi

ch he di d.

0n September 25th,

at the U.N. General Assembty

session

in New York City, President Trump met President Zelensky
face-to-face. He also released a transcript of the July 25th
ca11. The Unjted States gave the Ukrainians virtually no
notjce of the release, and they were livid.
Although this was the first tjme I had seen the details
of President Trump's July 25th call wjth President Zelensky
in which he mentioned Vice President Biden, I had come to
understand well before then that "investigations" was a term
Ambassadors Volker and Sondland used to mean matters related
to the 2015 elections and to investigations of Burisma and

 42

I

the

Bi dens.

Mr. Chairman, I recognize this is a rather lengthy

2

6

recitatjon of the events of the past few months, told from my
vantage point in Kyiv. But I also recognize the importance
of the matters your committees are investigating, and I hope
that this chronology will provide some framework for your

7

questi ons.

J
4
5

t4

I wish to conclude by returning to the points I made at
the outset: Ukrai ne 'is i mportant to the securi ty of the
United States. It has been attacked by Russia, which
continues its aggression against Ukraine. If we believe in
the principle of sovereignty of nations on which our security
and the security of our friends and a11ies depends, we must
support Ukrai ne i n i ts fi ght agai nst i ts bul1yi ng nei ghbor.

l5

Russ'i

8

9
10

ll
t2
t3

an aggress i on cannot stand .

l6

There are two Ukra'ine stori es today, Mr. Chai rman.

t7

first is the one we are discussing this morning and that you
have been hearing for the past 2 weeks. It's a rancorous
story about whistleblowers, Mr. Gjuliani, side channels, quid
pro quos, corrupti on, i nterf erence 'in electi ons. In thi s
story Ukraine is an object.
But there's another Ukrai ne story, a posi ti ve,
bi parti san one. In thi s second story, Ukrai ne i s the
subj ect. Thi s one i s about young people 'in a young nation
struggling to break free of its past, hopeful their new

l8
t9
20

2l
22
23

24
25

The

 43

I
2
J
4

will finally usher in a new Ukraine, proud of its
independence from Russia, eager to joi,n Western instjtutions
and enjoy a more secure and prosperous life.

government

s story descri bes a Nation developi ng an i nclus'ive,

Thi

7

in America, in
best moments, feel about our diverse country less
concerned about what language we speak; what religion, if

8

any, we practice; where our parents and grandparents

9

from

5

6

l0

democratic nationalism, not unlike what we

more concerned about

Because

our

came

building a new country.

of the strategic

importance

of Ukraine and our

ll

effort to create a whole, free Europe, w€, through

t2

and Democratic admin'istrations over three decades, have

l3

supported Ukraine. Congress has been very generous over the

t4

years with assistance funding, both civjl'ian and military,

l5

and poli

Republican

t9

tical support.
Wi th overwhelmi ng bi parti san maj orj ti es, Congress has
supported Ukraine with harsh sanctions on Russia for invading
and occupying Ukraine. We can be proud of that support and
that we have stood up to a dictator's aggression against a

20

democratj

l6
t7
18

22

c nei ghbor.
This second story, l'lr. Chairman, is the one I would like
to leave you with today. And I'm glad to answer your

23

questions.

2l

24
25

IThe i nformati on follows:

]

 44

I
2
a

J

4
5

6
7
8

9
10

ll
t2

l3
t4
l5
t6
t7

l8
t9
20

2t
22
23

24
25

********

INSERT L_L

********

 45

you. We' re j ust tryi ng
what you said. Thank you for your detailed

THE CHAIRMAN: Ambassador,

I

2

to process

3

openi ng statement.

thank

5

I recognize l'4r. Goldman now for an hour of questions by
the majority to be followed by an hour of questions from the

6

mi nor i

4

ty.
BY MR.

7

a

8

9

GOLDMAN:

Thank you, Ambassador

detailed opening statement.

We

Taylor.

Thank you

for

the

obviously just rece'ived jt,

t6

not to be too repetitive.
It is incredibly detailed, and I note that you mention
that you wrote a memo to file on June 30th and that you sent
a cable to Secretary Pompeo on August 27. Can you tell us
whether there were any other documents that you relied upon
in putting together this opening statement today?
A Yes. Three sources, I guess. One you are fami 1 i ar

t7

wi

l0

ll
t2

l3
t4
l5

l8
l9
20

2t
22
23

24
25

and we'11 do our best

th are the texts of WhatsApp messages that Ambassador
Volker, Ambassador 5ond1and, and I exchanged. There were
other WhatsApp messages that I exchanged with Ukrainian
officials and other American offic'ials, all of which, like
Ambassador Volker's package, I have provided to the State
Depa r tment. That ' s number one
Number two, I've always kept careful notes, and I keep a
fittle notebook where I take notes on conversat'ions, in
parti cular when I 'm not i n the offi ce. So, i n meeti ngs wi th
.

 46

Ukra'inian of f icia1s or when I'm out and

I get a phone call

6

I can I keep notes.
The third documents are handwritten notes that I take on
a sma11, ljttle spiral notebook in my office of phone ca11s
that take place in my office. So those, I think, are the
three sources of information that you see here. You wj11 see

7

some

8

texts or from my notes.

2
3

4
5

9

l0

ll

and

quotes and those are quotes from either the

O

And have you provided

WhatsApp

all of those documents to

the

State Department?

A
a
A

I

have.

t7

At their request. Is that right?
At thei r request. I thi nk 'in response to your
subpoena to the State Department, they did a document search
which came, of course, to Embassy Kyiv, applied to the State
Department. We did a search of all of our documents,
including the ones I just mentioned, and sent them into the

l8

State Department.

l9

2t

that you are aware that, other
than the WhatsApp messages that Ambassador VoIker prov'ided to
the committees, the committees have not received any of these

22

documents from

l2
l3
t4
l5

l6

20

23

24
25

a

Okay. And I

assume

the State Department?

I assumed that, but I d'idn't know that unti 1 you
confirmed it.
a 0kay. But you remain in possession of your
A

 47

personal documen ts?
2
J
4
5

6
7
8

9

l0

ll
t2
l3
14

l5

l6
t7

l8
t9
20

2t
22
23
24
25

A

I

do.

Okay. Prior to your testimony here today, did
h ave any di scussi ons wi th anyone at the State Depa r tmen t
about your testi mony?
a

A
a

you

No.

Did you receive any instructions from the State

Department about your testimony?

A

Yes. Let me be clear, i had no substantive
conversat'ions wi th anyone about testimony. I have been i n
touch. As soon as I got your invjtation, I, as jnstructed,
tatked to our congressional ljaison and in turn our lega1
offi ce, whi ch John Bel1 i nger knows somethi ng about. And they
gave me jnstructions on how I was to proceed. So I've had
those conversations with them, with what we call H and L.
People in the room are probably familiar with both.
a Right. But you djd not show this opening statement
to anyone at the State Department?
A That ' s cor rect.
a And you did not receive any guidance about what you
could testi fy about here today?
A The guidance I got was to be sure not to talk about
class'if ied materi al or anythi ng havi ng to do wi th privi lege,
and I th'ink I've abided by those. I'm not sure exactty what
the privilege constraint is. I don't thjnk I have v'iotated

 4B

I
2
a

J

4

I've certainly not violated anything e1se.
lDi scussj on off the record. l
AMBASSAD0R TAYL0R: Ah, good point. I was also
j nstructed not to appear. That's an i mportant i nstructi on.

that,

and

BY MR.

5

6
7

a
A

GOLDMAN:

0kaY.

And

jn that message, that letter, it said not to

8

appear under current ci rcumstances. My i nterpretati on of

9

that is,

when

I got a subpoena, that those were different

l0

ci rcumstances.

ll

2t

A Right. A subpoena compels your testimony, correct,
and that's why you're here todaY?
A Yes, sir.
a You indicated that you struggled a ljttle bit over
the decision whether or not to take the offer to be the
Charge to the mission'in Kyiv. Can you describe in a 1itt1e
bit more detail why you struggled with that decision?
A Yes. A couple of reasons. So I was approached
with the idea of going back out to Kyiv by Ambassador Volker
and then Deputy Assi stant Secretary of State George Kent
about the ti me, thi s would have been 1i ke Apr i 1 , l'4ay , when i t

22

was possible

L)

before the regular end

t2
l3
t4
15

t6
t7

l8
l9
20

24
25

that Ambassador Yovanovitch would be com'ing

back

of her term.

I, of course, was following events in Ukraine, not as
closely then as I do now, but waS certainly aS I ment'ioned

 49

I
2
J
4
5

6
7
8

9

l0

ll
t2

I cared a 1ot about the place. I had seen
press reports of the 'intent of l'4r. Gi u1i ani to travel to
Ukraine, to pursue these investigations that I've mentioned a
couple times in my opening statement, wjth the intent of
usi ng that i nformati on i n po1 i ti cal campai gns.
I knew of the I knew the people that Giuliani had
been talking to in Ukraine. I knew the prosecutor general,
Mr. Lutsenko. I knew that Mr. Lutsenko had given interviews
in

my statement,

pretty negatjve about both
United States and about the U.S. Embassy in Kyiv, in
particular the Ambassador and the deputy chief of mission.
I knew there
So I knew that they were I put i t
to

American media which were

l6

in Ky'iv, and I knew there were problems in
Washington. I knew that Secretary Pompeo had received a
letter from a l4ember of Congress or maybe a former Member of
Congress he's certainly a former Member of Congress now

t7

saying that

l8

20

All to say that I was concerned that there
a snake pit in Kyiv and a snake
was I think I put it
pjt here, and I was not sure that I could usefully serve in

2t

that context.

l3
t4

l5

l9

22
23

24
25

were problems

Masha

be removed.

Yovanovjtch, Ambassador Yovanovitch, should

 50

I

[10:53

a. m. ]

BY MR.

2

GOLDI4AN:

4

letter you referenced is from former
Representative Pete Sessions? Is that what you' re talki ng

5

about?

J

a

6
7
8

9

l0

ll

A
a
A
a
A

Correct.

a

What

In

May of 20L8?

Correct.

did you know about that?
I suppose I had heard that from the State
Department -- from Mr. Kent. I don't know that.

t2
l3

That

How

did you know about the circumstances

surroundi ng Ambassador Yovanovi

tch's

removal?

20

I met Ambassador Yovanovitch in Kyiv on several
occasions that spring, last spring. From my position at the
United States Inst'itute of Peace, I was an election observer,
an internat'ional election observer, for the two rounds of the
Presidential election. And on both those vjsits to Kyiv,
those were separated by 3 weeks. So both of those visjts I
would check in of course with the embassy and sat down with

2l

Masha Yovanovi

t4

l5
t6
t7
18

t9

A

We

22

So

tch,

wi

th

Ambassador Yovanovi tch.

talked in Kyiv about what was going on there and this

disturbing to her.

I

came back

from those

trips,

23

was

24

djdn't think

25

from George Kent, Deputy Assistant Secretary George Kent,

When

much more about

that until I got a phone call

I

 5'l

askjng hypothetically, he said, would
2

out to Ukraine, which

I

be

willing to go back

was odd because we have an Ambassador

6

out there and this gave me some sense that something was
going on here. Shortly thereafter, he ca11ed up and sajd,
i t's not hypothet'ical anymore. Wi 11 you go back out? And
that prompted me to do some checking and this kind of

7

busi ness.

3

4
5

8

9

l0

in what, late
I think that's right, I talked to her about this and she
When Ambassador

Yovanovitch came back

May,

described the circumstances under which she came back.

ll

a

Did you have any understanding as

to

whether the

l2

allegations that were levied against her had any basis in

l3

fact?

t4

I7

A No, because I don't thj nk there were allegati ons
well , as she's testi fi ed, she was told by the deputy
secretary of State that she had done nothing wrong. So there
were no allegations of
as far as any official channel that

l8

she had done anything wrong.

l5

l6

a

t9
20

Were you aware of

atlegations i n the

medi

a agai nst

her?

24

in the medja were that she was
tough on corrupti on. Now, that doesn' t sound so bad, that's
what an Ambassador out there has do. She was very frank, she
was very direct. She made points very clearly, and she was

25

'indeed tough on corruption, and she named names and that

21

22
23

A

The allegations

 52

is controversial out there, but she's a strong

I

sometimes

2

person and made those charges.

J

4
5

6
7
8

O When you say name names, d"id she generally name
names of people or entities to prosecute or not to prosecute?
A No, nei ther. She named Ukra'in'ians who were
standing in the way of reform of the judiciary in particular.
a I want to show you a -- what's been marked as
Exhi b'it L , whi ch i s a May 9th, New York Times arti c1e.
lTaylor Exhibit No. L
Was marked for jdent'ification.l

9

l0

ll
t2
13

l4
l5
t6

BY MR.

GOLDMAN:

a You just testifjed a second ago that you were aware
of efforts by Mr. Giuliani to go to Ukraine to push for
i nvesti gati ons. Do you recogni ze thi s arti cle?
A I do.
a Okay. Was this what you were referring to?

t7

A

It

l8

a

AI1 right. And if you could just

WAS.

read

20

highlighted paragraph, the second paragraph?
A Mr. Giuliani said he plans to travel to

2t

Ukrainian

t9

for us the
Kyi

v,

the

24

capital, in the coming days and wants to meet wi th
the nation's President-e1ect to urge him to pursue inquiries
that a11ies of the White House contend could yield new
'inf ormati on about two matters of i ntense i nterest to Mr.

25

Trump.

22
L)

 53

a
A

I

2

Conti nue, please.
One i s the ori gi n

of the Speci al

Counsel's

5

a's i nterference i n the 2015
election. The other is the involvement of former Vice
Presjdent Joseph R. Biden, Jr.'s son and a gas company owned

6

by a Ukrai ni an oli garch.

J

4

i nvesti

gation i nto

a

7

And then

Russi

if you could read the quotation from l4r.

Gi u1 i

ani

l0

, two paragraphs down?
A We're not meddling jn an election, we're meddling
in an investigat'ion, which we have a right to do, Mr.

ll

Gi u1 i

ani

8

9

a

t2

sai d.

A11

right.

And then

if you go to the next page and

l5

ust read the two 1i nes that are hi ghl i ghted?
A He said that his efforts in Ukraine have the full
support of Mr. Trump. He declined to say specifically

l6

whether he had briefed him on the planned meeting with

t7

Mr. Zelensky but added he basically knows what I'm doing,

l8

sure, as his lawyer.

l3
t4

l9
20

2t

j

A

States,

23

to, teI

25

a

if you could go to the last

page and the

just read that.
My only client is the President of the Un'ited
he said. He's the one I have an obligation to report

last f i ne

22

24

And then

o

1

and

him
So

what happened.

this article is dated l"lay 9th,

whi

ch as I

understand i t was during the peri od that you were consi deri

ng

 54

1

2
a

J

4
5

whether or

not to return to Kyiv?

A

That's correct.

a

Okay. And what was your reacti on to see'ing thi

s

article?
A

This was one of the several concerns I had when

l3

to accept the offer to go back out to
Kyiv. This was part of the one of the two snake pits,
this is the Washington snake pit that I was concerned I would
be stepping into if I were to accept the offer. So this made
me less interested, this made me concerned, it troubled me
that thjs is what was affecting U.S. policy towards Ukraine.
a Did you have any conversations with anyone, any
executives or sen'ior officials at the State Department about

t4

your multi faceted concerns?

l5

with the Counselor
Ulrich Brechbuhl and then a conversation with Secretary

6
7
8

9

l0

ll
t2

t6

considering whether

A

I did. I

had a conversation

22

were they were simi 1ar i n both i n
both meetings I 1et them know up front going into the meeting
that I had not decided whether to accept the offer to go back
out to Kyiv because I was troubled by what I was hearing, not
just this Giuliani article, but I was troubled by other
things as well and I made this clear to both, both Mr.

23

Brechbuhl and Secretary

t7

l8
l9
20

2t

24
25

Pompeo. And they

Pompeo.

that the strong support, the policy
of strong support for Ukraine, that as I said in my
And the concern was

 55

statement, bi parti san, House, Senate,
2
3

4
5

6
7
8

9

l0

ll
12

l3
t4

l5

l6
t7

l8
l9
20

2t
22
23

24
25

administrations

Repubf

RepubI i cans

,

Democ

rats

icans, Democrats all the way through,

that strong support I was worried could change. And if it
d'id change, I told them both, I couldn't serve. The counsel
I ment'ioned that I'd consulted with a mentor, and he said,
Bi11, if your country asks you to do something you could do
jt, if you can be effective. And the if you can be effective
clause is rea11y important.
And I could not be effective if our strong support for
Ukraine policy were to change and if we were if for some
reason, I couldn't imagine this would happen, but I was
worried that there could be some dramatic change where we
would agree wjth the Russians, that well maybe Crimea is
Russi an after all, you know, or somethi ng 1i ke that. And i f
that were to happen, and I made this clear to the Secretary
and others in the room, I would have to come back, I would
have to resign, I would have to leave post.
a And what did Secretary Pompeo say jn response to
your expression of these concerns?
A He said that he supported the strong U.S. poficy
and that he would continue to support that strong U.S.
pol i cy, and that he would make thls case to Presi dent Trump.
a What, 'if anythi ng, di d he say about the snake pi t
in Washington that you described?
A He said that I should, as the Ambassador, as the
,

 56

I
2
J

out there, that I should fo11ow the guidance and
pursue the foreign policy of the U.S. of the
administration, of the government, well established. And he

Charge

6

said, and that policy'is strong support, economic support,
mi 1i tary support, poli tical support, Democratic support
and and that he would do his best to keep that strong

7

support.

4
5

8

9

l0

a
A
a

Did he in any way mention Mr. Giuliani?

didn't.
What did Counselor Brechbuhl say to you in
He

response

t2

to these concerns?
A Same thing. We1l, he said you need to

l3

about 3 days, the Thursday before the Monday meeting with

t4

Secretary Pompeo, he sa'id, you'11 have an opportuni

l5

the Secretary about that.
a What was Mr. Brechbuhl's view, personalty?

ll

l6

I

saw him

ty to

l8

h€'s i s not di rectly i n the Ukrai ne
policymaking channel. He was more in the executive

l9

personnel, whjch

20

him, a meeting with him before seeing the Secretary.

t7

2l
22
23

24
25

A

a

He agreed,

is

why

I

was having

my an interview with

Did you specifically mention Mr. Gjuliani

to either

or Secretary Pompeo?
A Mr. Goldman, I don't remember if I did, I don't
remember if I d'id or not.

Counselor Brechbuhl

a

ask

0kay.

 57

I

A
a
A

Not that

I

remember.

l3

to take the job?
The Secretary's assurance that he would cont'inue
that strong support and that he would continue to push that
strong support within the government. And frankly one of my
concerns had been that there had not been a letter to
President Zelensky congratulating him on his victory. And
Secretary Pompeo looked over at Counselor Brechbuhl and said,
what, no letter? And wi th'in 48 hours there was a letter.
Now and it was a good letter -- it's the letter I
mentioned in my statement that congratulated President
Zelensky and invited hjm to a meeting in Washington.
a Okay. That was the May 29th letter that you

t4

referenced?

l5

A

2
J

4
5

6
7
8

9

l0

ll
t2

What ultimately 1ed you

Correct, correct. That's ri ght, because I

saw

on the 28th.

l6

Secretary

t7

24

a By the time you had seen Secretary Pompeo, were you
aware that there was a meeting related to Ukrajne with the
President in the Oval Office on May 23rd?
A Yes. I think I had heard that. I know I've heard
about that -- I have I've gotten reports of that meeting.
This was the --this is the meeting of the delegation that
went the U.S. delegation that went to the inauguration jn
Kyiv and they came back to brief President Trump, that's the

25

one you're

l8
t9
20

2t
22
23

Pompeo

talki ng about.

 AO

I

a

Yes.

6

or not I knew of
that meeting when I saw the Secretary on the 28th. I don't
know when I heard I can't remember. I heard several
reports of, descriptions of that May 23rd meeting, but they
mi ght - - may have come af ter my meeti ng wlth Secretary

7

Pompeo.

8

a

2
J

4
5

A

Yeah.

Who

So your question

is

whether

djd you get reports of that meeting

from?

13

If I could just interrupt. And I don't
know all the Members so I apologize. 0nly members of three
committees and their staff and committee staff are authorized
to be present. If there js any Member here who is not a
member of the three committees, they need to absent

t4

themselves.

9

l0

ll
t2

l5

THE CHAIRMAN:

AMBASSADOR

BY MR.

l6
l7
l8
t9
20

TAYLOR: So who

a
A
a
A

did I hear from

GOLDMAN:

Yeah.

about the May 23rd meeting,
Ri

Yes?

ght.

I'm sure Kurt Volker -- I imagine

we had several

22

thjs, this is an important meeting. And
okay and Ambassador Sondland, because it was at that

^t3

meeting

24

Energy

25

the President to work on Ukraine policy.

2l

conversations about

that Ambassador Sondland, Volker and Secretary of
Perry, Ri ck Perry were gi ven some responsi bi 1 i ti es by

 59

I

2
a

J

So f 'm sure i n answer your quest j on, 14r. Goldman, I 'rr

sure I heard 'it f rom Kurt and Gordon, Kurt Volker and Gordon
Sondl and.

8

in addition to the fact that the President had
asked the three of them to work on Ukraine poticy, did you
learn anything else about the conversation at that meeting
A I -from ei ther Ambassador VoIker or Ambassador
a

9

Sond 1 and?

4
5

6
7

l0

a

And

A

I did. 5o they described

how

enthusiastjc they

ll

were coming back from Kyiv, from the inauguration,

t2

enthusiastic they were about the new Pres"ident, President

l3

Zelensky. And they described their attempts or their

t4

l6

to pass on this enthusiasm to President Trump.
Presi dent Trump, I thi nk I menti oned i n my statement,
was sceptical of Ukraine in general, but
of the new

t7

Ukrainian administration. And when Secretary Perry,

l8

Ambassador

t9

would be a good idea

l5

how

attempts

Volker, and Ambassador Sondland suggested that it

22

for the two Presidents, President Trump
and President Zelensky to get together in a meeting. This
now i s bef ore the Ietter was si gned. Ri ght, but so the 'idea
to get together for a meeting was a good idea so that

Z)

President Trump could see himself, what they had seen when

24

they were

25

with President

20

2t

in Kyiv,

and what they had seen

Zelensky.

in their meetings

 60

President Trump didn't agree, but what he did say was

I

work

Did he say what he wanted them to work with

Rudy

work with Rudy

J

wi

6
7

Rudy Gi uli anj

a

4
5

th

Gi

Gjuliani, he told the three of

to

2

them

.

uli ani about from your readouts?

A
a

No, not
By

that I

reca11.

this point you understood that in part based on

8

that arti cle, but you 'i ndi cate i n your

9

other preSS statements, did you understand what

openi ng statement
Rudy

Giuliani

22

for in Ukraine?
A This article that we just talked about was probably
it may have been the only
the best description and it
d'i rect description of what Mr. Giuf iani was interested in.
a And were you f ami 1i ar wi th Buri sma or the Ukrai n'ian
role at all in the 2015
A I became familiar, but I -- I think at that time I
was not. In the past several months since seeing this and
hearing how it piped up I became more familiar with it so now
I'm pretty familiar. At the time, it is hard to say, exactly
what you knew at a particular time. I don't think so. I -I don't think I understood other than you know, that Giulianj
was out doing some things along these lines that this was

23

what he was after.

l0
l1

t2

l3
14

l5

l6
t7

l8
t9
20

2t

24
25

was pushing

to hearing that the
President had directed the Ambassador to the European Union,

a

And what was your reaction

 61

I

the Special Envoy to the Ukraine conflict, and the Secretary

l6

of Energy to take a role in Ukraine policy and to speak to
his personat lawyer?
A Actually, I wasn't disturbed by that. It's not
unusual to ask people outside the government to play a ro1e.
In some sense Kurt Volker was k'ind of outside the government
and he was playing a very important ro1e. He kind of came
'i nto the government, a very i mportant role i n the
negoti at'i ons. There have been examples, we've heard about
them recently of other civilians doing work for the State
Department. And as long as the people pu11ed in from the
outside, consulted from the outside, giving advice or ideas
on policy, that's
we see that all the tjme. We all have
seen that, and that's okay, as long as it's consistent with
and supports the main thrust of U.S. fore'ign policy.
And so at the time I didn't think that that was a

l7

problem.

2
J
4
5

6
7
8

9

l0

ll
t2

l3
t4
l5

l8

a

Over time, did your view

l9

A

It did.

of that

change?

22

get into that a 1itt1e bit tater. Did
you come to understand whether any of those three individuals
spoke to Mr. Giuliani after the President directed them to do

23

so on

20

2l

24
25

And we'11

a

A

May

23rd?

I

know

phone a couple of

Kurt,

Ambassador

Volker, spoke to him on the

times, I think had a breakfast with

him

 62

I

during the summer. And as

2

touch with Andrey Yermak, the assi stant

J

Zelensky.

4
5

6

to

Giuliani in

Presi dent

I

know

.

a

8

A

9

me see

l0

a

l2

know, put Rudy

did fo11ow
that Ambassador Volker had some
up. And I'm pretty sure that Ambassador Sondland had some
contact w'i th Rudy Gi uf iani as we11
So

7

ll

we

L7

And what about SecretarY PerrY?

I don't know. I've had almost no deali ngs 1et
i f i t's even no deali ngs wi th Secretary Perry.
You testified that you returned to Kyiv on June

th?
A

Yes

t6

in your opening remarks a phone
conversation that you had 10 days later on June 27tn with
Ambassador Sondland about Ukraine matters. Do you recall
anything more about that phone conversation with Ambassador

t7

Sondl and?

l3
t4

l5

18

t9
20

2l
22

Z)
24
25

a

A

And you described

This phone ca11, Mr. Goldman, was in preparation

for a larger phone call the following day on June 28th. And
I can I'd be happy to check my notes on anything e1se.
When preparing this statement, I did check my notes and, as I
said in my statement, Ambassador Sondland told me during a
phone conversations President Zelensky, needed to make clear
to Presjdent Trump that he, President Zelensky, was not
standing in the way of investigations, there could have been

 63

I

other parts of the conversation. That was the one piece that

2

stuck out

l0

that I included here.
a And di d you know at that t'ime what
investigations Ambassador Sondland was referring to?
A I did not. I didn't, you know, I knew that these
were that Mr . Gi uf i ani was pursui ng some i nvesti gati ons
and I hadn't again, this was L0 days after arriving there
I hadn't put this together. 5o no I wasn't sure what he was
tatki ng about, nor was I sure the next day, "in thi s larger
phone ca11, what people were referring to when they talked

ll

about investigations.

t2

l4

I believe you testified in your opening
statement that the call the next day there was a reference to
'investigations to, quote, "Get to the bottom of things. "

l5

unquote.

3

4
5

6
7
8

9

l3

t6

l7
l8
t9
20

2t
22
23

24
25

a

A

sticks out to

me

And

That's correct. And that was

Ambassador Volker

to say to President Zelensky when Ambassador Volker
sat down with President Zelensky in Toronto at an assistance
conference, at a reform conference that was coming up the
following week. And yes, it was -- and again, from my notes
in preparing this from my notes preparing this, this
actually was i n the f ittle spi ral notebook by my desk 'in the
office where I had that meeting had that phone call is
where I have that quote.
a Was the reference to investigations by Ambassador
intended

 64

2t

27fi the earliest date or time that you can
reca11 any discussion of investigations?
A And again, before I came out there, w€'d had some
conversati ons I 'm Sure that I had conversati on wi th Deputy
Assistant Secretary Kent about the Giuliani role, which made
me concerned and the role was an investigation So I wanted to
be careful about how I answer your question.
When I got out there in the first L0 days -- let me see,
I did have a meeting I had a phone call the day after I
got there, which was on I got there on the 17th. And on
yeah, but it was about -- it
the L8th we had a phone call
was about the meeting, it was about the meeting that the
Ukrainians wanted w"ith that President Zelensky wanted wjth
President Trump. And I don't reca11 any discuss'ion on that
day, on the L8th, which is again the day after I arrived of
investigations and I show nothing else in my notes about
that. So I think that's the answer.
a Okay. And you do reference speci fi ca1ly i n your
opening remarks that President Zelensky needed to make it
clear to President Trump that he was not standing in the way
of investigations. And that was a preview to the catl that

22

you had with President Zelensky the day after?

I
2
J

4
5

6
7
8

9

l0

ll
t2
13

t4
15

l6
t7

l8
t9
20

.t)
24
25

Sondland on June

ght. 0n J une 27tn, correct.
And do you recall whether or not that message was
conveyed to President Zelensky on the calt on the 28th?
A
a

Ri

 65

A

I

2

to pass

J

4

a

he went

not. And
and Ambassador Volker
that message in Toronto several days later
It

was

Okay.

And

to Toronto i n early

5

A

Many times.

6

a

Speci

7

did you speak to
J

Ambassador

intended

Volker after

uly?

But about that?

ficatly about a conversation that he had with

President Zelensky?
A

8

Yes.

ll

did he tell you about that conversation?
He said that he had been in a broader conversation,
a larger conversation with many officials on both sides. And

t2

then he had an opportunity

l3

l6

with President Zelensky and Presjdent Zelensky's Chief of
Staff, Andriy Bohdan, where Kurt said that he had Kurt
told me that he had discussed how Pres'ident Zelensky could
prepare for the phone call with President Trump. And without

t7

goi

l8

specific words, did talk about investigations in that

t9

conversati on wi th

9

l0

t4
l5

20

2t
22
23

24
25

a
A

And what

ng i nto

a

wi

to have a smaller conversatjon

thout providi ng me any detai ls about the
'in Toronto

th Zelensky and Bohdan.
In what context did he tetl you that he spoke about
wi

i nvesti gati ons?

A
a

So when

in

did he te1l

me

did the issue or topic of
investigations come up? Was it jn connection with an
jnteractjon between President Zelensky and President Trump?
No,

what context

 66

4

A Yes, i t was speci fi cally i n preparati on for the
phone call and Kurt suggested to President Zelensky that
President Trump would like to hear about the investigatjons.
a Okay. And at that point did you know what

5

i nvesti gati ons he was

I
2
J

6
7
8

9

l0

ll
t2
13

t4

l5

l6
t7

l8
t9
20

A
a
A
a

talki ng about?

No.

It

was

-- i t

was

just described as investigations?

Correct.

Understood. You j ust

Is there anything more you could tel1 us
about that conversation when he when Ambassador Volker
sai d that he di scussed i nvesti gati ons wi th Zelensky's Chi ef
of Staff. Did you ask him what about that, what are you
talking about, you were aware at that time of what Giulianj
had said, did it come up in that conversat'ion?
AMBASSADOR TAYLOR: Mr. Chairman, the conversation I had
with Ambassador Volker about that -- about the Toronto
conversati on took place probably 1et's see, so 'it was - THE CHAIRI4AN:

July 2nd was the Toronto conversation. Kurt arrived, he and
I talked a 1ot, and he also visited a couple of times in this

22

timeframe. And i t was duri ng those conversations and vi si ts
that we had this conversation. So nothing specific came out

Z3

of those conversati ons descri bi ng thi s.

2t

24
25

THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you.
BY MR.

GOLDMAN:

 67

5

testified that you had a meeting
'in Kyiv with President Zelensky's Chief of Staff Andriy
Bohdan who had indicated to you that he had heard from Mr.
Giuliani that the phone call between the two Presidents was
unlikely to happen and that they I think you sa'id were

6

alarmed and disappointed. 0h, and the meeting also was the

7

Forei gn

0n July L0th you

a

2
J
4

8

9

A
a

Mi

ni

ster Vadym Prystai

ko?

Yeah.

Did they indicate to you who had heard from

Giuliani and how that

message had been relayed?

was going over my notes

t2

A
Yes, it

l3

fellow I

l0
l1

You know,

I

Mr.

last night.

was relayed through the then prosecutor general, this

t4

it was -- and as we
know, Gi ul'iani and Lutsenko talked a 1ot. And so Prystai ko

l5

and Bohdan had heard from

l6

a
A

mentioned

earlier,

Lutsenko and

Giuliani through

Lutsenko.

What do you know about I'1r. Lutsenko?

22

I was in Kyiv 2005 to 2009, Yuriy Lutsenko was
the Minister of Interior so he headed up all the police. And
frankly he djd a pretty good job at the time. He was a
controversial choice for President Poroshenko as the
Prosecutor General because he he had 1aw enforcement with
police but had no legal training. So he was an unusual

./.)

choi ce.

l7
l8
t9
20

2t

24
25

When

Mr. Lutsenko was 1oya1 to President Poroshenko and so
kept his job there. But was a very kjnd of a person

who

 68

J

listened carefully to what was going on in Washington, what
was going on in Kyiv, the politics. He wanted to stay in the
job and of course this is 20L6 when he is the Prosecutor

4

General and no one knows about the outcome

I
2

7

of the election.
So I mean a 1ot of Ukrainians, probably a lot of
internationals around the world were trying to figure out
American politics at the time, but Lutsenko was also tuned

8

i

5

6

9

nto those.

a

But clearly the sen'ior

officials for

President

that l"lr. Gi u1i ani had to

l0

Zelensky were i nterested i n anythi ng

ll

l8

say. Is that accurate?
A That's accurate, because they understood, as did
Kurt and Ambassador Volker and Ambassador Sondland, that
at Presi dent Trump's di recti on, Rudy Gi u1 i ani was
i nfluenti a1 , was i nfluenti al wi th that team. And they were
sure, and I think Lutsenko had the same view that in order to
have this meeting, get this meeting between the two
Presi dents that Mr . Gi ul i an'i was goi ng to be an i mportant

t9

player.

20

a

t2

l3
t4

l5
l6
t7

2t
22
./.)

24
25

Did they understand why Mr. Giuliani had indicated

that there would -- the phone call was unlikety to happen?
A I don't know.
a Okay. And you said that you relayed these concerns
to Counselor Brechbuhl?
A I did.

 69

a
A

I

And what

did he say to

you?

8

first he'd heard I was hoping I could find
out something from Washington that indicated whether or not
this phone call was going to happen and he didn't know.
a Did he get back to you?
A No.
a You describe a phone conversation that you had with
Fiona Hill and Alex Vindman on Juty L9th at some length in

9

your openi ng statement.

2
J

4
5

6
7

10

ll
t2

l3

He

A
a

Yes.

A
a

That's correct.

refer back to a meeting that occurred on
July LOth, while you were in Kyiv, so you were not there. Is
that right?

t4
l5

And you

And based on the

phone wel1, let

me ask

this,

t6

did you hear about that meeting from anyone other than Dr.

t7

Hi

l8
l9
20

2I
22

24
25

11 and Mr. Vi ndman on the l.gth?

A

Yes. Let's see, so at that meeting that meeting
included Mr. Danyliuk, as well as Mr. Yermak. And I think
Ambassador Sondland, and it might have been Secretary Perry,
and of course Ambassador Bolton were in that meeting. I will
fi nd that there yeah. Yes.
So, 0teksandr Danyliuk is the Natjonal Security Advisor
so he is Ambassador Bolton's counterpart. And they had a
good meeting there. 5o your question was had did I hear

 IU

4

is certainly yes, again with
back and forth with Kurt Volker so at least those three
recounting of that meeting.
a Di d you have any di scussi ons wi th any Ukrai ni an

5

offi

I
2
J

from other people? The answer

ci a1s about

A

6

Yes.

that

meeti ng?

When

are

when Oleksandr Danyliuk

7

I'm sure we had conversations about it.

I

8

him up again as the National Security Advisor

got

back

had also had set

for Ukraine. I

l0

also set him up to see in Washington Steve Hadley who had of
course had that job earlier, and they had a good meeting as

ll

we11.

9

t2
13

So

I djd

have a conversatjon with Danyliuk when he got

back about with meetings with Hadley

and

but not in great

t7

detail about the meeting with Ambassador Bolton and team.
a Okay. So you outlined in some detail what Dr. Hill
and Mr. Vindman describe to you about that meeting. Is there
anything else that you recal1 that they said about that

l8

meeting

t4

l5
l6

t9
20

2t

A
a

that

comes

to

mind?

No.

What was your reaction when you heard

description of

thejr

how Ambassador Sondland had connected

23

investigations with the 0va1 0ffice meeting and that
Ambassador Bolton had directed Dr. Hill to brief the lawyers

24

and Ambassador Bolton's reference

25

your reaction?

22

to a drug deal?

What was

 71

6

that the opportunity for 0teksandr
Danyliuk and John Bolton to have a good conversation was
important for Danyliuk. For him to understand how NSCs work,
number one. And two, what the substantive policy issues in
particular the war in the East, and energy security, probably
economic reform, the substance -- and they apparently were

7

having a good conversation Bolton and Danyliuk were having

8

good conversation along these lines.

I
2
J

4
5

9

A

My reaction was

Maybe toward

the end, but certainly after they'd

a

had

l3

part of that a good amount of that conversation,
programmatj c conversati on, substanti ve conversati on, what I
call the regular channel conversation, Fiona Hill and Alex
Vindman describe how Ambassador Sondland in that meeting with

14

John Bolton mentioned investigations.

l5

And John Bolton understood what

l0

ll
l2

the reference was and

2t

of the meeting, ended the meeting abruptly. Not
he understood, more than I , I
wanti ng to have that k'ind of
guess at the t'ime, that thi s was - - thi s could lead to
interference in U.5.- politicat life and he wanted nothing of
it.
a And that was the description that you had received

22

from Dr.

l6
t7

l8
l9
20

23

24
25

walked out

A
a

Hi

11 and Li eutenant Colonel Vi ndman?

That's correct.
So at this point thin then did you have a better

understanding as

to what these investigations

were that

 72

1

President Trump and Rudy Giuliani

2

an 0va1

0ffice

wanted i n connecti on wi th

meeting?

4

this is, yeah, July
A So thi s i s getti ng i nto July
L0th yes, I 'm begi nni ng to understand that there that

5

the i nvesti gations,

J

6
7
8

9

agai

n I'm not sure i f there's a crystal

ti me, a speci fi c ti me, but I 'm begi nni ng to understand that
these investigatjons of Burisma and the 20L5 elections are
what the term investigations refer to.
a And what djd you know about the Burisma

l0

investigation?

ll

t7

that energy
company that invests a lot and has dealings in Ukraine, in I
th'ink mainly it's'in energy, I'1r not sure if it's got gas
had Hunter Biden on its board at an earlier time, maybe
back in 20L6. I am not an expert on this but this is you
asked what I know, this is what I know.
This of course is the time that Vice President Biden was

l8

pushing the Ukrainians very hard on corruption and the

t9

allegation you know the allegatjon. The allegation is
that the Vice President wanted to get a Prosecutor General
fired in order, the allegation was, to stop the jnvestigation
of the Burisma the Burisma was a bit of a shady
organi zatjon I'm toId. Agai n, I'm not an expert on thi s.
But it had been accused of money laundering and those kinds
of things so there were some investigations of it. I think

t2
l3
t4
l5
t6

20

2l
22
23

24
25

A

So Burisma, a London based company

 /J

they may have been closed, the investigation may have
2

closed under one or the other

J

the previ ous ti

O

4
5

6
7
8

9

l0

ll
t2
l3

been

of the Prosecutors Generaf in

me.

D'id you understand whether

the i nvesti gati on

ani related to Buri sma was connected to
the Bidens rote in Ukraine and that company in part'icular?
A It became clear to me with press reports or other
di scussi ons, but that emerged, yes.
a Okay. i want to give you what we've marked as
Exhi bi t 2, wh'ich i s a stack of the WhatsApp messages that
l'lr. Volker had provided to us.
lTaylor Exhibit No. 2
Was marked f or ident'i f ication.l
des'i

red by Mr.

Gi u1i

t4

BY l,IR.

l5

t7

a
could.

l8

time.

l6

l9
20

And

I

GOLDMAN:

And i f you go

A
O

7

to 7 /2L at

,

/2L.

1,:45

:54

a

.m

right sort of in the middle page.

2t

you see I t?

22

A

Yes, yes.

a

And i f you could read.

th

a chai n

25

writing here can you read it?

Do

This is a text from you on

Gordon Sondland and Kurt Volker and you're

24

wi

to 37, page 37 if you
L:45 a. m. , whi ch i s Eastern

would ask you to go

 74

I
2
J

4
5

I'm wri ti ng, ri ght -- Gordon, one thi ng Kurt
and I talked about yesterday was Sasha Danyliuk's point that
President Zelensky is sensitive about Ukraine being taken

A

seriously, not merely
reelecti on po1 i ti cs.

a

6
7
8

And

aS an instrument

in

Washington domestic

Okay. And when you had that conversation with

Mr. Danyliuk, what did you understand him to be referring to,
when you say Washington domestic reelection poli tics?

l1

I'm sure that was a reference to the investigations
that Mr. Giuliani wanted to pursue.
a What was your view of the potential telephone call

t2

between President Zelensky and President Trump?

9

l0

A

t8

Initially, as I sa'id jn late like June when I first
arrived, th'is sounded like a good idea. A good idea to have
the two Presidents talk. In particular if President Trump
were skeptical about Ukraine in general and President
Zelensky jn particular, I thought that would be a good idea.
Pres'ident Zelensky i s a smart man, a good pol i ti ci an. I

l9

would even Say charming and he could have a good conversation

20

with President Trump so I thought it was a good idea to

2l

that.

l3
t4
15

l6
t7

22
23

24
25

A

As the month

this, I

of July

went on and some

was less convinced.

I

became

of these

have

suggest

less convinced that

Giuliani was asking. Yes, it
would be fine to have the two Presidents talk, but if

that meeting

was worth what

 75

Z)

in order to get that meeting were going
to have to intervene in U.5. domestic policy or politics by
i nvesti gated by announci ng an i nvesti gati on that would
it
benefi t someone i n the Uni ted States, then i t's not
wasn't clear to me that that would be worth it. That the
meeting would be worth it.
a Ambassador Sondland then responds to your text 3
hours tater. Can you read what he reads?
A Yes, he writes, absolutely. But we need to get the
conversati on started and the relati onshi p bui 1t i rrespecti ve
of the pretext. I am worried about the alternative.
a What did you understand him to mean by the pretext?
A I thought about -- I'm not sure I understood, but
my my guess looking back on it is the pretext for the
phone caI1, that is Gordon wanted he thought that the
phone call would be a good idea and wanted it to happen. And
if the discussion of the investigatjons was what'it took,
then j t's
thi s suggests that that's what he had i n mi nd.
a And when he says, I'm worrjed about the
alternative. What did you understand
A I guess -- again, I'fi not sure what is in Gordon's
mind, but I guess he was worried that if they didn't have the
meeting it would not be good for the relationship between the

24

two countri es.

I
2
J
4
5

6
7
8

9

l0

ll
t2

l3
t4
l5

l6
t7

l8
t9
20

2t
22

25

President Zelensky,

a

And i s thi

s 'in ref erence to the

meeti ng

or

the

 76

I
2
3

4
5

6
7
8

9

l0
1l

t2

l3
t4
15

l6
t7

l8
l9
20

2l
22
23

24
25

phone call?

A
a
A

Phone ca1 1 .

I 'm sor ry, phone

ca1 1 .

at stake at this point?
It was at stake at this point. And the idea was
that the phone call would be a step toward the meeting.
a All right. Now this is 2 months after -- almost
2 months after the letter inviting President Zelensky to the
White House. Is that right?
A That's correct. The letter from it was May 29th
and this is July 2Lst.
a And as the Charge de mission, you're meeting with a
number of Ukrainian officials, did you get the sense of
whether or not they were getting a little worried or nervous
or what was thejr reaction to the delay jn time?
A Yes, they were eager for this meeting. They wanted
the meeti ng. They wanted the i nvi tat'ion to the Whi te House.
And when it was suggested that a phone call would be a good
step toward that, they were willing to do that. But in
answer to your question, they were very eager to have thjs
meeti ng. That was hi gh on thei r 1 j st.
a
A

And

that

Why were

was what was

they so eager?

meeting people in this room will know as well
as I, a meeting with the head of state with a U.S. President
'in the 0va1 0f f ice suggests a relationship. It suggests a
relationship between the two countrjes that the Ukrainians
A

 77

I
2
J
4
5

6
7
8

9

wanted. The Ukrainians vaIue, valued and they value

a

relationship with the United States as thei r main strategic
partner, as thej r mai nstream partner.

or any President for
that matter, but President Trump in the 0val 0ffice doesn't
happen regularly
doesn't happen to very many heads of
state. And if you get that, you can be sure or you can think
or people might be able to believe that you've got a good
relationship between the two countries and I think that's
So a meeting

with President

Trump

l0

what they were looking for.

ll
t2

If I could direct your attentjon to page 42 now.
0n July 22nd, near the top at 4:27. Thjs is a text exchange

t3

between Kurt Volker and Gordon Sondland. You are not

t4

22

this. Volker writes to Sondland, orchestrated a great phone
call with Rudy and Yermak. They are going to get together
when Rudy goes to Madrid'in a couple of weeks. In the
meantime Rudy is now advocating for a phone calI. And Volker
explains how he's also advocating for the phone call and then
Gordon Sondland responds I talked to T'im Morri son, Fiona's
replacement he is pushing, but feel free as wel1.
Volker had said, but I can te11 Bolton and you can te11
Mick that Rudy agrees on a ca11, jf that happens. I assume

23

that

l5
t6
t7
18

t9
20

2t

24
25

a

means

A
a

Mi

ck Plulvaney.

on

Ri ght?

