UNCLASS ] FIED I I 2 J 4 ON INTELLIGENCE, 5 PERMANENT SELECT COMMITTEE 6 j oi 7 COMMITTEE ON OVERS]GHT AND REFORM 8 and the 9 COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFA]RS, nt wi th S. the l0 U. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 1l WASHINGTON, D.C. t2 l3 t4 15 DEPOSIT]ON OF: F]ONA HILL 16 t7 l8 19 20 l'londay, 0ctober L4, 2019 Washi 21 ngton, D. C. 22 23 24 25 in the above matter was held in Room HVC-304, Capi toI Vi si tor Center , commenci ng at 9: 55 a. m. The deposition UNCLASS I EIE D UNCLASS Present: Representat'ives I 2 j 4 I FIED H 2 Schi f f , Carson, Swatwell, and eck Also Present: Representatives Jordan, Zeldi n, Perry, and Gaetz. 5 6 7 8 9 l0 ll t2 l3 t4 l5 t6 t7 l8 t9 20 2t 22 23 24 25 UNCLASS I FIED Raski n, Rouda, Rooney, UNCLASS I EIED I Appearances: 2 3 4 FoT the PERMANENT SELECT COMMITTEE ON ]NTELL]GENCE: 5 6 7 8 9 10 ll t2 l3 t4 l5 t6 t7 t8 t9 20 2t 22 FoT the COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND REFORM: 23 24 25 UNCLASS I FIED J UNCLASS I FIED 1 2 J For the COMMITTEE 0N F0REIGN AFFAIRS: 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 For FIONA HILL ll S. t2 SAMUEL l3 LEE t4 BOIES SCHILLER FLEXNER LLP l5 L40L New York Avenue, t6 Washington, D.C.2005 UNGAR WOLOSKY NW t7 18 l9 20 2t 22 23 24 25 UNCLASS I FIED 4 UNCLASS I FIED I THE CHAIRMAN: The committee 2 Good morning, J 4 5 6 7 Permanent 5 will come to order. Dr. Hi11, and welcome to the House Setect Committee on Intetligence, wh'ich, along with the Foreign Affairs and 0versight Committees, is conducting this investigation as part of the offjc'ial impeachment inquiry of the House of Representatives. Today's deposition is being conducted as part of that inquiry. ll In light of attempts by the White House administration to direct witnesses not to cooperate with the inquiry, the committee had no choice but to compel your appearance today. We thank you for complying with the duly authorized t2 congressional subpoena. l3 t4 Dr. Hill has served with distinction in and out of government, including as National Intelligence 0ffjcer for l5 Russia and Eurasia t6 seni 8 9 10 l8 th the Brooki ngs Insti tut'ion, and, most recently, as Deputy Assistant to the President and Senior Director for Europe and Russia on the National Security t9 Counci t7 or f ellow at the National Intelligence Council, as a wi 1 staff. 24 In her most recent work at the White House, Dr. Hill held a unique position at the top of the executive branch's policymaking process, in which she would have had access to and been i nvolved i n key po1 i cy di scussi ons , meeti ngs , and decisions on Ukraine that relate directly to areas under 25 j nvesti gati 20 2t 22 23 on by the commi UNCLASS ttees. I EIED UNCLASS I FIED 6 l0 t your posi t'ion, Dr. Hi 11, only a f ew days before the Presjdent's July 25th, 2019, call wi th Ukrai ni an President Zelensky, we look forward to heari ng your test'imony today about the range of issues and jnteractions we are investigating that occurred in the leadup to the July 25th ca11, as well as your expert assessment of the ev'idence we have uncovered s'ince you left the White House. This includes the July 25 call record itself as well as the documentary record that has come to 11ght about efforts after the caIl to get the Ukrainians to announce publicly l1 'investi gati ons i nto the two areas Presi dent Trump asked t2 President Zelensky to pursue, the Bidens and Burisma, and the 13 conspiracy about Ukraine's purported jnterference t4 U. Although you lef 2 J 4 5 6 7 8 9 15 t6 t7 l8 l9 20 2t 22 S. electi ons. I turn to committee counsel to begin the deposition, I invite the Ranking Member Nunes or, in his absence, one of the Republican members present to make any opening remarks. I will recognize one of the GOP members. Before MR. J0RDAN: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Dr. Hi11, I want to thank you also for appearing today. My understanding is you were coming voluntarily until about an hour ago when the chairman issued to you a subpoena. 23 THE CHAIRMAN: Excuse me, 24 Do we have any members 25 in the 2016 could we suspend? here that are not three committees authorized to be present? UNCLASS I FIED members of the UNCLASS ] FIED 7 1 Mr. Gaetz, you're not permitted to be in the 2 MR. GAETZ: J THE CHAIRMAN: 4 am on the J udi ci ary Commi ttee . Judiciary Committee is not a part of th'is hearing. MR. GAETZ: 5 6 I room. I thought the Judi ci ary Commi ttee had juri sd'ict"ion over impeachment. Mr. Gaetz, you're not permitted to be in 7 THE CHAIRMAN: 8 the room. PIease 1eave. MR. JORDAN: Mr . Chai rman 9 THE CHAIRMAN: 10 , real1y? Yes, rea11y. t4 to i nclude Members of Congress on committees that have roles of impeachment THE CHAIRMAN: 14r. Gaetz, take your statement to the press. They do you no good here. So, please, absent 15 yourself. 1l t2 l3 l'4R. GAETZ : t4R. GAETZ: t6 t7 l"1r . Gaetz 24 25 re goi ng the testi to remove yourself , . MR. JORDAN: 14r. Gaetz is going to stay and listen to mony. THE CHAIRI4AN: 22 ZJ goi ng You're going to have someone remove me f rom THE CHAIRI"IAN: You' 20 2t re the heari ng? l8 t9 You ' Mr. Gaetz, you're goi ng to leave the room. I think I have a right to be a rule you can cite as to why I am not MR. GAETZ: No, UNCLASS I FIED is there UNCLASS THE CHAIRMAN: I I EIED You're not a 8 member of this committee. 2 Thjs is conducted in closed sessjon. You're not permitted to J be here. I'm on the Judjciary 4 t"lR. GAETZ: 5 THE CHAIRMAN: Committee. Mr. Gaetz, please absent yourself from t4 ttee. I t' s the rul i ng of the chai r you ' re not permitted to be here. PIease leave the committee. MR. JORDAN: Mr. Chairman, I think in the 20 hours of testimony we've heard in the two previous intervjews, there have been a grand total of L2 Members of Congress present. I don't think it's going to hurt to have a L3th Member actually hear something that, in my judgment, all 435 Members of Congress should be entitled to hear. THE CHAIRMAN: Mr. Gaetz, you're not a member of the l5 three desi gnated 6 7 8 9 l0 ll 12 13 the commi 18 ttees that are parti ci pati ng i n thi s 'intervi ew. You ' re not permi tted to be here . That i s the ruling of the chair, and you are required to 1eave. MR. GAETZ: Do you have a rule that you're able to cite l9 for t6 t7 20 2t 22 23 commi that? THE CHAIRMAN: I citing the House rules and the deposition rules. You are not permitted to be here. MR. GAETZ : Whi ch rule? THE CHAIRMAN: Mr. Gaetz, you are simply delayi ng the 24 procedures 'in 25 yourself. am violation of the rules. Please absent UNCLASS I FlED I EIE UNCLASS : ch rule? I MR. 2 THE CHAIRMAN: J a spectacle outsjde? Th'is 4 thi s GAETZ commi Whi 9 D Mr. Gaetz, why don't you take your is not how we conduct ourselves in ttee. t0 I've seen how you've conducted yourself in this committee, and I'd like to be here to observe. THE CHAIRMAN: We'11 wai t unti 1 l"lr. Gaetz leaves bef ore we begin. I do want to say that thjs dilatory tactic will come out of the minority's time for questioning. HR. GAETZ: Th'is isn't dilatory. You can begin any tjme ll you 1 i ke. 5 6 7 8 9 MR. GAETZ: THE CHAIRMAN: We' re goi l2 13 t4 t5 t6 wilt come to begi n the c1ock. Thi s out of the minority's tjme for questions. MR. J0RDAN: Wel1, when you ng interrupted THE CHAIRMAN: I had a statement I wanted me. We're not back on the record. t7 l8 19 20 2l 22 23 24 25 UNCLASS I EIED to get to UNCLASS [].0:43 a I E] ED 10 .m. l 6 Okay. Let's go back on the record. MR. BITAR: Hi. As the general counsel of the House Intelligence Comm'ittee, I'fi relaying the v'iew of the Parliamentarian, wh'ich was just relayed over the phone, to both Members and staff of the minority comm'ittees as well as 7. the 2 J 4 5 8 9 l0 ll t2 l3 t4 THE CHAIRI"IAN: maj or i ty . The Parliamentarian made clear that the House deposition regulations and the language used therein has always been of the committees undertaking the joint investigation and not members of other committees who may w'ish to attend f or other reasons, and, theref ore, they are not allowed to participate 'in the deposition jtself or be present. construed as meaning members 15 Thank you. 16 MR. J0RDAN: Chairman, l1 THE CHAIRMAN: YCS. IB I'4R. J0RDAN: could I just add one thing? The Parf iamentarian was also clear that 20 there is no precedent, no basis for docking anyone's time, that this was a legitimate question and not dilatory in any 2t sense. t9 22 23 THE CHAIRMAN: Mr. Jordan, you have an opening statement? I 24 MR. J0RDAN: 25 0n September 241h, Speaker Pelosi unilaterally do. UNCLASS I EI ED I FIED UNCLASS I announced - THE CHAiRMAN: The 2 J 11 has record should reflect that Mr. Gaetz left the room. 4 MR. JORDAN: Yes. 5 0n September 24th, Speaker Pelosi unilaterally 6 7 8 9 10 announced that the House was beginning a so-ca11ed impeachment inquiry. 0n October 2nd, Speaker Pelosi promised that the so-ca11ed impeachment inquiry would treat the President with fairness. However, Speaker Pelosj , Chai rman Schi ff, and Democrats are not living up to that basic promise. Instead, Democrats 12 are conducting a rushed, closed-door, and unprecedented impeachment inquiry. Democrats are ignoring 45 years of l3 bipartjsan procedures, procedures that provided elements of r4 f undamental f a'i l5 20 inquiries, the majority and the minority had coequal subpoena authority and the right to requi re a commi ttee vote on at1 subpoenas. The Presi dent's counsel had a right to attend all depositions and hearings inctuding those held in executive session. The President's counsel had a right to cross-examine witnesses and a right to 2t propose wi tnesses. ll t6 l7 l8 l9 In past rness and due process. impeachment The President's counsel also had the 22 right to present to the admission of evidence, and to 23 evidence, object 24 all 25 Speaker Pelosi and Chaj rman Schi ff's so-called impeachment review evidence presented, both favorable and unfavorable. UNCLASS I F]ED I E]ED UNCLASS i nqui 2 J 4 5 6 ry has none 12 of these guarantees of fundamental fai rness and due process. Most disappointing, Democrats are conducting this inquiry behind closed doors. This seems to be nothing more than hiding thjs work from the American people and, frankly, as we just saw, hiding it from other Members of impeachment 8 the Un'ited States Congress. If Democrats intend to undo the will of the American people just before the next election, 9 they should at least do so transparently and be willing to 7 l0 ll 12 l3 t4 l5 accountable f or the'i r acti ons And, fi na11y, Dr. Hi be . 11, we've been advi sed by the State that communications between heads of state are classified, and I think it's important that we keep that in m'ind as we proceed through today' s i ntervi ew. With that, I yield back. Department t6 THE CHAIRMAN: 14r. Goldman. t7 MR. GOLDMAN: Thank you 18 This is a deposition of Dr. Fiona Hill conducted by the House Permanent 20 the 'impeachment inquiry 2t on September 24th. 23 Mr . Chai rman. Select Committee on Intelligence pursuant to l9 22 , announced by the Speaker of the Dr. Hi11, if you could please state your fu11 spell your last name for the record. name and HILL: 1t's Fiona Hi11. Last name is H-i-1-1. 24 DR. 25 MR. GOLDMAN: Along UNCLASS with other proceedings in I FIED House UNCLASS I furtherance t3 I EIED of the inquiry, this deposition is part of a 3 joint investigation 1ed by the Intelligence Committee in coordi nat'ion wi th the Commi ttees on Forei gn Af f a j rs and 4 Oversight and Reform. 2 8 In the room today are majority and minority staff from both the Foreign Affajrs Committees and the Oversight Commi ttees, as well as maj ori ty and mi nori ty staff from HPSCI. Just so the record js clear, equal numbers of staff 9 from both the majority and minority have been and are 5 6 7 22 tted to be here. Thi s i s a staff- led deposi tion, but l'lembers, of course, f rom the three commi ttees may ask questions during thei r allotted tjme. My name is DanieI Goldman. I'm the djrector of investigations for the HPSCI majority staff, and I want to thank you very much for coming in today for thjs deposition. I would like to do brief introductions, and I understand that the w1 tness would also j ust 1i ke f or everybody around the table to introduce him or herself so that the witness knows who everybody is. 5o, to my right js Daniel Nob1e, who is the senior investigative counsel for HPSCI. Mr. Noble and I wjll be conducting most of the interview for the majority. And then, if we could just continue down the room next 23 to Mr. Noble, that would be great. l0 11 t2 l3 r4 l5 t6 t7 t8 19 20 21 permi 24 25 MR. HECKr I'm Denny Heck. I represent the UNCLASS I FIED 10th FIED UNCLASS I I District of 14 Washington State. 2 J 4 5 6 7 8 MR. RASKIN: Congressman Jamie Raskin from Maryland's Eighth Distrjct. MR. R0UDA: Congressman Hartey Rouda from 0range County, Cali forni a. MR. R00NEY: Franci Forei gn Af f a'i rs Commi s Rooney from southwest Florida, ttee. 9 l0 Scott Perry, Pennsylvan'ia's L0th District. 11 MR. PERRY: 12 MR. ZELDIN: Lee Zeldi n, New York- L. l3 MR. J ORDAN Jim Jordan, 0hio. : 14 l5 t6 t7 MR. CASTOR: Steve Castor the Oversi ght Commi with the Republican staff of ttee. t8 t9 24 , counsel to Dr . Hi 11 MR. UNGAR: I'm Sam Ungar, also counsel for Dr. Hi11. DR. HI LL: Thank you MR. GOLDMAN: Dr. Hj ll, thi s deposi tion wi 11 be conducted enti rely at the unctassi fj ed leve1 . However, the 25 depos j 20 2l 22 23 MR. WOL0SKY: I 'm Lee Wolosky . . t'ion i s bei ng conducted UNCLASS I FIED 'in HPSCI's secure spaces and i n UNCLASS ] FIED l5 I the presence of staff who all have approprjate security 2 clearance. It J questions asked 4 5 6 7 8 9 t0 ll t2 l3 t4 'i s the commi ttee's expectation that nei ther of the witness nor answers by the witness or the witness' counsel will require discussjon of any information that is currently or at any point could be properly classj fied under Executive 0rder 13526. Moreover, E0 13526 states that, quote, in no case shall information be classified, continued to be maintained as classj fied, or fai t to be declassi f ied, unquote, for the purpose of conceafing any violations of 1aw or preventing embarrassment of any person or entity. Now, I understand that, Dr. Hi11, you had classificatjon authorization in your prev'ious job. You were the classifying authority. So we expect you to fully understand the l7 d'istinction here between the classified and unclass'ified, and we will be relying on you in part to'indicate whether any questions that are asked may call for answers that are 18 classified. l5 l6 t9 20 2l 22 23 24 25 If that js the case, we would ask that you please inform us of that before answering the questions so that we can adjust accordingly. Part of the reason for that is our understanding is that your attorneys do not have appropriate securi ty clearances DR. HI LL : Ri ght MR. GOLDMAN: -- and so we'11 want to make sure that we . UNCLASS I EIED l6 UNCLASS I FIED all classi fi ed i nformati on i n our nati onal securi ty 1 preserve 2 i nterests. Today's deposi ti on 'is not bei ng taken 'in executi J ve 4 session, but because of the sensi tive and confidenti a1 nature 5 of 8 of the topics and materials that will be discussed, access to the transcript of the deposition will be fimited to the three committees in attendance. You and your attorney wi11 have an opportunity to review the transcript at a later 9 date. 6 7 l0 ll t2 l3 14 15 l6 t7 l8 t9 20 2l 22 Z) 24 25 some I'd like to go over a couple of ground rules for this deposition. We will be following the House regulations for depositions. As you know by now, we have previously provided your counsel with a copy of the regulations, and we have copies here as well if you or your counsel would like to review them at any time. The way this deposition will proceed js as follows: The majority will be given L hour to ask questions, and then the mj nori ty wi 11 be given L hour to ask questions, and, thereafter, we w'i11 alternate back and forth between majority and mi nori ty i n 45-mi nute rounds unti 1 the questi oni ng i s complete. We will take periodic breaks, but'if you or your counsel need any break at any time, just 1et us know. As we just understood, you do have counsel here, who just introduced themselves. And so we want to make it clear that, under the House deposit'ion rules, counsel other than Before we begin, UNCLASS I FIED UNCLASS I FIED t7 I your own counsel, including counsel for government agencies, 2 may a counsel here today representing you not attend. 5o it is our understanding that the only 5 is your personal counsel. There is a stenographer taking down everything that js said here today. For the record to be clear, we would ask 6 that you please wait unti1 questions are finished before you 7 answer, and we will do the same when you answer. 8 stenographer cannot record nonverbal answers, such as shaking 9 your head or saying "uh-huh, " so 'it js important that J 4 The you t2 with an audible, verbal answer. We ask that you give complete replies to the questions based on your best recollection. If a question is unclear or l3 you are uncertain l0 11 answer each question 15 in your response, please don't hesjtate to let us know and ask that the question be rephrased or asked again. If you do not know the answer to a question or cannot t6 remember, simply say so. 14 l7 l8 l9 20 2t 22 23 24 25 You may onty refuse to answer a question to preserve a privilege that is recognized by the committee. If you refuse to answer a question on the basjs of privilege, staff may either proceed with the deposition or seek a ruling from the chairman on the objection 'in person or by telephone during the deposition at a tjme of the majority staff's choosing. If the chair overrules any such objection, you are required to answer the question. And, fina1ly, you are reminded that it is unlawful to UNCLASS I EIED UNCLASS l8 I FIED 4 deliberately provide false informatjon to Members of Congress or staff. It is imperatjve that you not only answer our questions truthfully but that you give fu11 and complete answerS to all questions asked of you. Omissions may also be 5 considered I 2 J to be false statements. Now, as thi 6 s deposi ti on i s under oath, Dr. Hi 11 , would ll to be Sworn? Do you answer or affirm that the testimony you are about to give us is the whole truth and nothing but the truth? DR. HI LL: I do. MR. GOLDI"IAN : Thank you . Let the record ref lect that 12 the 7 8 9 l0 you please stand and raise your wi t4 t7 18 t9 20 Fli 11 , i f you choose, now i s your t'ime to make any openi ng remarks. DR. l5 t6 hand tness has been sworn. Dr. 13 right here HI LL: I don ' t have to answer everyone's MR. GOLDi"IAN: And, any openi ngs remarks . I 'm j ust questions. Mr. Wolosky ' do you have anythi ng that you would like to address before we begin? MR. WOLOSKY: Yes. Thank you, Mr. Goldman. I would like to enter into the record a letter of 22 today,s date, 0ctober L4, 2019, from Michael Purpura of the whi te House Counsel's off i ce governi ng the subj ects or 23 addressing the subjects 2l 24 of execut'ive privilege and classification, along with a letter from me to Mr. Purpura 25 dated 0ctober L3, 2019. UNCLASS I FIED UNCLASS I FIED 19 5 I'd like to make it clear that Dr. Hill is testifying today subject to the contents of these letters or of the White House Counsel's 0ffice's letter, also pursuant to the subpoena she recejved today, and pursuant to any rulings that are made by the chair during the pendency of these 6 proceedi ngs I 2 3 4 THE CHAIRI"IAN: Those 7 8 9 . r eco letters rd lThe information follows:l l0 1l ******** INSERT L_L **x***** 12 l3 t4 l5 t6 t7 l8 t9 20 21 22 23 24 25 UNCLASSIFIED wi 11 be admi tted i nto the UNCLASS THE CHAIRMAN: I FIED 20 In 11ght of the Wh'i te House counsel J letter introduced by the witness' counSel, 1et me State at the outset of today's testimony that thjs testimony should 4 proceed without any interference 2 5 6 7 Dr. Hi or delay. 11, you are compelled to testi fy at thi s deposition by a subpoena that the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence issued to you today, 0ctober 14, 2019. You l0 are required to provide fu11, truthful, and accurate testimony i n connection wi th the commi ttee's joi nt investigation, which is undertaken aS part of the House of ll Representatives' impeachment inquiry. 8 9 t7 letter sent to your counsel this morning from the White House stating that the information that you may be asked to testify about today could be covered by a privilege. Under the House deposition ru1eS, aS the cha'i r, I have the authori ty to rule on any such objection, but no such objection wj11 be in order or should 18 be necessary. t2 l3 t4 l5 t6 t9 Your counsel has provided a As you know, only the President may assert executive 2l privilege, and the Presjdent usually does so jn writing with specificity along with an opinion from the Justice 22 Department. The President has not communicated any 23 assertion to the committee with respect to the information 24 requested. 20 25 The Presjdent has also spoken extensively UNCLASS ] FIED such publicly about UNCLASS 2t I F]ED 1 the matters under investigation here, and he has declassified 2 and J Ukrai ni an Presi 4 the wh'istleblower complaint and a range of accompanying 5 materials that address the range of issues under discussion 6 today publicly released a summary of his call with dent. the The adm'ini strat'ion also declassi f i ed . to further 7 The President's actjons have opened the door 8 investigative actions and taking of testimony on these 9 subj ects. The Presi dent has wai ved hi s abi 1 i ty to block l0 others from making statements about the l1 contrad'ict hi s own statements or expose hi s wrongdoi t2 same matters that ng. of deliberative process privilege as of executive privi lege, thi s j s not a privi Iege Regarding any claim l3 an element t4 recogni zed by the Congress. Furthermore, l5 have been asked to provide l6 t7 investigation and the House's impeachment inqui ry. We must obtain your answers here because Congress has a l8 const"itutional duty to expose wrongdoing jn the executive t9 20 21 22 23 24 25 the j nformation you is critical to the committee's and to act as a check and balance to the power of the executive, especially when there is significant evidence that the Pres'ident is abusing his executive power for his own personal gain. The committees cannot accept any effort to interfere with these proceedings. We therefore expect you do answer all questions during the deposi tion. With that, I will yield back to Mr. GoIdman. UNCLASS ]FIED UNCLASS I FIED MR. GOLDMANI: Thank You I BY MR. 2 22 . GOLDMAN: 7 Dr. Hi11, could you please explain for everyone in the room What your role was on the National Security Council? A Yes. I was the senjor director who was overseeing all of the interactions across the interagency pertaining to Europe, our European a11ies, including also the European 8 Union and NATO, and also including Russia, Turkey, and the J 4 5 6 9 l0 ll t2 a ect at hand, Ukrai ne. a When did you join the NSC? A I formally started on April 3rd of 201.7. Technically, it was April L, but it was a weekend. subj a A l3 And when did You dePart the NSC? 2l i departed the NSC physically on July 19th of thjs year, 2019. I handed over my duties on July 15th to my SucceSSor, Tim Morrison, and I handed in my badge technically on September 3rd of 2019. But I was actually on vacation, a paid vacation from the NSC, from basically July 19 all the way through untjl handing jn my badge again. My last payday was August 30th of 2019. And I gi ve thi s deta'iled answer because I know that there's been Some confusion as to when I 22 was t4 15 t6 t7 l8 t9 20 23 24 25 physically there or what my actual tenure was. July L9th until September 3rd, what was your acceSS to email and other communications within the NSC? A I had some limited access to unclassified email on a And from UNCLASS I EIED UNCLASS I FIED 7 that would have be under agreement with Ambassador Bolton and with other NSC staff. Because of the short handover to Tim Morrison, there were concerns that emails would come into me directly because I'd been there si nce the begi nni ng essentj a1ly of the admi ni stration, and they wanted to make sure that if I was the only person getting an email, that it wasn't lost and could be forwarded 8 on. I 2 J 4 5 6 23 my iPhone, and 24 0kay. And prior to joining the NSC, can you just give us a brjef overview of your professional experience. A I have been working on issues related to Russia since I was an undergraduate at university back in the 1980s. And, actua11y, I fjrst started in a professional way working on Russi a- related i ssues, i ncludi ng actually wi th my counsel, Lee Wolosky, in the early 1990s when we were both research at the Kennedy School assi stants at Harvard working on technical assistance projects. After I completed my Ph.D. at Harvard and fjnished worki ng wi th , I then worked for the Eurasi a Foundation. I was the di rector of strategic planni ng for the Eurasia Foundation, which was a congressionally funded technjcal assistance foundation. I became an adjunct fel1ow at the Brookings Institutjon jn 2000, and I became a fu11-time employee of the Brookings Inst'itution around 2002, 25 2003. 9 l0 ll t2 13 t4 15 l6 t7 l8 19 20 21 22 L) a UNCLASS I FIED UNCLASS I FIED 24 4 I then, f rom the beg'inni ng of 2005 through to November 2009, at the end of the Bush administration and the first year of the 0bama administration, was the national intelligence officer for Russ'ia and Euras'ia at the National 5 intelligence CounciI. I 2 J 6 7 8 9 l0 ll t2 l3 I then returned to Brookings in the end of November 2009, and for the next 7 years, I was the director of the Center on the U.S. and Europe at the Brookings Institution before I joined the admjnistration. a You mentioned that you were responsible for overseeing the interagency process as it relates to your portfolio. Focusing on Ukraine, what does that mean? A That means bringing together interagency meetings, l5 State Department, Pentagon, every other department for discussions of U.S. Government policy. It also means l6 meeti t4 t7 l8 t9 20 2l 22 23 24 25 offi ci als, meeti ng with analysts from our intelligence services to get updates on a regular basis on developments in Ukraine, and also preparing, of course, memoranda and any policy documents ng, where appropri ate, wi th Ukrai ni an for the President or the National Security Advisor or other senior members of staff who may be having i nteracti ons perti nent to po1 i cy. a All right. We are going to get into many of the details during your tjme with the NSC, but I would like to spend this fjrst hour trying to hit on some top-1ine issues necessary UNCLASS ] FIED UNCLASS I 2 J 4 5 6 7 I FIED and get an understanding more broadly about what was going 16 t7 aggression against Ukraine. 9 l0 ll t2 l3 t4 l5 18 19 20 2t 22 23 24 25 on with Ukraine while you were there. And, I guess, the first question, and thjs is perhaps a f i ttle d'i ff i cu1t, but can you descrj be, generally speaki ng, what the official U.S. policy was related to Ukraine and what the focus of official U.S. policy was in relation to Ukraine? A I think the policy towards Ukraine was going of evolutjon jn the time that I was in the administration. lv'lany of you, being long-serving Members of Congress, and the staff, will of course recall that, you know, a 1ot of focus was put onto Ukraine after the annexation of Crimea by Russia in 2014. And then, of course, there was the outbreak of the war in Donbas, the downing of MH-17, and decisions made by members of this body to impose sanctions on Russia in response to those acts that were conducted, those acts of 8 25 through a period I into the administration there was a great deal of debate. This is, of course, you know, the beginning of 20L7. We've had essentially 2-ptus years of efforts to deter Russ'ia from taking further aggressive acts agai nst Ukrai ne. The warin Donbas i s st j 11 conti nui ng. There' s a quest'ion about what role the Uni ted States should play in the resolution of that conflict, because at that juncture jt was the French and the Germans in the course So, when came UNCLASS I FIED UNCLASS I FIED 26 I of the Mjnsk group, the grouping set up by the French and the 2 Germans, along J with Ukra'in'ians and technically also Russ'ians, to try to find a resolution to the war in 4 Donbas. the the 6 didn't actually have a role in this. So we were in the process of deliberating then what role the 7 Uni 5 8 9 10 1l t2 l3 14 15 l6 t7 18 t9 20 2l 22 23 24 25 The United states ted States should play, how we would work together wi th the French and the Germans to try to seek a resolution of the conflict in Donbas, how We should conduct ourselves in terms of assistance to Ukraine; should there be the provision of lethal weaponry, meaning, of course, defensive weaponry; how would we be able to help Ukraine over the longer term thjs i s a bi g debate wi th the Pentagon to rebui 1d i ts ml1i tary forces that had been decimated not just by the war with Russia but by the annexat'ion of Crimea because the Russians, of course, se'ized the ma j or ports and the whole enti re Ukrainian Black Sea f1eet, and, of course, it also devastated thei r command and control. We were also concerned about domestic politics in Ukraine. I mean, this has been a longstanding concern through multiple administrations. And when I was in the DNI, I mean, I felt in many respects that I was reprieving, you know, many of the analytical concerns that I'd had when I was nat'ional jntelligence officer for Russia and Ukraine. We were worried about the stability of the Ukrajnian UNCLASS ] FIED UNCLASS 1 2 I FIED 27 the role of oligarchs in the Ukrainian Government. It was a very weak Presidency. There was, of Government, t2 of corruption. Thjs has been standard across most of the republics in the former Soviet Union in thei r i ndependence. Many of them had had weak 1ocal governance in the Soviet structure. And when they became i ndependent enti ties, they weren't particularly well set up to be i ndependent countries, and there was a great deal of efforts by private interests to, you know, pick away at the structures of government. That happened in Russia as wel1. And we were also trying to figure out indeed how we l3 would work with our European al1ies on a much broader set of a J 4 5 6 7 8 9 l0 1l t4 l5 courSe, a great deal projects related to Ukra'ine's long-term sustainability. So j t wasn ' t j ust tackl i ng corrupti on or hetpi ng the Ukrai nj ans 18 buitd a more viable, sustainable state apparatus and institutions, but also how we would tackle some key problems for them beyond the restorati on of thei r mi 1 i tary capabi I i ty, 19 including their dependency on Russia for energy supplies t6 t7 20 2t 22 23 24 25 as well as acting as the main conduit or transit for energy supplies from Russia, exports of Russjan energy through Ukraine to the rest of EuroPe. So we were also starting to work on a more comprehensive approach to Russia's energy. I mean, you're all very much familiar with the debates about Nord Stream 2. I was there UNCLASS ] FIED UNCLASS ] F]ED 28 8 in the Bush administration for Nord Stream L when we were also tryi ng to block the expansjon of pi peli nes from Russi a. I mean, we tried again also under Reagan in the Soviet period. I mean, thjs is a longstanding U.S. policy to find ways of diversi fyi ng European energy suppli es. And so we were starting to look at how we could try to wean Ukrajne off the dependence on Russian energy and try to find other energy suppliers, be it U.S. LNG or other oi1 and 9 gas supplies, coa1, including from Pennsylvania and, I 2 J 4 5 6 7 you l0 know, other U.S. States. ll , you know, as I 'm t ry'i ng to poi nt out here having a wide-ranging set of discussions about Ukraine all against the backdrop, obviously, of a debate about how t2 13 So we were , t6 effective the sanctions were being on Russia's own behavior and, you know, Rt,lssi a's own att j tudes towards Ukra j ne. MR. W0L0SKY: Mr. Goldman, can I just interject that the t7 witness t4 l5 20 js obviously testifying to U.5. deliberative processes relating to the conduct of U.S. foreign policy. I actually don't think that this is covered by the letter from the White House Counsel's Office, but I would appreciate 2t guidance and a 22 type that she is offering. l8 t9 23 24 25 ruling from the chair on testimony such as the I thank the counsel f or rai si ng the issue, and I'm prepared to rule on it now. Dr. Hj 11, you are compelled to testi fy at thi s THE CHAIRI.{AN: UNCLASS I F]ED UNCLASS IF]ED 29 deposition by subpoena that was issued to you by the House J Intelligence Committee on 0ctober L4,2019. Your counsel raised a potential objection on behalf of the White House 4 stating that informatjon that you are providing could 5 covered by 2 has be 6 privilege. Under the House deposition ru1es, as the chair, I have the authority to rule on that potential 7 objection. As you know, only the President may assert executive 8 t2 privilege, and he usually does so jn writing w'ith specificity along with an opinion from the Justice Department. The President and Department of Justice have not specifically invoked executive privilege with respect to the jnformation l3 requested. 9 t0 ll The President has also spoken extensively about the t4 l5 matters under investigation here, and he has dectassified r6 publicly released a summary of his call with the Ukrainian t7 Pres'i l8 whistleblower complaint and a range l9 that addressed the 20 dent. The admi ni strati on also declassi f i ed the range of accompanying materials of issues under discussion The President's actions have further today. opened the door to 22 further investigative act'ions and taking of testimony on these subj ects . The Presi dent has wai ved hi s abi 1 i ty to L) block others from making statements about the 2t 24 25 and same matters that contradict his own statements or expose h'is wrongdoing. The privitege cannot be used to conceal misconduct during UNCLASS I FIED UNCLASS 1 I FIED 30 in particular during an impeachment inquiry. To the extent that the White House may be asserti ng 2 a 6 deliberatjve process privilege aS an element of executive pri vi lege , thi s 'i s not a pri vi lege recogni zed by the CongresS. Furthermore, the information the witness has been asked to provide'is critical to the committee's 7 i nvesti gati on. J 4 5 We 8 must obtain your answers here because Congress has a t4 constitutjonal duty to expose wrongdoing in the executive and act as a check and balance to the power of the executive, especially when there is significant evidence that the Presjdent is abusing his executive power for his own personal gain. Therefore, I am overruling any potential aSsertion of privilege, and I 'instruct the witneSs to anSWer all queStions l5 du r 9 l0 ll t2 l3 t6 t7 l8 t9 20 2t 22 23 24 25 i ng the depos i t i on today . respectfully, i f the wi tness i s about to g'ive an answer and i s unsure of whether or not her anSWer may violate a privilege, is the witness permitted MR. ZELDIN: Mr. Chai rman, to consult with the executive branch for advice on that question of whether or not that content is privileged? THE CHAIRMAN: Mr. Zeldin, the White House had the opportunity, in correspondence w'ith the witness prior to the testimony today, to rai se any speci fic obj ection to any specific question. They chose not to do so. And, therefore, we will go forward as the chair has ru1ed. UNCLASS I FIED UNCLASS 1 2 a J I EIED 31 That's not what the question well' respectfully, Mr . Chai r , the questi on i s, i f the wi tness' understanding of what js privileged comes up and the witness MR. ZELDIN: 6 to whether or not her answer js going to violate somethi ng that's pri vi leged, wi 11 the wi tness be permi tted to get advice before being forced to provide information that 7 may be pri vi leged? 4 5 js THE CHAIRMAN: 8 9 10 unsure as has already been in No, counsel. The counsel communication for the witness with the Whjte House, has already received whatever guidance the White House was t2 willing to give. The chair has made a ruling on the question of privilege; none applies here. We will not be asking the 13 witness about extraneous conversations with the President t4 about other l5 the chai r has ruIed. 1l matters. 0ur focus today will be on Ukraine, t6 Mr. t7 MR. JORDAN: l.4r. Chairman, Goldman. o11owup. So, 'if Dr. if I cou1d, just H'i11 gets a quest l8 f 19 it 20 communi 2l executive branch and she chooses not 22 are you then going to overrule it? ,tJ does and one quick jon and she believes violate what she has communicated the cati ons her and her counsel have had w'ith the THE CHAIRMAN: 24 already 25 concerns made to anSWer that question, Mr. Jordan, as the witness counsel c1ear, the witness' counsel has raised the that were expressed to the UNCLASS I FIED wi tness through has UNCLASS ] F]ED 32 ) with the White House. It's appropriate that the counsel do so, and they have done so, and I have ruled on that potential objection. That is the process that we will 4 use today. I 2 5 6 7 8 9 10 1l t2 13 t4 l5 l6 correspondence just underscore, Mr. Chairman then we can get back to Mr. Goldman's question I would just underscore this is why executive agency counsel should be here. This is why I have never -- this is now I've never been in these kind of proceedings where agency counsel wasn't permi tted to be present. We wouldn't have these concerns if they were here. MR. J0RDAN: I THE CHAIRMAN: would Actua11y, Mr. Jordan, you were present at a deposition conducted by Chairman Issa without the preSence of agency counsel, and you were perfectly copacetic with it at that time, so your statement is not accurate. But, nonetheless , the cha'i r has ruled and we wi 11 go f orward. t7 14r. Goldman. l8 BY t'{R. t9 a 20 tenure Dr. Hi GOLDMAN : 11, ultimately toward by the end of your 24 at the NSC, had the United States agreed to provide lethal mi 1i tary assi stance to Ukra'ine to wi thstand the aggression from Russia in the eastern area of Ukraine? A That's correct. a And what anticorruption efforts did the U. S. 25 promote 2l 22 23 within Ukraine during the time that you were there? UNCLASS I F]ED UNCLASS I FIED JJ 2 WelI, the time that I was there has also spanned what was a period jn Ukraine itself of a transition in its J own 4 gone through I 5 6 7 8 9 A government. I mean, we'11 all reca1l that Ukraine has quite a period of upheaval. The i ndependence movements back i n the 1990s, 1980s, 1990s, then 'in a period of turmoi 1 and changes of government, that were sparked off by Ukraine's deci s'ion to try to 3 oi n the European Uni on, at least to an assoc'iation agreement with the European Union, that and then the events f orm l0 precipitated Russ'ia's decision to annex Crimea because of the lt revolt in Ukraine that led to a change in government. So there was a focus, as I said before, on trying to fjnd a way of getting the Ukrajnian Government to stabilize and sustainable. And we were also in the period in the last year or so of preparation for Ukrainian Presidential electj ons , whi ch made i t qui te compl j cated i n tryi ng to work with the incumbent government and all of the'ir instjtutions and then look'ing f orward to what mi ght be a change of government in Ukrajne. So what we were trying to do was work wjth the institutions that were there already in p1ace, from the prosecutor's office to the Ukrainjan Parliament, the Rada, to government officials who these sets of issues came into their purview, and the main locus of that activity was through our embassy in Kyiv and also through the State Department. t2 13 t4 l5 t6 t7 l8 19 20 2t 22 23 24 25 UNCLASS ] F]ED UNCLASS I FIED 34 I a Now z A I should also point out, of course, that we have J posted 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 to the Embassy 'in Ukrai ne, j ust as i s the case i n most embassi es , representati ves of all the U. S. Government departments and agencies that would be jnvolved in these kinds of issues, so from the DOJ, FBI, and many others. a But certainly eliminating corruption in Ukraine was one of, i f the central, goals of U. S. foreign policy? A That's right, as it has been with many other former Sov'iet states where the corruption pervades through anything t2 to getting into schools, getting medical treatment, you know, all different 1eve1s of the l3 public sector. l1 from the police force a t4 l5 of whether aSsessment A a t6 t7 Intelli gence Communi ty's Russia interfered in the 2016 election? Are you f ami 1i ar w'ith the I am. And are you familiar with an indictment that l8 Special Counsel Robert Mueller l9 i 20 2t 22 23 24 25 nterf erence 'i n the A a Yes, I 2C)16 the filed jn connection to Russian electi on? am. to doubt ei ther the facts alleged 'in the i ndi ctment or the Intell i gence Communi ty' s assessment that Russia did interfere in the 2016 election? A i do not. a And do ycu have any reason to beljeve that Ukraine Do you have any reason UNCLASS I FTED UNCLASS I I did interfere in the J 35 2015 election? I do not. We're talking about the Ukrainjan A 2 FIED Government here when you say Ukraine, correct? a 4 Yes. l3 A Yes, I do not. a Okay. I'm goi ng to swi tch gears for a mjnute, Dr. Hi11. When did you first become aware of the jnterest in Ukrai ne of Rudy Gi u1 i ani ? A It would have been sometime between July I'm sorry January 2019 and March 2019. And I first became aware of it partly through articles in the newspaper that I see some of our Members of Congress reading, The Hi11, by John Solomon, and also because of Mr. Giuliani's statements t4 on televi s'ion. 5 6 7 8 9 l0 l1 12 17 a Part of your duties and responsibilities is to track of matters in the public, right, and jn the media related to the areas that you were covering. Is that l8 accu rate? l5 t6 A t9 Not entirely. I mean, my keep job was to, you know, 22 of what our foreign counterparts were doing. I have to, you know, confess right upfront that it's incredibly difficult to keep up with what everybody else is doing as 23 we11. 20 21 24 25 keep track And I would often rely on members of our i nternal press corps, other colleagues, our di rectors, and other UNCLASS I EIED NSC UNCLASS I 2 ^J 4 5 6 7 8 9 l0 ll t2 13 l4 15 l6 t7 l8 t9 20 2t 22 I FIED to flag anything for me that they thought that I should be paying attention to. I had every morning an intel brief, and i t didn't, you know, basically always pertai n to domestic related i ssues, of course. But we do get as much, of course I think most of you compilations of who have served in government know this c1i ppi ngs that the Wh'ite House Si t Room deems to be of relevance or of i nterest. And some of those would be forwarded onto us if they had subject-related interest. So that was how I fjrst became aware that there was Some deeper interest on the part of Mr. Giuliani. a And what did you understand that interest to have been when you initially learned about it? A To be honest, i had a hard time figuring out quite what j t was about because there were references to George Soros; there were references to 2015; and then there were all when I first read the article in kinds of references to The Hi11, which I think was in late March of 2019, it was referring to do-not-prosecute lists and statements from the Ukrai nj an prosecutor , Mr. Lutsenko, none of whi ch I'd ever heard of anything about before. a And at this point, what was your impression of the peopte 24 Ukrainian Prosecutor General Yuriy Lutsenko? A I hadn't really formed much of a personal opinion 25 of him, but certainly from the information that I had, not 23 36 UNCLASS I FIED UNCLASS 5t ] FIED I just from our embassy but from also colleagues at the State 2 Department and others across the 3 were clearty some problems analytical community, there with this gentleman jn the way 24 that he was conducting his work. a And around thi s time, what d'id you understand the relationship between Rudy Gjuliani and the President of the United States to be? A Beyond the official role of Mr. Giuljani as the private attorney, I had no other sense whatsoever of what h'is role might be. a Okay. Did you ever meet or communjcate with Rudy Gi u1 i ani di rectly on matters relati ng to Ukrai ne? A I did not. I've never actually met him. a Now, after you first learned about Mr. Giuliani's interest in March, what did you understand to be the development of his interest in Ukraine after March? A We1l, he seemed to develop a very strong interest in Ukrajne in that timeframe. And I was trying, you know, to the best of my t'imited ability, to figure out what that interest might be. And I made a couple of inquiries to people to ask what they knew about hi s acti vi ti es, and I w1l1 be quite frank in saying that most of the people who I spoke to thought i t was related to personal busi ness on h'is part. a And who did you injtially speak to about 25 Mr. Giuliani? 4 5 6 7 8 9 l0 ll t2 t3 t4 l5 t6 t7 l8 19 20 2t 22 23 UNCLASS I EIED UNCLASS]FIED A I 2 J 4 5 6 7 8 9 l0 know, asked several of my colleagues who familiar with his work in New York. I were, you asked other of the references were obviousty to energy related issues. I talked to some of my colleagues across the NSC who work in our energy directorate. And I tried to read as much as I possibly could in the press to figure out what was going on because, at this point, jt started to have an impact obviously on our own work because of the constant references by people to hi s because some statements, especially on a ll t2 I 38 Can you FOX News. explain what impact it had on the official U.S. policy and your role in making that? l5 Giuliani was asserting quite frequently on television in public appearances that he had been given some authority over matters related to Ukraine, and 1f that 16 was the case, we hadn't been informed about t7 making a l3 14 A Because Mr. that. But he was 18 lot of public statements and, you know, obviously making a 1ot of assertions, including about our ambassador to t9 Ukrai ne, O 20 Masha Yovanovi Di tch. d you try to determ'ine whether l4r . Gi u1i ani was 24 portfolio over Ukraine? A I asked my, you know, direct superior Ambassador Bolton if he was aware of Mr. Giuliani being given some direct taskings related to Ukraine, and he was not aware of 25 thi s. 2t 22 23 accurate and he had been g'iven any UNCLASS I EIED UNCLASS I FIED 39 ll a Did you speak to anyone else about this? A People 'in the State Department aIso. a All right. And what was their response? A Everyone was completely unaware of any djrect official role that Mr. Giuliani had been given on the Ukraine account. And, at that partjcular juncture, no one that I had been in contact wjth had actually spoken to him. a And what particular juncture are you referring to? A You asked me about the early stages, so around March, Apri 1 of 2019. a To your knowledge, was Mr. G'iulian'i ever a t2 government employee? I 2 a J 4 5 6 7 8 9 l0 l3 t4 15 A a A a Not that I know of, no. Do you know whether he I don't held a security clearance? know. t7 said that, initjally, you were led to believe that hjs jnterest was based on his personal financial l8 interest. Did you come to l9 his evolved over time? A If we're talkjng at later stages, I mean, it depends on how you want to go through this, you know, chronologically or, you know, what I started to know before i 1eft. How would you like to approach this? a I'm asking after March, Apri l, up unti 1 you 1eft, just broadly speaking, what did you come to understand his t6 20 21 22 L) 24 25 Now, you UNCLASS I understand FIED that that interest of UNCLASS I F]E 40 D 4 interests to encompass? A Well, there was a period before the ousting of our 'in the Ambassador , and there was a peri od af ter thi s . So, period up until the ouster -- and I'm using this, I think' 5 very clearly, I think, for all of us who were working on the 6 Ukraine account, the dismissal I 2 J 7 8 9 of Ambassador Yovanovitch a real turning point for us. Because all 0f the information that I had seen in press, be i t on The Hj 11 , John Solomon's arti cles , on waS the 22 or the newspaper articles I looked at, material that was you know, I asked to collect together and, You know, information that I got from other colleagues who were tracking this as well seemed to point towards a mixture of some business associates of Mr. Giuliani. I was told the names of the two gentlemen who happen to have just been jndicted. I had not previously come across them at all. There was also an American businessman in Florida who WaS associated with them whose name was also mentioned to me, Harry Sargeant. I dj dn' t fi nd any further i nformati on out about him. I mean, and my job was to track what was going on with Ukraine, not to start looking, you know, at what ,t .) domestic actors were about. 10 ll l2 l3 t4 l5 t6 l7 18 l9 20 2l 24 25 Mr. Giuliani's whirlwind, on FOX News I just want to make it very clear that at no tjme did I try to go beyond the confines of my job. I was just trying UNCLASS I F]ED UNCLASS I F]ED 41 J to understand what was going on so that I could then factor that in into any interactions that we were having with Ukrai ni an offi ci a1s and across the board across the 4 i nteragency. 