Yes.

Were you aware

that Ambassador Volker had connected

 lo

I
2
J
4
5

6
7
8

9

l0

Mr.

ani and 14r. Yermak?
A Not at that point. I was made aware later.
a Do you recall when you were made aware?

Gi u1i

A
a
A
a
A
a
A
a

No.

Did you learn

that they had a meeting in

Madrid?

Later.

After their
Well after.

meeting?

Well after their meeting?
Yeah.

l3

Okay. And then if we go to page 19 on 7/25 at 8:35
in the morning. This is a text exchange between Volker and
Yermak. Volker wri tes to Yermak, good 1unch, thanks. Heard

t4

from White House. Assuming Presjdent Z convinces Trump he

l5

will investigate/ quote, "get to the bottom of what happened"
unquote, in 2016, we will nail down date for visit to
Washi ngton. Good luck see you tomorrow. Kurt.
Have you seen thi s text before?
A Yes. I think I've seen it in the paper.
a As part of th'is i nvesti gati on?
A Right, right. I wasn't on it.
,
a So you were not on this one?
A Correct.
a But were you aware that this message, that Volker
texted to Yermak, were you aware that that message was

ll
l2

l6
t7

l8
t9
20

2t
22

.t)
24
25

 79

to the sen'ior Ukrainian officia1s in

I

relayed

z

phone call?

advance

of

the

6

Yes. Thjs is the basic message that Kurt -- that
Ambassador Volker provided to Pres'ident Zelensky and Bohdan
in Toronto on the 2nd of Ju1y, it's very consistent.
a And is it your view that by this point the White

7

House meeting between

8

was condjtioned on

9

Ukrai ne?

J

4
5

A

l0

I

A

ll

said.

t2

poi nt

am

President Zelensky and Presjdent

Trump

the jnitiat'ion of these jnvestigations

sure that happened based on

So Mr. Goldman, you asked me

did I

all the things
know it at that

by

I

or on 7 /25?
ght.

l3

o

Ri

t4

A

The answer must be yes,

l5

became

l6

you said it was I think
djd not
somewhat strange that you did not get a readout of the July
25th ca11. Is that ri ght?
A That's correct. It's a 1itt1e strange, it's not a
lot strange. We didn't get very many readouts, but

t7

l8

l9
20

2t
22
23

24
25

yeah. I

knew

it in July it

clearer and clearer

a

0kay.

a

And

Ambassador

A
O
A

And you

I believe you were in Kyiv

Volker and Sondland?

Correct.

At this

time?

That's correct.

and so

was

 BO

J

official whether it was Zelensky
or any of their senior officials say anything to you during
their visit, perhaps at a dinner that you had with

4

Mr.

5

mjnd

I
2

a

Did any Ukrainian

Danyl i

uk about these i nvesti gati ons, was that on thei r

l2

at that point?
A We did have dinner with Gordon Sondland, and
Danyliuk, and Kurt the night before the discussion so
yeah, that -- the night before the discussion, so on the
25th, yes. But the brief conversation that we had with
Danyliuk about that was that they seemed to think that the
call went fi ne, the call went well . He wasn't dj sturbed by
anything. He wasn't disturbed that he told us about the

l3

phone cal

6
7
8

9

l0

ll

1

.

THE CHAIRMAN: Ambassador,

t4

our time has expi red. It's

l6

intention after the minority has their L hour to take
brief lunch break. Would you like a rest room break now

t7

before we begin?

l8

AMBASSADOR

l5

t9
20

2t

my

24
25

I'm fine, I'm fine. I appreciate

the offer.
THE CHAiRMAN:

Okay. Thank you. L hour to

the

minority, sir.
BY MR. CASTOR:

22
23

TAYLOR:

a

for your service
50 years of faithful service to the United States. We truly
appreciate that. To the extent any of our questions here
a

Thank you, Ambassador

Thank you

 81

that, let

I

today you belie

2

appreci ate your servi ce.

me

just state at the outset

we

7

A Thank you, Mr. Castor.
a I al so want to express condolences to ["1r . Cummi ngs
staff, they rejoined us today, Susanne Grooms, Peter Kenny.
Mr. Cummings treated his staff like family and his staff
treated him like family as we11. So they are hurting and we

8

are glad they are back today.

J
4
5

6

You're here today under subpoena.

9

A
a

l0

ll

to have a copy of the subpoena?
A tot of these subpoenas some of

Would we be able

it.

We've never seen

13

them we have seen, others we have not.

l5

l"lR. GOLDMAN: The HPSCI minority saw

it

it like an exhjbit? Usually
per subpoena, you make it an

MR. CAST0R: Could we make

t7

when a witness

t8

exhi

b'it.

is

Can we

appearing

do that?

l9

MR. G0LDMAN: We'11 consider

20

MR.

CASTOR:

2t

MR.

GOLDMAN:

23

back

to

So the answer is

No,

BY MR.

a

I said

that and get back to

you.

no?

we'11 consider

that

and get

you.

MR. CASTOR:

24
25

the subpoena before

was

l6

22

Is that correct?

Yes, si r.

t2

t4

'

When

So

okay.

CASTOR:

did you first learn the

subpoena was coming?

 82

I

A

2

a

J

A

4

a

5

Thi

s morni ng.

0kay. What ti me?
8:30? 8:30.
Was it your understanding all along that a subpoena

was 1 i kely to

I'd

A

6

seen the pattern of other witnesses who were

I

7

under the same instruction

8

the

9

right before they appeared, so I

same

constra'int and that

was
when

and presumably we were under

they received the

subpoena

was anti ci pati ng the

same

l0

th i ng.

ll

a And a handful of State Department of f i c'ials have
come in so far, Ambassador Yovanovi tch, Deputy Assi stant
Secretary Kent, Ambassador McKi nley. A1 though I don' t thi nk

t2
13

t4
l5

l6
t7
18

l9

A
a

Ambassador Sondland.
Ambassador

Sondland. And they all had subpoenas,

co r rec t?

A
a

Correct, that's

mY understand.

Not Ambassador McKinley. So the State Department
aware of

thjs

22

is well
A
a

23

circumstances changed, you believe you would be allowed to

20

2t

24
25

Very well

Pattern?

av,,are.

Okay. You mentioned the ci rcumstances. If

the

testify pursuant to the subpoena. They weren't ordering you
not to appear over the subpoena, were they?

 83

I
2
J

A
a

No.

Okay. Did anyone at the State Department reach out
to you either in H or L when it became a foregone conclusion

5

that these subpoenas are coming? Did anybody reach out to
you to communicate that should a subpoena be issued, you

6

should not testify?

4

7
8

9

l0

ll
t2
l3

l4
l5
t6
t7

l8
l9
20

2t
22
23

24
25

A

Can

I ask counsel to answer that,

because they had

interaction with the State Department lawyers.
MR. CAST0R: 0kay.

th H,
then all further conversations were from the L lawyer to me.
They sent us the directive that said that he should not
appear under I thi nk the quote 'is under the present
circumstances. We told the majority that we could not
appear; he'd been instructed not to. We saw the pattern.
The L said to us, if you get a subpoena, we're not
prohi bi ti ng you from appeari ng, but i f you do appear,
uttimately under a subpoena then you have to protect
classi fi ed i nformati on and other i nformati on. So that was
the back and forth with the lawyers at the State Department.
MR. BELLINGER:

MR. CASTOR:
BY MR.

After

hi

s

i ni

ti a1 conversations

wi

0kay, thank you.

CASTOR:

a I apologize for asking you some of these details a
lot of those, on the Republican s'ide of things, we're in the
dark about many of these blow by blow when the subpoena, is

 B4

I

the subpoena going to go. And that leads to mistrust.

Some

6

of the other machinatjons about you can't we can't have
copies of the transcript, we're only alLowed two staffers in
the room from the Oversight Committee, leads to questions of
thi s sort. So that's why I ask. So I appreci ate that.
You mentioned that the company Burisma was a bit of a

7

shady organi zation?

2
J
4
5

A

8

9

Mr. Castor, I don't want to say more than I

And again, as

I

mentioned

know.

to Mr. Goldman, I learned about

l6

sma I don't thi nk I knew about Buri sma before spri ng,
before this past spring when I was thinking about coming back
out to Kyiv. So what I know about Burisma is recent and you
and I have probably read the same thing.
a Okay. So you're aware that after you left your
first tour as Ambassador, I think it's in 20L4 this former
ecology minister Zlochevsky, it's alleged that he improperly

t7

obtained certain licenses.

l0

ll
t2
l3
t4

l5

l8
t9

Buri

A
a

I 've heard that.

Okay. And there are a number of allegations

20

surrounding the company since 20L4 relating Zlochevsky,

2t

you're familiar with

22
23

24
25

A
a

those?

Not 1n any detai

1.

Do you have any reason

occurred?

A

I

have no reason.

to dispute that these things

 85

4

a When you arrived at the embassy did your staff
brief you about about some of the oligarchs and the
envi ronment of cor rupti on?
A In general certai nty. I don't reca11 a speci fi c

5

bri efi ng on Buri sma.

I
2
3

0kay.

6

a

7

those bri efi

8

A

9

l0

ll
t2

l3
t4
l5

l6
t7

l8
l9
20

2t
22
23
24
25

it

Was

the

in

any of

ngs?

has

certainly

and over the past couple

the papers.

name everybody mentioned

been ment'ioned

since, you know,

of months when'it has shown up jn

 86

I

[1].:53 a.m.l
BY MR. CASTOR:

2
J
4
5

6
7
8

9

te1l us about other oljgarchs
that might allegedly be jnvolved with corruption jn Ukraine?
A A general question, okaY.
a Is it an issue?
A It's a big issue. It's a big issue. And it's
particularly a big issue today with this new administration.
The one problem, the one concern, the one issue that we have,

a

And what you can you

ll

the U.S. Government and the international community more
broadly, with this administration, with the Zelensky

t2

admi ni

l0

l3

strat'ion, i s the

i nf

Now, the influence

luence

of

one

of oli garchs.

particular oligarch over

t4

Zelensky'is of particular concern, and that's this

l5

Kolomoisky,

14r.

fe11ow

24

so and Kolomoisky has growing influence. And
thjs is one of the concerns that I have expressed to
President Zelensky and his team on several occasions very
explicitly, saying that, you know, Mr. President, Kolomoisky
was not elected. You were elected and he, Mr. Kolomoi sky, 'is
i ncreasi ng hi s i nfluence i n your government, whi ch could
cause you to fail. So I've had that conversation with him a
couple of times.
a And you're aware from at various points in time
some these oligarchs, some of these companies have been under

25

i nvesti gati on?

t6
t7

l8
l9
20

2t
22
23

 87

I
2
J
4

A
a
A
a

Yes.

For

va r i

ous reasons?

Yes.
We understand

Burisma, from additional witness

5

testimony, has been either Burisma or Zlochevsky has

6

under investigation

7

among

8

9

l0

ll

for

money

laundering, for tax evasion,

other thi ngs. And you' re

A
a

I

fami 1i

ar

wi

th that

familiar with that generally.
What can you say about the integrity of

generalty?

am

crimi nal j ust'ice system i n Ukrai

A
a

been

the

ne?

Flawed.

24

js it fa'i r to say that if some of these
companies, some of these otigarchs had been under
investigation at some point in time that the investigation
may have been closed for improper purposes?
A Yes. It could have been closed for payments, yes.
a So, inherently, the interest of somebody in the
wanting Ukraine to get to the
Unjted States of wanting to
bottom of corruption is not a problem, right?
A We have long made it, over certainly while I was
there in 2006-2009 and subsequently, have long made it clear
to the Ukrainian Governments over time that their ability to
integrate into Europe and succeed in that goal was challenged
by, was threatened by, a lack of credible rule of 1aw, which

25

included courts, investigations.

t2

l3
t4
l5
t6
t7

l8
t9
20

2t
22
23

So

 B8

So

I

yes, that's been a constant theme of U.S. policy

2

towards Ukrai ne.

)

Okay. So, to the extent somebody in the United
States, whether it be at the State Department or the National
Security Council or even the White House, has questions about

4
5

a

?

whethelinvestigations were properly closed and ought to be
reopened i s somethi ng that 'is a product of the envi ronment,

8

correct?

6

A

9

We

look very carefully at the operation and the

l5

of the j usti ce system i n Ukra'ine, agai n,
because of its importance for investment, because of its
importance for trust in the government, because of the
importance of having confidence that an objective rule of law
system, a judiciary system, was so important for jt.
So that, in general now, you know yeah, that, in

l6

general, has been our policy.

l0

ll
t2
t3

t4

i mplementati

a

t7

on

But if Zlochevsky or Burisma is under investigation

l8

for

t9

closed, as you suggest, because they were paid off, the

20

prosecutors were paid off

2t

those cases

22
23

24
25

money

laundering, tax evasion, and those cases are

, then certainly it's okay to want

to be reopened?
A The policy that I've been aware of has been a
general policy of the importance of honest judges, of the
selection process for judges, the selectjon process for
prosecutors, the instjtutions. 1t has been less a focus on

 B9

1

2
3

4
5

6

indjviduat cases. Indjvidual cases, in
U.

5.

my

view, is not

what U.5. forei gn po1 i cy. What we need

what

to press

on

s strengtheni ng the i nsti tuti ons i n Ukrai ne, but i n other
countries as we11, so that the population, the society has
conf i dence i n i t. So i t's more the i nst'i tuti on than the
specific case.
j

16

effort of Burisma in 20L4 to,
you know, assemble a hi gh-profi 1e board of di rectors?
A So 20L4, I was not paying great attention to that
aspect. So what I know, probably what we aIl know js that
they put some very high-profile people on their board.
Again, I've only come to know that over the past couple of
months because of all the attenti on. So I know th'is
I
didn't know it in 20L4 because I was at the Institute of
Peace trying to do Iraq or Afghanistan, whatever.
a And one of the folks they put on the board was

t7

Hunter

l8

A
a

7
8

9

t0

ll
12

l3
t4
l5

t9
20

Are you aware of the

a

Bi

den, ri ght?

That's

Do you know

A

22

know what he

24
25

if he has any experjence in

corporate

governance?

2t

23

my understandi ng.

I

don'

t know. I

don ' t know

Hunter

Bi

den. I

don'

think it's possible that he was tapped for
the board because his dad was the Vice President?
A So, Mr. Castor, I'm here as a fact witness. I

a

Do you

t

 90

t

I

don'

2

that,

J
4

h

ave

and

that. I don't
you don't want me my
any facts on

have an opinion

on

But a reasonable person could say there are

a

perceived confl i cts

of i nterest there, right?

5

A

Sure.

6

a

In your time as Ambassador, the first stint '05 to

7

'09 and then again, have any

8

whether you had an issue about putting certain

9

thei

t0
l1

t2

r board?
A Recently, there

has anyone asked the

Embassy

officjals

have been questions about

--

on

wel1,

recently there have been questions about boards of Naftogaz.
So the answer js yes, in that case.

l8

of issues are the corporate boards of the
state-owned banks. And decisions about who is appointed to
the state-owned bank boards has been an i ssue for the for
the independence of the National Bank of Ukraine, the NBU, in
confl i ct wi th the admi ni strati on.
So the short answer is yes, the board membership has

l9

been an issue

13

t4
l5

l6
t7

Another set

that we've paid some attention to.
0kay. And what's the Embassy's ordi nary

24

a
when i t
A
a
A

25

examples

20

2t
22
23

comes

posture

to that?

The

Do you

The selection process

I just

-- so what -- again, the

gave you, the Naftogaz and the state-owned

 91

being both being state-owned,

I

banks, our policy on those,

2

atl of those being state-owned

3

selection process, open,

4
5

6
7
8

9

l0

ll
t2

banks and Naftogaz, the

competi

tive, transparent.

I don't know that that I don't remember seeing any
specifjc of privately owned companies that -: or the boards
on pri vately owned compani es. So the i nterest i n board
membership is of
that I'm famifiar with is state-owned
companies, the ones I've mentioned.
IDi scussi on off the record. ]
AMBASSADOR TAYLOR: No, jt's actually
the open
competition is for contracts as well as an open competitive
selection process for board members.
BY NR.

l3

CASTOR:

t9

a You mentioned in your opener that you're on the
board of a sma1l Ukrainian
A I was. I 'm not on, but I was, yeah. I t's called
the East Europe Foundati on. Yeah.
a Okay. Any other board memberships for you?
A I was, again, on the board of the American

20

Counci

2l

Wash

14

l5

l6
t7

l8

22
23

24
25

1s, both nongovernmental organi zati ons here i n

i ngton.

a

Okay. Any of these boards pay you $50,000 a month

for your service?
A No. They pay nothi ng.
MR. CASTOR: I want to mark as exhibit 3 a Pofitico

 92

article from January.
nori

ty

Exhi bi

2

IMi

J

was marked

4
5

6
7
8

9

for

t No. 3

i denti

f i cati on. l

of this? We try to
bring enough copies for at least four or five people, and so
to the extent you guys could reciprocate, w€'d appreciate
that. You've been handing us one copy, and I have to share
i t wi th our members, and i t gets tri cky.
MR. CASTOR: Anybody need

BY MR.

copies

CASTOR:

24

a Th'is is a Politico article dated January 20L7. Can
you identify the article
or the author for the record?
A Mr. Castor, I don't know the two authors.
a Yes, could you just say their name?
A 0h, sorry. Kenneth Vogel and Davjd Stern.
a Going back to exhibit L, the New York Times story.
A Yes.
a Who wrote that one?
A Kenneth Vogel.
a Would you mind reading the highlighted paragraph?
A "Ukrainian Government officials tried to help
Hillary Clinton and undermine Trump by publicly questioning
hj s fi tness for offi ce. They also di ssemi nated documents
implicating a top Trump aide in corruption and suggested that
they were investigating the matter, only to back away after

25

the election, and they helped Clinton's a11ies research

l0

ll
t2
l3
t4
l5

t6
t7
18

t9
20

2l
22
23

 93

ng i nformati on on Trump and hi s advi sers, a Pol j ti

I

damagi

2

i nvesti gati

a

3

4

A
a
A
a

5

6
7
8

9

on found. "

Now, you

been aware

co

of

any

weren't in the Ukraine in 20L7.

Had you

of these i ssues

No.

from your post at

tute, no.
Are you aware of the allegation that a
At the

DNC-connected

I nst i

consultant was communicating with the Ukrainian

here i n

l0

Embassy

ll

A
a

And have you ever heard the

name

A

Again, I thjnk in that

connection where I've

t2
l3

I

D. C.

?

have recently heard that.

Iz

l4

same

l5

recently heard that issue that you

l6

j

t7

l8

limjt of
a

l9

give you briefings about --

ust descri bed, I thi nk that's the name. That's about

20

A

2t

a

22

A

23

a

24
25

the connection that

the

U. S.

A

my knowledge
Fai

you

the

on that.

r enough. When you arri ved at post, di d anybody

They

didn't.
or

They

d'i dn '

t

.

efforts of the DNC to influence Ukrainians in
?

They di dn't

 94

2

Okay. 5o your sum total of

a

I

knowledge

of that

comes

from news accounts?

5

I think that's
A I think that's right. It's
I could have also had a conversation with
right. It's
somebody about that, but that was also based on news

6

accounts.

J
4

7
8

9

l0
1l

t2

l3

l4
l5
l6
t7

l8

that the Ukrainian Ambassador to the
U.S., Chaly, had entered the fray, the political fray, and
wrote an op-ed i n opposi t'ion to then-cand jdate Trump?
A I was not aware.
a Is that ordinary or -A It's not. Ambassadors do not are not supposed
to and should not interfere in or participate in domestic

O

Were you aware

elections, the host country etections.
a Did anyone at the Embassy ever call to your
attention the 'issue with Ambassador Chaly?
A In thi s context, no. In other contexts, i n
particular the Zelensky administration, the new

20

administration was looking to replace him as soon as they
could once they came jnto office. This, of course, was this

2l

past

t9

22
23

a

coupl

24
25

summer.

WAS

A

0kay.

e

Presi dents

A

HeI

And i s that common? Had Chaly served

or was he linked to
thi nk

he

for

Poroshenko?

only served under Poroshenko.

profess i onal Forei gn Service

a

He

officer, so he undoubtedly

 95

earlier in his career in other things, but in terms of

I

had

2

that

Ambassadorshi p.

4

this story, there's a reference to a
Ukrainian investigative journalist and, at the time, a

5

Partiamentarian named Serhiy Leschenko. What do you

6

about 14r. Leschenko?

J

a

0n page 11 of

know

14

A So Mr. Leschenko is a known reformer journalist
who, in 20L4, when the so-ca11ed Revolution of Dignity,
decided to join the government -- we11, run for office and
was elected to the Rada, to the Parfiament, where he
continued to be associated with a group of reformers.
a And i s he sti 1I in the Parli ament?
A I s he 'in the Pa r1i ament? I th i nk he ' s not
a Do you know if he's ever been jnvestigated or

l5

prosecuted?

l6

been. He has been i nvesti gated.
thi s 'is not my thi s i s bef ore I arri ved.

7
8

9

l0

II
12

l3

t7

l8
t9
20

2l
22
23

24
25

.

A

He has

a
A

If you know.

don't

Yeah.

He has been

remember whj

a

ch court

-

-

Agai n,

investigated, and a court
di smj ssed

the charge.

Okay. Are you aware of the allegations relating to

Leschenko and the Manafort ledgers?

A
a
A

I

Yes.

And what do you know about that?

As

I

understand

it,

he was the one

who

Serhiy

 96

ther f ound or

I

Leschenko was the one who ei

2

ledger, and either he or

3

that ledger over to the Anticorruption Bureau. That's what I

4

remembe r

5

6
7
8

9

ed the

in law enforcement turned

.

0n page LL, there's a paragraph that begins,

a

"The

scruti ny around the ledgers"

A
a

Yes.

Ukraine

work

"combined

l0

Trump campaign

ll

And

t2

A
a

l3

someone

i dent'i f i

with that from other stories about his

proved too much, and he stepped down from the

less than a week after the Times story.

that's relati ng to

"

Manafort.

Yes.

"At the time,

Leschenko suggested

that his

l4

motivation was partly to underm'ine Trump. "

l5

l8

it well-known that Leschenko was, indeed, trying to
underm'ine candi date Trump at the ti me?
A So this would have been what year? Not to me.
Yeah, it was a 20L7 article, but I don't know when they were

t9

talking about here.

t6
t7

20

2l

Was

These thi ngs were occurri ng duri ng the 2016

a
election.

015

22

A

2

Z)

a

Okay.

electjon, right
When

you arrived

24

adviser there or anybody give you

25

i ssues

relati

ng

to

Leschenko?

Not known to

me.

at post, did your poli tical
a briefing on some of the

 97

2

of the questions was so I mentioned he was a
reformer. One of the and he had supported Zelensky,

J

President Zelensky, and had given hjm, had given Zetensky

I

4
5

6
7
8

9

l0

ll
t2
13

t4
l5

l6
t7

l8
t9
20

2l
22
23

24
25

A

One

credibitity as a reformer. The other reformer, by the
way, we've already talked about js a man named Alexander
some

Danyliuk. And so those two people joined Zelensky's team
early as reformers.
What I was told, in answer to your question,
14r. Counselor, was that Leschenko took himself off of the

of these this controversy.
a Okay. At the bottom of page LL, the report, the
Politico report notes that Leschenko told the Fjnancial
Times, you know, about 2 weeks after the news conference that
he was trying to undermjne candidate Trump.
The newspaper goes on to note, the Fi nanc'ial Times, that
Trump's candidacy had spurred Kyiv's wider poljtjcat
leadership to do something they would never have attempted
before, intervene, however indirectly, in a U.5. election.
What do you know about attempts of the Ukrainian
Government or Ukra'in'ians to i ntervene i n the 2016 electi on?
A Mr. Castor, I don't know about those attempts.
a 0kay. And has that been part of any briefings that
you rece'ived once you arrived at post?
A No.
a Okay. And so that's not a concern that's been
Zelensky team because

 9B

I

communicated

A
a

2
3

to

you

Flipping

ove r

"Ukraine's Minister of

5

wi

6
7

to page t4, the paragraph begins
Internal Affai rs, Arsen Avakov. "

A
a

Fourteen. Yes. Yep.
Okay piled on, trashing Trump on Twitter as

clown and asserting that Trump

9

the U.5. than terrori

1l

You

me?

8

l0

i n?

Correct.

4

th

you've settled

AS

is an even bigger danger to

sm.

The Politico story goes on
di sparaged

a

to report that Avakov also

the Presi dent i n Facebook posts.

t2

What

do you

13

A

So he

know

is

the

about Avakov?

Minister of Internal Affairs and was

t4

the Minister of Internal Affairs under President Poroshenko

l5

as one

l6

of only two carryovers from the Poroshenko Cabinet
the Zelensky Cabinet. He, as I think I mentioned earlier

t7

when we were

l8
19

20

2t
22
23

24
25

to

talking about Lutsenko, the Minister of
Interior, which Avakov is now, controls the police, which
gives him significant jnfluence in the government.
a Avakov, he's a relatively influential 14ini ster. Is

that right?
A That is correct.
a Does it concern you that at
hi ghly cri tical of candidate Trump?
A It does.

one time he was being

 99

I
2

a

I

ca11ed

J
4
5

6
7
8

And

did you ever have any

your attention to thi

awareness

of that

before

s?

ng.

A

I haven't.

a

Flipping to page 15, the paragraph that begins with

Th'is i

s surpri

si

Di sappoi

nti

ng,

but

"Andriy Artemenko.

A
a

"

At the top,

yeah.

Ukrai ni an Parl i amentari an associ ated wi th

ll

tion, you know, met wi th Trump's team
during the campaign. And he was quoted saying: It was clear
they were supporting Hillary Clinton's candidacy. They did

t2

everything from organizing meetings with the Clinton team to

13

publ i c1y supporti ng

9

l0

t4

l5

l6
t7

l8
t9
20

2l
22
23
24
25

conservative opposi

her to cri ti

c'i

zing Trump.

I thi nk they

didn't meet because they thought Hillary woutd wjn.
Thi s i s yet another Ukrai n'i an Parl i amentarian, you know,
going on the record in a news account asserting that the
Ukraj ni an Government establi shment was, i n fact, supporti ng
Hillary Clinton.
Is this a new fact for you?
A This is a new fact for me. I've not read this
art'ic1e. So this was a 20L7 article. So I didn't know
that I don't know Artemenko, so I haven't had a chance to
deal with him. And the answer is yes, new fact.
a Does i t concern you?
A Yes. Same thing, for the same reason.
simply

 100

2

is it reasonable for someone in the Trump
administration to conclude that if Artemenko and I

)

apologi ze i f

I

a

Now,

8

A No, you' re doi ng fi ne.
any of my pronunciations are
a
A You're doing fine.
a If Artemenko, Cha1y, Avakov, Leschenko were
engaged these are all Iegitimate people in the Ukraine,

9

right?

4
5

6
7

l3

A I don't know how legitimate Artemenko js, but
a He's an elected member of the Parfiament?
A He's an elected member of the Parliament, which
means -- which may mean that he could you can buy your

t4

'into the Parl i ament.

l0

ll
t2

l5

l6
t7

l8
t9
20

2l
22
23

24
25

a
A
a
A

0kay. But certai n1y a government offi ci a1?
Certainly a -- a deputy, a Rada deputy, yeah.
'is a legi timate power player i n Ukrai ne?
At least a power player, that's ri ght. That's
Avakov

right.

a
A
a

And Chaly i

Chaly

s the Ambassador to the U. S. ?

is the Ambassador.

Okay. And Leschenko was a man of

some

significance, right?

A

Leschenko was a well-known reformer and a well

and a good

journalist beforehand, so yes, well-recognized.

way

 101

J

a So i sn' t i t possi b1e that Trump admj ni strati on
officials might have a good-founded belief, whether true
untrue, that there were forces in the Ukraine that were

4

operating against

I
2

5

6
7
8

9

l0

ll
t2

l3
t4

l5

l6
t7

l8
t9
20

2l
22
23
24
25

or

them?

A Mr . Castor, based on thi s Po1 i ti co arti cIe, whi ch,
agai n, surpri ses me, di sappoi nts me because I thi nk i t's a
mistake for any diplomat or any government official in one
country to'interfere in the political life of another
country. That's di sappoi nti ng.
a So the question is, isn't it fair to say that, if
you're aligned with the Trump administration, isn't it
legitimate to have a good-faith befief that Ukrainians were
operating against you in the 2016 election?
A That's certainly the thrust of this article.
a And thi s i sn't an opi ni on pi ece. I mean, thi s i s
not an opi ni on pi ece. Thi s i s a j ournal i st
A This is a journalist. And, as you pointed out,
it's Kenneth Voge1, who also writes for The New York Times.
a So'it's not a fringe, you know, journalist. I
mean, thjs is a mainstream journalist for Poljtico and now
the New York Times, not an opinion piece. And to the extent
he's reporti ng and documenti ng these facts, I mean, i sn't i t
fair to say that if you're aligned with the Trump
administration, you might have a good-fai th belief that the
Ukrainians were supporting Hitlary Clinton and trying to

 102

I

unde rmi

ne h i m?

6

that opinion, that some were. If
this reporting is correct, you could certainly have the
opi ni on that some Ukrai ni ans were.
a 0kay. And do you have any si nce you've arrived
at post, has anyone briefed you to try to debunk any of these

7

allegations?

2
3

4
5

A

A
a

8

You could have

No.

ll

Okay. So nobody at the Embassy has sat you down in
briefings and said, "Ambassador, there are allegations out
there that the Ukrainians were working for Clinton and

t2

against Trump, but

t3

nobody came and

9
10

A
a

t4
l5

I want to te11 you that didn't

happen";

briefed you on that?

Correct.
Since your time considering the post, which

I

th'ink

l8

I thi nk you ment'ioned was the end of May, and then you
arrived relatively quickly, to your credit, in June, did you
get any background on some of the concerns that the folks

19

aligned with the President had about the Ukrainians

20

i

t6
t7

2t
22
23

24
25

you

nterferi ng wi th the electi on, or

a1leged1y?

No. Mr. Gi u1 i ani and hi s who i s i nfluenti a1
wi th the Presi dent, and hi s efforts were known. I wouldn' t
say I wouldn't say "briefed." What the Embassy tries to
do, as a general rule, is stay out of either our domestic or
we have tried
Ukraine internal poli tics. So we have not
A

 103

to

avoi

2

d deal i ng certainly with Mr. Giuliani and the kind of
efforts that he was i nterested i n. 5o that's, again, for

J

we

don't

I

a

4
5

to

6

some

get i nvolved i n electi on campai gns on ei ther s'ide.

diffjcult envi ronment leading up
Yovanovi tch's recall , and you testj fi ed about

But you

Ambassador

describe a

of the concerns you had before accepting the post.

8

Did anyone give you any additional background about what
the jssues are that concerned the President or was motivating

9

Mr.

7

l0

Giuliani?

A
a

No.

t7

0kay. Di d you have a general understanding of what
Gi u1 i ani 's concerns we re?
A
Again, our focus has we've attempted to keep the
focus on our bilateral relations and away from domestic
poI i ti cs or Ukrai ni an i nternal po1 i ti cs, to the degree we
can. So
a Just forgive me. If there was a concern about the

t8

20L6 elect'ion and concern about

t9

22

find out exactly what the
concerns were before you arrived at post?
A No.
a Did you have any conversations with Yovanovitch

23

about thi

ll
t2
l3
t4
l5

l6

20

2t

24
25

try to do some due diligence

A
a

jnvestigations, d'id you ever

and

s?

About -The environment, the snake

pit I think

you called

 104

I

it.

8

had I had a conversation with her
in Kyiv and then again in Washington about the about that
envi ronment, about how the domesti c, our domestj c po1 i ti cs
into affecting her career.
had gotten into the
a 0kay. But did you ever have a discussion about
what, you know, when yoLr're did you ever try to get 'into
the what was the genui ne concern f rom G'iuli ani , other

9

than

2
J
4
5

6
7

l0

ll
t2

Certainly,

A
a

No.

Okay. You met with Yovanovitch a couple times,

A
a

t4

obse rve r

you

Yes.

when you were

Yes.

t9

A

Correct.

20

a

2t

A

22

a

23

A

24

a

25

A

t7

over there as an election

.

A
a

l6

l8

we

said

l3

l5

A

And then you met

with her again after she came

home

before you went out?
Correct.

is that roughly three conversations?
Three conversations, at 1east, yeah.
And what do you reca11 her telling you?
I reca11 in particular the last conversation,
So

which

 105

I
2
J
4
5

6
7
8

9

l0

ll

jn

office at the institute of Peace. She was very
emotional about having been pul1ed out ear1y. As she has
i ndi cated, she di dn't thi nk she had made mi stakes or done
something wrong. She felt like someone had she felt that
someone or some people may have had other motives for wanting
her not to be there.
And I think she's indicated that maybe in her testjmony
or the papers or something that has described her testimony.
She made that same poi nt to me i n l'lay.
a Did she say who?
A I don't recall her mentioning any specific names.

was

my

l6

I'm not even sure she knew the people. She had a sense that
there were people who wanted to invest in Ukrajne or wanted
to sel1 things to Ukraine that thought that her
ant'icorruption stance was getting in their way. I don't
remember -- if she mentioned any names, I don't remember

l7

them.

t2
l3
t4
l5

a

l8

0kay. Did you have any discussions --

how many

t9

discussions did you have with Brechbuhl before taking the

20

post?

2t
22
23

24
25

A
O

Two.

And during those two djscussions,

did you have

any

dialogue with him about what was going on over there?

A Again, he with Counselor Brechbuhl, it was
more the two conversati ons were on lj ke the 23rd of l'lay

 '106

I
2
J

4
5

of

with the Secretary. And
they were focused more on my interest, my qualifications,
rather than anything about Ukraine policy.
a Did they ever tell you they'd have your back?
A Secretary Pompeo did say that he'd support me on

and the 28th

May, and the second

8

this strong Ukraine policy. That was my condition for going
out, and he said he wou1d.
a And did you have a relatively open communication

9

with both Counselor Brechbuhl and the Secretary?

6
7

l0

ll

A
a

Yes.

So, if you needed them, they would engage with you,

t2

right?

l3

l8

A They wou1d. And I didn't and the Secretary said
but I djd call
any time. I didn't abuse that and I only
the counsetor a couple of t'imes, yoLl know, and f rom Kyiv.
So I met with him tw'ice wh'i1e I was before I left, called
him a couple times to check in when I started to get
concerned about the security assistance, for example. But

t9

yes, he was available and responsive.

t4
l5

l6
t7

2t

Okay. Did you ever have any discussions with
Secretary or the counselor about the circumstances of

22

Ambassador Yovanovitch

20

)1
24
25

a

A

being recalled?

That was a concern

to take the job.

the

I

had before

I

agreed wj th them

it may it could have been part of
that conversation, Mr. Castor. I don't reca1l specifically
So

 107

I

2
a

J

talking to

them about Ambassador Yovanovitch.

Did they ever give you any assurances that this

a

won't happen again

no. I djdn't ask for

6

didn't receive any.
Okay. The i ssues that moti vated her recall , di d
they give you any indication that they were sti11 viable

7

issues that made the environment tricky?

4
5

8

9

t0

ll

A
a

and

No,

A
a
A
a

They di dn'

t.

But you expected i t would

I

and

expected

it

be?

would be.

Did you ever have any communications wjth

Mr.

t2

Giuliani

l3

l6

A None.
di recttY?
a
A No. He visited Kyiv in 2008 or '07, while I was
there. 2008, I think. And I remember shaking his hand. He

t7

was America's

t4

l5

l8

a

t9

spoken

20

2l
22
23

24
25

A
a
A
a

mayor. But otherwise, not.
But for times relevant, May 28th on, you've

to l'lr.

Gi u1i ani

?

No, no.
Has anyone ever asked you

to

speak to Mr. Giulian'i?

No.

And

if I

may, have you spoken

the United States?

A

never

I

have not.

to the Presjdent of

 108

I
2

0kay.

a

of

You had no communications

the Uni ted States?

J

a

A

Correct.

4

a

Have you had any communications

5

of Staff
A

None.

7

a

The Whi te House

th,

have

8

wi

9

statement?

you i denti fi

l0

A

Yes

ll

a

0kay.

13

l4
l5
l6
t7

l8
t9
20

2t
22
23

24
25

Hi

11, Mr.

A
a
A
a
A
a
A
a

wjth Acting Chief

Mulvaney?

6

12

with the Presjdent

So

Vi ndman,
Vi ndman

,

offi ci als you have had di scussi ons
them for the most part in your

ed

it's

Ambassador

Bolton, Fiona Hi11,

Lieutenant Colonel
ri

Any others

ght

Dr.

Vi ndman?

.

that

were

Tim Morri son took
Tim Morri son.

Fiona's place.
Okay.

I think those are the ones.
And once you arrived at post, did you have any
occasion to engage the Secretary on any of these issues, ask
the Secretary f or hi s assi stance 'in pushi ng back on the
irregular part of the policy?
A So I went to the Secretary at the end of August in
a -- in a cable expressing my concern about -- August 29th,
Yeah,

 109

I

my concern about

a

2
J

Secretary on thi

A
a

4
5

6
7
8

0kay.

the hold on security assistance.
Was

that the fjrst time you engaged the

s?

Yes.

Okay. In your statement, you walk us through what
was a regular, formal, diplomatic process that you were the
poi nt person f or , and then there was an 'i r regular, j nf ormal
channel, and that was concerning to you. Is that fair?

l5

A Not at the beginning.
a 0kaY.
A At the beginning, as I said, I felt the goals were
aligned. I thought the goals of having -- the overall goal
of havi ng strong U.S. -Ukraj ne relati ons was supported by
certainly by I knew by Ambassadors Sondland and Volker.
I didn't
I never, as I said, haven't had much

l6

dealings with Secretary Perry, but everything leads me to

t7

believe that he also supported that. And so that irregular

l8

i

l9

a 0kaY.
A And i t wasn't I didn't thi nk i t was bad. I
di dn't thi nk i t was a problem i n the begi nni ng. And,
actual1y, it could have been helpfuI, because Ambassador
Sondland is able
is able to call the President, and that's
a valuable thing jf you want to try to move our U.S.-Ukraine
relat'ions a1ong. So, at the beginning, it was not a problem.

9

l0

ll
t2
l3
t4

20
21

22
23

24
25

s not

necessari

ly

bad.

 110

a
A
a
A
a

1

How

long have you known Ambassador VoIker for?

6

years. A long time.
And is he a man of integrity?
He is a man of integrity.
And he is somebody that's always, to the best of
your knowledge, acted in the best interests of the United

7

States?

2
J
4
5

5o probably 20

ll

A He when he got involved with Mr. Giuliani, I
think that that pu1led him away from or it diverted him from
bei ng focused on what I thought needed to be focused on, that
yeah. So, in general, yes, but the Giuliani factor I
is

t2

th'ink affected Ambassador Volker.

l3

18

of integrity, if he genuinely believed
it was in the best interests of the United States to engage
he was acting jn
with Gjuliani, do you agree that that's
the best interests of the United States when he did that?
A I think he thought he was.
a There's this May 23rd briefing in the 0va1

l9

0ff

8

9

l0

t4
l5

l6
t7

20

2t
22
,/.J

24
25

a

But as a

man

i ce

A
a

Yes.

where the delegation

that went to

i naugu ra1

A
a
A

Yes.

communicated
Yes.

with the President.

the

 111

I

2
J

a
A
a

We've had some accounts

of that

meeting.

I'm sure.
And Ambassador Volker was

4

talked to him at

5

characterizations of that meeting have differed

6

between the actual

7

they th i nk had

some

length.

there. Obviously,

Ambassador

Sondland.

we've

And

sometimes

participants and those reporting on what

occu r red.

l7

it's been you know, the President has
been characterized or has been quoted as saying, "Work wjth
Rudy. " Is that something you heard?
A Yes.
a Okay. And then 'it's also been related to us that
the Presi dent sai d, "Ta1k to Rudy, " and i t's i n a di smi ssi ve
sort of way. You know, the President had his concerns about
corruption in Ukraine and, you know, a laundry list of
reasons, including the fact that the Pres'ident believed that
there were Ukrainians trying to work agajnst him in the

l8

electi on, ri ght?

8

9

l0

ll
t2

l3
t4

l5
16

l9
20

2t
22
23

For example,

A

As we established, some Ukrainians, a couple of

Ukrainians. And the important point here is none of those,
with the exception of Avakov, who is sti11 none of those
were in or are in the Zelensky administration.
So

that's what as I

understand

it, that's

what

Volker, Sondland, Perry were coming back to telt

24

Ambassador

25

President Trump,

that, you know, we just

met President

 112

1

Zelensky, and he supports what you support.

I've

heard

2

a

3

And the participants

of the meeting

have

told

us

7

that they briefed the President, and the President wasn't
havi ng i t.
A Ri ght.
a He said negative things about the country of

8

Ukra i ne .

4
5

6

t6

I've heard that.
And he di dn' t, you know, get i nto speci fi cs. He
simply sa'id: It's been related to us, talk to Rudy. If you
think Ukraine is doing such -- you know, they've turned the
corner and Zelensky is the reformer he says he's going to be,
you know, talk to Rudy.
Is that fair?
THE CHAIRMAN: If I could just interject, and I have to

t7

make

l8

prior witnesses may have said or not said,
for the accuracy.

9

l0
l1
12
13

t4
l5

l9

A
a

thi s advi sory peri odi ca11y. What counsel represents

TAYLOR: Okay.

20

At"IBASSAD0R

2t

THE CHAIRMAN: Unless

22
23

a

in

wi

tness,

you

evidence before you.

TAYL0R: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

BY MR.

24
25

you are a perci pi ent

should not assume facts that are not
AMBASSAD0R

we cannot vouch

CASTOR:

You know,

there's nuances that we aren't aware of,

 113

I

you know, that occur

in these meetings. There's

ambi gui

ti

es,

8

in the, you know, ambiguity a 1ot of times people jump to
conclusions. And so the question is, is there a difference
between talk to Rudy and work wi th Rudy?
A I don't know.
a 0kay.
A I don't know.
a And was that related to you by Ambassador Sondland

9

or

2
J

4
5

6
7

and

Volker?

l0

A

The di fference between those two?

ll

a

Yes.

12

A

No.

22

to be effectuated with Mr. Giuliani?
A
Here's what I understood from Ambassador Volker and
Ambassador Sondland.. In order to get President Zelensky and
Presi dent Trump i n a meeting jn the 0va1 Office, they took
from that May 23rd meeting that they needed to work with Rudy
Giuliani, so and so they did.
What did Volker relate to you about next steps
a
then? You sai d you talk wjth Volker a 1ot, right?
A
I do.
do you remember some of the blow
And what did he
a

23

by blow, the play

l3
t4
l5

l6
t7

l8
l9
20

2t

24
25

0r what

a

about

him

by

flo, actua11y, he didn't te11 me anything
reaching out to Gjuliani. And about the same time

We11,

A

had

 114

1l

his breakfast with Giuliani, he mentioned that i think
in a text to me and Gordon. And about that same time, Fiona
Hi11, Dr. Hill mentioned that same thing, that she had heard
that Kurt had been in touch with or met wjth Rudy Giuliani.
That was I think that was the first time I was aware that
Kurt had been in touch with Giuliani along these f ines.
a Did Ambassador Volker give you any readout of his
conversations or what he was doing?
A He di dn' t.
a Okay. So he didn't tell you that he told Mr.
Giuliani that there was no good-faith basis to investigate

t2

the

I
2
3

4
5

6
7
8

9

l0

he had

A

13

14

a
A
a
A
a

l8

l9
20

./.)

that to
A
a

24

the

22

25

dn't te1l me anythi ng about hi s conversati on

Did you ever come to learn from Sondland or other

players that that was the

t7

2t

He di

with GiuIiani.

l5
t6

Bi dens?

case?

No. That was the case between Volker and Giuliani?
Correct.
No.

Would
Gi ul i ani

that surprise you if Volker had communicated
?

Communi

cated what?

That there

js no good faith basis to investigate

Bi dens.

A

No knowledge.

I can't

answer.

 115

or 9 minutes left and I
promised our members we would pivot to them at the end of
the at the end of our round, so I would like to do that.
MR. NUNES : Thank you, Mr . Castor
Ambassador, welcome. You're aware that th'is committee
had an investigation into the 201.5 etections, the House
Intetli gence Commi ttee?
AMBASSAD0R TAYLOR: Am I aware that there is one? Yes.
MR. NUNES: Yes, that there was one that completed, and
MR. CASTOR:

2
J

4
5

6
7
8

9

l0

now those i nvesti gati ons have even cont'inued.
AMBASSADOR

Chai rman,

but

TAYLOR:

I don't know much about it,

Mr.

Mr. Nunes, but

MR. NUNES: You're

l3
t4

have about 8

.

ll
t2

I

also aware that

you're aware of

the Bob Mueller special counsel investigation
TAYL0R:

I

am aware.

l5

AMBASSADOR

t6
t7

NUNES: of the 2015 etections.
AMBASSADOR TAYLOR: I am.

l8

MR. NUNES: You may

MR.

this

not be aware, but at least the

committee were very concerned by

t9

Republicans on

20

Ukrai

2t

long been a target of our invest'igation and have contjnued

22

today

23

the 2015 election between the Ambassador's

24

between

25

ne's acti ons duri ng the 2016 electj on, and they

have

to try to get to the bottom of what they were up to

comments here and

other incidents that are out there.

Most notably, are you f am"il i ar wi th

in

well

, I

know

 116

I

you're familiar because you talked about Leschenko earlier

2

former journalist turned politician
AMBASSADOR

J

TAYL0R: Leschenko, yes.

5

current involvement with
Leschenko? Do you run into him now or you're just familiar

6

wi

4

MR. NUNES: Do you have any

th

hi m?

l0

th him. I thi nk I
met him in my in the 2006-2009 time period, or maybe it
was an earlier vis'i t in like 20L4. But he's not in the
governmen.t now, and he's not in the Parliament now, I'm

ll

pretty

7
8

9

AMBASSAD0R

t4

l5

I'm fami 1i ar

wi

sure.

MR. NUNES:

t2

l3

TAYLOR:

0kay.

So

he's of parti cular i nterest to at

least the Republicans 'in Congress. Are you aware that he was
a source for the Democrats and the Clinton campaign's dirt
that they dug up on the President and fed to the FBI?

l6

AMBASSAD0R

TAYL0R:

I

am

not

aware.

20

Okay. So I didn't thi nk you were aware of
by
that, but I wanted to make sure you knew that he is
witnesses who have testified before this committee, he's the
source of that dirt that was then used you're familiar

2t

with

t7

l8
t9

22
23

24
25

MR. NUNES:

of the Steele dossier, I assume?
AMBASSADOR TAYLOR: I have.
MR. NUNES: Okay. So that is our real concern in
Ukrai ne over the 2016 elect'ion. So I understand that you, as
an Ambassador, you don't like to get involved in politics,
you've heard

 117

J

but the fact of the matter is the Ukrainians decided to get
involved in politics and be, in almost all cases, supportive
of the Democrats and helped to del j ver d'i rt that was then

4

used by the

I
2

5

6
7
8

9

l0

ll
t2
l3
t4

l5

l6
t7

l8
l9
20

2t
22
23

24
25

l'lr. Nunes, the only comment I would
make on that i s that, agai n, accordi ng to thi s Po1 i tj co
document, which is similar to what you're describing, there
were a couple of Ukrainians who djd what you said.
When you say "Ukrainians," that paints a broad brush.
And President the reason I raise this is that President
Zelensky wants to make it very clear to us and to President
Trump that it wasn't hjm and it wasn't his people.
at the
MR. NUNES: Right. But at the time of the
time when Mr. Giuliani and Republicans in Congress are
raising these concerns about what was happening in Ukraine,
you know, that's when the Mueller investigation is sti11
ongoi ng, our probe i s sti 11 ongoi ng, looki ng i nto getti ng to
the bottom of FISA abuse and other matters.
5o I know you don't want to get involved in politics,
but those are stil1 just ongoing concerns of the Congress.
Thank you for your attendance today.
I '11 yi eId to Mr. Jordan.
MR. J0RDAN: Real qui ck 'i f I could , Ambassador, on that
last point. President Zelensky does want to clean up
corrupt'ion. You know, he's been viewed as a reformer, but I
AMBASSADOR

TAYLOR:

 118

1

thi nk you sai d earl i er to 14r. Castor's questi ons that

2

Mr. Avakov

J

is sti1l in the government. Is that right?
AMBASSAD0R TAYL0R: That is correct.

4

MR. JORDAN: And he has

5

AMBASSAD0R

a

a pretty important position?

TAYL0R: He does.

l0

he's the guy who sa'id that Pres'ident
Trump, during the 2015 campaign, was I think he referred
to him in social media postings as a clown and as worse than
a terrorist. Is that accurate?
is that the quote
AMBASSADOR TAYL0R: Is that what

ll

out of this Politico

6
7
8

9

MR. J0RDAN: And

t2

MR. JORDAN:

l3

AMBASSADOR

document?

it is.

TAYLOR:

YCS.

l5

he's currently in the government,
Minister of Interior, in charge of the police in Ukrajne. Is

16

that ri ght?

t4

t7

l8
t9
20

MR. J0RDAN: And

AI'4BASSAD0R

TAYL0R: He i s. He i s.

I suspect he would

thing today that he said then.
MR. J0RDAN: No, I understand that, but I just want to

not say the

same

be c1ear.
TAYL0R: But 20L6.

2t

AMBASSAD0R

22

MR. J0RDAN: A11

23

l'lr. Ratcliffe

24

t'lR. RATCLIFFE: Ambassador Taylor, my name

25

Ratcl i ffe.

right.

Thank you.

has a couple.

is

John

 119

2
J

4
5

6
7
8

9

l0

ll
t2

l3
l4
t5

l6
t7

l8
l9
20

2t
22

)1

I want to read from direct you to your opening
statement this morn'ing, page 9, the bottom paragraph, and it
reads: "Just days 1ater, on August 27, Ambassador Bolton
arrived in Kyiv and met with President Zelensky. During
thei r meeti ng"
AMBASSADOR TAYLOR: Congressman, can I get you to hold
on? I'm looking at a different one. Yeah, thank you.
MR. RATCLIFFE: Last paragraph, page 9.

, got 'i t . Okay , met wi th . Yes
MR. RATCLIFFE: "During their meeting, security
assistance was not discussed amazingly, news of the hold
did not leak out until August 29. I, on the other hand, was
aIl too aware of and stjl1 troubled by the hold."
Have I read that correctly?
AI"IBASSAD0R

TAYL0R:

AMBASSAD0R

TAYL0R: Yes, si r.

Yes

0kay. It

.

like, from your
statement today, that you were aware of the hold and troubled
by i t but that Pres'ident Zelensky was not aware of i t at that
poi nt i n ti me.
AMBASSADOR TAYL0R: That is correct.
MR. RATCLIFFE:

sounds

Okay. So, based on your knowledge,
nobody in the Ukrainian Government became aware of a hold on
military aid until 2 days later, on August 29th.
MR. RATCLIFFE:

TAYLOR: That's my understanding.

24

AMBASSADOR

25

MR. RATCLIFFE:

That's your understanding. And that

 120

well over a month after the July 25th call

I

would have been

2

between President Trump and President Zelensky.

TAYLOR: COTTCCt.

J

AMBASSADOR

4

MR. RATCLIFFE: So

5

6

you're not a lawyer, are

you,

Ambassador Taylor?
AI'lBASSADOR

TAYLOR:

I

am not

.

l0

Okay. So the idea of a quid pro quo js
it's a concept where there is a demand for action or an
attempt to influence action in exchange for Something eIse.
And in thjs case, when people are talking about a quid pro

ll

quo, that something else is military aid.

7
8

9

t2

l3
t4

l5

l6

MR. RATCLIFFE:

in the Ukrainjan Government 'i s aware of a
military hold at the time of the Trump-Zelensky cal1, then,
as a matter of 1aw and as a matter of fact, there can be no
quid pro quo, based on military aid. I just want to be real
clear that, again, as of July 25th, you have no knowledge of
So,

if

nobody

t9

tary ai d
AMBASSADOR TAYLOR: July 25th is a week after the hold
was put on the security assistance. And Juty 25th, they had

20

a conversation between the two Presidents, where it was not

2t

di scussed.

t7

l8

22
ZJ
24
25

a qui d pro quo i nvolvi ng

mi

1

i

.

to your knowledge, nobody in the
Ukrainian Government was aware of the hold?
AMBASSADOR TAYLOR: That is correct.
MR. RATCLIFFE: Great. Thank you for clarifying.
MR. RATCLIFFE: And

 121

I

I yield

2

THE CHAIRMAN: 0kay.

J
4
5

6
7
8

9

l0

ll
t2
l3
t4
l5

l6
17

l8
19

20

2t
22
23

24
25

back.

The time

of the minority

has

expi red.

Let's break for lunch until L:30. I want to remi nd
members they are not to di scuss the substance of the
Ambassador' s testi mony. And we will resume at 1:30.
lRecess.l

 122

I

[].:55 p.m.l

2

THE CHAIRMAN:

J

Ambassador,

I

We're back on the record.

wanted

to just ask you a few followup

7

to the questions you received from the minority,
and then I want to go through some of your opening statement.
Then I'11 hand it over to Mr. Noble, who will go much more
methodically than I will through your testimony and the

8

timeline.

4
5

6

9

l0

ll
t2
13

t4
l5

l6
t7

l8
l9
20

2t
22
23

24
25

questions

in the minority doesn't
the U.S. have a legitimate interest in fighting corruption,
and I think you would agree that we do. Is that right?
AMBASSADOR TAYL0R: That is correct, Chairman.
THE CHAIRMAN: And in fact, Ambassador Yovanovitch was
doing exactly that. She was urging the Ukrainians at every
opportunity to fight corruption that had plagued Ukraine.
You were asked by my colleagues

AMBASSADOR

TAYL0R: Yes, si r.

t came to your attenti on that part
of the reason why people in Ukraine and maybe some in the
hornets'nest or vipers'nest in the United States wanted her
out was that her efforts to fight corruption were getting in
the way of some potentially corrupt business deals they
wanted to make happen. Is that a fair summary?
AI'4BASSAD0R TAYLOR: That could be the case. I don't
know the direct ljnks there, but there were people who were
i t would be hard for
concerned that she was so tough on
THE CHAIRI{AN: And i

 123

I
2
3

4
5

6
7
8

9

l0
1l
12

l3
t4
l5
t6
t7

l8
t9
20

2l
22

24
25

them

to do the kinds of deals that they wanted to do.
THE CHAIRMAN: Because she was fi ghti ng corrupti on i n

Ukra'ine?
AMBASSAD0R

TAYL0R: Yes, yes, and supporting reformers

or other people in the government who were fighting
corruption in Ukraine.
THE CHAIRMAN: And you can distinguish, can't you,
between a legitimate interest in getting a country to fight
corruption and an itlegjtimate interest in getting a foreign
government to interfere in U.5. Presidential elections?
AMBASSADOR TAYLOR: There is a difference.
THE CHAIRMAN: And wouldn't you say that trying to get a
foreign country to intervene in a U.S. Presidential election
is not fighting corruption, it is in itself corruption?
AMBASSADOR TAYLOR: Mr . Chai rman, you' re taki ng me
beyond my area of expert'ise. Just the facts are what I can
attest to, but the what I said earlier about'institutions
I think is
the way to fight corruption is to fix the
courts and fix the judges.
5o it's an jnstitutional rather than, as you point out,
rather than individual cases, which may or may not get us to
a reformed, less corrupt system.
THE CHAIRMAN: And one of the concerns you had, though,
was that there were efforts being made through this irregular
channel to get Ukraine to jnterfere in U.S. politics and the

 124

I

2

next election, is that right?
AMBASSAD0R

TAYLOR: The i

rregular channel seemed to

J

focus on speci fi c i ssues, speci fi c cases, rather than the

4

regular channel's focus on i nsti tuti on bui ldi ng. So the

a

7

irregular channel, I think under the influence of Mr.
Giuliani, wanted to focus on one or two specific cases,
irrespective of whether it helped solve the corruption

8

problem,

5

6

9

fight the corruption problem.

THE CHAIRMAN: And

those two cases you mentioned, the

election, those were both

l0

Burisma and the Bidens and the 2015

ll
t2

individual investigations that were sought by l"lr. Giuliani
because he beljeved jt would help his client, the President

l3

of the United States, right?
TAYL0R: That's my understanding.

l4

AMBASSADOR

l5

THE CHAIRMAN:

l6
t7

l8
t9
20

Let me go through I want to ask you

Poljtico article which minority counsel spent about
a third of their time asking you about this article. Prior
to today, had you ever read thi s art'icle?
AMBASSAD0R TAYL0R: I had not.
THE CHAIRMAN: Are you able to confirm in any way any of
about the

22

the allegati ons i n the arti c1e?
AMBASSADOR TAYL0R: Mr. Chairman, as I mentioned to

23

Castor, I was surprised and disappointed to read what these

24

Ukrainians were reported

25

THE CHAIRMAN:

2t

Mr.

to have said and done.

But you' re not 'in a posi ti on

to conf i rm

 125

I

2

or deny whether the article is right, not right, half right,
or anything of the sort?
TAYLOR: No, si r.

J

AI"lBASSADOR

4

THE CHAIRMAN: And

5

decjsion-making

6

AI"IBASSADOR

7
8
9

at

thi s arti c1e di dn't affect your

any time, because you were unaware

TAYLOR:

I

was unaware

of i t. It

of it?

was 2 years

ago.
THE CHAIRMAN: There

are at least a couple issues that

have been raised by your testimony. The first involves

l0

conditionality surrounding the desperately sought

ll

between the two Presidents, desperately sought by the

t?

Ukrai ni ans,

l3

ty around mi 1 i tary
aid. So 1et me go through your testimony, if I coutd, and
ask you about a few of those both of those i ssues.
0n page 5 of your testimony, in the third paragraph, you
say: "But during my subsequent communications with
Ambassador Volker and 5ond1and, they relayed to me that the
Pres j dent, quote, "v^/anted to hear f rom Zelensky, " unquote,
before scheduling the meeting in the 0va1 Office. It was not
clear to me what this meant.
Now, I take it, Ambassador, you used that word "before"
deliberately, that is, they wanted to hear from Zelensky
before they would schedule th'is meeting. Is that right?
ANBASSADOR TAYL0R: That is correct.

t4
l5

l6
17

l8
t9
20

2t
22
23

24
25

that

meeting

i s.

And the second i nvolves condi

ti

onal i

 126

I
2
3

4
5

6
7
8

9

l0

at the time I think you said it
wasn't clear to you what this meant.
AMBASSAD0R TAYLOR: That is also correct.
THE CHAIRMAN: And in the two paragraphs be1ow, you say:
"I sensed something odd when Ambassador Sondland told me on
June 28 that he did not wish to include most of the regular
i nteragency parti ci pants i n the call planned wi th Pres'i dent
Zelensky later that day."
THE CHAIRMAN: Now,

did you sense something odd about that?
AMBASSAD0R TAYLOR: He and I were on the phone talking

Why

l5

of this ca11. This call had been set up.
Obviously, when you're trying to get the head of state on a
ca11, get President Zelensky on a ca11, you had to work
through the timi ng. Was j t conveni ent? Could he there
may have had to be interpreters present. He had to be at the

l6

ri ght phone. So we were work'ing on when the meeti ng would

t7

happen.

ll
t2
l3
t4

l8

about the timing

0n the phone, Ambassador Sondland told me that the

19

timing was going to change, that the time of the phone call

20

was going

2t
22
23

24
25

to change. And I asked hjm something 1ike,
shouldn't we let everybody else know who's supposed to be on
thi s call? And the answer was, don't worry about i t. Even
his staff, I think, were not aware that the tjme had changed.

 127

I
2
J
4
5

6
7
8

9

l0

ll
t2

l3
14

l5

l6
t7

l8

l9
20

2t
22
23

24
25

12:02 p.m.l

to you about that?
At'4BASSADOR TAYL0R: Thi s suggested to me that there were
the two channels. This suggested to me that the normal
channel, where you would have staff on the phone cal1, was
being cut out, and the other channel, of people who were
worki ng, agai n, toward a goal whi ch I supported, wh'ich was
havi ng a meeti ng to further U. S. -Ukrai ni an relati ons, i
supported, but that irregular channel didn't have a respect
for or an interest in having the normal staff participate in
this call with the head of state.
THE CHAIRMAN: So was this an early indjcation to you
that these two channels were diverging?
AMBASSAD0R TAYL0R: It was.
THE CHAIRMAN: And the i nterests of the i rregular
channel, represented by Mr. Giuliani, may not be the same
interests as the State Department and what was in the best
interest of the United States?
AMBASSADOR TAYL0R: That second part I came to believe.
I'm not sure it was at this point. This is within a week, a
week and a half, of me L0 days of me arriving there. And
so I was sti11, maybe naively, but I was sti1l of the view
that I was on I was part of a team that might have several
parts but we were moving in the same directjon.
I think, Mr. Chairman, it was not yet.
So it was not
THE CHAIRMAN: And what was odd

 128

I

That would

come.

THE CHAIRMAN:

2

But Ambassador Sondland made it clear not

4

only that he d'idn' t wi sh to j nclude most of the regular
interagency participants but also that no one was

5

transcri bi ng or

J

moni

tori ng the call as they added Presi dent

7

Zelensky. What struck you as odd about that?
AMBASSAD0R TAYLOR: Same concern. That is, in the

8

normal, regular channel, the State Department operations

9

center that was putting the call together would stay on the

6

22

line, in particular when you were having a conversation with
the head of state, they would stay on the line, transcribe,
take notes so that there could be a record of the discussion
with th'is head of state. It is an official d'iscussion.
When he wanted to be sure that there was not, the State
Department operations center agreed. And they told us, they
sajd in response to his request, they said, we won't
and we certai nly won't transcri be
mon'i tor and wi 11 not
because we' re goi ng to si gn off.
THE CHAIRMAN: 0n the following page of your testimony,
page 5, second paragraph, you testifjed: "By mid-July it was
becoming clear to me that the meeting President Zelensky
wanted was conditioned on the investigations of Burisma and

.L)

alleged Ukrai ni an i nterference j n the 2016 U. S. elections.

24

It

10

ll
t2
13

t4

l5
t6
t7
18

t9
20

2t

25

clear that this condition was driven by the
irregular policy channel I had come to understand was guided
was also

 129

I

by 14r. Giuliani."

clear to you by mid-Ju1y?
TAYLOR: In the subsequent paragraphs,

that

2

How had

J

AMBASSADOR

become

4

Mr. Chairman, I tried to walk through that conclusion, how I

5

came

6
7
8

9

to that

conclusion.

you

I'11 go through that with
you. But when you say "conditioned on the jnvestigations, " f
take it by that you mean, unless President Zelensky would
agree to do these investigations of Burisma, meaning the
THE CHAIRMAN: And when

dens, and Ukrai nj an i nterference i n 2016, he wasn't goi ng

l0

Bi

ll

l9

to get the White House meeting. Is that right?
AMBASSAD0R TAYL0R: That i s correct. Mr. Yermak,
Pres'ident Zelensky's assistant, came back at one point -- I
think I talk about it in here and asked to nail down a
date first and then he would make the statement -- he would
make the statement of the 'investi gati ons.
You know, Kurt and Ambassador Sondland did not
weren't able to make that of f er, weren't able to na"il down
the date. But the point is, that was they saw that that

20

was the condi ti on.

2t

act, later on, they would 'insi st
that President Zelensky speak first. That is, until you say
publicly you're going to do these two investigations we want
f or the Pres'ident, you're not going to get that meeting.
That was essentialiy the position that this irregular channel

t2
l3
t4
l5

l6
t7

l8

22
23

24
25

THE CHAIRI'IAN:

And, 'in

f

 130

I

took.
TAYL0R: Yes.

2

AMBASSAD0R

J

THE CHAIRMAN: Now, my

4

quo."
TAYLOR: i

you about "quid pro

am

AI'IBASSADOR

6

THE CHAIRMAN: Because

8

9

l0

ll
t2
l3
t4

l5
l6
t7

l8
l9
20

in the minority

asked

And are you a lawyer?

5

7

colleague

not. I

am

not, Mr. Chai rman.

he asked you about the lega1

definition of "quid pro quo." So you're not in a posjtion to
talk about legal defi ni ti ons?
AMBASSAD0R TAYLOR: I am definitely not in the position.
TH E CHAi RI'IAN : 0kay
AMBASSADOR TAYLOR: I don't speak Latin.
THE CHAIRI4AN: And, of course, whetheli t meets a lega1
def ini t'ion of "qui d pro quo" or i t doesn't i s reaIly
irrelevant to what we're focused on here.
But it is your testjmony that, hey, you don't make these
publ i c statements about these two po1 i ti ca1 i nvesti gati ons we
want, you' re not getti ng th'is meeti ng you make these
statements, you ' 1 1 get the meet i ng; you don ' t make these
statements, you won't. Was that your understanding of the
state of affairs in July of 20L9?
.

TAYL0R: Yes.

2l

AMBASSADOR

22

THE CHAIRMAN:

Further down on page 5

of your testimony,

24

at the end of that paragraph, you
state: "A11 that the OMB staff person" -- now we're talking

25

about the

23

second-to-1ast paragraph,

mi 1i

tary

assi stance.

 131

AMBASSADOR

THE CHAIRMAN: '.A11

2
J

4
5

6

9

l0

ll
t2

Ri

ght.

that thC Ot.,IB staff person said

was

that the directive had come from the President to the Chief
of Staff to 0M8."
That is the directive not to provide the military
assistance, or to hold it up. Is that right?
AMBASSAD0R

7
8

TAYL0R:

TAYLOR: That's correct.

"In an instant, I realized that one of
the key pillars of our strong support for Ukrajne was
THE CHAIRMAN:

threatened. The i rregular policy channel was running
contrary to the goals of longstandjng U.5. policy. "
What did you mean by that?

l8

of U.S. policy
would be to support Ukraine in its attempt to defend itself
against the Russians. Part of that was security assistance.
Securi ty assi stance had been very effective. It was weapons,
it was train'ing, it was the commun'ications equipment, it was
sustainables. It allowed Ukrainian sold'iers to actually

l9

defend themselves.

l3
t4
15

l6
t7

Al\4BASSAD0R

TAYL0R: Longstanding goal

That was longstanding

20

U

S

.

pol i

cy.

Even i n the previ ous

2l

administration, the previous administration d'id not provide

22

1etha1 weapons, but they did provide

23

that

24

apparent reason

25

longstandi

was longstanding policy

all this other -- so
To stop it, to hold it, for

that I could see,
ng U. S . pol i cy.

was undercutting the

no

 132

J

In the last paragraph on page 5, you say:
"There followed a series of NSC-1ed interagency meetings,
starting at the staff 1eve1 and quickly reaching the level of

4

Cabinet secretaries. At every meeting, the unanimous

5

conclusjon was that the security assistance should

6

resumed, the hold 1 i fted.

I
2

THE CHAIRI"IAN:

be

"

1l

I take 'it by that there was no di ssent, no di sagreement
with that. Everyone thought that, from the point of view of
U.S. national security and our a1ly flghting the Russians,
that securi ty assi stance should be resumed wi thout de1ay.
AMBASSADOR TAYLOR: Unanjmous opinion of every level of

t2

i nteragency di scussi on.

7
8

9

l0

13

THE CHAIRMAN: Was

t4

AI4BASSADOR

l5

THE CHAIRNAN: And

that i t should

TAYL0R:

Wi

resume

w'ithout delay?

thout delay.

jn that paragraph to say:
was that the Secretaries of Defense and
you go on

l6

"My understanding

t7

State, the CIA Director, and the National Security Advisor
sought a joint meeting with the Presjdent to convince him to
release the hold, but such a meeting was hard to schedule."
What do you deduce from that, that our alIy is fighting

t8
t9
20

2t
22
23

24
25

with the Russians, but all of these agencies that support
this can't get a meeting with the President to discuss it?
AMBASSAD0R TAYL0R: It turns out, Mr. Chai rman, that
those principals, as we call them, were on different trips at
different times. I think this was also about the time of the

 IJJ

I

Greenland question, about purchasing Greenland, which took

2

a 1ot of energy in the
THE CHAIRMAN:

J

4
5

di

fferent

NSC.

Okay. That's

dj sturbi ng

for a whole

reason.

Al'IBASSAD0R

TAYL0R:

Di f f

erent story.

D'if f erent

story.

8

But, no, the general point was, jt was a scheduling
issue, because they really wanted Secretary Esper to be
there, for obvious reasons. Most of this assistance came

9

through the Defense Department, and they wanted him

6
7

up

to be

t7

there. He was traveling. There may have been an Afghanjstan
trip. I can't remember whether -- but the problem was
getting the right people in the room at the same t'ime.
There actually was a meeting on Afghanjstan where all of
the principals hoped to raise the Ukrajne issue at the end of
the Afghani stan meeti ng. Di dn' t happen.
AIl to say that there was a strong interest in having
this meeting with the President to try to change the

l8

position.

t9

to say, a couple paragraphs
1ater, "In the same July 19 phone call, they gave me an
account of the JuIy 10 meeting with the Ukrainian officiats
at the White House. 5pecifica11y, they told me" -- and
you' re referri ng to Dr . Hi 11 and Mr. Vi ndman, I bef i eve

l0
t1

t2

l3
t4
l5

l6

20

2t
22
23

THE CHAIRMAN: You

go on

TAYLOR: Yes.

24

AMBASSADOR

25

THE CHAIRMAN:

-- "that Ambassador

Sondland had

 134

connected ' i nvesti gati ons' wi th an 0va1

0ffi ce meeti ng for

2

President Zelensky, which So irritated Ambassador Bolton that

J

he abruptly ended the meeti ng, te11i ng Dr.

4

Mr. Vindman that they should have nothing to do with domestic

5

politics.

Hi

tl

and

"

7

n, i s thi s goi ng to the condi ti onal i ty of Ukrai ne
havi ng to do these i nvesti gati ons 'if they wanted the 0va1

8

0ffi ce meeti ng?

6

Agai

AMBASSAD0R

9

TAYL0R: That was the implication

of the connection

l0

connection,

ll

i nvesti gati ons.

of that

between the meeting and

13

to say, in the second-to-1ast
paragraph, "A1so duri ng our July L9 ca11, Dr. Hi ll j nformed

t4

me

l5

discuss Ukraine. This caught

me

l6

asked Ambassador Volker about

that meeting, but received no

t7

response.

18

How

l9

AI4BASSADOR

20

THE CHAIRMAN: And had

t2

?t
22
LJ

24
25

THE CHAIRI"IAN: You

that

Ambassador

go on

Volker had met with Mr. Giuliani to
by

surprise.

The next day I

"

did you ask him about the
TAYL0R: By

replying to you in the

text

meeting?

message.

he been pretty good about

Past?

but, again, he's
on the road a 1ot. And sometimes he's in an airplane.
Sometimes I'11 get a message back. Most times I get a
message back, but not all the time.
AMBASSAD0R

TAYL0R: Pretty good,

also

 135

2

In this case, you got no reply at all,
matter when he got off an airplane or whatever took ptace

J

thereafter?

I

THE CHAIRMAN:

TAYL0R: I don't remember getting a response.

4

AMBASSAD0R

5

I think, at the same time, that
Dr. Hj11 that

was when

I

heard from

7

a meeting wjth
Mr. Giuliani, so that I got both bits of jnformation the

8

time on, I think, the

6

Ambassador Vo1ker had had

THE CHAIRMAN:

9

no

same

same meeting.

Turning

to page 8 of your testimony:

July 20, I had a phone conversation with

l0

"A1so on

ll

Mr. Danyliuk, during which he conveyed to

t2

Zelensky

l3

U.

that
did not want to be used as a pawn in a
me

President

S. re-electj on campai gn. "
Do you remember what

t4

Mr. Danyliuk said and why he was

or

l5

concerned he was being used as a pawn

l6

Zelensky was concerned he was being used as a pawn

t7

U.

why President

in

a

S. reelecti on campai gn?

2t

Yes. I think it was becoming clear
to the Ukrainians that, in order to get this meeting that
they wanted, they would have to commit to pursuing these
i nvesti gati ons. And Mr. Danyl j uk, at least, understood

22

and

l8
t9
20

AMBASSAD0R

TAYLOR:

24

I'm sure that he brjefed President Zelensky, I'm sure
they had thi s conversatjon believed that opening those
'investigations, in particular on Burisma, would have involved

25

Ukra'ine

23

jn the 2020 election campaign. He djd not want to

do

 136

I
2
J
4
5

6

that.

to page 9 of your testimony,
second paragraph, about midway through: "A formal
U. S. request to the Ukrai ni ans to conduct an i nvesti gati on
based on violations of thei r own law struck me as 'improper,
and I recommended to Ambassador Volker that we 'stay clear ' ' "
THE CHAIRMAN:

Turning

What struck you as improper about

7

it?

l0

It struck me as improper that the
United States would be asking if the United States were to
ask Ukrai ne to nvesti gate an apparent vi olati on of Ukrai ni an

ll

1aw,

8

9

t2

l3
t4
15

l6
t7

l8
t9
20

2t
22
23

AMBASSAD0R

TAYLOR:

"i

that would be improPer.

If, on the other hand what is proper and what happens
frequently is the United States goes to Ukraine and asks for
thei r help to pursue an i nvesti gati on of vi otatj ons of
American 1aw, of U.S. 1aw. That's what we have a mutual
lega1 ass'istance treaty, an NLAT, for.
But this is different. This would be what Kurt was
aski ng for was examples or precedent for aski ng the
Ukrainians to investigate a violation of their own 1aw.
THE CHAIRMAN: We11,

there were two things that

were

this, weren't there? There was the one you're
mentioning now, which is that it wasn't appropriate to ask
Ukraine to investigate a violation of Ukrainian 1aw, correct?
improper about

TAYLOR: Correct.

24

AMBASSADOR

25

THE CHAIRMAN:

But it was also improper because the goal

 137

1

2

of those i nvesti gati ons was to j nfluence the U . S. electi on.
Isn't that also the case?
TAYLOR: Yes .

J

AI{BASSAD0R

4

THE CHAIRMAN:

5

6
7
8

9

If

you could

turn to

page L0

of your

tten test'imony.
One of my colleagues 'in the mi nori ty asked you about,
wel1, how could it be a quid pro quo if the Ukrainians didn't
know that securi ty assi stance was wi thheld. But Ukrai ne
f ound out i t was bei ng w'ithheld, di d they not?
wri

TAYLOR: They di

10

At'lBASSADOR

1l

THE CHAIRMAN: And once

d

.

they found out it was being

l3

wjthheld jn the second paragraph of page L0 of your
testimony, you state: "The same day that I sent my cable to

t4

the Secretary, August 29, Mr. Yermak contacted

l5

very concerned, asking about the withheld security

l6

ass"istance. The hold that the White House had placed on the

l7

assistance had just been

t2

18

l9

made

public that day in a Politico

story. At that point, I was embarrassed that I could
him no explanation for why it was withheld. "

20

Why were you embarrassed

2t

AMBASSAD0R

22

me and was

TAYLOR:

I

give

by that?

was embarrassed because

the United

States, as the pri nci pal a11y, the pri nci pal supporter for

24

Ukraine, in general , but in particular in 'i ts fight with the
Russians, was seen to be they found out that we had put a

25

hold on the assistance that woutd help them fight the

23

 138

I

Russians. And, at that point, I had nothing to te11

I

2

them.

mean, the obvious questjon was, "Why?" So Mr. Yermak

6

trying to figure out why this was, and they
thought maybe, if they were to travel, if Mr. Yermak were to
the Defense
go to Washington to talk to someone here or
Minister also contacted me later on. He wanted the same

7

th i ng.

J
4
5

and others were

They thought

8

that there must be some rational reason for

l8

this being held up, and they iust didn't and maybe in
Washington they didn't understand how important this
assistance was to their fight and to their armed forces. And
so they were just desperate.
so maybe they could figure
And I couldn't tel1 them. I didn't know and I didn't tetl
them, because we hadn't we hadn't there'd been no
guidance that I could give them.
THE CHAIRMAN: And was i t your suspi c'ion at thi s poi nt
already that the assistance was being withheld potentially
because of this help they wanted to get from the Ukrajnians

t9

f i rst?

9

l0
11

t2
13

t4

l5
l6
t7

AMBASSAD0R

20

2t
22
23

24
25

TAYL0R: You know, Mr. Chairman, same kind of

question about how it dawns on you. My next paragraph said

that the hold on security
assistance could be related to the investigations. As of
that ti me, i t hadn't. I hadn't put those dots together. I
hadn' t connected those dots.

it

had not occurred

to

me

 139

The next couple

I
2

September

-- the next

1st through about

THE CHAiRMAN: 5o when

J

week, from the discussion

September

7th, it

became

you're asked about this

clearer.

by

4

Mr. Yermak on August 29th, you're embarrassed because

5

hadn't been able to get an answer as to why the aid

6

wjthheld and you felt it desperately ought to be provided.

7
8

9

l0

ll
t2
13

t4

l5

on

you

was

I'm a representative of the United
States Government out there, and he asked me a perfectly
tegi timate question, why are you holdi ng up thi s assi stance,
and I couldn't te11 him.
THE CHAIRMAN: Now, at thi s poi nt, when you couldn't
AMBASSAD0R

TAYL0R:

tetl them, they were aware of other asks the President had
made in that catl, right? You know that now, although you
didn't at the time.
AI'4BASSADOR TAYLOR: 0n
correct, on the meeting.

l8

the Ukrai ni ans learned on
August 29th that there had been a hold placed, they certainly
knew up through this whole period of June, Ju1y, August that

t9

they hadn' t yet recei ved the ai d, ri ght?

l6
t7

THE CHAIRI"IAN: And even though

AMBASSADOR

20

2t

TAYLOR: The ai d

so, ri ght.

The ai d had,

by and large, not been put out to contract.

23

It's L-year money, by the way. If we can make 'it 2-year
money, that would be great. This is a littte plug here for

24

2

22

25

-year

money.

But it was L-year money. It expired on the 30th of

 140

I

September. And i t was late i n

comi

ng 'in the f i scal year,

and

7

It hadn't been put into
contracts yet. So, ri ght, they I don't thi nk they
suspected anythi ng duri ng that time.
THE CHAIRT'IAN: Yeah. But you sai d, i n the mi ddle of
page 10, "It had st'i11 not occurred to me that the hold on
securi ty assi stance could be related to the ' i nvesti gati ons.

8

That, however, would soon change."

2
3

4
5

6

so

it

had not been obligated.

So

9

let

me ask you about when

AMBASSADOR

10

that

began

'

to change.

TAYL0R: Yeah.

l3

In the middle of the following paragraph,
you testify, "Indeed, I received a readout of the
Pence-Zelensky meeting" that would be the meeting in

l4

PoI and

ll
t2

THE CHAIRMAN:

.

TAYLOR: 0n the

l5

AMBASSAD0R

l6

THE CHAIRMAN:

0n the Lst

Lst of

September.

of September.

You received

t7

readout "over the phone f rom l'4r. Morri son, duri ng

l8

told me President

t9

the

20

2t

Vi

whi

ch

a

he

Zelensky had opened the meeting by asking

ce Presi dent about securi ty cooperati on. "

So

this was if he opened the meeting with this, this

was foremost on President Zelensky's mind?

TAYL0R: Yes, si r.

22

AMBASSADOR

23

THE CHAIRMAN: Now,

this

the fjnal paragraph on page 1.0:

call I

with Mr. Morrison, he went

24

"During

25

on to describe a conversation Ambassador Sondland had with

same phone

had

 141

I

Mr. Yermak at Warsaw. Ambassador Sondland told Mr.

2

that the security assistance

3

President Zelensky committed to pursue the Burisma

4

invest'igation.

5

one j nvolvi ng the
Now,

6

"

money would

And the Burjsma

not

come

Yermak

until

investigation, again, is

the

Bi dens.

again, I want to ask you about conditionality. If

7

Mr. Morrison told you that, according to Mr. 5ond1and, that

8

Mr. Sondland had communicated to the Ukrainians, to

9

Mr. Yermak, security assjstance money would not come until

to pursue the Burisma

l0

President Zelensky committed

ll

investigation, the one is being condjtioned on the other, is

t2

i

t

not?

l3
14

l5

l6
t7

l8
t9
20

2t
22
23

24
25

AMBASSADOR

TAYL0R: Yes, si r.

at the end of that paragraph,
top of page LL: "This was the first time I had heard that
the security assistance not just the Whjte House
meeti ng
was condi ti oned on the i nvesti gati ons. "
So both of these things you now had learned were
THE CHAIRMAN: You

go on,

ti oned on these two pof i ti ca1 i nvesti gati ons, ri ght?
AI"IBASSADOR TAYL0R: That's correct, si r.
THE CHAIRMAN: That is, but for the Ukrainians'
wi 11i ngness to do these two investigations, they were not
only not going to get the White House meeting, they were also
not going to get the military assistance.
condi

AMBASSADOR

TAYL0R: That

is

what Mr. Sondland told

 142

I

Mr.

Yermak.

5

that is what's communicated by the
U. S. Ambassador to the EU, charged wi th a Ukrai n'ian
responsibility to the Ukrainians, about what they have to do
if they want to get the White House meeting and U.S. military

6

assi stance.

2
3

4

THE CHAiRMAN: So

AI"IBASSADOR

7
8

on that

9

Uni

only quali f ication I would put
Sondland was not the principal

TAYLOR: The

js that Ambassador

l0

ted States representati ve to Ukrai ne. Ukrai ne's not i n
the EU. He had this i rregular, informal commission from

ll

President Trump based on May 23rd.

l2

THE CHAiRMAN:

t3

AMBASSADOR

t4

THE CHAIRMAN:

l5

AMBASSADOR

l6

THE CHAIRMAN:

t7

20

2t
22
23

24
25

TAYLOR:

AMbASSAdOT.

-- high

rank

TAYL0R: Yes.

-- having di rect communication with the

Presi dent

l8
t9

But this is someone, an ambassador --

AMBASSADOR

Presi

TAYLOR: He had

direct

communication

with

the

dent, yes.
THE CHAIRMAN:

--

and he

is

communicating

to

the

that i f they don't do these pol i ti ca1
investigations that would help Mr. Trump in the next
electi on, they won't get the meeti ng wi th the Presi dent
they won't get mi 1i tary assi stance. 1s that correct?
Ukrai ni ans

AMBASSADOR

TAYL0R: That's correct.

and

 143

I

2
J
4
5

THE CHAIRMAN:

on page l. L

of you r

If I

can go

to the second fu11 paragraph

tes t i mony .

that he now recognized
that he had made a mistake by earlier telling the Ukrain'ian
officials to whom he spoke that a White House meeting with
"Ambassador Sondland

also told

me

7

President Zelensky was dependent on a public announcement of
investigations 'in fact, Ambassador Sondland said,

8

'everything'was dependent on such an announcement, including

9

securi

6

l0

ty

assi stance.

Meaning

"

that he had understated the matter before.

Am I

ll

right?

t2
l3

it would he realized
that it had been a mistake to condition it only on the

t4

meeti ng.

l5

AMBASSAD0R

TAYL0R: He thought

THE CHAIRMAN:

That

jt

was

also

the military

l6

assistance was also going to be conditioned on the

t7

by Ukrai ne to do these two

po1 i

ti cal i nvesti gati

commitment

ons.

TAYLOR: Yes.

l8

AMBASSADOR

l9

THE CHAIRMAN: You

to say in that paragraph, "He
Sondland "said that President
go on

20

said" -- he,

2t

Trump wanted President

22

public statement about ordering such investigations.

23

24
25

Ambassador

Zelensky'in a public box'by

making
"

that, do you mean, Ambassador, that Presjdent Trump
wanted Zetensky to have to make a pubtic commitment, to get
jnto a public box that is, commit publicly to these two
By

a

 144

1

2

nvest'igations bef ore he was goi ng to get e'ither
meeti ng or the assi stance?
i

AMBASSAD0R

J
4

the

TAYL0R: That's what Ambassador Sondland told

me.

THE CHAIRMAN: So

5

it wasn't even enough that they make a

7

private commitment; Ambassador Sondland was saying that
Ukraine and President Zelensky needed to make a public

8

statement

6

AMBASSADOR

9

l0

ll
l2
l3
t4

In the next paragraph, you say, " In the
same September 1 ca11, I told Ambassador Sondland that
President Trump should have more reSpect for another head of
state and that what he described was not in the interest of
either President Trump or President Zelensky. "
What

t9
20

2l
22
23

24
25

did you

mean

that he should

have more respect for

another head of state?

t7

l8

TAYLOR: Yes.

THE CHAIRMAN:

l5
l6

for the President.

AMBASSADOR

TAYLOR: What Ambassador Sondland was

telling

that President Trump wanted, and, again, presumably based
on a phone call between Ambassador Sondland and President
Trump, was that President Trump wanted a public statement
from President Zelensky. And that struck me to be bad for
both, that it woutd not turn out well for both.
But, in answer to your question, Mr. Chairman, that
would show disrespect to another head of state. If President
Trump is telling you, I want you to go out and publicly say
me

 145

I

you're going to do this, that was disrespectf u1, in

2

to another

J

4
5

6
7
8

9

head

my v'iew,

of state.

ul i n the sense that he not
only wanted this ilticit bargain but he wanted h'im to make it
public that he was going to
in other words, that he
couldn't trust the Ukrainian President to honor a private
commitment to do these two political investigations, he
needed it to be public?
AMBASSADOR TAYL0R: Mr. Chairman, I djdn't go that far.
THE CHAIRMAN: D'isrespectf

THE CHAI RMAN: Yeah

l0

.

t4

not in my mind,
about publtc/pr ivate. It was more the di rection from one
President to another President. Two sovereign states having
a conversation, a respectful conversation, you would not have

t5

one

ll
t2

l3

AMBASSADOR

TAYLOR:

I

mean,

that

was

23

telling the other to go out and make a public
THE CHAIRMAN: In the next paragraph we1l, 1et me
turn to the following page, page L2, of your testimony.
The second-to-last paragraph, in the middte of the
paragraph, you testify: "Ambassador SondIand said that he
talked to Presjdent Zelensky and Mr. Yermak and told them
that, although this was not a quid pro quo, if President
Zelensky did not'c1ear things up' in public, we would be at
a 'stalemate.' I understood a 'stalemate' to mean that

24

Ukraine would not receive the much-needed military

25

assi stance.

16

t7

l8
l9
20

2t
22

"

 146

2

that, unless President Zelensky made
this public statement, they weren't going to get the military

J

assi stance.

1

4

So you understood

AMBASSADOR

TAYLOR: Yes.

ll

, the mi ddle paragraph, you' re
talking about the text messages, and you testifjed: "Before
these text messages, during our call on September 8,
Ambassador Sondland tried to explain to me that President
Trump js a businessman. When a businessman is about to sign
a check to someone who owes him something, he said, the
businessman asks that person to pay up before signing the

t2

check.

l3

to you this
signing of the check, did you take it by that he was
referri ng to si gni ng the check for the mi 1i tary assi stance?

5

6
7
8

9

l0

14

l5

THE CHAIRMAN:

0n page

L3

"

Now, when Ambassador Sondland described

TAYLOR: Yes.

l6

AMBASSADOR

t7

THE CHAIRMAN: You go

on

in the next sentence to

Volker used the same terms several days later

l8

"Ambassador

l9

when we were

20

Conference.

together at the Yalta European Strategy

"

2t

Did he use the same "signing the check"

22

AMBASSADOR

23

THE CHAIRNAN:

24
25

say,

TAYLOR: Yes.

that same analogy
At"IBASSADOR

term?

Did that strike you as remarkable, that

was used by both ambassadors?

TAYLOR:

No. It struck me I

concluded

 147

5

that they had had a conversat'ion.
THE CHAIRMAN: And that they both understood that if
President Trump was going to sign the check for military
assistance then they needed to pay up first and that pay-up
was a public declaration of these two poli tical

6

i nvesti gati ons?

I
2
J

4

TAYLOR: That was the para11e1.

7

AMBASSADOR

8

THE CHAIRMAN: You

9

the explanation

made

go on

to say, "I

argued

to both that

no sense: the Ukrainians did not 'owe'

ng, and hotdi ng up securi ty

l0

Presi dent Trump anythi

ll

for domestic political gain was'crazy,'as I had said in
text message. "
We11, I think that's self-explanatory.
I'm going to hand it over to Mr. Noble.
0h , I 'm sor ry. 0h . Yeah . 0kay
We11, actua11y, I'm happy to go to members, if they
would like to ask some questions.

t2

l3
t4

l5
t6
t7

Mr. Quigley.

t9

MR. QUIGLEY: Ambassador,

2t
22
23

24
25

my

.

l8

20

ass'i stance

what 14r. Gi uf iani
AMBASSADOR

's role

at any time did anyone detail

was i n Ukrai

ne?

TAYL0R: No, si r.

did you keep aware of his activities?
Did anyone report to you? Did anyone at all tel1 you what he
was doi ng? The Ukrai ni ans, for example?
l"lR. QUIGLEY: How

AMBASSAD0R

TAYLOR: No,

sir.

The work on these

 148

4

investigations, to make commitments to pursue these
investigations, was done by Ambassador Volker and Ambassador
Sondland. What I knew was that Ambassador -- that they both,
to a greater and lesser degree, extent, had conversat'ions

5

with l'4r. Giuliani. I don't

6

conve

I
2
J

the nature of those

rsat i ons.
MR. QUIGLEY: You

7

know

described, I believe, that there

were

vergent functi ons taki ng place, offi ci al and unoffi ci al,

8

di

9

and the

Giuliani roles were unofficial.