5 I I 2 6 told that these gentlemen, Mr. Parnas, Mr. Fruman, and Mr. Sargeant had at1 been jn business with Mr. Giuljani, 7 and was 8 that the impression that a number of Ukrainian officials and others had had was that they were interested in seeking 9 busi ness l0 t1 deals i n Ukrai ne. did the removal of mark a turning point for you? t2 a Now why A Because there was no bas'is f or Ambassador Yovanovitch her removal . The l3 accusations against her had no merit whatsoever. This was 14 mi shmash a 15 of conspi racy theori es that, agai n, I 've told you, I believe firmly to be baseless, an idea of an association t6 between her and George Soros. I t7 had had accusations sjmilar to this being made against 19 first year of my tenure at the Nati onal Securi ty Counci 1 was fi 11ed wi th hateful calls , 20 conspiracy theories, whjch has started again, frankly, as 2t j t 's been announced that I 've been gi vi ng thi s deposi ti on l8 22 23 24 25 me as we11. My entire , of being a Soros mole in the White House, of colluding with all k'inds of enemies of the President, and, you know, of various improprieties. And it seems to be extraordinarily easy, as Ambassador accusing me UNCLASS I FIED UNCLASSIFIED 42 2 in her opening test'imony, for people to make baseless claims about people and then to seek their J di sm'issa1 I Yovanovitch pointed out so 4 . I'd experienced exactly the same treatment that she 8 in the whole fjrst year of my tenure at the National Security Council, which is a period in which Lieutenant General Mcflaster and many other members of staff Were targeted as we11, and many people were hounded out of the 9 Nat'iona1 Security Council because they became frightened 5 6 7 had r own securi tY. l0 about thej ll I recejved, I just have to te11 you, death threats, ca1ls at my home. My neighbors reported somebody coming and picked up a phone call hammering on my door. MY very to have someone call me obscenities to I I nervous about me testifying today as a result of that. t2 13 t4 l5 19 I'm not easily intimjdated, but that made me mad. And when I saw this happening to Ambassador Yovanovitch agai n, I was furi ous, because thi s i s, agai n, j ust thi s whipping up of what is frankly an ant'i -semitjc conspiracy 20 theory about George Soros to basically target nonpartisan 2t career t6 t7 l8 22 23 24 25 Now, officials, and also some political appointees as we11, because I j ust want to say thi s: Thi s i s not i ndi scrimi nate in its attacks. And so it was obvious to u5, and I mean all of my team, everybody at the State Department that I spoke to including UNCLASS I FIED UNCLASS I FIED 43 8 at the higher 1eve1s, inside the NSC at the high leve1s as we1l, that she'd been subject to a pretty ruthless, nasty defamatjon to basically remove her from p1ace. And the most obvious explanation at that point, it has to be said, seemed to be busjness dealings of individuals who wanted to improve their investment positions insjde of Ukra'ine itself , and also to deflect away from the findings of not just the Mueller report on Russian jnterference but 9 what's also been confirmed by your own Senate report, I 2 3 4 5 6 7 I and myself to be true as a former intelligence l0 what ll analyst and somebody who has been working on Russia for 12 than 30 know years. l3 fact that Ambassador Yovanovitch removed as a result of this was, I have to say, pretty t4 di spi ri ti l5 a l6 removal t7 A So the more was ng. Who did you understand was responsible for her ? I understood this to be the result of the campaign 2l ani had set 'in moti on i n con j uncti on wi th people who were wri ti ng articles and, you know, pubf ications that I would have expected better of, and also, you know, just the constant drumbeat of these accusations that he was 22 maki l8 t9 20 Z) 24 25 that ['4r . G j uIi ng on the televi sion. a result of that, he had created an atmosphere 'in whi ch she was under great suspi ci on , and j t was obv'ious that she would lose the confidence of senior people because these And as UNCLASS I E]ED UNCLASS I I accusations 2 not to be true. Seem FIED to stick to 44 people even when they're proved 4 did you understand that the State Department well, let me take a step back. Who ultimately 5 made 5 a 7 8 9 the decision to remove her? A 6 We11, I assumed, and I was to1d, that i t was at the top levels of the State Department because they felt that position was no longer tenable. a Did you understand whether the President of her the t7 in this at all? A I was not 1ed to believe that. I did not hear that, and I was not told that. But it was clear that her position had become untenable by the nature of these accusations against her. And there are many other djstinguished public servants who we read about in the paper every single day who have resigned or get pushed out because accusations are made agai nst them that make 'it i ncredi b1y l8 di l0 ll t2 l3 14 l5 t6 l9 United States had a role ffi cult for them to do thei r jobs. a Were you aware, by the end of April 20 Yovanovitch was removed, 2t retweeted Some of L) 24 seen those tweets. 25 a that the President himself John Solomon's to thi s? A I think I 22 articles in had seen those I EIED The tweets. I'd And since you were working UNCLASS when Ambassador had Hill related obviously in the White House, what I UNCLASS I EIED I 2 did you understand at that po'int, in Apri1, the Pres jdent's vi ew of Ambassador Yovanovi tch to be, 'if you knew? J A 4 MR. W0LOSKY: 5 6 45 Basi ca1ly yeah. Let me just caution you not to speculate about things that you don't DR. HILL: Yeah. I know. was just going to say that I could 8 only form a judgment as everybody else could from the tweets. I was not able to form any other judgment. i did not hear at 9 any juncture the President say anything about Ambassador 7 l0 Yovanovi tch. ll t2 BY MR. a And GOLDMAN: did you discuss Ambassador Yovanovitch with l3 Ambassador Bolton? l4 t9 A I did. a And what was his reaction to this? A Hjs reaction was pained. And he basically said in fact, he directly sajd: Rudy Giuljani is a hand grenade that is going to blow everybody up. He made it clear that he didn't feel that there was 20 anything that he could personally do about thjs. l5 16 t7 l8 2l I met with Ambassador Yovanovitch and Assistant 22 Secretary Phi1 Reeker on l4ay Lst when she was recalled to 23 Washington, D.C., 24 to hear from her and to hear from Acting Assi stant Secretary Phj f Reeker what they thought had 25 happened. UNCLASS ] FIED UNCLASS I FIED 46 this had a rea1ly devastating effect on the of all of the teams that I work wjth across the Because I 2 morale J i nteragency because everybody knows Ambassador Yovanovi 4 be the best 5 offic'ia1. of the best in terms of a nonpartisan And as a woman, and, you know, 6 I don't tch to career see always a lot prominent women in these positions, she l^,as the highest 7 of 8 ranking woman I both in diplomat. And have worked with her across t4 government when I was at the all of my careelin DNI and also jn the think tank world as a professional who works on this region when she'd been Ambassador in Armenia and also in Kyrgyzstan. And I only have a professional relarionship with her. don't see myself as a personal friend of hers. But I just l5 see her as epitomi zing what United States diplomacy should 16 be. 9 10 ll 12 l3 a t7 During that meeting that you had on May Lst' did l8 she relay to you what the reasoning l9 she understood i t? for her removal was aS 2t basically the same things that she wrote in her testimony, and that has been made public. 22 And she was deeply disappointed and very 23 made 24 she appreciated 25 her. 20 A I She relayed it clear that to me she wasn't going to upset. She also grandstand and that that the State Department were trying to UNCLASS I FIE D help UNCLASS I FIED 47 2 left a 1ot of her colleagues at high 1eve1s feeling extremely upset. It J certai n1y seemed that Deputy SuIl i van, Assi stant Secretary I It was obvious that this had t6 offici als i n the State Department's highest leve1s were trying to do their best to make sure that she, you know, kept her reputation and was also given at least a position in the interim that would be worthy of the kind of person that she is. She's, remember, also been commandant of the National Defense Universi ty. I mean, thi s i s rea1ly one of our most di sti ngui shed di plomats. a Did she indicate to you that Deputy Secretary Sullivan had told her that this order had come from the President at that point? A She did not say that to me, but she did say that he had said to her that there was no cause for her dismissal and that he was deeply regretful of i t. She was bei ng very t7 discreet. l8 21 it was your understanding that no one at the senior 1eve1s at the State Department had any'issues with her qualifications or her competence? A That was my understanding, and the same with all of 22 her colleagues across the diplomat'ic corps, the ambassadorial 23 corps, and certainly wjthin the National Security Council. 4 5 6 7 8 9 l0 ll t2 13 t4 l5 t9 20 24 25 Reeker, and other a a And And did you understand whether Secretary Pompeo any concerns about her work product UNCLASS I FIED or competency? had UNCLASS I A I never heard FIED anythi ng 2 J 4 5 6 7 8 9 l0 ll 12 l3 t4 l5 t6 t7 l8 t9 20 21 22 23 24 25 UNCLASS I FIED 48 to i ndi cate that. UNCLASS I BY I,IR. a J GOLDMAN: And you said a second ago or a few minutes ago that 4 you never heard anything 5 to 7 8 9 l0 49 [1L:33 a.m.] 2 6 I FIED A O directly from the President related I did not. Ambassador Yovanovi tch. Just broadly speaking, we're not going to get right now into the communicatjons, but how frequently did you speak to the President about any matters under your portfolio? 24 in the context of larger meetings, particularly around visits. it changed over time. In the first year of our of the Presidency under General 14cMaster, he had a very different style, and he would bring many of us into meetings. That was different under Ambassador Bolton, but I think that that's also quite typical of the approach of different Nati onal Securi ty Advi sors , so I don't read anythi ng i nto that. People have a different approach. And, as you know, there's been a big debate since the beginning of the National Security Council when it was fjrst set up, you know, around the t'ime of , you know, World War II and the Cold War, about what the right size, what the composition should be, and what the approach should be, both of the National Security Advisor 25 and the ll t2 13 t4 15 16 t7 l8 l9 20 2t 22 ZJ A 0n1y staff. UNCLASS I F]ED UNCLASS ] FIED 50 J t relates di rectly to Ukra'ine, how many were you present for where conversations did you have with the Presi dent was di scussi ng Ukrai ne, Ukrai ni an po1 i cy , or 4 othe rwi se? I 2 Now, so as i a MR. W0LOSKY: 5 I think it's fine to generalty speaking, times you were in 6 of 7 di scussi ons wi th 8 questions about the content how many, answer the question the Pres'ident. I mean , i f there are f urther of those discussions t2 I'm asking because she indicated that she didn't hear anyth'ing about Ambassador Yovanovitch directly from the President, so I'm trying just to understand how frequently she would have been in a posit'ion to discuss these 13 matte 9 10 l1 MR. GOLDMAN: rs . t7 just also to be c1ear, Ukraine was not a top policy item in a lot of this period. And my portfolio covered all of Europe. 1t covered Turkey, which, you know, obviously, there was a great deal of activity, and l8 Russi a. t4 l5 t6 19 20 2t 22 L) 24 25 DR. HILL: I mean, really only ever in the context of when there would be an official meeting with the Ukrainjan President. And jn the tjme that I was there, there were not a great deal of meetings with the Ukrainian leadership. There was Poroshenko at one of the U.N. General Assemblies. So the meetings were only very much in the context of bri ef preparatory di scussi ons for a meeti ng and thi s i s So it was UNCLASS I FIED UNCLASS I F]ED I obviously covered by executive 2 S tate removal 5 that? 8 9 l0 ll l2 l3 t4 with heads of . 4 7 privilege that Ambassador Yovanovitch's was a turning point. How djd things change after MR. GOLDMAN: So you sa'id J 6 51 to that, if I coutd just ask, Dr. Hi11, you ment'ioned that the decision to remove the Ambassador, as far as you knew, took place at the top of the State Department. By that, do you mean Secretary Pompeo or THE CHAIRMAN: Before we go someone else? HILL: This would be a presumption so MR. WOLOSKY: If you don't know the answer, don't DR. speculate. Just state what you know. THE CHAIRMAN: Ambassador Yovanovitch related seeking 15 support, a statement of support from the Secretary of State. 16 That was not forthcoming. Do you have any personal knowledge t7 of those l8 HILL: I do not. I did take part in basically reviewing statements of support for Ambassador Yovanovitch from the State Department, but thjs was done at the working leve1. I mean, there were many announcements trying to refute some of bas'ica11y the baseless accusations against Ambassador Yovanovjtch in the period of March and April. And I j ust want to say agai n that I met wi th her on l'lay l-st, when she had been unexpectedly summoned back to t9 20 21 22 23 24 25 ci rcumstances? DR. UNCLASS ] FIED UNCLASS I F]ED 52 J D.C. It took all of us by surprise because, to be frank, I thought that those accusations about her would be dismissed because they were c1ear1y, in some cases, just 4 absu rd I 2 Washington, . BY MR. 5 6 7 8 GOLDMAN: just going back to after her removal, how did you said it was a turning point. How so? A We11, it was a shock, to be frank, to all of the a So l1 a key person, as I mentioned before. Many of the interagency-approved policies that we were implementing were carried out primarily by the t2 Embassy 9 10 team. Ambassador Yovanovitch had been 20 in Kyiv, and we had just then lost the leadership. There was also a changeover in the Embassy at that point, as the inevitably, as you get into the spring-Summer period, as new staff are going to be brought on board at the Embassy. And so there was a bit of a kind of a loss of djrection for a Period. Now, we had, of course, the ongoing efforts of Ambassador Kurt Volker as the U.S. Envoy for Ukraine. But at this particular juncture, Ambassador Volker's main job had 2l been 22 of the Normandy format Minsk group, the French and the 23 Germans, under l3 t4 l5 l6 t7 18 t9 24 25 to meet with the Russians aS well as the other members the European leadership. thjs particular juncture were not really pi cki ng up on the 'idea of havi ng f urther meeti ngs. But the Russians at UNCLASS I FIED UNCLASS I F]ED 53 I They were stonewalling because they themselves 2 make didn't want to very clearly any steps in determining the future of 4 policy until they found out who they goi ng to be deal i ng wi th i n the Ukrai ni an Presi denti a1 5 electi on. J their own Ukraine were 7 of course, the election in April of Zelensky, but at this point, we were also waiting to see what 8 would happen 'i n the Ukrai ni an Parf i amentary electi ons, the 9 Rada, to see whether Zelensky would be able 6 t0 u t2 l3 t4 l5 Now, we'd had, workable maj or i You might ty to have a . also reca11 in November of 2018, there was the incident "in the Kerch Strait, where the Russians seized Naval vessels of the Ukrainian Navy that were trying to enter through international waters of the Kerch Strait 'into the Sea of Azov and then detained their sailors after, in fact, 23 firing on the two Ukrainian ships and injuring at least one, but maybe more of the sai 1ors. And they'd taken the sa'i1ors to Moscow. They were effectively becoming prisoners of war. And we'd been focused in thjs period on trying to push the Russians to release the Ukrainian sailors, and we had pu11ed down meetings, bi lateral meetings wi th President Puti n thi s was actually the Presi dent's deci si on to do so in response to the Russjans' refusal to release the 24 Ukrai ni ans. t6 t7 l8 l9 20 21 22 25 And so, you know, there were many issues that UNCLASS I EIED we were UNCLASS ] FIED 54 J at this period, and we had to figure out how we were goi ng to do th1s. So there was a peri od of uncertai nty as to how we were go'ing to be conduct'ing our 4 Ukraine policy. sti11 trying to 2 a 5 6 7 8 9 posi And push that's from the offj ci a1 Uni ted States ti on, you mean? A a Correct. Giuliani's ef forts f rom af ter -from May through the summer impact the official U.S. foreign l0 policy? ll A Now, how d'id Rudy Well, we heard that he was planning on visiting t4 djdn't know why, you know, for what purpose and what was his intent. And, you know, I heard about that on the news and read about that in the paper. I mean, l5 subsequently t2 l3 t6 t7 l8 t9 20 2l 22 23 24 25 Ukraine, and we that meeting was pu11ed down. But th'is was then i n the period where Ambassador Volker told us that he was planning on meeting with Mr. Gjuliani to try to see i f he could resolve whatever i ssues there may be there. You've had Ambassador Volker come and talk on his own terms and to answer your questions, and I'm sure he'5 told you what he told us. But this is also in the period where, rather unexpectedly, our Ambassador to the EU, Ambassador Sondland informed us, but just informed us without, again, us being given any specific directive, that he had been assigned to be UNCLASS I FIED UNCLASS I EIED 55 I in charge, at least in interim fashion, of the Ukraine 2 portfolio. a A a J 4 5 6 And around when was that? That was i n the And who May-J une timeframe. did you understand ass'igned Ambassador to do that? A At first, nobody. Sondland 7 And jt was only 1ater, very late 8 June, when Ambassador Sondland told me again that he was in 9 charge l0 And he of Ukraine. And I asked, we11, on whose authority? t9 said, the President. a At this point now, Mr. Giulian'i had indicated he was going to speak to Ukrainian officials, and then he decided not to go. Now, into the June timeframe into July, did you understand what he was advocating about -- in Ukraine and what his interests were? A In thi s period i n l4ay, I had a request f rom a former U. S. Government offici a1 to meet wi th me. Thi s was Amos Hochstein, the former U.S. Envoy for Energy, who I'd previ ously worked wi th j n dj fferent capacj ti es. 20 l'lr. 2t the main Ukrainian-U.S gas and oil company. He had ll 12 l3 t4 15 l6 t7 18 Hochstei n had been appoi nted to the board of Naf togaz, 24 actually been appoi nted duri ng thj s admi ni strati on , i n conjunction with d'iscussions wjth the Department of Energy. So I just want to make clear that although Amos 25 Hochstein had been the U.S. Energy Envoy under President 22 23 UNCLASS I FIED UNCLASS I FIED 56 I Obama, he was somebody who was 2 Department well-respected by the J of Energy, and he had very close ties with Secretary Perry's staff and also with people who served 4 the National Security Council who worked on energy issues. 5 So they were very comfortable with him taking on thjs on ro1e. 23 in the posit'ion for several months, perhaps even a year at thjs juncture when he came in to talk with me, which was towards the end of May. And he came in to express Some seriouS concernS that he had. In the course of his time on the board of Naftogaz, which he actually said had actually not been a parti cularly up1 i fti ng experi ence, i t had come to his attention that there was a lot of preSsure being put on the officials of Naftogaz, who had also reached out to talk to me and my colleagues at the National Security Council, to have other board members put in place and this seemed to be at the d'irect'ion of G'iu1i ani , and that they were also being pushed more generatly in the Ukrainian energy sector to open up investigations into corruption in the energy sector that seemed to go beyond what I had assumed was the thrust of our push on corruption, wh'ich was related to people trying to siphon off assets of Naftogaz or to use that improperly, which had been done at many tjmes in the past, and, 'in f act, would i nclude the energy company Buri sma that 24 everyone has been very concerned about. 6 7 8 9 l0 1l t2 l3 14 15 t6 t7 l8 t9 20 2t 22 25 And he'd been I, to be honest, had forgotten the name of Burisma. UNCLASS I FIED It UNCLASS I F]ED 57 that surfaced. It 1 had been a long time since 2 been on my radar screen sometjme previously, and name had I had asked Amos 4 to remind me of the Burisma issue. And he reminded me that this was the company that Hunter Biden had been affjliated 5 with. 3 l4 at that juncture, it became clear, from Amos' concerns that he was flagging for me he also said that a number of Ukrain'ian officials had come to him very concerned that they were getting pressure from Giuliani and Giuljanj associates and he also mentioned the names of Mr. Parnas and Fruman to basically start to open up investigations and also to change the composition of the Naftogaz board. a 5o did you come to understand that Mr. Giuliani perhaps , at a m'ini mum, was advocati ng f or an i nvesti gati on l5 i l6 20 to be a package of issues that he was pushing for, including what seemed to the business interests of his own associates. a And when the way Mr. Hochstein explained it you, did you understand what Rudy Gjuliani's jnterest in 2t i nvesti gati 6 7 8 9 l0 l1 t2 l3 t7 l8 t9 So, nto Buri sma? A A a 22 23 24 25 i t It was part of what seemed be to an on i nto Buri sma was? I d'id not at that j uncture. At a later point, did you come to understand what Not enti re1y, was? A 0n1y, frankly, since UNCLASS I FIED I've left the administration. UNCLASS I a A And what is I E]ED 58 that? t2 It's only based on and, again, this is what I've been reading in the papers. My jaw dropped when I saw the indictments of these two gentlemen, of Fruman and Parnas. So i t becomes clear that they were certai nly up to no good. But that was what I was already hearing. And I was also told by Amos and other colleagues that they had some linkages, so I also want to, you know, get you to step back at thi s period. Th j s i s, you know, l'4arch, Apri1, into May, where we were having a standoff over Venezuela. And the Russ'ians at this particular juncture were signaling very strongly that they wanted to somehow make some l3 Very strange 2 J 4 5 6 7 8 9 l0 ll t4 l5 t6 t7 18 t9 20 2t 22 23 24 25 SWap arrangement between Venezuela and Ukra'ine. In other words, if We were going to exert some semblance of the l4onroe Doctrine of, yotl know, Russia keeping out of our backyard, because this js after the Russians had sent in these hundred operatives eSSentially to, you know, baSically secure the Venezuelan Government and, you know, to preempt what they were obviously taking to be some kind of U.S. military act'ion, they were basically signaling: You know, you have your Monroe doctrine. You want us out of your backyard. We11, you know, we have our own version of this. You' re i n our backyard i n Ukrai ne. And we were ge'-ti ng that sent to us, you know, kind of informally through channels. It was in the Russian press, various commentators. UNCLASS I FIED UNCLASS And 1 I was asked to I FIED go out 59 to Russi a 'in thi s timef rame to 4 basically tetl the Russians to knock this off. I was given a special assignment by the National Security Council with the agreement with the State Department to get the Russians to 5 back 2 J off. So, in the course of my discussions with my colleagues 6 8 , I also found out that there were Ukra'ini an energy i nterests that had been i n the mi x i n 9 Venezuelan energy sectors as 7 well as the names again of l0 Mr. Parnas and Mr. Fruman, and this gentleman Harry Sargeant ll came t2 said these guys were notorious in Florida and that they l3 bad news. a l4 l5 up. Gi u1 i 16 And my colleagues And you understood that they were were working with Rudy ani at that poi nt? A I did at th'is point. t9 a You mentioned Ambassador Sond1and, who I thjnk in June told you that he had been assigned by the President to cover Ukraine. You said that was somewhat of an unusual 20 development. What did you 17 l8 A 2t i 23 didn't 25 it by that? was very unusual because we were given no nstructi ons. There wasn't a di recti ve. Ambassador Bolton 22 24 WeI1, mean this. Nobody at the State Department seemed to know about this either. I went to consult several times wi th seni or State Department offi ci als to ask them i f know about UNCLASS I FIED UNCLASS ] 1 2 3 4 5 FIED 60 they knew if this was the case. a A i nformati a A And what did they saY? They said they had on no no directive, no to suggest thj s. And who did You sPeak to about this? 8 to Under Secretary Hale. I spoke to Assistant Secretary Reeker. And I did have a phone call at one point with Ulrich Brechbuhl, the counsel to Secretary 9 Pompeo. 6 7 10 I spoke But I also have to say that Ambassador Sondland had l6 asserted and, again, I mean asserted by telling me that had a very large remit for his understanding of Ambassador the European Un'ion. He ref erred to a letter outl i ni ng hi s authorities and his responsibjlities given to him by the State Department, which is, frankly, the regular State Department letter to Ambassadors when they, you know, t7 get remit as the plenipotentjaries and the representatives of 18 the Presi dent. ll t2 l3 t4 l5 he to 22 In all cases, you know, they have qu'ite extensi ve responsj bi 1 i ti es and authori ti es anyway . But sai d that he had been again, this is what he said to us, and I can only te11 you what Ambassador Sondland said to me, that the 23 Presjdent had given him broad authority on a1t things related t9 20 2l 24 25 to Europe, that he was the President's point man on Europe. So this meant that anything that was related to the UNCLASS I FIED UNCLASS I EIE I 2 6l D in hjs view, fall within his purview. And I was constantly going back to State Department and to European Union cou1d, 4 the Deputy Assistant Secretaries and Acting Assistant Secretary to try to clari f y th'is. And, agai n, i n each 5 they had no knowledge of these responsibilities that had 6 accorded 7 i ssues. J 8 9 l0 ll t2 l3 to And so Ambassador Sondland I in h'is rendition of was spending an inordinate amount of case, been these time trying to coordinate in some fashion wjth Ambassador Sondland on a whole range of issues related to visits by heads of states, meetings. And Ambassador Sondland would frequently give people my personal ce11 phone to call up and demand meeti ngs wi th Ambassador BoIton or wlth me. 20 all ki nds of offi ci als from Europe, parti cularty *rt the president jn office of the European when I Unjon, 1itera1ly appearing at the gates of the White House, calling on our personal phones, which are actually in lock boxes, so it was kind of d'if f icult to get hold of them. I'd officials who'd fjnd endless messages from irate I been told that they were supposed to meet wi th me by 2l Ambassador Sondland. t4 15 l6 t7 l8 19 22 23 24 25 We had I mean, some of it was comical, but it was also, for me and for others, deeply concerning. And I actually went to our Intelligence Bureau and asked to have sit down with him and explain that this was a I UNCLASS I EIED UNCLASS I 2 I FIED 62 counterintelligence risk, particularly giving out our personal phone numbers. And also just, I mean' basically J a going beyond the larger remit because he should have 4 havi ng bri 5 assi gnments, he should have been havi ng appropri efi ngs. If , i ndeed, been he had been gi ven these ate bri efi ngs ll for all of these meetings. And as far as I could understand, the briefings that he so he was often meeting with people he had no was getting information about. It's like basically driving along with no guardrai 1s and no GPS on an unfami 1i ar terri tory. He was officjals that we had meeting with, for exampl", I 12 derogatory information on that he shouldn't have been meeting 6 7 8 9 l0 22 with, or he was, you know, giving out his phone number and texting to, you know, regional offic'ia1s, for exampte, the wno he met at a meeting in Prime Mjnister of f Brussels. A11 of those communications coutd have been exfi ltrated by the Russi ans very easi 1y. So I'11 just say right upf ront we had a lot of concerns, but I expressed these openly to Ambassador Sondland. 5o I'm not tetling you anything that I didn't say to him. a Dld there come a time when you had a meeting at the White House with Ukrainjan officials in early Ju1y, where 23 Ambassador Sondland was l3 t4 l5 16 17 18 t9 20 2t 24 25 A a also present? Yes, that i s correct. Do you recall what daY that UNCLASS I EIED was? UNCLASS I FIED 63 5 10th. So this was essentia1ly the week before I was due to wrap up and hand off. a And who was present for that meeting? A This was a meeting by, at this point, the appointee for President Zelensky to be his National Security Advisor, 6 Oleksandr Danylyuk, and 7 has been named A 2 J 4 8 9 t0 1l t2 l3 t4 l5 16 t7 l8 19 20 2l 22 23 24 25 That was July his personal adviser, a gentleman who in the press, Andrey Yermak, with Ambassador Bolton. Secretary Perry waS also i n attendance. Yermak had an assi stant. Ambassador Sondland. There was our Ukra'i ne director, Ambassador Volker, and myself and our senior director for energy affairs, We11s Griffith. And there may have also been the room got a bit crowded and, I had to sit on the back sofa. I think there mi ght have also been one of Secretary Perry's aides w'ith him jn that meeting. And then there were other officials who Were also there in attendance, but not in Ambassador Bolton's office, who were wajting out in one of the anterooms. a And what was the ostensible purpose of the meeting? A It was twofold. Danylyuk, who was the designated National Security Advisor, was trying to seek assistance in what he wanted to do with a revamp of the Ukrainjan National Securi ty Counci 1 , whi ch , frankly, could do wi th j t. And so he was wanting to ask Ambassador Bolton for hjs assistance and recommendations on, you know, what they could do to sort of streamline the national security apparatus, and would the UNCLASS I FIED UNCLASS I EIED 64 I I U.S. be willing to help with technical assistance. 2 again, this would be something that would normally be done J 4 5 6 7 mean, It's not something that the National Security Council deals with. But I think they were trying to get Ambassador Bolton's imprimatur, because he is the National Securi ty Advj sor, and support for thi s. through the State Department. And also Ambassador Bolton has, you know, deep knowledge l2 of many issues, and Mr. Danylyuk was hoping to get, you know, some of his advice just in the general perspective of nati onal securi ty i ssues. And then there was also that the Ukrainians were very anxjous to set up a meeting, a first meeting between 13 President Zelensky and our President. 8 9 10 ll l9 a And there had already been a written invitation to that effect by that point from the Vnlhite House, right? A It wasn't an i nvi tation. It was basically a general, you know, we look forward to seeing you kind of open-ended invitation at the end of a congratulatory letter that was sent to President Zelensky after his election in 20 Apri 1. t4 l5 l6 t7 l8 2t 22 23 24 25 a President Zelensky A a A that the Ukrainians wanted to make a White House visjt? But you understood Correct. Why is that? Every single leader, with very few exceptions, UNCLASS I FIED UNCLASS I FIED 65 5 in office some period wants to have a meeting with the President at the White House. At1 of my interactions with Ambassadors or officials f rom other countries inev'i tably came to, "When can we have a White House meeting, and if we can't meet with the Presjdent, 6 when can we meet I 2 3 4 who's either come into office or been with the Vice President?" ll in these circumstances were not sati sfied wi th perhaps a pu11-asjde at a larger event like the G-20 or the U.N. GA. They wanted to have a White House meeti ng, i f at all possi ble. a Djd anything happen in that meeting that was out of 12 the ordi nary? 7 8 9 l0 r3 t4 And people, you know, A Yes. At one point during that meeting, Ambassador Bolton was, you know, basically trying very hard not to 23 to a meeting, because, you know and, again, these meet i ngs have to be we1 1 - prepa red . They ' re not j ust something that you say, yes, we're going to have a meeting without there being a clear understanding of what the content of that meeting is going to be. And that i s a perpetual problem for us, that many not all leaders but some, you know, want to rea1ly just have a photo opportuni ty often for thei r own purposes. I mean, legitimacy and legitimization of them as a new leader is 24 obvi 25 i ssue. l5 t6 t7 l8 t9 20 2t 22 commit ously very i mportant. That ' s not j ust an i nconsequenti al UNCLASS I F]ED UNCLASS I E]ED I 2 66 But sometimes you know, the previous Presjdent Poroshenko very much wanted a White House meeting in the 5 to use that for hjs election campaign. We've had, you know, a1l kinds of leaders or people who are running for reelection actually try to 6 ambush J 4 runup to his election, the Pres i dent because he wanted . l0 for election in one country that I State Fai r and worked won't state who showed up at tne ! the rope 1i ne to get a pi cture w'ith the Presi dent and then put it up on the website of his campaign, claiming that he'd ll had a personal meeting 7 8 9 We had one candidate t2 with the President. we 1, you know, it was against a backdrop, So you couldn't See the cows in l3 the background t6 , you know, the f a rm enti ty , but we a1I thought it was quite hysterical that they go to those lengths to get a picture. to work the rope line I But this shows the importance that Ieaders put on t7 meeting with our President, and having a White House meeting t4 l5 l8 l9 20 2t 22 23 24 25 ol- is obviously the most important of all. And Ambassador Bolton is always -- was alwayS very cautious and alwayS very much, yog know, by the book and was not going to certainly commjt to a meeting right there and then, certainly not one where i t wasn't i t was unclear what the content of the meeting would be about, what kind of issues that we would di scuss that would be pertai ni ng to Ukrai ni an-U. S. relati ons. And secretary Perry had been talking in this context UNCLASS ] FIED UNCLASS I about the importance 2 Ukrajne a J 4 5 ] FIED 67 of reforming the energy structures in in a very general sense and talking about how important that was for Ukra'inian national security and that, as well as reforming their natjonal security structures, they also have to, you know, rea11y pay attention to the'i r 8 AchilIes heel, at1 the places that Russja had leverage, the mi 1i tary sector, whi ch Ambassador Bolton had also been talk'ing about, and then the energy sector, which was rea11y 9 in 6 7 l0 ll t2 l3 t4 t5 l6 l7 l8 19 some considerabte disarray. Then Ambassador Sondland blurted out: Wel1, we have an with the Chief of Staff for a meeting if 'investigations jn the energy sector start. agreement these ffened. He said I can't say word for word what he said words to the effect because I was behind them sitting on the sofa with our Senior Djrector of Energy, and we all kind of looked up and thought And Ambassador Bolton immedi ately sti that was somewhat oOd. And Ambassador Bolton stjffened and ended the meeting. a A immediately Right then, he just ended the meeting? 22 Yeah. He said: We11, it was very nice to see you. You know, I can't di scuss a meeti ng at thi s time. We'11 clearly work on this. And, you know, kjnd of it was rea1ly 23 nice to see you. 20 2t 24 25 So i t was very abrupt. I as if he had, you know, suddenly UNCLASSIEIED at the clock another meeting and his time mean, he looked UNCLASS ] was up, 2 a J BoIton but it And F]ED 68 was obvious he ended the meeting. djd you have a conversation with Ambassador 8 after this meeting? A I did. a Descri be that. A Ambassador Sondland said as he was leaving again, I was back to the back of Ambassador Bolton's office. And Ambassador Sondland said to Ambassador Volker 9 and also Secretary Perry and the other people who were with 4 5 6 7 hjm, including the Ukrainians, to come down to t2 there's a room in the White House, the Ward Room, to basically talk about next steps. And that's also unusual. I mean, he meant l3 to talk to the Ukrainians about next steps about the meeting. 10 ll t4 And Ambassador -- 20 te House meeti ng? The Wh1 te House meeti ng. And Ambassador Bolton pu11ed me back aS I was walking out afterwards and said: Go down to the Ward Room right now and find out what they're talking about and come back and talk to me. So i did go down. And I came 'in as there was obviously 2t a discussion underway. And there was a very large group of 15 16 t7 l8 l9 a A The Whi 24 in the room. They were the aides to the Ukrainian officials, Mr. Yermak and Mr. Danylyuk. There were a couple, at least two State Department aides who had come over with 25 Ambassador 22 23 people Sondland. There was Ambassador Volker's aide, UNCLASS I FIED and UNCLASS I FIED 69 I there were a couple of other people. I weren't sure who they 2 were, whether they'd been part of Secretary Perry's team. l8 in, Secretary Perry was leaving to go off to another engagement. So I thjnk that one person there was probably one of his team, but I'm not sure for certain, because I didn't recognize the person. And there was also our di rector f or Ukra'ini an af f ai rs And Ambassador SondIand, in front of the Ukrainians, as I came in, was talking about how he had an agreement wjth Chief of Staff l'lulvaney for a meeting w'ith the Ukrajnians if they were going to go forward wjth investigations. And my di rector f or Ukra'ine was looki ng completely alarmed. And I came in again as this discussion was underway. Mr. Danylyuk looked very alarmed as we1l. He didn't look like he knew what was going on. That wasn't the case with Yermak. And I immediately said to Ambassador Sondland: Look, we can't di scuss the meeti ng here wi th our Ukrai ni an colleagues. you know, kind of to Ambassador Bolton sent me down to ask 19 make J 4 5 6 7 8 9 l0 l1 t2 13 t4 15 t6 t7 But as I was coming . sure that you understand that we'11 be talking about the 24 meeting. We'11 obviously be looking into this, but that we can't make any commi tments at thi s parti cular j uncture because a lot of things will have to be worked through in terms of the timing and the substance. And Ambassador Sondland cut me off, and he said: We 25 have an agreement that they'11 have a meeting. 20 2t 22 Z) UNCLASS ] FIED UNCLASS I FIED I 2 J 4 5 6 7 8 9 l0 ll t2 l3 14 l5 t6 17 18 t9 20 2t 22 23 24 25 70 I said: Look, we cannot discuss this in front of our colleagues. You know, we have to talk about, you know, the detai 1s of thi s. And he said: OkaY, okaY, I get it. And he asked the Ukrainians to basically leave the room. So they bas i ca1 ly moved out i nto the cor r i dor And I said: Look, I don't know what's going on here, but Ambassador Bolton wants to make it very clear that we have to talk about, you know, how are we going to set up this meeting. It has to go through proper procedures. And he started to basically talk about discussjons that he had had with the Chief of Staff. He mentioned Mr. Giulian'i , but then I cut h jm of f because I didn't want to get f urther "into thi s di scuss'ion at all And I said: Look, we're the National Security Council. We're basically here to talk about how we set this up, and we're going to set this up in the right way. And' you know, Ambassador Bolton has asked me to make it completely clear that we're going to talk about this, and, you know, we will deal with this jn the proper procedures. And Ambassador Sondland was clearly annoyed with this, but then, you know, he moved off. He said he had other meetings. And I went back to talk to Ambassador Bolton. And Ambassador Bolton asked me to go over and report this to our NSC counsel, to John Eisenberg. And he totd me, and this is And . . UNCLASS I E]ED UNCLASS I 1 2 J 4 5 6 7 8 l1 t2 l3 t4 l5 t6 71 a direct quote from Ambassador Bolton: You go and te11 Eisenberg that I am not part of whatever drug deal Sondland s, and you go and te11 him what you've heard and what I've said. So I went over to talk to John Ei senberg about thi s. MR. G0LDMAN: We'11 have to pick that up in the next round . 0ur ti me i s up. Over to the mi nori ty THE CHAIRMAN: The mi nori ty j s recognj zed. and l'lulvaney are cooki ng up on thi . BY I',IR. CASTOR: 9 l0 FIED a Good morni Republ i can A a staff ng, Dr. Hi 11 , 5teve Castor wi th . Yes. Ambassador VoIker related his thoughts about the July L0th Whjte House meeting. Was Secretary Perry involved with that, was he in the meeting? A He wasn't in the Ward Room when I came in. He was 17 leaving out. But he was in the meeting with l8 Bolton, correct. t9 20 21 22 23 24 25 the a A a Ambassador fjrst part of the meeting? That is correct, yes. Could you just run down the people that were in The the meeting again? Danylyuk, Yermak. A Yeah, Yermak' s assi stant or ai de, whose name , I 'm ffi th, P. We11s Grj ffi th, our senior di rector for energy. He and I were sorry, I don't reca11 . There was We11s Gri UNCLASS I FIED UNCLASS I FlED 72 2 sitting together on the sofa. There was Secretary Perry. There was our director for Ukraine, and there was Ambassador J Volker and Alex Vindman, and there was Ambassador Bolton. 4 And, again, there may have been another aide to I 5 6 7 8 9 l0 a A Was Volker there? Volker was there. Yes, correct, he was there. And there may have been another a'ide to Secretary Perry. I'm just trying to think about the layout across the tab1e. It's not a very blg tab1e. Because I think there was somebody else sitting in one of the chairs. And I'm afraid' I'm l3 sorry, I can't reca1l who i t was. a Did I get this right? You said Bolton wanted you to go down to John Eisenberg, and he said, "I'fil not part of t4 any d rug l5 16 That's exactly what he said, quote/unquote. thjnk he was being ironic. But he wasn't very happy. t7 very angry. ll 12 l8 t9 20 2t 22 23 24 25 dea1 " ? A a A Then you went down and spoke Yes, with I He was Eisenberg? I went across to speak to him jn the other bui 1di ng. a A And what did you te1l Eisenberg? I told Ambassador Eisenberg that Ambassador Bolton had instructed me to go over there right away. And I gave him the details of what had transpired in the meeting in Ambassador Bolton's office and then what I had overheard aS I UNCLASS ] FIED UNCLASS I FIED t3 2 nto the Ward Room and that my, you know, kind of primary concern for me personally was the fact that 3 Ambassador Sondland was 4 foreign nationals. I came i saying all of this in front of l3 is located right beside the Navy mess . It's i nsi de rea1ly the secure spaces of the Whi te House. Ambassador Sondland sa'id he had requested this room through the Chief of Staff's Office, because I was a bit surprised that they had thjs room. We do meet with foreign delegatjons in there, but usually in a formal setting, not j ust for i nformal ta1ks. And when he pushed them also out of that, they were basically standing jn a space between the Navy mess and the t4 Whjte House 5it Room. 5o 5 6 7 8 9 10 ll t2 Now, the Ward Room 16 this was an awkward setup, to say the least. So I also expressed those concerns to John, that then foreign nationals, you know, are just standing around in t7 the corridor outside the Ward Room by the doors 'into the 18 Room. 15 19 20 2l 22 23 24 25 a The President sent a letter May 29th, are familiar with that, where he congratulated A I am famjljar w'ith that, right. Si t you Zelensky? a And at the end of the letter -- we can make it an exhibit if we need to, but the Presjdent says: I would like to invite you to meet with me at the White House in Washington, D.C., as soon as we can find a mutually UNCLASS I FIED UNCLASS I I 2 J 4 5 6 F]ED 74 conven'ient time. A a A Correct. re aware of that? Yes. And I also want to tell you that Ambassador Sondland told us that he had dictated that paragraph to the President and to the Chief of Staff to add to that letter. You' t2 letter did not go through the normal NSC procedures because the 'initial draft of the letter that we had put in place was sent back to the Chief of Staff . So Ambassador Sondland coordinated on that letter d'irectly with the Chief of Staff, and it did not go back through the National Security Council Exec Sec. I had to get that letter directly l3 from the White House Exec Sec. 7 8 9 l0 l1 That l9 Is this an unusual statement to put in a letter? Not at all. I mean, it's the kind of thing that or might have in a letter, but one would normally have in I have to say, again, we were very cautious because it's not the case that you want actually every single head of state who'S j ust been elected to come to the Whi te House. So we 20 would usually have something more generic, "We look forward t4 l5 t6 t7 l8 2t 22 23 24 25 a A to seeing you, you know, kind of at some future event," because a 1ot of heads of state we'd much prefer to meet with them on the margins of the U.N. General Assembly or NAT0 or, you know, some other event because, I mean, you can't have basically every week the President having to host some head UNCLASS I FIED UNCLASS I FIED 75 ll of state in the White House. a Is it fair to say sometimes these invitations are theoretically extended, but, in practicality, they don't come to frui ti on? A That is correct. They're often done as a courtesy, you know, as one and the President has had invitat'ions ljke that himself. You may remember he got an invitation f rom Theresa ['{ay on her f i rst vi si t to the Whi te House i n 20t7 for a state visit to the United Kingdom, and that took a long time to come about. a So is it fair to say jt's part of the diplomatic t2 pleasantrj I 2 J 4 5 6 7 8 9 l0 A a A l3 t4 l5 l6 t7 l8 es? That is correct. Say, we'11 bring you to the White House? But not always, because we don't always put that in. So, again, Ambassador Sondland specifically told us that he had had that paragraph inserted. And we were, again, somewhat nervous about that, because, again, when you make an 20 tati on f ike that and an expectati on i s set uP, you need to have a clear idea of the timeframe and then the nature of 2t the discussions. t9 22 23 24 25 i nv'i at thj s particular poi nt, we're sti 11 wai ting for the elect'ions to the Ukra j ni an Parl i ament. So I j ust want to And put that on the record. a When was that going to UNCLASS ] EIED be? UNCLASS I FIED 76 4 A That was going to be in Ju1y. We11, in actual fact, at that point I'11 have to go back and check. Perhaps we can all check whether i t had actually been announced because Zelensky was under a great deal of preSsure 5 i 2 J nternally, 8 9 l0 ll t2 also from the There was, you know, speculatjon 6 7 domesti ca11y, and Russi ans. in all analytical circles, both in Ukraine and outside, that he might not be able to get a workable majority in the Ukrajnian Parliament. And all of us are very cognizant of the dangers of writing congratulatory letters to people who can't form governments. We've had a number of tetters, in fact, we had to pul1 back where heads of state that we congratulated then couldn't t6 actually form a government. And at that point, we were very hesitant to, you know, push forward with any invjtation to Zelensky until we knew that he had a workable majority in the Rada and was then 17 goi ng t3 t4 l5 to be able to f orm h'is own cabi net. so myself and others were actually cautioning against 18 invitation at that particular point until l9 extending an 20 knew 2l extremely concerned about Zelensky's retationship with the 22 gentleman that Zelensky would form a government. We we were also 24 Igor Kolomoisky, the Ukrainian oligarch, who was -the oligarch who was basically the owner of the TV and production company that Mr. Zelensky's famous Servant of the 25 People program had been Part of. 23 UNCLASS I FIED UNCLASS I EIED 77 4 of course, our analysts and our Embassy and others were watching very closely and this is ptaying out now in the press and public -- to see how much influence l'lr . Kolomoi sky mi ght have on Zelensky or on government 5 formati I 2 J And, on . 8 is someone who the U.S. Government has been concerned about f or some t'ime, havi ng been suspected and, indeed, proven to have embezzled money, American 9 taxpayers' money, from a bank that was subsequently 6 7 And Kolomoisky l0 nati onal i zed , Pri vatBank. And he had gone i nto exi 1e i n ll 18 Israel in th'is particular timeframe. a Is he back in Ukrajne? A So we were watching he's gone back to Ukraine. So we were watching for exactly these kinds of eventualities and were very reluctant at that point to put a meeting on the agenda, push for a meeting until we could see how the complexi ties of Ukrai ni an poti tics would play out. a What were your thoughts on Zelensky in the runup to t9 hj 12 l3 t4 15 l6 t7 20 s election victory? A I had an open mind about him. He was, you know, out of the 2t somebody, you know, completely, you know, 22 outside the political realm. Obviously, you know, we asked 23 our analysts to, you know, get us as 24 could. 25 And, as much 'inf ormation from as they I said, the one question we had was real1y UNCLASS I FIED ] EIED UNCLASS 78 6 to act independently. He would obviously need a major Parliamentary majority for this or a si gni fj cant Parl i amentary maj ori ty, and whether someone f i ke Igor Kolomoisky or other oligarchs would try to predate upon his Presidency. a Did you believe he was genuinely campaigning on 7 being an anticorruPtion I 2 J 4 5 8 9 whether he would be able A chamPion? There was a good chance that he was. And I'm of the people, you know, trust but verify. to have a bit more information about him. always one So I 10 wanted ll l5 a Had Poroshenko's time run out, you think? A Poroshenko's time had defi ni tely run out. I also want to say that, you know, 'in thi s t'imef rame, we were being very careful in the runup to the elections not to appear, as the previous administration had done, to tip our t6 hat in the election. 12 l3 t4 18 the notorious phone call that the Russians bas'ica11y intercepted and then put on YouTube of l9 Assistant Secretary Victoria Nuland talking to our 20 Geoff Pyatt t7 2t 22 23 24 25 And we all remember Ambassador at the time about decisjons about who should be Prime Minister of Ukraine and the very damaging effect that that had. So we were trying to ensure at that time a A When did that occur? That was during the gosh, when was that of the many upheavals in Ukrainian politics back in UNCLASS I FIED the one UNCLASS I FIED 79 2 to you. That's one of those, you know, trivja questjons I would have failed in my pub quiz J there. I 4 5 6 2000s. I'11 have to come back all remember that 'i t was intercepted by the Russians. It was a queStion of then-Prime Minister Yatseniuk about who would be more preferable for the But, basi ca11y, you wi 11 ll States. And we had determined as a government that we weren't going to play that game. We were not going to try to jn any case in any shape or form suggest that Poroshenko was our candidate or that we had a preference for Zelensky or any of the other candjdates that were running in the t2 Presidential race. 7 8 9 t0 Un1ted And t3 that had made President Poroshenko very for kind of t4 uncomfortable and he had been agitating t5 meeting t6 or t7 a It's been posited that Ambassador Yovanovitch was close to Poroshenko, whether that's true or untrue. A That's rubbish, just to be very c1ear. Then anybody in the government who js interacting with Poroshenko' includ'ing the Vice Pres'ident, was and the President was close to Poroshenko, and that's just not true. a When was it clear that Poroshenko's time was up? A I think it became, you know, very obvious in his handling of , you know, various issues. The Kerch Strait l8 t9 20 2t 22 23 24 25 Some in that timeframe, including with the Vice President someone as well. UNCLASS ]EIED UNCLASS 1 I FIED 80 incident could very well have been handled differently. t2 a When was that? A That was in November of 2018. They have a perfect right to send the'i r ships through the Kerch Strait, but it seemed to us that this action, you know, was taken it was taken on the eve of the armistice commemorations in France, where we'd already announced that there was going to be a meeting between the President and President Putin. There waS a 1ot of scrutiny on other major events. And it seemed to have been done not just with a freedom of navi gati on goal 'in mi nd, wh'ich, agai n , i s completety acceptable and the right of the Ukrainians, but also to gain l3 maxi mum 2 a J 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 ll attenti on. 15 there. Perhaps the Ukrainians -- this js speculation on my part, but I think it t6 bears on an analytical basis rather than on anything else 17 that President l8 catch and release, that they would, you know, perhaps attempt t4 And there was a miscalculation Poroshenko thought that the Russians would 24 to detain the ships, not that there would be a fire fight, which is actually what happened. I mean, those ships were shot on by a Russian helicopter, and one of the seamen, the sai 1ors, was i nj ured . And I don't thi nk he anti ci pated they'd seize both vessels and take the sailors off to Moscow. a Was i t clear that Zelensky was goi ng to be the 25 wi nner? 19 20 2t 22 23 UNCLASS ] F]ED UNCLASS A a I 2 It was not. So it 8l I F]ED was trending not towards Poroshenko, but it 5 to be Zelensky or a third candidate? A Yeah. I mean, all the analysis, we had many updates at the time we were doing. In fact, the Embassy 6 Ukraine was doing some rea1ly excellent work on polling 7 ort, you know, kind of outreach to Ukrainian citizens J 4 was going in and and 20 their think tanks. And it was clear that Poroshenko was polting in the single digits, so it was an uphi1l battle for him if it was a free and fair election. So our focus was on encouraging all parts of the Ukrainian establishment to have a free and fair election, and signaling to Poroshenko that if he tried to steal the election, this would not be acknowledged by the U.S. Government, that we were watching this. And to be fajr to Poroshenko, he rea1ly did run a free and fair election. It was something the Russians didn't expect, and it was something I think that a lot of people did not expect. a How confident were you that Zelensky would be able to get the margins he needed to form a parljament or to form 2t a 8 9 l0 ll t2 l3 t4 15 16 t7 l8 19 maj or i ty? 24 to be honest, given the pressures that he was facing and also the role of the Russians jn obviously targeting the Ukrainjan elections as 25 we11. You have to 22 23 A Not especially confident, remember UNCLASS I that before, you know, the F]ED UNCLASS I EIED 82 1 Russians targeted us and targeted other European countries 2 around 6 their elections, they targeted Ukraine as wel1. And it was well-documented that the Russ'ians were trying to run thej r own candidates, people with affiliations with Russian busi nesses , Russi an o1i garchs, and wi th the Kreml i n. a But, ultimately, he was able to do that in the July 7 electi J 4 5 A 8 9 10 on? He was, because I think everyone has always underestimated the Ukrainian people's political sentiment and grassroots. l3 Volker, you touched on it a fittle bit in the first hour, what was his portfolio? A His portfolio was to conduct, as best he could, the t4 negotiations or give the Unjted States a role in the l5 negotiations with the Russians and the Ukra'inians to find t6 resolution to the war in ll l2 a t9 Donbas. So h'is portf o1i o covered i nteracti ons wi th t7 l8 Ambassador the Normandy format t4insk group, the French and the Germans and the Ukrainians and Russians 'in that context. He was responsible 22 th Pres'ident Puti n's desi gnated Ukrai ni an envoy to the Ukrainian conflict, Mr. Sokov. That in jtself is a challenge. Sokov is a political operator of the highest 23 cali ber and, you know, very well-known i n 24 And also 20 2t 25 f or meeti ngs wi to deal with other you know, actively involved UNCLASS I Russi an ci rc1es. European leaders who have been, and engaging FIED with Ukraine, and UNCLASS I FIED 83 I our other a11ies, the Canadians, you know, 2 But it was very much focused on the resolution of the NATO and others. 