Had you

ever seen,

t2

in all your years working in the field that you do, someone
operate in this manner?
AMBASSAD0R TAYLOR: Congressman, I have seen

l3

constructive input coming from outside the government into

l0

ll

15

the government deci sionmaki ng process. In particular -- i n
every case, that was to push forward, on trying to find ideas

l6

coming from the outside,

t7

goal or obj ecti ve.

14

MR. QUIGLEY:

l8
l9

offi

Did they typically work together with the

ci a1s?

20

AI"lBASSADOR

2t

That's why you

TAYL0R: They typi ca1ly worked together

of what each other

doi ng

24

AMBASSAD0R

25

MR.

.

yeah.

MR. QUIGLEY: They were aware

22
23

to push forward an agreed policy

TAYLOR: AbsolutelY.

QUIGLEY:

and they knew each

other's role?

was

 149

4

Absolutely. And they can be
often can be. I mean, there's things called at the
Institute of Peace, we do some what we call track two, which
i s the unoffi ci aI - - track one i s the offi ci a1 di alogue

5

between governments. Track two

I

2
J

AMBASSADOR

TAYLOR:

8

is unofficial, where you have
former members of the government talking to former members of
another government. And they come up with ideas that they
feed into the track one, to the formal, and they push that

9

forward. That's

6
7

MR. QUIGLEY:

t0

ll

common

practi ce.

And, final1y, did the Ukrajnians ever

ask

you about h j s role and what he was doi ng, or d'id
TAYL0R: No, si

t2

AMBASSADOR

l3

MR.

t4

Al\4BASSAD0R

l5

MR. QUIGLEY: They never

QU

IGLEY:

Ri ght

r.

About

Gi u1i an'i

's

role?

.

TAYL0R: No, si r.

talked to you about it?

2t

that I recal1.
MR. QUIGLEY: Very good. Thank you.
THE CHAIRMAN: I take i t from your testjmony,
Ambassador, that while there are appropriate cases to have
that second track, where the second track is ultimately
coordi nated wi th the fj rst track, that's not really what

22

happened here.

t6
t7

l8
t9
20

AMBASSADOR

AMBASSADOR

TAYLOR: Not

TAYLOR: Mr. Chai rman, i t's unusual

24

was some coordination. Occasionally

25

some

of these discussions. I

was

I

.

There

would be included in

in the first track, in

the

 150

2

regular track, and as you could see from the emails, or the
texts, I was included on some of those. So there was some

J

coord i nat j on among that

I

.

t4

I guess the more accurate way
to ask the question is, in this actual case, not like prior
track two djscussions, the irregular channel came to co-opt
the regular channel in pursuit of an objective that was not
in U.5. interests. Is that fair to say?
AMBASSAD0R TAYL0R: In one aspect of the regular
channel that i s, i n the securi ty assi stance component of
the regular channel. The regular channel is all of our
i nteracti ons wi th Ukra'ine, and one of the very i mportant
components of that interaction with Ukraine is the security
assi stance. And the securi ty assi stance got blocked by thi s

l5

second channel.

4
5

6
7
8

9

l0
1l

t2
13

THE CHAIRMAN: You know,

THE CHAIRMAN:

16

t7

also the

l8
l9

meeti

just the one, because it

was

ng, correct?

AMBASSAD0R

meeti ng as

We1l, not

TAYLOR: The meeting as

wel1. Yes, sir.

The

well.

Mr. Swalwe11.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

20

THE CHAIRMAN:

2t

MR. SWALWELL:

22

And thank you, Ambassador.

23

Do you have any reason

to befieve, Ambassador, that

24

anyt'ime during your communications with Ambassador Sondland

25

that

Ambassador Sondland misrepresented

the directives or

 151

I

intentions of President Trump?
TAYLOR: No.

2

AMBASSADOR

J

MR. SWALWELL: How would you assess

the character of

4

Ambassador Sondland? You've assessed Mr . Volker'

5

Can you make

6
7
8

9

.10

s earl i er.

for Ambassador Sondland?
AMBASSAD0R TAYLOR: I can do facts, you know.
MR. SWALWELL: Based on your facts, how would you assess
his integrity jn this irregular process that you engaged in?
AMBASSAD0R TAYLOR: I have no reason to believe that he
was not acti ng wi th i ntegri ty.
the

same assessment

ll

l'lR. SWALWELL: What was your concern?

t2

AMBASSADOR

TAYLOR: My concern about the whole second

l3

track was that, apparently at the instigation of

t4

Mr. Giulian'i, Ambassador Sondland and Ambassador Volker

l5

conditioning an important component of our assistance on what

l6

woutd ultimately be a

t7

l8
t9
20

2t
22
23

24
25

1'4R. SWALWELL:

were

political action.

And, Ambassador, you were asked earlier

this to Ambassador
Sondland as "no quid pro quo, no quid pro quo." But as you
described th'is here, the conditions that were laid out to
you, at least through Ambassador Sondland relaying President
Trump's wishes, you're familiar with the phrase, 'if it looks
like a duck and it watks like a duck, you can say it's not a
duck, but it's a duck?
AMBASSAD0R TAYLOR: Congressman, I can just te11 you the
about President Trump characteriztng

 152

1

2
a

J

4
5

6
7
8

9

l0

ll
t2

l3
t4
l5

l6

facts. You've stated them. That i s , apparently,
President we11, Ambassador Sondland told me many times
that Pres'ident Trump said i t was not a quid pro quo. I
observed that, in order to move forward on the security
assistance, the Ukrainians were told by Ambassador Sondland
that they had to pursue these investigatjons.
MR. SWALWELL: I was moved by page 8's description of
your trip to Donbas, and I think you included that for a
reason, because you also expressed the concern that 1.3,000
Ukrainians have been kil1ed in the war.
Can you just talk about the human element here and what
it means to Ukrainians every single day that goes by where we
have authorized aid, they don't see it 'in their bank account,
and Ukrai ni ans cont'inue to lose thei r 1i ves, and what that
means for our security and just thei r livelihood?
AMBASSAD0R

TAYLOR: Congressman, the Ukrai n'ians are

l7

remarkably f ocused on the casualt'ies i n the east.

l8

When Senator Johnson and Senator Murphy

visited,

about

24

this time, we had a meeting with the Defense 14in'ister. And
it was the first meeting of the day. We went over there.
They i nv"ited us to a ceremony that they have i n f ront of
the'i r mi ni stry every day. Every day, they have thi s
ceremony. And i t's about a half-an-hour ceremony where
soldiers in formation, the Defense Minister, families of

25

soldiers who have been ki1led are there.

l9
20

2t
22

z)

 153

7

of whi ch sold'iers are honored, whi ch
soldiers who had been kilted are honored, is on the date of
it. So whatever today's date is, you know, if we were there
today, on the 22nd of 0ctober, the families of those soldiers
who were ki1led on any 22nd of October in the previous
5 years would be there. And
MR. SWALWELL: Is it fair to say that the sooner they

8

would have received the a'id from the United States, the fewer

9

the casualties would've

And the selecti on

2
J
4
5

6

l0

AMBASSADOR

s

been?

TAYLOR: 5o here's what we could

say.

Thls

I don't want to overstate th'is. Because i t wasn't that
holdup of thi s parti cular set of equipment and weapons
radar and communi cati ons and veh'ic1es, that that 1ed to,
week that I was there or even any partjcular -- we can't

ll

i

t2

the

l3

and

t4

the

l5

make

t6

21

is that that radar and weapons and
sniper rifles, communication, that saves f ives. It makes the
Ukrai nj ans more effective. It might even shorten the war.
That's what our hope js, to show that the Ukrajnians can
defend themselves and the Russians, in the end, will say,
"Okay, we're going to stop. " It's that saving of 1ife.

22

That's

t7

l8
t9
20

that connection.
What we can say

how we would save

fives.

23

MR. SWALWELL: Thank you.

24

Y"ie1d back.

25

THE CHAIRMAN:

0ur time has expi red. Forty-five minutes

 154

I

to the minority.
BY MR.

2
J
4

CASTOR:

In your statement, on page 2, you mention that,

a

when you were

serving outside

of

government during the

Obama

6

adminjstration, after the Russian invasion, you jo'ined two
other former Ambassadors to Ukraine in urging the 0bama

7

administration officials at the State Department, Defense

8

Department, and other agencies

9

weapons

5

to Ukraine in order to deter further

l0

aggress i on?

ll

A
a
A
a

t2

l3
t4

l5

l6
t7
18

t9
20

to provide lethal

defensive

Russian

Yes.
Who

were the two other

offjcjals?

Ambassador John Herbst and Ambassador Steve

What was the

Pifer.

objection to providing letha1

at the time?
The objection was that it might provoke

defensive weapons

A

the

Russians.

a
A

didn't think that was a good argument?
I di dn't. I thought that the Russi ans had aI ready

But you

been provoked and they had i nvaded Ukra'i ne.

2l

a

22

0vera11, once you joined, you know, the administration

23

24
25

Uh-huh.

in Kyiv, were you happy with the package of aid?
A I was happy that we were providing aid. It could
always be more. But I was glad it was coming. I would've

 155

I

been very unhappy'if

a

2

it didn't

come.

But the Trump administratjon had a package of aid

t4

to the Ukraine
A Yes.
i ncludi ng lethal def ens'ive weapons - a
A Yes.
fj nanci al assi stance
a
A I was very happy about that.
a OkaY.
A Yes.
a And that was an improvement of years prior?
A It was.
a Was it a substantial improvement?
A It was a substantiat improvement, in that this

l5

administration provided Javeljn antitank weapons. These are

l6

l8

I beljeve successfully
deter, Russi ans from tryi ng to grab more terri tory, to push
forward any further tank attack, number one. So there was a

l9

mi 1i

J

4
5

6
7
8

9

l0

ll
t2

l3

t7

20

defensjve weapons, and they deter, and

tary

capabi 1i

ty.

There was also a very strong

political

message

that

said

24

that the Americans are willing to provide more than blankets.
I mean, that was the prevjous. And these weapons are serious
weapons. They wi 11 ki 11 Russi an tanks. 5o these were
serious weapons. It was a demonstration that we support

25

Ukrai ne.

2t
22
23

 156

O

I
2

Uh-huh. And "the Americans are willing to provide

more than blanketS," WaS

that a characterization of the aid

7

in the prior admjnistration?
A The pri or adm'ini strati on had been wi 1t i ng to gi ve
aid, but "blankets" was just kind of the more derogatory
version of it, but it was nonlethal weapons. So there was
communi cati ons equi pment, there were vehi cles, there were

8

maybe some

J
4
5

6

9

l0

rations, there were blankets, there were
night-vision goggles. 5o it was a significant package' but

it

ll
l2

of weapons.
0n page 5 of your statement, right

stopped short

a

around the

June 27tn-28th timeframe

A
a

l3
t4

Yes, si r.
you stated that you sensed something odd

told me that he did not

w'ish

when

to include

l5

Ambassador Sondland

t6

most

t7

call with President Zelensky.
A Correct.
a Who was excluded from that call?
A At a minimum, his staff in Brussels. It may have
also included people on the Department of Energy staff,
because Secretary Perry was on the cal1. I don't know
which -- I don't think the State Department -- I don't know.
I don't think State Department was even planning to be on the
ca11, but I -- which is another question, why would that not

l8
t9
20

2t
22
23

24
25

of the regular interagency participants on the upcoming

 157

I

be, but that' s

a

2
a

J

Okay.

Was

the Nati onal Securi ty Counc'i1 staf f

on

that call?

7

A
a
A
a

8

You

4
5

6

9

--

call,

No.

Would they

ordinarily be on such a call?

Not necessari ly.
Okay.

state that, before President Zelensky joined

Ambassador

the

Volker advised that he planned to meet with

l0

President Zelensky in Toronto on July 2nd and discuss with

ll

President Zelensky, you know, how to position Ukraine for

t2

l5

te House meeti ng?
A It was to prepare President Zelensky for the phone
call , whi ch we were tryi ng to schedule, whi ch, i n turn,
would've been a step for the meeting would've been a step

l6

towa rds

t7

a
A
a
A
a
A

l3
t4

l8

l9
20

2t
22

Z)
24
25

thi s

Whi

OkaY.

the scheduling of the meeting.
And

Yes.

did you have a concern about that?

I didn't.
About what Ambassador Volker would say j n

Canada?

I didn't have a concern. As I think I've
mentioned, I didn't, at that time, understand what the code
was for i nvesti gati ons.
a Uh-huh.

 158

6

think, at that point -- I don't
think Kurt said anything about investigatjons on that call or
even on the prep ca11. So that ca11, that day, there were
two parts; one was Americans on1y, and then they introduced
President Zelensky. And it was in the preparatory call with
Americans only that Kurt said he was going to have this

7

conversation with President Zelensky.

1

2
J
4
5

8

9

l0

ll
t2

A

a
A
a
A
a

And

I don't

even

Right. But Ambassador -And

0h, I'm sorry.
No, go ahead.

"But Ambassador Volker noted that he would relay

l6

that President Trump wanted to see rule of 1aw, transparency,
but a1so, speci fical1y, cooperation on investigations to 'get
to the bottom of things.'"
A Good poi nt. You' re exactly ri ght. So I stand

t7

corrected.

l8

a
A
a

13

t4

l5

t9
20

2t
22
23

24
25

He

did mention investigations

Okay.

in that prep Part.
And he indicated that this would be a topic
Toronto in a couple days. Is that correct?
A In about 3 days, yes.
a And did you have any concerns about that?
A I dj dn't. As I say, I di dn't know what
" i nvesti gati ons" ref erred to at th'is po'int.

in

 159

1

2
J

4

a
A
a

0kaY.

You know,

I

was

starti ng to get

suspi ci ous.

Okay. But once President Zelensky joined the

ca11,

there was no discussion of that?

8

A There was not.
a At the top of page 6, you state you reported on
this call to Deputy Assistant Secretary Kent and you wrote a
memo for the record dated June 30th that summarized the

9

Zelensky call?

5

6
7

ll

A
a

t2

the pre-ca11?

l3
t4

A
a

l5

the pre-cal1?

l6

A

l0

Yes.

Did the

memo

you prepared have anything

in it

about

No.

Okay. Did you

communicate

with Kent anything

I don't thi nk so. I don't thi nk so.

about

I 'm not

t7

100 percent sure.

l8

did he ask you to write the memo or
He suggested that I write the memo.
So this is on the 30th of June. I got there on the L7th
of June. I'd had a previous call on the L8th of June when I
first arrived, and then there was this.
So I was , as I sai d 'i n the testi mony, real i zi ng that
there are these two channels. At the time, I thought it was
beneficial -- benign or even beneficjal to have these two,

t9
20

2t
22
23

24
25

a
A

Now,

 '160

I

because they could reinforce each

2

least support

the other.

it struck me the reason

But I thought it was

J

other, or one could at
I

5

to be sure that Deputy Assistant Secretary George Kent
knew about it was he's clearly and solely 'in the of f i ci al

6

channel, the normal channel.

4

wanted

It wasn't at all clear to me from that

7
8

9

phone

call that

the State Department, the normal channel, as you
just pointed out no State, no NSC was on the ca1l. I

anyone from

t2

to be sure that they knew that this other one was
going on. It could still be benign or even beneficial, but
it just seemed to me that there ought to be knowledge of the

13

two.

l0

ll

just

t4
l5
t6
t7

l8
t9

22

a
A

Okay. And so you discussed that

a
A

Do you remember what he

A

th Kent?

which

I did.

said to

you?

him sayi ng two thi

And two, he sai

ngs. 0ne i s,

d,

Bi 11 ,

You

I 'm glad

re out there, I 'm glad that you're there, that you can be
the link between these two what we're now calting channels.

you'

23

a

24

So

25

wi

I did.

I just remember
better wri te i t down
a OkaY.

20

2t

wanted

Okay.

did you write

pre-cal1?

the memo about

the calt but also the

 161

A
2

a
A

4

6
7
8

have

to

go

back and look at

J

5

I wrote the memo about the call. I'11
Okay.

5o the

memo

the State Department,

is in the documents that I submitted
so they witl be available sooner or

to

later to you.
a Possi b1y later.
A Th i s 'i s up to Sec reta ry Pompeo.
THE CHAIRMAN:

9

BY NR.

l0

ll

a

t2

the meeti ng

We're hopi ng sooner.

CASTOR:

By mid-July, you

write, it

was becoming

ctear that

l3

th Zelensky was cond'iti oned on the
investigations of Burisma and alleged Ukrainian interference

l4

i

wi

n the 2016 elections.

l5

MR. SNITH: Which page, again, was that?

t6

MR. CASTOR:

t7

AMBASSADOR

l8
t9
20

2t
22
L)

24
25

TAYL0R: Yeah. Yeah.

BY ]'4R.

a

It's the very next paragraph.

CASTOR:

And so my question

is, what happened in

between

that time period?
A 50, actually, what I meant to imply what I meant
to suggest was that, right after -- by mid-Ju1y, it was
becoming c1ear. And so, on the two paragraphs to fo11ow
that, Mr. Castor, I tried to describe what ted me to make
it
why it was becoming clear to me that that was the case.

 162

a
A

I
2
3

4

Uh-huh.

And

that is the

oh, I'm sorry. I've gone now to

page

a
A

We'

re on page 6.

l0

in order to
answer that questjon about why mid-Ju1y. It's on the L9th.
You have to skip ahead until we get to the paragraph that
starts, "In the same July L9 phone ca11," which on yours is
on page 7 tn the mjddle.
This is a readout of the Ju1y LOth meeting, where you

ll

had Danyliuk and Yermak, Bolton, 5ond1and, Volker.

5

6
7
8

9

t2

a
A

You're on page 6, but

Ri

I've

jumped

ght.

22

it's at that one where Sondland connected
investigations to an 0va1 0ffice meeting, Bolton walked out.
a And you learned that from Fiona Hill?
A And Alex Vindman, yes.
a Okay. How frequently did you speak with Hill and
Vindman? Was it on an as-needed basis
A Yes.
or was it a regular schedule?
a
A No. As needed.
a Okay. Any idea why it took so long for the tjme

23

period between the L0th and the 19th?

l3
t4
l5
16

t7

l8
t9
20

2t

24
25

A

And

The

reason I

The L8th was the

NSC

remember

it well about the Lgth.

meeting where the hold on security

 163

assi stance was
2

a

J

A

fi rst

Okay.

broached. TroubI i ng. I

day.

4

peopte the next

5

readout of the July 10th.

7

Had you

a

6

9

l0

ll
t2

l3

that one, they gave me the

received a readout f rom Volker about the

A

About the Ju1y L0th meeting?

a
A
a
A
a

Yeah.

I don't think so.
Okay.

Yeah. I'11 have to check my notes.
Have you

happened

l5

coming from

t6

A

l9

I don't
a
A

20

obvi

ever had a readout from Volker about what

in the July

t4

l8

led these two NSC

meet i ng?

8

t7

And on

ca1

1.0

meeting? 0r is your only i nformati on

Dr. Hj11 and Lieutenant Colonel

Vi ndman?

It might just be from that source of
remember having

i

nformati

on

a conversation

0kaY.

about these other

ones.

Danyl"iuk was,

2t

ously, i n that meeti ng. Yermak was i n that meeti ng. And
I 've had multi pIe conversati ons wi th them, more often than,

22

actual1y,

wi

th

24

a Did anyone retate to you that Danyliuk was getting
way into the weeds with Ambassador Bolton and jt was not a

25

long meeting jn

23

 164

2

no. Actual ly, i t was no. What I heard f rom
Vindman and Hill was that the fjrst part of that meeting went

J

we11. Substantive discussions: security, national security,

4

both si des, energy securi ty.

I

5

6
7
8

9

l0

A

No,

to them, their boss, John
Bolton was appreciating the substance of that meeting. And,
in thei r description, when Ambassador Sondland ra'ised
investigations 'in the meeting, that triggered Ambassador
Botton's antenna, political antenna, and he said, we don't do
And, apparently, according

pof

i

ti cs

a
A
a

1l
12

l3

here.
Uh-huh.

And so he ended the meeting.

0kay. Did anyone provide you a readout that

t4

Danyliuk was talking about establishing new types of

l5

i

t6
t7

l8

l9
20

2l
22
23

24
25

nsti tuti ons i n the Ukrai ni an

A
a
A
a

I don't

that.

Okay.
No.

And so no one related

getting into the

A
a

remember

Government?

weeds

with

to you that Danyliuk

was

BoIton?

No.

10th going back to the paragraph on
page 5 begi nni ng wi th, "Ofl J u1y 1.0"
A Yes.
you met with Zelensky's Chief of Staff and
a
0n July

 165

I

then-foreign poticy advisor, who had advised you they

2

heard f rom Mr.

Gi

had

uf ian'i?

4

Ah. Yes. This is the one where I mentioned that
they had heard this via
they had heard from Giuliani v'ia

5

the Prosecutor General Lutsenko.

J

A

7

Okay. And you relayed your concerns to Counsetor

a

6

Brechbuhl?

A
0
A

8

Brechbuhl. That's correct.

l7

his feedback?
Again, the Counselor to the Secretary is focused a
lot
I won't say mainty, but focused a Iot
on personnel
issues. And yet jt was he who I had two meetings with
hi m, one j ust bef ore the one wi th the Secretary 'in t''lay. And
it was he who said, "Look, 8i11, call me anytime if you've
got questjons or problems. I can check wjth the Secretary
and" so that's why I catled him.
a So he is someone who had great influence with the

l8

Secretary, ri ght?

9

l0

ll
t2
l3
t4
l5

l6

A

t9
20

2l
22
23

24
25

What was

long

He

is very close

he and the Secretary go back

ways.

a
concerns

A
a
A

Okay. So if you, you know, communicated your

to Brechbuhl
Yes.

on Ju1y L0th
Yes.

a

 166

2

wasn't that,

a

I

effect,

in

a

signal that your

to frui tion?

concerns before you took the post were comi ng

J

A

Yes.

4

a

Okay.

5

that?

6

back and

And

A
a
A

7
8

did he recogni ze
did Brechbuhl have a
did he realize that this was part of havi ng your

He

And

did.

He

did.

the other

commi

tments that were

made

to

you?

t4

I think I talked to him a couple of times along
these l i nes. And, agai n, i t comes up when we ta1 k about the
securi ty assi stance. You know, I called him that time as
we11. He said he would check. So he was responsi ve. I t
he didn't do th'is day- to-day. So he
wasn't in his area of
other people in the
had to talk to other people about

l5

State Department about th'i s.

9

l0

ll
t2

l3

And

And then the next event --

t6

a

t7

MR. J0RDAN: Can

l8

l'4R. CASTOR:

Su

l9

MR. J0RDAN:

I want to go back to the JuIy 19th call

I

jump

in for just a second?

re.
you

22

with Dr. Hill and Lieutenant Colonel Vindman. You said,
Ambassador, you injtiated that call?
AMBASSAD0R TAYL0R: Congressman, I think so. I know it

L)

was on

24

again, the troubling

20

2t

25

had

my

I

remember seeing
NSC

it on the schedule. So,

meeting was the L8th.

MR. J0RDAN: Understood.

 167

AMBASSAD0R

I

TAYLOR: And

the Lgth, it

may have been

a

5

ca11. I can't remember if I initiated it or
not. Was that the question?
MR. JORDAN: If it was prescheduled with the NSC, would
Dr. Hill or Mr. Vindman have scheduled that call with you?

6

Who

2
J

4

prescheduted

I can't remember who did it.
MR. JORDAN: You get to Ukraine on June 17th. Is that

AMBASSADOR

7
8

9

would've scheduled that?
TAYLOR:

right?
TAYLOR: Yes, si r.

l0

Al'IBASSAD0R

ll

MR. JORDAN: A11

right.

So

you're there L month.

t2

June LTth and July l-9th, how many conversations d'id you have

l3

with Dr. Hilt and/or Lieutenant Colonel
ti me peri od?

t4

Vindman

TAYLOR: This might have been

l5

AMBASSAD0R

16

MR. JORDAN: Thi

s 'is the f i rst

in that month

the first

one?

first one.
MR. J0RDAN: And you don't know who initiated 1t?
AMBASSADOR TAYL0R: The only reason I'm hesitating
I
know that I was concerned about the L8th cal1.
MR. J0RDAN: I understand.
AMBASSAD0R

TAYL0R: This could have been the

22

AMBASSAD0R

TAYL0R: And they were on that.

23

MR. J0RDAN: 0kay.

24

AMBASSADOR

t7

l8
t9
20

2t

25

one.

my

TAYL0R: And

I

know

schedute. Somet'imes we11, I

that it

was

actually

remember seei ng i

on

t on the

 168

2

schedule. So sometimes when there's kind of a
spur-of-the-moment call it doesn't show up on my schedule.

J

But this was on my schedule. 5o it was scheduled to

I

happen

5

the following day. I can't remember if it had been
previously scheduled and I just took advantage of it or if I

6

scheduled

7

L8th meeti ng.

4

MR. J0RDAN:

8

9

jt right then because I
If it

to talk about the

had been previously scheduled, do you

'it would've been previ ously scheduled?
AI4BASSADOR TAYL0R: I don't.
MR. JORDAN: Okay. So would you guess i t originated

know why

l0

ll
t2

with the NSC catling

l3

AMBASSADOR

t4

wanted

remembe r

you?

TAYLOR:

I can't speculate. I can't

.

l8

Okay. But this is the only call you've had
with him in the month that you've been there as Ambassador?
AMBASSADOR TAYLOR: i think that's correct.
MR. JORDAN: And just to go back where our counselor

t9

was,

20

day before, relatj ve

2l

A['4BASSADOR

22

MR. JORDAN:

l5

l6
t7

23

NR. J0RDAN:

it

was both about your concerns

about thej

to securi ty

that you had learned

assi stance dollars

TAYLOR: Correct.

--

and then they volunteered

to tell

r July L0th meeting, right?
TAYL0R: Correct.

24

AMBASSAD0R

25

MR. JORDAN: And

did you talk to them about your

you

the

 169

I
2
J

4
5

6
7
8

9

l0

July 10th meeting in Ukraine with the jndividuals you had met
with, Mr. Zelensky's Chjef of Staff? Did you fill him in on
that as well?

I dON't thiNK I did.
MR. JORDAN: Is it fair to say the bulk of the
conversat'ion was Dr. Hill and Lieutenant Colonel Vindman
retating to you what happened at the July L0th meeting here
in the United States?
AMBASSADOR TAYL0R: The first part of the conversatjon
was about what we had all heard the day before
AMBASSADOR

TAYLOR:

ll

MR. JORDAN: Okay.

12

AMBASSADOR TAYLOR:

l3

being held

up.

And none

t4

MR. J0RDAN: 0kay.

l5

AI,IBAS SADOR TAYLOR:

l6

MR. J0RDAN: 0kay.

l8

time of the phone call?

t9

AMBASSADOR TAYLOR:

2l
22

ass i stance

of the three of us had any idea why.
And then they went

into this

other

di scussion about the July 10th meeti ng.

t7

20

about thi s securi ty

Any idea which took the bulk

I'm sure the July l-0th

of

the

d"iscussion

of the July L0th meeting took the bulk of the cal1.
MR. J0RDAN: The bulk of the tjme was on this meet'ing
that took place at the White House.
TAYL0R: Yes.

23

AMBASSAD0R

24

MR. JORDAN: Okay.

25

5teve, thank

you.

 170

I

[3

:

05 p.m. ]
BY MR.

2

CASTOR:

l5

this time period, did Volker ever talk to
you about his view of whether the aid would be released?
A Yes, I can't remember speci fi c conversati ons, but I
remember we had conversations, and we all agreed that it
would be released. We were all sure it would be released.
The fact is we want we were hoping that it would be
resolved, released, deci ded, reversed, 1 i fted, whatever the
verb is, before the Ukrainians heard about it because we
didn't want to be in the position I found myself later on
being embarrassed and not be able to say. So we hoped that
it would be fixed, and they would never hear about it, and we
wouldn't have to explain.
a And from time to time, thi s happens wi th aid. It

l6

gets held up, right?

3

4
5

6
7
8

9

l0

ll
t2
l3

l4

t7

l8
l9
20

2l
22
23

24
25

a

A
a
A

During

Sometimes

aid gets held up. Yeah, yeah, yeah.

For whatever reason?

Mr. Castor, I don't know. 5o I've been in the aid

for a long time.
a I mean, you know you can snicker about this, but
A No, no, flo, I 'm not.
a You' re not sni ckeri ng at thi s. Let me be clear,
you' re not sni ckeri ng. But i t's been related to us that thi s
happens f rom time to time. Aid gets held up for whatever

business

 171

I

r ea

son

A

2

So

I'm trying to

Mr. Castor, I've done a

bunch

5

of aid stuff as I mentioned here. Aid can be held up when,
you know, if there is a CR or something, you know, if there's
a congress'ional i t could be a congress jonal hotd. Yes, so

6

there are instances that aid gets held

3

4

up.

8

Okay. But j n thi s i nstance, everyone was al i gned
you thought that we ought to work through this and the aid

9

wi

7

a

l6

ll be f i ft
the hold wi ll be li fted.
A Because I was convinced, and all indications were
that everyone in the interagency community that had anything
to do wi th thi s a'id was 'in support of that ai d f lowi ng.
a And bipartisan Members of Congress?
A And bipartisan Members of Congress.
a And, ultimately, the hold was 1i fted, right?
A And, ult'imate1y, the hold was tifted on the Llth of

17

Septembe r

l0

ll
t2
13

t4

l5

l8
t9
20

2t
22
23

24
25

a

.

In total , the Ukrai n j ans knew about th'is f or what

about L0 days?

A

that there was a hold on the 29th, and
they knew it was lifted on the 1Lth of September.
a Twelve days?
A INonverbal response. ]
During that time, I got a lot of questions about it.
a Fai r enough. Duri ng the July L9th cal1, was i t
They knew

 172

4

call between the
Presidents? There was a July 25th call between President
Trump and Zelensky that's attracted some attention?
A You're talking about with Fiona Hilt and Alex

5

Vi ndman?

I
2
J

6

di scussed

a
A

the status of the

Ri

upcom'ing

ght.

t2

I don't recall. I don't thi nk so. I thi nk
actually I could check my text messages. Schedul i ng that
call was a challenge.
a 0kay.
A And 'it went back and f orth i n te rms of ti me. SoI
don' t think I had a conversation with Vindman and Hi 11 about

l3

that at that point.

7
8

9

l0

ll

position on the call?

t4

a

What was NSC's

l5

A

They opposed i t.

t6

a

Okay. And so Dr.

t7

A

18

a

Certainly her boss opposed it.
So Ambassador Bolton opposed the call?

t9

A

He

20

a

0kay

2t

A

And

22

a

clear from the July L0th
So whoever set up the call

23

A

Yes.

24

a

25

A

Hi

11 oPPosed i t?

did.
?

that

was

it wasn't Ambassador Bolton, right?
I thi nk that's ri ght.

meeting

 173

O
2

A
a

a

4

the

know anything about the

7

You say

I djdn't

You were

know about

call on the

25th?

the call? I --

talking to Fiona Hi11. I'm going back to

L9th?

A
a

6

8

d'idn't

L9th, and then it was scheduled on the

J

5

So you

Yeah, yeah.

You're on the phone with Dr.

Hill

and Lieutenant

Colonel Vi ndman?

A
a
A

9

l0

ll

And we were

talking about two things.

Two th'i ngs .
We

were talki ng about why

this

ass j

stance was put

t2

on the day before, and we're talking about -- and they are

13

relating the discussion of July 10th with Danyljuk

t4

BoI

l5

a Ri ght.
A And the call was not yet locked in, scheduled.
a OkaY.
A And it was going back and forth there was some
ta1k. There was some as I reca11, there was, you know
it was on and off, the call's on, the call's off. It is
scheduled for here. Not going to happen. I could go back
through the records if you want.
a Okay. To the extent that you can recall -A Yes.
when did you then learn that this July 25th call
a

t6
t7

l8
l9
20

2t
22
23

24
25

and

ton.

 174

I
2
J

4
5

6
7
8

9

l0

ll

would be scheduled?

trying to schedule it for about
a week in advance, that whole week. As I say, back and
forth, yes, flo, this time, that time. So that was I was
doing it on the Ukrainian side and trying to go back to the
trying to keep the NSC advised as to what was going on.
it may have been about the day
And I think it was kind of
before that'it was actually locked down, So about the 24th.
a Okay. And did you fjnd out whY
A Why?

A

a
A

I --

we11, we were

the change.

t7

just made the point, Ambassador Bolton
d'id not want to have the call
waS not 'interested 'in havi ng
because he thought'it was going to be a disaster. He thought
that there could be some talk of investigations or worse on
the ca1I. Turned out he was right. So he didn't want to
have the ca11. I think it was the Chief of Staff who helped

l8

schedule

t2

l3
t4

l5
l6

t9
20

a
A
a

No.

that
Mr.

As you

ca11.
Mulvaney?

Mr. Mulvaney.

22

0kay. Do you remember when you finally found out
that the call was happening and you had to go alert the

23

Ukrai ni ans?

2t

24
25

A

We

were

alerting the Ukrainians back and forth.

had given them a couple

of

head fakes

all the way through

We

 175

I
2
J
4
5

6
7
8

9

l0

ll
t2

l3
t4

l5

l6
t7

l8
l9
20

2t
22
23

24
25

this is going to happen; this js not going to happen.
And probably the day before. Now the other thing is the
White House situation room can work directly with the
Ukrainjans as we11. Most of the time, they would come
through me, and I would kind of set the stage. But when it
gets to the actual final hours of its schedule, they will
they can call directly to the Ukrainians.
a 0kay. A1so, on the July L9th cal1, Dr. Hill
informed you that Volker had met with Giuljani to discuss
about

Ukrai ne?

A
a

Yes.

that the first tjme that you knew Volker and
Giuliani were talking about?
A You know, Mr. Castor it was about that time I
was looking at my notes last night or the night before it
was about that t'ime that I heard f rom Dr. Hi 11 that Kurt
mentioned Kurt sends a text that I have to check to see if
I was on, but in some text that Kurt sent about this time, he
sai d: I had a good breakfast wi th Mr. Gi u1 i ani . Maybe you
have already pointed this out earljer today. Was that right?
I t was 'i n one of your test
a I don't think I pointed that out, but fair enough.
A 50, so here's what I know. Ambassador Volker sent
that text to at least Ambassador Sondland and maybe -- maybe
the three-way I can't remember.
Was

 176

a
A

2

Uh-huh.

But he said, had a good breakfast

ani

.

)

Gi ul i

4

one, but

And

oh, then he also

wi

I thi nk I

th Mr.

was

not on thi

5

it in some document that says that
Kurt's note back to Rudy Gi u1i ani sayi ng: Thanks for

6

good breakfast and had a good time.

I've

seen

s

had

the

8

that same t'ime. And I thi nk that's the
same contact that Fiona Hill was talking about, about the

9

same

7

So i t was about

ti

me.

t2

Okay. Di d you have any direct conversations with
Volker about that or just the text?
The text that I think I was asked and I didn't get
A

13

a

l0

ll

a

response.
So you never had any idea what Volker was

t4

a

l5

communi

l6

A

Correct

t7

a

Also, on July 20th,

Okay.

cati ng to Giuliani?
which

l8

or you had a phone conversation with

t9

discussion

of

bei ng

a

is the next
Danyl i

A

Yes.

2t

a

Did you communicate that concern

as Brechbuhl or

A

23

24

Sondland,

25

or

Kent.

uk where the

pawn had come up

20

22

day, you sent

to anybody, such

Kent?

I d'id 1t I exPressed the concern to Volker and
as I said here. I don't recall goi ng to Brechbuhl

 177

I

a

0kaY.

But that would have been another

fact -- if

2

you had gone to Brechbuhl, that would have been another fact

J

a

that pointed to the concerns that you di scussed before you

4

took the post?

ll

A Yeah. The whole thrust of this irregular channel
was to get these j nvest'igati ons, whi ch Danyl i uk and
presumably Zelensky were resisting because they didn't want
to be seen to be interfering but also to be a pawn.
a Ri ght.
A Ri ght.
a But you said the i rregular channet i s i t

t2

happens.

5

6
7
8

9

l0

t7

A
a
A
case
a

l8

view became a problem?

l9

2t

A It did.
a And you had the facts from Fiona Hill and Volker
and that s'ide, and then now you're getting the facts from the

22

Ukrai ne si de?

13

t4
15

l6

20

23

24
25

A
a

It

does.

And j t can be okay?

It

can be

okay. It can be helpful. In this

yeah

But

at

some

point, the irregular channel in

your

Correct.

I'm wondering, at thjs point, did it crystalize
to you that the irregular path was going to be more of a
And

 178

concern than you anticipated?

A

2
J

Yes.

The general way

I

have described

it is,

during the month of July, it began to be clear --

t2

a Okay.
A
that this was a problem.
a Did you I know you sent the cable on the 29th
after you spoke with Ambassador Bolton, but at any point in
time between the 20th and learning that, did you have any
offi ci al State Department hi gher up di scussi ons?
MR. GOLDMAN: Can you clarify 20th and 29th, which?
MR. CAST0R: Ju1y. Do you fol1ow?
MR. G0LDMAN: I don't thjnk there was a cable on July

l3

29th.

4
5

6
7
8

9

l0

ll

TAYL0R: August 29th.

t4

AMBASSAD0R

l5

MR. CAST0R: August 29th.

l6

AMBASSADOR

TAYLOR: Which makes your point?

BY MR.

t7

CASTOR:

20

s i s what I 'm getti ng to, i s, what d'id you do
between now and the 29th to alert l'4r. Counselor Brechbuhl
or Kent or somebody that this is becoming a problem, this is

2t

i rregular?

l8
l9

22
23

24
25

a

So thi

A So before the cable -- so August when it was
becoming July, I started to identify the problem of the
second channel, in particular with regard to the meeting.
then the assistance gets put on hold, and that gets to be

So

 179

l6

into the middle of August
and sti 11 i s not resolved. I t 'is attempti ng to be resolved,
and there were descriptions to me from Tim Morrison of how
they tried to get the principals in the same room, couldn't
do it, schedules, et cetera. I then I did, I ca11ed
Counselor Brechbuhl, talked to John Bolton
O This is much 1ater.
A Thjs is in August.
a OkaY.
A This is in August.
a I'm just after the, you know, it seems like the
July 20th communication you had wi th Danyliuk rea1ly
crystalized that this was also becoming a concern on the
Ukrai ni an sj de of thi ngs.
A It was a concern on the Ukrainian side.
a And I'm j ust wonderi ng i f you did anythi ng ri ght

t7

then and there other than Sondland, VoIker channel?

I
2
5

4
5

6
7
8
9

l0

ll
12

l3
t4
l5

goes a month, goes from July L8th

l8
l9
20

2t
22
23

A
a
A
a

I

Who

A

Three

wi

11 check agai n.

Okay. And then the July 25th call

happens.

Yes.

did you get a readout from about the July

25th

call?

people.

One was

a very short message from

24

Danyliuk, wh'ich said: Went wel1. 0h, there was also the

25

Ukrai ni ans

put out

the Ukraj ni an 0ffi ce of the President

 180

J

short descri pti on. Turned out, looki ng back on i t,
that's not a bad one because it talks about corruption and
worki ng on corruption would improve relations and that kind

4

of thi ng,

5

that.

I
2

put out

a

and then kind

of

normal

working so that was

l5

28th. So
that was, what, 3 days later. And he had this is one
where he said, " It could've gone better, " or somethi ng. I
took it as a Sarcastic comment: It could have gone better.
And then he described several of the things that
happened on that ca11. He mentioned that Giuliani came up in
the call. He mentioned that he he mentioned that Gordon
Sondland had talked to Pres'ident Trump before and after the
ca11. So that was not in the cal1, but that was before and
after, he told me. And he mentioned that the so-ca11ed

l6

previous Ambassador, Ambassador Yovanovitch, was a topic of

t7

the ca11.

l8

22

a 0kay.
A So there was that.
I got one other readout of the call and this was from
George Kent. And his was secondhand. So George Kent had
talked to Alex Vindman, who had been on the call. So George

23

hadn't been; Alex

6
7
8

9

l0

ll
t2
13

t4

19

20

2t

24
25

Tim l4orrison and

a
A

Was

I

had a conversation on the

had.

Morrjson on the call?

I'm sorry,

who?

 181

I

2
J
4
5

6
7
8

9

l0

il
t2
l3
t4
l5

l6
t7

l8
t9
20

2t
22
23

24
25

a Was Morri son on the call?
A I thi nk so, yes, yes. I 'm sure he was. I 'm sure
he was. Yes, the answer is yes.
George was not. George talked to Alex Vindman, and
George then relayed AIex's comments to me. There was a
difference in their two readouts of the call in one specific
respect, and that is Tim Morrison was sure that Presjdent
Trump had asked Presjdent Zelensky to fjre prosecutor general
Lutsenko. Lutsenko was sti11 on the job because he had he
had to stay on the job untjl Rada takes h'im off, so he was
sti1l on the job. And Giuliani, we know, wanted to keep
Lutsenko on the j ob out there. And Ti m ['4or r i son' s
recollection or recounting of the call was that President
Trump asked President Zelensky to fire Lutsenko. Vindman to
Kent to me said the opposite, that'is, that President Trump
said, "Keep Lutsenko, " again because Lutsenko and Gjuliani
were so that actually and that turned out to be the
case. We now know, going back to the transcript we saw on
September 25th, we know we think, it is a little bjt
unclear on that transcript, but we're pretty sure that
President Trump in the transcript asked President Zelensky to
keep it said, I understand you fired or you're about to
fire or you're not going to keep this very good prosecutor
general, and we think that's a mistake. So it turns out that
the Vindman description of that aspect was the correct one,

 182

I

and Tim Morrison

actually got that one wrong.

l3

a Okay. So you spoke wi th Mor r i son and Vi ndman.
A I spoke to Kent, who had talked to Vindman.
a 0kay. Anybody etse?
A And Danyliuk and the report from the
a Anybody else before the matter became public at the
end of September?
A No.
a 0kay. So that's sort of the roster of
A That's the roster of rePorts.
MR. CASTOR: I'm at my there's about L0 minutes left.
I'd like to pivot to our members.
MR. ZELDIN: Ambassador Taylor, on page 9, the second

t4

paragraph.

2
J

4
5

6
7
8

9

l0

ll
t2

l5
t6
t7

l8
t9

AMBASSADOR

2t

MR.

24
25

Which page?

ZELDIN: Page 9

AMBASSAD0R

23

I'llt sorry.

of your opening statement, where you
discuss Mr. Yermak asking the United States to submit an
offi ci a1 request for an i nvesti gation i nto Buri sma's alleged
v'iolati ons of Ukrai ni an 1aw.
MR.

20

22

TAYL0R: Congressman,

TAYL0R: Yes, si r.

ZELDiN:

Was

that request ever made by the United

States?
AMBASSADOR

TAYLOR: No, not

to

my knowledge.

of your open'ing statement,
second paragraph from the bottom in the middle of the
MR. ZELDIN: 0n page 10

so

 183

I
2
J
4

paragraph, you say, quote,

"I

was hopeful

TAYL0R: Yes, si r.

AMBASSAD0R

6

MR. ZELDIN: A1so, on page

8

9

l0

ll
t2
l3
t4

l5

l6
t7

l8
l9
20

2t

the

bilateral meeting or shortly thereafter, the White House
would tift the hold, but this was not to be." The hold was
released just L0 days 1ater, correct?

5

7

that at

10,

same paragraph

bottom you say, quote, "The Vice President

at

the

did say that

to do more to support
Ukraine and that he wanted the Ukrainians to do more to fight
cor rupti on, " end quote. Doesn' t that al i gn wi th U. S . law and
President Trump wanted the Europeans

poticy what the Vice President stated?
AI'IBASSADOR TAYL0R: I t does. And as I understand i t,
Congressman, when President Trump decided not to go to Warsaw

to go for hjm, President Trump
asked Vice President Pence to make those two points.
l"lR. ZELDIN: Which, as you just stated, is entirely
consistent w'ith U.S. law and policy, correct?
AMBASSADOR TAYL0R: Yes. We want the Europeans to do
more for Ukraine, and we want them the Ukrainians -- to do
more to fight corruption.
and ask Vice Pres'ident Pence

I'lR. ZELDIN: And on page 11, the th j rd paragraph down,

quote: In fact,

said, quote,

22

you say,

23

"everything" was dependent on such an announcement, including

24

securi

25

ty

Ambassador Sondland

assi stance.

Ukraine never made such an announcement, correct?

 184

TAYL0R: That's correct.

1

AMBASSADOR

2

MR. ZELDIN: And

)
4
5

6
7
8

9

l0

ll

is correct.
MR. ZELDIN: 0n page L2, first paragraph, on September
5th, I hosted Senators Johnson and Murphy for a visit to
Kyiv. During that meeting, did President Zelensky say
anything to Senators Johnson and Murphy about a quid pro quo?
AMBASSADOR

TAYL0R: That

At'{BASSADOR

TAYL0R: No, si r.

MR. ZELDIN:

MR. ZELDIN:

t7

l8
t9
20

2t
22
23

24
25

to Senators

Johnson

TAYL0R: No, si r.

l3

l6

Did you say anything

and Murphy about a quid Pro quo?
AMBASSADOR

l5

10

days 1ater, correct?

t2

t4

the hold was still released just

0n page L2, the middle paragraph,

you

talked about a conversation with Mr. Morrison. And this
phone ca11, was Morrison on that call?

that's a good question.
I don't know what I don't know how he knew that. It was
the same then, in the next paragraph, Ambassador Sondland
told me that he had a conversati on wlth Presi dent Trump. And
so I -- and I th'ink they were talki ng about the same
conversation. I think those two paragraphs talk about the
same conversation. And I don't know how T'im l4orrison
unless he may have been on the call, or he may have talked to
Sondland after the ca11.
MR. ZELDIN: I might get back to that, but at the bottom
AMBASSAD0R

TAYL0R: Congressman,

 185

I

of

page L2 and the bottom

of

page 13 as we1l, so

I'm skipping

6

to the bottom of page 13, 'i t says, agai n, I asked
Mr. Danyliuk to confirm that there would be no CNN interview,
which he did. It seems throughout your opening statement
you're talking about this demand for a pubfic statement in
order to release aid to Ukraine, but no announcement was ever

7

made and

2
J
4
5

ahead

the aid was stj11 released, right?

I

AMBASSADOR

9

MR.

TAYL0R: That' s correct.

ZELDIN: Eartier on, you had an exchange with the

l0

chairman. He asked you with regards to the 1ega1 definition

ll

of the term "quid pro quo." I believe you sajd something to
the effect of "I don't speak Latjn," correct?

t2

TAYL0R:

l3

AI''IBASSADOR

t4

l'lR. ZELDIN: Correct.

l5

AMBASSADOR

l6

MR. ZELDIN:

t7

l8
t9
20

use the words "quid pro quo. "
AMBASSADOR

TAYLOR:

I only quote other people using

those words, Congressman.
MR. ZELDI N :

0kay

.

22

the two Ukraine stories.

25

.

In your opening statement, though, you do

statement, you do make a

24

ry

TAYLOR: YeS, si T.

2t

23

So r

AMBASSADOR TAYLOR:

At the very end of your opening
reference to quid pro quo as one of
0n

Ah,

page

14

I do, yes, si r.

t' s an important question for us to ask
you, i f you' re goi ng to use that term "quid pro quo," for us
MR. ZELDIN: So i

 186

1

2

to ask you what you mean by it,

and we're not going to

obviously, we wouldn't accept the answer that you don't

speak

5

Latin. We want to know what you mean about it. I'11 let
Mr. Ratcliffe get into that further with you.
THE CHAIRMAN: Let's take a 5- or 10-minute break, and

6

then we'11 resume.

J
4

7
8

9

l0

ll
t2
l3
t4
l5
t6
17

l8

l9
20

2t
22
L)

24
25

AMBASSADOR

lRecess.l

TAYLOR: Sure.

 187

14:45 p.m.l

1

Okay. Let's go back on the record.
Fo1ks, settle down a bit. Let's go back on the record.
Just a few follow-up questions before I hand it over to

THE CHAIRMAN:

2
J

4
5

Mr. Nob1e, Ambassador.
l'ly colleagues on the

6

mi

nori

ty

asked you about general

8

in which aid may be withheld, that this kind of
thing happens. So I want to ask you a little further about

9

that.

7

circumstances

There are

l0

certainly legitimate

ll

withheld, such as

t2

judgment

occas'ions when aid'is

when Congress decides

to withhold a'id.

Am

in its policy

I right.

TAYLOR: YeS, siT.

l3

AI,IBASSADOR

t4

THE CHAIRMAN: And

there may be other circumstances,

l5

changing conditions on the ground somewhere, where a decis'ion

l6

will

t7

be made to wjthhold
AMBASSADOR

aid, appropriately so, correct?

TAYL0R: Yes, si r.

l9

But you can djstinguish between
appropriate ci rcumstances 'in which aid is wjthheld and

20

i 11egi

2t

another country

22

AMBASSAD0R

23

THE CHAI RMAN: Now, my co1 leagues asked you

l8

24
25

THE CHAIRMAN:

tjmate ci rcumstances i n whi ch aid i s

w'i

thheld to coerce

to do something improper.
TAYL0R: You can.

,

wel

1

,

ultimately the aid was released. I think the thinking js no,
you know, no harm no foul, jt ultimately was released. But

 1BB

6

at the time that it was released are you aware that the White
House was in possession of a whistleblower complaint now
public -- that alleged that the assistance may be w'ithheld
for reasons of wanting leverage over Ukraine for political
investigations? Were you aware that at the time it was
released the White House already knew the existence of this

7

complai nt?

I
2
J

4
5

TAYLOR: Mr. Chairman,

8

AMBASSADOR

9

THE CHAIRMAN: Were

you aware

I don't

know that.

at the ti me that 'i t

was

ll

the aid was released that'in fact there were public reports
in newspapers that the aid may be withheld for this improper

t2

reason?

l0

l3
t4

Al'4BASSAD0R

TAYL0R: When

'it

was released, on September

L1th, when it was released?

l5

THE CHAIRMAN: When

l6

AMBASSADOR

t7

THE CHAIRMAN:

the aid was eventually released

TAYLOR: Right.

--

were you aware there were already

l8

public reports suggesting perhaps that it

t9

for inappropriate or inexpl'icable reasons?
AMBASSADOR TAYLOR: In the press? I don't

20

2t
22
23

24
25

was being withheld

reca11.

THE CHAIRMAN: 0kay.

I don't reca11.
THE CHAIRI4AN: And we'll check the timeline. That's my
recollection, but I could be wrong.
So if I can go back to your testimony. At the bottom of
AMBASSADOR

TAYL0R:

 189

I

2
a

J
4
5

6
7
8

9

talk about a phone call you had with Mr. Morrison
in which "he went on to describe a conversation Ambassador

page L0 you

Sondland had w'ith Mr. Yermak at Warsaw. Ambassador Sondland

told Mr. Yermak that the security assistance money would not
come until President Zelensky committed to pursue the Burisma
investigation. I was alarmed by what 14r. Morrison told me
about the Sondland-Yermak conversation. This is the first
time I had heard the security assistance not just the
Whi te House meeti ng
was condi ti oned on the

l0

j nvesti gati ons.

lt

l8

At that point did you understand that unless the
Ukrainjans did this for President Trump, that is committed to
these investigations, they were not going to get that
mi 1i tary assi stance or that meeti ng?
AI4BASSAD0R TAYL0R: Mr. Chairman, what I know for sure
is what Mr. Morrison told me that he must have heard
Ambassador Sondland te11 l'lr. Yermak. And as I said, this was
the fjrst time I'd heard those two put together, those

t9

connec ted

12

l3
14

l5

l6
t7

20
21

22

z)
24
25

"

.

that, this was the first
time I heard that the security assjstance not just the
Wh'i te House meeti ng
was condi ti oned on the i nvesti gati on,
when you talk about conditioned, did you mean that if they
di dn't do thi s, the i nvesti gati ons, they weren't goi ng to get
that, the meeti ng and the mi 1i tary assi stance?
THE CHAIRMAN: And when

you say

 190

AMBASSAD0R

I

2
a

J

4
5

security assjstance

money

tted to pursue the i nvestigation.
THE CHAIRMAN: So if they don't do this, they are not
going to get that was your understanding?

commi

TAYL0R: Yes, si r.

6

AMBASSAD0R

7

THE CHAIRMAN:

8

clear understanding,
would not come until the President

TAYLOR: That was my

means

thi s

for

that?

AMBASSADOR

9

TAYLOR:

THE CHAIRMAN:

l0

BY 1"IR.

1l

Are you aware that qujd pro quo 1itera1ly

Mr.

I

AM.

Nob1e.

NOBLE:

l9

you. Thank you, Chai rman.
Ambassador, just sticking in this same general
timeframe, still on page 10 of your statement, on September
lst you wrote that you had a conversation with Mr. Danyliuk
to 1et him know that the delay of the U.S. security
assistance was a, quote, "a11 or nothing propositjon, in the
sense that if the Whjte House did not lift the hold prior to
the end of the fiscal year, September 30th, the funds would

20

expi

t2
l3
t4
l5

l6
t7

l8

a

Thank

23

re and Ukraine would receive nothing."
How did Mr. Danyliuk respond when you told him that?
A Mr. Nob1e, the reason I told him that, the reason i
made it clear that it was all or nothing, was that he had

24

sent me an earlier note, a note

25

we11,

2t
22

'it's a gradually

just before that,

'increasi ng problem,

saying,

that we're

 '191

gradually m'issi ng out

thi s assi stance.

5

Sasha
d, ho, Alexander
Mr. Danyl i uk, i f the hold is not lifted, in particular by the
And he was
end of the fiscal year, then it goes away
i t would be dri bbled
thi nki ng that i t was just kind of

6

out.

2
J
4

And

I

on

wrote back and sai

So i n answer to your question,

7

ve. I

8

substanti

9

somethi ng.

a

l0

mean,

did he respond, nothing

he may have sajd thank you or

Subsequently, though, did you have conversations

th the Ukrai ni ans? I

ll

wi

mean, di d they become 'i ncreasi ngly

t2

concerned when the freeze remained

l3

in place and they weren't
getting an explanation why, and you had told that them these

t4

funds may evaporate completely?

l5

20

Yes. And they I may have mentioned this
already, I can't remember -- they could not understand why it
was being held. And they suggested, wel1, maybe if i just go
to Washington and convince the President or conv'ince the
Secretary of Defense that this is. important that that would
do the trick. They were trying to figure out why this was

2t

bei ng he1d.

l6
t7

l8
l9

22
Z3

24
25

A

a

But then at some point, and again later on page

10,

it appears, told Mr. Yermak, President
Zelensky's adviser, that the money would not come until
Zelensky committed to pursuing the Burisma investigation. Is

Ambassador Sondland,

 192

4

that ri ght?
A That i s cor rect.
a So, I mean, did the Ukrainians have an
understanding at that point what they had to do in order

5

get the funds

I
2
a

J

A

6
7
8

9

l0

released?

Certainly l4r.

Yermak

did. That's what he had heard

f rom Ambassador Sondland.

Okay. I want to go back now to the first time you,
I believe, learned of the freeze. Was that during the July

a

L8th

SVTC

ll

A

t2

you had?
a
I'd like to ask some quest'ions about that

l3

l4

It

Can you

t6

on Ju1y L8th?

t8

l9
20

2l

WAS.

and the other

interagency meetings that you had.

l5

t7

to

just tell us how did you participate in the SVTC

that i n the Whi te House, 'in
the 01d Executive 0ffice Building, there is a room, there's a
series of rooms where they have interagency meetings.
MR. BELLINGER: I'm not sure all of this is public.

A

So the way i t works i s

AMBASSADOR

TAYL0R: Ah.

24

to scrub it later.
At{BASSADOR TAYL0R: Fai r poi nt. Thank you, Counselor.
You thi nk i t m'ight be classi f i ed that there are those?

25

Anyway, yeah.

22
23

MR. BELLINGER: You guys have

 193

to be, it used to
It was classi fied when I was

It

MR. BELLINGER: No, ro, no.
2

be, but times have

J

there.

changed.

4

AMBASSADOR TAYLOR:

5

THE CHAIRMAN:

make

7

i nformati

these classi fi ed rooms i s

BY

t2

a

it

and

t4
l5

A

]"IR

.

not. Unless the existence of
classified. I can't which I

We're

ca11.

t7

A

It is a secure

18

a

0kay.

conference ca11.

I'm in Kyiv. I'm in a secure room. Can I say
that? And there are several other satel1 i te offi cers that
beam i n. And we' re all i n dj fferent parts of
A

22

A

this is a video conference?
It's a video conf erence, a secure

a

Okay.

a

24
25

it to get i nto classi fi ed

to navigate this would be to shortcut
just say it's a conference call system.
Thank you. That's a good idea. It is a conference
Okay.

2l

to interject. I want to

Perhaps a way

a

20

goi ng

NOBL E :

l6

t9

ust

don't think it is.

ll
l3

j

5o

on today.

AI'4BASSADOR TAYLOR:

8

l0

Am

sure we're not going

6

9

I

Okay.

used

are?

So

So you can see who

v'ideo conf erence

the other parti c'ipants

 194

l1

A It depends on so if the camera is right there,
all of those folks can be on the screen but I'm not, because
i t's goi ng ri ght over my head. So the answelis most, but
not all. And I couldn't see the person who said the OMB
person who said: I've been told to stop this.
a 0kay. Do you know the identity of the Ol\4B staffer?
A I don't.
a But you believe I believe your testimony said
you believe it was a female staffer?
A It was.
a Okay. And to this day you sti11 don't know who it

t2

was

I
2
J

4
5

6
7
8

9

l0

l3
t4

that

A
a

announced i t?

I don't.
Did you participate

in the subsequent

interagency

l5

meetings about the ajd?

l6

20

this was a
sub- PCC, so a Sub- Pof i cy Coordi nati on Commi ttee. And then
there is a Policy Coordination Commjttee, and that is chaired
at the assistant secretary 1eve1. And then there's a
Deputies Commi ttee. And then there's a Principals Commi ttee.

2l

And then

22

And

t7
18

l9

A

One

of them. As I say, there

there's an NSC meeting.

it went --

and so

I

was present and beamed

in

from

24

Kyiv for the sub-PC and the PC, but not the ones above that.
a Okay. Can you tell us what happened at the PCC

25

meeting, the second one?

)1

 195

A

.

4

the room, observati ons, i nformati on
about the value of the assi stance. In particular 0SD, I
think it was Laura Cooper, who is probably on your list, made
a very strong case and continued to make a very strong case

5

for the effectiveness -- indeed, her office

6

overseei ng th"is assi stance, so she made a very strong case

7

for that.

I
2
J

l0

was the one

strong statement, we made a strong statement about the
importance

ll
l2

Around

around the State Department representative,

0thers

8

9

Yes

a

of this

assi stance.

And was there an OMB representative there

for that

meet i ng?

A
a
A
a

l3
t4
t5

l6

I don't

know

the

answer

Okay.

Probably.
Do you

recal1 whether there was any communicatjon

2t

or f rom Ol\4B regardi ng the f reeze and
whether it was going to stay in place at that meeting?
A I don't. I think coming out of that meeting was
the instruction that we're continuing that we're
continuing the policy as it had been. And, probably after

22

the

t7

l8
t9
20

23

24
25

f rom

the

PCC,

l,rlhi

te

House

the State Department and maybe the

Defense

to move forward wjth this
assi stance anyway, OMB notwj thstandi ng. Thi s was a bi g
decision that L came to over there, over some debate as to
Department decided they were going

 196

7

or not they could do'it without OMB's clearance, send
a CN to the Hill without OMB's clearance, and they decided to
do that. I don't know if they've ever done that before.
This was a big decisjon for them.
a So as far as you know, that was unprecedented?
A As far as I know.
a Was that related to the FMF or USAI portions of the

8

assi

I
2
J
4
5

6

9

l0

whether

stance?

A
a

Do you know?

I think both.
Do you know whether

ll

documentation

t2

meet i ngs?

l3
t4
l5
t6
t7

l8
t9
20

2t
22
23

24
25

A
a

there was any kind of written

of kind of the decisions

There

0kay.

made

at

these

is every time.
And State Department would have a copy of

those?

A
A
A

NSC

would probably have those.

NSC.

And they were then sent

out to the interagency,

including the State Department.

0kay. Are you aware whether there were any kind of
preconditions or certifications that had to be made with
respect to Ukraine before the funding could flow?
A In this case, for
O Yeah, for this assjstance.
A The only thing I heard was that there was a request

a

 197

and

I

I'm not sure who it

came

from, but it

may have come

t2

NSC to the Defense Department for an evaluation
of the assistance to be sure that it was being well spent and
jt was effective. And the Defense Department came back very
quickly with the conclusion that it was.
a WeI1, we've heard claims that President Trump was
interested in corruption or concerned about corruption
generally in Ukraine. Are you aware that DOD, in
consultation with the State Department, had certified that
Ukraine had taken sufficient steps to address corruption such
that they were entitled to the aid at that time?
A Mr. Nob1e, I'm not sure. I think in the Defense

13

Authortzation Act every year there are conditions that are

t4

required to be met in order for that assistance to

l5

l8

forward. And my understandi ng i s those condi ti ons were met.
0n thi s speci fi c one I 'm not sure. I thi nk so.
a Okay. In your statement on page 4 you reference
several actions that President Zelensky had taken quickly to

t9

address corruption

20

High Anti-Corruption Court, which had been a

2l

f

2
J
4
5

6
7
8

9

l0

n

l6
t7

22

Z)
24
25

from the

or

qu i

A
O
A

te some t'ime
We

in Ukraine, including opening

go

Ukraine's

U.S.policy

goat

.

played a big role

in that, yes.

And President Zelensky had done

that at that point?

that and he showed up himself at the
opening of the Hlgh Anti-Corruption Court -- with the two
He had done

 198

I

Senators, by the way. They were both there as

a
A
a

2
5

4

we11.

Which two Senators?

Senator Murphy and Senator Johnson.
And then President Zelensky had

also, after winning

5

control of the Rada, he changed the Ukrainian Constitution to

6

remove absolute immunity from Rada Deputies, which you say in

7

your statement was a source of corruption for over

8

decades. Is that ri ght?

A

9

So Rada

Deputies I

two

imagine Representatives in

l2

in the Senate would love to have this but
the Rada Deputies in Ukraine up until the point where they
changed the Constitution could commit any kind of crime and

l3

not be prosecuted.

l0

ll

this

body and

16

that was changed, he changed that right away, a
commitment that he'd made in his campaign, and he made good
on that commitment right away. And overwhelming support. It

t7

had been promised every Rada by every President before, 1t

t8

never happened. He got

t4
15

l9
20

2l
22

)?
24
25

And

a

it

done.

5o not only had President Zelensky campaigned

on

I bel'ieve hi s number one pri ori ty,
but he had taken concrete steps. And yet the OMB, the
President, sti 11 had decided to freeze the aid purportedly
because he had some concerns about corruption in Ukra'ine?
A It is certainly true that he made he is not only
flghting corruption. So he changed the President Zelensky
rooti ng out corrupti on,

 199

changed

the language. He said he wants to defeat corruption.

So he was

2

priority.

realty focused on this, he made jt his

priority

was stopping the war on

J

two

4

Ukrain'ian terms and number two was defeating

5

6
7
8

9

l0

Number one

number

corruption.

And

lot on that.
And it was -- we talked earlier about how we're focused
on institutions fighting corruption. So the High
Anti-Corruption Court and the Special Prosecutor and all, the
i nsti tuti onal way of fi ghti ng corrupti on, rather than case by
he did a

case.

ll

And

so, yes, he pushed that very hard.

t4

Okay. So I want to move, fast forward a little bit
to August. And I noticed in your statement that there's a
1ittle bit of a time gap between on page 9 -- between July

l5

28th to the middle of August, to August L5th, between the

l6

first

t2

l3

a

and second paragraphs on page 9.
And

t7

I also noticed that jn the text

messages

that we

have

in

23

that Ambassador VoIker
produced, there's also a simi 1ar gap i n that timeframe.
So i f you take the
i f you have the text messages and
you turn to
1et's go to page 28 first. And if you look at
I '11 dj rect your attenti on to the top there. And
beginning on or around August Llth
we11, actually, yeah,

24

back

to the top there.
5o these are text messages

l8
t9
20

2t
22

25

which you're a participant

between you and Ambassador

 200

Volker.
2
J
4
5

6

A Okay.
a There's one July 24th, 2019, where Volker says:
Hi, 8i11. Can you talk now?
Do you see that?

A
a

I

do.

l2

it skips forward ti11 August 3rd and you
have a di scussi on about: Di d Ti m I bel i eve that' s Ti
Morrison say how he was doing on the call?
And then i t ski ps f orward to August 11.th. And 'it's not
until August L6th, I beljeve, that you kind of start talking
again about the investigations or the requests for a White

l3

House

7
8

9

l0

ll

t4

l5

And then

m

meeting.

A
a

I

Do you see that?

do.

Okay. And then, if you move to page 38, so this is

l6

the three-way text

t7

Volker and Ambassador Sondland. And if you look toward the

l8

bottom, there's a big gap between August 6th, 2019, and

t9

then jumps to August 29th, 2019. Do you see that?

20

2t

A
a

I

see

message

chain between you and Ambassador

it

that, ri ght.

Do you

recall whether you had any WhatsApp

22

conversations with Ambassador Sondland and Ambassador Volker

23

basicatly during the month of August, or the last 3 weeks of

24

August?

25

A

From the

5th to the 29th?

 201

Yeah.

a

I

Do you know whether

there'd be any messages

4

that might have been deleted here?
A 0h, I don't know if it's possible to delete on
these things. I don't know. I don't know the reason for

5

gap.

2
J

the

ll

a 0kaY.
A Yeah, yeah, yeah. The State Department has alt of
mine. I have them as we11. But, yeah, the 5tate Department
has all of these.
a Okay. But in this timeframe were you aware that
Ambassador Volker and Ambassador Sondland were in direct

t2

communication

l3

drafting of a statement that they

t4

to

6
7
8

9

l0

l5

l6
t7

l8
t9
20

2l

with Mr.

A
released

So

the

wanted Pres'ident Zelensky

his texts. I think that's

a
remember,

A
a

only after -- only after

So you

Ambassador Volker

where they showed up.

weren't involved, as far as you can

in the drafting of
I was not.

that?

Okay. So that was something that Ambassador Volker
and Ambassador Sondland were doing with Giuliani and Yermak?
A

Yes.

23

a

0kay.

25

with Mr. Giuliani about

release?

22

24

Yermak and

5o

I

would

like to

show

of the end
page 23 of the text
you ki nd

result of that process. If you turn to
messages. And, agai n, these aren't ones that you were on.

 202

But the last couple messages on that page, from August

I
2

L3th, 2019, this is an exchange between

J

Mr.

Ambassador

Volker

Yermak.

5

writes: Hi, Andrey. Good talking.
Following is text with insert at the end for the two key

6

i

4

7

and

And Volker

tems. We wi 11 work on offi

ci a1 requests.

And then Ambassador Volker

drafts

pastes the

t4

that they want President Zelensky to release. And
it reads: "Special attention should be paid to the problem
of interference jn the political processes of the United
States, especially with the alleged involvement of some
Ukrainian potitjcians. I want to declare that this is
unacceptable. We intend to initiate and complete a
transparent and unbi ased i nvesti gati on of all avai lable facts

l5

and epi sodes, i ncludi ng those i nvolvi ng Buri sma and the 2016

l6

t9

elections, which in turn will prevent the recurrence of this
problem i n the future. "
So this is a draft statement that Ambassador VoIker and
Ambassador Sondland had drafted with Rudy Giuliani for

20

President Zelensky

2t

crafti ng of thi s?

8

9

l0

ll
t2
l3

t7

l8

22

.t)
24
25

statement

to release.

Were you

involved in the

A I was not.
a Okay. So you had no knowledge that thjs
on at the time?
A I had no knowledge.

was going

 203

2
3

4

of any statement generally that
I wasn't until I saw these once they were released.
Okay. How did you react when you tearned, I guess
from seeing Ambassador Volker's text messages, that this had
a
A
a

Were you aware

7

that you're the Charge
d'Affaires in Ukraine, and yet you have no idea that Volker
and Sondland are working with Giulianj and Yermak to get out

8

a statement from the President of Ukraine and you had no idea

5

6

been going on behind the scenes, given

24

that that's going on? Did that concern you?
again, this
A It did. When I found out about it
was the irregular channel, I was in the regular channel.
Every now and then I would see what was going on in the
i rregular channel , but not i n thi s case.
And, yeah, I mean, I should have been 'involved, but I
knew that there were a lot of communications between
Ambassador Volker preceding and President Zelensky and
Yermak precedi ng my arri val . They had a relati onshi p.
And similarly with Ambassador Sondland. Ambassador
Sondland had a relationship, he told me, I don't know I
thi nk th'is 'is true
that he could WhatsApp and phone and
call Presi dent Zelensky. And norma11y, j n a normal
arrangement, the ambassador helps either facilitate that or
monitors that or is at least aware of that and gets
back-brjefed on that. I had accepted that this was an

25

unusual ci rcumstance.

9

l0

ll
t2
l3
t4
l5

l6
t7

l8
t9
20

2t
22
23

 204

'is i t

J

or would you agree
that these text mesSages and the drafting of this statement
was, in effect, making concrete the quid pro quo that you had

4

realjzed'in mid-July, as you describe in your statement, that

5

a White House

6

making a public commitment

7

investigations?

1

2

8

a

A

I

mean,

visit

would you say

was dependent on President Zelensky

So again, being

to those two specifjcs

careful about my use

and

l8

of quid pro quo, which is imperfect at best,
the facts were that these relationships between the
announcement and the meeting or phone call and the meeting
and then the security assistance, it was clear to me that
there was that relationshi P.
What I didn't know was there were these this drafting
sessi on, thi s drafti ng exerci se to put together the language
that President Zelensky would use.
O Okay. I want to fast forward a 1itt1e bit to
September 7th or 8th. Do you recal1 sending George Kent a

t9

WhatsApp message regarding

20

Morrison about what President Trump wanted Zelensky

2t

Do you

9

l0

ll
l2
l3

l4
l5
t6
t7

22
23

24
25

understanding

your conversation with

Tim

recall telling George Kent about that?
A Is this mentioned in my statement -a No, but if you go to your statement -A September 5th. Thi s i s wi th Senators
and Murphy were in town.

to

do?

Johnson

 205

6

a And then on page L2 in the middle.
A Ri ght.
a It says you had a call wj th Mr. l4orri son where he
had a , quote, si nki ng feel i ng
A Yes.
after learning about the conversation that
a

7

President Trump had with Ambassador SondIand.

I

2
J
4
5

8

9
10

A
a

Yep.

George

Kent?

Did you relay that

in a written communication

to

Do you remember that?

t2

A
a

t3

page 53, the

t4

A Okay. I'm informed that on my text message there
was a text back to George Kent.
a Okay.
A So let me be clear. I didn't remember it until
just now and this great colleague back here reminded me that
this was there.
a 0kay. And those text messages have been turned
over to the State Department?
A They have, they have, they have.

u

l5

l6

l7
l8
l9
20

2t
22
23

24
25

I don't

remember.

Can we go back

last

to the text messages

and

turn to

page?

5orry, where are we now?

a
A

Sure. Last page of the text
Yes.

messages, page 53.

 206

I

a

At the

top

of the page, I believe, on September
ti

J

8th, 20L9, LL :20 a. m.
convos wi th ZE.

4

That's Zelensky,

5

A

Yes.

6

a

And

7

A

Yes.

8

a

Presi dent Trump.

9

A

Yes.

l0

a

Let'

ll

A

Ri

l2

a

And then you go on to have a conversation, which I

2

Gordon Sondland says:

Guys,

mu1

p1e

co r rec t?

POTUS.

s ta1k.

ght.

'is the conversation

l3

be1 i eve

t4

Is that right?

15

A

Yes.

l6

a

0n page

t7

A

Yes.

.

you descri

be i n your statement.

L2?

20

that's where President Trump had made
clear that if Zelensky dj d not, quote, "c1ear thi ngs up i n
publ i c, " there would be a, quote, "sta1emate. " Is that

2t

ri ght?

22

A

That i s correct.

23

a

And you understood

l8
t9

24
25

a

0kay

Ukrai ne would not
A

And

that stalemate meant that
get the mi 1 i tary assi stance?

That's correct.

 207

I

2
J
4

a

Okay.

Was Ambassador

Volker on that call with

you

and Ambassador Sondland?

A
a

I'm sure he was, yes.
During that ca11, did you discuss the possibility

2t

of President Zelensky
A 0h, I 'm sorry, I 'm sorry. 0n the phone call?
a The phone call, yes.
A No, no, no, no. The phone call was just
a Just you and Sondland?
A Yes. Ri ght. Sorry. The text was the three of us,
the phone call was just the two of us.
a Okay. During that phone call did you djscuss the
possibjlity of President Zelensky doing the CNN interview
during the YES Conference in Ukraine? Is that when that
fi rst came up?
A That's when he yes, that's when Ambassador
Sondland said that he had talked with them and they
and
the Ukrai ni ans had agreed to do a CNN i nterv'iew.
a Okay. Can you j ust descri be i n a 1 i ttle more
detajl your recollection of that conversation with Ambassador
Sondland? Was this the fjrst time you had heard the idea of

22

President Zelensky making a public announcement on CNN about

5

6
7
8

9

l0

ll
t2

l3
t4
l5
t6
t7

l8
l9
20

these 'investi gati
24
25

A

it

certainly the first time I'd heard about it
had earlier conversations about making publjc

was

on CNN. We'd

ons?

 208

I
2
J
4
5

comments.

the thing about the interest that Ambassador Sondland had in
having President Zelensky go in a box, in a public box. 5o
there were those conversations on a couple of occasions.
This is the first time on CNN, talking about CNN interview.

a

6
7
8

9

l0

ll
t2

l3
t4
l5

l6
t7

l8
t9
20

I thi nk that i s the case here. I 'm rememberi ng

And do you

recatl the dates of the

YES Conference?

this interview supposed to take place?
A The interview, the CNN interview I think was going
to be in UNGA, which is at the end of September. The YES
Conference was the first week in September, as I reca11,
maybe the first -- oh, no, flo, sorry. It was the Friday,
Saturday Saturday is the 14th of September. But I
don't and there was a 1ot of press at the YES Conference.
I don't think there was talk about doing an interview there.
a Okay. 5o you think that the interview that
President Zelensky was going to do that you discussed with
Ambassador Sondland during your call on September 8th was
going to be during UNGA?
A When we were talking about it on September 8th, I
think it was not clear when it was going to be.

When was

a
A

2l
22

Okay.

And when

it didn't

when

it didn't

happen,

didn't

Z)

happen, and then they were approaching the

24

what, the 25th of September, then they got more serious --

25

then

UNGA

meeting on,

I started hearing about the CNN interview. And so it

 209

I
2
3

4

was going

to take place in

Okay. Going back to the text messages, do you see
the message on September 8th at L2:37 p.m.? Can you just
read what you wrote there about "the nightmare"?

a

5

A

6

"The nightmare"

7

New York.

I

wi11.

is they give the interview and don't get

the securi ty assi stance. The

Russi ans

love i t

lt

parenthet'icaI (and I qui t. )
a Can you unpack that a litt1e bit for
A Sure.
a What did you mean by "the nightmare"

t2

the Russians love?

8

9

l0

13

A

us?

and what would

"The ni ghtmare" i s the scenari o where Presi dent

20

in public, makes an announcement that he's
going to'investigate Burisma and the election in 201.5,
interference in 2016 election, maybe among other things. He
might put that jn some serjes of investigations.
But he had to
he was going the nightmare was he
would mention those two, take all the heat from that, get
himself jn big trouble in th'is country and probably in his

2t

country as we11, and the security assistance would not

22

released. That was the ni ghtmare.

t4
l5

l6
t7

l8
t9

23

24
25

Zelensky goes out

The Russi ans lovi ng i t.

attention.

be

The Russi ans are payi ng

attention to how much
support the Americans are going to provide the Ukra"inians.
The Russians are paying

 210

I

The Russi ans are leani ng on Ukrai ne. They are leani ng on

2

Ukraine about Donbas. They are leaning on Ukraine about

J

soverei

4
5

6
7

gn small 1 i ttle soverei gn countri es here, 1 i ttle
statelets. They are leaning on economically, they have got
the Nord Stream coming through, they have got they are
putting pressure on they have to come to a new gas
agreement by the Lst of January.

t2

them. And they, the Russians
want to know how much support the Ukrainians are going to get
in general, but also what k'ind of support from the Amerjcans.
So the Russians are loving, would love, the humif iation
of Zelensky at the hands of the Americans, and would give the

l3

Russians a

8

9

l0

ll

So they are leaning on

l6

freer hand, and I would quit.
a And why would that make you quit?
A That's exactly the scenario that I was worrjed
about when I had my meeting with Secretary Pompeo on the 28th

t7

of

t4

l5

t9

I said: Mr. Secretary, you know, your current
strong policy of support for Ukraine is one I can support and
I would be gtad to go out to Kyiv and support it and push it

20

hard.

l8

2l
22
23

24
25

May where

I totd him and the others who were in the room,
if that changes and this would have been a change, this
would have been it was a nightmare. This would have been
throwing Ukraine under the bus. And I told the Secretary:
If that happens, I'11 come home. You don't want me out
However,

 211

2

there, because I'm not going to defend it, you know. I would
say bad things about it. And you wouldn't want me out there

J

doing

I

5

I'm going to come home on that. So that was
the message about I quit.
And did you communicate that, these concerns around
a

6

this

4

that.

So

7

A

8

a

to Secretary Pompeo or
I had done so on August 29th.
In your in the cable?

9

A

Correct.

l0

a

What was the di

ll

time

stri buti on on that

cable?

l5

It was cal1ed "NoDI5. "
0kay. What's that mean?
a
A
So i t's very limited distribution. It's also first
person, which means the way it reads is: Mr. Secretary, I
I Bill Taylor I am concerned about thi s
am concerned

t6

problem.

t7

l8

that's first person. Normally these cables are not
f i rst person, they are third person. So it gets attention,

t9

there are not

20

attenti on when

2l

concerned.

t2

l3
t4

22
L)

24
25

A

So

it gets
it comes in from the ambassador saying: I

many

first

person cables coming, so

am

that it is very limited distribution.
It goes obviously to the Secretary. And then if other people
want to read it they have to come up to the Operatjons Center
in the State Department and they can go into the special room
And "NODIS" means

 212

I

2
J
4
5

6
7
8

9

l0

ll
t2
l3
t4
l5

l6
t7

l8
t9
20

2t
22
23

24
25

and they can read i t.

a

And

in your statement, I beljeve

page 10, you said

you heard soon thereafter the Secretary carried that cable

with him to a meet'ing at the White House focused on security
assistance for Ukraine. Where did you hear that from?

A
a

Deputy Assjstant Secretary George Kent.

if anything, else
Secretary Pompeo did after receiving your cable to fol1ow up?
A I know that I know that he had been pushed I
think I mentioned that after the July LSth meeting where the
ass'istance was f rozen by the Ot"lB hand, that there were a
serjes of these meetings, up to and including Secretary of
State and Defense. And so I know that Secretary Pompeo was
worki ng on thi s 'issue, that he wanted i t resolved.
I was getting more and more concerned that it wasn't
getting resolved. And so I wanted to add my concern and my
arguments, from the perspective of Kyiv and the Ukrainjans,
about how important this assistance was.
' a Okay. And you said how did you learn that the
aid had been unfrozen? I believe it was on September LLth,
is that right?
A It was September LLth. So, yeah, I remember
getting an email from a staffer, a Senate Armed Services
House
Committee staffer. And of course Senate staffers
staffers too, I'm sure get the word much earlier than
0kay.

And do you know what,

 213

I

2
J
4
5

6
7
8

9

l0

ll
t2
13

t4

anybody el se .

i got this emai1, I think it was probably
overnight, which I then sent to Tim Morrison and I think
maybe to George Kent saying: 0h, this is great news. This
And so

s what we've been wal ti ng f or.
And Tim hadn't heard i t yet. So that's how I fj rst
heard. And then he tater that day confirmed.
i

a

Okay. Are you aware that The New York Tjmes

ons, some emai 1s, relati ng to the
release of the freeze that jnvolved you on 0ctober 9th, 2019,

publ i shed some communi cati

wjth a State Department employee, Brad Freedon (ph)?
A 0h, I do remember this, yes.

a
A

Do you reca11 those emails?
Thi

s 'is the

one where Brad sai

d

somethi ng about

l5

nothing to see here, move along.

l6

I believe the quote is: Keep moving people,
nothing to see here.
A There you go.
a Did you have any communjcations with Mr. Freedon
(ph) or anyone else at the State Department about why they
wanted to keep the release of the funds quiet?
A No, I di dn't have a conversati on wi th lvlr. Freedon
(ph) on this one. I imagine that
my understanding -- my
view of this was that, as I said earlier, this was an
embarrassment, this freeze on assistance was a m'istake, an

t7

l8
t9
20

2t
22
23
24
25

a

 214

it

I

embarrassment, and

2

fixed.

J

less embarrassi ng i t

4
5

6
7
8

9

l0

ll
t2

l3
t4

l5
l6
t7

l8
l9
20

2l
22
23

24
25

And the

was going to be

less said and the less

fixed, it

to be
attention it got, the
had

was.

fine with don't talk about this or, you know,
1et's not make a big deal of this.
So

I

was

 215

I

14:23 p.m. l
BY

2

.

NOBL E

:

Okay. 0n or about

a

J

I,IR

September

4

was released, do you reca11 a meeting

5

VoIker had with Andriy

7

A
a

8

di nner?

9

A

6

L4th, so after the aid

that you and Ambassador

Yermak?

I do. It was a dinner.
A dinner. Can you te1l us what happened at that
One

of the things that

happened was

Mr.

Yermak

l3

to Kurt and me, described to Ambassador Volker and
me, their plans for a resolution of Donbas, how they were
going to get to a resolution with Donbas.
There was a fourth person there, another of his

t4

another Ukrai ni an colleague.

l0

ll
t2

described

There were a couple other topics discussed, Mr. Noble,

l5

t7

but anything jn partjcular that I should try to remember?
a Do you reca11 anything about an jnvestigation

l8

involving former Ukrainian President Poroshenko coming up

t9

duri ng

t6

that

I

meeti ng?
do.

20

A

2t

a

22

A

tell us about that conversation?
Yes. I can. I can see Ambassador Volker has been

Yes,

so Ambassador

23

here.

24
25

Can you

Mr.

Novi kov,

Volker suggested to l'1r. Yermak

the other Ukrai n'ian, that i t would be a

and

good

 216

jdea not
2

to investigate President Poroshenko, the previous
President. And one of the reasons Kurt said that was there

J

were indications, and maybe even some actions taken by that

8

it clear that the new government, the new
Zelensky government, was going to go after President
people in
Poroshenko for a range of issues, on things like
this room will remember that President Poroshenko was in
office at the time of the Kerch Strait incident. This was

9

Thanksgiving a year ago, when the Russians attacked these

4
5

6
7

time, that

made

t2

patrol shi ps, patrol boats. And Presi dent
Poroshenko was getting blamed for and being possibly even
taken to court for some of those military decisionS that he

l3

made.

l0

ll

Ukrai ni an

And, at that dinner, both Mr. Yermak and Mr. Novikov

t4

r9

their ce1l phones I, of course, don't have but
took out thei r ce11 phones and pu11ed up pi ctures of the'i r
relatives one was a brother, and one was a cousin who
had been killed or wounded in the east. And they showed this
to Kurt and me, and they said, Poroshenko is responsible for

20

thi s.

l5

l6
t7

l8

took out

23

at Poroshenko at an
emotional level. And that was one of the things
motivating one of the things motivating the attacks on, or

24

the court cases on President Poroshenko. Not the only ones.

25

There were

2t
22

There was a deep-seated anger

others. This otigarch that I

ment'ioned

earlier,

 217

I

Kolomoisky, also had
And Kurt

2

it in for

Poroshenko.

said, you know, you should

move

forward, don't

3

prosecute Poroshenko. And they responded, take a look at

4

thi s.
Do you reca11 Yermak sayi ng anyth'ing

a

5

6

that,

7

pushi ng us
A

8

9

l0

shouldn'

why

t

to the ef f ect

we i nvesti gate Poroshenko when you' re

to investigate Joe Biden?
0h, I don't remember that, but

I don't

remember

that.

a OkaY.
After the freeze

l8

lifted, it sounds 1ike, from your
statement, you sti11 had concerns that President Zelensky
might go forward with the CNN jnterv'iew and stitt announce
the i nvesti gatj ons. Is that ri ght?
A That's ri ght.
a Why did you have that concern that that was goi ng
to happen?
A
I had the concern because I had a couple of

19

meeti ngs

ll
t2
l3
t4
l5

l6
t7

was

with President Zelensky

and Andrei Bohdan, hjs Chief

2t

of Staff, about this time. It was just after -- it was on
the L3th, I think, of September, just after the hold had be en

22

released.

20

l

And walking
24
25

out of that meeting, Andriy

Yermak was about

just said to President Zelensky,
bipartisan support of Ukraine in Washington js your most
to walk in.

And

I

had

 218

rategi c asset, don' t j eopa rdize i t.

And don't

I

va1 uabl e st

2

i ntervene

J

i

4

Presi dent Zelensky, and on the way

5

to Andriy Yermak.

6

looked to me like he was sti11 thinking they were going to

7

make

8

9
10

il
t2

l3
t4

l5
t6
t7

l8
t9
20

2l
22

don'

t i nterfere

25

n

our electi ons, and we won't

nterfere in your elections. I had just said that to

out I said the

And the body language

that

statement.

a

At that point, had there

was

such

same

a

No?

Did

you

thi

ng

that i t

been a White House meeting

for President Zelensky scheduled?
A No. And there sti 11 hasn't been.
a OkaY.
Di d you participate in UNGA? Were you here in
A No.

New York?

help prepare for President Trump's

meeti ng wi th Presi dent Zelensky?

. I sent in a suggestion to Tim Morri son on
what should -- you know, what he could use as the President's
talki ng poi nts when he sat down wi th Zelensky, bas'ica11y
making the point that, you know, correct, a good, solid,
And that's in the cables,
Yeah.
substanti ve conversati on
I'm sure, that the State Department is preparing.
A

Yes

a

Okay.

'd 1j ke to gi ve pri ori ty to the members
that have been here for most of the day.
THE CHAIRI'4AN: I

24

i

Mr.

Welch?

 219

I

2
J
4
5

6

7
8

9

l0

ll
t2

l3
t4

l5

l6
t7

l8

I'11 be brief.
I just want to, first of all, thank you. But I've been
fistening all day and pretty much all day, and what I
understand your testimony more or less is, succinctly and
correct me if I'm wrong is: You have a longstanding
interest in Ukraine; it's been the U.5. policy since 1991 to
support Ukraine; that the policy has been internalty for
Ukraine to fight corruption, and we've been supportive of
that, externally to resist aggression from Russia, and we
were trying to be supportive of that; that when you were
faced with this question of whether to return to public
serv'ice at the request of Secretary Pompeo, you had a frank
conversation where you made it clear that you had to be
MR. WELCH:

that you could defend what had been the consistent
United States policy in both those respects; that if, in
fact, you were unable to do that or the policy changed, you
candidly said you would have to quit; that you then began
your servjce on the understanding that the policy was to
assured

24

fight internal corruption and to resist external aggression;
and that, as time developed, yor.,r started havi ng questions as
to whether there was a secondary channel for that policy;
and , over t'ime, you came to see that not only was there a
secondary channel but that it included a policy variance from
the tradi tional one of fighting aggression and corruption;

25

that you had specific 'information from people

t9
20

2l
22
23

who had talked

 220

7

to President Trump, 'including Mr. Volker and Mr. Sondland,
that what that policy was was essentially to extract an
agreement from the President of Ukrajne to do these
investigations and that everything, not just the White House
meeting but the aid itself, was conditioned on getting that
agreement and that explicit statement; and, at the end, there
was an effort to, quote, put President Zelensky in a box,

8

which the public statement would make him do.

I
2
3

4
5

6

Is that a fair

9

l0

ll

AMBASSAD0R

one

thing

summary

of

what you've said?

TAYL0R: Excellent summary, Congressman.

The

the only clarification I would make is that, in

l3

the beginning, in late June and early July, in July, there
was, in my view, my observation, not a conflict. There was

t4

not a conffict

l5

1"1R.

l6

AMBASSADOR

t2

WELCH: Right.

TAYL0R:

--

between these two channels.

l8

No. And you were clear that just having
somebody outside of the normal State Department isn't

19

necessari 1y a bad thi ng.

t7

MR. WELCH:

TAYLOR:

COTTCCt.

20

AMBASSADOR

2t

MR. WELCH: Having two

22

But

23

polic'ies was the question.

just a couple more, because I want to yield to my

cotleagues.

Mr. Welch, our time has expi red.

24

THE CHAIRMAN:

25

MR. WELCH: 0kay.

 221

THE CHAIRMAN:

I
2

We'1l come back to you

at the very top of

the next.
Sure, Mr.

J

 \/lR. WELCH:

4

THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you.

5

Forty-five

mj

BY MR.

6

nutes

Cha'i

rman. I yield.

to the mi nori ty.

CASTOR:

l0

a Where we last left off was a discussion of it
was right around the time of this telephone caI1, July 25th.
A 25th, yes.
a And the very next day, you had a meeting wjth

ll

Presi dent Zelensky.

7
8

9

A
a

t2

Correct.

20

I think you told us that feedback from the call
f rom the Ukra'inians was posi tive, f or the most part.
A Yes.
a They had put out a statement -A They had put out a statement. They'd mentioned
investigations or -- I should look at that statement. But
they had mentioned something that led me to believe that they
were jn the same meeting, that they were describing exactly

21

that cat1.

l3
t4
l5

l6
t7

l8
t9

a
A
a

22
23

24
25

that

And

Okay.

So

Law enforcement,
Was

was a

I think it was. Yeah, yeah,

yeah,

there any other discussion during that meeting

fallout from the caIl?