7 conflict in Donbas. a With Ambassador Sondland's self-asserted authority over at least parts of the Ukrainian portfolio, who are the other relevant U.S. officjals, not Rudy Giuliani, but relevant U.S. officials involved wjth Ukraine policy at this 8 point? a J 4 5 6 A 9 In terms of across the interagency, the equivalent l0 Assistant Secretaries and Deputy Assistant Secretaries of ll Defense and t2 a A l3 at State. Who So are they? George Kent is the DAS in charge of Ukraine at the t4 State Department. Wess Mitchell was previously the Assistant l5 Secretary, but he left in February of 2019, February of t6 that sound right? And Phil Reeker came in as Acting Assistant Secretary, having been the special adviser to EUCOM, only rea11y in April-May. So he was actually dual-hatted until the ret'irement of General Scaparrotti. He was his chief adviser. So he was, you know, doing two jobs at once. So I think he was appointed of named as Acting Assistant Secretary, but he only really was coming into the job in April. the DAS is Laura Cooper at the And then, jn terms of Defense Department. Then well, we also had had a number t7 l8 l9 20 2t 22 23 24 25 Does UNCLASS IF]ED 2019. UNCLASS I F]ED 84 J there. I mean, the Defense Department, there was a whole range of people who were involved in this, because of j ust the nature of assi stance to Ukra'ine. We'd 4 also had General Abizaid, who had been a chief military I 2 of changes over 6 adviser to Ukraine. He was replaced by Ke'ith Dayton, General our mi 1i tary Kei th Dayton, who 'is the head of Garmi sch 7 school at Garmisch. 5 t2 of people, people also at, obvi ously , OMB, Departments of commerce, usTR. There' s a broad range of people who were involved in one way or another on Ukrai ne portfol i o. Department of J usti ce, the FBI . We had a Department of Justice team working, and also in our l3 I 8 9 l0 11 l4 l5 So you had a broad range ntel agenc i es as we1 I a And in your directorate, could you help us understand how your directorate was set A l6 t7 . We had one particular juncture up? director for Ukraine, who at this was Alex Vindman. Our previous di rector 2l detailed from the Defense Department, he had been well , he St'i1f is a f orei gn area of f i cer detai 1ed to the Chai rman's 0f f ice, the Jo'int Ch'ief s of Staf f . He had been General Dunford's key action officer for jnteractjons 22 wi 18 t9 20 23 24 25 who was th the Russi ans. a And who's that? A For i nteracti ons, thi s i s Alex Vi ndman. a Okay. Thi s i s Alex Vi ndman. Is he sti 1t UNCLASS I FIED there? UNCLASS I 2 3 4 5 I'm just giving you his background. To the best of my knowledge, he's sti 11 there. Hi s predecessor was Catherine Croft, who was previously the Ukra'ine desk officer at the State Department, and she went to work for Kurt Volker as his deputy, but only in the very last couple of months. a A a 9 o offjcjals on your staff concentrated on 0n1y Alex Vindman. How many personnel did you have in your rgan'i zat'i on ? A ll t2 How many Ukrai ne? 8 10 85 A 6 7 I FIED As you're aware, there was an the National Securi ty Counci effort to streamline 1 l3 l4 So, basically, we didn't replace people when they rotated out l5 of detail. l6 t7 initially been taken on by my the di rector wi th ln€, Colonel the other seni or di rector i n l8 Rich Hooker, who had been, you know, very interested, 19 obvi So some people had enormous And Alex Vindman had ously, i n defense- related i ssues. initially brought him on And we 20 2t of 22 determinatjon 23 24 25 portfolios. to look at the totaljty but then there was a in the course of the streamlining of Russian defense-related issues, during that that should all be concentrated in our defense di rectorate. So another person had been taken on there to focus on those related issues who would work closely. 5o we the NSC UNCLASS ] FIED UNCLASS I I a A J 4 When a A 6 did that occur? So he wasn't hi red primari when Catherine 5 86 Alex to work on Ukraine, Belarus, and Moldova. moved 2 FIED ly i t had occurred Croft left. When was that? That would be sometime toward the end of the summer t2 in the summer of the Summer we have a rotation of detailees. Most people are there for a year. Some people get permission from their agencies for l-8 months. And on rare occasions people are seconded for 2 years, but only if their department is willing to pay. And there was a big debate while I was there that people l3 here may recal1 about whether departments and agencies were t4 going 7 8 9 l0 l1 of 2018. to pay for additional time beyond the L year. O And what agenc'ies do you draw the detai lees f rom? A Every agency, i f we can. 15 l6 a A 17 18 t9 20 21 22 23 24 25 Every year, I Such as? Every agency that we can to have Wel1, in your tenure, that will detail someone. mean, i t's rare a what were the agencies supplyi ng detai lees? A We11, understandi ng. it depended, again, on the memorandums of When I fj rst started, the maj ori ty were from the State Department. But the State Department, when Secretary Tillerson came in, was refusing to let people stay UNCLASS I FIED FIED UNCLASS I I 2 J 4 5 6 87 for longer than a year, and there was also some questions back and forth about the downsizing of the State Department. DOD initiatly were more receptive to putting forward particularly foreign area officers and particularly people from JCS. And there were a 1ot of detailees from DOD in the time that I was there across the NSC and all d'i rectorates. 7 8 9 l0 ll t2 l3 t4 trying to get someone actually from Commerce, because I felt like we needed, you know, kind of a diversity of views, especially since an awful 1ot of the issues that we were dealing with related to trade, especially when it came to Europe but also with many other countries. And although that was in our International Economics'djvjsion, it was very helpful to have people with, you know, broader backgrounds. I l5 t6 t7 was We had also detailees from Treasury, although Treasury 'itse1f, they got short-staffed and were trying to recatl of their deputies in that tjme. l8 And 1et me just see l9 a A a 20 2l 22 if I've Wh'ich some missed anyone. And then ? I think in some cases, that would be classified. And in total, you had anywhere from 10 to L4 people under your supervisjon? 24 because, of ten with times, "it was only I the detailees changing over, we could go weeks, you know, I 25 see 23 A At some UNCLASS I FIED UNCLASS I FIED 88 I could 2 a changeover of detailees, it J attest that, 4 often takes a long time for people to 5 be real1y short-staffed. 6 7 8 9 10 ll t2 13 t4 l5 when you have 1iterally come in, and you might d'i rectors, you to I know, kind of tota1, and myself have acted aS a director and at different times have had to ask our special assistant. We So I have been down also had a number of special assistants. In special assistant. down to onfy ! a my case, we Were The often that was how people's portfofios ended up getting determined. So we had one colleague who had to cover the entirety of the eastern flank of NATQ, I mean 20-p1us countries because, when ! came in, the other previous ! A And t7 directors who were djvided up between them had 1eft. And I did that job for several months and actually did it so well l8 that we decided not to hire an extra deputy. I t9 basi ca11y worki t6 20 2t 22 23 24 25 a A a was ng L8-hour days, however. Switching gears back to the July LOth meeting. Yes. The next sort of key event was the July 25th call with President Trump and President Zelensky. You had left shortly prior -- A I had. UNCLASS I F]ED UNCLASS I 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 a ] FIE 89 D prior to the call. But what was the preparation for that call underway? A It was not because the call had not been announced when I 1eft. a So you djdn't know the call was scheduled A I did not. as of J u1y 1-9th? a A As of July Lgth, I did not know it was scheduled. And on July L5th was the last day that I had formal l0 interagency meetings. And from Ju1y LGth, L7th, LSth ll t2 L9th, I had meetings myself just to wrap up and, you know, kjnd of basically pass on informatjon about the portfolio to l3 relevant people, i ncludi ng across the i nteragency. and l6 did you pass your portfoljo on to? i passed my portfotio on to Tim Morrison. And so any meetings that were pertinent to Ukraine in that tjmeframe l7 of that t4 l5 18 l9 20 2t 22 23 a A Who week, he attended with AIex Vindman, although actually, to be honest, I think he was traveling in that period. He went to take part in he may have been back by the Thursday an arms control meeting with the State Department because he came over, as you know, from being the seni or d'i rector f or arms control a Did he at any point work for you, Morrison? . 24 A Work 25 a Yes. for me? UNCLASS ] E]ED UNCLASS I A I 2 J 4 5 6 of mass No, he did not. FIED 90 He was my counterpart in weapons destruction. a A a A Then he came over to take your job? Correct. Why I did you decide to leave the White had always sai d when I came cal appo'intee. I House? 'in: I 'm a red, i n f act, 7 nonparti san , nonpol i ti 8 by General Flynn, K.T. McFarland, and General Ke1logg. 9 when they 10 ll t2 l3 l4 l5 t6 t7 l8 t9 20 2l 22 23 24 25 was hi And first approached me and asked me if I would be willing to do this, I had previously taken a leave from Brookings, I was on IPA to the National Intelligence 0ffice. So I had actually worked with General Flynn when he was working for Admiral Mu11en at the Joint Chiefs of Staff when I was a National Intelligence 0fficer. And I said that I couldn't commit to longer than 2 years, maximum. 1n actual fact, I stayed longer because I agreed to help wi th transjtion, finding new directors, and also trying to find a successor and to be able to do a handover. And I said I was willing to stay no later than the end of the year to do this And Tim l4orri son wanted to start on July 15th. a So you're nonpartisan? A I am nonparti san. a In thi s current envi ronment we're j n, i t's A That's actually why I took the job. Because in thi s current env'i ronment we' re i n, I thi nk j t's extremely UNCLASS I FIED 9l UNCLASS I EIED for people who are nonpartisan I important 2 government pos'i tions. 3 4 5 6 O At any point as you were on-boarding, was it you find that you were ostracjzed because you weren't associated w'ith the more partisan side of the house? A I got ostracized by 7 MR. W0L05KY: What do you mean? 8 DR. 9 10 to serve jn HILL: Ostracized by Yeah, by whom? Not by anybody Republican Party, but in did whom? the I did have a colleague who had previously BY MR. l1 CASTOR: 2t a Like were you who has not spoken to me since I took the job, A but for the opposite reasons from what you are suggesting. a And how would you characterjze, were you a supporter of the President? Were you agnostic? A I was agnostic. And I don't think that there's anything wrong with that either. I was, basically, like I said, in the case of Zelensky and many others, I think everyone should have a very open mind. And I think it's very important to serve your country and to serve the President 22 and the Presidency, you know, as being duly elected. t2 l3 t4 l5 t6 t7 l8 l9 20 z5 24 25 And I thought it was very important to step uP, as an expert, as somebody who's been working on Russia for basically my whole entire adult 1ife, given what had happened UNCLASS I FIED UNCLASS I FIED 92 6 peril that I actually thought that we were in as a democracy, given what the Russians I know to have done in the course of the 2015 elections. a So you say you were agnostic on the President, so you hadn't been a critic of the President? A I had not. There are a couple of art'icles where I 7 expressed some, you know, skepticism about how his in 2 J 4 5 2015 and given the t0 relatjonship would be w'ith Putin that, you know, kind of perhaps didn't prove to be true, but anyway. So, I mean, you can look back and, you know, see that' l1 you know, 8 9 12 13 I suggested they might not get a1ong, you know, kind of because, you know, given the different natures of the individuals, I thought, you know, there might be some 2t friction. a At any point, did you find yourself becoming a cri tic of the President? A I did not. And if I had done, l would have left right away, and I left only on terms. And a lot of people -and I'm just going to put this out there. You haven't asked the question, but I have been accused of it many times. I did not write Anonymous. I am not Anonymous. So just to say 22 that t4 15 16 17 18 t9 20 because I didn't 24 a A 25 people, and 23 ask you that. Lee has been having endless phone ca11s from I was accused of that within the White House. It UNCLASS I FIED UNCLASS ] FIED that I had. It was the only t'ime when I experjenced discomfort. Because of people parsi ng everythi ng I had wri tten. And M'ichael Anton, who was the head of the press at that time, was fielding endless ca11s from people saying that I was Anonymous. And I was not, and I will state it for the record: I was not. a But you didn't leave the White House because you found yourself becoming a critic of the President? A No, I didn't. I had gi ven myself 2 years. I stayed longer than that. But, as a nonpartisan person, I did not want to be part of the campaign a And even since you've left the White House, you don't fjnd yourself as a cri tic of the President? A I have not returned to the Brookings Institutjon. I 'm on leave. And I have not taken on any speaki ng engagements. I am not writing a book. I am basically trying to keep my head down, you know, while everybody else is trying to do their jobs. I worked with the most unbelievably professional first-rate team of people, both potitical and nonpolitjcal, 'in the time I was at the NSC, and I want to give them the space to do their jobs a The July 25th call, who would ordinarily be a parti ci pant on that call? A That really could vary because it also, you know, depends -- I mean, there were ca11s that I would have been was the most uncomfortable time 2 J 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 t2 13 14 15 t6 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 93 UNCLASS ] FIED UNCLASS IFIED 2 ordinarily ofl, but I wasn't there or present. I might have been in another meeting or I might not have actually been J physically i n the I bui 94 ldi ng. 1l be we11, again, it often would be selected by the front office of the National Security Advisor as well as, you know, the kind of the broader White House team. You would imagine someone from the Chief of Staff's Office, someone repreSenti ng the National Securi ty Advi sor, which could be the deputy. It could be myself, as the senior director, or the director if I'm not present. Someone from the V'ice President's staf f . 0f ten Someone f rom press or the t2 White House counsel. 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 So it would usually t7 if there was an ant'icipation that a particular topic in somebody else's area of responsibility would come up say, jt's a call with Chancellor Merkel and she wants to talk about 1et's j ust pick a random Li bya, then the di rector who has responsibility and the senior directors for Libya 18 woutd basicalty also be present. t3 t4 15 t6 t9 20 2l 22 Z5 24 25 And I can't say for sure, you know, who would normally have been in those meetings, but that's usually I mean and then you have the Whi te House Si tuat'ion Room staf f , and then other Cabinet members can call in as we1l. Now, also remember that there's another side to alt of these ca11s. So, while people start parsing who's in our cal1s, all of those ca11s could very easily be being recorded So UNCLASS I F]ED UNCLASS I 2 J 4 5 6 I E]ED well as transcribed by a very large phalanx of other people on the other s'ide of the ca11. And I wi 11, you know, refer you to look at pictures that, for example, President Erdogan of Turkey would frequently release with himself listening to the call with about as many people as are sitting here 'in this room. as 7 8 9 t0 l1 t2 l3 t4 l5 l6 t7 l8 l9 20 2t 22 23 24 25 UNCLASS ] E]ED 95 UNCLASS I I 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 ll BY MR. CASTOR: a 14 l5 t6 t7 18 t9 20 2t 22 23 24 25 Did you speak with anyone? You had left on the L9th, but had you spoken to anybody about the call? I did not. I was on vacation the time the phone call took place, I think, date-stamp on my phones, I was snorkeling. A . And at based on my V0ICE: You were under water. HILL: I was under water, yeah. It was a pretty good alibi. I djdn't take underwater pictures, but, you know, I can basically DR. BY MR. CASTOR: 12 l3 96 [].2 : 33 p.m. l 2 J FIED a A a A a A So you d'idn't I did not. until it I did not. rece jve any read-outs of the call became Public -- on the 25th? people I said I 'd promi se I would check my ema'i1 once a day and there and I was a big time difference as well, so that was quite would forward on to them anything that they needed to deal with and, otherwise, I would prefer if they didn't call me. No, I did not. I'd actually asked a Okay. But you were getting your emai1, so you saw the traffic from your A That was the first I saw that there was a call. UNCLASS I EIED UNCLASS ] E]ED 97 I a 2 A Right. And were there any And I didn't see anything after that call at all. J a Were there any 4 A There were 5 that at all. 6 a Okay. 7 A And, usual1y, 8 secu re unclassified read-outs on emajls? not. I system, because any one mean, they don't normally do preparation is done on a more should assume that, in those kinds 15 of emails, anybody could be readi ng them. a Ri ght. When is the first time you learned about the call and i ts nature? A Really when it was started to be made public. The first hint that I got that there might have been some discomfort about it was when I was handing back in my badge t6 on September 3rd. 9 l0 11 t2 l3 t4 t7 a A Uh-huh. 21 I said, how are things going, and people said, we11, not great. And I thought, well, okay, something is up. But there wasn't any I mean, I was coming in to hand in my badge, so I was 22 technically no longer -- 18 t9 20 23 24 25 a A And I went in to tatk to my office, and Uh-huh. brief discussion with Tjm Morrison, and he didn't mention the call at all. He did take And i had a very UNCLASS I FIED UNCLASS I the tjme to te11 me that I FIED 98 Gordon Sondland was apparently glad 5 I thought, wel1, that was a rather po'inted message f rom Ambassador Sondland. But I didn't take that to be about the call or anything else. It just seemed to be a fairly gratujtous, you know, kind of messaging as I 6 was leavi ng. 7 a 2 3 4 8 9 10 1l t2 l3 l4 15 l6 t7 l8 t9 20 2t 22 23 24 25 that I had gone. So So Ambassador Sondland didn't attend your farewell party? A He didn't. No. a Did you have one? A Sort of. a And when was that? A That would've been in the week I was leaving. I can't remember when 'it was, honestly. a But back in July? A June or July, Yeah. a Where was i t? A It was just in the White House. We had a lot of farewell parties in that period. We11, it was because people are rotating out, and everybody likes to go and relax and see thei r f ri ends . MR. JORDAN: Doctor, you mentioned on September 3rd you got a hint of the call or the content of HiLL: No, I had more a hint that something but I didn't know exactly what. DR. UNCLASS I E]ED was up, UNCLASS MR. JORDAN: Not I 2 DR. HILL: Yeah. MR. JORDAN : BY MR. 6 a 7 9 a hint of the cal1, just a hint that People didn't look very happy in my di rectorate. 5 8 99 something was up. J 4 I FIED your Who 0kay. CASTOR: did you speak with when you came to turn in badge? A I spoke to resource management, the financial 10 people, the ethics people. And i also did have a very brief ll di scussion wi th John Ei senberg and t"ljchael E11j 12 with very frequently on a whole t3 real1y excellent, you know, professional retationship with. number s, who I met of issues and had a 20 I asked them if there was anything that I should be mindful of as I was leaving, in terms of communications. Because I'd seen an ema'i1 suggesting, again, that we had to keep all communications related to Ukraine. There'd been an emajl sometime in that timeframe. And I just wanted to te11 them that I'd put everything into the records, and was there anything that I needed to know, and they djdn't indicate that 21 there t4 15 l6 t7 18 t9 22 23 24 25 And was. a A a Di d you talk to V'indman? I d'id not talk to Alex Vi ndman, no. What did Eisenberg and E11is tell you about your records? UNCLASS ] FIED UNCLASS I 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 t0 l1 t2 l3 t4 15 l6 17 l8 l9 20 21 22 23 24 25 I F]ED 100 that, as long as I was having oo, you know, kind of official communications, that there was oo, you know, reason to be concerned, and just asked me what I'd done with all of my records. a Li ke, all your notes that you take 'in meeti ngs? A Correct. And I'd already f i led all of those wi th the records office on the L9th. a Okay . So you d i dn ' t take any A I took nothing with me. of your own notes with You? a A No. A11 I took with me was my the ethics and, you know, financial agreements. And the reason that I didn't because I was on hand my badge i n unt'i1 September 3 rd vacati on unti 1 the 30th 'is that you have to f i 11 out all the ethics paperwork on your last -- or immediately after your last payday. a Yeah. A And you can only then sign out of all of the resource management . I t' s j ust , yoLl know, ki nd of a bureaucrati c thi ng. A They said MR. JORDAN: Doctor, you said you learned about the calt of when it was public. Does that mean you learned about it prior to the 25th? 0r when did you learn about the contents and the nature of the calt? MR. W0L0SKY: I believe that misstates her prior about the time UNCLASS I EIED UNCLASS I F] ED 101 1 test'imony over when she learned about the ca11, when she 2 continued to have access to her nonclassified emai1. The 8 or i tsetf she MR. JORDAN: No, but she earlier, she said said a hint of a ca11, and she clarified that and said that wasn' t about the call necessari ly, j ust a hi nt of somethi ng. DR. HILL: Yeah, I was alert to the fact that people didn't look happy and something was up, but I didn't put it 9 together wjth the cal1. J 4 5 6 7 record w'i11 speak f MR. JORDAN: And l0 3rd, ll September t2 September 25th l3 catl? . there was no time when you had between a hint of something up, and that you learned about the contents of the 16 LL: NO, I did not Iearn about the contents of the calt. I did 1earn, as a result of lots of media calting me I was wi th , and I had 17 very poor t4 l5 DR. HI 20 Fi router that doesn't extend beyond, you know, kind of, basically this desk. I had to sit on it to basically get a text. And I basically ran through And when I eventualty called my enti re data plan. 2l to get the data plan extended, l8 l9 has a Wi 22 23 24 25 When i t came back on, I had of texts and emails from press UNCLASS I FIED found I had just bazillions And I didn't know what was I EIED UNCLASS on. And and a call. 1 going 2 NSC 3 4 5 6 I it texted And was clearly , I texted about who was not actually directly related to all of this, and said, what's going on? What I do need to know? Why am I getting d, i t's the whi stleblower account, and i t's related to the Ukrai ne ca11. all of these ca1ls? And sai 7 MR. JORDAN: That was 8 DR. 9 102 before the 25th? HILL: That would've been because I came back on , so it the 25th w'ith was in lt the couple of days before that. I basically read about everything as I was sitting in Newark Airport in the transit t2 area l0 wi th 13 MR. JORDAN t4 DR. HI LL: : . Uh- huh And who was ? The 15 t6 17 l8 I di dn't know I mean , I agai n, I And we kept a very close separation t9 especi a1ly on Russ'i 20 professjonal. a. Russi of issues, a was hi ghly coordi nated, hi ghly 24 all the Russia stuff out of everything e1se, because there was a tendency for people to leak 'inf ormati on about Russi a, and we wanted to make sure that that did not happen. t4R. ZELDIN: If I -- excuse me. If I could ask a quick 25 followup on that? 2t 22 23 And we kept UNCLASS I FIED UNCLASSIFIED I So, earlier on in your testimony, you stated that 2 ljke to J stated that you' re not the person 4 York Times 5 6 7 I 9 10 103 you keep your head down. Even without being asked, you DR. HILL: I've who wrote the anonymous New been asked about every single other t'ime by every imaginable press person, and all of the people who are emailing me, who don't know me, are asking that. So I thought I would just get it on the record so that it's not, you know, kind of, a question that js all hovering over people' s mi nds. l3 ro, I appreciate that. But that's why your last answer just sparked my interest, and I just wanted to ask a followup question. How would so many in the 14 media have your phone number? ll t2 l5 t6 t7 l8 l9 20 2l 22 23 24 25 MR. ZELDIN: Yeah, HILL: i used to work at a think tank, the Brookings Institution. In fact, I'il MR. ZELDIN: It was all from before you were jn the Whi te House? DR. HILL: -- I am technically, you know, supposed to go back there. And I haven't gone back there because you can't rea11y shelter in place at somewhere like the Brookings Insti tuti on when somethi ng 1 i ke thi s i s goi ng on. And what I mean by that is, I'm obliged as part of the iob as a senior fellow to talk to the media and to the press and to make publ i c pronouncements. DR. UNCLASS I FIED UNCLASS ] FIED 104 I MR. ZELDIN: 2 DR. HILL: And Brookings has, very sad1y, I SO J 4 Okay. But you weren't givi ng out your number to the media while in your position at the White MR. ZELDIN: 5 6 phone 7 House? 8 9 l0 ll 12 l3 t4 15 t6 t7 l8 t9 20 2t 22 23 LL: No. And I'11 be very clear, and you can ask any of the press directorS, that I only ever gave background interviews at the request of the Wh'i te House, i ncludi ng the press secretary on the NSC, wjth NSC press or White House press available. I never, on any occasion, talked to the media outside of those ci rcumstances background, authori zed i ntervi ews. I di d not leak any information. I did not talk to the press. I was accused of many things, and that's why I'm just saying that it gets my back up when people tike Masha Yovanovitch and others were accused baselessly of doing all ki nds of improper activi ty. And I did not leak, and I was not Anonymous. I am not DR. stlebtower. And I 'm not the second whi stleblower. Just get this all for the record so we have it all out there and you don't have to ask any more questions about that. the whi BY MR. 24 25 HI a Yeah, CASTOR: v,,e11 , you know, i f I UNCLASS I EIED may j ust walk you UNCLASS I through this. We first I FIED 105 heard about you coming in for today's 6 all-day interview, all-day depos'ition, Iast Wednesday night. Nobody told us earljer than Wednesday. I contacted your lawyer on Thursday to try to find out a 1itt1e bit more information and was unable to connect with your lawyer. We were i n here all day Fri day. And, fi nal1y, I connected wi th 7 your lawyer for about 5 minutes last night. 2 J 4 5 And so you have 8 9 to understand that when we're trying to prepare ourselves and prepare our members, we are being kept ll in the dark. So you just have to excuse the fact that we're going to have some questjons about who were the people you t2 worked for. l3 19 I completely understand. And I think, you know, my reaction is not because of you at all. I mean, it's the, you know, kind of, just the onstaught that I have been getting. I've had media inqui ries and, you know, people I don't know at all a Got it. you know, worki ng I 'm on YouTube. I 'IIr, you A 20 know, on the internet. l0 t4 15 t6 17 l8 A 2t 22 23 24 25 I No, O OkaY. js panicked that, you know, kind of, AMy going to be targeted. You know, there are a We11, certai nly, that j s A So I'm responding to, you know, all these UNCLASS ] FIED UNCLASS I IE]ED as a person. And, again, I suspicions about who 2 nonpartisan professional. And J have on the record. a Dr. Hi 11, 4 v\,e am 106 that's just what I I am a wanted to appreci ate your servi ce and have t2 for you and, you know, the like-minded nonpartisan people that serve in the National Security Council. And, good heavens, anything that can be likened to , good heavens, that a threat and anything with is something that nobody, on the Republican side or the Democratic side, will A No, I'm aware that this is not You at alt. It's just, as you said, when you asked me a question before, gi ven l3 the envi ronment 5 6 7 8 9 10 ll enormous respect l8 a But just let me be clear that we find that type of thing to be absolutely abhorrent, and we want to assi st you in any way possible to mjnimize that. A No, I appreciate that. a Can you help us understand, Iike, when is the first l9 time you heard the committee had an interest in speaki ng 20 you t4 15 t6 t7 2t wi th ? MR. WOLOSKY: I'm going to instruct her not to answer L) that question to the extent that it ca11s for communications wi th her attorney that are covered by attorney-client 24 privilege. 22 25 MR. CASTOR: 0kay. UNCLASS I FIED UNCLASS I 2 Like, how Mr. Wolosky then? HILL: I DR. 4 MR. CASTOR: And 6 7 8 9 l0 l1 t2 l3 t4 107 did they know you were represented by J 5 I FIED Wedn e sd ay When asked Mr. Wolosky to when 1ike, was it earlier than last ? I thi nk that i f you want to ask a question to the witness, she will answer the question to the extent that she has personal knowledge. If you want to ask a question to me, I'm not the witness in these 1"1R. W0LOSKY: Yeah, proceedi ngs I mean, . I don' t want to ask a questi on of you I just want to know generally when you fjrst became t'lR. CASTOR: . aware the comm'ittee had an i nterest i n speaki ng wi th you. DR. HILL: I became aware of it, actuaIly, when the l6 letter publicly about what the because, you know, my tjtle js on that Iist. It sajd current t7 and former. 15 chairman released the l8 MR. CASTOR: Okay. l9 DR. 20 l'lR. CAST0R: 0kay. HILL: And so I assumed -- 23 HILL: -- and I hope that 'i t was a correct assumption based on the very thorough list of all the people that you intended to call for depositions, that that 24 would cover 21 22 25 DR. me. MR. CAST0R: 0kay. UNCLASS I FIED UNCLASS DR. I HILL: Now, the 2 Europe and Russi a when J changed 4 108 D title has changed somewhat. was the senior di 1t rector. It's was been to European Af f a'i rs oF, you know, European Issues whatever it's been changed to now. MR. CASTOR: 5 6 I I EIE Okay. And do you remember when that or was' generatly? l5 HILL: We11, whenever the chai rman publi shed the letter that was put 'in the med'ia. MR. CASTOR: When is the first time you learned the committee attempted to contact you specifically? oh, not my name' DR. HILL: I saw that my name was on was on not my name in person, but my function and my job the 1ist. So I assumed that, at Some point, I would be asked to testify or to speak to someone in some fashion. And I've known Lee for 30 years. And on my first day t6 back, t7 I 7 8 9 10 l1 t2 l3 t4 DR. l8 to me and said, you need a lawyer. And I thought, who do I I t9 20 2t 22 23 24 25 0h, I came up know? know Lee. that, the 25th? MR. W0L0SKY: Thank you for the endorsement. DR. HILL: I know he's a great lawyer. I know he's a great lawyer, just to add to all of that. But I've known him MR. CASTOR: And when was UNCLASS I FIED UNCLASS ] FIED I since before he was a lawyer. 2 going 109 Lee's 1ike, great, now I'm to have no more clients Anyway, sorry. 0ops. BY MR. CASTOR: J a 4 which I 5 I I 6 7 I 8 A doe s work for? ! does not I used to work for the 9 l0 a For what? ll A I'm not going to bring ! into this a I'm not asking you for ! name. l2 l3 I I l4 l5 A for, you know, the government. t6 t7 did We1I, pursued white-co11ar crime. l8 19 I mean, I was somewhat disturbed, 20 2l 22 24 I dismissed it first, but then, as the news media picked up on this, 25 thought 23 would te11 me that ! I should was probably right. UNCLASSIFIED and at I UNCLASS I I 2 a J 4 5 6 110 did you first realize that, indeed, wanted to speak wlth You? a And when A Well they , that's when MR. WOL0SKY: I mean, again, to the extent that that i nvolves communi cati ons wj th me, I 'm goi ng to i nstruct her not to answer that quest'ion. MR. CASTOR: Uh-huh. 7 BY MR. 8 a 9 l0 FIED with what A a ll CASTOR: The documents produced last night, are you famifiar was produced on your behalf? The yes, I am. Yeah. 13 the circumstances, to the extent know, not involving communicatjons with your lawyer, but 14 was t2 l5 t6 17 l8 t9 20 2t 22 23 24 25 And what were that produced? Your calendar entries, is that that you had wi th You? A I didn't actuallY have i t wi th me. a 0kay. There was a range. A a A l4y you how something assistant at the National Security Council OkaY. actually kept the calendar. And it's only but only for the year in whjch he was working there. a A Ri ght. to, you know, obviously, establish a timefine, you know, and what meetings I would've been available jn. And I asked him if he had kept a copy of the And I was asked UNCLASS I FIED UNCLASS I I 2 J 4 5 6 FIED 111 to refer to to make sure that we got at least , you know, k'ind of , the meeti ngs that the committee was most interested in in sequence. a The handwritten notes on the calendar, is that A That was just me circling calendar that a A I would be able OkaY. 1l I thought would be most pertinent, and also pointing out that I wasn't because calendar had entries for after I had already 1eft. a Sure. I thjnk on the L9th it said A I'd gone or something, on vacation, or handed t2 over the l3 that your handwri ting? Yeah, that's my handwriting. Because he gave it to me and I tooked. And I onty had one copy of this. 7 8 9 10 t4 15 t6 17 l8 l9 20 2l 22 z3 24 25 you know, what a A And i s a A OkaY. this is trying to establish the facts as best I can, because, as you know you know it. mean, I can't have total recal1 of every a 0h, of course not. you know, single timing and things as well. A a And I don't expect you to. A Yeah. Yeah. MR. W0LOSKY: Can I have just L minute? DR. HILL: Yeah. Please. Yeah. And, again, UNCLASS I FIED the me I UNCLASS I FIED 112 4 off the record. ] DR. HILL: Yeah, I just also wanted to mention that, you know, obviously, in terms of documents and document retention, everything was fited in accordance with the 5 requi rements from records. I 2 J 6 7 8 9 l0 l1 t2 l3 14 l5 IDi scussi on that last day that I was in the office, on September 3rd, if I could have a copy for reference of my contacts database, because I wanted to be able to pass on to Tim Morrison and to other colleagues names I And of had asked on ambassadors and ambassadors' staff. And things are unacceSsible to your SucceSSor mean, the accounts are all closed down. all of when you those 1eave. I that was the similar I asked if my assjstant, who was actually working in the transj tion period for Tim Morrison, could have access to the calendar that he had kept And 2t in that time so that Tim and others would be able to refer back to when I had a particular meeting. Because, I mean, it's obviously important for the President'ial record and for, you know, recordkeeping and for directorate continuity purposes to know when the predecessor met with whom, you know, which ambassador o[, you know, which other 22 offi ci a1 t6 t7 l8 t9 20 for me . BY I'4R. CASTOR: 23 24 a 25 Volker? You always had a good relationship with Ambassador UNCLASSIEIED UNCLASS 2 J Sondland, but A 4 I I did. Very good relationship with him. I think we're clear where you stand with A O I ] FIED I actually had a very good relationship, l3 Ambassador I thought' l0 at the very beginning with Ambassador Sondland. But the unfortunate thing was I had a blow-up with him a Ri ght. in June, when he told me that he was in charge A of Ukra j ne, because i n'i ti a1ly I sai d to him, "You' re not, " wi th that k'ind of , you know, surpri se and probably i rri tat j on 1l i 5 6 7 8 9 t2 n my voice. a A Ri ght. Ri ght. l5 got testy wjth me. And I said, who has put you in charge of it? It seemed 1ike, h'i , I'm in charge. You know, there's no ambassador here. We11, at that point, t6 Charge l3 r4 t7 And then he Taylor had been sent out. And I sai d, who has sai d you' re 'in charge of Ukrai ne, Ambassador l8 Gordon? And he sa'id, the Presi dent. Well t9 because you 20 2t 22 23 24 25 wasn't a A a A , that shut me up, can't rea1ly argue with that. But then I to be honest, I wasn't real1y sure. But Ambassador Volker always acted with integrity? He did. In the interest of the Unjted States? He did. I have to say, though, that we did say to him that we did not think it was a good'idea for him talking UNCLASS I FIE D UNCLASS I I to Rudy FIED 114 Giulianj. 4 did he resPond to that? He said that he thought that he would be able to I don't think he used exactly these words, but be able to 5 reason 6 know, manage 7 manageable. 2 J 8 9 a A And how w"i th h'im and to, you know, ki nd of , basi ca11y t very clear that should be talking to Rudy Giuliani, on our team or else should ll a you th'is. Wetl, we did not thi nk that thi s was And Ambassador Bol ton m.ade i l0 , nobody anybody be. You may have had a disagreement with Ambassador t9 like you just recounted, but, I mean, he always was acting in the best interests of the United States, to the best of your knowledge, correct? A To the best of my knowledge, correct. a Okay. He A Ambassador Sondland, I'm afraid, you know, I fe1t, you know, as I mentioned before, he was driving along on th; road. You know, he'd j ust gone off the road. No guardrai 1s, 20 no t2 l3 t4 15 t6 t7 18 2t 22 23 24 25 Sondland, GPS. a A Ri ght. And my main concern, that he was wading into, not just on Ukraine but many other issues, everything which he was not being properly briefed. And we reached out to his team at the EU mission, and they weren't giving him briefings UNCLASS ] FIED UNCLASS I E]ED I 2 J 115 on thi s. a A Ri ght. And, again, that's why I asked 6 to try to find some time to sit with him and to encourage him again not to use his personal phone, not to use other peopte's personal phone, not to give people's personal phone 7 numbers out. 4 5 8 9 l0 11 r2 t3 14 15 16 t7 l8 t9 20 a A Yeah. A Ambassador pretty confident that he was, you know, doing what he thought was, you know, the right thing to get agreements made and to further relationships, but he wasn't doing it in a way that was, you know, going to basically make for good process. And he was also doing this in a way that I thought put him at risk. a Who'is "we"? You said "we." I mean, he I am Bolton, Ass'istant Secretary Reeker, Under Secretary Ha1e, Deputy Assistant Kent. a Okay. A I could j ust go on and on I mean and, a1so, we had complaints from other . 2l ambassadors about Ambassador Sondland, 22 into their areas. 23 without being, you know, kind of 24 foreknowledge. In 25 cases they were He would show some cases not. up in that he was wading their countries without rea11y much they were pleased, and in other And he would piggyback onto other UNCLASS I F]ED UNCLASS visits I people's 2 the ambassador, shepherd J would be there too. 4 5 6 7 8 9 l0 ll t2 l3 t4 15 l6 17 l8 t9 20 2t 22 L) 24 25 I FIED ll6 to, you know, basically, as their head of state to visit, and he when they wanted a And he wasn't a Foreign Service officer. He was new to the experience, right? A He was new to the experjence. I mean, he was cIearIy, you know, a savvy guy. He's charmi ng. He's funny. He was well-meaning. I mean, a lot of the storjes that have been in the press about him paying for things, actually I think he was doing that out of generosity. He was truly trying to build up morale in his embassy. His embassy loved, you know, the kind of treats and things that he would get for them. He was trying to create happy hours. I thjnk he was, in the spirit of being, obv'ious1y, a pretty good hotelier, he was, you know, trying to do the hospi tali ty part of the embassy, wh'ich i s actually an important part of being an ambassador. a Ambassador Volker related to us that he was engagi ng wi th Mr. Gi uIi anj because he belj eved that Gi u1j ani was amplifying a negative narrative and he had the ear of the Presjdent, and so he was trying to make the best of this truism. Is that a -A That's exactly what he told me as we11. I mean, I beg to differ, because I didn't think that this was actually going to be very helpful. Because the more you engage with UNCLASS ] FIED UNCLASS I someone who tt7 ] EIED is spreading untruths, the more validity you give 5 to those untruths. a But Volker's i ni ti ati ves here and Sondland's i ni ti ati ves here, i s i t your testi mony that you be1 i eve they were trying to do what's in the best interests of the Unjted 6 States? 2 J 4 l8 I do believe that they were trying to do that. All ri ght. And they' re men of i ntegri ty? I know Kurt Volker definitely to be a man of i ntegr i ty . And 'i n terms of Gordon Sondl and , based on my i nteracti ons wj th hi m, I 've a1 ready expressed the concerns but I can't say that he's not a man of integrity. And he definitely was very enthusiastic in all of our early initial meetings about serving the United States, serving the President, and realIy trying to do as good a job as possible to also patch up our relat'ions with the European Uni on , whi ch were qui te rocky And, you know, from all reports that I was getting back 19 from 20 and 7 8 9 l0 ll t2 13 t4 l5 t6 t7 2t 22 23 24 25 A a A , . EU ambassadors, they actually appreciated h'is outreach felt that he was very open a Ri ght. and they thought, you know, he was rea11y trying A very hard. a 0kay. So he wasn't Fruman UNCLASS I FIED part of the Lev Parnas and Igor ElED UNCLASS I I 2 J 4 5 6 7 8 9 we I A I don't think he even knew who those gentlemen a A OkaY. l8 re because blow-up with hjm, a A in the meeting where I had a bit of a I said -- OkaY. Gordon, you' re i n over your head. I don't thi nk you know who these people are. a A OkaY. l3 I also, myself, didn't know who all of these peopte were either. I'd only heard their names. And from what I could gather from just, you know, a quick Google and, you know, kind of, open-source search, they seemed to be t4 bad news. l0 ll t2 l5 a t6 And Because Yeah. Volker, he related to us that the President had a r corruption that you can attest to? t7 deep-rooted skeptical view on Ukra'ine and thei l8 environment. Is that something l9 23 I think the President has actually quite publicly said that he was very skeptical about corruption in Ukraine. And, in fact, he's not a1one, because everyone has expressed great concerns about corruption in Ukraine. a And, you know, Ambassador Volker related the 24 President's busj ness experience i n the region and hi s 25 knowledge 20 2l 22 A of other business executjves that UNCLASS I FIED may have trjed to UNCLASS ll9 ] FIED 8 jn the Ukraine contributed to his deep-rooted views of Ukraine and corruption. Is A Correct. that something you can attest to? a A Wel1, I can attest to that, because, again, the President has said this publicly. O And then, you know, addi ti onal1Y DR. HILL: Can I make a quick request to have a quick 9 bathroom break? I 2 J 4 5 6 7 l0 do business MR. CAST0R: Yeah, we've got about 2 m'inutes l3 HILL: Yeah, I'ffi not trying to cut you off. I'm just sort of thinking I'd real1y ljke to go to the bathroom. MR. CASTOR: We've got about 4 minutes left. Would you t4 want to ll t2 DR. HILL: Could we j ust 1i teralty take a qui ck break? l5 DR. l6 MR. CAST0R: t7 l8 of course. DR. HILL: Because I've been kind of waiting for Yes, pause. 19 MR. CASTOR: We can always 20 THE CHAIRMAN: We'11 2l lRecess. l 22 THE CHAIRMAN: BY MR. 23 24 25 a take a break. take a qui ck break. We're back on the record. CASTOR: talking about President Trump's what was at least related to us as his deep-rooted skeptical view of a We were UNCLASS I FIED I FI UNCLASS 120 ED in the region I Ukraine as a businessman, as both hjmself 2 also with his colleagues. But he also had a skepticjsm as and 4 result of allegat'ions in the 20L6 election. Is that also fair to say, that the President harbored 5 some 6 reaSonS 7 Ukra'ine? a J 8 9 l0 1l t2 a skepticjsm, whether based ort, you know, legitimate or not, that he did harbor Some reserVations about I think you should limit your comments to absent a ruling from the public statementS unless there is chairman on the issue of privilege. DR. HILL: Yeah, but I think he said jt repeatedly in public, you know, kind of recently as we11. MR. W0L0SKY: BY MR. CASTOR: l3 t6 I'm not asking about your personal commun'ications wi th the President. I'm talki ng about your understandi ng, as an offici al wi th responsi bi 1i ty for thi s area, that the t7 Presi dent harbored skePti ci sm. t4 15 l8 19 20 a A He's- expressed it openly in the press pool and his own statements. O You know, the U. S. -Ukrai ni an relati ons , you know, 2l obviously, you have the President speaking with President 22 Zelensky. But you also have a fairly robust set of, 23 know, 24 Department, the DOD, other agencies. You know, you had Kurt 25 Volker, Phil Reeker, staff at the National Securi ty Councj Wess Mitche11, George UNCLASS ] FIED you 1, at the State Kent. We have UNCLASS I1 Taylor. I Bi 2 ti tIes. A a A a J 4 5 6 And I I EIE apologi ze That's all right. I mean no t2l D for not usi ng thei r offi ci a1 No worries, no worries. disrespect bY that. Yeah. And so, to the extent there may have been some, you calI, isn't there 7 know, comments exchanged on the 8 relati vely robust i nfrastructure around the relati 9 help steer anything into the types of back-and-forths 10 U. l3 t4 l5 l6 t7 l8 19 20 2l 22 a onshi p to S. and Ukrai ne ought to be havi ng? ll t2 Yeah. A a Hang on. a We11, you know, Can you clari fy agai n? So, absent the know absent the President's call wjth President Zelensky, there is an infrastructure of staff, at the State Department, at Nat'iona1 Securi ty Counci I , that are 'interacti ng wi th A Ri ght. Okay. Ukrai ne offi ci a1s to help everyone understand a some of the various things that are being requested. A Yes. 0 I mean, i sn't that A Yeah, but I 'm not qui te sure what the questi on 'is, though. I mean, are you what are you suggesting? 