 222

it was
Ambassador Volker, Sondland, and I were all there. And the
bulk of the cal1, after the brief conversation about the
I'm sorry. The bulk of the meeting after the brief
conversation about the call was on how to solve Donbas.
bulk

A

Not that

I recall.

6

a

Were you

surprised when you read the whistleblower

7

complai

I
2
J
4
5

The

so

l0

nt? And, fi rst of all , di d you see the whi stleblower
complai nt before i t was public?
A No.
a Okay. So i t was made publ i c, I thi nk, on Thursday,

ll

September 26th.

8

9

A
a

t2
13

0kay.
Were you

surprised when there was a discussion of

l6

this July 25th meeting in the whistleblower complaint?
A Mr. Castor, I remember reading that quickly, but I
but can you remind me what
may have missed that July

t7

the

t4

l5

t9

a
A

Yeah.

20

a

0n page 4

l8

2t
22
23

24
25

Su

re.

of the complai nt

we can give you the

complaint.
A

I'm sure I have it

somewhere,

but that's

okay.

it states that Ambassadors Volker and
Sond 1 and reportedly provi ded advi ce to Ukrai ni an leadershi p
about now to navigate the demands that the President had made
a

You know,

 223

I
2
J

4
5

6
7
8

9

l0

lt
t2
t3

t4

l5
t6
t7

l8
t9
20

2t
22
23

24
25

to Zetensky.
Does that ring any be1ls? Does anything of that sort
A This is in the 26th meeting?
a Yeah.
A Advi ce to Zelensky about how to navigate the
a Demands of the Presi dent.
A I was i n that so the records of my records of
that meeti ng are 'in the State Department, and they wi 1 t come.
a OkaY.
A I don't recall that.
a Okay. By that
A Ah. Ah. Thank you, Counsel.
He di d ask
one th'ing that was i n addi ti on to the
brief conversation about the call and Donbas, and it may have
been at the end, President Zelensky stj11 expressed his
interest in the face-to-face meeting in the 0va1 0ffjce.
a OkaY.
A Yeah. Thank you.
a But by that point in time, from your limited
knowledge of what had occurred on the cal1, you didn't know
that the President had made any demands or there was anything
to navi gate.
A Correct.
a 0kay. 5o, to the extent the whistleblower
complaint chronjcles that
and you were in the meeting, and

 224

I

you

don't

remember

I don't

2

A

J

MR. I"IEADOWS:

4
5

anything

remember

Steve,

of that sort.

that.

let me your response, that you

that, js rea11y an indication that
reca11 that happeni ng. Is that correct?

don't

remember

AMBASSADOR

6

you don't

TAYL0R: Yes, si r.

0kay. I just wanted to clarify that.
AMBASSADOR TAYLOR: Yes . Yes . Good po'i nt
MR. ['4EAD0WS:

7

.

8

BY MR.

9

Now, the various requests

a

l0

CASTOR:

that

for the Ukrajnians to

had been closed,

did you have

ll

open investigations

t2

opposition to the effort for Ukraine to investigate,

l3

know, Ukrainians

l4

h

l6

wrongdoing

you

that

Just in general?
Ri

ght.

You di

Was

dn't

that the question?

0r

have any obj ecti on to

t7

investigations being reopened that genuinely deserved to

l8

r eope ned

A

l9

5o when President Zelensky comes

we11, even before

2l

i

22

was defeating

24

be

?

20

Z)

may

ave

A
a

l5

that had been engaged in

any

that

when

he runS for President and then

s elected and then takes offi ce,

corruption.

into office

And he

agai n, hi

s

second pri ori ty

said, I think'in the ca11,

in the July 25th ca11, he said he has a new prosecutor
general, who is very good, by the way. And President
Zelensky said, this man wilt do the investigations and, you

 225

I

know, he w'i11 enf orce the law

a
A

2
3

OkaY '

And

so, yes, he committed to

have

P

rosec u to r

4

General Ryabshapka, and then again recently sayi ng

5

take a look at all these

8

a
A
a

9

There was a reference

6
7

that

he'

11

Uh-huh.

take a look at all these cases
OkaY.

to reaching

out

to the Justice

l0

Department. You menti oned Deputy Assi stant Attorney General,

ll

whi

ch I assume 'is Bruce Swartz?

r3

A
a

14

Swartz?

t2

l5

A

t6

a

t7

A

l8

a

t9

D'id you ask Ambassador Volker to reach

He

A

2t

a
Swa r

Bruce

0kay. And what was the feedback from Swartz?
I don't know that they ever connected.
0kay. And was there any followup effort to close
Department?

No. I thought the whole thing was a bad idea.
You thought it was a bad idea to reach out to Bruce

tz?

24

No. I thought the idea of the
Ukrai ni ans to i nvesti gate a vi olati on of

25

bad i dea.

23

out to

volunteered to do that.

the loop with the Justice

20

22

It is.

A

Americans aski ng the

Ukrai ni an law was

a

 226

I
2
J
4
5

6
7
8

9

l0
l1

t2

l3
t4
l5
16

l7
l8
t9
20

2t
22
23

24
25

a
A

Okay

to pursue that.
And when he volunteered to take that question to Bruce
Swartz, that was fine with me.
a Okay. I mean, i s j t possi ble that Swartz's
feedback on that issue would have been compelling to the
group? Like, why didn't anyone fo1low up with Swartz?
A No i dea.
a 0kay
You ca1led Counselor Brechbuhl on August 2Lst to engage
about whether there was a change in U.S. policy.
A Yes.
a And presumably that was on the heels of the
securi ty assi stance bei ng held up?
A Yes.
a Was that the first time you had engaged Brechbuhl,
you know, in the month of August?
A In the month of August?
O Uh-huh.
A So I'd had a couple meetings with him before I
left.
a Ri ght.
this may have
A I cal1ed him early on, I think in
sti11 been July, about the security assistance, and then I
and then catled him agai n.
thi nk about securi ty
But Kurt,

for

some reason, wanted

 227

I
2
3

4
5

6
7
8

a
A
a

Okay.
Yeah.

50, on the 8/2L ca1l that you ment'ion on page 9 of

your statement --

A
a

Yep.

did you, at that time, alert him that you had
concerns about the i rregular channel?
A At that time? Let's see. At some point, I had a

t7

about I wasn't calling it the
i rregular channel at thi s poi nt. I was talki ng about
Ambassador Sond1and, Ambassador Volker. And it might have
also been in this case.
a OkaY.
A But it was not the main thing.
a 0kay.
A The mai n thi ng was securi ty assi stance.
a Okay. I'm just wondering, you know, during July

l8

and August, you're

9

l0

ll
t2

l3
r4

l5
16

t9
20

2l
22
23

24
25

conversation with him

A
a

Cor

getting increasingly concerned, correct?

rect.

It culminates on August 27tn when you wrote thjs

fi rst-person cable.
A I sent it in on the 29th.
O 0kay, but the end of August, right?
A Ri ght.
a And then by September 8th, you're djscussing

the

 228

24

quit, right?
A I was discussing that even earlier. I was my
cable on the 29th hinted at that as we11.
a Okay. And so, on the 2Lst, did you raise any of
these concerns? I mean, you had him on the telephone, right?
A Yes. Yes. So when I asked him explicitly about a
change in policy, he and I both remembered that a change in
pol'icy was what I was concerned about on May 28th . And thi s
is why on a couple of times we've had that conversation. He
knew exactly what I was talking about.
a 0kay. And did he give you any feedback or I
are you soundi ng the alarm? Is that
mean, you' re soundi ng
a fai r characteri zati on?
A I'm soundi ng the alarm on the 21st. I'm soundi ng
the alarm on the 23rd. I had another conversation, oh, with
Tim Morrison, I think, asking the same question. Is that
am I getting these numbers right? Next day, yes, on the 22nd
wi th Morri son, I asked him the same th'ing, had there been a
change in policy.
a Uh-huh.
A So, yes, I am getti ng i ncreasi ngly concerned. I 'm
tryi ng to get from Washi ngton what's goi ng on.
a And did Brechbuhl give you any jndication that he
was going to talk to the Secretary or he hears you loud and

25

clear --

I

2
a

J
4
5

6
7
8

9

l0

u
t2
13

t4
15

t6
t7

l8
t9
20

2t
22
23

prospect that you might have to

 229

I

A

2

a

J

a

A

He says,

4

a

Okay.

5

A

"f will

check.

6

a

And di

he check?

7

A

I don't know. I didn't hear anythi ng back from

a

0kaY.

8

Hears

me

and he' 1 1

d

I

try to do something about it?

witl

check.

"

"

him.

9

And then Ambassador Bolton comes

l0

ll

August 27tn?

t2

A
a

13

to Ukraine on

Correct.
And

did you discuss these issues with him at that

t4

time?

l5

At the end of yes. Yes. At the end of his
he was there for, 1ike, 3 days. And the second day he
left the morning of the third day, early. The evening of the
second day, which I thjnk is maybe the 28th of September or
so, I asked for a meeting with him to talk about this. And,
agai n, thj s i s the 28th.

l6
l7
l8

l9
20

A

September 29th i

2t

s when the word leaks out j n the

24

ti co arti cte, okay, there i s a hold on so i t wasn't
out then, and, thus, r't wasn't a topic of conversation with
the Ukrainians. And he saw the fu11 range of Ukrajnians,

25

i ncludi

22

Z)

PoI i

ng the Presi dent.

 230

I
2
3

4
5

6
7
8

9

at the end of his
meeting, at the end of hjs visit, before he went to bed, if I
could have a session with him. And I did, and I raised
exactly this question. It was he who suggested then at that
meeting that I wrjte thjs note to Secretary Pompeo, which I
But I knew it.

And

I

asked him

did the next day.
a Okay. Di d he urge he di dn' t urge a telephone
call or anything of that sort?
A No. He urged the first-person cable to get

l0

attenti on back there.

ll

Okay. Did you ask him whether he was trying to
work the issue from his vantage point?
A He indicated that he was very sympathetic. I had
known from earlier conversat'ions with people that he was also

t2
13

t4

a

l8

trying with the two Secretaries and the Director of the CiA
to get this decjsion reversed. So he confirmed that and
urged me to make my concerns known to the Secretary again.
MR. SMITH: Before we leave this, I think the Ambassador

t9

said the meeting was on September 27th. It was August 27tn.

l5
t6
t7

20

MR. CAST0R: 0kay.

2l

AMBASSADOR

22

MR. SMITH:

23

AMBASSADOR

24

MR. MEAD0WS: So, Ambassador

25

j

TAYLOR:

I think

Correct. 0h, did I say September?
you did.

TAYLOR: Thank you, Counselor.

ust one clari fyi ng?

-- can I fotlow up with

 231

I

So, Ambassador, you said that you were aware of

2

Ambassador

Bolton's advocacy for this. You were aware of

a

that how?

From

J

4

AMBASSAD0R

whom?

TAYL0R: I was aware, Congressman,

in

the

at the NSC where the

5

discussions that followed the meeting

6

hold was put on. And it rapidly went up the chain to

7

Ambassador

l0

told a couple of times by people
at State and people at the NSC that the Secretary of Defense,
Secretary of State, the Natjonal Security Advisor, and the
head of CIA all strongly supported the resumption of this

ll

assi stance.

8

9

t2
l3
t4
l5

Bolton.

And was

MR. MEADOWS: Who

to get at. I

told you that? That's what I'm trying

mean, who were

AI'4BASSADOR

the conversations with?

TAYL0R: I'm sure they were

wi

th Deputy

Assistant Secretary of State George Kent.

l6

MR. MEADOWS: From

t7

AMBASSADOR

the State Department standpoint.

TAYL0R: The State Department.

24

right. From the NSC standpoint I
mean, who would have direct knowledge of what Ambassador
Bolton had done or was doing that conveyed that to you?
ANBASSADOR TAYLOR: Congressman, again, what I know is
those principals were trying to get together with the
Presjdent to have this meeting. So, knowing that
MR. MEADOWS: Right, but you said somebody told you

25

about Ambassador Bolton's advocacy

l8

l9
20

2t
22
23

I"lR. lvlEADOWS: A11

 232

4

That's what I was referring to. I
was referring to that I knew what his position was, because
he wanted to get that group together to make the case.
MR. MEAD0WS: So did he te1l you he was getting the

5

group together? 0r who

6

together?

I
2
J

7
8

9

AMBASSAD0R

TAYLOR:

told you the group was getting

I guess I'm a 1ittle concerned on who at NSC would've
been telting you about Ambassador Bolton. You fett like he
was a kindred spirit on this. So who was telling you from
that he was?

l0

the

ll

It would've been either -- it
would've been Tim Morri son. But I can't remember the

t2

NSC

AMBASSADOR

TAYLOR:

l8

specific phone ca11.
But, again, the main reason I know where Ambassador
Bolton was was that interest in getting it reversed, getting
the decision reversed, and the way to do that was to get a
meeting with the President. 5o that was my main source of
informatjon. And that came, as I say, from the State

t9

Department.

l3
t4

l5
t6
t7

BY I,IR.

20

a

2t

And then you had a subsequent conversation with

son? It sounds 1i ke you' re talki ng to Morri son pretty

22

Morri

23

much every day

24
25

CASTOR:

A

"

during this time period?

Every day" i s too strong,

So Morri son i

s

wi

th

Bolton.

but

let' s see.

Yeah.

 233

I

a

Okay.

2

A

So

J

and he

4
5

and

a

he's jn Kyiv.

A

so he took Fiona

He came

from another part

8

know what

a

9

A
a

t2

that

So you sent

r

I don't

the first-person cable where you
"

floor

on

cable?

l5

a

0kay.

16

A

I

got feedback from the
What feedback

sixth floor on that.

did you get?

got feedback saying,

I'm glad you sent that

cab1e.

18

a

Okay. Did you get any feedback from the Secretary

or
A

I

23

a

Okay.

24

A

Nope.

25

a

Anybody else?

22

and

Did you get any feedback from the seventh

i

2t

p1ace, comi ng

did.

A

20

with Bolton,

before that

t4

t9

Hill's

of the NSC doing arms control,

mention the term "fol1y.

ll

t7

Warsaw

I have conversations from Warsaw.
0kay. What's Morri son's background? Where di d he

7

l3

to

come from?

6

l0

He goes on

dn't. I di dn't. As I say, I know he carri ed
it with hjm to one of these meetings where they were going to
try to reverse the decision, but no direct feedback.
di

How

about from Mr. Brechbuhl?

 234

I

A

2

made sure

J

ensure

4

no, again, other than the desk. I

Not

I

somehow

th'ink I sent an emai 1 to Ulri ch Brechbuhl to

that cable, and he may have sent back an
ac kn owl ed geme n t that he'd seen i t.
that

5

a

6

After

7

A

he

saw

OkaY.

the hold was

fifted

Yes.

1l

to f1ow, was there any
other activi ti es that concerned you in the irregular channel?
Not that I can remember.
A
0kay. I mean, you talked about the statement, the
o

t2

possi b1e CNN

8

9

l0

l3

and the funds started

a

A

interview, and some of

these

Correct.

t7

that channel
so I
A Correct. But that had been in train for
was trying to be sure that the things from the other channel
that had been put in place, like the CNN intervjew, didn't

18

happen.

t4
l5
t6

t9
20

concerns from

a

a
A

0kay.

And then the focus was on UNGA, as we

said, on the

L)

that, of course, was back into the
regular channels, I mean, all the preparations for that.
a Did any of your conversations wi th l'4orri son reveal

24

any concerns about the Giuljani-Sondland-Volker channel f rom

25

that point

2t
22

General Assembly. And

on?

 235

A
a

I
2
J

Morrison

Not that

I

recaI1.

Okay. Djd you ever have any communications with
after the aid was released where he indicated to you
problem was solved and on to the next i ssue?
No. No. Hi s no. t"ly conversati ons wi th Ti
have been primarily, in particular since then, since

5

that the
A

6

Morrison

7

the aid was released, on China.

8

Chi

9

conversations about that.

4

na's i nvestments j n

a

t0

ll
t2
l3
t4

m

some

0kay.

Ukrai

He was

very concerned about

ne, so we've had many

5o you sti 11

talk wi th Mr. l'lorr j son wi th

regulari ty?

A
a

I

do.

did the fact that there was a complaint lodged
about these matters come to your attentjon?
When

24

A I 'm not su re, l'lr . Castor
a The whi stleblower complai nt, when di d that fi rst
come to your attention?
A The whistleblower complajnt?
a Yeah.
A I guess when I read it in the paper.
a Okay. Wh'ich was towards the end of September or
before it was made public?
A No, no, no. In the newspaper.
a Okay. Did anyone try to contact you to find out

25

any i nformati on, any f i rsthand i nformati

l5
t6
t7

l8
l9
20

2l
22
23

.

on?

 236

A
a
A
a

I
2
t

J

4
5

A
a

7

A
a

l0

How

frequently do you have conversations with the

I think none.
Okay.

A
a

13

Does

a person by the

Cor

Af

with

somebody

a

Yes.

t7

A
a

I don't think so.

l8

23

24
25

di

d you ever have a

close-the-1oop session with VoIker and Sondland?

l6

22

name?

ter the aid was released,

About

2l

by that

rect.

A

20

of Eric Ciaramella

you?

15

l9

name

It doesn't.
50, to your knowledge, you never had any

communications

t2

t4

No.

ring a bel1 for

9

ll

Okay.

DNI about these issues? Any?

6

8

No.

that

topic?

Okay. So, once the aid was released, it was sort

of

A
a
A
a

That was my big concern.
0kay.
Ri

ght.

that Sondland relates,
talking to the President, was pretty defi ni ti ve, was i t not?
A I thlnk so. It is the one we're talking about that
The telephone conversation

 237

I

he relates he had with the President

a
A

2
3

4

Ri

ght.
and then Morrison also reports on

that same

conversation, I think.

ll

a Ri ght.
A That's ri ght. Yes.
a And Morrison's vjew of that conversation is
slightly different than Sondland's, is it not?
A It could well be.
So I'm looking at, what, page L2 here. He described
phone call earlier in the day between Sondland and Trump.

t2

Si nki

l3

that may answer th'is question earlier about
he was on i t.

5

6
7
8

9

l0

t4
l5

l6

a

ng feel i ng from Ambassador Sondland.
So

a
A

whether

Yeah.

to Morrison, President Trump asking for
was not asking. Did insist that President

According

l7

quid pro quo

l8

to a microphone.
And then Sondland and I spoke on the phone. He said he
talked to President Trump. Adamant Zelensky himself had to
clear things up. The same comment about no quid pro quo.
Sondland said he talked to the President and then he talked
to Zelensky and Yermak after that.
a Uh-huh.
A 5o it sounds like they're talking about the same

l9
20

2t
22
23

24
25

Zelensky go

a

 238

I
2
5

4
5

6
7
8

9

phone ca1 1

.

a What was the s i nki ng feel i ng?
A Thi s was a comment that Mr. l"'lorri son made when he
heard that there were a Sondland-President Trump phone ca11,
and that gave him a sinking feeling. And I think what he
meant by that was, he recognized that that channel that's
the irregular channel I've been talking about all day has
the potential to be counter to the regular channel. And
whenever he heard that there was an activation of that

ll

irregular channel, you know, he was concerned.
a Okay. How frequently, to your knowledge, was

t2

Sondland i n di scussion w'ith the President?

l3

18

s i s a good quest'ion. Ambassador Sondland wi 11
te11 you, has told you, told me: frequently. Frequently. I
I don't know.
mean, I can't
I know for a fact that he can call the President
directly and does. And I've known this has I have heard
that on several occasions he had done that, so it's not just

t9

a one-off. I mean, he's done it a bunch -- a couple times

l0

t4

l5

l6
t7

20

2l
22
23

A

Thi

that I know of.
a 0kay. So'it's a regular enough occurrence that
he's probably talked to the President 10, 20, 30 times?
A I have no idea of the number.

24

a

25

There's a

Okay.

litt1e bit of a disconnect between 1ike,

 239

3

this time period is when Sondland reports the
President 'is pretty def jnitive, "I don't want anything. I
want nothi ng. " But ri ght at the same t j me, ["lorr j son i s

4

revealing that he has a sinking feeling.

right

2

around

And so

5

I'm just curjous as to

how you

piece those

6

together.

7

nothing, then the aid's released; but, on the other

8

Morri son has the sinking feeling.

A

9

Because, on one hand, the President says,

Morri son's si nki ng feel i ng i s anytime there i s

activation of that kind of Giuliani-oriented channel.

ll

a Uh-huh.
A But it seems to me that they describe the
seems to me that they describe the same phone call.
ri ght, there was some vari ance.

l3
t4

want

hand,

l0

t2

I

two

an

it
You're

2t

a Ri ght.
A And both related that the Presjdent sa1d no quid
pro quo. But they also both related that President Trump did
i ns'ist that Zelensky go to a mi crophone and open
'investigatjons of Biden and 2015, and President Zelensky
should want to do it himself, and
a But that part's not from Sondland's readout of the

22

ca11.

l5

l6
t7

l8
t9
20

23

A

24

meet'i ng

25

a

Thi

s i s Morri son telli

OkaY.

ng me about a Sondland-Trump

 240

I
2
J

4
5

6
7
8

9

ght? And then Sondland Gordon
tel1s me the next day, on September 8th, that he talked to
President Trump it must have been the day before and
that Trump was adamant that President Zelensky himself -a Uh-huh.
A Because a week earlier, I had suggested to Gordon
that maybe the prosecutor general could make thjs statement;
jt would be more logical than the President.
a But, i n any event, you're only heari ng thi s from
A

phone

call.

Ri

t2

or Morrison, and you have no idea whether
these ca11s actually haPPened.
A i think they actually happened, just because I got

l3

two reports

t4

a
A
a

Okay. But bY
But i t's true that I never talked to the Pres'ident.

A
a
A
a
A
a
A

That was August 29th.

l0

ll

l5
t6
t7

l8
t9
20

2l
22
23

24
25

either

Sondland

of what sounded like the same ca1l.

Okay. But by September 9th, there had been some
I mean, it had become public, right, with the Politico story
that the ajd was being withheld?

Right.

So by September

9

Correct, it was out there.
on the eve of the aid hold being lifted
Yep.

i

t

had been publ i c.

For a week, week and a ha1f.

 241

a

I

Ri

ght.

7

A Yeah.
a And, as we understand it, there were Senators, you
know, calling the
A Two Senators came up. 0h. Right, right. You're
exactly ri ght. Senators cal1ed the Presi dent. Yes.
a Okay. So i t's possi ble Sondland when Sondland

8

says the Pres'ident doesn't want anything, no quid pro quo,

2
J
4
5

6

l0

it's possible the Presjdent's reacting to the fact that he's
getting some heat on this issue and he's about to lift the

ll

hold.

9

t4

A
a
A

l5

MR. MEADOWS: So

l6

AMBASSADOR

t7

MR. MEADOWS because sometimes my ears

l8

AMBASSADOR

t2
l3

t9
20

I don't

know.

Okay.

Don't

know.

I

have the

same problem.
MR. MEADOWS: So

22

AMBASSAD0R

25

clarifications

TAYL0R: I have the same problem.

5ondland-Trump phone

24

wanted a few

TAYL0R: Please.

2t

23

I

are you saying you got a

call about the

call from Morri son

TAYLOR: Correct.

-- before you did from Sondtand?
AMBASSADOR TAYLOR: Correct. I got the Morrison call
the 7th, and I got
MR. ['{EAD0WS:

on

 242

I

MR. MEAD0WS:

Is that unusual, I

2

get a report from the

J

Ambassador and

4

got a readout from the

5

6
7

on a phone

call

that you would

between an

the President of the United States before

AMBASSADOR

logistics of

NSC

mean,

you

or to the President?
TAYL0R: Congressman, it's just a matter of

when

Ambassador

you're on what ca1l.

MR. MEAD0WS: Yeah,

but I guess the question I have is,

t9

calls between the
Presi dent and othelindi vi duals to you? I j ust f i nd that
just interesting, that he would pick up the phone and call
you and say "by the way" about this readout between a phone
call and the President before Ambassador Sondland did that.
AMBASSADOR TAYLOR: It was before. There's no doubt it
was before Ambassador Sondtand did that. That's clear from
the 7th and 8th of September.
But Tim Morrison and I have a lot of interactions that I
just mentjoned to Mr. Castor, and I may have ca1led him with
some other quest'ions about, I don't know, Chi na, and he may
have related that. 5o it was not a regular I don't

20

remember any

2t

the Pres'ident.

8

9

l0

ll
t2

l3
t4

l5
t6
t7

l8

does l4orrison report on other phone

other time when he related a conversation about

24

ously, th'i s would've been a bi g
deal, this phone ca1l, I mean, with the President saying, no
quid pro quo. Did you have a reljef at that point that,

25

we11, gosh, since there's no quid pro quo,

22
23

MR. MEADOWS: So, obvi

I

guess the funds

 243

I

2
a

J

4
5

are gojng to be released?
AMBASSAD0R

TAYL0R: That was not my reaction

ti me, Congressman.

I'm a 1ittle

I

AI'{BASSAD0R

7

l'{R. MEADOWS:

8

9

l0

ll
t2
l3

that it

TAYLOR: Yes.

TAYLOR: To the statement

was not a quid pro

MR. MEADOWS: Right.

l5

AMBASSAD0R

l6

that? 0h, because

l7

question.

TAYL0R:

a

that I

heard twice,

quo? Is that

I should've

been exuberant about

I 'm j ust tryi ng

to

understand your

And so

MR. MEADOWS:

it.

I

Yeah. No, that's the question.

guess

I fjnd jt that it

t9

understand

20

that you got a phone call

was

You

just very

blase

TAYLOR: ]

2t

AMBASSADOR

22

l'4R. I"IEADOWS:

23

would you have not reacted j n

manner?

t4

l8

such a big deal

Lst

I guess, exuberant

AMBASSAD0R

if this js

It is a big

I'1R. MEAD0WS: - - why

more,

your reaction? Because I

-- that you raised it with a Ukrainian

officia1 on September
AMBASSADOR

mean,

TAYLOR:

6

the

My

MR. I'4EAD0WS: We11, what was

guess

at

--

when you had

raised this, and you

didn't

24

THE CHAIRI4AN: Please

25

AMBASSAD0R

let the wi tness answer.

TAYL0R: The answer, Congressman,

js that

 244

MR. l'IEAD0WS: Adam,

I
2

THE CHAIRMAN:

times

asked me two

MR.

l0

t2

l3

know, but he's

trying to

answer three

I'm trying to clarify

my

question.

He's

times.

TAYLOR: And

I think I got the question

now.

Thank you.

9

ll

I

or three

AMBASSAD0R

7
8

not jnterrupted you at all

in a row.

t'4R. MEADOWS:

5

6

have

tod ay .

J
4

I

I"IEAD0WS

AMBASSAD0R

:

0kay

.

TAYLOR: Thank you, Congressman.

the answelis that, even af ter the statement that I
heard both times from both recollections, reci tations,
descriptions of the phone ca11, after the quid pro quo, there
So

l8

is none, there is none, there is none, then it went on
both conversations went on to say: But President Trump did
insist that President Zelensky go to a microphone and say he
i s openi ng i nvesti gati ons of B'iden and 20L5, and Presi dent
Zelensky should want to do this himself. That was the

t9

that' s what

t4

l5
l6
t7

Ti

m

that

20

MR. ['4EAD0WS: And

2t

AMBASSAD0R

22

MR. MEADOWS: 0kay.

23

AMBASSADOR

24
25

came from Morrison?

TAYLOR: That came from Morrison.

TAYLOR: What came from Sondland when he told

this story was President Trump said it was not a quid
quo. Ambassador Sondland said that he had talked to

me

pro

 245

I

President Zelensky and

2

this

J
4
5

6
7
8

9

l0

ll
t2
13

Yermak

and

told

them

that,

although

if President Zelensky did not
clear things up in public, we would be at a stalemate.
MR. MEAD0WS: Alt right.
And so let me go back to one other thi ng, because I
think you said you've sajd it twice now, and I want to
make sure I understand you. You do not thi nk i t's
appropriate for the Ukraine Government to jnvestigate a
violation of Ukrainian 1aw. Is that what you said?
At'lBAS 5AD0R TAYLOR : No
no. I thi nk i t's perfectly
appropriate for the Ukrainian Government to investigate a
violation of Ukrainian 1aw. I think it's
MR. MEADOWS: 0kay. All right. I thought so.
was not a quid pro quo,

,

TAYL0R: Yeah, yeah.

t4

AMBASSAD0R

15

MR. MEADOWS: A11

l6

So one

right.

other area. You talked about -- and I think it

Mr. Noble had asked you about the funds being withheld,

l7

was

l8

23

that it was the aid and foreign
military sales as we11, all together in one bunch, in answer
to hi s questi on.
And I want to remind you, actually, the talk of the
J avel i ns and f orei gn m'i1i tary sa1es, i t comes at a separate
tjme. And I want to refresh your memory on that and perhaps

24

a1

t9
20

2t
22

25

and you said you believed

tow you
AMBASSADOR

TAYLOR: You' re

 246

I
2

)
4
5

6
7

-- to correct the record. Because I think
Mr. Noble asked the question and you lumped it alt together
and said it came at one time
MR. MEAD0WS:

AMBASSAD0R

TAYLOR:

that that's not accurate'
AMBASSADOR TAYLOR: Let me tel1 you what I think is
MR. MEADOWS:

--

and we know

accurate.

8

MR. MEADOWS: Okay.

9

AMBASSADOR

l0

lt

No

TAYLOR: What

I think is accurate is

there

million in something ca:L1ed the Ukraine Security
Assistance Initiative, USAI. And that
was 250

Controlled by DOD.

t2

MR. MEAD0WS:

l3

AMBASSADOR

t4

MR. NEADOWS: That'

TAYL0R:

-- is

s

cor

owned

by

DOD,

correct.

rect.

l6

Correct. And there's another
141 mi11ion of, I think it's FMF that's run by the State

t7

Department.

l5

l8
t9
20

2t
22
L)

24
25

AMBASSAD0R

TAYL0R:

MR. MEAD0WS:

State DePartment.

is separate from those two
things are separate from the purchase of Javelins by the
Ukrajnians wjth their own money
AMBASSAD0R

TAYL0R: That

MR. MEADOWS:

That's correct.

-- of about $29 million for about
L50 Javelins, right? So those are three separate pieces. If
I was not clear on that
AMBASSAD0R

TAYL0R:

 247

MR. MEAD0WS:

Yeah.

Because they came

'in three separate

J

tranches. And I used to be on Foreign Affairs, and when we
talk about all of this stuff, there's a whole 1ot of things

4

that hold up foreign ajd.

2

TAYLOR: Yes.

5

AMBASSADOR

6

MR. MEAD0WS: And so

you're a career Foreign Service

8

I am actually not a career Forei gn
Service, but I've been in the State Department for a long

9

time.

7

A1'1BASSAD0R

l0

ll

TAYLOR:

MR. 14EADOWS:

for a long

Well, you've been in the State Department

time.
TAYLOR: That's correct.

t2

AMBASSADOR

l3

MR. ['4EADOWS: And

so have you seen ai d held up f or

a

t4

variety of reasons other than just a normal appropriations

l5

gtitchT

t6

occas i onal 1y

Have you seen Senators

TAYLOR: Yes .

t7

AI"IBASSADOR

l8

MR. MEADOWS:

19

AMBASSADOR

20

2l
22
23

24
25

put a hold on foreign aid

-- to get votes on things that
TAYLOR: I don't know about getting votes

on

ngs. But, sure, there are certai n1y holds put on forei gn
assi stance packages. There's no doubt about i t.
MR. MEADOWS: That have nothing to do w'ith our overall
foreign policy initiative. Have you seen that?
AMBASSADOR TAYLOR: I don't remember, but I would not be
surprised. I would not be surprised.
thi

 248

I

MR.

MEADOWS

All right.

2

NR.

JORDAN:

Ambassador,

J

meetings did you have wi th

4

pe

ri

Mr

how many conversati ons and/ or

Morrison

in this relevant time

od?

5

AM BAS SADOR

6

MR.

JORDAN:

TAYL0R: "Relevant time"

on June LTth

8

who held Mr. Morrison's position

9

conversati

uly

L9th

on

ng all

summer?

one you get there
you had one conversat'ion wi th the i ndi vi duat
We1l, you said you

7

and

meani

in your first

month

at

had

NSC

You had one

there, and

it

was on

10

J

ll
l3

5o, between July L9th and the September timeframe when
Mr. Morrison cal1s you to tel1 you about a call that
Mr. Sondland had w'ith the President of the United States, how

t4

many

times between July L9th and September 9th, roughly,

l5

many

times did you communicate with Mr. Morrison?

l6

like it

t2

.

was a

sounds

lot.

AMBASSAD0R

17

It

how

TAYLOR:

Yeah. I

was going

to say 8, 10, t2.

l8

A good number. A 1ot.

t9

Yeah. 5o his predecessor you had one
conversation wi th in thi s timeframe.
before
AMBASSAD0R TAYLOR: We11, no. I actually had

20

2t
22
23

24
25

MR. JORDAN:

out, I sat down with Fjona and Alex actua11y, a
couple times before I went out. And then had this meeting
or had thi s call
MR. JORDAN: We11, earlier, in a previous hour, when I
I

went

 249

asked you how many conversations you had

with Dr. Hill

2

between June LTth and Ju1y Lgth, you said one, and

3

on J u1y 19th.

4

AMBASSADOR

5

what I'm saying

6
7
8

9

l0

ll

TAYLOR: And

AMBASSADOR

l"lR. JORDAN: So you had one conversation

jn your fjrst

month on

TAYLOR:

I th'ink that's correct, yes.

MR. JORDAN: And now

t7

l8
t9
20

2t

AMBASSADOR

TAYLOR: Yes.

in your testimony,
was this Mr. Plorrison ca1led you to te11 you about that, or
was it his previously scheduled call?
MR. JORDAN:

AI'4BASSADOR

0kay. This

one

TAYLOR: We're

that

was

talki ng about

September 7th

now, Congressman?
MR. JORDAN:

7th

Let me just go back and look. Yeah, the

you described a phone conversation between

September

23

Ambassador Sondland and

25

you've said you had muttiple

conversations with Mr. Morrison.

22

24

with Dr. Hill

the job.

13

l6

And

TAYL0R: That's correct.

AMBASSADOR

l5

I think that's correct.

was

is before I -i t sounded
MR. JORDAN: And we tried to establish
like it was on your calendar. She probably called you, but
you weren't sure. Am I characterizing that accurately?

l2

l4

that

AMBASSAD0R

President Trump. Did he call

you?

TAYLOR: The way we do these phone caI1s

to be secure, to be secure

September

7th

may be

a --

is,

was

 250

I
2

it a Sunday? September 7th. It was a Saturday. So to have
a secure call on a weekend, I go into the Embassy.

J

MR. JORDAN: 0kay.

4

AI"IBASSADOR

TAYLOR: And the way we arrange these ca11s

7

is through unclass emai1. We say, Tim, you know, you got
time? 0r he may have sent me a note saying, do we have time?
And I'd said, sure, I'11 go into the Embassy at such and such

8

a time.

5

6

5o the short answelis I 'm not sure who called

9

MR. JORDAN:

l0
l1

Okay. But you had multiple calls

whom.

between

July L9th and this call on September 7th.
TAYLOR: Yes.

t2

AMBASSADOR

l3

MR. JORDAN: And d'id you have

a prior friendship or

t4

relationship working with Mr. Morrison prior to his time

l5

comi

ng i n
TAYLOR: No,

I

had not met him before.

l6

AMBASSAD0R

t7

MR. J0RDAN: So

l8

AMBASSADOR

t9

MR. J0RDAN: He

20

AMBASSAD0R

2t

MR. JORDAN: And then you have

22
23

24
25

him

as

in this

you'd never met him before.

TAYLOR:

COTTCCt.

gets Dr. Hill's position.

TAYLOR: Correct.

multiple

phone

caIls with

timeframe.

AMBASSADOR

TAYLOR: ThAt' S

COr

rCCt.

I think you said some of it was
relative to Chjna. And Ukraine as well? The linkage
MR. J0RDAN: And

 251

TAYLOR: YeS.

I

AMBASSADOR

2

l"lR. J0RDAN:

J

AMBASSAD0R

4

MR. J0RDAN:

5

AMBASSADOR

6

MR. J0RDAN: 0kay.

7

AMBASSAD0R

--

between Chi na and Ukrai ne?

TAYLOR: No, China

I

in

Ukraine.

understand.

TAYLOR: Chj na i nvesti ng i n

TAYL0R: Yeah, he's

very

yes.

he

and

people, as you are I'm sure aware, are

8

Dr.

9

concerned about the Ch'inese i nterest i n buyi ng up some of

Kupperman and many

.

l0

Ukrainjan technology and a company ca11ed

ll

5o we had many conversatjons about that.

t2

of these multiple conversatjons,
many conversati ons you had, do you thi nk i t's
characteri ze
it. Was it more Mr. Morrison reaching out to you to
communjcate information to you or the other way?

l3
t4

l5

14R. JORDAN:

0kay.

Yes.

And

TAYLOR: Both.

l6

AMBASSADOR

17

 \/lR. J0RDAN: Who

18

AI4BASSAD0R

TAYLOR:

l9

It's both.
MR. JORDAN: Who initiated most? I'm just curious.

20

AMBASSADOR

TAYLOR:

2t

MR. J0RDAN: You don'

22

AMBASSADOR TAYLOR:

t know?
Both. I don't

23

MR. JORDAN: Okay.

Thank you.

24

AMBASSADOR TAYLOR:

I

25

MR. JORDAN: A11

initiated?

I'm just

t's

right

some

of

know.

each.

 2s2

I
2
J
4
5

6
7
8
9

l0

ll
t2

MR. MEADOWS: And
Satu rday

so

this

AMBASSADOR

TAYLOR: September

MR. MEAD0WS: So how many

phone

AMBASSAD0R

literally say, we1l, I need to go
talk to Washington, D.C., and go in on a Saturday
AMBASSADOR TAYL0R: 1f it has to be secure, yes, I go
into the Embassy. And the Embassy is 25 minutes away.
MR. MEADOWS: No, I get the secure nature, but
TAYLOR: Yeah.

to

make

this

phone

you're saying is you go into the

call to talk about a phone call

Embassy

t6

that he had with the President.

22
23

make

MR. MEAD0WS: So you

l5

2l

in to

TAYL0R: Not infrequently, sadly.

MR. MEADOWS: So what

20

times do you go

calls on urgent matters on a Saturday?

t4

t9

7th I think was a

Saturday.

AMBASSADOR

l8

call you had was on a

.

l3

t7

phone

AI'4BASSADOR

TAYLOR: ThAt hC hAd i t

it with the Pres'ident.
AMBASSADOR TAYL0R: Ri ght. Morri son i s talki ng about a
Sondland conversation wi th the President, correct.
you don't
MR. MEAD0WS: 0kay. And so, as you go in
recall what else you talked about?
AMBASSADOR TAYL0R: In that phone call?
l'4R. MEAD0WS: Sondland had

24

MR. MEADOWS: Yeah.

25

AMBASSADOR

TAYLOR:

I

dON't.

 aE1

BY MR.

I
2
3

4
5

6
7
8

9

l0

ll
t2

CASTOR:

a You first learned you were going to be coming here
today to answer quest'ions last week? 0r bef ore?
A No, no, no. You sent me somebody sent me a note
or an invitatjon to come probably 2 weeks ago?
a Okay.
A Yeah.
a But prior to today, have you had any communications
with congressional staff about any of the issues that we've
discussed here today?

A
a

No.

Okay. And, you know, there was a report running

l3

yesterday about things that may or may not have occurred on

t4

codel, and I just want to

a

t7

A
a
A

l8

aski ng.

t9

I was in Kyiv this must've been maybe about
the same time. I can't remember. In September. The
Atlant'ic Counci t had one of i ts many vi si ts, and the Atlanti c
Counci 1 i nvi tes congressional staff. Generally, they are
fai r1y j uni or congressi onal staff. And I thi nk there were
probabty 1.5 or so congressional staffers on this trip.
John Herbst, Ambassador Herbst organizes these. It was

15

16

20

2t
22
23

24
25

Staffdel, maybe. Was it a staffdel?
Codel or staffdel.
So I saw a report. Maybe thjs is what you're

While

 254

2

a Sunday afternoon. They were just off the plane. They came
to my residence, and I gave them a briefing. And i t could've

J

been

I

that

4

a

5

communi

6
7
8

9

l0

ll

of your staffers was on this, Mr. Chai rman.
My question was just simPlY, You haven' t had

one

cati ons wi th

A
a

I

have not.

congressional

That's ri ght. Other - - 'if the questi on i s about
that Atlantic Council one, there were a bunch of
congressional staffers whom I gave a regular briefing to.

A

a

Okay.

l3

What

else

15

l6
t7

l8
t9
20

2l
22

24
25

what we' re here

doing here today?

t2

t4

staff outside of

Fai

r

enough.

what can you te11 us about the Atlantic

Council? Did you know they were funded in part by Burisma?

. I di dn' t know that.
So I have great respect for the people I know a lot of the
and I
people at the Atlanti c Counc'i1. And I know that
know that they have to raise funds. I didn't know that
Burisma was one of their funders.
a Okay. But you learned that recently or -A l4aybe in the past week.
a Do a lot of Ukrainian business enterprises
contribute money to the Atlantic Council, to your knowledge?
A I don't know.
A

You know,

MR. CASTOR:

I

di dn'

t

know that

Mr. Armstrong, did you have something

you

 .EE

I

wanted to

l'lR. ARMSTRONG:

2

, j ust br i ef 1y.

Yeah

5

talking about the High Court of
Anti-Corruption. And that was actually set up under
Poroshenko, but it was inactjve. And when Zelensky got

6

elected, he brought it back, right?

J

4

You were

AMBASSAD0R

7
8

TAYL0R: Yes, si

r.

"

Inacti ve" i s probably

it didn't
was, i t d"idn't have a place to meet.

wel1, it wasn't put into effect. It wasn't

l0

start.
And so

ll

thinking that he was kind of dragging his feet.

9

And the problem

under President Poroshenko. And so people were

t2

MR. ARMSTR0NG: Yeah

l3

ANBASSADOR

.

TAYL0R: And then Zelensky gets

in,

and

t6

within,1ike,2 weeks, the same fe11ow, this prosecutor
general that I mentioned a minute ago, Ryabshapka, came up
wjth a p1ace, got them in, and they opened it on

t7

September 5th.

t4

l5

MR. ARMSTRONG:

l8

But

earlier in your testimony,

t9

said

we had

20

can

your way into Parliament.

2l

j usti ce.

22

is

23

buy

you

a comment about Parliament, and you said

You can buy your way

We asked about

you

criminal

out of prosecution essenti a1ly

going on.
And

there were actually

24

concerns about Zelensky's

25

of i garch

relati

you had talked
onshi p wi th

earlier

about

a parti cular

There were concerns about the Naftogaz board, the

 256

I
2
a

J

of state-owned banks, and, obviously, even outside of
all of thjs, some questions abou t Burisma and what we just
boards

found out.
And corruption relating

4
5

new, correct?
TAYLOR: Correct.

6

AMBASSAD0R

7

MR. ARMSTRONG:

8

through i t.

9

who was

l0

ll

to oli garchs i s not somethi ng

of

I

I

mean

--

and during

this,

we went

mean, there was a parliamentarian, Leshchenko,

investigated.

You said he was an

original

supporter

Zelensky and then wasn' t?
AMBASSAD0R

TAYLOR: So he was

originally

we11,

he

13

started off as a journali st. He joined President
Poroshenko's party and was elected to Parliament. And then,

t4

as a reformer, he was advising the Zelensky campaign,

l5

self-selected out of the Zelensky

t2

l6

camp.

MR. ARMSTRONG: And people were

time

excited about Zelensky's

I'11 get back to

t7

election, but also, at the

l8

2t

this in a second I mean, there was at least four current
or former members of the Ukrainian Government that were, I
mean, parti ci pati ng i n our 2016 electi on. And I don't mean
anything I mean, they were posting on Facebook, whether it

22

was former Prime

t9
20

same

and

23

Minjster Yatseniuk was posting on Facebook;
who 'is sti 11 a member of
Mi ni ster of Internal Af f ai rs

24

government, correct.

25

AMBASSADOR

TAYLOR:

COTTCCt.

 257

MR. ARMSTRONG: Avakov, who

1

has, I mean, said

some

2

pretty derogatory things about the Pres'ident. Cha1y, who was

J

the Ambassador to Ukra'ine, coined an op-ed "in The H'i11 during

4

the

5

campai gn.

So we have

a concern about a potential relationship with

have I

6

ZeIensky.

7

on for a long time.

8

We

mean,

th'is i s

systemi

c,

and j t's gone

So, I mean, while we're excited and this is moving

l0

of these things are going on, you can see
probably how thi s admi n'istrati on maybe had a 1i ttle concern,

ll

part'icularly not only with corruption but also wlth direct

t2

relationship to what went on with

9

l3

forward and some

AMBASSADOR

thing I'd

TAYLOR: Congressman, the only

say

l5

is that the concern should not have been about the new team.
Now, your point is a good one that is, they had one

l6

carryover from

14

t7
18

l"lR. ARPISTRONG: Wel I

weren't the

Ambassador

, let

me ask you th'i

.