23 So the Pres'ident, you there's di scussion about, you know, 24 2015 and Burisma. And, you know, we saw the back-and-forth 25 on text about whether there's going to be a statement in UNCLASS I FIED UNCLASS I I 2 J FIED 122 of the Whjte House meeting. And what we saw, I think, in that exchange is that there was a, you know, good bit of staff work going back and forth that ultimatety 1ed to advance 5 a conclus'ion where no statement was i ssued. MR. W0LOSKY: We're sort of losing you here. It's 6 extremely long, compound questi 7 messages 4 8 9 t4 l5 16 re referri ng to text BY MR. CASTOR: a ll l3 You' that are not being presented as exhibits. So we're happy to respond to a question if there's a c1ear, specific question that you have for her. 10 t2 on. an the U.S. A There - Ukraj ni is an'infrastructure of staff dealing with an relati onshi p. 0n that particular j ssue that you're talking about, actually there was not. I mean, if you're talking about preparati on for the call the . a A Uh-huh. t9 that was what I was explaining before about why July 10th was so problematic. Because, norma11y, there is indeed an interagency process that goes together in 20 preparation 2t a t7 l8 22 23 24 25 And for a ca11. Volker related to us that he got a readout from both the Ukrainian and the U.S. side and nobody mentioned or 2015. THE CHAIRI4AN : You know, I j ust want to cauti on counsel we can't vet what counsel is saying was represented in Hunter B'iden UNCLASS I FIED , UNCLASS I EIED 123 7 earlier w'itness testimony. So if you have a question about the facts for the w'itness, rather than representing what prior wi tnesses have sai d, that mi ght be more appropri ate. MR. WOLOSKY: Let me put jt another way. The witness is happy to testify to areas that are withjn her personal knowledge, not Mr. Volker's personal knowledge. So I'd ask you to please direct your questions to her personal 8 knowledge. I 2 J 4 5 6 9 l0 ll t2 MR. G0LDMAN: Time. to f ini sh the last question? DR. HILL: Yeah. I'm trying to figure it out what it is that you' re tryi ng to fi gure out. THE CHAIRI'IAN: Do you BY MR. 13 t4 a My want CASTOR: question 'is, there i s an i nf rastructure of staf f 20 at the State Department to manage the relationship. A There is infrastructure to manage the relationship. a And all these people, as you've testified, have you know, are individuals of high integrity. acted with A But they were not coordinating across the government. I can be pretty confident, based on where I left 21 things on Juty L9th, that nobody beyond 22 Ambassador Sondland knew what 23 of Staff Mulvaney 24 Ambassador Sondland and Ambassador 25 Mulvaney. Sondland said repeatedly he was meeting with Chief 15 16 t7 l8 l9 Ambassador FIED and they were doing, beyond Chief because Ambassador Bolton UNCLASS ] Volker and both Bolton referred to UNCLASS I F]ED 124 10 of Staff Mulvaney. And that was it. It was not going down to the rest of the staff. When I left, I djd several things in the week that I left just to wrap up. I had a discussion with George Kent, telling h'im where I knew things stood and telling him and th'is was not knowi ng that there was goi ng to be a call because I don't think it was actually at aI1 even scheduled at thi s poi nt or even thought of a Uh-huh. warning him that I was very worried about this A ll whole engagement between Sondland and I 2 J 4 5 6 7 8 9 t2 l3 , Giuliani and with Kurt that he should be mjndful of this, and I thought that it was starting to take on different dimens'ions, including, you and t6 this reference to, you know, energy corruption. Although, when I spoke to George, I djdn't have a ful1 picture. I just told him that he should be rea1ly mjndful t7 and be t4 15 l8 l9 20 2t 22 23 24 25 know, careful on thi s. And on the very last day, on the l"9th, I had a phone call with Ambassador Taylor relating everything that I knew at that point. I was sort of sending out red flags for him and telling him, there's a 1ot of stuff going on here that we have no insight into and that you need to, you know, kind of, f i gure out and get on toP of th'is. And I told him at that point that Ambassador Sondland had told me that he was in charge of Ukraine. And that was UNCLASS I FIED UNCLASS I 2 a J 4 5 also news to THE CHAIRMAN: Let' s pause here. We'11 take a l'0-mi nute to ejther wolf down lunch or get 1unch, and then resume in L0 minutes. break I Okay. We'11 go back on the record. 7 Mr. 8 MR. G0LDMAN: Thank l3 Goldman. BY MR. 9 t2 we'11 Recess . ] THE CHAIRMAN: l1 125 Ambassador TaYlor. 6 l0 I E]ED you, Mr. Chairman. GOLDMAN: Dr. Hi11, before, at the tail end of our jnitial round, you were descri b'ing the c j rcumstances around the July 10th meeting at the Whit; House. a A a Yes. t6 I believe you said that, after you came back from meeting in the Ward Room with the Ukrainian counterparts and the other American officials, you went and spoke to t7 Ambassador 14 15 l8 19 20 2l 22 23 24 25 A a And Bo1 ton Uh-huh. right? And did you inform him of what had just transpired in the Ward Room? A Yes, I di d. a And could you j ust te11 us agai n what he sa'id to you at that poi nt? A He told me, as I stated before, to go and talk to he sa'id , you go and te11 J ohn i senberg. And he basi ca1ly E UNCLASS I FIED UNCLASS ] FIED 126 2 Eisenberg you go and tell Eisenberg that I am not part of this drug deal that Sondland and Mulvaney are cooking J up. I John t9 a And what did you understand A He was saying that sarcastically, of course, I mean, just to be clear. Actua11y, he was angry, but he was also sarcasti c. I mean , he wasn't a Ri ght, because inferring that they were cooking up an actual A drug deaf in the Ward Room. a Ri ght. So A Just to be c1ear. a So we're c1ear, because sometimes A Yeah, I know. This could lead to some conspiracy theori es and yeah. a Yes. And sometimes our colleagues don't understand parody or sarcasm, so A No. Ambassador Bolton has a reputation for being sarcastic and, you know, for basically using those kinds of 20 expressi ons 2t a Okay. But what did you understand him to A Wel1, based on what had happened 4 5 6 7 8 9 l0 ll t2 13 t4 l5 t6 t7 l8 22 23 . mean by that? blurting out that 24 meeting and Ambassador Sondland 25 already gotten agreement to have a meeting UNCLASS I F]ED jn the July 10th he'd at the White House UNCLASS I 2 5 6 And Ambassador BoIton had a A 8 t0 said repeatedly that nobody recall before that I said that he described Giuliani as a b"it of a hand grenade that was going to blow everyone up. should be meeting with 7 9 127 for Zelensky if these investigations were started up again, clearly Ambassador BoIton was referring directly to those. J 4 I FIED closely a A And you may Uh-huh. And he was obviously, moni messaging l1 Giuliani. at that point, you know, tori ng what Mr. Gi u1i ani was doi ng and the that he was sending out. Uh-huh. t4 thjs is also against the backdrop, as all of you witl reca11, of Mr. Giuliani's frequent appearances on television. And I can't say that I caught all of them, but I l5 was t2 13 16 t7 18 19 So by, you know, other staff I mean, you've all , no doubt, been 'in members. And, of ten the National Security Council buildings and the White House. There's TVs everywhere. So, I mean, I could often just walk down the corridor and catch Mr. Giuliani on the television. getting them relayed to a 20 me But Ambassador Bolton specificalty referenced 22 Mr. Sondtand and Mr. Mulvaney, who A Correct. And he had said previously I mean, 23 had regular meetings with Ambassador Volker, you know, jn 24 which, you know, getting back to Mr. Castor's questions, they 25 were 2t we all about the, you know, regular coordination of what we UNCLASS I FIED UNCLASS I F]ED 128 15 trying to do on Ukraine, you know, trying to get the Russians to start meeting with Ambassador Volker again, see 1f we could move forward on the Donbas. Ambassador BoIton made it very clear that, you know, again, he didn't think anybody should be deali ng wi th Gi u1 i ani a And who did he make that clear to? A He expressed i t i n one of the meeti ngs w'ith Ambassador Volker. But, at that point, I don't think he was fu11y aware of the extensive meetings that Ambassador Volker was having. This may have been early on, when Ambassador Volker had just started to meet with Giulianj. Because I only, actua11y, to be honest, became famifiar wi th the t'imeli ne once i t was all publ i shed i n the press agai n, I 'd personally sai d to Because we'd al ready sai d to Ambassador Volker and others that he shouldn't be talking to t6 Mr. Giuliani. t7 O were 2 J 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 l1 t2 l3 t4 l8 t9 20 2t 22 23 24 25 . . And did you say that to Mr. Volker before that Ju1y L0th meeting? A a A Absolutely. What was Mr. Volker's resPonse? n, you know, gett'ing back to what I sai d to Mr. Castor, it was rea1ly about he was trying to fix it. I mean, he was trying to refute, you know, the, kind of, very negative perceptions that were coming out. But I expressed to him that I was concerned that there Agai UNCLASS I FIE D UNCLASS I F]ED 129 I were business dealings, nefarious business dealings, 2 underway. And 4 to Kurt Volker the names of these individuals that had been relayed to me. THE CHAiRMAN: I just want to fo11ow up with a couple of 5 questions about Ambassador Bolton's comments about not 6 wanting J 7 8 9 l0 ll t2 l3 t4 l5 l6 l7 I had mentioned to be part of this drug deal. Did you understand it from that that he was not referring to an actual drug deal but DR. HILL: 0f course not. Yeah. transaction THE CHAIRMAN: -- some other kind of ilticit that he believed that Sondland and Mulvaney were engaged 'in? DR. HILL: Yes. He made it clear that he believed that they were making, basically, an improper arrangement to have a meeting in the White House, that they were predicating the meeti ng i n the Wh'i te House on the Ukrai ni ans agreei ng, i n this case, based on the meeting on July L0th, to restart investigations that had been dropped in the energy sector THE CHAIRMAN: And l8 ZJ HILL: -- by which po'int it was apparent that thjs was code, at least, for Burisma. Because that had been mentioned, you know, in the course of 14r. Giuljani's I'd already appearances on television and in the course of relayed to Ambassador Bolton everything that had been told to 24 me 25 Reeker, when Amos Hochstein had come t9 20 2l 22 DR. by everyone, including Ambassador Yovanovitch and Phit UNCLASS ] FIED in to see me, and I'd UNCLASS I EIED to him everything I'd 130 been I relayed 2 directorate and by our Western J we11. THE CHAIRMAN: And 4 told by our energy Hemisphere djrectorate as not only was djscussion of energy 6 but Buri sma was also, at thi s poi nt, understood to be code for the Bidens, an investigation jnto 7 the 5 8 9 l0 1l t2 l3 t4 l5 t6 t7 18 code for Buri sma, Bi dens DR. . HILL: That never came out explicitly, just to be c1ear. THE CHAIRMAN: ANd I talked to Ambassador Bolton, I also talked to Charlie Kupperman at length about th'is, the Deputy National Securi ty Advi sor. I mean, I recall te11i ng Charlie that this was the company that Hunter Bjden was not at thi s aSSoci ated w'ith. And we were concerned that parti cular j uncture, agai n, not speci fi cally about the Bi dens per se, but that Ukraine was going to be played by Giuliani in some way as part of the camPaign. DR. HILL: I d'id l9 THE CHAIRMAN: 20 DR. HILL: when NOW Because jt was positing, you know, here that 2t there was a great deal of, you know, illegal or whatever 22 acti vi ty goi ng on i n Ukrai ne, accordi ng 23 know, 24 the cyber issues 25 these art'icles j n the newspaper to G'iuI i ani . You alternative theory of the election, these were all getting put out through basically, the 2016 UNCLASS ] FIED . So i t was k'ind of creati ng I F]ED UNCLASS 131 2 a klnd of a story that was out there that was bei ng packaged. you THE CHAIRNAN: Now, do you recal1 at the time J mentioned I 5 that Giuliani had expressed that he was going to go to Ukraine. Do you remember when that was? DR. HILL: That was almost immediately after Ambassador 6 Yovanovitch had been removed from 4 was sometime l8 it on the television, he said he was going to go. And then I heard jt from colleagues. And there was, you know, kind of, quite a bit of consternation on the part of the State Department. THE CHAiRMAN: And he made it c1ear, I think, in those televi sion appearances, didn't he, that he was going to Ukraine to seek to have them investigate the Bidens? DR. HILL: Wel1, that's what he said. That's what I I mean, I think, you know, part of mean. This is part of you, ffi€, the dilemma that we all have here in trying to parse thjs, is that a lot of this is and all of us happening on the television, in terms of statements that 19 Gi u1 i 7 8 9 l0 ll t2 l3 t4 l5 t6 t7 20 2t 22 23 24 25 in May. I mean, again, I office, so it saw ani has made. THE CHAiRMAN: Did that give content to you when you that inform I DR. HILL: Correct, 'it did. And it was clearly mean, jn Ambassador Bolton's offjce, when I was meeting with him, the television was always on. And it was usually on FOX News. I mean, there was sometimes a split screen. And often heard these discussions going on, or did UNCLASS ] FIED UNCLASS I was I FIED 132 in the office, Giuliani would be on the I when 2 television, and, you know, Ambassador Bolton would put on the J sound to hear what he was saYing. THE CHAIRMAN: So they didn't 4 what Burisma meant. 5 in your presence 6 G'iuliani's public 7 meant i nvesti gati ng the B'idens. 8 9 1l comments that, for HILL: Correct. But it just to reiterate that. DR. THE CHAIRMAN: l0 need It to make was Rudy it explicit clear from Giuliani, was never Burisma explicitly said, Not unti 1 the President's call wi th President Zelensky. t4 HILL: Again, which I only read about when the t ransc r i pt was released THE CHAIRMAN: But you've seen that transcri pt now. 15 And t2 l3 t6 t7 18 19 20 2l DR. . DR. HILL: I have. But I was not aware until that point. THE CHAIRMAN: And, i n fact, i n that transcri pt, talk about Burisma; he talks about i nvesti gati ng the Bj dens. Is that correct? DR. HILL: From what I 've read j n the transcri pt. President doesn't 22 THE CHAIR["IAN: 0kay. 23 Mr. Goldman. BY MR. 24 25 Rudy a GOLDMAN: Ambassador Volker was also UNCLASS ] FIED at that July L0th the UNCLASS I I 2 meet i ng , FIED right? He was. A 5 Okay. So, to that point, had you gotten any indication that the acting Chief of Staff, M'ick Mulvaney, any discussions about a White House visit wl th Ambassador 6 Sondland J 4 133 a or had anyone else? 10 I had. And just to be c1ear, that's also a part of, you know, the acting Chief of Staff's r01e, is to oversee White House visits. It would be rather unusual for him not to have been, ll you know, consulted with on this. 7 8 9 12 13 t4 l5 l6 t7 l8 t9 20 2t 22 23 24 25 A Yes, at thjs particular juncture, there was a bit of tension on these visits overall. But many ambassadors and I don't just mean our ambassadors, but, you know, kind of, foreign ambassadors and foreign I mean, were aware that Ambassador Bolton and officials the National Security staff would always do everything according to national securi ty provi sions. there were So there were a lot of meetings that requests, 1et's say, from heads of state that we actually didn't think merjted the Presjdent's tjme, because they weren't pertinent to, you know, basically, policy priorities. And I don't want to be jnsulting to any particular countries by, you know, singling any of them out, but let's just say I think you would all, you know, agree that there's I mean, you know, UNCLASS I FIED UNCLASS I EIED 134 2 a certain hierarchy of countries that one would imagine that the President should be making the most time for, and there J are orders that would be, you know, kind of a nice, you know, 4 diplomatic gesture, getting back to the quest'ions before I 5 6 7 8 9 l0 ll letter, but that, you know, obviously wouldn't be something that one would want to schedule at any particular, you know, kind of fast pace. And these could be, you know, heads of state that the President could have a greeting with at a diplomatic reception at the UNGA and things like this. a Wel1, let me rephrase mY question A No, so about the t2 a l3 A 0h. the poi nt i s, on thi s, that Mulvaney's office t4 had been pushed many, many times by Ukrainians and others for l5 a visit. t6 was talki ng t7 And so I was well-aware to the Ch'ief of that Ambassador Sondland f at the moment. was, frankly, tryi.ng to play us Staf And Ambassador Sondland 20 off the National Security Council and Ambassador Bolton agai nst l"'lulvaney's of f i ce. Because we were sayi ng that we didn't actually believe, at that particular juncture, that we 2t should have a meeting with Zelensky. Because we wanted to l8 l9 24 wait until the July by this point, you know, I can't remember exactly, you know and forgive me when it was announced that the Ukra'ine elections would be Ju1y 2Lst. 25 Because there was some quest'ion about whether 22 23 UNCLASS I FIED it would be a UNCLASS IEIED 135 2 election. The actual election time might have been in the faI1. You know, it could've been in October or, you J know, some other date. I 4 snap And so we were waiting to see when the election would 11 be. And we were pushing back against thjs, you know, kind of, idea that Zelensky needed to have a meeting right away. We were saying, you know, getting back to our earlier di scussion, flo, we should wa'i t to see 'if he actually has a and we didn't also want to majori ty. I mean, what i f he then be seen to be playing in the Ukrainian parliamentary electi ons . Because, obvi ously , a Whi te House v'isi t f or t2 Zelensky before the Rada electjons, the parliamentary t3 electi t4 23 to get a workable or a majority mandate. So we were trying to be very careful. And Ambassador Bolton knows Ukraine very wel1. I mean, you've seen, you know, he did hj s i ndependent vi si ts there. When he was outside of government, he was frequently in Ukra'ine. He knew all the players. He knows how compf icated the politics and things are there. And he was trying to, you know, basically restra'in others for pushing for a meeting that he thought would be premature. a Prior to that July 10th meeting, were you aware of 24 lvlr. Mulvaney bei ng i nvolved i n any conversat'ions about 25 Whjte House 5 6 7 8 9 l0 l5 l6 t7 l8 l9 20 2t 22 ons , would be a bi g boost, potenti a11y, to hi s abi 1 i ty a vis'it being contingent on opening investigations? UNCLASS]FIED UNCLASS I A a A a A I 2 J 4 5 6 7 8 9 l0 ll t2 l3 l4 l5 l6 t7 l8 t9 20 2l 22 23 24 25 'in dec j si I FIED 136 was not. So that was the first That was r i ght . that you had heard of it? But I knew that he was obviously a player already ons about havi ng a vi si t. a Okay. A And I was to be honest, I was quite shocked. I mean , pri or to that, the only othelindi cati on that I had that Ambassador Sondland and the Chief of Staff were, you know, kind of talking about this, you know, directly was the letter, gettjng back to the paragraph that we discussed earlier, where Ambassador Sondland essentially, you know, told us that he had, you know, personally made sure that this letter was released and that because it was delayed, you know, somewhat, i t wasn't jmmediately out after the election. The election happened over a weekend, and, you know, it was taki ng a whi 1e f or the results to get i n, but 'it was , you know, getting snarled up. And Sondland said that he would make sure that the letter got out. And he said that he was the person who put in this paragraph about having the White House visit. So that's in the week of April 22nd'23rd, if the 2Lst was a Sunday. So that week immediately after the April 2l.st Presi denti aI electi on. UNCLASS I E]ED UNCLASS a A I ] F]ED 137 You're referring to the phone call? 6 letter that was bas'ica11y stati ng that there would be a general invjtation for a Whjte House visit. a i think the letter was May 29th. A Was it May 29th? So there was a considerable delay 7 then. 2 J 4 5 8 9 No, about the after the you may recall, just to refresh your recollectjon, that the inauguration in Ukraine a So it was 10 was May 20th. ll Right. Okay. So it was around the inauguration. I'm sorry then. I was getting my dates mixed up. a Uh-huh. A So 'i t was af ter, then, the i nauguration f or a congratulatory letter. a Ri ght. A 5o that makes sense. I 'm sor ry , because I 'm getting my timelines confused here. Because the election happened; there was a congratulatory phone catl, which we, you know, kind of, prepared just to say, hey, congratulations, that was great. And then there was an idea then there would be a letter that would be tied to the inauguration. And there was a 1ot of back-and-forth on when 12 l3 t4 l5 t6 t7 l8 l9 20 2t 22 /.) 24 25 A that would be as we11. But that was on the Ukrainian part. UNCLASS I FIED Because the UNCLASS I FIED I Ukra'ini ans , themselves, were 2 i naugurati J when they would 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 ll t2 l3 t4 l5 16 on, because, BY MR. r9 afterwards. 23 A a A a 24 So, 25 determi ne GOLDMAN: I just want to know if you read the transcript a 22 n, they were tryi ng to . l8 2t not sure when to have the call parliamentary Rada elections. I'm sorry. I got the timeframes confused. a No, that's fi ne. Just whjle we're on the topic of the April 2l.st ca11, did you listen in to that call? A I did not. It was on a weekend, and I remember I and Alex Vindman, our was doing something with ,y I, di rector, agreed to go 'in. a And listen in? A Yeah. And it was a very short call. a Did you read the transcriPt? A I think I'm not MR. W0LOSKY: Yeah, I think that would probably be classi f ied, the Apri 1 2l.st call t7 20 agai 138 I did. OkaY. I sa'id 1t was a short congratulatory ca11. A11 ri ght. just getting back to this, sort of, aftermath of July LOth, you said you were surprised, and Ambassador Bolton UNCLASS I FIED UNCLASS I I asked you 2 wi th J 4 5 A 139 to go meet with John Eisenberg. Did you go meet I did. Mr. a A O A FIED Eisenberg? Yeah. 9 did you do that? I ended up meeting with him on the next day. I went over immediately and talked to him, you know, very briefly, and we agreed that we would have a longer discussion l0 the follow'ing day, where I would talk to him about all of the 1l concerns 12 front. 6 7 8 r3 t4 When that I a had about what was going on on the Ukraine And i n that i ni ti a1 bri ef conversati on, do you reca11 what you said and what he said? t7 Yeah. I told him exactly, you know, what had transpired and that Ambassador Sondland had basically indicated that there was an agreement with the Chief of Staff l8 that they t9 Presi denti a1 meeti ng i f 20 jnvestigations again. And the main thing that I 2l personatly concerned about, as 22 did this in front of the Ukrainians. l5 t6 23 24 25 A a A would have a White House meeting Why were Well , I or, you know, a the Ukrai ni ans started up these was I said to John, was that he that jn particular? you know, we' re talki ng you concerned about mean, thi s is here about, you know, shoutd one reveal deliberative process UNCLASS I EIE D UNCLASS I FIED 140 4 of the government? And here we're having a deliberative process. I mean, this is what Ambassador Bolton was pretty livid about, you know, kind of jn an argument between, you know, our ambassador to the EU 5 and our Nationat Security Advisor about having a meeting, you 6 know, I 2 J 7 8 9 l0 to, you know, kind of, peopte outsjde in front of the natjonal security advisor-designate of Ukrai ne and the chi ef adv'i sor , Mr . Yermak, to the Ukrai ni an President and a whole bunch of extraneous, you know, kind of, people who hadn't, actua11y, also been in that meeting on J u1y L0th . 11 a The t2 A And, again, the Ukrainians were put outside I poi of the nted out that th'is wasn't an appropri ate 13 Ward Room when t4 place l5 t7 deliberative process about how one goes about setting up a meeting and the timing of it and the content of it. And then they're standing there in, you know, basically the space in l8 the corridor between the Navy mess and the White House Sit t9 Room. t6 And why were you concerned about a 20 2t to be having a discussion about what was going to be a that specific locati on? lot of people were going in 23 A the Sit 24 conversations that may or may not be classified on 25 i 22 We11, because an awful Room and are having, you know, deliberative nto there. UNCLASS I FIED their way UNCLASS And I EIED 141 there's a sign in the Navy mess that says, you know, 8 in here because, you know, external people may be present. But on the way to the S'it Room I don't know if you've been in the space. It's about the space of, kind of, the interior here of these desks. So you have a couple of Ukrainians who were standing there as Cabinet members or anybody else could be going into the Sit Room, which wj11 already give them 9 jnformation about meetings that could be taking place there. 2 J 4 5 6 7 10 ll t2 do not have classified, you know, conversations I mean, they shouldn't have been, you know, kind of, basically out jn the corridor. But, also, that meeti ng i n the Ward Room would've 22 been under normal ci rcumstances, we would've known about it. We didn't know that they were actually having a meeting i n the Ward Room. And i t's completely i nappropri ate to have, you know, the Ambassador to the EU take the Ukra'inians down to the Ward Room to have a huddle on next steps about getting a meeti ng w'ith the President of the Uni ted States. a You had said earlier that A Now, Secretary Perry, again, I want to say, had left by the time I got down there. He had clearly gone down and then had 1eft. So this 'is Ambassador Sondland and 23 Ambassador l3 t4 l5 l6 17 l8 19 20 2t a 24 25 that Volker there. And you had said earlier that Ambassador Sondland was you were concerned a counterintelligence risk. Is UNCLASS I EIED UNCLASS I FIED 142 t7 this an example of that concern? A Well, yes. And a risk not by intent, getting back to Mr. Castor's question about, you know, Ambassador Sondland's 'integri ty, but one about j ust more about bei ng clueless sometimes about the k'inds of natures of threats. And that's something ambassadors get all kinds of, you know, early counterintelligence brjefings. But, you know, he has now expanded his remjt, you know, to countries that, you know, in the case of Ukraine, are targeted by the Russians. One could be sure that you know, I didn't even know whether the Ukrainians had Ieft thejr cel1 phones in boxes at this particular point. I mean, they had when they were in Ambassador Bolton's office, but had they picked them up before they went down to the Ward Room? I djdn't know any of thi s. And so, I mean, all of them and you can be sure that they're being targeted by the Russians, jf not, you know, 18 kind of, t9 Ambassador Sondland was 20 all times, as well as hi s government-i 2t became 22 going to be secure. I 2 J 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 ll t2 l3 t4 15 t6 23 24 25 members of our own Cabinet and our own team. And as cetl phone at ssued cell phone, I using his own personal extremely concerned that his commun'ications were not a For example, the WhatsApp A Yeah, we were not allowed text messages that you've now UNCLASS I FIED j ust to be, agai n, UNCLASS I FIED 143 t2 clear, the White House has d'isabled all of those functions on the phone. And Ambassador Sondland was always trying to text. And on my White House phone, which did not receive texts, I would always get this kind of ghost text from Ambassador Sondland, from the very first time I met him, texting me to say that he wanted to meet, from his personal cell phone. And every time I switched the phone on, this ghost text would appear. Just to make the point. But he was the only person, you know, who tried that. We kept telling him over and over again, please do not text us. And the same thing with WhatsApp; we were not allowed to use this because of the Presidential record and Presidential l3 communicat'ions. I 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 l0 l1 t4 15 16 THE CHAIRMAN: I just want to go back to that first short discussion you had w'ith Attorney Eisenberg. DR. HILL: Yes. I think 23 that you described briefly your concern over having this debate about setting up this meeting in front of the Ukraine delegation. You expressed your concern about the security issues 'involved wi th havi ng thj s di scussi on, where i t was taki ng p1ace. Did you also di scuss wlth Attorney Ei senberg, though, Ambassador Bolton's concern that there was an i l1ici t 24 t ransacti 25 DR. t7 l8 t9 20 2t 22 THE CHAIRMAN: you conveyed on here? HILL: I did. And I said that, actually, what I UNCLASS I E]ED UNCLASS I FIED 144 5 like would be for him to also ask my counterpart, We1ls Griffith, to talk to him too, who'd been in the meeting. Because I couldn't really determ'ine, at the t'ime, j ni ti a11y, in the meeting with Ambassador Bolton, exactly what it was that Ambassador Sondland had said that triggered off 6 Ambassador I 2 J 4 would Bolton's reaction. Because Secretary Perry had been 7 sticking to the regular talk'ing poi l0 nts about energy that we always had, you know, that were obv'iously referring to Naftogaz and, you know, to the energy sector wri t large, wh'ich was, f rankly, ri f e w'ith il corrupti on 8 9 . And, you know, you may t2 all recall, you know, under of the Ukra'inian l3 previous iterations t4 the notorious Dmytro Fi rtash-run organ'ization olintermedi ary l5 gas Government, there was 17 entity, RosUkrEnergo and I'm sure you had lots of congressional hearings, you know, about this -- that was rea11y basjcally an interface for all kinds of i1lic'it l8 dealings between the Russjans and the Ukrainians. l6 t9 20 2t 22 23 24 25 this issue for decades, frankly. I mean, I was working on thjs with the Bush administration and the 0bama admi ni stration. Everybody has gone through looki ng at this issue. So when Secretary Perry was talking, I mean, from my perspective, jt's just following in a long line of all of the issues that we said. And then when Ambassador Sondland came in about specific So we've been on UNCLASS I FIED UNCLASS I EIED I investigat'ions, that's 145 when Ambassador Bolton stiffened up l3 to a halt, because he tied that to the meeting. But when I went down MR. GOLDMAN: Sorry. You mean the White House meeting? DR. HILL: To the White House meeting or to a meeting wi th the Presi dent. Now, j ust to be, k'ind of , clear actua11y, it wasn't always a White House meeting per se, but definitely a Presidential-1eve1, you know, meeting with Zelensky and the President. I mean, it could've taken place in Poland, in Warsaw. It could've been, you know, a proper bilateral in some other context. But, in other words, a Whj te House- level Presi denti al meeti ng. THE CHAIRMAN: 5o then you were saying and then you t4 went downstai rs. 2 J 4 5 6 7 8 9 l0 11 12 and immediately, you know, brought the meeting , DR. l5 HI LL: And then I went downsta'i rs . And I came i n t7 the conversation was already underway, because I had talked to Ambassador Bolton quickly to, you know, kind of, l8 get a bit more of a sense of, you know, kind of, his concerns t9 and what he wanted me to be watchful 20 own concerns. l6 2t 22 23 24 25 when for. I mean, I had my I said, wh'en I was coming in, Secretary Perry was leaving. 5o I'm not sure that Secretary Perry was there for thjs portion of the discussion. And We11s Griffith had already had also left as we11. As BY MR. GOLDMAN: UNCLASS I FIED UNCLASS a A I 2 Was Ambassador Ambassador I I FIED Volker stilt there for this? Volker was sti11 there, and Yermak mentioned before, a couple J Danylyuk and, as 4 Department people and somebody who 5 one 6 7 8 9 l0 ll t2 l3 t4 l5 16 t7 l8 t9 20 146 of and State I thought could've been of Secretary Perry's aides but I'm not 100 percent sure. because he was off to Because Secretary Perry had a large go to do some other business and he had a large group of people wi th him. And jt was at that point that sondland was complaining to our djrector, Alex Vindman, about the fact that he already had an arrangement to have this meeting that he worked out wi th Mulvaney. THE CHAIRMAN: And so I want to get back to your conveyi ng thi s to the attorney, Ei senberg. DR. HILL: Yeah. THE CHAIRMAN: What did you convey to him at that first get i nto what you conveyed to hjm in the longer meeting. But in the first meeting, what did you convey to him about any concern you had over this illicit transaction, the "if" that you mentioned? short meeti ng? And then l'4r. Goldman wi 11 23 HILL: Yeah, I explai ned to him what I j ust explained to you. And then I said, but I need to actually talk to Wells Griffith and we should talk to Wells about what 24 he understood was the larger context here as 2l 22 25 DR. Because Sondland we11. talked about Burisma when I was with UNCLASS I FIED UNCLASS I 2 J 4 5 6 7 8 9 l0 11 I FIED 147 in the Ward Room, but I didn't hear him say Burisma when I was jn Ambassador Bolton's office. And, again, I was sitting at the back, on the sofa. They were all, you know I was behind Sondland, and he was talking forward. So I wasn't sure if I missed it or whether he didn't say it at all. And I also wanted to be clear -- because he seemed to sort of interrupt Bolton and Perry you know, what it was him that Wells understood that decretary Perry was tatking about. Because this gets to the nub of what we're concerned about. Was this a generic d'iscussion about, you know, corruption in l3 the energy sector and Ukrai ne, or was 'i t somethi ng much more specific? And I wanted to make sure that We1ls Griffith t4 could also l5 larger meeting the next day. t2 talk to Eisenberg. And that's t6 17 l8 l9 20 2l 22 23 24 25 UNCLASS IFIED why we had the UNCLASS I I 148 [].:55 p.m.l THE CHAIRMAN: And 2 3 FIED E did you the larger meeting with i senberg? 7 HILL: Just me and Eisenberg and Wel1s Griffjth. I mean meeting, meaning to bring in Wells, and so that I could get into more detail, and I could go through my notes and' you know, kind of basically figure out, you know, what 8 exactly had happened. 4 5 6 9 DR. THE CHAIRMAN: Do BY MR. t0 1l t2 l3 t4 l5 l6 a A a A a A you want to walk through that meeting? GOLDMAN: Yeah. So in that meeting on Juty l'1, Wel1s -Wells also came in. last name? Wells Griffith. Gri ffi th. It's P. We1ls Griffith. What's h'is And he is a long-term, t7 he's a rea11y, you know, superb energy expert, works very l8 closely w'ith SecretarY PerrY. a And j t was the three of l9 20 2l 22 23 24 25 You? A Yes, i t was the three of us. a All right. And so describe that conversatjon. A Well, I reiterated to John the day before, and, you know, I apologized to Wel1s for, you know, jumping on him, but I said that I wanted to, you know, basically just to clarify for John, you know, what had I told him what had UNCLASSIF]ED r49 UNCLASS I EIED l1 jn the Ward Room, but I wasn't entirely sure, you know, what Wells also thought had happened in Ambassador Sondtand's office, because it was immediatety after Secretary Perry had gone through his talking points. And We1ls and the deputy the deputies to Secretary Perry had worked on those talking points. And I wanted to just kind of be certa'in, 100 percent sure that Secretary Perry's talking points were exactly what I anticipated or thought that they were, which is about the generic, you know, problems of the energy sector , wh'ich i s what MR. W0L0SKY: You said Ambassador Sondland's office. I 12 thi nk you meant Ambassador BoIton's offi ce. happened 2 J 4 5 6 7 8 9 l0 14 HILL: 0h, did I? I'm so sorry. Yeah. Thank you for correcting me. Yeah, when Ambassador Sondland was in l5 Ambassador 13 DR. BY MR. t6 t7 Bolton's office. O And GOLDMAN: just to be clear, between meetings with l8 Mr. Eisenberg, did you have any fol1ow-on conversations with l9 Ambassador Bolton? 20 21 22 ZJ 24 25 I did not, no, not in that time. Did you talk to anybody else about this meeting? I talked to Wells Griffith. And then I also had my colleague Alex Vindman was really upset, because he said that before I came in Sondland was making jt very clear that that there was and Perry had there was all kinds of A a A UNCLASS I EIED UNCLASS t at th'is poi nt. I 1ef 2 because by J was very up upset. a A 4 5 6 the time I He I FIED 150 said Perry didn't need to stay, came i nto the Ward Room Alex Vlndman And what d'id l",lr. Vi ndman saY? He said that these are obviously not issues that the National Security Council was dealing with, should not 8 deal with. And he actually said this along the lines to Ambassador Sondland, that whatever it was that he was talking 9 about was not appropriate 7 l0 ll t2 l3 t4 l5 for us to be engaged jn, and that were you know, could only, you know, be organizing a meeti ng, you know, as the National Securi ty Counci 1 oo, you know, offi cj al nat'i onal securi ty basi s , and clearly somethi ng we else was going on here. a So at thi s meet'ing on the 1l.th wj th Mr. and Mr. Grj ffi th, what did Mr. Gri ffi th relay to Ei senberg t7 Mr. Eisenberg about his recollection of this meeting? A Hi s recollectj on was somewhat simi 1ar that, l8 know l9 20 points were all the usual talk'ing points about energy Sector corruption, the importance of getting the energy sector into 2t good shape and diversi f i cati on l6 'l 22 23 24 25 and he confirmed you that Secretary Perry's talking of energy, all of the 'issues trying to do. We were trying to get the Ukrainians to work with the Czechs, the Po1es, and with the Europeans more broadly, the Germans, you know. Secretary Perry had been going to the that we were UNCLASS I FIED l5l UNCLASS ] EIED I Three 5eas Ini ti 2 i ative, whi nfrastructure i n Eastern ch i s all about bui 1di ng up Europe. So Secretary Perry was, you know, very much focused on J 6 larger initiative spearheaded by DOE but also with the State Department on trying to help Ukraine wean itself off this dependency. 5o everything that We11s believed that 7 Secretary Perry was say'ing was related 4 5 whole to that. We also agreed that Sondland seemed to be red"irecting jt 8 9 t0 1l i nto a What was h'is Sondland said recollecti on of what Ambassador in the Ward Room? A a A l9 In the Ward Room he wasn't in. 0h, so this was just jn the main meeting. Wel1s was also confi rmi ng, though, that 5ecretary Perry was not in on this discussion jn the Ward Room, that he'd come down briefly. And that was also important to me because I needed to know did Secretary Perry, you know, have part of th'is di scussi on as well a 5o it was you personally who heard Ambassador 20 Sondland ment'ion Bur i sma t2 l3 14 l5 t6 t7 l8 2l 22 23 24 25 a . A a A Correct. jn the Ward Room? Correct. And We1ls had been sitting with me in Ambassador Bolton's office when the 'initial meeting took place, and he also understood jt was a redjrect. UNCLASS ] EIED I FIED UNCLASS 4 a A a A 5 THE CHAIRMAN: Can 1 2 a J And Mr. Vindman was 152 also there Correct. and heard 'it? And Kurt Volker. you tel1 us what -- you said 6 Mr. Vindman expressed concern about what took place, and he 7 was there before you HILL: got to the Ward Room. 8 DR. 9 THE CHAiRMAN: Can Yes. you te11 us what Mr. Vindman told l0 you ll l5 really uncomfortable with where the conversation waS, and that's also because it was in front of Ukrain'ians, that it was basjcally Ambassador Sondland gett'ing very annoyed that he already had an agreement with the Chief of Staff for a meeting between the Presidents on the basis of t6 these i nvesti gations. t2 l3 t4 t7 l8 t9 20 2t 22 DR. HILL: He was THE CHAIRMAN: And did he know anything more about the investigations? DR. HILL: He was alarmed, Mr. Vindman, because he exactly what was going on. And he sajd that and as I said, Sondland had mentjoned meeting wi th Giuljani in front of, again, the Ukrainians. And didn't know 23 MR. G0LDMAN: So what 24 DR. 25 MR. G0LDI'4AN: HILL: -- who was the Nat'ionaI Security Advisor -- did he say about that? UNCLASS I FIE D UNCLASS I FIED 153 HILL: I didn't get exactly what the wording I DR. 2 THE CHAIRMAN: was. But Mr. Sondland brought up Mr. Giuliani 5 in the context of there being this agreement on the meet'ing. DR. HILL: And that he said he'd been meeting with Giuliani as we11. Thjs is at least what I understood, you 6 know, f rom Alex J 4 7 8 9 l0 lt THE CHAIRMAN: That was what Mr. Vindman relayed? HILL: That's what he understood, yes. THE CHAiRMAN: And did Giuljani's name come up when you were in the Ward Room? DR. HILL: No. DR. BY MR. t2 l3 . a GOLDMAN: Can you just clarify why it was important to you to l5 that Secretary Perry's talking points were separate and apart from the reference to investigations t6 Ambassador Sondland? t4 t7 l8 l9 20 21 22 23 24 25 understand A It was important to me because I was trying by to figure out how much Ambassador Sondland was coordinating with others. And, agai n, we'd actually trj ed to pri orj ti ze i n thi s timef rame energy sector ref orm and all of the work w'ith the other European countries. So I was pretty concerned here in thinking that maybe Ambassador Sondland was not keeping Secretary Perry fulty informed of what was going on ejther. a And so A And I'd understood from the May inauguration, I was UNCLASS I FIED UNCLASS I FIED J not in the meeting that relayed back to the President about how the inauguration had gone, but I understood from the readout there that we were to focus on energy Sector reform 4 as a top I 2 5 6 7 8 9 l0 ll priority, 154 that Secretary Perry had been asked to sort of step up and to really see what he could do to, you know, work w'ith the Ukrajnians in this timeframe to prove that they could actually start to tackle, you know, corruption in Ukraine. And so by this point I'm personally concerned that there's something else going on, and I wanted to make Sure that I understand who it's going on between. and l3 a So the energy sector reform and the anticorruption efforts surrounding that were what Secretary Perry was t4 talki ng about? t2 15 t6 t7 l8 t9 20 2t 22 23 24 25 A a Correct. And is it was Ambassador Sondland was A a A a A it your understanding that not talking about that Correct. when he mentioned And it's the way that he djd a redirect. And what do you mean bY redi rect? talking, and then, you know, he laid out all of these talk'ing points. And then you know, was basically saying Ambassador Bolton said well, you know, we'11 work all the way through all of this, We11, Secretary Perry was UNCLASS IEIED UNCLASS ] FIED of a ru1e, you know. At some point start, you but, you I you know, kind 2 know, thinking, you know, basically about a meeting, J know, we're going t 155 to be, you know, in the process of and 6 actually what you' re talki ng about, whi ch was all the staffing work and the different parts of the agencies, State Department. He was urging the Ukrainians to 7 deal 8 Perry. 4 5 i was encouragi ng wi th the State Department and to deal wi th Secretary t7 this is when 5ond1and, who is, you know, a fairly big guy, kind of leaned over across Ambassador Bolton, because I could see that from where I was sitting, and said to the Ukrainians and back to Ambassador Bolton, but we've already got, you know, kind of an agreement on a meeting. I mean, he was basicatly and you can imagine, you would all be annoyed as well that he was basicalty countermanding what Ambassador Bolton had just said. In other words saying, I actually have, you know, some 18 completely separate agreement about a meeting, you know, kind 9 10 1l t2 l3 t4 l5 t6 l9 20 2l 22 ZJ 24 25 And of you ' re stonewall i ng ki nd of thi ng. when he went out into And then he was clearly in the the office in front of Ambassador Bolton he was kind of clearly, you know, feeli ng i rri tated, Sondland was. And that's when he said, let's go back down to the Ward Room and tatk about next steps for the meeting. And that's when BoIton was just, you know, I wouldn't say apoplectic, but UNCLASS I E]ED UNCLASS I I a J A 4 a 6 7 8 9 156 pretty furious 2 5 FIED Who did that to? Sondland say said it to the Ukrainians. Was i t your understand'ing that he had previously He di scussed I took it from that that he'd already said to the Ukrainjans that there was going to be a meeting and that obviously he was expecting Ambassador Bolton to start, you know, pulling out the schedule, which is not what Ambassador A l0 Bolton does anyway. That's worked out through the Chief of ll t2 Staff's 0ffi ce and the Vi si t. a And just so the record is c1ear, when you say l3 meeting, you mean a Presidential meeting? A t4 A Presi denti a1 - level meeti ng, agai n, be i t the l5 White House, be 16 of the places it l8 Ambassador t9 meeting 2t I've said repeatedly, BoIton and others, recommending against having the Ukrainian parliamentary elections. a Was it your impress'ion that the Ukra'inian officials 23 24 that 25 a at this juncture because this is, you know, before there were hearing this idea of a Presidential meeting conditioned on these investigations for the first time at 22 any would be. And we had been again, as 17 20 it in Warsaw, be 'it, you know, kind of in meet i ng A Danylyuk for sure. UNCLASS I PIED He just looked alarmed, and UNCLASS I F]ED I actually he wanted to speak to 2 obvi a J 4 5 t57 me afterwards because ously di dn ' t know what was go'i ng on O A he . And what about Yermak? but I'm not entirely sure that he fu11y understood everything because I'm not Yermak was more impassive, t6 his English is. So I just want to state that for the record, that I wasn't entirely clear that Yermak was understanding everything because he didn't rea1ly say too much. And he had an a'ide wi th him who was whi speri ng to him, and, again, I was sitting at a distance, and he maybe had been helpi ng hjm wi th translati on. a Did you end up speaking to Danylyuk about A I djd, but we actually didn't rea1ly discuss what had actually happened wel1, I didn't want to d'iscuss what had happened obviously in the Ward Room. What I was tryi ng to encourage Danylyuk was to work with t7 the State Department, work with our embassy, and, you know, l8 2t particularly as he was'interested in working on the National Securi ty Counci 1 reform i n Ukraj ne. I really wanted to get, you know, Danylyuk into the channels that we all, you know, kind of knew were working on 22 getti ng back to thi s robust relati onshi p. Danylyuk was a, 23 you know, very above-board guy, one 6 7 8 9 l0 ll t2 l3 t4 l5 l9 20 convinced about how good 24 of the reformers jn Ukraine. Actually, he resigned his position'in Ukraine 25 recently. UNCLASS I FIE D UNCLASS I 2 J 4 5 6 I FIED 158 t your understandi ng f rom any of the interactions you had with him or any information you got that Danylyuk was aware of Rudy Giuliani's efforts separate and apar t f rom the of f i c'i a1 A He didn't raise it. He was just generally concerned about actually not having a meeting because he felt a Was 'i l5 that thjs would deprive Ukraine, the new Ukrainian Government of the legitimacy that it needed, especially vis-a-vis the Russ'ians. So thi s gets to, you know, the heart of our nati onal securi ty di lemma. You know, the Ukrai n'ians at th j s poi nt, you know, are looking at a White House meeting or looking at a meeting with the President of the Un'ited States as a recognitjon of their legitimacy as a sovereign state. And they are, you know, clearly perplexed, you know, kind of about this whole l6 si tuati on surroundi ng the meeti ng. 7 8 9 l0 ll 12 l3 t4 l8 was just because we're somewhat short on tjme, I'm going to jump to the crux of this July LLth t9 meeting. 20 explained to him had and Mr. 2t had occurred the daY before? t7 22 23 24 25 a What What was Mr. Eisenberg's reaction to what Griffith had explained you to h'im A Yeah. He was also concerned. I mean, he wasn't aware that SondIand, Ambassador Sondland was, you know, kind of running around doing a lot of these, you know, meetings and independently. We talked about the fact that, you know, UNCLASS T FIED ] FIED UNCLASS said he'd been meeting with Giuliani I Ambassador Sondland 2 he was very concerned about J follow up on thjs. 5 that. He has frequent meetings 4 159 with And he sa'id Ambassador and that he would Bolton and had frequent meetings with Ambassador Bolton and also with 7 Charlie Kupperman, our deputy National Security Advisor, both of whom, you know, were fully cognizant of everything that 8 was kind 6 l0 of going on and churning around. I'd already expressed concerns to all of them about the removal of l4asha Yovanovitch. I mean, I'd gone to talk all ll the way up my chain expressi ng my concerns and, you know, t2 basi 9 l3 cally anger that th'is had happened. I'd also talked to the Vice President's staff, to 14 General Ke11ogg, who was the person who'd hired me and who, l5 you know, l6 administratjon, about these concerns as we11, flagging for t7 hjm l8 t9 I'd previously reported to jn the first year of that there were problems and that we should a Sorry, j ust to be clear , you ment1oned That she had been unfairly dismissed, that she'd A 21 been forced 22 theories and these attacks on her. a 23 24 25 Ambassador Yovanovitch. What are these concerns? 20 Mr. Gi out as a result of all of these conspiracy Did you speak uli ani 's A I to them as -- d'id. UNCLASS I EIED well about the ] FIED UNCLASS 160 t8 efforts and i nfluence? Because this was all in the news, and, I mean, you know, aga'in , everyone was watchi ng the news and seei ng thi s. And I said that this was, yotl know, a massive complication in terms of our engagements wi th Ukrai ne, becauSe t,,le were also talking about the Vice President having engaged with the Ukrainjan leader if we could not schedule a meeting wlth the President, and that's simply about scheduling. Because, you know, tradi t'ionally the Vi ce Presi dent has played an important role on countries fike Ukraine or Georgia or a whole host of issues. And the Vice President had on his i ti nerary a range of forei gn tri ps, i ncludi ng the tri p you saw that he took recently, a personal trip to Ireland. And we were trying to talk to hjs staff about whether it would make sense for the Vjce President to maybe go via Kyiv or, you know, kind of basically meet with President Zelensky if we could not schedule a Presidential meeting jn due course, you know, within a reasonable period of time after t9 the parl i amentary electi I 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 l0 ll t2 l3 t4 l5 t6 t7 20 2l 22 23 24 25 a A ons. After - And also, by the way, September Lst we knew was coming up because the President had been invited to commemorate the initiation of World War 1I. a There wasn't a long period of time when you were sti11 there after this July LLth meeting, but at any point a A UNCLASS ] FIED UNCLASS I I l6l FIED before July Lgth did you hear back either from Mr. Eisenberg 6 directly or from Ambassador Bolton or anyone else about any further conversat'ions that Mr. Eisenberg had on this topic? A Not from Ambassador Bolton, I did not. John Eisenberg said that he had followed up, and he had followed up, you know, through hi s basj cally reporti ng authori ty, 7 whi 2 3 4 5 ch would be the Wh'ite House counsel a A a A a 8 9 l0 l1 t2 l3 did and you didn't hear anything else I did not, no. on your sjde of the No, I did not. But Do you know whether ['1r. Ei senberg spoke to Mr. Sondland at all? A t4 l5 . posi ti , that wouldn't be, I thj nk, Who would be the proper person appropri ate i n hi s on. a t6 Well to speak to t7 Mr. Sondland and te11 him to, you know, change his course of l8 acti l9 20 21 22 23 24 25 on? A a It would be the State DePartment. And did you hear whether the State Department did that? A I talked to Assistant Secretary Reeker about this, and I also flagged it, you know, again, as I'd mentjoned before, at different points, actually probably not after the July LLth discussion. But I'd also at different Wel1, UNCLASS I F]ED ] FIED UNCLASS 162 2 points talked to Under Secretary Hale about the concerns about Ambassador Sondland, we11, obviously, going in a J di rect j on we were hopi ng he wouldn't on the Ukra j n'ian i ssue. I O 4 5 And was there Secretary Hale or Mr. A 6 I a substant'ive response f rom Under Reeker? mean, they were aware 7 presumption was based on the 8 know, 9 i of it. And, you know, my fact that they're both, you stellar professionals that they would fo11ow up on this n some way. 15 this time jn mid-July, we understand that there was an order to hold on the security assistance i ntended for Ukrai ne. A Ri ght. a When did you learn about that? A I learned about i t i n that week, that 'is my last l6 week there. t7 a And how did you learn? A I learned about it just in the normal course of action. We were informed that there had been a hold on the from 0MB. by the a Were you informed as to the reason why? A No, there was no reason given. And we were told that it actually came as a direction from the Chief of Staff's office. a From Mr. Mulvaney? l0 ll t2 13 t4 l8 l9 20 2t 22 23 24 25 a Around UNCLASS I FIED UNCLASS A 2 a J 4 5 6 7 8 9 l0 ll 12 l3 t4 l5 16 Who, I think I EIED 163 is he stil1 technically the head of OMB? t left, yes I So there you are then. Yeah. I mean, that's mean, he had three different hats then, I guess, and I think it came under his it would have been, you know, I guess, normal for him to have put the hold on. a As of that July L0th meeting, do you know whether Ambassador Bolton or anyone else was aware of whether this military aid or security assistance had been put on hold? A I don't think they knew. It had not been discussed. It was in the last week that I was there. a A Yes. a Okay. And did you have any conversations yourself He hasn' . about the hold A a A We d'id wj . thi n your reporti ng structure? l9 in fact, there was a meeting set up, two meeti ngs on Ukra j ne "in the last week that I was there, but Tim Morrison went and chaired them, so I did not take part 20 these meeti ngs . 2t was interagency meetings were basically ca11ed to find out what was going on. And Charlie Kupperman, the deputy ass'istant to the President, the National Security Advisor, was basically trying to get to the bottom of it. a And did you ever learn what he found out? t7 t8 22 23 24 25 And, So there UNCLASS I FIE D in UNCLASS ] 1 A talk to F]ED I did not, but I know 164 that he was going to go and 4 this. And I left on the L9th, so, you know, by that point -but I relayed to Ambassador Taylor at that point most of the 5 things I've actually relayed to you today. 2 J Mulvaney about 7 1et's just talk about Ambassador Taylor for our last couple minutes. He had become the Charge d'Affaires in 8 Ukra'ine? 6 a A a 9 l0 ll So J uly Correct. And you spoke to him you said, I think, on 1.9th? 22 I'd actually spoken to hjm on several occasi ons before. I thi nk you' re all fami f i ar wi th Ambassador Taylor's biography. I've worked wi th him i n many, many di fferent capaci ti es. And he was asked after Ambassador Yovanov'i tch was removed along wi th a number of other people whether they would be willing to be Charge, because it was agreed that wi th her preci pi tous removal - - I mean, she'd i ni ti a1ly been, it was my understanding because I'd been told that by the State Department, asked to stay on for a trans'itional period a bit longer than she was supposed to, you know, as the 23 Zelensky Presidency was underway. t2 l3 t4 l5 16 t7 l8 t9 20 2t 24 25 A So Yes, but it was pretty abrupt, notwithstanding all the information we now have about this. So there was a debate UNCLASS ] EIED UNCLASS I FIED 165 4 how could you possibly stil1 have the embassy there wjth, you know, no Charge of any stature.. And there was a new DCM bei ng sent out, Kri sti na Kv"ien, who I met in that last week as we11, who was just being sent 5 out fresh, although she was very knowledgeable about 6 regi on. I 2 J about And there was a debate back and 7 8 could find someone the forth about whether they from either previous ambassadors to 16 like a Pauta Dobriansky, you know, the Ukra'inian American community, or somebody who would be wjlling to be Charge at thjs transitjonal period to basi ca11y agai n, getti ng back to the nati onal securi ty questions about showing to Ukraine that we were stil1 supportive of them and that we were sti1l standing by them in the face of Russian aggression to have someone of stature there until there could be a formal appointment and naming of 17 a 9 l0 11 t2 l3 t4 15 l8 l9 Ukraine or someone from high 1evel, new ambassador. a And Ambassador Taylor was someone of stature jn your vi ew? 24 Correct. Yes. I mean, h€'d previ ously been ambassador to Ukra'ine and i s one of the most di sti ngui shed, you know, people that one can think of. a I believe you sa'id, and I just want to clarify this, that Ambassador Taylor, you relayed I think you ca11ed 25 them red flags 20 2t 22 23 A UNCLASS I FIED UNCLASS 2 A a J was unaware 4 Ukrainian I 5 I FIED 166 My red flags. your red flags to Ambassador Taylor, and that A that Ambassador Sondland had taken policy. Is that Correct. That was news to h'im. I lead on mean, he, like 7 that Ambassador Sondland was playing a role, but he had not been told that Ambassador Sondland was 8 the lead. 6 9 10 ll t2 13 l4 he everybody e1se, knew a And he had not been told by the State Department? A No. a Nor by Ambassador Sondland? A No. a 0kay. All right. I believe our time is UP, so I yield to the minority for 45 minutes. BY MR. CASTOR: l5 20 Is jt fair to say just about every special envoy or broadly chartered ambassador sometimes 'is blamed for jumping out of their lane? A Yes, but Ambassador Sondland hadn't been named as a special envoy or, you know, ambassador at that time. We had 2l Ambassador 22 Ukraine, but Ambassador Sondland was saying that he was in Z) charge 24 a t6 t7 l8 t9 25 a of Volker who had been named aS the speci a1 envoy for Ukrai ni an affai rs wri t 1arge. Are we certain the President never appointed Ambassador Sondland to this UNCLASS role? I FIED UNCLASS A a A I 2 ] FIED t67 No. 0r we only know about 5 I said before, you remember, when I said, I said whatT Who? You know, who said this? And he said the President, and then, you know, I couldn't really argue w"ith 6 that. J 4 7 8 9 l0 ll t2 l3 t4 As In the July L0th meeting in the fa1lout in the Ward Room, was it ever clear to you what investigations were part of thi s di scussion? A We11, he mentioned Burisma. a Buri sma. Anythi ng else? A No. a a A OkaY. And again, I cut it off because it was obviously for 15 going down avenues which were not appropriate l6 Nati onal Securi t7 haggt i ng almost about l8 allegation there's been some reporting, there was a big Poli tico art'ic1e in January 20L7 about Ukrainians' efforts to affect the outcome of the election, the U. S. election? A I'm aware of the articles. a And do you give any credibility to some of the ? Are you basic charges in there, such as familiar with that? Would it be helpful jf we marked thjs as l9 20 21 22 23 24 25 a ty Counci 1 to go down. And also, the agai n, he's thi s meeti ng. Are you aware of the UNCLASS I FIED UNCLASS I 2 J 4 5 6 7 8 an exhi bi t, thi A a A O A a A s I FIED r68 ti co arti cle? I've seen that Politico article. Po1 i Okay. I think we have I can hand i t to you. No. But we have Look, Do you want i t? and I am very confident based on all of the t4 I don't want to start getting into intelligence matters that the Ukrainian Government did not interfere in our election in 2015. a 0kay. But you're aware of the reporting? A I'm aware of the reporting, but that doesn't mean that that amounts to an operation by the Ukrainian l5 Government. t6 Right. What do you know about I don't know very much about them, apart from things that I couldn't speak about. Can I also say that in my past life at Brookings, is a think tank, I must have had about 25 different people f rom all kinds of d'ifferent backgrounds coming to try to use me as 9 l0 ll t2 l3 t7 18 t9 20 2t analysis that has been done and, again, a A ? 23 a conduit to various campaigns, Republican and Democrat, given my experience and links, from, you know, Ukrainian, 24 Belarussi an , you know, Georgi an, Russi an, 25 contact with the campaigns. 22 UNCLASS I FIED all tryi ng to make UNCLASS I FIED 169 5 I could wrjte a million articles like that putting all kinds of people's names out there based on just the contacts of people that I had. a Fai r enough . J ust aski ng the questi ons A No, but I'm just saying in here that but this 6 gets back to what I 2 J 4 . Masha Yovanovjtch said, that you can write l8 in an article and it somehow becomes true that it's written in an artjcle without all of the due diligence that's done about done on this later. I have my own beef with 2015 and the investigations, that I don't believe it should have started by focusing, fi rst of all, on Americans. It should have started by looking at what Russians were doing, and I think we would have ended up in exactly the same place that Mr. l.4ueller djd on what the Russ"ians di d wi th the same sets of i ndi ctments and it might have not been quite so politicized at the tjme, because I can promise you that the Russians did everything that he outlined and then some. And I myself have been l9 targeted by the Russians on many occasions. 7 8 9 l0 u 12 13 14 l5 t6 t7 20 2l 22 23 24 25 something , that doesn't make me anti -Russi an. But I'11 j ust say that this particular Russian administration, run by And is an 'incredibly, you know, well-ski1led KGB operative, is something that you just don't mess with. And we are going to be in big trouble -a Who is the KGB operative? somebody who UNCLASS ] FIED UNCLASS I A I FIED 170 That's Presi dent Puti n. 8 to be'in big trouble, if we don't get our act together, in creating more fodder for them to throw right back at us in 2020. And I th'ink th'is is an issue of our natjonal security for all of us, no matter what part of the ai s1e that you' re si ttj ng on. a Would you agree though that, you know, the bringing of Mr. Manafort's dealings in the Ukraine to the forefront, 9 you know, may have 2 J 4 5 6 7 And we're going had il s the way that Presi dent Puti n and other nefarious actors, be they from Chjna, Iran, or North 12 Korea, access our system. l0 A a l3 Corrupti on 'i Are you familiar with the, you know, the allegation 14 about Serhiy Leshchenko? I'm sorry i f I'm not pronounci l5 that t6 t7 l8 t9 20 2t 22 23 24 25 A a ng Leshchenko, yes. You know, relating to publicizing Manafort's role in the Ukraine? A You've also got to remember that Ukraine is going through a massive period of upheaval i tself i n thi s period. I mean, this is the period where Yanukovych, the previous Ukrainian Presjdent, basically flees the country, leaves all ki nds of documents and thi ngs behi nd, and the Ukra'in'ian 'i nvesti gati ve reporters and everybody pori ng all over thi s. You can go back and look on YouTube at some of the UNCLASS I FIED UNCLASS I FIED 171 4 rather strange things that Yanukovych left behjnd hjm. He tried to flush half of his documents down the toilet. He threw some of those in a 1ake. There was all k'inds of material that were out there for people to pick over and to 5 look at. And I think, again, that Mr. Mueller and his 6 have I 2 J 7 8 a 1ot of this information. well documented a But to the extent the Ukrainians were involved in pushing out the information on Paul l4anafort, don't you think 10 that could have had an impact on the election? A There are all kinds of things that could il an impact on our election. 9 team O t2 Do you think it's fair that people have had who are aware of 20 that reporting A I don't know how much the average American voter is aware of that reporting. My family ,my in-1aws, that was not the reason that they voted in the election, for example. I have a huge Amerjcan family, and none of them have ever referenced anything like that to me at all. They just they care about all the things that the average Ameri can cares about, whi ch i s health, educati on, 2t jobs. l3 t4 l5 t6 l7 l8 t9 22 a But if there are Ukrainians trying to push the 23 information out about Manafort, isn't that an effort to 24 influence the outcome of the election? 25 t4R. W0L0SKY: I think UNCLASS I she answered the question several FIED UNCLASS I 2 a J 4 5 6 7 8 9 l0 I FIED 172 times. HiLL: Also there are Ukrain'ians pushing out -MR. CAST0R: I t' s a pretty harmless questi on MR. WOL0SKY: You ' ve asked i t three or fou r t i mes DR. HILL: Yes, but there are Ukrajn'ians pushing out i nf ormati on about Masha Yovanov'itch whi ch 'is untrue. Why don't you ask about that as well? Is l'4asha Yovanovi tch any less of an American that Mr. Manafort? She has not been accused of any corruption. DR. . . I'4R. ZELDIN: Dr. Hi 11 l5 HILL: I'm sorry. I'm just getting annoyed about this, because the point is that, you know, Mr. Manafort has also been subject -- I don't know him either. But there's been a trial in which he was convicted of certain activity. And I like to believe that the law was abided by in pursuing, l6 you know, what he did. t7 I've said, corruption j s our Achi 11es heel here in the United States. And I am shocked, again, that we've had the f a jlure of imaginat'ion to reaf ize that the Russians could target us in the same way that they use corruption in Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, Armenia, Georgia. We, unfortunately, by not cleaning up our own act, have given them the doors in which they can walk through and mesS around in our system. And jf Mr. Manafort did half of the things that he was ll t2 l3 t4 18 t9 20 2t 22 23 24 25 DR. And, agai n, as UNCLASS I F]ED UNCLASS I said to do, shame I EIED on him. Okay? And 173 I don't know him. And, 13 n, thj s i s not a parti san di scussion. And, frankly, what he d'id shoutd not be subject to, you know, thjs kind of back and forth ei ther. MR. ZELDIN: Just kind of unpacking that back and forth and the origin of it, the fjrst question, the answer was that it was -- and I don't want to put words in your mouth, so please correct me if this is not accurate. But the answer to the first question was where you concluded Ukraine did not 'interfere in the U.5. election? DR. HILL: The Ukrainian Government did not interfere in the U.S. election. The Ukrainian Government did not do that. The Ukrainian Special Servjces also did not interfere'in our t4 election. l5 l8 0kay. The fotlowup question and answers, the answer is that it's your assessment that where there was interference by Ukrainjans that it's your assessment that it djdn't change the electjon results. So I see that there is 19 an i nterpretati 2 J 4 5 6 7 8 9 l0 ll t2 l6 t7 20 2t 22 23 24 25 agai MR. ZELDIN: on MR. W0LOSKY: That mi sstates her testi mony. HILL: It also m'isstates i t. I have no basi s MR. ZELDIN: Feel f ree to cor rect i t. I 'm j ust MR. W0L05KY: We j ust sai d i t mi sstated her testi mony, so go to your next question, please. MR. ZELDIN: So the first answer is, it's your position DR. UNCLASS I EIED UNCLASS I FIED 174 I that the Ukrainian Government did not interfere with the U.S. 2 electi on, correct? LL: rect. J DR. HI 4 MR. ZELDIN: Did Ukrain'ians interfere with the 5 election? Cor U.S. t2 any fore'ign HILL: I mean, 1ook, this is individual the way that you're going with this question is any foreign ind'ividual who evinced any kind of interest in the campaigns or tried to meet with anyone in any campaign and I just said to you before, I can come up in my own accounting of a whole range of people who are foreign ind'ividuals who wanted to meet with the various campaigns 13 then that would count as 'interference, anybody wanting to t4 meet 6 7 8 9 l0 ll l5 t6 t7 DR. with anybody in any campaign to talk to anybody. MR. ZELDIN: Okay. As far as DR. HILL: So did some Ukrainians want to talk to yes, but so d'id some Ch j nese, did a lot of Russi ans. And 19 there were a lot more Russians that were trying to get i nvolved i n all ki nds of people's campai gns. I mysetf 20 wi l8 2t 22 23 24 25 of th'is, and i t wasn't j ust on, you know, the kind of Democratic or the Republican side. And, I mean, th j s i s not the nature of my test'imony because it's when I was in, you know, not in my current job' but when I was at the Brookings Institution. But remember, I 've been the nati onal i nte11 i gence offi cer for Russi a before tnessed some UNCLASS ] F]ED UNCLASS I I this for 3-L/2 years. 2 classi fied. I FIED So a t75 lot of the information I have is 5 position about how many people who were trying to gain influence into our politics. And it's very the Russians want to show that, in fact, 6 that it wasn't J 4 7 8 9 l0 And know from my previous them MR. ZELDIN: ans' j nvolved i Was n any of the ef f orts MR. ZELDIN: all to 12 the U.S. election? t4 2015. to i nterf ere wi th U . S. electi ons? DR. HILL: Tamperi ng wi th our election systems? No. Ukra'ini ll l3 that were involved in any DR. answer All r'ight. of the act'iv j ti es of HILL: I can't connected at Was answer Ukrai ni ans to i nterf ere w'ith that question. No, I can't that question. t6 just to be clear whether we're talking about on the basis of press reports or are we talking t7 about witness' personal knowledge? 15 THE CHAIRMAN: And 23 ' personal knowledge. DR. HILL: My personal knowledge, no. My personal knowledge, no. I mean, there were a 1ot, a 1ot of press reports purporting to all kinds of things, and I'm not testifying about press reports. MR. ZELDIN: So that I don't misunderstand your answer, 24 based on your personal knowledge, you're 25 being connected 18 t9 20 2t 22 MR. ZELDIN: The wi tness UNCLASS I not aware of to any Ukrainians attempting FIED to UNCLASSlFIED I 2 a J i 176 th the U. S. etecti on? DR. HILL: COrrCCt. And I also want to just point out here that nterfere wi our 4 intelligence agencies were pretty thorough about a lot of 5 i nvesti gati 8 9 ons and thi ngs here. BY MR. CASTOR: 6 7 at the NSC? My predecessor at the NSC we11, there would have been two predecessors, because this was an amalgamation of O A Who was your predecessor l0 two bureaus. The immediate predecessor would have been ll Celeste Wallander t2 probably not Ukraine. l3 t4 15 t6 t7 the a A a A a Who had for Russia, Central Asia, I guess, but the Ukra'ine Portfolio? I think it would have been Charles Kupchan. I'm sorry, what was his last name? Charles Kupchan. He's a professor at And then who had the Ukraine Georgetown. portfolio before l8 Vi ndman? t9 20 Croft, who was the Ukra'ine desk officer at the State Department and then went to work with Ambassador 2t VoIker. 22 a 23 24 25 A Catherine And what was the timeframe that she had the Ukraine portfolio? A Up unt"il the summer of 2018. And bef ore her i t v,,as oh, I can't remember who was bef ore her. There were UNCLASSI FIED UNCLASS I I FIED several changes of directorates in the tjme that 177 of 5 directors in the time that I was there. Look, and I'm sorry to get testy about, you know, this back and forth, because I'm rea1ly worried about these conspiracy theorjes, and I'm worried that all of you are 6 goi 2 3 4 ng to go down a rabb'i t ho1e, you know, looki ng f or thi ngs t5 that are not going to be at all helpful to the American people or to our future election in 2020. You just had the Senate report coming out informing us all yet again, a bipartisan, nonpartisan report from the Senate about the risk that there is to our elections. If we have people running around chasing rabbit holes because Rudy Giuliani or others have been f eeding inf ormat'ion to The Hi11, Politico, we are not going to be prepared as a country to push back on this again. The Russians thrive on l6 mi 7 8 9 t0 ll t2 l3 t4 17 l8 t9 20 2l 22 23 24 25 si nf ormati on and d'i si nf ormati on . I just want to say that that was the reason that I went into the administration when I was asked by General F1ynn, K.T. MacFarland, and General Ke1logg. We're jn peril And of other people interfering here. And i t doesn't mean to say that other people haven't also been trying to do things, but the Russjans were who attacked us in 20L5, and they're now wrjting the script for others to do the same. And jf we don't get our act together, they witl continue to make fools of us'internationally. as a democracy because UNCLASS I FIED UNCLASS J 178 l'lR. JORDAN: Dr. H'i11, was Christopher Steele's dossier I 2 I FIED a rabbi t DR. hole? HILL: I thi nk i t was a rabbi t hole. 5 think the Russians were trying to influence us and get us to buy into something that was 6 absolutely not true? 4 MR. JORDAN: You t6 HILL: But that was not on any basis once I got into the administration I didn't see that that was a rabbit hole that my former colleagues in the Natjonal Intelligence Council had gone down to. The way that the Russians operate is that they will use whatever conduit they can to put out information that is both real and credible but that also masks a great deal of disinformation. So I've written a book on Vladimir Putin, and if you, you know, have a moment when you want to have a sleep aid, you know, late at night, I've laid all of that out there. t7 And Putjn himself has gone around, you know, claiming there 18 were dossiers on h'im 7 8 9 l0 ll t2 l3 t4 l5 DR. trying to red j rect people to look in 20 other places for i nformati on. When I was at the Nationat Intelligence Council there 2t was some person who kept constantly 19 22 23 24 25 writing to us, telling us that we were missing, you know, whole things about, you know, Vladimir Putin, which was clearly, you know, kind of an effort on the part of the Russians to send us down rabbit holes of inquiry that would kind of distract us from looking UNCLASS I FIED UNCLASS I FIED 179 5 at the actual issues that we should be rea11y concerned about. And thi s was under the Bush admi ni strati on l'4R. JORDAN: So I j ust want to be c1ear, there was a story done in Politico on you last month. In that reporting it says Steele might have been played by the Russians into 6 spreading disinformation. That's what you think 7 wi th I 2 J 4 8 9 10 1t t2 . happened HILL: It's very 1ike1y that the Russians planted disinformation in and among other jnformat"ion that may have been truthful, because that's exactly, again, the way that they operate. And I think everyone should always be cogni zant of that. DR. l6 Yeah. So i nformation that Chri stopher 5tee1e was played by the Russians, that information was used, as you well know, by our Justice Department, specifically our FBI, as part of the basis for securing a warrant to spy on an t7 American l8 19 HILL: I think it's already come out that that wasn't exactly the case, that the dossier was basically out 20 there when those investigations had already taken place. l3 t4 l5 2t 22 23 24 25 .4R. J0RDAN: citizen. DR. lvlR. JORDAN: WeIl, that's not accurate. It was part of what was taken HILL: Wel1, some of the information was that it had come through other ways. But, look, I don't want to also get into, again, a discussion that could go down a ctassified DR. UNCLASS]FIED UNCLASS I FIED 180 J I just want to te11 you oo, You know, rea1ly good author i ty that the Russians I mean, again, we shoul d all know thi s, the Senate has reconfirmed this again 4 attacked I 2 avenue because I'm not disPuting that. 5 MR. JORDAN: 6 DR. HI LL 7 And also, the point that actually hasn't : attacked our democracy . come out and, 8 again, why I've been very cross in the media, is that the 9 Pres'ident waS attacked aS we11, because the Russians sought 10 l1 t2 l3 t4 l5 t6 17 l8 t9 20 2t 22 to discredit him. And I've been very unhappy with the media coverage of all of this, which is why I don't want to start, you know, k'ind of basi cal1y doi ng test'imony by vi rtue of an arti c1e that you've read in Politico. Because everybody wants to sensationalize things, everybody wants to spend time look'ing at the things that seem sexy, and they don't want to actually look at, you know, talk to what the facts are. MR. JORDAN: I'm not trying to do that. Doctor, te11 me about your relationship with Chri stopher Steele. HILL: He was my counterpart when I director, the national intelligence officer. DR. was the 23 24 l"lR. JORDAN: And so 25 DR. HI LL: So i nevi tably UNCLASS , I FIED when I had to do l'iai son UNCLASS I meet'ings wi th the .4R. JORDAN: And 2 J 4 5 6 7 U. K. him for , I EIED he was the person 181 I had to meet wi th. so you had a worki ng relat'ionship wi th how long? HILL: For the whole period that I was national intelligence officer, so that would be from 2005 to the end of 2009. DR. MR. J0RDAN: 0kay. t7 HILL: 5o anybody who was working in the intelligence agencies at the time MR. JORDAN: I get it. DR. HILL: -- who was deafing with Russia would have to as I understand, deal wi th hi m. He reti red at the end of 2009. MR. J0RDAN: The story on you says that you spoke with him in 2015. So can you tel1 me about that conversation? DR. HILL: That was prior to the t'ime that I had any knowledge about the dossier. He was constantly trying to l8 drum up business, and he had contacted me because he wanted t9 20 to see if I could give him a contact to some other individual, who actually I don't even recal1 now, who he 2t could approach about some business issues. 8 9 l0 ll t2 l3 t4 l5 t6 22 23 24 25 DR. earlier you said there were all kinds of folks who contacted you from time to tjme wanting to get involved and have contact w'ith various political campaigns. Is Mr. Steele one of those i ndiv'iduals? MR. JORDAN: And UNCLASS I F]ED I FIED UNCLASS HILL: He was not. I DR. 2 MR. JORDAN: He was J 4 5 182 not, okay. article that yotl, when you were hired, as soon as you were hired you told Mr. McMaster that you had worked with Mr. Steele. Is that right? And then the same mentions l5 HILL: Yes, in the course of my official duties as NIO, because I thought , obvi ously , gi ven the si tuati on , i t would be worth saying that. I also told Ambassador Bolton this as we1I. MR. J0RDAN: Okay. And you did that based on the fact that Steele was i n the news? DR. HILL: Correct. MR. JORDAN: Okay. And you did that after you were hired or before you were hired? DR. HILL: I mentioned it to General Kellogg when he was t6 i 6 7 8 9 l0 ll 12 l3 t4 DR. ntervi ewi ng me as well t7 MR. JORDAN: 0kay. 18 DR. HILL: I . mean, you can't, you know, choose who you 22 to interact with. MR. J0RDAN: No. I just want to know DR. HILL: And at that point Christopher Steele was the poi nt person for deali ng wi th Russi a. 23 MR. JORDAN: Great. 24 MR. ZELDIN: l9 20 2l 25 have between Dr. Hi 11, are you aware of any i nteraction Mr. Steele and Ukrai n'ians UNCLASS I FIED UNCLASS I DR. HILL: - I E]ED 183 I'm not. 8 ZELDIN: i nvolved i n the dossier? DR. HILL: I have no knowledge whatsoever of how he developed that dossier, none, I just want to state that. The first time I saw that dossier was the day before jt was pubtished jn Buzzfeed when a colleague, like it seemed to be about half of Washington, D.C., had it and showed me a copy of i t and I was shocked. And then i t appeared 'in Buzzf eed 9 the next 2 J 4 5 6 7 10 MR. day. MR. JORDAN: And when you read it you were convinced 1l that it t2 HILL: That was when I expressed the misgivings and concern that he could have been played. MR. JORDAN : Yep. Okay . Thank you DR. HILL: Because if you also think about it, the Russians would have an ax to grind against him given the iob that he had previously. And if he started going back through hjs old contacts and asking about, that would be a perfect opportun'i ty f or people to f eed some ki nd of mi si nf ormati on I had no basis on which to assess that. l3 14 l5 l6 t7 l8 19 20 DR. . . I,IR. 2t 22 was -- a We CASTOR: learned during the course that Steele was desperate to 24 25 see of our investigation that Donald Trump was not elected Pres'ident. Do you A I don't know anything about that at all, UNCLASS I EIED no. UNCLASS I FTED I 2 J a How 184 does the Natjonal Security Staff staff the Vice Presjdent? Is there a separate unit that A He has a separate unit. But we, in my directorate, t2 of people, again, that he has detailees often for just a year at a time who rotate around. And we try to keep them as informed as possible about everything that's happening in our area of responsi bi 1i ty, especi ally, as I sai d, that's 'in the context of, you know, your question about red f1ags. I wanted them to know that, you know, if we were di scussi ng the possi bi t i ty of a Vi ce Presidenti aI v'isi t , that there would be issues that we might be concerned about to be, l3 you know, very carefut about, you know, protecting the t4 integrity of the Vice Presidency 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 ll l5 work very closely with the series and the V'ice President. Because the Vi ce Pres"ident played actually a very 2t in terms of his outreach, and especially th'is Vice Presjdent like, you know, predecessors has really kind of stepped up where there's been a conf lict or where there's been some spec'ial care needed, you know, for a country that, you know, perhaps isn't one of the top allies but, you know, certainly might need some 22 attenti l6 t7 l8 t9 20 important foreign policy and diplomatic role on. 23 And, you know, Vice President Pence has been, you 24 extremely good about stepping up when asked, you know, 25 and, you know, give speeches UNCLASS for I FIED Munich Securi ty Counci know, to 1 go UNCLASS I EIED I conference and other settj ngs, 185 for example. 4 it's often very difficult for him to do these trips because of course he can't be out of the country when the President is, and he has got other domestjc 5 obligations, not least being here as representative as we11. 2 J 6 7 8 9 l0 ll r2 l3 t4 l5 t6 t7 l8 l9 20 2l 22 23 24 25 But the other thing, a Ri ght. There was some quest'ion about whether Vi ce President Pence was going to attend Zelensky's inauguration? It depended on the date. I mean, we were hoping, you know, if others couldn't attend that he could. I mean, I myself couldn't attend because of the date, that the way that it aga'in, there were several di f f erent dates, and then the date that was announced in May was very quickly announced. a Ri ght. A It was, you know, k jnd of bas'ica1ly wjth a couple of days' notice. O So the decjsion not to send the Vice President had nothing to do wjth A Well anything other than hjs schedule? a A I can't say with any with complete certainty. I did flag already that there were some problems, but I have no reason to believe you know, I flagged to his staff, to General Kellogg that there were some issues, yoLr know, kind of noise going on around Ukraine that was worrisome and that we'd need to get to the bottom of. But I have no basjs to A UNCLASS I FIED I FIED UNCLASS I say that he was told not 2 real stretch for his 4 okay. a J 186 to go. I think it would have been schedule. How big is the NSC staff for the Vice Pres'ident? 8 I don't know. I don't know the numbers. It's not big at a1I, maybe about 1.0 people total. a Which js about the same size as your -A Is that about ri ght, Derek, L0 people at the V'ice 9 Presi 5 6 7 A To be honest, dent's staff? MR. HARVEY: l0 ll I thi NK SO. BY MR. CASTOR: that's about the same size Yeah, which is why we always tried to a A a A t2 l3 t4 And he1p. as your t7 Yeah. I mean, no one can say that the Vice Presi dent i s overstaffed MR. BiTAR: Just for the record, that was Derek Harvey l8 answeri ng. 15 16 . 20 HILL: Yeah, Derek Harvey, yes. You know, I asked him because I could see him and I know that he would, you 2t know t9 DR. 22 t'4R. BITAR: For the reporter. 23 DR. HI MR. 24 25 LL: a I 'm sor ry . Yes . Yep. CASTOR: Vice President Biden had a role overseeing Ukrajne UNCLASS I FIED a UNCLASS]FIED 187 4 policy. Do you know anything about that? A It was, you know, as far as I understand, you know, part of the di vi s'ion of labor f rom the previ ous admi ni strati on. I mean, as I sai d , Vi ce Pres'idents of ten 5 you know, step up and play particular ro1es. I 2 J 6 7 8 9 10 ll t2 l3 t4 l5 t6 t7 l8 , When I was in the Bush administration as NIO, Vi ce Presjdent Cheney had actually played a very active role on et Un'ion, gave many speeches. And I often had to go and brief him as well when I was NIO. a When you lef t the NSC on J uly l"9th , could you j ust go through your direct reports again? A There was my assistant. Do you need me to name them all for the record? a That would be he1pfu1. . He was an A So there was my assistant NSC direct hire. He's no longer there because he had agreed to be there for the year that I was there and then he woutd transi tjon off. He's gone to the Treasury Department. the f ormer Sovi 22 , who was basjcally detailed from Treasury, and she and I started around the same time and ended the same time. She'd also had an agreement to be there for 2 years, and Treasury was understaffed and wanted to pu11 23 her back. l9 20 2l 24 25 There was There was John Erath, who was the deputy senior director. John had been there UNCLASS I FIED for about a year and from UNCLASS I EIED I 188 State Department, and he had previously been detailed out to J the Defense Department and all kinds of other -- NATO. He's, you know, kind of a quite long-serving State Department 4 official 2 5 6 who covered was sorry. I'm closing the desk things in order here. There who was 7 10 l1 t2 l3 detailed do from I ment'ioned huge portfoljo of countries, so we had everything from the Baltic States all the way down to k'ind of Romania, Bulgaria, Poland, you know, all those other countries. NATO. There , was who was who was detailed Netherlands, and the Western European t6 back to There who was from covering the U.K., France, the l5 18 to k'ind of entire eastern flank of before that some people ended up with a t4 t7 my mind and covered the 8 9 the whole gamut of issues. countries. He's gone , also from was our NATO djrector. And he had a smaller portfolio 24 is very wide ranging on a whole host of issues There was , who was the director for Turkey, Greece, the Aegean, and at one point had the Caucasus as we11, but that actually became too much for him to handle. Turkey 'is a 24/7 , 365-days-a-year job. He's actually now of f wi th the , so he was also detailed 25 over f rom 'the t9 20 2t 22 23 because NATO UNCLASS I FIED UNCLASS I 2 J 189 I explained before, got Ukra'ine, Belarus, and Moldova, also detailed in from the JCS. There was , who was detailed from ! There was Alex Vindman, who, as so we shared with the 4 5 I FIED directorate, and the nature of I job was classjfied. who was our director for *rt I, and who was really handling all the outreach that we And then there 6 7 Russia 8 had l0 to the Russian Natjonal Security Council and very much f ocused on j ust the ni tty-gri tty of coordi nat'ing all of our interactions with the Russians, which at this point were 11 actual 1y fai r1y extensj ve. 9 l3 d'id none of these other individuals the Ukraine portfolio. We actually had to ask f t4 up arfd help on the Balt'ics and Caucasus j ust i n a pi nch l5 because t2 t6 And he our other djrectors were getting I don't think I've worked on to step overwhelmed. missed anyone. How many people do that add up to? Is that !? l7 you have there? l8 24 It's about!, yeah. 'Yeah, that sounds about right. And we previously had a couple more directors and we'd gone we were agreeing, I mean, as you've heard and read about the NSC downsizing, we were agreeing to attrition a Ri ght. you know, so that d'i rectors would not A 25 necessari 1y be replaced. t9 20 2t 22 23 How much does a A UNCLASS I FIED UNCLASS I FIED 190 6 fi rst arri ved? Li ke, you know, how many people did you have reporting to you? A Initially there were ! people there. But by the time I arrived there was a reorganization going on, because we used to also have Central Asia, and that moved to the directorate covering Central and South Asja. So one of the 7 directors already went, and the Western European portfolio 8 was 9 di rectors. I 2 J 4 5 l0 ll 12 a So what was i t 1 i ke when you differently arranged, and we djdn't replace one of So, in fact, had all of the EU, , I taly , the Vat'ican, Spai n , Portugal a In the course of your experience did you ever come Germany . l5 into contact with national security staffers that poli tical orientation? A We11, I mean, I had plenty of political l6 from the administration. l3 l4 t7 l8 t9 20 2t 22 23 24 25 those had a appointees a Any political or nonpolitical appointees that had a pol i ti cal ori entati on? A Not in my experience. People did not express those. I mean, I made it very clear from when I came on 'in that I was nonpart j san and I did not want people's, you know, politjcs brought into the office. I mean, people could share opinions. And I was aware, you know, obviously of a few people's political preferences, but they weren't in any way that was only just by chance. But they were mostly UNCLASS]FIED UNCLASS I all 191 Republicans. a 2 J I FIED When you started were there any holdovers from the previous admini stration? ll A Wel1, of course there were because the administrations that always happens. I mean, I was a holdover f rom the Bush admini strat'ion at the DNI a How many of tne ! were holdovers? A Wel1, when I first started all of them would have been, because my first job, when I came in in March, was to preside over -- that's why I can't remember, you know, all of the sequencing of directors, because the entire staff were t2 from the previous administration. And from, you know, the 13 period between March and the summer, that's when I ended t4 down l5 new detai 1ees. t6 O And you were A And everybody left, you know, we11, for the most part, who had just had a L-year detail in the summer of 20L7. But, again, all of these people were detailed from agencies, 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 t7 18 l9 with four people at one point. We 2t so they're professional staff. a You were j n j t j a1ly 'introduced 22 working 20 23 24 25 were trying to find to the possi bi 1i ty at the NSC by General Flynn A I was. K.T. MacFarland? a A Correct. I had my f i rst discussion with K.T. UNCLASS I FIED up 'in of UNCLASS I December J 4 cont i nue a 5 6 t92 2016. And when General McMaster -- a A 2 of ] FIED I had to wai t a ujhi Ie to see whether he wanted to . Okay. And could you just help us understand, to cont'inue to He did. I mean,, I he wanted you A a A 7 8 9 came 'in to meet with him. And I mean, I'd been already offered the job and I was 'in the process of onboardi ng. But clearly, you know, l0 al ready ll t6 if a new National Security Advisor comes in, he's, you know, perfectly wi thi n hi s ri ghts to deci de not to proceed. 0 But he A And I d'idn't know him well. I mean, I knew him somewhat professionally. I'd been at a conference or two with him. But, I mean, 'it wasn't f ike I rea11y knew h'im t7 we11. l8 24 a When you onboarded, did you have any Flynn that left? loyalists that you had to A Remember, I was hired by General Flynn, and I knew him from the period when I worked at the DNI. And there were a number of people who continued who had worked with General Flynn. But, yes, it was true that, you know, Ambassador -sorry General McMaster, just like Ambassador Bolton, also 25 did t2 l3 t4 l5 t9 20 2t 22 23 change out the staff. UNCLASS I FIED UNCLASS I EIED I a General McMaster, could you 193 identify the 2 differences, top-1ine differences between how he ran the J and Ambassador Bolton? 4 5 6 7 8 9 NSC different personati ties. I mean, they've obviously got very di fferent backgrounds. And General Mcl4aster was very focused on process. He had a lot of interagency meetings. He was focused in the whole year that he was there on the National Security Strategy and then trying to create integrated strategies to pu11 all the policy A They have very l0 together. ll different, deliberative approach, a 1ot of, you know, meetings in his office, a lot of meetings with a 1ot of staff, you know, going through all the national securi ty pri nci p1es. And Ambassador Bolton, you know, is much more of the view, as I think'is well known about him, of a much sma11er, streamlined Nat'ional Security Staff in which just the pri nci pals i nteract wj th the Presj dent and, agai n , sma1l he famously has a picture meetings between, you know, the on his wa11 that's put in all of the, you know, bios of hjm or the stories about him sjnce it's all been out in public of the picture of the, you know, the Bush Wh'i te House wi th Scowcroft and Powell and Cheney and others just at the desk, at the Resolute Desk, you know, k'ind of a sma11 group. Where Ambassador Bolton then kept it sma11, General t2 r3 t4 l5 16 t7 l8 t9 20 2l 22 23 24 25 So, you know, it was a very UNCLASS I FIED UNCLASS I FIED 194 5 liked, you know, kjnd of the larger, bringing out the guys, you know, for meetings and things. a There was some discussion about the WhatsApp usage. A Yes. a And you indicated that White House staffers 6 couldn't use WhatsApp? I 2 J 4 7 8 9 l0 ll t2 l3 t4 15 t6 l7 l8 19 20 2t 22 23 24 25 McMaster A a A a A No. It was not on our phones. But the State Department fo1ks, they Yeah do use WhatsApp? this has actually been an issue not with WhatsApp because it's a relatively, you know, recent platform, but when I was Ni0 between 2005 and 2009, State Department did an awful lot of business on their BlackBerrys or, you know, whatever their system was at the time. I think BlackBerrys were invented by 2006, right? I keep remembering times when we all had giant, you know, kind of phones and things like this. And we had a real problem at the time capturing, you know, the flow of information. And when I was NI0, I mean, an awful lot of things that we refied on were embassy cables and feedback, you know, from our ambassadors or the deputy assi stant secretari es, assi stant secretari es. And a lot of the information was just not accessible to us because, you know, they'd take weeks to write up a cable and often the So UNCLASS I F]ED UNCLASS I i I FIED 195 nformation was not captured. 6 in the executive branch, because of the concerns about executive privilege, but also about Presidential records, everything needs to be captured. a But State Department offic'ia1s that are utilizing WhatsApp, as long as they're preserving it for their own 7 recordkeepi ng rules 2 a J 4 5 And, you know, obviously, A 8 9 I presume that, you know, the State Department has fai r1y robust procedures. l0 We were also instructed, you know, ll that'if anybody, you know, got hold t2 any way or, you know, kind of 13 jmmediately forward that onto our t4 did. l5 l6 It didn't like everybody e1se, of our personal phone number, NSC that emai1 in we had to email, which I always often, but, you know, as you mentioned before, you asked me a question, why did the media happen very l9 jn actual fact, it's on my Brookings out-of-office message on leave. So they have it. You know, it's quite easy to get, hence why I get a 1ot of 20 emai t7 l8 2t 22 23 24 25 have my phone number, my emai1, 1s and phone ca11s. I'd f jnd that, you know, some of f icjal had, you know couldn't remember the sequence of the NSC, so they'd just use my Brookings email and email me, and I would forward that on. But we were not a11owed, as I said, to go before, i n any offjci al busi ness i n otherwi se an offjci al So somet'imes UNCLASS ] EIED UNCLASS I manner I EIED 196 like that. 6 a President Trump's Ukraine policy with forwarding lethal defensive weapons to the Ukrajne, is it fair to say that that is a much more robust aid policy? A That's correct. a And what else can you tel1 us about the difference 7 between the current admini 2 J 4 5 stration and the previous? l0 A Wel1, I, myself -- you can find th1s in the pubtic record wrote an op-ed before long before I joined the adm'ini strati on , af ter the annexati on of Cri mea and wi th the 11 war on the Donbas, actually opposing letha1 t2 provisions, defensive letha1 13 was rea11y worried 8 9 weapons weapon to Ukraine, because I t6 at the time as an'independent analyst and based on what I'd known previously in my NIO job that the Ukrainian miljtary was in such a state of shambles that it would never be able to stand up to the Russian military, l7 which had, you know, basically escalation dominance, and that l8 we were t4 l5 t9 in the danger of basically fanning, you know, of the flames of the confljct and having the slaughter, frankly, of 20 Ukrai ni an soldi ers. 2l that the Europeans wouldn't step up and woutdn't do anything. I mean, this is a perpetual problem that I was facing on many fronts. Remember, Europe is all in my portfofio as well. And we were very concerned that, you know, it could become I was concerned, and my cohort at 22 23 24 25 And also UNCLASS I FIED UNCLASS I the time, that it's 2 Europe, I E]ED become 197 a rift in our relations with J that they might actually even step back from sanctions or other commitments that they've made with us as a 4 government. ll I got into the government, the adminjstratjon, I became actually more convinced that there was a thorough plan, that our colleagues at the Pentagon had rea1ly thought aI1 of this through, and that General Abizaid and then, you know, kind of his replacement, Keith Dayton, who had been working on the behalf of the Pentagon as a special envoy of the Secretary to work with Ukrainian defense, as one would 12 hope, they knew what they were doing. 5 6 7 8 9 l0 Now, when 24 for the long-term sustainability of the Ukrainian military, and that the'intent was that the Ukrainian defense sector would be able to get itself back jnto shape again over time. Because you may recal1 that Ukraine, as a republic of the Soviet Union, was one of the 1ocus, along with Belarus, of the majority of 'the defense industrial base of the Soviet Union. So many parts for helicopters and planes, all the heavy f ift capacity for the Russian forces, were stil1 being made in Ukraine up until the falling out between Ukrajne and Russia. So we were kind of confident that if Ukraine could get its act together, especially jf jt could tackle some of 25 the energy issues as we11, whjch, you know, were real1y l3 t4 l5 l6 t7 l8 t9 20 2l 22 23 And then they had a proper plan UNCLASS I F] ED UNCLASS I FlED 198 2 it down, energy efficiency, and as we alt know, militaries are one of thei r biggest utjlizers of energy, that J over tjme Ukraine, you know, could actually have a viable 4 mi I 5 6 7 8 dragging f i tary. And given the size of the country and, you know, the size of the populat'ion, Ukraine could actually potentially over time become a formidable mjlitary power, like the Poles were al ready becomi ng 'in Eastern Europe. there. 12 , you knout, everybody changes their mind, you know, and kind of learns things, I, you know, was basically persuaded that, you know, this was actualty worth doing, even though I sti11 had qualms l3 about Russian escalation dominance and was worried about t4 th'is would be provi ded and maki ng sure not to provoke the l5 Russians. 9 l0 ll And so there was a plan So I how 22 to the vjew that it was i djd. I mean, I didn't want to use it as a way of just, you know, sticking a finger up to the Russians, you you know, there were a few people know, which is kind of that wanted to say, hey, you know, here, Russians, you know, k'ind of we' re taki ng these acti ons, but i t was very f ew. I wanted to make sure that it was part of a well thought out 23 policy. t6 17 l8 t9 20 2t 24 25 O A So you came around MR. CASTOR: I have about just shy of 10, 8 minutes. Does anybody, any Members have any questions? UNCLASS ] FIED UNCLASS I MR. ZELDIN: I FIED Dr. Hi11, Ambassador 199 Volker made it sound 4 like many in the U.S. Government working on these issues really wanted the meeting with Zelensky to happen. And earlier you're testjfying a litt1e bit about the des'i re for 5 meeting between President Trump and Zelensky. Can you just 6 help me better understand your interest and your team's 7 interest in wanting to set up a meet'ing 8 Trump and President Zelensky? 2 a J 9 10 ll t2 l3 l4 15 t6 t7 l8 t9 20 2t 22 23 24 25 UNCLASS ] FIED between President a UNCLASS I 2 I FIED 200 [2:55 p.m.] DR. HILL: We11, there was a bit of a split there as J we11. You know, I think I've 4 you know, be more c1ear. That myself and Ambassador Bolton 5 and, you know, 6 we should be having a meeting 7 8 9 some myself c1ear, but I'11, made other parts of our team did not believe with President Zelensky I mean "we" writ large as the U.S. Government at the highest levels -- until we were very sure how the Ukrainian Rada parliamentary elect'ions would play out. And a1so, then, we sure is ever was going to be under which, you know, nothing l0 could be rea11y ll rea11y t2 the i nfluence of vari ous o1i garchs. l3 2t I was concerned, as was Ambassador Bolton, that there was all this extraneous activity going on that would one way or another impact on this meeting in ways in which and this'is actually my worst n'ightmare, what's happen'i ng now, that thi s could , you know, bas i cal1y spi n out and put, you know, kind of the United States in a very bad position because I d'id not know exactly what [.,lr. Giuliani was doi ng. So we are now 1i vi ng my worst n'ightmare. MR. ZELDIN: As far as people inside of the United 22 States Government working on the Ukraine issue, there was a 23 difference of opinion and desjre of whether or not to set 24 a meet'ing between President Trump and President Zelensky? t4 l5 t6 t7 t8 t9 20 25 sure about how much Zelensky And, again, DR. HILL: Yeah, overa11, we UNCLASS] FIED all wanted to have a up 201 UNCLASSIEIED 4 right kjnd of circumstances, you know, wj th the right messaging and the right discussion because i t was important for the legitimization of the new Ukrainian Government and as a strong symbol of U.S. solidarity with 5 Ukrai ne. I 2 J meeting, but under the 11 I mean, Ukraine is in a rea11y remarkable and very di fficult posi tion. I mean, j t fi rst got i ts i ndependence after the collapse of the Soviet Union and Lee will actually remember this. Back in 1994, we all worked on a report called "Back in the USSR" when we were at the Kennedy School that was basically documenting all of the efforts that tz the Russian Government and Boris Yeltsjn were actually 6 7 8 9 l0 13 14 making to subvert the sovereignty of all of the new countries that emerged out of the Soviet Union. t7 basically highlighted Ukraine as being the most vulnerable at that particular juncture because this was the period when Ukraine was being pushed to give up its nuclear 18 weapons. And we actually wrote 19 shouldn't give up jts nuclear 20 good chance l5 t6 2t 22 23 24 25 And we in the report that weapons because Ukraine there was a that they would then be predated upon by the Russians. And this was then addressed by the Budapest Memorandum in late 1994. And there were all kinds of attacks on Ukraine taking this is a long time to go back but there were lots of attacks on Ukrai ne, strange assassi nati ons, all kj nds of UNCLASS I F]ED UNCLASS I FIED 202 2 threats of military act'ion, jncluding against Crimea, all in thi s timeframe. And that's when the U.5. Government moved, J wjth others, to basically give guarantees to Ukraine of its 4 soverei gnty . I 5 6 7 8 9 t0 ll l2 13 t4 l5 16 t7 l8 t9 20 2t 22 23 24 25 at what's happened to Ukraine, you know, basically 20 years ofl, exactly what we feared at the time has happened. So Ukra'ine has basically lost its sovereignty again. And our concern was to show that we were looking at Ukraine as a sovereign country. And one of the ways of expressing that sovereignty is obviously to show respect to their head of state at the very highest levels in our country. It's something that we traditionally do. MR. ZELDIN: Ambassador Sondland seems to have a reputatjon, from the conversat'ions I've had outside of this setting and from what we're hearing, that he rea11y liked to get his hands into everything. Even though he was the U.S. Ambassador to the EU, someone told me that he rea1ly looked at the entire European continent as his. And on his own initiatives, he was just getting himself involved "in everything. Was that pretty much your observations too, or did you have a different observation? DR. HILL: We11, that was my observation. And I said, you know, before that I was I had, you know, what I thought was an unfortunate blowup wjth him at the time when he told me he was in charge of Ukraine, which it was already, So, when you now look UNCLASS T FIED UNCLASS I EIED at the juncture 203 where Ambassador Taylor was being 1 you know, 2 sent out as Charge. And when he J time that he sa'id to me that the President had told him he 4 was in said that was the first t7 of Ukraine. But prior to that, he'd actually said to me repeatedly when I challenged him, you know, on issues ljke th'is where, you know, he was running around with, you know, appearing at the White House and, you know, all kinds of other thi ngs that he was, you know, doi ng at the t'ime that were, you know, completely out of the ordinary process, I, you know, sa'id to him agai n: What's goi ng on here? And he sa'id: The President has given me, you know, thi s broad I am to be his point man on Europe. \,lR. ZELDIN: Do you know whether or not he was actually getting any of this guidance from a higher 1eve1, or is it possible that he was just name-dropping the President? DR. HILL: It i s enti rely possi ble that he was l8 name-dropping the 5 6 7 8 9 l0 lt 12 13 t4 l5 t6 charge 20 Presjdent. There were many times where I mean, he was a shocking number of times in Washington, D.C., to the point where several people said to me: Is he 2t ever in Brussels? t9 24 I busted him a couple of t'imes on the street i n West Executive where, I mean, if he was there, he would normally come in through protocol , as all the other Ambassadors did. 25 They would have a meeting 22 23 And UNCLASS ] with F]ED me or with Ambassador Bolton. UNCLASS I I FTED And he would have some meetings 204 with Ambassador Bolton 10 to time, but I'd often see h'im in West Exec coming out of, you know, what looked like he was coming out of the West Wing. And he'd say that he'd been in, you know, to see the Presjdent, but I would find from talking to the staff that he'd only been up to see l'4i ck Mulvaney . I don' t know whether that's hearsay or presumption or MR. ZELDIN: But as far as him getting involved in other countries outside of the EU, he came across as someone who was trying to get his hands into everything on his own l1 initiative? 