Because you

during the 2015 election.

TAYLOR: That's true.

t9

AMBASSADOR

20

MR. ARI'ISTRONG: But you were

2t

s

the Ambassador duri ng the

2008 election.

24

I was.
14R. ARMSTR0NG: And if four members of the Ukrainian
which
Government were di rectly i nvolved i n the election of

25

ended up bei ng Presi dent Obama, i n your posi

22
23

AMBASSADOR

TAYLOR:

ti on of

 258

I

Ambassador, how would you have handled that?
AI"IBASSADOR

2

)

scenario

that

7

government

8

concern

l0

I'm assuming

none

2008.

ANBASSADOR

15

1"1R.

20

2l
22

TAYLOR: Not

that I

know

of.

that you're

aware of.

t4

l9

would

of that happened in

t,lR. ARMSTRONG: Any Ukrain'ian of f ic'iaIs

l8

of

me.

t2

t7

Would

officials in an election 'in another country

AMBASSAD0R

l6

so the

of diplomats or

TAYLOR: Any interference

ll
13

to

let's start here:

Let me ask

MR. ARMSTRONG: So

9

have done

have concerned you?
AMBASSAD0R

6

I

s

MR. ARI4STRONG:

4
5

i

TAYLOR: What would

TAYL0R: Not

ARMSTR0NG: 0kay

.

that I'm

Thanks

aware of.

.

I think our time has expired.
THE CHAIRMAN: Let's take a 5- or LO-minute break. We
do have votes coming up. It would be my intention for staff
to conti nue the i ntervi ew duri ng votes. And I don' t th'ink we
have a lot more questions for you. I don't know where the
minority is, but hopefully we won't go too much longer.
AI"IBASSADoR TAYL0R: I',m at your service, l',lr. chairman.
MR. CAST0R:

23

THE CHAIRI'IAN:

24

AMBASSADOR

25

lRecess.l

Okay. Thank you,

TAYL0R: Thank you.

Ambassador.

 259

I

[5:31 p.m.]
THE CHAIRMAN:

2

to go back on the record to
as we can before votes. And

We're going

l1

try to get to as many members
let me start by recogni zi ng Mr. Mali nowski
MR. MALINOWSKI : Thank you, Mr . Chai rman.
Thank you, Ambassador, for your service and your
pat'ience wl th us today. I j ust wanted you've answered
most of my questions, so I wanted to maybe try to sum things
up a 1i ttle bi t. It seems to me f rom your test'imony and f rom
that of others that we've heard that there was a group of
officials in the executive branch who were working on Ukraine

t2

and who cared about Ukraine across

J
4
5

6
7
8

9

l0

.

And

l3

at the start of this

the interagency.

drama,

all of you basicatly

t4

agreed on the objective, supporting Ukraine against Russ'ia,

l5

fi ghti ng corrupti on,

t6

relationship between the two countries. And then, at

l7

certajn point, you all learned that the President was in

l8

dj

l9

fferent

promoti ng democracy. You wanted a good
a

p1ace, correct?

AMBASSADOR

TAYLOR:

Yes. So, in the May 23rd, before I

20

got out there, in his meeting with the delegation that

2t

back enthusiastic about Zelensky, the President was less

22

enthusi asti c.

23

24
25

a

came

at that point, things
that group of people, roughly speaking, split into two
different camps. You all sti1l had the same goa1s, but there
MR. MALIN0WSKI:

Right.

And

 260

was one group

of folks who felt that they didn't want to have

2

anything to do with what Mr. Bolton reportedly described

as

J

the drug deal because it was wrong, it was unprincipled,

we

4

should not be operating that

5

way.

And then there was a second group

of people that

may

6

have i ncluded Kurt Volker, Ambassador Sondland, Secretary

7

Perry, who decided that they had to

8

9

l0
l1

t2
l3
t4

l5
l6
t7

l8
19

20

2t
22
23

24
25

somehow

go along with

felt it was the only way to bring
the President back, to get him to support the vision of the
relationship that you wanted. Is that a fair assessment?
AMBASSADOR TAYL0R: It is, Congressman. And it was
motivated, but as you said, toward a strong relationship. It
was just a different -- they thought they had to take a
di fferent route through Gi u1 i ani to get there.
MR. IVIALIN0WSKI: Right. And so the problem wasn't with
either of those groups of people. The problem was the drug
deal itself, in effect. It was this decision that, you know,
you had to go through this path to get to that outcome. And
so 1et me ask you, who was responsible for the drug deal?
Who was responsible for setting all this into motion? Was it
Mr. Sondland? Was 'i t Ambassador Sondland?
AMBASSADOR TAYL0R: I don't think so. I think the
origin of the idea to get President Zelensky to say out loud
he's goi ng to i nvesti gate Buri sma and 2016 etecti on, I thi nk
the originator, the person who came up with that was
this drug deal

because they

 261

I

l'lr.

uti ani

.

t'lR. MALIN0WSKI: And he was representi ng whose 'interests

2
J

Gi

in
TAYL0R: President Trump.

4

AMBASSAD0R

5

MR. MALINOWSKI: Thank you.

6

THE CHAIRMAN: l*'lr. Kri shnamoorthi

7

MR. KRISHNAI400RTHI: He11o, Mr. Ambassador.

8

Thank you

9

AI4BA5SAD0R

for your jncredible service to our Nation.
TAYL0R: Thank you, si r.

First of all, on page t2 of your

MR. KRISHNAMOORTHI:

l0

.

ll

statement, you talked about the meeting that you helped

t2

f aci

l3

Zelensky.

f itate between Senators Johnson and t'lurphy
Do

wi

th President

you recall that meeting?
TAYLOR:

I

t4

AMBASSAD0R

l5

MR. KRISHNAM00RTHI: And

do.

in your statement, you say that

l6

they emphasized that President Zelensky should not jeopardize

17

bi parti san support by getti ng drawn i nto U. S. domesti

l8

politics.

t9
20

2t
22
23

24
25

c

exactly were they referring to when they said
he should not jeopardize bipartisan support by getting drawn
into U.S. politics?
What

Al{BASSAD0R

TAYL0R: The Senators were

concerned

the

that Pres'ident Zelensky faced a dilemma,
and the di lemma was j nvesti gate Buri sma and 2016 or don't.
And if they investigated, then that would be seen to be
interfering on the side of President Trump's reelection; if
Senators could see

 262

J

didn't investigate, that would be seen to be interfering
'in favor of some of his
of President Trump's opponent. So
they told hi m: J ust don' t get i nvolved, j ust don' t get

4

i nvolved.

1

2

they

MR. MALINOWSKI: And

5

6

or expressed that sentiment, correct?
AMBASSAD0R TAYLOR: I want to be careful about quoting

Johnson

7
8

9

l0

both Senator Murphy and Senator

said

I was
counseled by smarter people than I about how to phrase this.

Members

of

Congress and Senators. This

But that was spoken by Senator

ll

MR. MALINOWSKI:

is

why

Murphy.

0kay. And, now, some folks might say

l4

that the beginning of those investigations was merely
i nvesti gati ng corrupti on. Why was i t your and thei r
sentiment that it was actually getting Zelensky drawn into

l5

U.

t2

l3

S. pol i ti

cs?

2t

it would get into U.S. politics if
the Ukrainians were to go was to investigate the Burisma
cases that were closed at the time when Vice President Biden
was in town in Kyiv frequently making the point about
anticorruption and when his son was on the board of Burisma.
So it was that cluster of issues surrounding Burisma that

22

would be hi ghl i ghted by an i nvesti gati on.

23

MR. KRISHNAM00RTHI: And you agreed

l6
t7

l8
t9
20

24
25

AMBASSAD0R

TAYLOR:

expressed by the Senators, correct?
AMBASSADOR

TAYLOR:

I did.

with the

sentiment

 263

l"lR. KRISHNAf400RTHI: Now,

I

2

page 8

me

turn your attentjon to

for a second. There?

AMBASSAD0R

3

1et

TAYLOR: Yep.

5

d that
I'm looking at the top of the page said that a catl

6

between President Trump and Presjdent Zelensky would take

7

place soon. Thjs is in the July timeframe. And Ambassador

8

Volker said that what was, quote, most important for Zelensky

9

to say that

4

l0

MR. KRISHNAM00RTHI: Ambassador Sondland sai

will help investigation and address any
speci f i c personnel 'issues i f there are any, closed quote.

ll

he

What specific personnel issues are being referred to?

t4

I don't know. To thi s
day, I don't know what he was referring to there.
MR. KRISHNAMOORTHI: 0kay. And did Ambassador Sondland

l5

ever bring up personnel jssues?

t2
l3

A['4BASSADOR

TAYL0R: Congressman,

l8

in my not that I know of
MR. KRISHNAM00RTHI: Finally, Giuliani. You may or may
not be aware of this, but Giuliani had a hand in try'ing to

l9

force out

20

Are you aware of any attempts by Giuliani or anyone else to

16

t7

AI'IBASSADOR

TAYLOR: Not

Ambassador Yovanovitch from

at you for

of the text

.

her post as Ambassador.

23

that you had
sent basically questioning the wisdom of Ukraine policy that
was bei ng pursued by Volker, Sondland, Gi ul i ani , or anyone

24

else?

2t
22

25

come back

AMBASSAD0R

some

TAYL0R: No, si r.

messages

 2U

 \4R. KRISHNAMOORTHI: And

I
2
J

did

directly about your statements and whether you were somehow
out of line in making the statements that you made?
TAYL0R: Not yet.

4

AMBASSAD0R

5

MR. KRISHNAM0ORTHI:

6

AMBASSADOR

7

MR. KRISHNAM0ORTHI: Do me

8

as you

are.

my

a favor though: Stay honest

you, si r.

TAYL0R: Thank you, si r.

THE CHAiRMAN:

l0

Okay. Thank you. I hope never.

TAYL0R: Thank you.

Thank

AMBASSAD0R

9

l1

anybody ever question you

Just one followup question before i go to

next colleague. Prior to the codel you mentioned with

t9

told The Wa11
Street Journal that Sondland had described to him a quid pro
quo involving a commitment by Kyiv to probe matters related
to U.S. elections and the status of nearly $400 mjlljon in
U.S. aid to Ukraine that the President had ordered to be held
up in Ju1y.
Apparently, Senator Johnson had told this to the Journal
bef ore the codel . Di d he ever ra'ise th'is wi th you duri ng

20

those meeti

t2
l3

l4
l5

l6
t7

l8

Senators Murphy and Johnson, Senator Johnson

2t
22

ngs?

At'4BASSAD0R

Mr.

TAYL0R: He di dn't rai se

that,

r'lo,

Chai rman.

24

0kay. Representative Lynch. Then
Maloney and Spei er, i f you have questi ons, Spe'ier, J acki e

25

Speier.

./.5

THE CHAIRMAN:

 265

I
2
J

4
5

6
7

you. Thank you, Ambassador. I really
appreciate your courage in coming forward, and thank you for
you r se rv'i ce
I'd like you to focus on page 10 and 11 of your opening
statement. And September Lst seems to be a red letter day,
so to speak. You have a conversation excuse me, yeah, you
have a number of conversations here that are very important.
MR. LYNCH: Thank

.

One you had

8

9

with Mr.  '4orrison,

who described

a

conversation between Ambassador 5ondland with Mr. Yermak at

t6

told Mr. Yermak that the
security assistance money would not come until President
Zelensky commits to pursue the Burisma investigation.
You also say that's the first time you've heard that
securi ty assi stance, not j ust the Whi te House meeti ng, was
condi tioned on the investigation. And then you text message
Ambassador Sondland, and you're saying 'it's a question:

t7

We

l8

meeting are conditioned on'investigations, quest'ion mark,

l9

q

l0

n
t2

l3
t4

l5

20

Warsaw, where Ambassador Sondland

are now saying the security assistance and the White

uote

House
end

.

There's also a statement here that you relate that

also told

24

that he now recognized he'd
made a mistake by earlier telting the Ukrai ni an offi ci als to
whom he spoke that a White House meeti ng wi th Presi dent
Zelensky was dependent on a public announcement of

25

i nvesti gati

2t
22
23

Ambassador Sondland

ons, i n fact.

you

Ambassador 5ondland

said everything

 266

1

2

was dependent on such an announcement, i ncludi ng securi ty
assi stance.

5

said the President Trump wanted President
Zelensky, quote, in a public box, close quote, by making a
public statement about ordering such investigations. This is

6

a ri ch descri pti on.

J
4

7
8

9

He

s i s all one day, September Lst. And
so I would like to know, is this a product of your memory, or
is this something that you took contemporaneous notes, you
know, at the time that this was occurring?
Thi

TAYLOR: Contemporaneous notes, Mr. Lynch.

l0

AMBASSADOR

ll

are. And that is your usual practice?
AMBASSAD0R TAYL0R: It is, indeed.
MR. LYNCH: And did you surrender these notes to the
MR. LYNCH: They

t2
13

t4

State Department?
TAYLOR:

I

d1d.

l5

AMBASSADOR

l6

MR.

t7

AMBASSADOR

l8

MR. LYNCH: And do you have copies

t9

AMBASSADOR

20

MR. LYNCH: You

2t

LYNCH

:

You di

d?

TAYLOR:

TAYL0R:

I did.
I

do.

do. Okay. That's all I got. I

THE CHAIRMAN: Mr . Maloney.

23

MR. MAL0NEY:

25

yi eld

back.

22

24

in your custody?

Just a quick followup on that one point.

here. My name is Sean Maloney.
thank you for your testimony today.

Over

Ambassador Sondland,

 267

2

Just to follow up on my colleague's questjon, along
those same 1ines, when you use quotation marks in your

J

opening statement, did you have a standard

I

4
5

6
7
8

9

l0

ll
t2

l3
t4

l5
t6

In other words, would we find those phrases, those quotes in
the notes you just described to my colleague, [",lr. Lynch?
AI"IBASSADOR TAYL0R: Yes, s'i r.
If I had them i f I put
them in quotation marks, that means I can find them in my
notes. And I took notes it would either be in a text
message or WhatsApp message or notes that I took on my little
notebook that I carry around, or a notebook that I keep in my
office that I take notes on phone cal1s when I'm in the
office. So the answer is, yes, if I've got quotes on them, I
can find them.
MR. MALONEY: Thank you.

I want to direct your attention to page 10. I just
a couple of questions about the Warsaw meeting.
AMBASSAD0R

l8

MR. MAL0NEY: Now, we see towards

20

have

TAYLOR: Yes.

t7

l9

that you applied?

the bottom of page L0

that Vice President Pence had with
President ZeIensky. I believe that was on September 1st?

you describe the meeting

TAYL0R: Yes.

2l

AMBASSAD0R

22

MR. MAL0NEY: And

in that fourth

paragraph towards the

23

bottom, you mentioned that while President Zelensky, and I'm

24

quoting, had opened the meeting by asking the Vice President

25

about security cooperatjon, you go on

to say, the Vice

 268

I

Presjdent did not respond substantively but said he would

2

talk to President Trump that night.
I'm reading from?

J

a

Do you see where

4

AMBASSADOR

5

MR. MALONEY: Do you know whethe

TAYLOR:

i

dO.

r the Vi ce P res'ident

7

to the President that night?
AMBASSADOR TAYLOR: ] dON't.

8

MR. I4AL0NEY: And then you al so go

6

9

spoke

do

ll

Trump wanted

t2

and

l3

corrupt'ion.

excuse me, the Vice President

that he wanted the Ukrainians to do more to fight
In the next paragraph,

l6
l7

I understand it,
Is that ri ght?

l8

AMBASSAD0R

2l
22
23

24
25

however, you describe another

that' s goi ng on aI so 'in Warsaw, also the

meeti ng

20

did say that President

the Europeans to do more to support the Ukraine

l5

l9

to say, the Vi ce

President d'id not say the President wanted the Europeans to

l0

t4

on

same

day,

between Ambassador Sondland and Mr. Yermak.

TAYLOR:

This is a report of a phone call I

son. I thi nk 'i t's the same one that we
j ust
I th'ink he ca11ed me to tel1 me about or I cal1ed
to ask about the events in Warsaw on September Lst.

had wi th

Mr

.

as

Morri

him

MR. MAL0NEY: And

sorry, Congressman. Thi s i s the
same phone call with Mr. Morrjson. He went on to describe
thi s subsequent conversati on wj th Sondland, Yermak.
AMBASSAD0R

TAYL0R: I 'm

 269

2

I think I understand your answer, sir.
But my question is, is in the phone call you're having with

J

Mr. Morri son

I

4
5

6

MR. MAL0NEY:

AMBASSAD0R

between

TAYL0R: And he's describing a Warsaw meeting

Mr. Sondland and Plr.

AlvlBASSADOR

Yermak

TAYLOR: Yes.

8

l"lAL0NEY: which seems to have happened at the
same tjme as the Vice President was meeting with President

9

Zelensky.

7

l0

MR.

Am

I correct?

AMBASSADOR

TAYLOR:

It

was the same event, but

t4

probably I wasn't there, but what happens at these is
there's a bilateral meeting between Vice Presjdent and the
Presi dent w'i th all the ai des. And then, af ter that, the
ajdes may get together separately, and that's what I imagine

l5

happened here.

ll
t2

l3

16

t7

l8

l9
20

2t
22
23

24
25

I understand. Do you know whether
Ambassador Sondland ever spoke to the Vice President about
hi s conversation wi th Mr. Yermak?
AMBASSADOR TAYL0R: I don't know.
MR. MALONEY: I want to ask you about one other thing,
sir, which is, on page L2 and on page 13, my colleague
Chairman Schiff has taken you at some length through the
vari ous statements of condi ti onal i ty and your vi ew of that.
And it's not my intentjon to go back into that. I just
wanted to ask you about the wording you use at this point in
MR. MAL0NEY:

 270

I

the sequence of events.

4

is the call between Sondland
and Volker and you, and you recount this expression about
how when a businessman is about to sign a check to someone

5

who owes hjm something,

6

pay up before signing the

7

mention

2
J

So, on September 8th, there

the businessman asks that person to

check.

And then,

of course,

you

8

that Ambassador VoIker used the same term several
days 1ater. Do you see where I'm reading from the from in

9

the middle of the

page?

TAYLOR:

I

dO

10

AI,IBAS SADOR

ll

MR. MALONEY: And you go

t2

l3
t4

.

on to say that holding

up

and you use the words "domestic
security assistance for
political ga'in" was, quote, crazy. Do you see that?
AMBASSAD0R

TAYL0R:

I

do.

l9

before excuse me, the day
after that, on September 9th, it comes before in your
testimony a couple paragraphs up, but it's actually the next
day is when you write the famous text: I think it's crazy to
withhotd security assistance for help with a political

20

campaign. Do you see that?

l5

l6
t7

l8

I'lR. MALONEY: And the day

TAYLOR:

I

do.

2l

AMBASSADOR

22

MR. MAL0NEY: And so my

Z)
24
25

question, sir, is, when you

use

tike "domestic political gain" or a "political
campaign," I want to understand what you meant by that,
because, of course, we're not just talk'ing now about whether
phrases

 271

6

or not an investigation was launched or whether or not it
would be appropriate or not to do that. I'm curious about
why you connected it up to, quote, a domestic potitical gain
and , quote, a po1 i ti ca1 campai gn?
Al{BASSADOR TAYL0R: Because as I understood the reason
for jnvestigating Burisma was to cast Vice President Biden in

7

a bad 1ight.

I
2
3

4
5

8

MR. MALONEY: That would be

9

AMBASSADOR

TAYLOR: Yes.

I'lR. MAL0NEY: To cast Vice President Biden

l0

ll

TAYL0R:

AI4BASSADOR

l3

MR. MAL0NEY: And

l5

l6
t7

in a bad

t i ght?

t2

l4

the domestic political gain?

pol i

Ri

ght.

the politicat campaign would be what

ti ca1 campai gn?
AMBASSADOR

TAYL0R: A

politjcal

campaign

for

the

reelection of President Trump.
MR. MALONEY:

0n page 2

of your testimony last

l9

question. 0n page 2 of your testimony, you say that Ukraine
was special, which struck me. You talk about your many years

20

of servjce

2t

country, but i n that thi rd paragraph, you say: Ukrai ne i s

22

special for me.

l8

and the extraordinary work you've done

for

our

24

that? In fact, you say, across
the responsibilitjes I've had in public service, Ukraine is
spec'ia1 for me. It's in the third paragraph, halfway

25

th rough

Z)

.

Do you see

 272

TAYLOR:

Yes. Yes, si r.

I

AMBASSADOR

2

MR. MAL0NEY: Throughout

J
4
5

6
7
8

9

the day, you've responded to

our quest'ions in a very professional manner. I take it this

is your years of trajning as a diplomat. But I'm curious
about your emoti onal reacti on to these events. Ukrai ne, as
you say, was special to you, and you witnessed this over the
series of a couple of months this summer from June, I guess,
through the present, but really to early September,
especially. What was your emotional reaction to these

l0

events?

ll

l4

a reaction based on the fact
that, as I mentioned, either before or after that, just after
that, that I think Ukraine is important object'ively to the
United States. That is not emotionally, but we can do some

l5

kjnd of analysis and determine why it's important for Ukraine

t6
t7

to
to

l8

pi ece.

t2

l3

AMBASSADOR

TAYL0R:

It

was

state and why it's important for Russia not
succeed in its aggression. That's kind of the analytic
succeed as a

22

in Ukra'ine in
2006, 2009, when traveling around the country, I got to know
Ukrainians and thei r frustrations and difficulties and those
kind of things. And then coming back and seeing it now where

23

they have the opportunity, they've got a young President,

24

young Prime

Minister, a young Parliament, the Prime Minister

25

is

old. This

t9
20

2t

The emotional piece

35 years

is

based on my time

new government has appealed

to

a

young

 273

I
2
J

idealistic, pro-!.'lest, pro-Un'ited States,
pro-Europe, that I feel an emotional attachment, bond,
connection to this country and these people.
people who are so

MR. MALONEY: You cared about

4

it?

l5

I cared about this country.
 VlR. MAL0NEY: And you didn't want to see it screwed up?
AMBASSADOR TAYLOR: I didn't want to see it screwed up.
I wanted to see it succeed.
MR. MAL0NEY: And you didn't want to see it screwed up
by some political agenda coming from Washington. Is that
fai r to say?
AMBASSAD0R TAYLOR: We11, what I didn't want to do is
have United States assjstance to Ukraine blocked or suspended
for no good reason that I could see. And there are some bad
reasons that
I didn't want to see that blocked. That was

l6

my

5

6
7
8

9

l0

ll
t2

l3
t4

AMBASSADOR

TAYL0R:

concern, 'in thi s epi sode.

t7

MR. MALONEY: Thank

t8

THE CHAIRMAN:

you, sjr.

Just one followup questjon before i go to

20

Speier. In Warsaw, l4orrison relates to you
there are two meetings going on. There is a meeting with a

2t

Vjce President and President Zelensky, and then there's the

22

separate meeting between Sondland and Yermak, correct?

l9

23

24
25

Representative

At'lBASSADOR

TAYL0R: Correct, and they're probably i n

sequence. They're probably not
THE CHAIRMAN: And

at the same time.

the meeting with the Vice President

 274

and Zelensky was
2
J
4
5

6
7
8

9

l0

people.

Am

I right?

AMBASSAD0R

TAYLOR:

Probably. I was not there, but,

yes. Normally that's the case.
THE CHAIRI'IAN: So, at a bi g meeti ng 1i ke that, i t stands
to reason they're not going to get into the specifics about
that we want you to do thi s pof i ti ca1 i nvesti gat'ion i n order
to get this. Am I right?
AMBASSADOR

TAYLOR:

THE CHAIRI'IAN:

l1

private meeting

t2

AMBASSADOR

l3

actually a big meeting with one or two dozen

COTTCCt.

That takes p1ace, i n

f

act, i n thi s sma1l

between Sondland and Yermak?
TAYLOR: Yes,

w'ithout

presumably wi thout

the Vice President.

Okay. Representative Speier.

t4

THE CHAIRMAN:

l5

1'4S. SPEI

l6

Ambassador, thank you

ER:

Thank you.

for really a lifetime of service

l9

to our country. You' re real1y a great Ameri can.
I've got a couple of kind of strings I'd like to just
get some clari fi cation on. You said that you met wi th

20

Ambassador

2t

September

22

kept pushing, saying, do not investigate Poroshenko. Did

23

have a subsequent conversation

24

doi ng that?

t7

l8

25

,

Volker and Mr. Yermak over dinner on the 1-4th of

after the money had been released.

AMBASSADOR

TAYLOR:

Wi

And Mr. Volker

with him as to why he was

th Mr. Volker, no. I wouldn't

you

 275

characterize it, Ms. Speier, as saying that he

J

or he kept
doing it. I mean, he raised it once, got a pretty emotional
response or kind of, you know, a strong response from both

4

Ukrainians

1

2

at the table.

And he

5

MS. SPEIER: He backed off?

6

AI'4BASSADOR

7

MS. SPEIER: But you

8

9

didn't

push

TAYLOR: Kurt di d not pursue j

t.

didn't ask him afterwards why he

WAS

ANBASSADOR

TAYL0R: I didn't.

ll

0kay. Did anyone in the Zelensky
admi ni strati on i ndi cate to you a sense of confusi on wi th

t2

you have dubbed as the irregular policy channel?

l0

l3

M5. SPEIER:

AMBASSADOR

in the regular

TAYLOR: Indi

rectly. So, in

what

my conversations

l6

with President Zelensky and his team,
they wou1d, on occasion, express confusion or uncertainty
about what direction they were getting from the United States

t7

because they were hearing, as

l8

from Ambassador Sondland who could and would pick up the

l9

call President Zelensky or Pres"ident Assi stant
Yermak and give them advice outside of the normal channel -outs'ide of my channel, orJtside of the normal channel . 5o
they were hearing different things from both from those
two channels. And that's confusi ng.
l'45. SPEIER: There's hardty any ref erence to Secretary
Perry, who has been included as one of the tres amigos. Did

t4

l5

20

2t
22
23
24
25

phone and

channel

I

mentioned

earlier, directly

 276

I

you have any contact with
TAYL0R:

hjm?

I

di dn'

t.

2

AMBASSADOR

J

M5. SPEIER: And he was never

4

in

any

of your text

messages?

t2

in any text messages. He
I think
was in two phone caI1s, Ms. Speier. Early on the
two phone ca11s. Certainly was in the June 28th phone cal1,
and he might have been I'11 check my notes to see if he
were in the June L8 phone ca1l. But those were the only two
times that I heard him on the phone or had any interaction
wi th hi m.
MS. SPEIER: Did you think it was peculiar that he was

l3

engaged

5

6
7
8

9

l0

ll

t4

l5
l6
t7

l8

AMBASSADOR

'i

n

th i

TAYL0R: No, not

s?

AMBASSADOR

TAYLOR:

No. Secretary Perry js

very

interested in energy markets. Ukraine could be a big energy
market. It would be Secretary Perry knows that there are
a 1ot of companies, in particular in Texas, but I'm sure in
other places, who would like to sel1 liquid natural gas,

20

liquefied natural gas, LNG, to Ukraine or east Europe more
broadly. So he had been interested in this, and I didn't

2t

thi nk th'is was very unusual

t9

.

L2, third paragraph,

22

MS. SPEiER: So, on page

23

reference that President Trump did

24

Zelensky go

25

you

insist that President
and say he is opening

to a microphone
jnvestigations of Biden and the 20L5 election interference.

 277

Was

AMBASSADOR

2
J

6

reference

to Biden and not Burisma?

TAYLOR: I would check my notes,

but I think

the answer is yes.
M5. SPEIER: So

4
5

that specific

of

it

was very

specific to an investigation

Bi den?
AMBASSADOR

TAYLOR: Yes.

13

right. There was a lot of d'iscussion
after September LLth that'it might be d'ifficutt to get all
the money out to Ukraine by the September 30th end of the
fiscal year. How much money actually got released?
AI"IBASSADOR TAYLOR: I should know the answer to that . I
don't know the answer to that. I know it's probably about
90 percent of
that's rough, Ms. Speier, but roughly

t4

90 percent.

l5

is, at one
point, there was a reference made, I think it's on page 9,
where Mr. Morrison references that the President doesn't want
to provi de any assi stance at all . And that's i n quotes.

7
8

9

l0

ll
t2

l6
t7

l8
t9

MS. SPEIER: A11

M5. SPEIER: Okay. And my last question

ANBASSADOR

TAYLOR: Yeah.

23

that alarm you?
AMBASSADOR TAYLOR: It did.
MS. SPEIER: And coupled with that May 23rd, I think jt
was, meeting in the White House where everyone came back very

24

excited and the President

25

that te11 you about his interest in

20

2t
22

14S.

SPEIER: Did

seemed

very unexcited, what
Ukraine?

does

 278

I

AMBASSAD0R

TAYL0R: Again,

I

have never

-- I wasn't in

7

that meeting. I've never had conversations with the
President. Secretary Pompeo did te11 me the same thing that
the participants of that lt4ay 23rd meeting said, and that was
the Presj dent was skepti caI of Ukrai ne. And we've heard
several descriptions of the skepticism. Some appear in this
the Politico article. I mean, he was concerned about the

8

allegations here. And that's as much as I know about the

9

President's view.

2
J

4
5

6

l0

MS. SPEIER: Okay. Thank you.

ll

AMBASSADOR

t2

THE CHAIRMAN: Representati

TAYL0R: Thank you.

ve Li eu.

t6

LIEU: All right. Thank you, Ambassador Taylor, for
your service to our country. Thank you for serving in
Vietnam with the 101st Airborne. I note for the record you
jumped out of perfectly fine airplanes, so thank you for your

t7

cou r age

l3
t4
l5

MR.

.

t9

I'd like to talk about U.S. national security. It's a
fundamental principle, intent of U.S. national security to

20

push back against Russian aggression, correct?

l8

2t

AMBASSADOR

TAYL0R: INonverbal response.]

23

LIEU: And Ukraine is one of the countries at the
ti p of the spear of pushi ng back agai nst Russi an aggressi on,

24

co r rec t?

22

25

MR.

AMBASSADOR

TAYLOR:

It

iS.

 279

l"lR. LI

EU: And on page ei ght of your statement, you

5

write, Ambassador Volker and I could see the armed and
hostile Russian-1ed forces on the other side of a damaged
bridge across the 1i ne of contact. 0ver 1.3,000 Ukrai ni ans
had been ki 1led 'in the war, one or two a week. l'lore

6

Ukrainians would undoubtedly die without the U.S. assistance.

2
J

4

7

But I want to make clear, U.S. security assjstance to

l3

isn't just to help Ukrainian national security. It's
also to help U.S. national security. Is that right?
That's correct.
AMBASSADOR TAYLOR: It is.
MR. LIEU: A11 right. And, jn fact, that's why, as you
said, the Department of Defense within a day came back with
analysis saying: We need to give security assistance to

t4

Ukra'ine.

8

9

l0

ll
t2

Ukrajne

l5

Isn't that ri ght?

l6

AMBASSADOR

t7
18

l9
20

2l
22

Z)
24
25

TAYLOR: That

is correct.

LiEU: Okay. When the President of the Uni ted
States freezes aid to Ukraine, the Russians can detect
weakness, j sn't that ri ght, between the U. S. and Ukrai ni an
relati onshi p?
MR.

AMBASSADOR

TAYLOR: The Russians are very careful

of Ukraine and the United States, and they would
immediately my bet js they knew. They're very good. My
bet is they knew that there was something up with the
secu ri ty as s'i s tance . So

observers

 280

2

LIEU: And 1f the U.S. doesn't give security
assistance, it could in effect embolden the Russians to

J

even more aggressive towards Ukra'ine.

I

MR.

AMBASSADOR

4

TAYLOR: Absolutely

be

Isn't that right?

right.

7

LIEU: Okay. So, when the President of the Unj ted
States freezes security aid to Ukraine for months and months
and months, that not only harms Ukrainian national Security,

8

i

5

6

9

l0
l1

t2
13

l4
l5

MR.

t also harms U. S. nati onal
AMBASSAD0R

TAYL0R: Yes, si r.

LIEU: A11 right. Let me move on quickly to one
other aspect. The public reporting on Ambassador Sondland's
testimony is that he didn't remember a lot of stuff. You
have a number of conversations here with Ambassador Sondland.
sure, jn those conversations, there was
no indication he was under the influence of alcohol, correct?

i just want to

make

At'4BASSAD0R

t7

MR.

l8

AI'IBASSAD0R

20

LIEU:

TAYL0R: Correct.
He

didn't slur his words, correct?

TAYLOR: Correct.

LIEU: There was no indication that he was under any
medications that caused him short-term memory 1oss, correct?
MR.

that I know of.
I'4R. LIEU: 0kay. And last couple questions. The State
Department told you not to come here today. Is that fatr?
AMBASSADOR

TAYL0R: Not

24

AMBASSAD0R

TAYLOR: They did.

25

MR.

2t
22
23

Isn' t that ri ght?

MR.

l6

t9

securi ty.

LIEU:

So

did they tel1 you to also not give

 281

I

2
a

J

4
5

to Congress, your notes? Did they say
you can't provide that to
MR. BELLINGER: They did. We've been prohibited from
providing documents directly to Congress.
MR. LIEU: 0kay. Thank you. That's all I have.
documents and notes

TAYL0R: Thank you.

6

AMBASSAD0R

7

MR. G0LDI'{AN: Thank
BY MR.

8

9

l0

ll
t2

a

you,

Mr

.

Li eu.

GOLDMAN:

Just a couple of sort of cleanup questions for

you,

Taylor, and then I think, at least, on the
maj ori ty si de, we'11 be fi ni shed.
Ambassador

You were asked by Mr. Jordan about

number of

l3

conversations that you had

t4

director on the NSC. Is it fairly common to speak regularly
wjth members of the NSC who cover the country where you are
the effective Ambassador or Charge de mission?

l5
t6

wi

th

the

T'im Morr j

son, the senior

20

A Mr. Goldman, you know, a 1ot of it depends on the
pace of activity in certain issues, and it certainly is the
case in this one. So the ro1e, of course, of the senior
director is to be the interface between the President,

2l

National Security Advisor and the President, and the

22

i nteragency.

t7

l8
t9

Z3

24
25

rect i nteracti ons wi th
people i n the fj e1d. In parti cular, I thi nk i t's the case
that embassies or ambassadors wjIl be in touch. I try to
And, often, they'11 be i n di

 282

I

keep my, you know, DAS Kent, the Deputy Assistant Secretary

2

George Kent, advised on

3

very

4

directly in

common

at1 of these things, but it's also

for an NSC director or senior director to

be

touch.

l0

I said it was dependent to some degree on the
issue, I think I mentioned that Tim Morrison, much more than
Fi ona Hi 11 , Dr. Hi I1 , was very ihterested i n Chi nese
i nvestment j n Ukrai ne, cont'inues to today. So our
conversations, the vast bulk of the conversations I had with
Tim l4orrjson concerned the Chinese attempts to buy a

ll

Ukrai ni an

5

6
7
8

9

t2
13

t4
15

l6
l7

l8
t9
20

2t
22

And when

manufacturer

-- Tim Morrison has been a driving
force in Washington to try to prevent that, and we are on the
front end of that. And so, you know, I go down to I
, and I visit and talk to people who are looking
for alternative investorS, and Ambassador Bolton, when he was
there, and Tim was there for that v'isit.
The mai n focus of Ambassador Bolton's vi si t and
conversations with atl of these officials that he had in the
Ukrai ni an Government was Chi na. And, agai n, thi S WaS the day
before Ukrainians knew that there was even a hold. But it
was China and its attempt to buy
And he has been a

23

So, when the question comes, how often are you talking

24
25

to

well, it

depends on

the issue. And 1f there's

any

 283

so, for example, Fiona was focused on Russia. She's a Russia

12

expert. And the Russi a-Ukrai ne Donbas negoti ati ons were
stal1ed. So there was not much happening there. What was
not stalled was the Chinese attempt wet1, what was not
stalled was our attempt to block Chinese purchase of these
So that's what -- Tim was
on the phone a lot for those purposes.
a You mentioned that you kept Deputy Assjstant
Secretary Kent as much up to date as you couId.
A Yeah.
a Did you speak duri ng the last f ew months, s'ince
you arrived there in mid-June, did you speak at all with

13

Assistant Secretary Phil

2
J

4
5

6
7
8

9

l0

ll

A

Reeker?

t7

of times. Phjl Reeker has not focused
very much on Ukrajne. He relies heavily on George Kent as
you have had him.
the DAS. And George, as we know, is
You know George, so he's great. He's an i ncredi b1e resource

18

on Ukraine and Thailand, by the

l4
l5

l6

l9

A couple

When

I

way.

was there 'in 2006, 2009, he was the deputy

20

political counselor.

2t

DCM. He then was pulted back

to be the DAS, Deputy Assistant

22

Secretary. He is a wealth of

as you probably heard from

23

him, he's a wealth of knowledge. So PhjI Reeker reljes

24

George Kent, and

25

We have

weekly

He

then, of course, went back as the

I'm in constant contact wjth

on

George Kent.

we have regular weekly SVTC meetings.

 284

a

1

Did you ever raise any concerns about

2

you call the i rregular policy path

J

Reeke r ?

I don't think so. I think it

4

A

5

George Kent.

6

a

7
8

9

l0

or track with
was

the

what

Ambassador

primarily with

Any other conversations on the sub

topics

today

that come to mind?
A No. So, let' s see, Ambassador Reeker , I thi nk, was
in my I have to check my notes on this too I think was
in my meeting with Secretary Pompeo, I'm pretty sure he was,

with

Ambassador Reeker

t4

of May, before I decided as I was deciding.
And Phil was there. And Phil Reeker travels a 1ot. He has
got all the European countries, and so he's on the road more
than average, I will say, and so hasn't focused a whole 1ot

15

on Ukrai ne.

ll
t2

l3

l6
t7

l8
l9
20

2l
22
23

24
25

on the 28th

to your cable on
August 29th from the sixth floor. Who responded to you?
A It was actually George Kent, who may actually be on
the fifth floor, but, you know, down one.

a

You said you received react'ion

a

Okay. What about Under Secretary David Hale?

Did

at all w'ith him?
A 0n occasion. I went to see him before I went out.
And he had visited Kyiv before I got there, so I was hoping
to have him come out, but he didn't. But only on occasion
I may have tried to be sure that he got the cable,
would I
you communicate

 285

the notice
2
3

4

a
A
a

cab1e.

0kay. But you never spoke to
No.

Did you ever speak

5

Kent about your

6

cable?

7
8

9

l0

ll
t2

l3
l4

to

anybody

UIrich Brechbuhl, I believe, the counselor, just to
be sure that he got it because I wanted to be sure that the
Secretary got it.

a
A
a
A
a

Right. But you never received a response
I d'idn't.
in any meaningful way?
I didn't.
Did you ever receive any indication when you

to the State Department about thjs

l6

irregular policy group that

t7

took any steps to resolve anything?

ZO

2t
22
23

24
25

George

A

relayed any concerns

l9

other than

-- at the State Department about your notice

l5

l8

him about it?

anyone 'in the Department actually

A

There was some discomfort

a

You

within the State
Department with Ambassador Sondland's role in Ukra'ine. 0f
course, Ukraine is not in the EU. But it was well-known
that, 'in that f amous May 23rd meeti ng j n the 0va1 0f f ice,
that Ambassador Sondland was given direction, with Secretary
Perry and Ambassador Volker, to focus on Ukrajne, to do
somethi ng wi th regard to Ukra'ine pot i cy.

testified a 1ittle

b'i

t earlier about a staffdel

 286

I

or Atlanti c Counci I tri

2

A

3

a

p

Yep

where you met

ttee, ri ght? And you

4

Intelligence

5

about any of these i ssues

6

A

7

a

A
a

8

Commi

with a staff

member

from the

had no conversations

No.

wi

th that

i ndi vi dual?

No.

l3

that there were also three staff
Republican Members of Congress who were on
members from
the Foreign Affairs Committee on that trip as well?
A I knew the names and affiliations and members or
commi ttees that each of those members of the staffdel were

l4

on.

l5

20

a Did you have any conversations with any of those
staff members about any of the i ssues here today?
A No. This was a briefin.g, as I say, in my
residence. I gave them a briefing, and then we had an
opportunity for questions and answers, and they hit 'i t off
a Are you familiar with the individuals Lev Parnas

2t

and Igor

9

l0
1l

t2

l6
t7

l8
t9

22

Z)
24
25

A
a
A
a

Were you aware

.

Fruman?

I only know them through the newspapers.
0r the indictments?
0r the i ndi ctments 'in the newspapers.
but prior to the public reports
So you were not

 287

l6

r involvement in Ukraine and thei r association wi th
Rudy Giuliani, you were not aware of them 'in any way?
A Mr. Goldman, looking back on this, I think back in
like March or April someone had again, when I was at the
Institute of Peace sent me some description of
in maybe a natural
interference in
what was this deal
gas I think there was a -- I think there was a proposal to
se11 natural gas to Ukraine.
And I think the person who was telling me this
referenced these two names, which I didn't recognize at the
time, and I didn't even register at the time. But now, you
know, in the 1ast, you know, now they're indicted or now they
were picked up at
then I now recollect that they were
mentioned in thi s previous di scussjon.
a Who were you having this conversation with?
A I got a note from a man named Dale Perry. He's a

t7

busi nessman.

l8

24

letter from Dale Perry? Did
you ever see that, or a memo of some sort?
A Yes. Yes. Whi ch I then sent agai n, i t meant
nothing to me. I was at the Institute of Peace. I had no
idea what he was talking about, but I sent it to George Kent
and to Masha Yovanovitch.
a Okay. Did you ever get a readout of the private

25

meeting between President Trump and President Zelensky at

I
7
J

4
5

6
7
8

9

l0

ll
t2

l3
t4

l5

t9
20

2l
22
23

about thei

a

Did you get an open

 288

I
2

UNGA

in
A

New

York

after their press

Ambassador

conference?

Volker gave me a description, I think,

6

private. I mean, there were
staf f s on both si des, ri ght. 0kay. I th'ink there's only
one. So I think and Ambassador Volker, with not in great
detail, he was in the meeting and said that it was a good

7

meet i ng.

J

4
5

8

9

of that meeting. It

The President

was not too

left

pleased

face to face. They discussed

that they had finally

some

met

connections between

l0

President Zelensky's cabinet or his government and several

ll

cabinet

t2

connec

13

t4

l5

l6
t7

l8
t9
20

2l
22
23

24
25

t

a

members

on President Trump's team that they should

.

Was

there any di scuss'ion that you heard of , whether

it was at the principal Ievel or the staff 1eve1, about any
of these investigations that we've been talking about?
A No.
a Now, you said that the new prosecutor general
A Yes.
confirmed that he is looking into the issues
a
that were the subject of the
A "Confjrmed" may be too strong.
a Sorry. Just for the record
A Ri ght. Ri ght. Ri ght. So what he sai d, I thi nk
fa'irly recently, last couple of weeks, was that he was going
to take a look at all of the cases that had been closed over

 289

I

the past several years to be sure they were done correctly

that include a Burisma investigation?

2

a

And would

3

A

Coutd.

4

a

0r the 2016 election interference

5

A

Coutd.

6

a

7

A

Coutd.

8

a

So would you say

9

P

i nvesti gati on?

res i dent Trump

l0

Ukrai ne tor?

ll

A

t2

Zelensky

l3

But

that, at the end of the day, that

got the investigations that he was pressuring

yet, and, of course, President
didn't have to go in front of a m'ike and say this.
Hasn't gotten them

l6

Mr. but the prosecutor general did say that he was
going to take a look at any or all of these cases that may
have been closed for no good reasons.
a A11 ri ght. So he's at least open to looking into

t7

thi

t4

l5

l8
t9
20

2t
22
23

24
25

s?

A
a

at least open, yes.
Okay. I think all right. We are out of
anyway. 5o we'11 yi e1d to the mi nori ty.
He's

MR. J0RDAN: Thank

you,

time

Ambassador.

I want to go back to the phone ca1Is you had wi th
Mr. Morri son. In the last hour, when I asked you, you said
that there were several just a few minutes ago when
ma jori ty counsel asked you, you sa'id that many of those calls

 290

I

dealt wjth the issue of China and its influence or attempt to

2

i

nfluence Ukrai ni an

the country of Ukrai ne.

TAYLOR: Yes.

J

AMBASSADOR

4

MR. JORDAN:

5

At"IBASSAD0R

6

MR. JORDAN:

That's all fair?

TAYL0R: Yes.

But there were at least four calls where it

7

wasn't about China because you reference four ca1ls in your

8

tes t i mony?
AMBASSADOR

9

MR. JORDAN: Were

l0

China

t2

your testj

l3

l5
t6

there other cal1s that weren't about

that were about this subject that aren't reflected in

ll

t4

TAYLOR: AbsolutelY.

mony?

AMBASSADOR

TAYLOR: Congressman,

I don't think so.

I

trjed, as I went through my notes, to pu11 out everything
that I could on this topic. I think I got them all, but I -I think I got them all.

t9

think any conversation you had with
Mr. Morrison relative to the subject that we've been
discussing all day are at least highlighted and referenced in

20

your opening statement?

t7
18

MR. J0RDAN: So you

TAYLOR: Congressman,

2t

AMBASSAD0R

22

MR. JORDAN:

23

AMBASSADOR

that

was my

intent --

That was your intent.

TAYL0R:

--

and

I

hope

24

have taken a look through these, and

25

that.

I succeeded. 0thers

I think I'm okay on

 291

3

t's not out of the well , let me ask
it this way. Let's go to the first -- the first call is a
couple days, 3 days af ter the calt between Pres'ident Trump

4

and Pres'ident Zelensky, and you get a readout f rom

5

l'lr . 14orri son about Presi dent Trump and Presi

t"lR. JORDAN: And i

2

dent Zelensky's

ll

ca1l. Is that accurate? It's on page ni ne of your testjmony
at the top.
AI{BASSADOR TAYLOR: Page ni ne, let's see.
l"lR . J 0RDAN :
Top of page n i ne
AI4BASSADOR TAYLOR: A11 r'ight. Yes.
MR. J0RDAN: That's your fi rst readout of the call

t2

between Presjdent Trump and President Zelensky?

6
7
8

9

l0

l3

.

AMBASSAD0R

TAYL0R: Yes.

l5

Okay. And why did Mr. [.,lorrison call
Did he call you to give you a readout of that calI, or

l6

there

t7

23

will be in my notes. So what I
did, Congressman, in preparation for this, I tried to pu11
out aIl relevant phone ca11s, meetings, et cetera, and with'in
each of those phone ca11s, I wrote down the components of
those or aspects of those that was relevant here, which means
that I djdn't write down, and so I'm not remembering what
other topics. I know that there were other topics in many of

24

these ca11s.

t4

l8

l9
20

2t
22

25

MR. JORDAN:

and/or

AMBASSADOR

some

other

was

reason?

TAYLOR: That

MR. JORDAN:

you?

Okay. You don't know about this

one?

 292

I don't
You know this was talked about,

TAYLOR:

I

AMBASSADOR

2

MR. J0RDAN:

in your testimony, that he gave you a readout of

J

referenced

4

Presi dent Trump, Presi dent Zelensky's

TAYLOR:

5

AMBASSADOR

6

MR. JORDAN: And

7

I

call

.

do.

there may have been something else

on

the ca11. You don't recall?
ANBASSAD0R

8

9

what you

on the

TAYLOR: There could have been

other things

call as wel1, yes.

t3

ti ated thi s call?
AI'4BASSADOR TAYLOR: You asked me thi s bef ore, and I
probably told you that I couldn't remember. It's not clear
to me from my notes here whether or not I did jt or he did

t4

i

l5

t7

a guess who 1ike1y initiated
the call? Was it you calling him, or did he call you to talk
about this? And was this his primary focus of the cal1,

l8

giv'ing you a readout

t9

call?

l0

ll
t2

l6

MR. J0RDAN: Who i ni

t.

Agai

n,

I

MR. J0RDAN: Can you hazard

of President Trump, President Zelensky's

20

AMBASSAD0R TAYLOR: .

2t

MR. J0RDAN: 0kay.

22

A['4BASSADOR

23

Agai

I can't

hazard a guess.

TAYLOR: Probably other i ssues on the ca11.

n, hi s mai n focus was not thi s; i t

24

MR. J0RDAN: 0kay.

25

AMBASSADOR

TAYLOR: But

was Chi na.

I don't want to

guess'

 293

0kay. Let's go to the next page.

I

MR. JORDAN:

2

AMBASSADOR

J

MR. JORDAN: Your second

TAYLOR: Yes.

call with Mr. Morrison, it

4

looks like the big paragraph about halfway down,

5

September 1st.

TAYLOR: Yep.

6

AMBASSADOR

7

MR. J0RDAN: And can you

give me the particulars of this

8

call? Did he call you? Did you call him?

9

scheduled call?

l0

ll

AMBASSADOR

Warsaw

TAYLOR: Ah, so

this

was

Was

jt

a

-- so he was in

on September Lst, yeah.

MR. JORDAN: You

t2

on

indicate at the bottom of the paragraph

l4

that he gives you a readout of the call that took place
between President Zelensky and V'ice President Pence. Is that

l5

accu rate?

l3

Yes. Yes. Yes.
MR. JORDAN: A11 right. And, again, how did this call

l6

AMBASSADOR

t7

l8

come about?

t9
20

2l
22
23

24
25

TAYLOR:

AMBASSADOR

TAYLOR: Same way the others

did, which is

of the two of us emails on an unclass system the interest
in having a phone cal1. The other writes back and says: The
time is good. Let's go it at such and such a time.
I go to a secure phone and get on it. So I can't hazard
a guess on who i ni ti ated thi s one ei ther, Congressman.
MR. JORDAN: Okay. And was it the primary focus to give

one

 294

I
2

of the call between the President of
and the Vice President of the United States?

you a readout

TAYLOR: YCS.

J

AMBASSADOR

4

MR. JORDAN:

5

6
7
8

9

12
13

So now we have two cal1s

that

you

It's

on

of them are on the weekend. And both are
readouts f rom l'lr. Morri son givi ng you a readout between
either the President's call with the President of Ukraine or
the Vi ce Presi dent's call wi th the Presi dent of Ukrai ne?
the thing.

Some

At"'IBASSAD0R

TAYLOR: Correct.

Right. And then we have the third one,
that we discussed earlier, which I think took place on the
7th. Is that right? Page twelve of your testimony.
MR. J0RDAN:

t4

l5

Okay.

get from Mr. Morrison, you initjate, he initiates.

l0

ll

Ukraine

At'4BASSADOR
wh

i ch

TAYLOR: Conversation

he desc r i bes

yes

.

MR. J0RDAN: So now we have

t6

with Mr. Morrison'in

l'lr. Morrison

and you getting

t7

on the phone agai n, and I'lr. Morri son i s gi vi ng you a readout

l8

of a conversation that

l9

T r ump?

AMBASSAD0R

20

Ambassador Sondland had

with President

TAYLOR: Correct.

23

js this I guess, maybe it is. I
don't know. Is it customary for the NSC to call up the
Ambassador and give them readouts of the President and Vice

24

Presi

2t
22

25

MR. JORDAN: And

dent's phone
AMBASSADOR

ca11s?

TAYL0R:

It's not unusual for the NSC to be

 295

describing the policy steps that need to be implemented

of

J

ca11s. That's not unusual.
MR. JORDAN: That's not what I asked. I asked

4

AMBASSADOR

2
a

coming out

phone

TAYL0R: Sorry.

t4

-- is 'it unusual for the new guy at the NSC
to call you three times jn 5 weeks and give you a readout of
the Vice President's caIl with President Zelensky, the
President's call with President Zelensky, and the President's
call with Ambassador Sondland? I'm asking, is that unusual?
Al'IBASSAD0R TAYLOR: Congressman, I 'm tryi ng to be
respons'ive here. It doesn't seem unusual to me.
MR. J0RDAN: 0kay. Yeah. I mean, I read this, and it's
like Mr. Morrison, new on the job, and he calls you four
times relative to the subject matter that this committee is

l5

looki ng 'into.

5

6
7
8

9

t0

ll
t2
l3

MR. JORDAN:

TAYLOR: Yeah.

l6

AMBASSAD0R

t7

NR. JORDAN: And three

l8
l9
20

2t
22
23

24
25

of those four times js to

give

direct readout of the Vice President's conversation
with someone else or the President, on two occasions the
Presi dent of the Un'i ted States talki ng wi th someone e1se.
And you're saying that happens all the time?
AMBASSAD0R TAYL0R: Those meetings don't happen all the
time, as we know. So it doesn't happen all the time.
MR. JORDAN: Is it customary for the person at the NSC
to, when the President of the United States has a
you a

 296

4

of the
United States has a conversation with someone, is it
customary for someone at the NSC to call up the Ambassador
and say, "Hey, I just want to let you know what the President

5

said on hi s ca11"?

I
2
J

conversation with someone and the Vice President

ANBASSAD0R

6
7

TAYLOR: Congressman, my understanding

is

not

unusual.

8

MR. J0RDAN: Not unusual?

9

AMBASSADOR

TAYL0R: Not unusual.

t2

the fact that you had three of those in
this sort of time period, that's not unusual?
AI"IBASSADOR TAYL0R: The unusual aspect of that 'is that

l3

there were meet'ings of the President of the United States

t4

with

l5

of

l0

ll

l6

MR. J0RDAN: And

someone

having

to do with Ukraine in that short

period

time.
MR. J0RDAN:

0kay.

A11

right.

l8

just to fol1ow
up with one quick question on that, when did you first meet

l9

Mr. Morri son?

t7

20

2t
22

Z)
24
25

l4R. ZELDIN: And, by the way, Ambassador,

In person, I
with Ambassador Bolton to Ukraine the
when I first met him in person.
AMBASSADOR

TAYLOR:

met him when he
end

came

of August. That's

MR. ZELDIN: And so these phone cal1s from Tim Morrison

to you, you hadn't even met Tim Morrison
AMBASSAD0R

TAYL0R: That's correct.

before?

 297

t"lR. ZELDIN: An Ambassador can

I
2

President

at

or without cause, correct?
I'm sure that's -- yes.

any time with

AMBASSADOR

J

be recalled by the

TAYLOR:

8

lot of claims in your opening statement
are without firsthand knowledge, and I just -- I wanted to
ask about one of them. So, in your opening statement, you
reference Burisma five times. You reference Biden twice.
One of those references of Biden was just a reference to the

9

July 25th ca11. The other reference

4
5

6
7

I'1R.

ZELDIN: A

3.

was on page L2 of

so, on September 7th,

l0

paragraph

ll

has a

t2

that you had wi th Tim Morri son, ri ght?

l3
t4

And

call with the President, according to a conversation

AMBASSADOR

the

TAYL0R: September

MR. ZELDIN:

l6

AMBASSADOR

t8

7th. Are we looking

at

same paragraph?

l5

t7

Ambassador Sondland

conversation

wi

Third paragraph

TAYL0R: Right,

th

MR. ZELDIN:

down

on page L2.

in which he described a phone

Sondland and President Trump, yes, si r.

This is the only reference in your opening

24

to Biden other than your one reference to the
July 25th ca11. And this isn't firsthand. It's not
secondhand. It's not thi rdhand. But i f I understand thi s
correctly, you're tetling us that Tim Morrison told you that
Ambassador Sondland told him that the President told
Ambassador Sondland that Zelensky would have to open an

25

i nvesti gati

l9
20
2T

22
23

statement

on 'into

Bi den?

 298

I

AMBASSADOR

TAYLOR: ThAt,S COrrCCt.

J

Is it possible that somewhere in that chain
of events that the Pres'ident spoke to President Zelensky

4

about Burisma? Probably assume Presjdent Trump spoke to

5

Ambassador Sondland about Burisma?

2

MR.

ZELDIN:

ll

I don't know, Congressman.
I
i t' s hard when we
MR. ZELDIN: Yeah. I t' s j ust
mean, i t's one thi ng i f you have f i rsthand 'inf ormat j on, but a
lot of what you're saying in your opening statement is not
firsthand information. That's one example. And it happens
to be the only reference at all in your opening statement to

t2

Joe Biden.

6
7
8

9

l0

AMBASSAD0R

TAYLOR:

16

that the goal requesti ng i nvesti gati ons
into the 20L5 election in Burisma was to influence the U.S.
election. Is that correct?
AMBASSAD0R TAYLOR: I 'm sorry. Say that agai n,

t7

Congressman.

l8

I believe you testified earlier that the
goal of requesting jnvestigations into the 2016 election and
Buri sma was to i nfluence the U. S. electi on. Is that an
accurate reflecti on of your testimony from earl i er?
AMBASSADOR TAYLOR: I don't think so.
MR. ZELDIN: Would you like to tell us what your
position is on jt? What was the goal of requesting
investigations into 201.5 election and Burisma?

13

t4
l5

t9
20

2t
22
23

24
25

You testi f i ed

l4R. ZELDIN:

 299

I
2

TAYL0R: As

AMBASSADOR

the

maybe

I

understand i t from one of

the article in The

New

York Times about

5

's i nterest i n Buri sma, i n that arti cle, he
descrjbes, and I think he quotes G'iulian'i at some length,
that arti c1e i ndi cates that Gi u1i ani was i nterested 'in

6

getting

7

be useful

8

says.

9

client.

3

4

Mr.

Gi u1 i

some

to

information on Vice President Biden that would

.

Mr

He says

Gi ul i

ani

's

Mr.

Gi u1 i

ani

I thi nk that's

what

he

it's your inference that

's goat would be the Presi dent's

goal?

TAYLOR: Yes .

t2

AI"IBASSADOR

13

MR. ZELDIN: And

t4

AMBASSADOR

l5

 VlR.

your source 'is The

New

York Tjmes?

TAYL0R: Yes.

ZELDIN: So do you have any other source that the

dent's goal i n maki ng thi s request was anythi ng other

l6

Presi

t7

than The

l8

cl i ent.

he's got one client, and he's useful to the

MR. ZELDiN: And then

l0

ll

ani

New

York Times?

AI4BASSAD0R

t9

I

20

th i nki ng.

2t

MR.

TAYLOR:

I

have

not talked to the President.

have no other information from what the President

ZELDIN:

Is i t

possi b1e

that

requesti ng

was

an

24

investigation, for example, into the 20L5 election wasn't to
i nfluence a future electi on?
AI{BASSADOR TAYLOR: I'm sorry. Can you say that one

25

aga i n?

22
23

 300

MR.

I

ZELDIN:

Is it possible that the request to

2

investigate interference with the 2015 election was not to

J

i

nfluence a future electi

on?

6

I don't know, Congressman.
MR. ZELDIN: Wet1, you just told us what you inferred
based off of what The New York Times told you Rudy Giuliani

7

was

4
5

8

9

l0

ll
t2
t3

t4
l5

AMBASSADOR

thinking, which inferred what the President was thinking.

I'm asking you to answer a question that, is it possjble that
the request to investigate the 2016 election was for a reason
other than jnfluencing the 2020 election? Is that possible?
AMBASSADOR TAYLOR: I don't know i f i t's possi ble.
MR. ZELDIN: I remember you testified a 1i ttle earlier
that you're familiar with the Robert Mueller investigation.
AI'4BASSADOR TAYLOR: I said I'd heard of the Robert
Mueller i nvesti gation, yes, si r.
MR. ZELDIN: And

l6
17

TAYLOR:

the investigation was sti11 ongoing at

that time, correct?

l8

AMBASSADOR

l9

l'4R.

TAYL0R:

I suppose

yes.

ZELDIN: Was your understanding

of the Robert

20

Mueller i nvesti gati on that Robert Mueller was i nvesti gati ng

2t

f

orei gn i nterf erence i n the

U.

S. elect'ion

TAYLOR: Yes.

22

AMBASSAD0R

23

MR.

24

AMBASSAD0R

25

MR. ZELDIN: As

ZELDIN: from 2015?
TAYLOR: Yes.

far as Burisma

and Tlochevsky, when did

 301

1

2
3

4
5

6
7
8

9

l0

ll
t2

l3
t4
l5

l6
l7
l8
t9
20

2t
22
23

24
25

familiar with thjs corruption case?
AMBASSAD0R TAYLOR: With Burisma, I think this summer
when it became when it was an item in the press.
you

first

become

 302

I

[5: 30 p.m

2

 VlR.

J

that

mi

.]

ZELDIN: And can you give us a rough idea

ght have

4

AMBASSADOR

5

MR.

6

AMBASSADOR

of when

been?

TAYL0R:

ZELDiN: A

I can't.

month?

TAYL0R: J uly .

ll

in your opening you
testi fi ed i n your openi ng statement, i t's on page 5,
paragraph 2, quote: By mid-Ju1y it was becoming clear to me
that the meeting President Zelensky wanted was conditioned on
the i nvesti gati ons of Buri sma and alleged Ukrai ni an

t2

i

l3

that was mi d-J uly. I s i t
wj th thi s case before mi d-July?

7
8

9

l0

t4

MR. ZELDIN: And you wrote

nterference i n the 2015 electi ons.
So

l5

AMBASSAD0R

TAYL0R: As

had you back fami 1 i ar

I say, I don't

remember

exactly

l8

familiar with that case.
MR. ZELDIN: I'm having trouble understanding how you
would have concluded it was ctear to you by mid-July that the

t9

meeting President Zelensky wanted conditioned on the

20

investigations of Burisma if you can't even testify now that

2t

you had even heard

l6
t7

when

I

became

24

of the Burisma case by then.
AMBASSAD0R TAYLOR: I think I said it was sometime this
summer. And I don't know exactly when i t was.
MR. ZELDIN: So it's possible that you did hear Burisma

25

before

22
23

mi

d-J u1y?

 303

AMBASSADOR

I

TAYLOR: YeS.

J

in mid-Ju1y it, as you testified,
became clear to you that the meeting that President Zelensky

4

wanted was condi ti oned on an i nvesti gati on i nto Buri sma and

5

alleged Ukrai ni an i nterference i n the 2016 U. S. electi ons.

6

Obviously you would be jdentifying

2

14R.

ZELDIN: And then

7

at that point that it's
important to the President, that investigation, if you were

8

reachi ng

that conclusi on?

lt

No. What I know is what what
Ambassador Sondland was able to te11 me about those
investigations and Ambassador Volker. I don't know what was

12

i

9

l0

r3

t4

l5
t6

AMBASSAD0R

n the

Presi

TAYL0R:

dent's

mi

nd.

MR. ZELDIN: So where was

this condit'ion

AMBASSAD0R

TAYLOR:

I think it

was coming from Mr.

Giuliani.

l8

l9

MR. ZELDIN: And you

MR. ZELDIN: But

20

were i nterpreti ng Rudy

2t

the Presi dent?

22
23

24
25

if

you're not sure if it was coming from the President?

not from the President?
Al\4BASSADOR TAYLOR: I don't know.

t7

coming from

Gi

testi fied earlier that Mr.

uf i ani

's

advocacy as the posi

you

ti on of

I said -- what I said, I think,
was the President was Giuliani's client.
you bef ieve in
MR. ZELDIN: And by Rudy Giuf iani
mid-Ju1y, when you reached this conclusion, that Rudy
AMBASSAD0R

TAYL0R: What

 304

ani wants an i nvesti gati on i nto Buri sma. Are you

I

Gi u1 i

2

bel i evi ng

4

at all that the Presi dent wants an j nvesti gati on
i nto Buri sma or no?
AMBASSAD0R TAYL0R: I don't know. What I know is that

5

the di rection was coming from GiuIiani.

J

6

MR. ZELDIN:

Okay. We11, it's important to point out

7

then, because your opening statement has leaked

because

8

that's what's

tions,

9

everyone outside has read your opening statement, but what

l0

ll
t2

l3
t4

l5

l6
t7

l8
t9
20
21

22
23

24
25

been happeni ng duri ng these deposi

so

they haven't read obvi ously 'is that you' re testi f yi ng now

that you're not even sure if that condition came f rom the
President. You don't even know where i t came from. You're
guessing maybe Rudy Giuliani and you're not sure whether or
not it came from the President. Is that what you're saying?
AMBASSAD0R TAYLOR: What I'm saying is that I'm
describing conversations that I heard. I didn't hear it from
the President. I can't say what the President was thi nki ng.

I can I can say what Kurt Volker and Ambassador
told me.

Sondland

firsthand knowledge that
confi rms that the Presi dent was cond'i ti oni ng an i nvesti gati on
Ukrai ni an i nterference
i nto Buri sma and alleged electi on
jn the 20LG elections with a meeting with President Zelensky?
MR. ZELDIN: Did you have any

AMBASSAD0R

the Presi dent.

TAYLOR: Again,

I

had no conversations with

 305

MR. ZELDIN: So

I
2

all to support that?

a

mean'ing f i rsthand
had I talked to the President? No, I've never talked

AMBASSADOR

J

TAYL0R: Fi rsthand

4

meaning

5

to the President.
MR. ZELDIN:

6
7

any other fjrsthand knowledge, other

l0

with

Sondland and Votker.
MR. ZELDIN: Why

wouldn't you want to get more familiar

t4
l5

again.

l6

jdent.

TAYLOR: No communication

with the case on its merits at this
AMBASSADOR TAYLOR: I'm sorry,

l3

Pres

with the President.
MR. ZELDIN: And no communicatjon with Rudy Giuliani.
AI"IBASSAD0R TAYLOR: There was none w j th G j u1i ani , only
AMBASSAD0R

9

t2

0r

than a commun'ication di rectly with the

8

ll

did you have any fjrsthand knowledge at

time?
Congressman, say

l"lR. ZELDIN: Why wouldn't you want

it

to get more f am"iliar

22

with the case on its merits at that time?
AMBASSADOR TAYL0R: I am trying to do U.S. foreign
policy. I am trying to stay out of U.S. domestic policy and
pol i ti cs. So I 'm not looki ng to get i nvolved i n that.
MR. ZELDIN: D'id the meri ts of the case matter to you
did the merits of the case matter to you in taking that

23

position?

l7
l8

l9
20

2t

24
25

of the case matter by
tak'ing the position of staying out of domestic politics.
AMBASSADOR

TAYLOR: The merits

 306

l6

of whether or not there was
actual corruption was not part of your decisionmaking process
at that time?
As part of your decision in mid-July you make this
conclusjon of a cond'ition. And I'm just asking 1f part of
that decisionmaking process of what to do next included any
analysi s of thi s parti cular corrupti on case on i ts meri ts.
AMBASSAD0R TAYL0R: I did not 'investigate the Burisma
case on i ts meri ts.
l'4R. ZELDIN: Were there any meetings at that time at the
embassy to discuss the case on its merits?
AI4BASSADOR TAYLOR: What we did at the embassy, as i
mentioned, js we are focused on institutions, not on specific
cases. We're looking to fight back against corruption and to
help the Ukrainians fight back against corruption by
improving thei r courts and thei r judiciat system. That's

t7

not on

I
2
3

4
5

6
7
8

9

l0

ll
t2
13

t4

l5

MR. ZELDIN: But the merits

i ndi vi

dual cases.

23

did take the time to analyze the
case on its merits and you were to determjne that it, in
fact, had meri t, that thi s was a corrupti on case i mpacti ng
parties from both the Ukraine and the United States, wouldn't
you possibly conclude differently with regard to an answer
you gave earlier where you said this was not in the U.S.

24

i

l8
t9
20

2l
22

25

MR. ZELDIN: And

if

you

nterest?
AMBASSADOR

TAYLOR: Can't answer

that one. Don't

know.

 307

MR. ZELDIN:
2
J

i

n the

U.

If the case had merits,

maybe

it

would

S. i nterest.

Alt'IBASSAD0R

TAYL0R: Don'

t

know, Congressman.

6

I believe you might have testifjed
earlier, U.S. 1aw conditions aid to Ukraine based off of
thejr efforts to make progress in fighting corruption,

7

co r rec t?

4
5

8

9

l4R. ZELDIN: And

AMBASSAD0R

TAYLOR: Some of the

conditjons in the Defense

l0

has conditions on

ll

of the military

t2

be

their

security assistance has
Authorizatjon Act every year that
having to do with civjlian control

of things. And it may well
have some language about governance jn contracting.
and those kjnds

l6

If the President believed that looking
further into Ukrainian interference in the 20L5 election and
Burisma had merit where would he have gone if you aren't
going to even look into it? What other way does he have to

t7

look 'into these two cases?

l3
t4
l5

l8
l9
20

2t

l"lR. ZELDIN:

AI"IBASSADOR

TAYL0R: He has

he has a

know. In the Justice Department I think
he's suggested or directed further investigations of 2015 and
related thi ngs. So he's got many ways to 'investi gate.
MR. ZELDIN: But you weren't one

23

Al'IBASSADOR

25

resources,

Congressman, as you

22

24

tot of

TAYLOR: That'

of those resources?

s correct.

text on September
lst, it appears that there were two things that you come in
MR. ZELDIN: So before you send your

 308

I

contact with, one being the Politico story that we spoke

2

about

3

between Ambassador Sondland and Mr. Yermak

4

earljer

and on page L0 a September

opening statement, the source

6

Morri son, correct?
AI"IBASSAD0R

8

MR. ZELDIN: The bottom

9

AMBASSADOR

went on

t2

Ye rmak

l5

Tim

te here.

page 10.

call I

of

had

page 1.0, ri ght.

with Mr. Morrison,

he

Ambassador Sondland with

.

it

with Morrison.
MR. ZELDIN: Tim l4orrison. Is he your only source of

Yes,

was

information?
TAYL0R: Yes.

AMBASSADOR

t7

MR. ZELDIN: Was

he in that meeting?

l8

that conversation with

l9

14r. Yermak?

20

AMBASSADOR

2t

I'4R.

22

'inf ormati on i

TAYL0R:

Was

he part of

between Ambassador Sondland and

I don't know.

ZELDIN: We11, how would 14r. Morri son know that

f

he wasn't i n the meeti

AMBASSAD0R

25

of

to describe a conversation

t6

24

of youlinformation is

TAYL0R: The bottom

During the same phone

l1

t4

Warsaw.

TAYLOR: I 'm looki ng f or your ci

7

l3

in

With regards to that September Lst reference in your

5

l0

Lst conversation

Ambassador

ng?

TAYL0R: Because he could have talked to

SondIand. I don't know which of those two.

MR. ZELDIN:

0kay.

So

that conclusion, again, i t's

not

 309

firsthand or
2
J
4

secondhand?

AMBASSADOR

don't know.

TAYLOR:

Fi rst

or

have been

firsthand.

t's not you r

f

-rr

sthand.

o i t's your secondhand i nformati on, but

scenari

6

thi rdhand information.
0n your

I

second

MR. ZELDIN: But i

5

7

It could

So best case

maybe i

t's

calt with Tim Morrison after the Juty 25th call

8

between President Trump and President Zelensky, d'id he te11

9

you anything

13

in his readout other than the reference to
anything else specifically from the call other than the
reference to fi re Lutsenko?
AMBASSADOR TAYLOR: Yes. He mentioned I think it
he who mentioned that there had been discussion of the

l4

previ ous ambassador.

l0

ll
t2

l5

was

Did I mention that? I think I did. Let's see here.

24

fi re Lutsenko. Tatked
about the previous ambassador. He mentioned G'iulianj. And
he mentioned and he mentioned that Gordon had Gordon
Sondland had catled the President before and after the
meeti ng
the phone call.
MR. ZELDIN: But as far as what was on the July 25th
phone ca11, other than a reference to fire Lutsenko, what
else was speci fi cally said on the caII?
AI'IBASSADOR TAYL0R: Agai n, I j ust sai d that he also

25

talked about the previous ambassador,

16

t7

l8

l9
20

2t
22
23

Yes, here we are. Yes, he said,

Ambassador Yovanovitch.

 310

I

that's all I have wri tten down.
MR. ZELDIN: After the text on September Lst, you then

He menti oned Gi u1 i ani

2
a

J

And

had a conversation with Ambassador Sondland, correct?
AMBASSADOR

4
5

.

back

to that

TAYL0R: September

Lst, you're going to

go

one.

t2

to that.
this is when
AMBASSADOR TAYLOR: Hang on here. So
are you looki ng at page 1.3, Congressman?
 \,lR. ZELDIN: Wel1, you do talk about it on page 10. At
the bottom is the reference to Ambassador Sondland's meeting
with Yermak that you heard from Tim l4orrison. And then it
goes through, as you go into the next page, the following

l3

paragraphs are leading you

t4

had

l5

page L1. is your

6
7
8

9

l0

ll

MR. ZELDIN: Yes , we'

with

Ambassador

re

goi ng back

into your conversation that you

Sondland. The first fu11 paragraph on

t7

text, and then you get into specifics
the phone call in the following paragraph.
In that conversation between you and Ambassador

l8

Sondland, did you ask him about the meeting he had with

t9

Mr. Yermak that Tim Morrison told you about?

l6

20

2t
22
23

24
25

about

I did not.
MR. ZELDiN: So the basi s of your i nformatjon,
secondhand or thirdhand, that there was a link between money
and an investigation into Burisma, you then have an
opportunity to talk to the person who was in the meeting and
you don't even ask him whether or not that meeting happened
AMBASSADOR

TAYLOR:

 311

I

or i f thi s was di scussed?
I was there's no doubt that the
happened. And I didn't ask hjm further about the

AMBASSAD0R

2

TAYLOR:

J

meeting

4

conversation w'i th

Yermak.

6

all I'm reporti ng all I'm
reporting is fjrsthand knowledge of my phone call with people

7

or

5

And those

my

are

you know,

texts with people.

8

MR. ZELDIN: Right.

9

AMBASSADOR

t0

TAYLOR: But you'

re ri ght, those are often

about other conversations.

ll

MR. ZELDIN: But

t2

good opportunity

l3

wi

it

seemed

like that

to ask Ambassador

would have been

a

Sondland about the meeting

th Mr. Yermak, correct?

I didn't take the opportunity.
MR. ZELDIN: How long was that phone caI1, if you

t4

AMBASSADOR

l5

TAYLOR: And

l6

remember, between you and Ambassador Sondland on September

t7

Lst?

l8

I don't remember.
MR. ZELDIN: Maybe any idea? Like a couple minutes
or 30 minutes? Was it a short ca11, a long call?
AMBASSADOR TAYLOR: Let's see here. So we're talki ng
about the phone call on LL, on page 11. Is that right?

l9
20

2t
22

AI"IBASSADOR

TAYL0R:

MR. ZELDiN: 0n page 11.
24
25

yeah. Right. Asked me to
calt him, which I did. During that phone ca11, right.
AMBASSADOR

TAYLOR: Yeah,

 312

I

Sondland

told

he now recognized he made a mistake.

me

5

I don't know, L5 minutes, 20 minutes
MR. ZELDIN: And here you have a -- so the reference on
the phone calf is to Burisma, not the Bidens, is that --is
that correct? That's what's that's what's i n your openi ng

6

statement?

2
5

4

7
8

9

l0

So probably,

: During the phone call Ambassador
Sondland told me that President Trump told hjm he wants
President Zelensky to state publ i cly i nvesti gate Buri sma and
is it that the one you're talking about?
alleged
AMBASSADOR TAYLOR

ll

MR

t2

AMBAS SADOR

l3

I'4R.

14

AI'4BAS SADOR

l5

MR. ZELDIN

l6

AMBAS SADOR

t7

i

t's

ZE

LDI

t i nked

TAYLOR: 0n the second paragraph?
Yes.

N

to

TAYLOR: Yes.

linking that to a'id, correct?
TAYLOR: No, the next paragraph descri bes how
And nothing

ai d.

MR. ZELDIN:

l8
l9

Yeah.

ZELDIN

did

Where

TAYL0R: L'ink i t

AMBASSADOR

2t

MR. ZELDIN: Go ahead

22

AMBASSADOR

24
25

where di

d

where

Ambassador Sondland

20

23

where did

TAYLOR:

YCAh.

to aid?

5o

So Ambassador Sondland on

that he now recognizes that he'd
made a mi stake when he told the Ukrainians that the only
the only thing they had
thing they had to do in order to

this

phone

call tells

me

 313

only thing they would get if they

I

to do

2

announced these

J

a mistake.

5

Ukrai

communi

9

l0

ll

cated to

TAYLOR: No,
Ye rmak

wi

Said that

communicated to

to a conversation that you had
Sondland spoke to

Yermak?
AMBASSADOR

t2

correct.

13

MR.

TAYLOR: That's on the previous page, that's

ZELDIN: You had

this conversation with

Ambassador

didn't ask him?

t4

Sondland and you

l5

just ask that? Is that
same question? i just want to be sure I'm getting th'is.

l6

AMBASSAD0R

TAYLOR: Djd you

I did not ask him.

t7

Yeah,

l8

MR. ZELDIN: Go ahead.

l9

V0ICE: No, I 'm j ust confused

20

2t
22
23
24
25

was

I think that is what he

th Tim Morri son about what Ambassador

Mr.

they

.

According

MR. ZELDIN:

8

actually

f

ne; correct?
AI{BAS SADOR

6
7

investigations was a meeting.

MR. ZELDIN: That was never

4

i

as

to which call

the

 314

1

2

[5:46

p.m . ]

MR. ZELDIN: We

are talking about the September i.st

l8

ca11. I befieve the Ambassador is testifying that
Ambassador Sondland had communicated this to Mr. Yermak. But
that information is not f rom Ambassador Sondland; that
information is from Tim l'4orrison, who may or may not have
been in that meeting with Ambassador Sondland and Mr. Yermak.
And then when Ambassador Taylor then sent thi s text and
had a ca11, during the call with Ambassador Sondland, he
didn't even raise that meeting at all with Mr. Yermak.
I just want to understand
Got i t. Ri ght.
AMBASSAD0R TAYL0R: Got i t.
MR. ZELDIN: that chain. Is that all correct?
AMBASSADOR TAYLOR: I didn't rajse the Yermak meeting.
What I raised was the concern about linking the security
assistance to the investigation. That was the concern.
tJlR. ZELDIN: Right, but you didn't confirm, though, that
that was actually communi cated. You didn't ask Ambassador

t9

Sondland that.

a

J

4
5

6
7
8

9

l0

ll
t2
l3

l4
l5

l6
t7

20

2t

phone

A['4BASSADOR

TAYL0R:

f he'd communi cated i t to

the

Ukrainians? No, I asked him about the linkage.

22

MR. ZELDIN: Rl ght.

23

Okay, 5teve.

24

BY MR.

25

I

a

CASTOR:

Looki ng back

on these events, would you

have

 315

4

differently jn terms of your communications
wi th the seventh floor of the State Department?
You sent your cable. You know, you had a couple phone
calls wi th Mr. Brechbuhl. But 'i t doesn't seem 1j ke your

5

concerns penetrated.

I
2
J

handled anyth'ing

ll

A l'lr . Castor, I don' t thi nk that's true. I thi nk
that, first of all, they shared my concerns. Second of all,
they got my cabIe. Third of all, based on the concerns and
the cab1e, Secretary Pompeo went to the White House, probably
on a couple of occasions, you know, in trying to have these
meetings, and attempted to get the decision changed. So I'm

t2

comfortable --

6
7
8

9

l0

l3
t4
l5

l6
t7

l8

O
A
a

OkaY.

that I got a response.
0kay. 5o, looki ng back on thi ngs,

you wouldn't

have handled anything different?

A
a

Cor

rect.

OkaY.

22

I'd just note for the record we haven't
seen a copy of the subpoena and we haven't made jt a,part of
the record. Is that sti11 on the table as an option?
MR. GOLDMAN: We're happy to show you a copy of the

23

subpoena.

t9
20

2t

24
25

MR. CASTOR:

for you, Mr. Castor,
to also make sure that the seal is authentic and that the
MR. BITAR: We're more than happy

 3'16

I

signature i s authentic. No worries. I'11 get i t for

2

now

MR. GOLDMAN: And

J
4

i nbox wi

in

your

the

MR. CASTOR:

5

6

th

apparently you have an email

you

0h, okay. Yeah, I mean, I don't have

my

emai 1.

BY MR.

7

a

8

CASTOR:

You would agree

that, if

Burisma

if their

l0

motivation for engaging Hunter Biden for their board was not
related to his corporate governance expertise but, i n fact,

ll

was hoping

9

l3

to buy some protection, you would agree that
that's worthy of i nvesti gati ng, ri ght?
A Mr. Castor, I don't know why Burisma got him on the

t4

boa rd

t2

a

15

l6
t7
18

t9
20

with regard to putting Hunter Biden on their
board, that could be something that could be worth
i nvesti gati ng, ri ght?
A I don't know. I don't know. I don't know the
relationship that he had wjth the board. I don't know.

wrongdoing

a

21

22

Okay. And, at the time, the Vice President had a'

of Ukraine on some respects.
He was very interested in policy with Ukraine, yes.
Okay. So do you see a perceived conflict of

you know, policy supervision

A
a

23

24
25

But jf Ukrainians were engaged in misdeeds or

i

nterest there?

 317

A
a
A
a

I
2
J
4
5

6
7
8

9

l0

lt
t2

l3

I 'm a

fact

wi

tness.

I 'm not gi vi ng opi ni ons

on

Okay.

this thing, but so I -Is it reasonable to see a perceived conflict of
jnterest there, or is that crazy?
A I've said other things are crazy.
O A reasonable person could conclude that there 'is a
possible perceived conflict of interest there, right?
MR. BELLINGER: You asked hjm that questjon earlier, at
the beginning, about 7-L/ 2 hours ago. It was one of the
f i rst questions you asked h'im. He's already answered i t.
l'lR. CASTOR: So he's not goi ng to answer i t?
MR. BELLINGER: He's a1 ready answered i t.
BY MR.

t4

CASTOR:

t7

wlth other
w'itnesses or 1ike1y witnesses before this investigation, such
as Mr. l4orrison? Presumabty he's sort of on the docket next

l8

to come jn.

l9

testi mony wi th other possi ble

l5

l6

a

A

20

2t
22
23

24
25

'in

Chi

Have you had any communications

Have you had any conversations about your
wi tnesses?

Not about testimony. Agai n, he's very i nterested

na, and we conti nue to talk about Chi na

a
A
a
A

OkaY.

but nothing about -With Mr.
No.

Reeker?

 3'18

a
A
a

I
2
J
4
5

6
7
8

9

l0

l5
t6
t7

l8

No.

You

BY MR.

a
just

wanted

A
a
A
O

to

some

of

our

Taylor, you've been here a long time.

I

address one thing

Please.

Please.

whi ch was

brought up

in the last

Yep.

It will

understand you' re

20

awe

2t

A

22

aso

25

th

GOLDMAN:

Ambassador

A

24

wi

No. Nothing on the substance of the testimony.
And just one other item. The State Department,
they di dn't order you to not appear under subpoena, r'ight?
A Correct.
MR. CASTOR: I think that's all I've got. I'm out of
I'm almost out of time.
members, so

t9

23

d'idn't have any communi cat'ions

A
a

12

t4

th some of the others?

previ ous wi tnesses?

ll
l3

Wi

No, no.

Not

j ust

ti red

be a couple minutes. But
and

it's

we

been a long day, and

we

Iam ti red, but i t's okay.

appreci ate

it.

This won't be long.

a problem

I think you testified earlier today that you
drafted your statement based on, in part, a review of your
notes and the various WhatsApp and text messages that you are
i n possessi on of, ri ght?

 319

I
2
J
4

A
a

And so

A
a

It is correct.
0kay. And so is that the most accurate recitation

Correct.

'is i t accurate that the statement, the
opening statement, that you gave is based on your very best
recollection after reviewing your own notes?

5

6

t4

of events that you can remember today? Is
A It'is.
that ri ght?
a
A It is.
a When Mr. Zeldin was questioning you, he was tatking
about the connection he was sort of conflating a couple
thi ngs between Mr. Gi u1 i ani , Mr. Trump, and the New York
Tjmes article. I just want to clarify a couple of things for

l5

now.

t6

did see that May 9th
believe is exhibit L, right?

7
8

9

l0

ll
t2
13

t7

l8

You

A
a

New

York Times

artjcle, which I

I did.

20

that article that
Mr . Gi u1j ani was i nterested 'in pressi ng Ukrai ne to conduct

2t

i nvesti gati

l9

22
23

24
25

A
a
A
a

And so you understood from

ons 'into

B

j den

and the 2015 electi

on?

Correct.
And

It

that

WaS.

Okay.

was before you took the job.

 320

1

A

It

2

a

Rl

J
4
5

6
7
8

9

l0

ll
t2

messages

was one

the hesi tat'ions about taki ng

the

in your text
about Rudy Gj ul i ani and Biden in

j ob

I believe you expressed

ght.

your concerns

text messages.
A I do.

a

of

Do you

those

recal1 that?

And were you aware

of other public statements,

either on Twitter or on televjsion, that Rudy Giuliani was
maki ng frequently on thi s topi c, about these i nvesti gati ons?
A Not on Twitter or television, because I rarely do
ei ther of those. But 'in the general press, I thi nk thi s i s
pretty well-descri bed.

a

0kay.

l4

testified, right, that at that
May 23rd 0va1 0f f ice meeting you understood that President

l5

Trump directed Ambassadors 5ond1and,

t6

Perry to consult with Rudy Giuliani

t7

House meeting

l3

l8
t9
20

2l
22
23

24
25

And then you also

A
a
A
a

to

VoIker, and Secretary

in order for a White

occur?

That was my understanding.
That was your understanding.
Yes.

And then

after that point, you had many

conversat'ions with Ambassadors Sondland and Volker about

Rudy

Giuliani's interest in the investigations in Ukraine. Is
that accurate?
A 14r. Goldman, I don't remember many conversations

 321

3

with those two about Rudy Giuliani's specific interest,
certainly with the jnterest that they were expressing,
presumably coming from Giuliani, in having these

4

i nvesti gati ons proceed.

I

2

5

a

Right.

but

And you say presumably coming from Rudy

8

A, understood that Rudy G'iuliani was
interested in these investigatjons and, B, understood that
the President had di rected them to discuss Rudy Giuliani's

9

concerns before scheduting a White House meeting.

6
7

l0

ll

Giuliani

A
a

because you,

A and B both correct.
Okay.

2t

call with Tim Morrison on
July 28th where he gave you a brief readout of the
Presi dent's caIl wi th Presi dent Zelensky.
A Yes.
a And I believe you testjfjed that you understood
also that Ambassador Sondland spoke to President Trump both
before and after that catl?
A Tim Morri son sa'id that, that he had i n that
cal1. He sajd yes.
a Okay. And then when you actually read the call

22

transcript, Tim Morrison's readout was accurate, correct?

t2

l3
t4

l5

l6
t7

l8
t9
20

23

24
25

And then you had a telephone

A
a
A

It was.
It wasn't complete
It wasn't complete, but what he said

was accurate.

 322

4

R'ight. Yes.
a And, subsequently then, you in early September had
two separate phone cal1s, right, with Tim Morrison and
Ambassador Sondland about a phone call between Ambassador

5

Sondland and President Trump?

I
2
J

A
a
A
a

6
7
8

9

Cor

rect.

And both

Ri ght?

Yes.

And both

of those conversations, so what Ambassador

told you about his

own conversation

with President

l0

Sondland

ll

Trump and what Tim Morrison

t2

Sondland's conversation with President Trump, were pretty

l3

cons i

t4

t7

A They were pretty consistent.
a Ri ght. And you understood that Pres'ident Trump was
insisting and conditioning the Wh'ite House meeting on, I
thi nk, quote, "everythi ng, " whi ch was both the securi ty

l8

assjstance and the White House meeting.

15

t6

l9
20

2t

told you about Ambassador

stent.

A

That's what Ambassador Sondland said. He said that

they were 1 i nked. They were

a
A

Ri

1

i nked.

ght.

24

I don't remember h'im saying President Trump said
that they had to be linked.
a Right. But you understood Ambassador Sondland was

25

speaki ng

22
23

regularly

 aaa

2

just gotten off the phone call with
President Trump, and he was then relaying it to Yermak

J

and

I

A

Having

me.

4

a

5

And then you also had your own conversations with

6
7

Ri

ght.

officjals about Rudy Giulianj, right? And'if I
could refresh you, because it's late, you, I think, testified
Ukrajnian

l0

that on Ju1y LOth, when you had your meeting with the Chief
of Staf f and the Def ense l'lj ni ster, they relayed to you that
they understood that Mr. Giuf iani had said that there would

ll

not be a phone ca1l.

8

9

Ah. Yes. Yeah, that's exactly ri ght.

t2

A

l3

came through

t4

a

l5

the Prosecutor General Lutsenko.

Right.

And they

A

They did.

l7

a

Because why

t9

Yes.

certainly understood that

Mr. Giuliani represented President Trump, correct?

l6

l8

And that

else would they care what Rudy Giuliani

t hou gh t?
A

Correct.

23

just to be clear, who ulti mately deci des
whether or not there is a White House meeting between the
Presi dent of the United States and any other foreign leader?
Is it Rudy Giuliani, or is it the President of the United

24

States?

20

2t
22

25

a

A

And

It's the Pres'ident of the Uni ted States

 324

I
2
3

4

a

0kay.

ust L mi nute.
A11 right. I think we are done. I don't
MR. G0LDMAN:

J

MR. CASTOR: Thank you

6

appreci ate your cooperati on.
AMBASSADOR

8

THE CHAIRMAN:

9

MR. G0LDI'IAN: Cha'i rman

I can tetl

t2

THE CHAIRMAN:

No,

t3

thank you, Ambassador.

t4

AMBASSAD0R

l5

[Whereupon,

t9
20

2t
22
23

24
25

coming

jn today.

We

to be here.
my

timing is

good.

Schiff has arrived to adjourn

the

TAYLOR: Unless he has questions.

AMBASSADOR

18

the

proceedi ngs.

l1

t7

for

TAYLOR: Glad

7

t6

if

minority has a couple followup questions?

5

l0

know

no.

We

are adjourned. And I want to

TAYL0R: Thank you, Mr'. Chairman.

at 7:00 p.m. , the deposi tion

was concluded.

]