2 J 4 5 6 7 8 9 from tjme t4 in Brussels from another country, they were fair game, is basically how it appeared to for a while and be. He spent a long time working on I l5 actually t6 t7 Prime Minister that he should information from th. I have actually handed over to State Department. He sat on it 18 for 3 months. t2 l3 DR. HILL: If made he met somebody a huge mess-up because he was given a piece of 23 at the State Department had meetings that were pertaining to that piece of paper, and it had never thought that actually been handed over. And the the'i r counterparts were either, you know, kind of insane or deliberately obfuscating on the issues that they kept 24 rai si ng. l9 20 21 22 25 And people THE CHAIRMAN: It's time, Mr. Zeldi n. UNCLASS I EIED UNCLASS The time I MR. ZELDIN: 2 THE CHAIRMAN: J l'4r. Goldman. 4 MR. WOLOSKY: 5 THE CHAIRMAN: 6 It is Can we 205 is almost up, or it is uP? up. take a 5-minute break? Yes, take a 5-minute break and we'11 come back i n. 7 lRecess. l 8 THE CHAIRMAN: 9 I FIED Mr . All right, let's go back on the record. Noble. 10 NR . NOBLE : Thank you , 14 r . Cha i rman . BY NR. NOBLE: 1l a t2 Dr. Hi11, you sajd in the last segment of your l4 living your worst nightmare. Can you unpack that a little bit for us? What do you mean by l5 that? 13 testimony that we're now A 16 Wel1, I was extremely concerned that whatever i t l8 . G'iul i ani was doi ng mi ght not be legal especially after, you know, people had raised w'ith me these 19 two gentlemen, Parnas and Fruman. And also they'd mentioned t7 20 21 22 23 24 25 was that Mr , this thjrd ind'ividual who, I mean, I guess js actually on the list of names that you had because I didn't recognize all the others of, Harry Sargeant and when I'd spoken to my colleagues who, you know, were based in Florida, including our director for the Western Hemisphere, and he'd mentioned that these people were notorious and that, you know, they'd UNCLASS I FIED UNCLASS I E]ED 206 J in all kinds of strange things in Venezuela and, you know, kind of were just well-known for not being aboveboard. And so my early assumption was that it was 4 pushing I 2 been involved a 5 6 7 8 9 10 ll t2 l3 14 l5 particular indjvjduals' business interests. Did there come a time when you understood, though, Giuljani was also pushing the Ukrainians to conduct or reopen or open particutar investigations? A Yes. I mean, that was when Amos Hochstei n had come to talk to me in May. I think it was May 20th, May 22nd, something like that. So all around the time of when we were preparing for the inauguration. And he had said that a number of Ukrai ni ans had come to compla'in to h jm that they were that this was starting to happen. I also had the a Just to be clear, that Rudy Giuliani was in Ukrai ne, tryi ng to that Rudy l9 A Correct. press Ukrai ni ans? a A 0r was talking to Ukrainians, I mean, in all of different settings, and was sending messages to 20 Ukrai ni ans. t6 17 l8 21 22 23 24 25 a And was kinds it about these investigations in particular? A Also about Naftogaz, again, the Ukrainian oi1 and gas company. And the a So those two. So Naftogaz and UNCLASS I FIED the jnvestigatjons? UNCLASS I EIED 207 2 of Naftogaz in this same time period had also come to have an official meeting with J i I A n the And the board us NSC because I think we're going to get to that a little bit a 4 5 Correct. 1ater. But they raised the same concerns, that they felt A 6 ll that they were under pressure to change out thei r board. a And with respect to the investigations, I just want to be very clear, did you have an understanding of which 'investigations in particular Rudy Gjuliani was pushing or pressing the Ukrainians on, and when did you come to realize t2 that? l3 t6 in that period of tate May after Masha Yovanovi tch had been removed where i t became clear that jt was Burisma. And it was being couched in the context of energy investigations, but it was primarily focused on t7 Bu l8 20 did you ever come to understand that Rudy Gi uf i ani was also pressi ng the Ukrai ni ans to i nvesti gate matters related to purported Ukrai ni an i nterference i n the 2t 20L6 7 8 9 l0 t4 l5 t9 A ri sma And . Presi denti a1 electi on? On1y based on what he was saying himself on the televi sion. a 24 25 U. 5 A was rea1ly . a 22 ZJ It that And when, was what in what time period did you realize that Giuljani was pressing as well? UNCLASS I FIED UNCLASS I EIED I A 208 Wel1, that began with the articles that I started 4 to see in The H11t and others, you know, from March onwards. And I started to pay attention to this. There was also the mentioning of George Soros, which, again, has become this 5 crazy trope where every time 6 George Soros, 2 3 somebody mentions the name of 7 there's a whole flurry of conspi racy theori es, and he seems to be basically orchestrating absolutely 8 everyth i ng. 11 of testimony, I believe you said while you and other NSC officials in the interagency were trying to make Ukraine poticy the way that 12 you normally went about such things, there was a1t this l3 extraneous stuff going 9 l0 t4 15 t6 t7 l8 l9 20 2l 22 23 24 25 a A a Giuliani A a A Right. So, in your last segment on? Correct. What do you mean? Were you referring to what Rudy and others were doing Correct. as the extraneous stuff? Correct. And sayi ng, yeah. I mean , so, you know, every single day it seemed and that's probably an exaggeration, but every single day it seemed that he was on televjsion, you know, basically spouting off, you know, one th i ng after anothe r a Okay. And I believe you also said something along the lines that you didn't actually know exactly what Rudy . UNCLASS I EIED UNCLASS I F]ED 209 4 Giuliani was going on, but did you have it seems that you did have some understanding at the t'ime of what he was up to. A Well , I tri ed I worked extraordi nari 1y Iong days, so the last thing that I wanted to do when I went home 5 was watch I 2 J 7 I watch FOX News just as much I watch anything else, and I've appeared on FOX News, and that's how I got to know K.T. I was often on her show. I 8 knew 6 9 television. And her through the Council on Foreign Relations. So, you know, just to be kind of clear, I'm an omnivore t to watchi ng the news, and but I would have l0 when i ll l6 to go home in the evening and try to look on the news to see what Giuliani was saying. And then I would have to go onto YouTube or whatever else I could find, you know, k'ind of replays of things because people were constantly saying to me: My God, have you seen what Giuliani is saying now? And it was clearly starting to create this, you know, t7 meta-alternate narrative about Ukrai ne l2 l3 t4 l5 18 l9 20 2l 22 23 24 25 comes a A And about Ambassador Yovanovi tch? a A O And Ambassador Yovanovitch as well? political articles and all these other things as we11. Correct. Now, so, when you saw Rudy Giuliani or you talked to your colleagues about his appearances on the televis'ion, part of what he was saying and part of what he was pressing UNCLASS I FIED UNCLASS I FIED 210 4 for Ukraine to investigate Hunter Bjden and his connect'ion to Buri sma, correct? A He was. He was. a So, at some point, did you come to realize that 5 what Rudy I 2 a J 6 7 was ani was pressi ng, these i nvesti gati ons were poli tical in nature, that these were 'investigations that could benefit the President in his reelection campaign? Gi u1 i 10 to realize that one way or another Ukraine was being used as part of the discussions and debates around the elections. And that's what I mean about my worst ll nightmare because Ukrajne and the national security aspects t2 l9 of this and what the Russians have done and will continue to do is something that we should all be it should be a nonpartisan issue, and we should all be paying a 1ot of attention to i t. And that's what I mean about my worst nightmare, is I 'm sure i t's the havi ng Ukrai ne become po1 i ti ci zed Ukrainians'worst nightmare as well -- to become politicjzed 'in the way that Russi a has become poli ti c'ized i n all of our 20 discourse. 8 9 13 t4 l5 t6 t7 l8 2l A I And came so, at that point, I together: saw all of the above being somebody's nefarj ous busi ness i nterests, 22 bundled 23 conspiracy theories about George Soros or the alternate 24 25 retellings of what happened in 2015, and then also, potentially, you know, digging up dirt on candidates, UNCLASS ] FIED al1 UNCLASS I based on what 2 c1ear. I FIED Giuliani himself 211 was saying, just to be very 8 Right. But did you also have an understanding that Gi ut i ani was worki ng and self-proclaimi ng to be the agent, essenti a11y, of the Pres'ident of the Un j ted States? A Yes, of course, I was aware of that. I mean, he said it all the time. a And did you have any conversations or did you hear 9 through other 3 4 5 6 7 r0 a U. S. offi ci a1s about how the Ukrai ni ans were reacting to this l5 A Yes. I heard from to this essential shadow foreign policy? a A Yes, I heard from our Embassy staff. And this was after Masha Yovanovitch had left as we11. I mean, I was in constant contact with Embassy staff. i heard from former t6 Assistant Secretary t7 Secretary, many others, and, of course, there's a whole think l8 tank world out l9 I'm hearing from people a1l the time. l1 12 l3 t4 there. the Deputy Assistant You know, I 'm readi ng arti c1es, and As we1I, we had regular meetings with people from 20 2l Wess Mitche11, Heri tage, CSIS, you know, ki nd of Atlant'ic Counci I 24 a lot of work on energy. And I know, you know, a 1ot of th'is gets poli ti ci zed agai n, but we were meeti ng wi th everybody from all of the thi nk tanks. And I '11 25 j 22 23 because they were doing ust po'int out that our colleagues UNCLASS I FIED f rom Her i tage were UNCLASS I FIED 212 to us repeatedly about what they were real1y I complaining 2 concerned about what was going on wjth Ukraine. 5 at the U.S. Embassy in Kyiv were you speaking wi th about thi s i ssue? A The previous DCM. I mean, obviously Masha 6 Yovanovitch herself before, you know, she was removed, J 4 7 8 a Who and then, after she was removed, I mean, talking to Ambassador 'in the Taylor , who had been reachi ng out and talki ng to ll of his work, you know, he 'd been, yoti know, very closely associ ated wi th all of the former Ukrai ni an U. S. Ambassadors to Ukraine, who had also been talking to people t2 as weII. l3 2t a And the prior DCM, was that Mr. Pennington? A That is correct. And he got moved on, you know, ki nd of basi ca11y i n thi s sort of timeframe as well a So you said, you know, you were concerned about the poli ticization of Ukraine. How does that impact our national securi ty, U. S. national securi ty? A We11, if Ukraine suddenly becomes, as it, you know, certainly appears to be, on the track of being a part'isan j ssue, and we can't have a serious nonparti san or bi parti san 22 discussion about what the U.S. national security interests in 9 10 t4 l5 r6 t7 18 t9 20 course . 24 it is, then that's a problem, especially as many of the sanctions that we've put in place I'11 give you a concrete 25 example about 23 this. UNCLASS I EIED UNCLASS I I FIED 213 3 put sanctions, as a government and as the U.S. Congress put in place, against Russia because of Russia's annexation of Crimea and the starting of the war in 4 the Donbas. The Europeans 1 2 mean, we came on board with those sanctions 7 tightly coord"inating with us since the downing of t4H17, the Malaysian airljne flight over Donbas, by what has been proven to be Russian operatives. And there's been a 8 very thorough international commission and investigat'ion for 9 this. 5 6 l0 and have been The Europeans have started to see that many of these ll issues, including sanctions that we've put on against t2 from 2016 onwards and now many of our machinations about l3 Ukraine, are nothing more than our own domestic political t4 games now. l5 I was very disturbed and distressed in my last few weeks at the NSC in discussions that I had with Europeans. One case in point was the CAATSA sanctions that you as the Congress, you know, kind of put forward, and the decision to t6 t7 l8 Russia So 24 basically sanction Mr. Deripaska and Rusal because the Treasury Department did a completely aboveboard and this, you know, is on everyone here process to reatly try to deconflict because when we're presuming that when you a1l put on sanctions under CAATSA, there wasn't an intention to close down factories and, you know, major installations 25 across Europe. They' re ki nd of collateral damage. And the 19 20 21 22 23 UNCLASS ] FIED UNCLASS I FIED 214 factory, manufacturing factory in I largest aluminum 2 happens to be in Ireland. J France and Sweden and, you know, elsewhere. And 4 5 There are major facilities'in to talk to us, very about the impact that this was going to have on all of the Ambassadors concerned Europe came l9 r countries and on, you know, major workf orces, mass'ive employment, if the sanctjons were done to the narrow letter of the 1aw. So Treasury was talking, you know, with all of them and trying to work on a supervisory arrangement and to try to make sure that there could be no collateral damage. And when, you know, Ambassadors would come to talk to staff and people here, they got the impression that this was just a pofitica1 game between both parties and that we were not taking seriously the implications of thi s. So they began to believe that we were politicizing our foreign policy, that we were doing it sometimes to target them or that we were doing this, you know, to basicalty fight out, you know, our own disagreements. And that means that we cannot be effective jn working together with our European 20 a1li es on pushi ng back agai nst Russi a 2t enshri ne Ukrai ne's soverei gnty. 6 7 8 9 l0 1l t2 l3 14 15 t6 t7 l8 22 23 24 25 thei or also tryi ng to a Okay. I want to I'm going to jump around just a 1itt1e bit to cover some topics that you already spoke about. The J u1y L0th and J uIy 1Lth, 2019, meeti ngs wi th Ei senberg, are you aware of any documentation of the concerns that you UNCLASS I F]ED UNCLASSIFIED I rai sed J 4 5 6 or Mr. Gri ffl th rai sed wi th Mr. Ei senberg? A a A a 2 down 2ts I 'm not. You're not aware of anythi ng? No. Are you aware of whether Eisenberg wrote anything or made any written reports? 8 I'm not. I mean, i n the time when actually, John has rea11y great recal1, as one would hope in a Iawyer. 9 And 7 10 ll t2 A I 'm sorry. I 'm maki ng that shtj ck about poor Lee all the time here. But he was fistening very intently, and he said that would fo1low up. l5 a Okay. Was he taking notes? A And I had every reason to believe he was very familiar already with a 1ot of this because, again, like t6 everyone 17 televi si on 13 t4 l8 l9 20 2t 22 ZJ 24 25 he a else, he was observing what was going on on the . Had you had pri or conversat'ions wi th Mr . Ei senberg about these 'issues? A In passing, I believe that I had. I met wjth him probabty every day one way or another. His office was opposite mine, so I would see him constantly. But also, just to be clear in terms of process, we always had a legal representatjve at all of our interagency meetings and you know, as one would hope, you know, in terms of keeping us on UNCLASS ] F]ED UNCLASS I 2 J 4 5 6 I FIED 216 the straight and narrow on many things. a So, going back to Ambassador Volker, his role was to the Donbas, correct? He wasn't he didn't have he wasn't in charge of Ukrainian policy writ large, is that right? A He was not, although I think, you know, you had a limited to trying to bring peace 10 often saw mjssion creep wi th speci al envoys . And, frankly, i t's a di ffi cult job for them anywhere because they're given a part'icular slice of and are dealing w'ith an issue, and they've got to ll bring jn, you know, so many other things as well. 7 8 9 reference before about special envoys. We 18 a Do you know whether Ambassador Volker ever had direct one-on-one conversations with the President? A He did not. a What about Ambassador Sondland? A Well, Ambassador sondland told me all the time that he did, but I don't know jf that was actually the case. a when was the fi rst tjme you di scussed Rudy Gi uli ani t9 w'ith Ambassador Volker? t2 l3 14 l5 l6 t7 20 zt 22 23 24 25 A I'm trying to think about which -- i think it might in an unscheduled meeting where I saw h'im around the ti me of Masha Yovanovi tch' s di smi ssal a So that would have been late April 201'9? A Late APri 1 , Yes. a And do you remember what that conversation was? have been . UNCLASS I F]ED UNCLASS A It I FIED 217 J basically talking about, you know, k'ind of basically the circumstances of her dismissal and that we should be extraordinarily careful about dealing with 4 Giuliani. I 2 was 6 Okay. And can you explain just a littte bit more what you sai d to h'im, what he sai d to you about Gi ut i ani and 7 what he' 5 a s up to i n Ukra'ine? 20 A Wel1, he basically ment'ioned at thi s time, and i can't say I mean, hopefully, he told you this exactly when he had hjs first meeting with him. But he was i nti mati ng that he was cons'idering meeti ng wi th Gi ul i ani or perhaps he had some initial encounter w"ith him so that he was clearly trying to you know, getting back to the question before try to figure out, you know, how he could do, you know, the right thing, in terms of trying to smooth this over and trying to deflect away because he was just as concerned as the rest of us were about the, you know, kind of politicization or the distortion of U.S.-Ukrainjan relations or , you know, of U. S . -Ukrai ni an po1 i cy. a And what did you say to Volker when he suggested he 2t may meet 8 9 10 1l t2 l3 t4 l5 t6 t7 l8 t9 22 23 24 25 A a A with Giuliani? I thought that it was futile. I mean Explai n why. Because based on or anything, but my look, I'm not a psychologist based on my assessment UNCLASS I F]ED of what Mr. Giuliani UNCLASS I I 2 J 4 FIED 2t8 television, it was all over the place. And if that's what he's like in person, I have no way to judge it, but if he was anything like he was on the television, I d jdn't see the point in hav'ing a conversation with h jm. He was sayjng on the l8 at times to actually believe some of the things he was saying that I knew to be untrue. a That what Gi ul i ani was say'ing was untrue? A Correct. a Are you aware that Ambassador Volker produced text messages to us? A I am aware because they were in the paper. a Okay. Have you read some of the text messages that are in the paper? A In the newspaper, yes. a Were you aware that those conversations were going on at the time? A I was not. a You never saw those you were never part of those t9 WhatsApp conversati ons? 5 6 7 8 9 l0 ll t2 l3 14 l5 l6 t7 20 21 22 23 24 25 seemed No. And, actually, the timing of it was after I left the NSC. Most of those text messages seemed to have been in the July-August tjmeframe, as far as I can te11. a But, in any event, you weren't aware that Volker, Sondland, and Taylor were having text message exchanges? A I was not. I would hope that they would be talking A UNCLASS I F]ED UNCLASS I 2 J 4 5 6 7 8 T FIED 219 Taylor. In fact, that was also one of my concerns when I was leaving, that they would not have Ambassador Taytor in the 1ooP. a And why i s that? Why was that a concern? A Because Ambassador Sondland had done this w'ith our r mentjoned bef ore he'd met tt " I Charge in I. Prime Minister in Brussels and then decided that he was going because we were also to be the point person to I, to Ambassador l0 but we had a very good without an Ambassadot in I, Charge like Ambassador Taylor, who had previously been an ll Ambassador 12 come back l3 him and pretended he wasn't there. 9 t4 l5 t6 17 t8 l9 20 2t 22 23 24 25 retired, but had Sondland just ignored and was to step up. And Ambassador text messages that are in papers, what's your opi nion of those? Is that normal based on your experience? di plomacy, as you A No. a Having reviewed the a A And why not? the of the content and the nature of , you know, setting up a meeting in relation to this, to something that i s not a national securi ty deliverable. a And can you explain that a litt1e bit more? Like what do you mean by this was not a national security def iverable? What was not the national securi ty deliverable? A It was obvious from those text messages that they Because UNCLASS I FIED UNCLASS I FIED 220 5 referring to the investigations, and that was not something that we were pushing from the national security perspecti ve, certai n1y not the Nati onal Securi ty Counci I and certainly not the State Department. a And they were pushing that in exchange for a White 6 House meeti ng? I 2 J 4 7 8 9 l0 were for a White House meeting. MR. NOBLE: I'd like to show you what's going to be marked maj ori ty exhi bi t 1, I guess. IMaj ori ty Exhi bi t No. 1 A In exchange ll was marked f olident'i f icati on. l BY MR. 12 l3 t4 l5 t6 t7 l8 t9 20 2t 22 23 24 25 a A a this js I'11 put my glasses on. one of the text message exchanges involving And Ambassador A a NOBLE: Volker and actually Andrey Uh-huh And I direct your attention to the entry, the fjrst entry on July 25th, A a A a A a Yermak? 2019. Uh-huh. Do you see that? I do, yes. Can you just read what that says? Whi ch? Hang on . I t' s the one that Yes, Yeah. UNCLASS I F]ED UNCLASS I A a A I 2 J FIED 221 starts with Kurt Volker. Yeah, Kurt Volker writing to Andrey Yermak. I t says : Good l unch . Hea rd f rom Wh'i te House 8 will investigate/get to the bottom of what happened in 2015, we will nail down date for v i s i t to Washi ngton . Good tuck. See you tomorrow Kurt. a Okay. And just for the record, the Bates stamp is 9 KV- 19 4 5 6 7 l0 11 12 l3 t4 l5 t6 l7 l8 t9 20 21 22 23 assuming President Z conv'inces Trump he . A a Uh-huh. Dr. Hi11, the message that Kurt Volker is relaying to Andrey Yermak, Presjdent Zelensky's adviser, how does that correspond or match up or not with the message that Ambassador Sondland delivered during the July L0th meeting that Ambassador VoIker was in attendance at? A I t seems cons'istent wi th that . At least i n that case, he 's talki ng about i nvesti gat'ions. And i n the context of the July L0th/LLth, you know, that was more on the energy sector jn the way that Sondland but in terms of saying he w111 i nvesti gate and then , you know, get to the bottom of what happened in 201,6 is consistent, at least, with the way that that was laid out in the Juty 10th. a But in JuIy L0th jn the Ward Room meeting, I 24 believe you testified you overheard Ambassador 25 specifically mention Burisma. Is that right? UNCLASS I FIED Sondland UNCLASS I I 2 J 4 FIED A a And can you te11 us A But He 222 did. a 1itt1e bit more about what he this somewhat we11, this is obviously, I don't know seems, you know, 8 I don't know I mean, exactly what they had in mind there. a But, agai n, i t's the they seem to be exchangi ng a White House meeting for a commitment by Ukraine to 9 i nvesti 5 6 7 slashed so gate these matters that Rudy Gi u1i an'i had been l0 pressi ng? ll A That's what it looks like. The "heard from the Whi te House" 'is i nteresti ng to me because I don't know, obviously, who they heard from in the White House. a Was i t you or anyone at the NSC that you're aware? A It would not be me because I was not there. But, I mean, th'is could be the Ch'ief of Staf f 's 0f f ice. t2 13 t4 l5 t6 17 l8 a A Mj ck I mean, Mulvaney? that leans to speculation, but based on the 2t July LOth, which js 2 weeks prior to that, the only person that Gordon Sondland referenced was Chjef of Staff Mulvaney. And, actuaI1y, getting to the point when you asked me 22 before about when did Sondland teI1 me he was t9 20 23 24 25 in charge of at that time, in that rather testy exchange I had with him, you know, I was tryjng to impress upon him the importance of coordinating, you know, with all of these Ukraine, UNCLASS I FIED UNCLASS I FIED 223 2 d'ifferent individuals and others that, you know, you were laying out. We had a fairly robust set of interactions with 3 Ukrai ni ans. I l5 that if he was coordinatjng with the President because, again, this is part of hjm saying he's talking to the President, he was talking to Mulvaney, and he was filling in Ambassador Bolton he d'idn't say he was talking to him, Ambassador Bolton, he said filling in Ambassador Bolton and then talking to, you know, he sai d Brechbuhl , U1 ri ch, at the State basi ca1ly Department. He d'idn't actually mention Secretary Pompeo, wh'ich I noted at the t'ime I thought was a bi t odd. Who else did he have to inform? And I said: We11, it would be nice to inform all of us and, you know, the obviously, the Deputy Assistant l6 Secretary and others. 4 5 6 7 8 9 l0 ll l2 l3 t4 And he retorted to me did not think that he needed to do that. t7 And he l8 a A Did you have an understanding why he A UIrich is a special counselor to l9 20 2t 22 23 24 25 was also, of course, talking to Ambassador Volker and Secretary Perry, and he did mention that. a Why was he keeping Ulrjch Brechbuhl in the toop? He was Brechbuhl -- to of course, Secretary Pompeo at thi s you know, it time is on the road all the time. So I'm would be difficult to meet wjth Secretary Pompeo on a regular Secretary Pompeo. And, UNCLASSIE]ED UNCLASS I FIED 224 2 that would actually make sense, I mean, but he's the special counselor. He's not, you know, kjnd of in the J chai I basjs. So n of command. l3 that's actually what I po'inted out to Gordon, that to Ambassador Sondland . He wasn ' t , you know, he wasn ' t kind of basically linked into anybody in the Embassy. He certai nly wasn' t talki ng to Deputy Assi stant Secretary George Kent, who, you know, on the basis of, you know, the daily interact'ions, would be managing that in the State Department. And he wasn't aware of some of the larger policy threads that were goi ng on e'ither . He si mply j ust wasn' t aware of some of the elements of things we were trying to do wjth Ukrai ne. He wasn't, aga'in, getti ng a regular brief on any of 14 thi s ei ther. 4 5 6 7 8 9 l0 l1 t2 And l8 a Do you know whether Ulrich Brechbuhl was generally aware of what Rudy Giuliani was up to in Ukraine? A I could not say. a Di d you have any di rect conversat'ions w j th t9 Brechbuhl about Giulian'i? l5 t6 t7 20 A mean , I Certai nly not about Gi u1 j ani . I di d not , no. I 22 d have conversat'ions wi th hi m about coordi nati on you know, trying to figure out how we could coordinate 23 better. 2l 24 25 a A di did Rudy Giuliani come up in those He did not. No, he did not. And UNCLASS I FIED contacts? , UNCLASS I FIED 225 J a 0n the security assistance issue, I believe you testified that the first time you learned that the President had placed a freeze on the assistance was July 18th. Is that 4 right? I 2 t4 A Yes. But I learned that as OMB a 0h , that 0l4B had put the f reeze and Mick Mulvaney had put a freeze on. So, just A to be clear, I never learned that the President had put a freeze on this. And this is on what was happening at this time was there was a freeze put on all kinds of aid and assistance because it was in the process at the time of an awful 1ot of reviews of foreign assistance. a But had there been any discussion within the national securi ty staff about freezing the Ukraine l5 assi stance? t6 A 5 6 7 8 9 l0 ll t2 13 No. I mean, it was at that point supposed to be ng forward. t7 movi l8 20 did you ever get an explanation before you left government for why the freeze was put in place? A I did not. And I discussed with Alex Vindman, the 2t deputy, and wi th others that i t would be 'important to 22 up on thj 23 Natjonal Security Advisor Charlie Kupperman because he at t9 24 25 a And s, f o11ow and they should work very closely wj th the Deputy this point was also trying to keep tabs on everything that was happening. So, I mean, I kept him fu1ly apprised of all UNCLASS I EIED UNCLASS I I FIED 226 of my concerns. 7 it was easier to meet with him often than Ambassador Bolton. And, you know, we were aware that Gordon Sondland was talking to Chief of Staff's 0ffice. They're all in the same corridor. And we were hopeful, at least I was hopeful at that time, that Deputy National Security Adviser Kupperman would be able to figure out what 8 was goi ng on. 2 J 4 5 6 And, obviously, t2 a Did Kupperman or Vindman or anyone else you spoke to in that timeframe express any views as to why they believed there was a freeze in place? A No. They were just wanting to find out. And they l3 were i n touch wi th OMB, and they weren't gett'ing t4 information apart from the fact there was a freeze. So I'11 l5 j t6 thjs general framework of t7 i tems bei ng l8 a 9 l0 ll t9 ust say that my assumpti on much at the time was that i t was 'in many, you know, foreign assistance put on ho1d. And do you believe that the assistance that the U.S. was providing to Ukraine should have gone through? 24 Yes. I mean, it had all been agreed on and was actually in train, but so had some of the other assistance, just to be c1ear. a And were you aware that, at the time, DOD had already certifjed that Ukrajne was compliant with the 25 anti corrupti on requi rement? 20 2l 22 23 A UNCLASS I F]E D UNCLASS I FIED 227 4 that, yes, because that's what I was already on train, and our colleagues in the Pentagon had been working on this, you know, very thoroughly. a Sitting here today, do you have any other -- has 5 your understanding changed about why the freeze was put in 6 place? I 2 J A mean; it I was aware of l5 A It hasn't actually because, you know, as I said, when I left, there wasn't an explanation, and foreign assistance overall was being frozen. And I haven't seen anything, at least in the public record, that would suggest that it was that the foreign assistance was being frozen for specific purposes at that point. I mean, this was also, remember, again, at the point of di scuss"ion about cutti ng back on lots of Pentagon pro j ects for the building of the wal1 for Homeland Security purposes, l6 the border wa11. t7 After you left the National Security Council, did you have any conversations with anyone about the freeze? A I did not, no. I mean, I had a conversation with Alex Vindman in the last couple of days. And I did also have a conversat'ion, as I reported before, wjth Ambassador Taylor. But I said at that point that I had no insight as to why it had been frozen, but I said, again, that I hoped that people would be able to get to the bottom of it with Mick Mulvaney. 7 8 9 l0 ll t2 13 14 l8 l9 20 2t 22 23 24 25 a a Did Ambassador Taylor say anything about why he UNCLASS ] FIED UNCLASS I I FIED believed the freeze was in place to 228 you? l5 at that point, he was asking me why it was, and I couldn't answer that. And then, again, I was leaving. So, I mean, I'd left that to Tim l4orrison. And I believe that the following week they had a meeting. So I left on the 19th. So, sometime on the 22nd or 23rd, there was a meeting scheduled aS I was leaving for them to pu11 everyone together from the interagency to try to get to the bottom of this. But I did thjnk that if it was political for whatever reason, the walt or, you know, you name it, it would have to be resolved at hlgh 1eve1s in the interagency, and that Ambassador Bolton and Deputy National Securi ty Advi sor Kupperman would have to si t down wi th M'ick Mulvaney and try to get to the bottom of what was go'ing on. And, aga'in ' there were other freezes of assistance because there was a move to t6 push 2 J 4 5 6 7 8 9 l0 1l t2 l3 14 t7 l8 A Wel1, out the new foreign assistance strategy. a There's been reporting that the President or perhaps Mulvaney had tasked Ambassador Bolton to do a review 20 of the security assistance. Are you aware of A I'm not aware of that. Not when I left, I didn't 21 know about that. t9 22 23 24 25 If there were a freeze if a freeze were going to be put in place like this, would it have been normal for the National Security Council staff to have been involved in the decisionmaking process leading up to the freeze? a UNCLASS I FIED I FIED UNCLASS 229 4 Well, if it was done from the perspective of Ol\/lB, this has happened before, so define normal. I mean, you know, "in other settings actua11y, when General McMaster was.in place there was a 1ot more process, so a lot more 5 regular interactions. And he always made sure to have OMB 6 and everybody etse present I 2 3 A in meetings. And there had been interventjons by 7 OMB previously, 8 Mr. Mulvaney was only singte-hatted as the head of OPIB, 9 hold things back and to review them. I mean, that had when to ll before. But in terms of you know, by this point, I have to say in thjs point in July, the process had somewhat t2 broken down. l3 a l0 happened You testified earlier about the scheduling of t4 meeting between President Trump and President Zelensky, l5 that a and l8 I just interject for a quick question? Dr. Hi11, you ment'ioned I think, when you lef t your position, you didn't have any firsthand knowledge about l9 why the t6 t7 THE CHAIRMAN: Can mi 1i tary ass'istance : rect 20 DR. 2t THE CHAIRMAN: And 22 23 24 25 HI LL Cor was bei ng f rozen. . you didn't subsequently personally Iearn anything that would inform you as to whether it HILL: Correct. THE CHAIRMAN: -- withheld as part of a broad wjthholding or for a more insjdious purpose? DR. UNCLASS I FIED was UNCLASS I FIED 230 6 first I saw of something suggesting otherwise was really in this exchange of text messages and also in newspaper reports. THE CHAIRMAN: And the text message you're referring to is one in which -DR. HILL: Ambassador Taylor makes the comment about 7 thi s. DR. 2 a J 4 5 THE CHAIRT'IAN: Yes 8 9 l0 1l 12 HILL: I did not, no. I with Ambassador . mean, the And have you had any conversati on Taylor -- HILL: i wi th him at all. DR. have THE CHAiRI'4AN: not. No, I have not been in touch So, i f there were a hidden agenda here, t4 in terms of why that military assistance was being withheld along the lines that Ambassador Taylor jnd'icated, that would l5 have not come t6 DR. l3 to your attention while you were there HILL: It and no. And, again, Taylor at great length on would not have done, 24 I djd speak to Ambassador the 19th of September , 'in whi ch I revi ewed a whole host of issues that I wanted to hand over to him, so Ambassador Taylor was very much alert to all k'inds of concerns. And he because he had to in his was going to, you know, basically job as Charge you know, basically try to look into these and to try to figure out, you know, how he could work, you know, more closely with Ambassador -- we11, he was already 25 working closely with Ambassador Volker but also with t7 18 t9 20 2t 22 23 though UNCLASS I FIED UNCLASS I n 4 5 to figure out what was going on' You referenced the L9th of September. I Ambassador Sondland t'4R. W0L0SKY: 2 J think you meant Ju1y. HILL: July. I'm sorry. Thank you, Lee. I'm sorry. My brain is now more shook up than my water. Sorry' DR. 6 THE CHAIRI{AN: Thank you. 7 DR. 8 9 l0 lt 12 23t ] FIED HILL: I apologi ze for that. testi fi ed DR. HILL: How does thjs get corrected, by the way? I mean, do you go back, do you do the whole, you know, kind of THE CHAIRMAN: You correction back and forth of dates, you know? THE CHAIRMAN: Well, the transcript wjtl read as you l5 said, and the correction will appear as you corrected it. DR. HILL: Okay, good, thanks. That was just a slip, based on, you know, the timing here. Yeah. Anyway, go t6 ahead l3 14 . Sor ry. BY MR. NOBLE: t7 20 between scheduling the meeting between President Trump and President Zelensky, I believe you said that, in your opinion, you were waiting to see what 21 happened i n l8 t9 22 23 24 25 a A a The meeting the Ukrai ni an part i amentary electi ons Correct. which I believe were held on July 2Lst' Is that right? A That's right. And I left before that. UNCLASS ] FIED UNCLASS I a I FIED 232 To date, though, there's been no meeting between 2 President Trump and President Zelensky, J House, ri ght? 4 5 6 7 8 A No, there has not. But there at least at the White has been a meeting, of course, in the a At the U.N. General Assembly? A In New York, yes. And, actually, I mean, agai n, we'd been preferring those kinds of meetings in the past l1 setting up a Whjte House meeting, as one can imagine, is a very heavy lift and, you know, the scheduling is always very djfficult. And, you know, basically, we always try to t2 have a serious meeting wherever we can. l3 l5 there, there had been ki nd of a schedul i ng aspi rat'ion f or Warsaw on the Lst of September because that seemed to be actually a very apt first l6 meeting. 17 now modern Ukraine were 9 l0 l4 because And the i n'i ti Because al even when I was after Poland, you know, the lands that were l8 pretty much run over by Nazi Germany, and, you know, Ukraine suffered greatly during World War II. t9 And we thought 20 the meeting with the Poles, to have the President meet with 2t Zelensky. So, I mean, that 22 packagi ng. it would be appropriate seemed to, immediately after to be kind of a n'ice 24 But, as you said, after you teft the Wh'i te House, you weren't privy to the conversations that were going on 25 behind the scenes 23 a UNCLASS I FIED UNCLASS I 2 A a I was z)) I FIED not, no. by Ambassador Sondland, Ambassador Volker, and, 4 to a certain extent, Ambassador Taylor about the scheduling of the meeting and linking jt to the Ukrainian commitment to 5 jnvestigate J 6 7 8 9 A a A a I was not. did not see any of those messages? I did not see any of those messages. I believe you said that you've reviewed a copy of You l0 the July 25th call summary, the call between President Trump l1 and President Zelensky? 12 13 14 15 t6 t7 l8 l9 20 A a The one that was published in the newspaper, I'd like to ask some questjons about those. MR. NOBLE: So we're going to mark this government I mean maj ori ty exhi bi t 2. exhj bi t 2 [4ajority Exhjbit No.2 was marked for identification.l DR. HILL: See, we all have thi ngs t"lR. NOBLE: 01d habi ts die hard. l'lR. CASTOR: Do you have a copy of that? 2t MR. NOBLE: We might have another copy. 22 THE CHAIRI4AN: 23 t'4R. CASTOR: It's j ust the call record. 0kay, gotcha . BY MR. NOBLE: 24 25 yes. a So I direct your attention to UNCLASS I FIED page 3. You see at UNCLASSIFIED 234 the top there that President Trump says: I would like you to 2 do us a favor though 8 A Uh-huh. a And then he goes on to mention: I would like you to find out what happened with this whole sjtuat'ion with Ukra'ine, they say CrowdStrike... I guess you have one of your wealthy peop1e... The server, they say Ukraine has it. what Pres'ident Trump Do you know what the Presi dent 9 was J 4 5 6 7 l0 referring to when he was asking President Zelensky to look i nto those thi ngs? l3 A I thjnk some of this gets to some speculation here. Clearly we11, this seems to be the alternative theory for 2016 at the begi nni ng here wi th the whole si tuat'ion w'ith t4 Ukraine when as you've been asking questions along that l5 Ukrai ne l6 in the references to CrowdStrike. 1l t2 Tom t7 18 t9 20 2t 22 23 24 2s mi ght have i nterfered i n the electi on , parti cularly Bossert has already spoken out publicly against of time with Tom and General McMaster and others trying to refute this one in the first year of the admi ni strati on. a Can you say a 1ittle bit more about that? What djd Tom Bossert do jn the first year? A Well, Tom Bossert came out publicly and said that he rea1ly regretted this reference after he read the transcript as well because this was a debunked theory. And this, and we spent a 1ot UNCLASS I FIED UNCLASS I this 235 was also a muddle. a 2 ] FIED But you sai d there were some ef f orts early on J the administration internally to debunk this theory. 4 explaj n what you did? A 5 6 7 8 9 l0 l1 Basically, Tom and others who were working 'in Can you on cybersecurity taid out to the President the facts about the n, I can't say any more than that. a Okay. But to a certai n extent, they adv'ised him that the alternate theory that Ukraine had interfered in the i nterference. Agai elect'ion was false? A a Correct. 16 If you turn to the next page, the top of paragraph 4. I'm sorry. Page 4, the top paragraph. A Uh-huh. a So the President is saying that he's going to have Rudy G'iuf ian j and the Attorney General call Presi dent t7 Zelensky about these investigations, and then he goes ofl, l8 lower in the paragraph, says: The other thing, there's a lot t9 20 of talk about Biden's son, that Biden stopped the prosecution and a lot of people want to find out about that so whatever 2l you can do with the Attorney General would be great. t2 t3 t4 l5 22 23 24 25 jn the next paragraph, President Zelensky responds. Kind of middle of the paragraph, you see he says: He or she, referring to the new prosecutor general that Zelensky says he's going to appoint, wj11 look into the And then down UNCLASS I F]ED UNCLASS I tuati on , speci f i ca11y I s'i 2 thi s i ssue. F]ED 236 to the company that you menti oned 'in 5 of, when President Trump ref erences i nvesti gati ng B'iden ' s son , Hunter Bi den , and President Zelensky's reSponse that they're going to look into 6 the company, what company Presjdent Zelensky was referring 7 to? J 4 8 Do you have an understanding A We11, I think he means Burisma, President Zelensky 1l is referring to. a And why is that? A Because that was the company that Hunter Biden was t2 on the board of. l3 t4 understanding did you have an understanding back at the time that when people like G'iuliani 15 were talki ng about i nvesti gati ng Buri sma, they were also t6 saying that Hunter Bjden and Joe Biden should t7 i nvesti l8 A 9 l0 a So you had an be gated, or Hunter Biden? That was becoming apparent. But, I mean, Mr. 2l Giuliani made it very apparent as we11. a And goi ng back up to that top paragraph, do you see President Trump sayS: The former Ambassador from the United 22 States, the 23 deating with t9 20 24 25 woman, was bad news and the people she was in the Ukraine were bad news So I just want to let you know that. Do you know who he's referring to there? A He's obviously referri ng to Ambassador Yovanovi tch. UNCLASS I FIED UNCLASS I 237 J that, later on, Presjdent Zelensky runs her name back agai n, although he mi spronounces j t. a I think it's spelled Ivanovich in the summary in 4 the next paragraph. I 2 And I FIED know A a 5 6 Yes. And 'in the next paragraph Presi dent Trump says : l0 things. Do you know what President Trump was referring to when he sajd that A I do not. Ambassador Yovanovitch was going to go through a ll some 7 8 9 We1t, she's going thi A O t2 l3 to go through , ngs? I do not know what that meant. Because at thi s poi nt , J u1y 25th, she'd a1 ready t4 been removed, ousted, as you 15 correct? A a l6 some said, from her position, Yes, correct. t9 did you react when you read that, the transcri pt, particularly the portions I poi nted to about President Trump pushing President Zelensky to investigate 20 Bi 2t interference in the 20L5 election and as well as h'is 22 about Ambassador Yovanovi tch? t7 18 How dens and 'i nvesti gate Ukrai ni an 23 A I 24 a why? 25 A We11, was actually purported Ukrai ni an comments shocked. partjcularly on Ambassador Yovanovitch, UNCLASS the I FIED and UNCLASSITIED 238 I very saddened because, again, Ambassador Yovanovitch is 2 great a J I don't thj nk any Ameri can ci ti zen should be d'i sparaged by thei r Presi dent, j ust to put i t out there 4 So 5 happy. Ameri can , and . that made me very sad and very shocked and, yeah, not too 7 other issue, it was pretty blatant. So, I mean, I found that I couldn't realIy explain that away with 8 an alternate explanation. So that's what 9 you know, quite shocked. 6 And on the I mean about being, 2t to be frank, that we ended up with a telephone conversation like this because all of the and , you know, thi s i s obvi ously go'ing i nto executi ve privilege, and I'm not going to say anything more about this, but I sat in an awful lot of calls, and I have not seen anything like this. And I was there for 2 and a half years. So I was just shocked. a And I'd like to ask you some questions, to the extent you can answer, about the process of preppi ng for these types of ca11s in a littIe bit. So you just said that it was pretty blatant, what President Trump was saying in this call. What do you mean by 22 that? 10 ll t2 l3 t4 15 16 t7 l8 l9 20 ZJ 24 25 And I was also very shocked, that it looks to me fike it was in the context of everything else that had come to my attention. a And what do you mean by you mean fike what A We1l, UNCLASS I FIED UNCLASS I ] FIED Ambassador Sondland had brought 239 up in the July L0th meeting? A l0 Correct. And then, you know, that Rudy Giutiani's commentary I mean, agai n, Rudy G'iu1i an'i has been sayi ng an awful lot of things all the time, and he was pretty inescapable. And after a whi1e, you know, kind of he was making it crystal clear what it was that he was pushing. And thi s i s very much repeati ng thi ngs that Rudy Gi ul"iani was sayi ng i n publ i c on televi si on. THE CHAIRMAN: And by that, you mean that he wanted an investigation done of the Bidens and of this debunked ll conspi racy theory about 20L6? 2 J 4 5 6 7 8 9 HILL: Correct. t2 DR. l3 THE CHAIRMAN: And l4 15 16 te House meeti ng? DR. HILL: That's certainty what this looks like, in context of thi s transcri pt. thi s Whi r9 20 2l 22 the BY MR. NOBLE: 17 l8 that thi s was a condi t'ion of getti ng "this," you mean the July 25th call summary? Correct. But, again, I only read this jn the context of the publication of jt by the White House and subsequently jn the press. a A And by a And here I it's mean, this is essentially 23 President Trump adopting exactly what Rudy Giuliani had 24 pressing since the spring 25 that right? UNCLASS of 2019 ] FIED in this phone call. been Is UNCLASS I FIED 240 2 I mean , G'iu1i ani has been relentless on thi s poi nt you know, to the point where, you know, obviously, he has, as J Ambassador I A , image. But now it's Pres'ident Trump pressing the President a 4 Volker said, shaped a very negat'ive 8 of Ukraine to do exactly what Rudy G'iuliani had been trying to get other Ukra'inian officials to commit to, correct? A That is certainly how this reads. a With the assistance of Ambassador Sondland and 9 Ambassador Volker? 5 6 7 A 10 ll t2 13 wi th the'i a We11, r I can't say that it was, you know, directly assi stance. But you've seen the text messages between them, correct? 20 A I have. a Doesn't i t seem that they were, i f not assi sti ng, faci 1i tating thi s scheme? A They certainly seem to have been 1ook, I wasn't in the deposition that Ambassador Votker gave. I don't know how many times he met with Ambassador I mean, with Giuliani or Ambassador Sondland, for that matter. I know 2t that Ambassador t4 l5 t6 t7 l8 l9 Sondland talked repeatedly about 23 conversations and you have him coming to give a deposition and, you know, I should leave it to him to speak on his own 24 behalf. 22 25 But he said to me repeatedly that he was going jn UNCLASS I F]ED UNCLASS ] FIED I talking to the President. I 2 ask him because he'11 have a J many 241 mean, again, you can actually to te11 you all truthfully how times he rea11y d'id meet with the President because I 7 I could be wrong, but there were often times when he said he'd been in to see the President when other staff jndicated to me that they did not befieve that he had. He was certainly meeting with Chief of Staff Mulvaney on a 8 regular 4 5 6 9 l0 ll t2 13 have my doubts. bas"is. a A a A And how do you know that? I that from Mulvaney's staff Who in particular told you about those meetings? look, and there Many people did. I mean, he has Because are also lots of know . again, I keep telling wel1, I've said l6 this before. Any of you who have been into the West Wing, into the entryway when you go jn from West Executive, it's a very sma11 space. So lots of people can say that they have t7 seen people. t8 front office of Ambassador Bolton, the door is always open. It looks right down the corridor to the Chief of Staff's Office, to the entryway to the foyer. People who are sjtting on the staff of Ambassador BoIton could see Gordon Sondland goi ng 'into Mulvaney's of f i ce. The guards could see Ambassador Sondland going into Mulvaney's office. I didn't have to be told secretly by, you know, some high-ranking staff member. I could just say to someone, the t4 l5 l9 20 2t 22 23 24 25 The UNCLASS I FIED II\T'T ACqTtrTtrN 242 I front desk receptionist: Hey, has Ambassador 2 been i n? Sondland just 6 I could just say: Did he see the President? No, but he' s been i n to see Mulvaney. So, I mean, I'fl uncomfortable with answering, you know, ki nd of the questi on the way that you put 'i t because I don't 7 know, you know, 8 was 9 saying, you know, "the White House" whether he means the J 4 5 And talking to what extent Ambassador VoIker, you know, I don't know whether when Ambassador Volker is l0 Chief of Staff or whether he means that Ambassador Sondland ll t4 told him that he's heard from the White House and he's just relating that to Yermak. a Fa'i r enough . Do you know whether Ambassador Bol ton or Secretary Pompeo ever tried to rein in Ambassador 15 Sondland? 12 l3 t6 has A Ambassador Bolton complajned about him alt the tried to rein him in Sondland i sn't i n hi s chaj n of t7 time, but I don't l8 because, agai n, Ambassador t9 command. And Ambassador Sondland, you know, would know whether he 23 occasionally and I just say "occasionally" make an appointment to see Ambassador Bolton, usually when he knew so I don't that I or somebody else wasn't there, just to know also what he said to Ambassador Bolton because I didn't 24 get a readout. 20 2t 22 25 So, often what he did with me, UNCLASS I FIED I would find out later UNCLASS]FIED I Ambassador Sondland had 243 told people that he'd called me and 5 to me about an issue, but he wouldn't relate what I'd totd hjm. He'd just then proceed to go ahead on the way that he wanted to proceed anyway by just simply saying: 0h, I tatked to Fjona, and, therefore, you know, k'ind of I'm doing 6 thi s. 2 J 4 spoken 8 I'd find out after the fact that he'd used my name, you know, as the basis of a phone call to just go forward and 9 proceed wi th doi ng somethi ng. 7 And a l0 R'ight. Going back to the transcript just quickly, ll the'investigations that President Trump was urging President 12 Zelensky to undertake, 'is i t f a'i r to say that those were to t4 ti ca1 i nterests as opposed to the nat'ional security interests of the United 15 5 13 serve Presi dent Trump's personal tates po1 i ? A l8 I don't honestly see much national security interest in what I've just read there, and I do not see and I d'id not see at any point any national security interest in l9 the things that 16 l7 Rudy Giuliani v{as saying on the television 23 that I watched. Now, I coutd have missed many of his appearances . Agai n, they were ubi quj tous, and I couldn't keep up with all of them, but I don't beljeve that he anyway, he's not a national security official at this 24 parti cular j uncture. 20 2t 22 25 a Do you see anything that would benefit President UNCLASS I FIED UNCLASS I 2 J 244 tically? A WelI, I think it depends on how this all plays out. THE CHAIRI4AN: Our ti me has expi red . The mi nori ty Trump poli . BY ]'4R. CASTOR: 4 5 I FIED a 6 Do you know ? 7 A I have, yes. 8 a And what do you know 9 A I !z 10 ll t2 a l3 I what were I Iz t4 l5 t6 t7 18 t9 20 2l 22 a What were ? 23 24 25 UNCLASS ] FIE D UNCLASS I a 1 F]ED And do you know what 245 the cjrcumstances of I ) 2 J T 4 5 6 I 7 8 9 10 ll I mean, a similar thing happened wi th Ambassador Bolton. t2 And l3 t4 l5 t6 l7 a of other people, there's just been a couple of people who have Ambassador Bolton's, one of his key assjstants, , who would actua11y, you know, know a 1ot about aI1 of these comings and goings, couple l8 l9 20 2t a Did you have any djscussjons, communicatjons with ? 22 23 A 24 I 've worked 25 a I 've kept j n contact w'ith most of the people that th, i n a general sense. And ! When js the last time wi UNCLASS ] FIED UNCLASS I EIED I 246 T 2 J 4 5 6 7 a A And so when was the last time l4 last tir. lI ! would have been before I went on vacation. I mean, in the last week. We did a 1ot of wrap-ups with all of the people who were, you know, pertinent. I did a lot of, you know, out-briefing in the professional arena. I often met, as I said, with DAS Kent. You know, I could run through, you know, all the people that I met with jn that week just to, you know, wrap things up 15 agai n. 8 9 l0 ll t2 l3 The t9 a Since you left A Th'is was part of the whole bri ef i ng, you know, and analytical I should actually clarify. When I mentioned analysts before I'm an analyst myself , so I tend to use 20 that as shorthand. But, you know, obviously, 21 awful lot of analysts or, you know, subject-matter 22 i ndi vi l6 t7 l8 we met with an duals from around the agenci es. 24 uly L9th , d i d you have you had any communications wi th any of the indjviduals we've 25 discussed today about your 23 a S'i nce you 1ef t on UNCLASS I J FIED UNCLASS A a A a I 2 With all of ] FIED my 247 staff. About your appearance here today? 8 , they know I 'm appeari ng, yeah. I mean Did any of them reach out to you, have any commun j ca t i ons wi th you ? A We1l, a lot of them have reached out to me and, you know, k'ind of in solidarity, you know, because, I mean, obvi ous1y, thi s i sn' t a pleasant experi ence for everybody. 9 And I 3 4 5 6 7 l0 Well 've had a few peopte who have reached out because they're just very concerned about the future of the National l3 ty Council, and they're worried that, you know, all these issues will politicize what has, you know, up until been again, has certainly strived to be a nonpolitical t4 body. ll t2 Securi a A a l5 l6 t7 l8 now try to influence your testimony? No, they have not. And, again, please don't jump down my throat when I ask thi s. A a t9 20 2l coming 22 A 23 Anyone of today I won't. When was jn the first time that you knew you were today? When was the f i rst time I knew I was comi ng 'in ? 24 a Yes. 25 A We11, for sure when I got the letter requesting me UNCLASS I FIED UNCLASS to J 4 5 6 7 8 9 l0 But today specifically, not that you were on a a generalized 1ist. I don't know when the fi rst day would be because I gave Lee a sense of dates about when I was available. a But it was sooner than -- it was farther back in time than last WednesdaY, right? A It might not have been. Actually, when was last Wednesday? What was the date of last Wednesday? I'm sorry, A I'm ll t2 248 come i n. 2 a I F]ED MR. WOL0SKY: I'm not testifying. If you don't know the date t3 DR. t4 to that. HILL: Yeah. No, I'ffi sorry, I don't 15 And, l6 basi cal1y 1ook, and one of the reasons that know I've the answer been t7 And l8 t9 I don't have a laptop 20 because I've taken right now, which may sound bizarre, an extended leave from Brookings. So I 24 only have my i Phone . And I ' ve been , you know, bas i cal 1y trying to keep focused on the personat stuff. And, a1so, I wanted to come here without any undue preparation precisely for the reasons that you've said, so 25 that no one could i nf luence my test'imony. It's hard to 2l 22 23 UNCLASSlFIED UNCLASS I EIED 249 3 I've tried to keep on top of that, but I haven't been, you know, completely keeping track of when I knew what, you know, because I wanted to come in and just 4 make I 2 escape the news, and myself available, you know, and do my duty. BY MR. CASTOR: 5 a 6 7 Okay. In terms of the universe of State Department off i ci als A O 8 Yes. l0 that you had communications with about these relevant matters, I just want to make sure that we haven't ll mi 9 t2 l3 14 t5 l6 t7 ssed anybody. There was Wess 14j tchel1? A a A a A a A Yes, who left in February of 2019, yes. And Phj 1 Reeker? Correct. And George Kent? George Kent. And Masha Yovanovitch? 20 out to be the DCM. I met with her as she was goi ng out. I also met wi th Catheri ne Croft, who I mentioned had been our d"i rector previously and 2l replaced Chrjs Anderson, who was previously Kurt Volker's 22 he's another individual you're probably aware of , Christopher 23 Anderson, who l8 19 24 25 Kristina Kvien, who went is Kurt Volker's deputy. Catherine was actually in language training to be sent out to Baghdad for all the period after she 1eft, but then UNCLASS ] F]ED UNCLASS in I EIED 2s0 got downsized, as you're all aware, I the 2 they started redeploying people. And given her work Embassy Baghdad so on 18 Volker. And I would have talked to all of, you know, the office, relevant office directors. David Hale. I've also talked to Deputy Su1livan, Under Secretary Ha1e. Brechbuhl only a couple of tjmes. I've talked to Morgan 0rtagus, the press spokesman, and press spokesperson and Robert Palladino I think he's moved on press people, because we coordinated a 1ot of statements jn support of Ambassador Yovanovitch. a Ambassador Taylor? A Ambassador Taylor, correct. a How about a former Ambassador Pyatt? A No. I've obviously had contact with Ambassador Pyatt because he's Ambassador to Greece. Is he still Ambassador to Greece? He was, you know, last time when I -yeah. And so, but i only dealt with him jn the context of things that we were doing in Greece. We didn't actually l9 speak about Ukraine, only J 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 ll t2 l3 t4 15 t6 t7 Ukraine, she was moved to work for Kurt with the exception of 20 2t 22 So, yeah , 23 24 25 that was the only and he's been very good about keeping a separation from his previous work on Ukra'ine I mean, UNCLASS I FIED UNCLASS because he 2 Ambassador Nuland. a A 251 got burned in that infamous phone call with I J ] FTED Kathy Kavalec, do you know her? t6 I do know her, yes. She was nominated to be our Ambassador to Albania until an Albanjan lobbyist group used a very tenuous tie that she had to Chris Steele to have her removed from the nomination. So this is another thing of somebody who was treated rather disgracefully. She had been i nstructed as part of her duti es to meet w1th hi m. She hadn't met him before. She had had very limited interactions in official position. And she with him when he wat l was snarled up in all of these exchanges of emajls when she just reported that she'd met with hjm. And an Albanian tobbyist group also started to accuse her of being part of spurious conspiracies. And so her nomination to Albania to be our Ambassador was shelved, even t7 though she would have been an excellent Ambassador and was in l8 Albani an language trai ni ng. 4 5 6 7 8 9 l0 ll t2 l3 t4 l5 t9 20 21 22 23 24 25 a Did you have any communications with her to the Ukraine matters? A I have not. I regards in touch with her more generally because she's now got a new position. She's being sent out to the OSCE to do some work on the Balkans, but I did not talk to her about Ukraine. O How many commun'ications did you have wi th UNCLASS mean, ] FIED I've in been UNCLASS I 1 2 J 4 5 \4r . Brechbuhl A FlED 2s2 ? 0n1y a couple. I mean, these were in general coordi nati on- related i ssues. a A Was I it went out to meet with him, you know, first to t7 I happened to have been j n grad school wi th , so I had a connection. I obvi ously had met h jm at some poi nt i n the d'istant past. And I wanted to go and meet him so he'd know who I am and so we could talk about trying to do better coordination. Because Secretary Pompeo didn't have a chief of staff , and, you know, given the jncredible amount of travel that he takes, it was important to be able to have some interactions. And we were a.1so concerned at thi s poi nt about coord'ination with a couple of Ambassadors, including Ambassador Sondland. 5o I wanted to make sure that Mr. Brechbuhl would feel free to reach out to me if there was l8 any i ssue. 6 7 8 9 t0 ll t2 l3 14 t5 t6 introduce myself when he was appointed. l9 20 2t 22 23 24 25 UNCLASS I F]ED UNCLASS I I FIED 253 [4:05 p.m.] BY MR. CASTOR: 2 4 a And forgive me if you said this. We've been here a 1jtt1e bit. Did you have any discuss'ions with Mr. Brechbuhl 5 about Sondland, Giuti ani J A a 6 7 8 her departure? A 9 l0 ll t2 l3 t4 l5 t6 t7 l8 t9 20 2l 22 23 24 25 I did not. But I -So i t was j ust Yovanov'i tch and the c i rcumstances of have Correct. But, obviously, Mr. Giuliani seemed to had a A Ri ght. even at the time, a big influence in her departure. a A a A OkaY. And I expressed concern about that. You expressed concern to l'lr . Brechbuhl about -- I probably said something about the circumstances of her departure. But this is only in a general sense. a Was 'it a one-on-one meeti ng or telephone call? A I think it was a telephone call. a 0kay. A But it was really about other issues. So, you know, he may I took most of my concerns, you know, directly to Under Secretary Hale, Ambassador Bolton, and to Assistant Secretary Reeker. And I also spoke to Deputy UNCLASSIFIED I FIED UNCLASS 1 Secretary Su11ivan. 2 a J The 4 fi ass'istance was frozen, it 9 10 ll 1 Yeah, exactly. you 1eft. So you may not have a 1ot of rsthand A a A a 8 l3 fact that the foreign A a 6 t2 Uh-huh. occurred on July 18th, which was the day before 5 7 254 Correct. facts, but And I already sajd that. it's your understanding that it was subsequently i fted? A O That's my understandi ng. 15 got their Javetins and, you know, everything has been flowing in terms of the financial t6 assi stance? t7 A a A a starts is A a A a t4 l8 t9 20 2l 22 23 24 25 And Ukraine I haven't any of the 'inf ormati on on thi s at all But that's your understandi ng? That's . my understanding. Is it fair to say that thjs type of stops sometimes and common Yes. wi th f orei gn ass'i stance? It is. That there's different UNCLASS 1 FIED -- different power centers UNCLASS I I FIED 255 have questions and there are some starts and stops? 4 That's correct. And as I mentioned before in response to this question, 0t4B quite frequently woutd raise 1ot of questions about this at other meetings in the past 5 they 2 J 6 7 A had. a Right. And sometimes You know, flembers get concerned there's issues from the Hi11. about something, and that has l3 to be sorted out and A Correct. And it wasn't clear, when I 1eft, about where was the provenance of this concern, but that l4ulvaney, presumably in his hat as sort of the head of OMB, you know, not just as chief of staff, had put the hold on this. a So these holds can happen for any reason or no t4 reason? l5 t7 A a A l8 perspective t9 a A 8 9 l0 ll t2 l6 We11, there's usually a reason But good reason. as you Ri of just laid out. Wel1, it depends on one's good reason. ght. 22 I mean, for some persons, it would be a good reasonI for others, it wouldn't be. a Right. I guess that's what I was trying to 23 establ i sh . 20 2t 24 25 a A a Yeah. Yeah. Do you agree wjth that? UNCLASS I E]ED UNCLASS I E]ED I 2 J 4 5 6 A a A O 256 I do agree with that. And I have a couple followup questions from Sure. other rounds. And I know I asked you this before, so forgive me. You know, witnesses told us when we looked at the we 8 at the Hillary Clinton investigation, and we looked at the begi nni ngs of the Russi a i nvesti gati on Iast Congress wi th 9 Chairman Gowdy and Chairman 7 looked Goodlatte. And so we had a 1ot 16 of firsthand testimony about -A Ri ght. Christopher Steele and Bruce Ohr and so forth. a A Ri ght. a And it was established I don't think anyone that Steele's m"indset was that real1y di sagreed wi th thi s he was desperate, or passionate, that President, yotl know, t7 Trump t0 ll t2 l3 t4 l5 18 l9 20 not be elected. And so my quest'ion and f orgi ve me i f you 've al ready addressed'this. I just want to be sure. Did you have any idea whether he held that view? 22 A I had no idea whatsoever. I was shocked to find out that he'd even been and undertaken thi s i nvesti gation, 23 honestly. 2t 24 25 a A OkaY. Because what I UNCLASS knew he was doing was, 1ike, I EIE D FIED UNCLASS I 2s7 6 political risk. I thought he was, 1ike, doing, like, cont ro1 led r i sks or Krol t a 0kay. A And all in my discussions with hjm, I mean, he was clearly very interested in building up a cfient base. I almost fel1 over when I discovered that he was doing this 7 report. I 2 J 4 5 8 9 10 ll . a Okay. So you have no idea whether he was desperate and it related to his business interests or he was -A I have no idea whatsoever. a 0kay. t2 Do you l3 A O A a A a A a t4 15 l6 l7 l8 t9 20 2l No. You ever met him? I mean, not since oh, I met him when I was NIO. Okay. Because, Ri I mean, he was at interagency meetings ght. given the nature of his Position. But did you ever have any communjcations with Mr. 0hr about the Steele dossier? 23 A a 24 How 25 A 22 ever have any communications with Bruce 0hr? I did not. OkaY. about t'lr. Simpson, Glenn Simpson, I didn't know who he was UNCLASS I FIED until at Fusion he was -- GPS? UNCLASS a A a I 2 J 4 5 6 7 8 9 l0 I FIED 258 OkaY. basically 0kay . Fa'i r named enough in the Press. . to time, expressed concern, among other descri ptors, of D'i rector Brennan, Director Clapper, and their role, you know, in the run-up to the 20L5 etection. Was there ever any frjction caused by that at the Natjonal Security Council between some of the nonpartisan staff that had been serving under Director President Trump has, from time Clapper and Di rector Brennan? A 1l Not that I noticed or was ever raised, you know, to 18 staff that we wanted to see the nonpartisan depolitic'izat'ion of intelligence. And having been the National lntelligence 0fficer for Russia and Eurasia previously, I personally didn't believe that intelligence officials should take potitical stances. So we dld have a d'iscussion about that. But there wasn't any friction within, certainly, my di rectorate or with any other t9 di rectorates about thi s. t2 13 t4 l5 t6 t7 20 2t 22 23 24 25 me. We a did have discussions'in the And did you ever have any discuss'ions with or Di rector A I did not. a You d'i d not A I worked briefly a About these Brennan . UNCLASS I FIED Di rector UNCLASS ] I A 2 a J A 2s9 with Director Clapper -About these i ssues contact 5 am. . NIO. But, no, I've had no with Brennan. I don't think Brennan would know who I when 4 a 6 FIED I was the 0kaY. l0 I think you've addressed this today on several occasions, but I just want to be sure that, other than the reference of Vice President Bjden in the transcript, he has never come up during the course of, you know, any NSC ll acti vi ty regardi ng the Ukra'ine? 7 8 9 And l3 He A 12 Gi did not. a l5 A t6 a Okay. on the televi sion repeatedty. Okay. And, to your knowledge, Ambassador Volker or nobody was encouraging the Ukraine to investigate t7 Sond l8 Vice President 20 2l 22 23 24 25 RudY uf i ani t4 19 No. It's only in the context of 1a nd Biden? A a To my knowledge, no. A a A Correct. Okay. It was related to Burisma, and to the extent the Vice President's son was a director on Burisma, that could be a -But it wasn't Vice President Biden I did not hear that. UNCLASS ] FIED UNCLASS himself. 0kay. a I I FIED 260 And you never heard of any 2 reason why anybody should be investigating Vice President J Biden? A a A a 4 5 6 7 I also did not hear that, correct. Okay. Yeah. Do you have any concerns 8 circumstances 9 call? l0 ll t2 A a generally about the of the transcript release of the July In what way would I Wel1, 25th have concerns? it lays bare the communications between, you know, our leader and the l8 I've read it, but and, no, please, I 'm not sayi ng that j oki ng. I mean, it's raised an awful 1ot of concerns as a result of reading it. a But as a more generat matter, the declassifjcation of, you know, call records from heads of states, does that t9 concern you? 13 t4 15 l6 t7 20 2t 22 23 24 25 A I have a lot of concerns now that A Yes, it does, actually, as a general matter. a Because i f A I mean, I was responsible for overseeing many of these in my position, and I was deeply concerned at all times that they would not be leaked. And in the first period when I was at the White House UNCLASS I FIED UNCLASS I and the NSC in I FIED 20L7 there were a lot of leaks 2 a J 4 5 6 7 8 9 261 of materi a1, and I felt that thi s was i ncredi b1y damagi ng. a Uh-huh. A Someti mes i t was obv'ious i t was bei ng done to settle scores internally, because there was blame apportioned to people who were not responsible for the leakage. And I firmly believe that one of the leakages of the preparation packages for, basically, a phone call with Putjn was used to fired. 10 have General McMaster ll Okay. Is it due to that pervasive leaking that these transcripts may have been moved to a d'ifferent server t2 a l8 or placed under a different set of A I personally never heard of a transcript being those moved to a different server. That also circumstances trouble me. But we did move and I was responsible for part of that, with our tegal colleagues reduce the number of people who had access to any of these t9 transcripts l3 t4 15 t6 t7 20 2l 22 a A Okay. i ncludi ng transcri pts that I would wri te up from meetings with heads of state. 24 a A 25 office. 23 to R'ight. And I took that very seriously up to the records UNCLASS I EIED UNCLASS ] FIED 262 6 of people who left, you know, from the NSC because they felt very responsible for all of these issues and felt that they couldn't contjnue with all of this leaking going on. Peopte were being accused, 1eft, right, and center, of having leaked documents. And I th'ink it's incredibly'important for all of us to have integrity of 7 commun'ications. I 2 J 4 5 And there were a number a 8 Uh-huh. And you're in favor of, if there is a t2 fix it, correct? A Yes, but not to put them on a system that isn't designed for that. You can restrict the number of people who have access to it fairly easily. I mean, we did a 1ot to l3 make t4 to them. 9 l0 ll 15 t6 t7 l8 t9 20 2t 22 23 24 25 pervasive leak problem, to do something to sure that you could actually figure out who got access ti mes of leaking documents, we made sure that you could actually get Hav'ing been , myself , accused mul t'ip1e a of who had O Who accessed i t. A Who accessed i t. Exactly. And, also, bei ng very mindful, and we were encouraging people to report if they saw somebody trying to look at their computer, for example, if they had access to something. usually, if there was some And then it was also concern about the sensitivity of the communicat'ion, having a restricted number of people sitting in on the call. a And what do you know about the al ternat'ive server record UNCLASS I FIED UNCLASS I arrangements? 2 A J 263 I'm not going to talk about it because it's classi fied a A 4 5 6 I EIED OkaY. and it shouldn't be used for this kind of materi al a A 7 0kaY. 10 it has classjfied content. And very few people have access to i t. a Okay. And do you know can you tell us when the ll migration occurred? t2 l3 A I don't know anything about it. I only know what I read jn the paper, and, as I said, that ra'ised concerns for t4 me t5 23 a 0kay. Do you know if it occurred while you were A It couldn't possibly have done because I wasn't there. I wasn't there for the cal1. So if the question was could the transcript of the call be placed on the server while I was there, the answer is no a Oh, I'm sorry. A because I had left. a My questi on was, the deci s'ion to move a certai n amount of information from one server to another, did that 24 occur while you 8 9 l6 t7 l8 19 20 2t 22 25 as unless we11. A were Not related to transcripts. UNCLASS I EIE D No. UNCLASS a I 2 J 4 5 6 7 8 9 1ef I FIED 264 Okay. So, if that did occur, it was after you t Correct. But it was I do not have any knowledge of any transcript that came under my purview being moved to that server. a Okay. There's been press reporting that there may be other ca11s with, you know, other leaders dating back to the earliest part of the administration. A I cannot speak to that. A l0 a ll The Juty LLth meeting OkaY. with John Eisenberg you attended t4 th Secretary Perry's A We11, no. 0ur senior director for energy, Special Assistant P. Wells Griffith, he used to work for Secretary 15 Perry. t2 l3 l6 t7 18 t9 20 2t 22 23 24 25 wi a A 0h, okay. We had a 1ot of people detail from DOE. I mean, again, you know, yoLl need expertise. a Sure. is really a great energy expert. So, if my recollection is correct, after the events occurred, Ambassador Bolton referred you to Mr. Eisenberg. A Correct. a And you walked across the hall A I had concerns myself -- we11, I went out of the A a And Wells UNCLASS I FIED UNCLASS I EIED 265 I bu'ilding and up. John Eisenberg's office is in a separate 2 building from Ambassador Bolton a A a A a A a A J 4 5 6 7 8 9 l0 OkaY. and hi s office was opposi te mi ne. ght. So, on the l-Oth, you I went over right away. went to talk to him? Ri Correct. And you gave him I the information? mean, basically along, you know, the lines that I l3 ore, a qu'ick summary, probably about i n the same ki nd of length and with detail that I gave to you. a Okay. And then he had you come back a day later t4 to 1l t2 said bef A l5 No, I asked t6 calI t7 because he'd been l8 l9 20 2t 22 23 24 .25 if we could go back and discussion and asked a A if for a more lengthy we could include Wells in the meeting with me Okay. and I wanted to make sure that I wasn't, you of, purporting things being said by Secretary Perry to be part of this as we1l. a Uh-huh. A Because Secretary Perry had been talking at great length about energy sector and corruption. And at no point did I th'ink that anything Secretary Perry sa'id referred to know, kind UNCLASS ] FIED UNCLASS I any 2 a J 4 FIED 266 of these jssues that are under discussion today. a OkaY. A And I wanted to make sure that I was 100 percent correct and that when Secretary Perry ha! talking points, 6 that, you know, these were there was nothing in there about any of these jssues. Because, again, that would 7 explain the very abrupt response to Gordon Sondland's 8 i 5 nterj ecti on . Okay. And nothing Secretary Perry I"lR. GOLDMAN: t'4r. Castor, I'm sorry, do you mjnd? a 9 l0 She l5 just Said "theSe iSSueS," and I want tO make Sure the recOrd i s clear as to what she meant. DR. HILL: 0h. Agai n, about Buri sma and the investigations on energy. I'm sorry. I should've been more specific on that, yeah. And do you need any further t6 clarification? 1l t2 l3 t4 t7 MR. GORDON: l8 DR. t9 MR. CASTOR: 20 2t J ust 24 25 NO? Thank You. OKAY. I'd like 30 seconds back. Just joking. j oki ng. MR. GOLDMAN: It's all yours. BY MR. CASTOR: 22 23 HILL: No. a You didn't have any concerns about what Secretary Perry was saying during that meeting? A I did not. And UNCLASS I I wanted FIED to make sure that it was UNCLASS I I EIED 267 very clear with John Eisenberg that, you know, kind of, t7 of, set of discussions and that, clearly, Ambassador Sondland seemed to be having a d'i f f erent one. Because i t was , you know, the a OkaY. A disjuncture between the two that was what had immediately got Ambassador BoIton alerted to it. a OkaY. A It also suggests that Ambassador Bolton Ambassador Bolton also, yott know, suggested to me that thi s was all related to the Rudy Gjulianj discussjons. a Ri ght. A So he had been, i n the run-up to th'is every time I was in his office, Giuliani was on the television. And I told you he'd already told me that Giuljani was a hand grenade that was going to blow everybody up. a Uh-huh. l8 Secretary Perry's, you know, i nvolvement 'in thi s and h j s 2 J 4 5 6 7 8 9 l0 ll t2 l3 t4 l5 l6 Secretary Perry was having one, kind ssues wi th the LNG and the other l9 'i 20 di dn't 2t dj d 23 24 25 who have any i ssue wj th anythi ng he was pursui ng there, you? A a A 22 , you know, gas i ssues, you Not in the discussions that I had with him. OkaY. We -- I was the one for Secretary Perry to show up around always had discussjons about often was pushing UNCLASS]FIED UNCLASS I EIED I E u 268 rope 5 a Okay. sending him off jn a plane to Three Seas A Initiative meetings and other -- because he knew what we were talking about. And we were trying to get him to integrate or 6 help us i ntegrate 2 J 4 7 O A 0kaY. l3 all of the different aspects of European energy to bring Ukraine into this so that it wasn't just the United States trying to push on Nord Stream 2. So we got the Czechs, Germans, the Poles, the Romanians, and others to Slovaks to step up and to help the Ukra'ini ans. a Uh-huh. And he 1ed the delegation to President 14 Zelensky's i naugurati 8 9 l0 ll l2 l5 t6 t7 l8 A a on? Correct. And he was i nvolved wi th, i t's been reported, some debriefing of the President about that A He was . Cor rect. 20 meeting. And with all of his involvement as it relates to these issues with President Zelensky, you don't 2t have any concerns? t9 22 23 24 25 a A a A I personallY had no concerns. OkaY. I wasn't 'in all of the meeti ngs, but there was nothing in any of my interactions with Secretary Perry that UNCLASS I FIED UNCLASS I would lead me to 2 a J So ] FIED 269 think anything different. OkaY. getting back to the July LLth meeting with P. Wells ll ffi th and John Ei senberg A Rl ght. and Mjchael E11is, I think you sa'id a A I didn't say, actually, because I'm not sure that Michael E11is was in there. a 0h, okay. A I did say that, on my last day in the office, on September 3rd, that I met with both John Ejsenberg and t2 Michael E11is. 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Gri O l3 0kay t4 of 15 maybe what 16 concerns . Okay . What was you gave a readout the f i nal determi nati on of what occurred in the meeting, your concerns were, what Ambassador Bolton's were. What was the final 20 A The final outcome of that was that John Eisenberg said that he would talk about this further, and I presumed that he meant with the White House counsel, with Pat Cipollone, and that he would, you know, raise these concerns 2l about what Sondland had said. 17 l8 19 22 23 a A OkaY ' And Wells Griffith, you know, obviously, in the general sense about the was'aIso 24 you know, concerned 25 references, you know, that were going out with Giuliani UNCLASS I FIED and UNCLASS I FIED 270 1 the other two, Burisma. But he did not indicate that, 2 know, Secretary Perry was following up on any J i ssues. 4 a of Okay. And was that loop ever closed? you these Did 8 to you and te11 you that he spoke with Mr. Cipollone or any other officials? A He said that he'd talked to Cipollone, but he didn't then give me any further -- but, again, at this point, 9 having 5 6 7 Eisenberg ever reach out told so many people and also Charlie Kupperman, as t2 well as Ambassador Bolton, there was every indication that they were at1 going to follow up on th1s. a Rl ght. And presumably you arti culated to John l3 E l0 ll t4 l5 t6 t7 18 i senberg this is July LLth, and I'm leaving following week. So I don't have a 1ot of time a Fai r enough. to do, you know, followuP. A a Fai r enough. A 21 22 23 24 25 the You retated your other concerns about Sondland, not just l9 20 And, again, the A We11, I'd said multi p1e times to him and to others that I was real1y worried about, you know, Sondland's extensive potentially self-appointed portfolio and that thj s could cause a whole range of problems, because we didn't have any oversi ght or i nsi ght, of ten, "into what he was doi ng. UNCLASS I FIED UNCLASS I FIED 2 it's 1ike, you know, the guardrails were off you know, kind of, there could be a lot of problems from J thi s. I And, again, 271 and, 20 I'd already gone and spoken to our intelligence di rectorate to ask them to reach out to the chi ef of stat'ion at the EU mission to see if they could actually do a proper briefing for him again. And I'd expressed that to Eisenberg as wel1, because that's also within Eisenberg's portf olio, to have these k'inds of concerns about, you know, kind of, jnadvertent disclosure or, you know, kind of, basically'if somebody is being targeted by foreign powers. And, basically, at this point, Sondland has made himself a target for foreign powers, because he's basically telling people, I can get you into the White House, I can get you in to see Ambassador Bolton. You know, you show up at the door, and, I mean, I thjnk alt of you who have trjed to show up at the door of the White House wjlt know it's actually not that easy to get in and you have to go through all kinds of procedures. You can't just, kind of, appear at the doorstep and be 1et in by the Secret 2t Service. 4 5 6 7 8 9 l0 1l t2 l3 t4 l5 t6 17 l8 t9 22 23 24 25 And litera11y coming up at the door because Sondland was -- and then he would, you know, literally call up and shout at the assi stants 'in the f ront of f ice to make sure that people were giving, you know, their passports or People were UNCLASS I FIED I EIED UNCLASS 272 6 to have meetings. So he was already offering himself as a conduit to all kjnds of foreign officials to the White House for meetings. And it didn't matter whether it was the President, but with myself and others. I mean, that i s, i n i tself, a problem. a And these are the concerns you related to 7 E I 2 J 4 5 any kind of informat'ion because he wanted i senberg? 9 A a l0 was goi ng to ll A 8 Correct. And he was going to talk to Pat Cipollone and he Yeah. And, 1ook, I'lr sure from the point of view t4 in the diplomatic serv'ice bef ore, I mean, and bei ng a busi ness guy, I mean, this is what you do. You kind of connect people, and you set 15 up meeti ngs . 12 l3 t6 t7 of Ambassador Sondland, having never been Uh-huh. Did you ever communicate to Sondland your discomfort? I know you had talked about the one a A 18 I did. I t9 Tim Morrison related 20 to 2t 22 23 24 25 see the back a A I had me that mean, to of me when I that which is probably why Ambassador Sondland was glad had come back agai n. OkaY. Because we ended up with a kjnd of testy set of final interactions, which, you know, k'ind of as I sajd, you know, when I f i rst started of f , I had qu'i te h'igh hopes. He was enthusiastic. He clearly wanted to serve, you know, UNCLASS I FIED UNCLASS 1 2 J 4 he's a patriot. the He wanted 273 to serve the American t get any i ndi cati on, you know, early off that he was going to go off on a tangent ljke this. a Uh-huh. people. You know, I I FIED d'idn' 7 did Volker deal with Sondland? A I don't real1y know, because I also sajd to Kurt that I di dn ' t thi nk he should be spendi ng qu'i te so much ti me 8 wi 5 6 How t0 th Sondland. Because, agai n , i f you recall , ori gi na1ly, I was skeptical that Sondland was actually in charge of Ukraine from any higher authority other than hjs own interest in this 11 i ssue. 9 a t2 13 t4 l5 Uh-huh . Okay. Dr. Hi11, you brought up the phone call that Presjdent Trump had wjth President Putjn and the leaks that took ptace and the f i ri ng of General Mcl'1aster. MR. ZELDIN: LL: 16 DR. t7 MR. ZELDIN: Do you know who leaked HI Yes . you say that you believe that l8 When t9 get General McMaster 20 i t? 2l DR. fj red, do You HILL: I don't know it that i nf ormat'ion? was leaked know who in order actually to leaked for sure, so I won't start to 24 speculate. But I'm pretty confident and, you know, kind of, just from other djscussions that I've had more recently, that this was exactly what happened, that thjs was leaked to get 25 rid of 22 23 him. UNCLASS I FIED UNCLASS I EIED 274 5 calls after that wjth General l4cMaster when he was being ripped open on thjs topic, blaming his staff for leak'ing this. And I know that I did not leak it and that my team did not leak it. And we offered to resign on that day, because jt had clearly been used as 6 part of an internal score settfing. I 2 J 4 I was ofl, you know, kjnd of, MR. ZELDIN: You 7 phone believe you know who leaked it 23 HILL: Could I j ust offer - MR. ZELDIN: but you're not sure? DR. HILL: -- to be clear, that this particular "do not congratulate" card was not intended, even, to be briefed to the President. So that's kjnd of part of the backstory that isn't publicly known. Because we knew that the Presjdent was you know, going to congratulate him anyway, because that's the President always congratulates people. And we always have a 1ot of people wanting to put things into, you know, Presjdential call packages for the historical record. And it was the State Department that had requested that we write that i n. MR. ZELDIN: I guess just due to the subject matter of why we're here, I won't ask further on that, but in another setting I'd have some followup questions DR. HILL: But this gives you the, kind of, sense of how 24 these things can be manipulated, you know, by people, which 25 i 8 9 l0 l1 t2 l3 t4 15 16 t7 l8 l9 20 21 22 DR. s also deeply d j sturb'ing. Because, agai UNCLASS I FIED n, thi s i s a I FIED UNCLASS 275 I national security issue. And no matter what your views are 2 of General J country, you know, to great di st'inction. And to be pushed 4 out over the leaking of a stupid card that wasn't 5 brj efed McMaster, he's an American hero who served his to the Presi dent i s pretty rjdi culous even . MR. ZELDIN: Earlier 6 8 the right person for the job or not is another matter, you know, that you a1t can debate 9 at 7 DR. HILL: some poi l0 MR. Whether he was nt. ZELDiN: Earljer on, after you had referenced the " ll term "drug deal, t2 referencing it, where he used the word "illicit" t3 t6 question. Do you reca1l that question and answer wjth Chai rman Schiff earlier? DR. HILL: I clari fied, of course, that the drug deal was an ironic and sarcastic statement that Ambassador Bolton 17 made. l8 was I just want to be careful with the use of the word "i11jcit." Do you bef ieve that 'it was i 1lega1 or no? 14 15 t9 20 MR. ZELDIN: Chajrman Yeah. zt MR. W0L0SKY: What 22 DR. 23 MR. ZELDIN: 24 25 from HI LL: earlier Schiff Was asked a question in his your opin'ion that'it are you referring to? What was i 11ega1? I just -- jt was one question and answer on MR. WOLOSKY: You can have UNCLASS I FIED it either read back UNCLASS I FIED 276 MR. ZELDIN: That would be I fantastic. that would be, yeah, because I'm I'lR. ZELDIN: And I thi nk that mi ght serve everybody DR. HILL: I mean, clearly, Ambassador Bolton was DR. 2 3 4 HILL: Yeah, 5 worried that something was going on, which is why he wanted 6 me to go to MR. ZELDIN: We 7 8 John Eisenberg. of might get back to that. Just for sake time t4 It's going to take a long time to get back to that. If you could just rephrase the question? DR. HILL: I 'm afrai d I can't remember the exact phrasi ng of Chai rman Schi ff's questi on f"lR. ZELDIN: You have a reputation, Dr. Hi11, of being a master note-taker. And I don't know if this reputation js l5 accu 9 l0 1l t2 l3 MR. GOLDI4AN: . rate DR. t6 t7 as MR. ZELDiN: 19 notes 20 that 22 23 24 25 been doing all of it quite as much I normally do. l8 2t HILL: I haven't Apparently, you and you took a 1ot of all the time, and you had books. The first off, is accurate? HILL: That's correct. I grew up in a town that very impoverj shed, and we didn't have textbooks. So I learned to take notes from basically first grade onwardS, because, you know, otherwise, I wouldn't have learned anything. And so jt's a habit as much as anything else. DR. UNCLASS I FIED was UNCLASS 1 t"lR. ZELDIN : I EIED 277 The books themselves , were they 5 re all i n the records. MR. ZELDIN: They at1 have been turned back jn? DR. HILL: Correct. 0n the L9th, I fi11ed up more boxes than I think is normal and spent lots of time putting in all 6 the forms about all the dating of all of those books, and I 7 handed them over 2 J 4 8 DR. HILL: They' to Presidential MR. ZELDIN: And you records. don't have in your possession l0 or copies of those books? DR. HILL: I do not, and that would be i11ega1. ll t'lR. ZELDIN: 9 of those any books th or Di d you ever di sobey any orders ref use to you implement superiors' po1"ic'ies t2 di sagreed l3 that you di sagreed wi th? DR. HILL: I did not. And if I'd come to a juncture where I'd been forced to do that, I would've left. MR. ZELDIN: And earlier on, at the beginning of this t4 l5 16 t7 w'i 45 minutes, you were asked I l8 19 7 DR. HILL 20 2t 22 23 24 25 UNCLASS I FIED UNCLASS I F]ED 278 I 2 a J 4 5 6 7 8 9 l0 11 t2 13 I t4 l5 t6 t7 I l8 t9 20 2t 22 23 24 25 dld not start formally until Apri 1 3rd, and the admi ni strati on came i n i n J anuary I had already been offered the job at that parti cular . point, but, as I mentioned before, General McMaster came on board. I 'd been hi red by General Flynn and K. T. and General Ke11ogg, and so we had to wait a period to see i f General McMaster wanted to conti nue w'ith the hi ri ng process. UNCLASS ] FIED UNCLASS ] FIE 279 D I 2 3 4 5 I 6 7 8 9 t"lR. ZELDIN: And tj ttle bj t. Just September I some apologi ze f or bounci ng around questions from 3rd, you mentioned that you l0 to your team, and one of the ll l'lorrison. 12 13 earlier HILL: Correct. MR. ZELDIN: And that's rounds. came people you spoke a back, to spoke was Tim DR. when you first became aware that t4 there may be an issue? l5 HILL: We11, I just noticed that everybody was not, you know, kind of, as chipper as, you know, I was expecting. We11, I mean, I was going jn just very briefly l6 t7 l8 DR. MR. ZELDIN: Did you 24 HILL: -- but there seemed to be, you know, just people just seemed tense. And, you know, I put it down initially to the fact that there was a transjtjon, you know, underway and, you know, all kinds of things. But I wasn't exactly I was just being honest in saying that I felt at the time that the atmosphere, you know, was d'ifferent and 25 people seemed worried. t9 20 21 22 23 DR. UNCLASS I EIED UNCLASS MR. ZELDIN: But you I 2 I ElED as to what that i ssue didn't 280 speak to them specifically was? 8 HILL: No. I just said, how have things been? And, you know, a couple of peopte said, not so great. MR. ZELDIN: But nothing more specific than that? DR. HiLL: Correct. But I had seen and I mentioned that before that there'd been and this is what I did raise to Mr. Castor 9 when you asked about meeting J 4 5 6 7 DR. l0 Eisenberg. As part of ll meet i t2 13 t4 l5 t6 t7 l8 t9 20 2t 22 23 24 25 my with Michael E1lis and John out-briefing, I had to have a ng wi th them. in the I don't know what exactly t'imef rame it would've been maybe late August, early September, just as I was, you know, coming back to D.C. from my vacation, that said we had to retain all documents pertai ni ng to Ukra'ine. And so I asked them, did I have to do anything? I also told them I'd already handed in all my documents before I saw this. So I was concerned about my own obligations, making sure I'd done proper retention, because, you know, I hadn't seen that before I left. And, obviously, i might have been more extensive in even keeping some of, you know, the just generi c i ntel pi eces you can of ten j ust, k'ind of , arch j ve electronically. Because I didn't know whether it meant, you know, you had to keep anything that had, you know, "Ukraine" And I had seen an email sometime UNCLASS I FIED UNCLASS 28t I FIED on top and what that meant. 2 J 4 5 6 7 8 didn't teI1 me anything in particular. just said that I'd already done what I needed to do. And they t"lR. They ZELDIN: So, on July 25th, you were snorkeling during the call. And at the end of the DR. HILL: I could've time, given the time 14R. ZELDIN: di been sleeping, actua11y, fference, but Hopef u11y in that anyway not at the same time. l6 HILL: Hopefully not, no. MR. ZELDIN: At the end of August, yo! said you returned home from vacation. Was that the same vacation from the end of J u1y DR. HILL: I'm afraid it was. I know that sounds outrageous. But I djdn't take much vacat'ion in the time I was at NSC, and they owed me 5 or 7 weeks of back pay, and they said they'd prefer to do it as a vacation rather than as l7 a payout. 9 l0 ll t2 13 t4 l5 l8 19 20 2t 22 23 DR. That communicat'ion MR. ZELDIN: I took an outrageous vacatjon. t'lR. ZELDIN: That commun'icati on at the end of August i s the first communication that you received to alert you that there may be some i ssue related to Ukrai ne? DR. HILL: Correct. DR. HILL: So 24 MR. ZELDIN: And who was the 25 DR. HILL: It was an UNCLASS I NSC you know, from the office FIED of UNCLASS I FIED 282 2 the lega1 counsel, so from John Eisenberg and his staff. Very generic. We've had these before, you know, related to J congress'ional i nqui ry I a 4 or anythi ng else, sayi ng that we had to retajn all documents pertaining any k'ind of 5 communi cati ons . 1l I said, I'd already handed in my box and, you know, djd a big purge of my offjce. And I'd also handed over things to colleagues that I thought would be useful for them for continuity purposes. And that's why i was nervous. You know, I thought, oops, did I retain everything I was supposed to? And I didn't know what this l2 was about. 6 7 8 9 10 l3 And, you know, as MR. ZELDIN: In an earlier round, we ran out of time. i t4 was asking about Ambassador Sondland l5 LL: Yeah. MR. ZELDIN: and how he had stated or you had stated that he asserted himself as a lead for Ukra'ine? DR. HILL: Correct. MR. ZELDIN: And that his authority was DR. HILL: He said he was in charge of Ukraine. MR. ZELDIN: And he stated that his authority was granted to him by the President? DR. HILL: Yeah, because I said, "No, you're not. " And' you know, I mean, sorry, it was kind of a bit of a rude retort because I was just So, "What?" And I said, "We11, we l6 t7 l8 l9 20 21 22 23 24 25 DR. HI UNCLASS I FIED UNCLASS ] EIED 283 J out as Charge. Who says you're in charge of Ukraine?" It wasn't exactly the most diplomatic of responses on my part. And he said, "The 4 President. " And I 2 have Ambassador Taylor who's been sent I was f ike, "0h." 7 don't know whether or not he actually was given that authority from the President. DR. HILL: I do not. And nobody else seemed to be aware 8 of that 5 6 MR. ZELDIN: But you ei ther. MR. ZELDIN: 9 There's a possibility that l0 Sondland was appointing himself as the lead ll stating that it t2 DR. l3 l5 16 t7 l8 t9 20 2l 22 23 24 25 for Ukrajne and was HILL: I think you should ask Ambassador when he submits Sondland his depos'ition. MR. ZELDIN: Yeah, l4 Ambassador I wi11. 5o we just don't know one or the other. DR. HILL: I do not know. There was never any kind of directive. Ambassador Bolton was not informed, and people at the State Department did not seem to be informed about this. I would've thought that Assistant Secretary Reeker, you know, and others would've known, i f that was the case. MR. ZELDIN: 0ne last questjon before I turn it back over. The calendar that we got w"ith your document production, very detailed. You sa'id it was prepared by someone else. Who DR. HILL: My assistant. I mean, it wasn't prepared. I way UNCLASS I FIED UNCLASS ] EIED 284 schedule. It's j ust a schedule. MR. ZELDIN: Your assistant post-leaving-the-White-House mean, i t's my 2 J 4 or from when you were at the White House? DR. HILL: No, it's actually only from the time that my 6 assistant was making the schedule. So my assistant, this parti cular last assi stant, , who I mentioned to 7 you before, he only worked with me for a year because, like 5 8 9 other positions, there was a rotation of detailees. And the role of a special assistant is to keep the schedule. in MR. ZELDIN: Thank you. l0 l1 t2 many HILL: So, I mean, it wouldn't also have every entry on it of everything I ever did either. DR. l3 MR. CASTOR: Do you have something? 14 MR. J0RDAN: Dr. Hi11, Ambassador Yovanovitch said that l5 President Zelensky, you know, had one priority and ran his t6 campaign on ending t7 befief? l8 20 l'lr. Jordan, I'm sorry to i nterrupt, but I don't believe that was what Ambassador Yovanov'itch testified. she wasn't there for this, And maybe if we could just ask 2t SO t9 22 23 24 25 corruption in Ukraine. Do you share that MR. GOLDMAN: I'm reading from her statement. She said, "During the 2019" -- which I think has been public. And I thi nk Dr. Hi 11 DR. HI LL: The publ i c statement . 0kay. MR. JORDAN: UNCLASS I FIED UNCLASS I F]ED 2 I think Dr. Hill said she read it. DR. HILL: Yeah, I had read that. Yeah. J MR. J0RDAN: I 4 5 6 7 8 9 285 MR. JORDAN: "During the 2019 Presidential elections, the Ukrainian people answered the question once again. Angered by i nsuffi ci ent progress i n the fi ght agai nst corruption, Ukrainian voters overwhelmingly elected a man who said that any corruption will be his number-one priori ty. " DR. HILL: He did say that, yeah. MR. JORDAN: 0kay. HILL: I mean, that was hi s campai gn pledge. l0 DR. ll MR. JORDAN: t2 never know, right? l3 t7 HILL: Yeah. I sajd that we were concerned, as you might reca11, to an earlier question, about the potential influence of Igor Kolomoisky, who was an oligarch, who was the owner of the televjsion and, you know, production company that Zelensky's program, "The Servant of the People," was l8 broadcast on. t4 l5 t6 But then, earlier, you also said that DR. t9 MR. HECK: Your time has expi red. 20 I'm inclined to take a 5-minute bio break unless 2t you somebody obj ects. 22 Heari ng no obj ecti on. 23 lRecess. l 24 MR. HECK: Very 25 Dr. Hi11, I'd like to start, before turning it over to good. Let's go back on the record. UNCLASS I FIED UNCLASS I 2 J 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Mr. I FIED 286 Goldman. HILL: Certainly. t'4R. HECK: You sa'id in answer to an earlier question from Mr. Noble that the President had been briefed early in the administration that the Ukraine Government did not interfere in the 2015 election in the U.S. How do you come to know that? DR. HILL: I know that from my interactions with General McMaster and Tom Bossert and many of the National Security DR. staf f . that they had briefed 1l MR. HECK: They both informed you l2 the President thusly. Is that correct? l3 that those brief ings had taken p1ace. But I think, you know, part of those t4 t5 t6 DR. HILL: We11, they 'informed me briefings were also conducted by the intelligence services. MR. HECK: Good. Very good. Thank you. t7 14r. Goldman? l8 MR. G0LDMAN: I t9 MR. NOBLE : BY MR. 20 '11 turn i t over to Mr. Nob1e. Thank you . NOBLE: 23 Dr. Hi11, just sticking on that point for a moment, can you say anything about how 14r. Giuliani or others working with him pursuing this theory that Ukraine interfered in the 24 2015, even though 25 does 2t 22 a it's been determined that they did not, that affect Russia? And can Russia take advantage of UNCLASS I FIED how IEIED UNCLASS 2 that jn A J mean, actua1ly, President 4 has been, "We didn't do I a A 5 6 7 8 9 any a1 287 way? 0f course Russia can take advantage of this. Putjn's whole schtick since 2015 it." tried to pin it on Ukraine? Pin it on whoever, you know, kind of else, And a Are you aware of any conversations between U.S. Government officials and Russia or Russian officials ll 12 a l3 Are you aware of about thi Okay. well, did you watch any of the press 14 conference that was hetd between President Trump and l5 President Zelensky on the sidelines t6 Assembly'in September? t7 l8 19 and ternati ve theori es . s theory that Ukra'ine i nterf ered i n 20L6? A I'm not aware of that. l0 I A a A I confess I did of the U.N. General not. did not watch jt? I was with my mother, and I djd not watch it. You I'm 20 sorry. 2l that press conference, President Trump said something along the lines that President Zelensky should meet with Vladimir Putin and settle their disagreement. Was a Putin-Zelensky meeting ever part of U.S. policy when you were working at the National Security 22 23 24 25 a 0kay. We11, during UNCLASS I FIED UNCLASS I 2 J 4 Counc i 7 8 288 1? I A encouraged a Putin-Zelensky meeting to Russians when, you know, a To what I was speaking to the them as wel1. end? To, indeed, have Putin 5 6 I FIED time, Putin was refusing to because for a period of acknowledge Zelensky as the new, legitimately elected Presjdent of Ukraine. And we had been encouraging we, writ large the Russians to adopt a 24 different strategy towards Ukraine. And, uI ti mately, i f Ukrai ne and Russj a make peace, i t has to be on Ukraine's terms, and it would be much better to be negotiated by Ukraine than, frankly, done by i ntermedi ari es . I mean, I thj nk that's the caSe i n poi nt for most disputes and most conflicts. International mediation can only do so much. We've still got Kosovo-Serbia, for example, where we're trying to encourage them to have direct ta1ks. So I don't th'ink that that, i n and of i tself , i s anything that anyone should be concerned about. And I had gone out to Moscow i n between the two rounds of the Ukrainian Presidentjal election at a point where you know, there was an earlier question, you know, were we sure that Zelensky was going to be elected? We were not. But, certainly, between the two election rounds, Zelensky looked like he had a pretty good chance of becoming the 25 Presi dent 9 l0 ll t2 l3 t4 l5 t6 t7 l8 t9 20 2l 22 23 . UNCLASS I F]ED UNCLASS i rreo 289 10 I lajd out to the Russians that, you know, maybe they should take a fresh look at this, that, you know' they' re creati ng 1i f elong enm'ity wi th an otherw'ise f raternal country, people who've been close to them, you know, for hundreds of years of history, and that, you know, they would be well-served to not be just so punitive wjth the Ukrainians and to, you know, reth'ink over the longer term. We also had jn June a trilateral meeting with the Russjans and Israelis in Jerusalem just before the G-20 in Osaka. And you're probably aware of that happening. And I ll conducted meetings with my counterparts from the Russian t2 Nati l3 President Zelensky had already been elected, and t4 urge them I 2 J 4 5 6 7 8 9 l5 And onal Securi ty Counci 1 , by to take a different whi ch time, of course, th Zelensky ' s electi on . refute t7 were saying wi to approach. Because there were two jssues t6 I tried that one could immediately The f i rst was the Russi ans l8 that Ukraine was being run by a fascist government and one that was also hostile to Russian speakers. l9 WeI1, Zelensky 20 2l 22 23 24 25 is a Russian-speaking Jew from basicatly eastern Ukraine. All of his family ties are in Russia. He'd spent an awful 1ot of time in Russia. He can neither be descrjbed as a fascist or as somebody who is hostile towards Russia or Russian speakers. And they couldn't argue wjth that. And, basi ca11y, the poi nt was, you know, thi s i s a time for reassessment. UNCLASS I EIED UNCLASS I 2 J 4 5 6 7 8 9 l0 ll t2 13 14 l5 t6 t7 l8 t9 20 2t 22 23 24 25 ] EIED 290 this is why it gets back to before, where Russia was looking for as much leverage over Ukraine as they possibly can. They were obviously waiting to see how things unfolded with the Rada, the parliamentary electjons, which took place later on in July, and to try to see there how much leverage they would have over Zelensky. They were stil1 holding on to the sai lors from the Kerch Strai t i ncident, and we'd been tryi ng to push them to release them. And, in fact, we thought that they m'ight around 0rthodox Easter in April, and they didn't. We'd been given all kinds of signs that they might. And it was very clear that the Russians were looking for anywhere to, you know, basically put Ukraine'in a weaker position so that when they do finally sit down with them they'11 have the upper hand and Ukrajne will have, you know, litt1e choice but to go along with, you know, many of the issues that were already on the table, of maximum autonomy for Luhansk and Donyetsk and basically having a veto over Ukrainian foreign policy, including any chance that Ukraine might have, somewhere off in the future, of their joining NATO or even becoming, you know, kind of a member state of the European Union at some point. a Ri ght. A So jt was all very obvious, you know, at this particular juncture, that Russia was look'ing for leverage. But they were waiting, UNCLASS honestly I E]ED and UNCLASS I E]E 291 D I But we were hoping that we could get, you know, kind of, 2 Putin to see it's somehow, you know, kind of, in his 5 interest, a recalculation and a recalibration of Russian policy, to at least begin to engage with Zelensky. a V{ould a meeting between President Trump and 6 President Zelensky following Zelensky's election be something J 4 7 8 9 l0 ll that the Russians would be paying attention to? A Sure. a Why is that? A Wetl , f i rst of all , they are very 'interested i n l3 fjnding out whether they can drive a wedge between Ukraine and the Un'ited States. I mean, President Putin has been out in public -- this is not, you know, classified'informatjon or t4 anything from the course of my work, but you can look l5 public l6 it's unremittingly negative. And he a1so, himself, always poi nts to corrupti on 'in Ukrai ne. I t's become, ki nd of shorthand for, "This is not a real country, thjs is not a sovereign country, and this is not a country that deserves support from the U.S. or the Europeans at a1l." a OkaY. I want to go back to the July 25th call summary. And we were talking about, I believe in the last round, the transfer of that summary into the NSC Codeword Class'ified System A Uh-huh. l2 t7 l8 l9 20 21 22 23 24 25 pronouncement at any of President Putin about Ukraine, and , UNCLASS I F] ED UNCLASS a which I FIE 292 D I believe is sometimes referred to as 5 Is that are you familiar with that acronym? A I am kind of familiar, Yeah a Okay. Do you believe there was any reason for this particular ca11, the July 25th ca11, summary to be placed in 6 ttre 2 J 4 I. system? ! 15 A No. a Okay. And why not? A Because that's not the appropriate place for these kinds of transcripts. As I said before, they can be restricted, in terms of their access, very easily, and you can keep track of who has access to them. a And when you were at the NSC, were you aware that or, not some transcripts were being transferred to the summari es of meeti ngs or telephone cal1s transcri pts l6 between t7 transferred to 7 8 9 10 lt t2 l3 t4 l8 l9 20 2t 22 23 24 25 A the Pres'ident and f orei gn leaders were bei ng I was not. And the only circumstances jn which that would be conceivable would be if it dealt with classi fi ed i nformati on. a Highly classified informat'ion? A Yes. But, I mean, we do occasionally talk to counterparts about that kind of information. a Who would have the authority to order a call summary like the July 25th call summary to be transferred to UNCLASS I F]ED UNCLASSIFIED I 2 3 the I 293 system? A I'm not entirely sure, to be honest, because I've never had to deal with that. t4 a OkaY. A I imagine that wel1, I shouldn't imagine. I basically I'm not real1y clear. I would have to refer you back to, you know, other officials to ask for that. a OkaY. A That was not, certainly, in my purview. I would never be able to, you know, make a determination to have it in that system. a And I think I know the answer to this, but are you aware of whether or not John Botton or, before him, H.R. McMaster was aware of this practice and that this was l5 goi ng on? 4 5 6 7 8 9 l0 lt 12 l3 t9 I don't beljeve that it happened on any occasion when General Mc['laster was there. I 'd never heard of anythi ng about it. You would have to ask Ambassador Bolton. a OkaY. 20 There's been public reporting about the May 201,7 meeting l6 17 l8 A Kislyak, Foreign Mjnjster Lavrov, 2l between Ambassador 22 Pres'ident Trump i n the 0va1 0f f i ce. 23 that 24 25 Di and d you parti ci pate j n meeti ng? A a I did You not. did not. Did you get a readout from that UNCLASS I FIED UNCLASS I I FIED 294 meet i ng? 4 A I did. a Okay. And do you know whether the readout or the notes or the summary of that meeting were placed in tne ! 5 sy s tem? 2 J A a A a A 6 7 8 9 l0 To my knowledge, it was not. Okay. But I don't know for sure. Okay. There were concerns about that transcript being t2 leaked, and so it was certainly being preserved. And, a1so, the fact that it was later on requested by Mr. MueIler in the l3 courSe ll 2t of hi s 'investi gation. So there was every ef f ort made to keep that transcri Pt secure. a And what were the concerns about that being leaked? A Well , I thi nk there's concerns every t'ime i t's been mentioned before -- about the integrity of communications, of leaking information' a But was there anything in particular about the conversation or the A We11, the conversatjon seemed to immediately end up 22 i t4 15 t6 t7 18 t9 20 23 24 25 n the press. let me also just keep saying that, every time we get bent out of shape on issues like this, remember, there are foreign participants in all of these meetings who take just And UNCLASS I FIED UNCLASS ] FIED 295 l3 I do or, in some cases, could very easily be recording some of these meetings. Because when you go not in the Wh'ite House, of course, but if you're 'in the G-20 or you're jn some other public setting, UNGA, I am not convinced that these things are screened. And I'11 just give you an example. When I was at one of the G-20 meetings, a member of the Chjnese delegation came in wjth a big backpack which they left on the chajlin one of the meeti ng rooms, and i t was there f or the ent'i re ti me. a When you got the readout of that May 20L7 meeting, was there anything that caused alarm for you? A Can I ask why we ' re go'i ng over the May Oval 0f f i ce meeting? Because I don't see how it's directly related to t4 Ukrai ne. l5 17 there's been public reporting about that parti cular meeti ng bei ng parti cularly sensi tj ve wj thi n the White House and'it being the transcript or readout, the 18 summary 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 l0 ll t2 t6 as good of notes as a t9 A 20 system. 2t a A a 22 23 24 25 We11, in tne f system. I was not aware that it was placed 'in ttre ! being ptaced Right. And I understand that's your -- Yeah. testimony, but we're trying to figure out that meeting, in particular, could have been A We11, that meeting UNCLASS ] FIED why UNCLASSIF]ED 2 call same way as the July 25th summary. A J 4 treated the a I 296 That meeti ng was scruti ni zed because of , agai n, the press reportjng that the Presjdent, who had the authority to 7 declassify information, had talked about something that was previousty codeword, in a general sense. And in actual fact, if that was the case, then there would be a reason to put jt 8 on 9 unauthori 5 6 10 it to, you know, kind of, zed i ndi vi duals or not, i f he had declassi fi ed that, Whether he'd said I. but it would sti11 technically be classified ll a A t2 0kay. And, i ndeed, when we had the readout l3 redact portions of jt. t4 way i nappropri ate on a l5 codeword. , we had to 5o that actually would not be that occas'ion in any . OkaY. 18 to the July 25th call summary, some of the portions I read included el1ipses. And there's been some public reporting and speculation that there could be other l9 things that were said. t6 t7 Going back Are you aware of , j n the process 20 2t of call summary, whether 22 transcri pt that's 23 24 25 of creati ng th'is type there's a more word-for-word created? A Transcripts that I produced often had ellipses in a 0kay. them. UNCLASS I FIED UNCLASS I EIED I 2 a J 4 5 6 7 8 9 l0 ll t2 l3 t4 t5 l6 t7 l8 t9 20 297 A I put el1 i pses i n. a Can you explain to us the process by which these types of call summarjes are created, from when the call occurs to when this type of summary is drafted? A There's been some public discussion of this, but I feel that this might be verging into secure, you know MR. WOLOSKY: I ' m sor ry . Could you repeat 14R. NOBLE: Yeah. I was aski ng her to explai n the process of creating a call summary. So there's a call that occurs. What's the process by wh'ich notes are taken? Is there a verbatim transcript created? DR. HILL: Is that f ine to talk about? MR. W0L0SKY: You can . Okay I mean, some of this has already been MR. NOBLE : Ri ght. DR. HILL: -- made public. I mean, I saw a piece of it on CNN or something that was reporting to say how the transcri pt would've come i nto bei ng. DR. HI LL: talk about the process -- Process . But the White House Situation Room, they produce that 22 transcript. They actually talk in real-time through kind of a -- I don't know, it's almost like I don't know whether 23 you have one as a stenographer, but they actually sort of 2t 24 25 talk through a device in real-time as they're hearing the speech and the exchange. And that's how UNCLASS I FIED UNCLASS a A I 2 Who ] FIED talks through the The White House 298 device? Situation Room staff. And that of a word vo'ice-recognition version of their J produces a kind 4 voi ce . So they a re 5 a And they' re repeat'ing what the 6 sayi ng? And what the translator is saying on the other 7 A as we1l. Presi dents are end l5 of you who, you know, are familiar with voice recognition js probably to deal with the fact that translators and others have accents. I have an accent. So, you know, it would make it difficult for the vojce-recognition software. And, a1so, I think, at this point, we no longer tape our President. That doesn't mean to say that the other party don't tape all of these communications, just to be very clear t6 here. 8 9 l0 ll t2 13 t4 And that's probably I mean, those 24 that rough transcript is then produced and then Sent to either the director or the senior director or both, whoevelis avai lable, to look through, and then to others who were on the call that'S pertinent to their area of expertise or who have taken notes a Okay. to check this for accuracy. And sometimes there A can be some pretty hysterically funny misrepreSentatjons of 25 what people heard. t7 l8 t9 20 2t 22 23 So UNCLASS ] FIED UNCLASS I E]ED 299 2 Okay. I won't ask about examples. So once you or your director reviews the, kind of, J transcript created by the voice-recogni tion software and you a I raw 7 all the corrections, are you the ones who draf.t the summaries, like the one that we see for the July 25th call? Who drafts that? A This, to me, looks like the transcripts that we 8 would draft. 4 5 6 make a A a A 9 l0 1l 12 l3 Okay. And then where does the transcript It goes to our -Are there further layers of approval? It goes through further layers of approvals. was managed by a A a A t4 l5 t6 l7 the Executive Secretarjat of the For the National Securi ty That NSC Counci 1? Correct. OkaY. And then wjth the White House review, and jt well -- goes l8 to the National Security Advisor r9 the Deputy National Security Advisor -- to take a look at. a 20 and others as and OkaY. 22 1itt1e bit, are you aware of a compilation of documents, you might say a dossier, that 23 Gi u1i 2t 24 25 Skipping around a Rudy ani created about Ambassador Yovanov'itch and A 0nly from news reports. others? Okay. You weren't aware of that at a UNCLASS I FIED the UNCLASS I 1 2 J 4 5 6 7 8 FIED 300 time I not, no. that that was created that it came in a Whjte House envelope to the State Department? A I had never heard anything about that. a Did you ever see those types of materials or a s'imilar dossier, floating around the White House? A I did not. A a was a OkaY. I believe in the last 9 1l of testimony you said that you had some conversations with Deputy Secretary of State t2 Sulf ivan l0 A a A a l3 l4 15 l6 t7 20 2t 22 23 24 25 Correct. about Rudy Giuliani and your concerns? Uh-huh. How many times did you speak with Deputy Secretary Su11 i van? A l8 t9 segment I saw Deputy Secretary Sullivan quite a lot at events, and I often talked to him on the sidelines of this. often, these were conversations that I was just having with Deputy Secretary Sul1ivan, who is a pretty wonderful 'indi vi dual . And , you know, I know he' s now been nomi nated be Ambassador to Russia. But he and I would talk a 1ot on the margins of events and other meetings. So, a And did you raise the UNCLASS I F] ED to T FIED concerns you had? UNCLASS A a A a I 2 J 301 I did. Frequently. And he was also concerned. 7 Okay. Did he say anything in response when you raised your concerns about Giuljan'i's activity? A He just expressed that he was also concerned. He didn't give any specifics, you know, back again. He just 8 gave me a good, you know, respectful 9 clear that he was very upset about what had happened to 4 5 6 l0 hearing. And it was Ambassador Yovanovi tch. t2 tried to, himself, do something about jt or get Secretary Pompeo to do something l3 about i t? 1l a A t4 15 t6 t7 l8 l9 20 2t 22 23 24 25 Did he ever say whether he ever He sajd that both he and Secretary Pompeo had tried r best to head off what happened. a Did he explain how they had tried? A He did not. But I was also very much struck by the commentary in her public statement, in Ambassador Yovanovitch's public statement, that they'd been under pressure since summer of 2018. I had no idea. Because, for me, I only you know, obviously, as I mentioned before, I just started to pick up that there something after January of this year. a Uh-huh. A And, most def ini te1y, when I saw what I thlnk was a thei UNCLASS I FIED UNCLASSIFIED I 2 J 4 5 6 7 8 302 article in The Hill by John Solomon, then I back and saw that there were, you know, other similar reports. And then, of course, I started to watch Mr . Gi u1 i ani on televi si on a 0kaY. March 20th Iooked . Did you ever speak wjth Michael El1is about your concerns? A at the request before, when I went in to talk to I'm sure I djd. But, I mean, not 13 of, as I mentioned a Mr. Ei senberg? Mr . Ei senberg. Yeah A a Okay. So these were A Because I saw all of them, both Michael E1lis and t4 John Eisenberg, pretty much dai1y, sometimes multiple times 15 'in the day. 9 10 l1 t2 . 21 n, our of f i ces were opposi te each other. And i t was, ki nd of , they were w'ith me worki ng on a whole range of issue. This was a big portfolio, and I needed a lot of legaI advice. We'd often looked at treaties and other issues that we were trying to coordinate, and we needed them to work wi th the legaI staff at the State Department, for example, or to reach out to DOD for us on a whole range of 22 i ssues. 16 t7 l8 l9 20 23 24 25 Agai I just, you know, wanted to say that they were the epi tome of prof ess'ional i sm, and I 've had a great worki ng relationship with them. And I had no hesitation in going to And UNCLASS I EIED UNCLASS ] EIED I 2 J 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 ll t2 l3 t4 l5 t6 t7 l8 express concerns to 303 them about any issue. a A And a Uh-huh. Did you ever ask him to do anything in I probably talked to l'4i chael on a number of occas'ions about th'is, just jn a general, hey, you know, th'is is going on and I'm worried about jt. So particular about -A I did not. I mean, I was raising concerns, but I did do the official reporting to John Eisenberg. a Okay. And did Mr. Ei senberg or Mr. El1i s ever telt you that they had taken steps to try to address the problem or had reported i t further up the chai n i n the Whi te House counsel's office or elsewhere? A Yeah, I already responded to that, that I believe that John Eisenberg talked to Pat Cipollone a A a A OkaY. i n the Whi te What about House counsel Mr. Elf 's offi ce. i s? 20 i do not know about that. And, again, you know, Ju1y LLth js just 10, LL is just the week before I'm 2t leav'ing. l9 22 a 23 0n the issue okaY. of the security assistance freeze, had for Ukrajne ever been held up before during your 24 assistance 25 time at the NSC? UNCLASS I EIED UNCLASS A a A I 2 1 FIED 304 Yes. For what -- and when was that? 5 At multiple junctures. You know, it gets back to the question that Mr. Castor asked before. There's often a question raised about ass'istance, you know, a range of 6 assi stance J 4 a A a 7 8 9 l0 ll t2 13 for Ukraine specificallY? Yeah , that' s cor rect But . Okay. Even though for the assistance? A Correct. a OkaY. A But there's there's been bi parti san support been a 1ot of hold-up of other 23 of additional questions asked. I mean, agai n , clarj fi cati on. You know, new people agai n, remember, a1so, there's a 1ot of turnover in staff at this point. So, as Mr. Castor was sort of suggesting, a 1ot of people suddenly want to know why is this happening, you know, ki nd of, who authori zed thi s, what's the nature of i t. Somet'imes i t was j ust i nf ormati onal a But at this point in time, when you learned about the freeze, July L8th I bet'ieve, everyone in the 'interagency had blessed it, so to speak, and had signed off on the aid. 24 And l4 l5 l6 17 l8 l9 20 21 22 25 assistance, you know, a 1ot . so, as f ar as you know, there was noth'ing that legitimately should be holding it up. UNCLASS IFIED UNCLASS I A a 1 2 J 4 305 Correct. OkaY. the issue of security assistance for Ukraine, are fami 1i ar wi th the fi rst sale of Javeli ns to Ukrai ne On A a 5 6 7 FIED I am. back jn 2018? March or April timeframe, js that correct? A a 8 9 Yes, that ' s cor rect 0kay. . Around the same time, are you aware that l0 Ukrai ne stopped cooperati ng wi th Speci 11 i nvesti gati on? al Counsel Mueller's t4 I was not aware of that. 0kay. Are you aware that they also stopped four separate investigations of Paul Manafort around this same l5 time? t2 l3 t6 t7 l8 19 20 2t 22 23 24 25 you A a A a Kilimn'ik, I was also not aware of that. Are you aware that Ukraine altowed Konstantjn who was a witness in the l"1ue11er investigation, stip across the border to Russia? A I was aware of that. a You were aware of that? A Uh-huh. a What did you know about that? A t{el1, Konstantin Kit'imnik is somebody if we're i n the space of who knew people 'in the past, he used to work UNCLASS I FIED UNCLASS I I 2 FIED 306 for the International Republican Institute in 14oscow. And when I was working at the Kennedy School of Government on 4 technical assistance projects, you know, we had a 1ot of interactions with IRI as well as NDI, and Konstintin Kilimnik 5 was J 6 all of my staff thought he was a Russian spy at the time that I was working with. there. And 8 Kilimnik was somebody who popped up on the radar screen from time to time. So, when his name came up, I 9 immediately had the, you know, reminders 7 So Konstantin l0 peopte ll know, t2 t3 t4 l5 l6 t7 l8 t9 20 2t 22 23 24 25 of the 1990s and of bei ng somewhat suspi ci ous of Kj 1 j mni k. And so, you I did note that he'd a How did you learn that Ukrai ne had allowed h'im to ex'it to Russi a? A It was in a report that I read. a Okay. Are you aware of any connection between that and the sale of Javelins to Ukraine? A I am not. a 0kay. You said that sometimes in your transcripts that you created or reviewed you'd use ellipses. A i did. a Why would you use elliPses? A When the sentence trailed off, it wasn't a complete sentence. And that mi ght be, you know, my Engl i sh trai ni ng, beCause, Often, the Exec SeC would correCt SometimeS and, yOU UNCLASS I FIED UNCLASS I E]ED 1 know, change punctuation and 2 example, things. I 307 overuse commas, for and 7 of the Oxford comma? I 'm confused, i s ki nd of basi cally where I am. Because when I was growi ng up, they changed the comma formatting, and then when I came here, I found there was at1 kr'nds of different comma formatting. So I tend to put commas 8 everywhere. a J 4 5 6 a A Are you a fan ll I also do like e1lipses. Because, you know, when somebody trails off, like I just do sometimes, just dot, dot, dot, finish that thought. So I wouldn't read too much into t2 the el 1 i pses 9 l0 And . l3 t4 15 t6 t7 l8 t9 20 21 22 23 24 25 UNCLASS I FIED UNCLASS I 4 5 6 7 8 9 l0 l1 308 [5:L4 p.m.] BY MR. NOBLE: 2 J I FlED at the NSC, were you aware of whether Kash Patel had any role in the Ukraine portfolio? A I became aware of that by chance and accident. In the last couple of weeks that I was there, probably in May, j ust after the Presi denti al i naugurati on i n Ukrai ne. I - a While you were working did you learn? I'd gone over to the Exec Sec in the White House pi ck somethi ng up, and thi s was around the t'ime where there was going to be a setup to debrief we were trying to a A j ust to How t4 the President on the Presidential delegation. And just one of the people in Exec Sec just as a routine, you know, just sa'id: 0h, the President wants to talk to your Ukraine 15 di rector. t2 l3 20 like a bit surprised by that because the President has never asked to speak to any, you know, of di rectors ever before. And I sai d: "Oh? " Yeah, to talk about some of the materials. And I said, "0h," again because I thought thjs is 2t strange. t6 17 l8 t9 22 .L) And I was And they out to said: Yeah, so, I mean, we might be reaching Kash. 24 And 25 a I said, "0h," because Kash the only Kash What was his role as far as You know? UNCLASS] PIED our UNCLASS I FIED 309 2 A I could thi nk of was Kash Patel , and I thought, welt, he i s in our International 0rgan j zat'ions Bureau and, J you know, considerably he works on the U.N. and other related 4 issues but he's not the Ukraine 5 director, you know, after aIl the streamlining is only'in 6 offi I director. The Ukraine our ce. l6 I basically djdn't engage any further because I was wonderi ng to myself: That's very strange. And I went to talk to Charlie Kupperman, who was going to be taking part on our behalf sjtting in on the debriefing for the President. And I said: Apparently, the President may think that Kash Patel is our Ukraine director, and I just want to make sure there's no embarrassment here. I'm not quite sure why that might be, but I want to flag for you that this is the case. And I related what I related to you. And I sajd: That 17 probably means that AIex Vi ndman, our Ukra'ine di rector 18 had 7 8 9 l0 ll t2 l3 t4 l5 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 So who actually been on the Presidential delegation, probably shouldn't go into the debrief from the delegation. a A a A And this was the l'lay 23 meeting Correct. after the delegation got back? Correct. And then I went back to my offjce and started looking at all my djstro ljsts to see, you know, kjnd of whether Kash was on any of the maybe I'd missed out, UNCLASS ] FIED UNCLASS 1 FTED 310 I you know, that he had some special, again, Ambassador 2 Sondland-1ike representational J a been informed about, and 4 about that. 5 6 7 8 a role on Ukrajne that I hadn't I coutdn't elicit any'informatjon Did you ever figure out what l4r. Patel was doing with respect to Ukraine kjnd of behind the scenes? A I did not, but I raised concerns with Charlie Kupperman about that, and he said that he would look into 20 that, whi ch j s the approprj ate course of acti on. a And did you ever learn what he learned after he looked into it? A I di d not because, agai n , yotl know, i t' s di ffi cul t always to f o1low up on these i ssues. But I d'id warn my office to be very carefu1 about communications with Kash Patel until we figured out why it was that he was sending clearly materials on Ukra'ine over to the because I didn't know what k'i nd of materi al s a Did you ever see the materials? A I did not. a 0kay. Did you ever learn what materials Mr. Pate1 2t was providing? 9 10 ll t2 l3 t4 l5 l6 t7 l8 t9 22 23 24 25 . A a i did not. Okay. You said that you advised or told Mr. Vindman not to go into the debrjef on May 23. A Wel1, particularly after it seemed to be the case UNCLASS T FIED UNCLASS I EIE 311 D I he's evidently not Kash Patel and that if there was some 2 confusion over who the director J rather difficult and awkward. 4 5 6 7 8 a 0kay. But you knew this about briefing the President A a A for Ukraine is, that could meeting was supposed be to be on 0n the Presidentjal delegation. the delegation to the inauguration? And Alex Vindman was also just there as the l3 of the NSC. He wasn't the lead of the delegation in any case. And the whole point of the debriefing was for Secretary Perry, Ambassador Volker, and Ambassador Sondland, and Senator Johnson to talk about their experiences and their views on Zelensky and to relay back the t4 meeti ngs. 9 10 t1 t2 representative t7 only jn those meetings as basically a notetaker and, you know, again, as the representative of the NSC because neither Ambassador Bolton or I were able to go 18 given the timing of the inauguration. 15 t6 t9 20 2l 22 23 24 25 And Alex was a Do you know whether Kash Patel attended that meet i ng? A I do not. I had never heard any information to suggest that he was there. Okay. Did Mr. Patel have anything to do wjth Ukraine after that meeting, to your knowledge? A I'm not aware that he did. And i took him off a UNCLASS I EIED our UNCLASS I FIED 312 7 distro list because I was alarmed in thinking that, you know, I mean, this is obviously just not approprjate, this is and I'd already reported it to Charlie Kupperman. a Do you know whether any of the documents that Mr. Patel was providing to the President relating to Ukrajne had anything to do with what Rudy Giulianj was doing? A I rea1ly do not know. And I'11 be also clear: I 8 never actually have ever had a conversation with Kash Patel. I 2 J 4 5 6 t4 at the international, you know, organization group, and I'd seen him in meetings. And I was, you know 1et's just say it's a red ftag when somebody who you barely know is involved orl, you know, one of your policy issues and is clearly providing, you know, materials outside of the line that we don't even know what l5 those materi a1s were. 9 l0 ll 12 13 I knew who he 18 t9 knew he was And we were atways very circumspect about the materials 16 t7 was. I that we provjded, and we only ever sent them up the chain to the Exec Sec to Ambassador Bolton. So, I mean, we never did anything to the President's or to the Chjef of Staff or 22 ty Advi sor. a And i t's your understandi ng, though, that these materials that Mr. Patel provided made their way directly to 23 President 20 2t 24 25 anythi ng else except through the National Securi A Trump? That's what I was 1ed to believe from 'interacti on wi th the Exec Sec. And, agai n, UNCLASS I FIED I my went very brief UNCLASS I 2 immediately and a 3i3 I EIED told Charfie Kupperman about this. Okay. 5 I do want to go through some of the other meetings on your calendar, and I thlnk we'd tike to mark your calendar as an exhjbit. So it's going to be 6 majority exhibit No.3. J 4 t"lR. NOBLE: So, Dr. H'i11, 7 [l\4ajority Exhjbjt No.3 8 was marked for i denti fi cati on. l BY MR. NOBLE: 9 ll a And we have an extra copy for you. And we're just going to skip through some of the meetings and see if there's t2 anythi ng t3 t9 A Sure. relevant. a A And I just want to assure everybody that I was not filing my na'i1s or having spa treatments in all thjs black space. I obviously don't look ljke I was very busy, but there were a lot of other meetings. And we also were very mindful of our calendars because 20 calendar information can obviously be used by outside l0 t4 15 t6 t7 18 22 parties, meaning Russ'ia, you know, kjnd of any others to of figure out the kind of meetings that they should be 23 checki ng 2t 24 25 for people's communi cati ons wi th. ask people to be very careful with this. a 0kay. We appreciate that. UNCLASS I FI ED So I kind would also UNCLASS I I 2 4 5 6 7 8 about A a A April 29 to May 3. It's Yeah. We a A a Bottom ri ght. Yeah. I got i t. Okay. So the meeting on May 1, that ll 12 Yovanovi tch? l3 A bei a t7 l8 t9 20 2t 22 23 wi page 36. haven't got oh, yeah. I see. Yes. I think we talked We did. That was with Phil Reeker and Ambassador Correct. That's when she told me that she was ng removed as Ambassador. l5 16 the wi th A a l0 t4 314 Let's ski p to page 36. I t's Hill 35. These are entries for April 29th through May 3 rd , 2019. J 9 FIED th Okay. The next day, on May 2nd, you had a meeting Rob Blai A a A a A r. Correct. Who i He s Rob Blai r? is the deputy to Mick l'4ulvaney. Do you reca11 what Yes. that meeting was about? And there was also a meeting with JRB was, .you know, Ambassador Bolton, and then with General Ke11ogg. They were both to relate to them they were to relate to 24 all of 25 Reeker. them my meeting with UNCLASS I Ambassador Yovanovitch and Phil FIED UNCLASS I a 2 Yovanovi tch? J A and 6 8 9 l0 How asked a A 5 7 I 315 Okay. And what specifically about Ambassador I 4 F]ED disturbed I was by what had happened to her, if there was anything that we could And what That' s Ambassador do. dld they say? when , you know, I ment'ioned to you that Bolton, who looked extremely pained, you know, basically said there was nothing that could be done, but Giuliani was a -a That's the hand grenade comment? lt A t2 everybody up. l3 a A hand grenade, yeah, Rudy that's going to blow Okay. And who is General Kellogg? 22 is the now National Security Advisor to the Vice President. And General Kellogg is the person who hired me along wjth K.T. McFarland and General Flynn to work at the National Security Council. He's had a number of positions. O What was his role at this time? A He was the National Securi ty Advi sor to the V'ice President. And I wanted him to know that this very troubling development had taken place because, I mentioned before 'in the line of question'ing, that we were always contemplat'ing: 23 Was 24 know, 25 know, we had been, you know, t4 l5 l6 l7 l8 l9 20 2t He there a way that we could get the Vice President, you to go to Ukraine at an appropriate time? And, you UNCLASS talking about, I EIED depending on the UNCLASS I FIED 316 I timing of the inauguration or, you know, any of the potential 2 meet i ngs . ll Sure. Let's talk about that for a second because there has been public reporting that originally Vice President Pence was supposed to attend the inauguration, and then President Trump, at least has been reported, ordered him not to attend. Do you have any knowledge about that and how that happened? A Yeah. I already responded to that in regard to Mr. Castor's question, and as I said, there was a lot of scheduling issues. The Vice President can't be out of the t2 country a J 4 5 6 7 8 9 l0 a 23 at the same time as the President. And as I mentioned, I'd already flagged that there were all kjnds of i ssues swi rl i ng around wi th Rudy Gi u1 i ani and Ukrai ne and you know, the ousting of our Ambassador. And i t was go'ing to be very ti ght f or the V j ce Pres'ident to make it for the inauguration. So I, you know, have no knowleQge that he was actually ordered not to go, but it was going to be very difficult for him to go. a 0kay. And A And I had already put forward, you know, as I mentioned before, Secretary Perry, who I, you know, was always advocating to go and you know, go to things like 24 this. l3 t4 l5 t6 t7 18 t9 20 21 22 25 , a Did you have conversations with General Kellogg UNCLASS 1 F]ED UNCLASS I IEIED 317 about your concerns regarding Giuliani ? 8 I did. 0kay. And was that is that around thjs time? No. Thi s i s exactly that ' s what I 'm sayi ng. These meeti ngs w'ith the three of them, and I know they look like they were in the same time because they were both very short with Ambassador BoIton, and then with Ke1logg, it was for somewhat longer because I had already expressed concerns 9 with 2 J 4 5 6 7 l0 A a A Ambassador And I Bolton beforehand. wanted to flag for Rob Blai r, because often l1 ambassadorial issues come through the Chief t2 0ffice, of Staff's l6 Blair js a, you know, very good professional, knows foreign affairs, that this was all transpiring and that this was going to have a massjve backlash also at the State Department and that it already had, you know, a chilling effect, you know, with our Embassy in Kyiv and also among, 17 you know, many people that we were interacting with. r3 l4 15 l8 and Rob People were shocked. They'd already got word that she'd 23 for or summoned very abruptly for consultatjons back at home, and she told me at this meeting here that she'd already been di sm'issed, and i t was looki ng for a time for her to come back. a Okay. How did Mr. Blai r respond when you raised 24 these concerns? t9 20 2t 22 25 been, you know, recalled A He said that he would flag this for t"'lick and that UNCLASS I EIED UNCLASS I he would pay attention a A 2 J How I FIED to it, for 318 Mulvaney. about General Kellogg? General Kellogg didn't say that he would te11 the 4 Vice President, but he said that he would talk to the 5 And team. 6 I also had Jennifer Wi11iams, his director who covered all of Europe, who was our counterpart there I mean, 7 again, we talked about how sma1l the Vice President's team 20 in the meeting. So I wanted to make sure that they knew that there 1,',ere issues and they should be very careful, you know, so that the you know, Vice President didn't, you know, get mi red up in I was flagging, you know, in case Rudy Gjuliani or anybody who's sort of seeki ng meeti ngs. We did this frequently. I mean, that's what the Vice Pres'ident's staff would rely on us for sending red flags to them for, you know, meetings they should avoid or, you know, kind of things that they should be aware of because they didn't have a big team to be able to track everything. a Okay. Let's ski p to the next page, page 37 , a meeting on l'lay 6th with, it looks 1ike, the Ukrainian it 2t was 8 9 10 l1 t2 l3 t4 l5 t6 t7 l8 l9 is and she was also a Ukrainian delegation along with 22 A ,t) speak about 24 j nte1l i gence di 25 a There was a Ukrai ni an delegatj on. I can't actually that one. This was arranged with rectorate. Okay. UNCLASS ] FIED our UNCLASS I I 2 a J 319 call with Phil Reeker was me following up again on, you know, more of these related A And then the secure i ssues. a A 4 5 6 FIED how Relating to Giuliani? Related to concerns about Ukraine and, you know, things were unfolding with Ambassador Yovanovitch. But 13 I mean, as Phil Reeker was the Assistant Secretary for all of Europe, we always had a long agenda of items that we needed to di scuss about. And i n thi s, you know, timeframe and you'11 see on the there was also things related to next page Viktor Orban, the Prjme Mjnister of Hungary was coming, and Ambassador Reeker was in charge of obviously Hungary in his portfolio. And we were doing a press t4 background bri efi ng i n thi l5 I l6 the t7 l8 a Okay. 0n l4ay 23rd, i t's not on your calendar, but that's the day of the meeting we've been talking about when l9 the 7 8 9 l0 l1 t2 20 2t 22 23 24 25 a1so, was doing one. So s timeframe. He was doi ng one, and all of these issues would have been on agenda. A a A a That's ri ght. U.S. delegat'ion came back. Yeah. Did you get a readout from anyone about that meet i ng? A Yes. I got a readout from Charlie Kupperman. UNCLASS ] FIED UNCLASS I I 2 J 4 5 a A a FIED He participated in the He did. And what 320 meeting? djd he say happened during that meeting on May 23rd? A He said that the other participants had made I 6 mean, he obviously wasn't on the 7 concerted delegation had made a t2 effort to express and Senator Johnson can talk to you about this because he was in that meeting about their positive impressions about Zelensky, and that there had been a lot of stress on energy reform, and that Secretary Perry had been instructed that he had 90 days to see if we could make some progress on the energy reform in the l3 energy sector. 8 9 l0 ll t4 And, agai n , thi s was all cons'istent wi th , as I menti oned 15 before, discussions that we'd been having with our t6 team, including with We11s Griffith and his t7 others, on how we would try to get Ukraine more embedded in European energy security, not just look to some kind of l8 19 20 2t 22 23 24 25 staff energy and many object vis-ir-vis Russia or as a trans'it country for Russian energy, but how we would get Ukraine in and of itself in a better place jn terms of its energy diversification and the restructuring of jts own energy sector. a Are you aware of President Trump saying anything in that meeting along the lines that he believed that had tried to bring him down jn 20L5? UNCLASS ] FIED Ukraine UNCLASS I F]ED 321 5 A That was related to me by Ambassador Volker at a later poi nt. a 0kay. What did Ambassador Volker tel1 you? A He told me exactly that. a Okay. Had you ever heard did you ever hear that 6 on any other occasions, President Trump expressing belief I 2 a J 4 7 8 9 that he believed Ukraine A I think he sajd i t pubticty, but defini tety Mr. Gi uIi an j has said thi ngs 'in that regard. 2l a Turning to page 39, on May 241n, that Friday, it looks like you had a meeting with Ambassador Taylor A That's ri ght and l4r . Vi ndman? a A Yes. And I had a previous meeting with Ambassador Taylor on the L3th. So this was when Ambassador Taylor, on page 38, was, you know, basically in the process of he wasn't able to go out to the inauguratjon. He was in the process of going out as Charge. And as I mentioned before, I've known Ambassador Taylor for decades, and he and I talked, you know, very frequently about some of the challenges he was going to face'in this 22 posi l0 ll t2 l3 t4 l5 t6 l7 l8 t9 20 23 24 25 ti on. talk to you himself, but he had made jt very clear that if the State Department didn't have hi s back on th'is, that he wouldn't And I know he's going to UNCLASS I F]ED come in and UNCLASS I continue FIED in the position. He was 322 very reluctant to step into J a situation where the previous Ambassador had been ousted baseless charges. He was very well aware of all of the 4 dangers here. 2 a on 12 a Did that include the dangers of Giuliani? A Yes. a Yeah. You discussed that with Ambassador Taylor? A I d1d discuss that with Ambassador Taylor. And, actually, i ni tj a11y, I thought he shouldn't do i t. And then over time we became, you know, more -- we needed Ambassador Taylor, frankly, somebody of his stature. And he said that he had an undertaking from Secretary Pompeo that they would t3 have 5 6 7 8 9 l0 ll l4 his back and make sure that he wasn't subject to baseless attacks either from inside of the Ukraine or l5 the outsi de. from 18 did you init'ia1ly think he shouldn't do it? Because he was basically taking over what looked at this point fike a tainted, poisoned chalice. I mean' if you 19 have had your previous Ambassador ousted on no 20 somebody 2l up a mess, 16 t7 22 23 24 25 a A O A Why just cause and else has to step in and they have to basically clean I mean, would You do that? I 'm not testi fYi ng, but Yes. But I thi nk basically most of us would thlnk twice, three times, four times before agreeing to do this. a Yeah. 0n page 39, there's th1s meeti ng on the 22nd UNCLASS I FIED UNCLASS with Amos I FIED JZ) Hochstein. Is that the meeting that you referred 15 to earlier? A That's the meeting that I referred to. And I related to Ambassador Taylor, who also knows Amos Hochstejn from the past, what he had told me and suggested that he should, you know, also talk to him if he wanted to. But Ambassador Taylor seemed to know a lot of this jnformation anyway. Ambassador Taylor is extremely well jnformed, and he's, you know, kjnd of never stopped on his keeping track of Ukraine, you know, since the time that he was an Ambassador. a Okay. What about thjs meeting on May 23 with Kri stj na I 'm goi ng to A Kvien. She is the new DCM, deputy chief of mi ssi on , i n Ukrai ne. a And what was this? Was thjs meeting just a briefer l6 on 2 J 4 5 6 7 8 9 l0 ll 12 13 14 t7 l8 A a A Correct. before she went over? 2t for us to talk about, you know, kjnd of policy 'issues. And I related to her, you know, the hopes that we would be able to focus with the Ukrainians on this broader 22 energy sector reform and how we could work with other t9 20 23 24 25 And there, the Germans, the Poles, the Czechs, the Slovaks, you know, not just the usua1, you know, suspects of , you know we always work obv'iously wi th the EU or the European embassies UNCLASS I FIED UNCLASS I F]E D 2 in a general sense, but how we could be more proactive jn trying to get the Europeans to do more on J Ukra i ne . I 4 5 6 7 8 9 NAT0 324 a11ies it wasn't just about military issues; it was also about energy because, yotl know, the Germans -- we were in this spat with the Germans about Nord Stream 2, but, you know, the Germans also have the wherewithal to help Ukraine refurbish its energy infrastructure and, you know, also to work with the Poles and the Czechs and Slovaks for bringing And n LNG. l0 i ll at this point talking about bringing through Bremen, and through a new port, LNG into Germany that also could come'into Ukraine 1f there was indeed a bujlding up of the infrastructure in that part of Europe. a Okay. 0n page 41-, we're moving into early June' you had a SVTC with Ambassador Volker, jt looks like? t2 l3 t4 l5 t6 And the Germans were also 24 to update the Eu ropeans on you know, the Presidential delegation and some of the next steps, you know, on and then, you know, the question stil1 at thjs point was, were the Russians going to be at all willing to meet, you know, as we're getting now past the inauguration of Presjdent Zelensky, or were we going to have to wait until the larger elect'ions were taking place? And so this is a kind of occasion where the French and 25 German t7 18 t9 20 2t 22 23 A Yes . That was f or him counterparts to Ambassador Volker would relay UNCLASS I F]ED , UNCLASS I 2 a J 4 i nformati I FIED on from meeti ngs that they had parti ci pated 325 i n. I to confess, I was only jn part of that meeting. a Okay. That's okay. We don't need to go i nto detail. But I did want to ask you have 5 MR. HECK: 6 Mjnority. IPresjdjng.] Your time has expi red. l5 HILL: And just as a note, the Alex Ukraine thing after this js to fol1ow up to say, you know, to kind of make sure that we were, you know, following up on any issues that would pertain to us in terms of interagency coordinatjon. So, often, when we had a meeting, I would follow up with our Ukraine director just to make sure that if we had any do-outs that we had to be in charge of and, you know, at his 1evel, there's lots of working-1eve1 meetings that i just to make sure that everyone is on don't participate in t6 the 7 8 9 l0 l1 t2 l3 t4 DR. same page. MR. t7 l8 a 19 20 2t 22 23 24 25 NOBLE : Okay. BY MR. CASTOR: 5o you told Mr. Vindman not to go to the debriefing th the Pres'ident? A We agreed with Charlje Kupperman that, given what I'd just Iearned about this confus'ion about Kash Pate1, that i t would not be best. a What "if i t was j ust a mi stake? A Charlie Kupperman led me to believe that it wi UNCLASS I F]ED UNCLASS I FIED I probably not was a mistake, and he 2 personnel i ssues. J 4 5 6 7 8 9 a A a Okay. 326 didn't want to get into So this as wetl. What exactly was the issue? It sort of strikes But he was clearly concerned by us as random that now we're talking about Kash Pate1. it was a bit random to me too. I'd never I would him, and i told you I didn't have any talked to meetings with him. And suddenly the Exec Sec, just, you A We11, t2 I'm picking up some other material for are telling me that the President wantS to meet wi th thi s Ukrai ni an di rector about materi als that they l3 had got from him and, you know, l0 ll know, the regular guys, you know, who t9 just to have an alert that he'd be asking for Kash. And that's obviously what, yotl know, for me a Is it possible there was just a mixup, that -A It didn't sound like it. That doesn't really happen . I 've not had that ki nd of mi xup before. I t ' s not like the names of directors not everybody knows our 20 di rectors. 2l O Any other reason the President would know Kash Patel? I mean, maybe A I couldn't tel1 you. I think you'd have to ask that yourselves. I don't know. a And you have never met Mr. Patel or you didn't t4 l5 t6 t7 18 22 23 24 25 UNCLASS I FIED UNCLASS I FIE 327 D 7 him. I know what he looks fike, and I'd meetings with hjm. But I'd never had any one-on-one jnteraction with him, and he'd not been attending any of our Ukrai ne meeti ngs. He was on the general d"istro f or hi s directorate. But I started to worry that he'd been sending some of our materials in an unauthorized fashion, so I made sure that he wasn't on any of our distros that could have 8 been i nternally. I 2 3 4 5 6 A been in a 9 l0 Bo1 ll t2 15 l6 17 18 t9 20 2t 22 23 24 25 have met Did you communicate your issue wjth Ambassador ? A Charlie Kupperman said he would speak to Ambassador Bolton about thi s. 13 t4 ton I a Okay. And did he ever get back to you about what A a A He the sajd that he was dealing with jt. Okay. That's i t? That was the end of j t? Charlje Kupperman always dealt with issues that you to hjm, and it was jn discuss'ion with h'im that he said that he would go in and sjt jn and give us a readout of the meeting, because it was another red flag at that point that something was going on, because Kash Patel had not been involved in the inauguration meeting. And I never raised th'is wi th Kash Patel because, agai n a Was this like a widely known fact at NSC? It just seems like a rather random factoid. brought UNCLASS I EIED UNCLASS I 2 J 4 5 6 7 8 9 l0 I FIED 328 A When I told my office that this was the case, I said: Has any of you had any interaction with Kash Patel? It alarmed everybodY. a Right. But now it's the subject of a Q and A being raised by, you know, congressional staff. I mean, how would that information get to congressional staff? A Wel1, that suggests that Charlie Kupperman did i ndeed rai se i t w'ith peoPle. a Including congressional staffers? A I don't know about that, but he must have raised it l3 with other people because, you know, how else do you guys get to know a lot of thi s stuff? a Okay. But you haven't communicated that t4 information ll t2 l5 l6 t7 A a A a I have not. i I n advance of today, ri ght? have not. t9 the information conveyed to the majority has been equal in terms of majority and minority get the same 20 i nf ormat'ion comi l8 2t 22 23 24 25 A a here talki A a And ng f rom you? I haven't spoken to anybody from any of the staff. 0kay. So this js the first time that you've been ng About? about these matters? You UNCLASS I EIED didn't have a UNCLASS I EIED 329 pre-brief? A a A O 2 That i s correct, I did not. l3 0r any pre-fe1t telephone ca1ls? I did not. And to your knowledge, there was no prof f er ra'ised by your representatives, whether your attorney or otherwjse? A What do you mean a proffer? a Proffer is when, you know, an attorney will call and talk about the testimony that his or her cljent intends to give. A Not to my knowledge. Although, now, what I have to say is that I've read a 1ot about my testimony, purported testimony, and as you know, I don't have a written testimony 14 i J 4 5 6 7 8 9 l0 11 t2 15 16 n the press. a A Ri ght. 50, as I had raised Kash Patel as a concern in my 17 djrectorate and to other people, and I mentioned it to l8 Kent, Deputy Assjstant Secretary Kent, and to also t9 21 Taylor, and after I'd put it up the chajn asking them to be aware if there was any communjcation from Kash Patel, I can be, you know, fairly confident that they talked to other 22 people about thi s. 20 Okay. So i t 23 a 24 be handled, 25 A wasn' t a mi in your view? Correct. That's ri ght. UNCLASS I EIED stake. I t DAS Ambassador was somethi ng to UNCLASS I a A 0kay. I F]ED 330 And 23 of 2 and a half years at the Natjonal Security Council, something like this isn't usually a mistake. We had an awful lot of people in the early stages of the admi ni strat'ion doi ng all ki nds of thi ngs that were not jn their portfolio. a 0kay. Did you talk wi th Mr. Patel's supervi sor? A I did not because they were jn the moment of a transi tion there as well. And Charlie Kupperman was the person who was dealing with all personnel issues, so I went to the appropriate channel. a And did he ever A I also was not, you know, at the time, you know, going to, you know, basically throw Mr. Patel under anybody's bus. I told Charlie Kupperman about it, and I said: I barely know Kash Patel. I know what he works on. But I did go back to my office and, aga'in, flag for the people who were working on Ukraine that they should just be alert to make sure that they had no representation from him and, you know, kind of suggested there may be some confusion that is exactly what I said -- from our Exec Sec for whatever reason about who is our Ukraine director. And I just want to make sure that everyone knows jt's Alex Vindman, 24 and there 2 J 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 ll t2 l3 t4 l5 t6 t7 l8 t9 20 2t 22 25 a And based on my experience is no other Ukraine director at the NSC. Okay. And Vindman wasn't in the May 23 debrief? UNCLASS I FIED UNCLASS A a A a I 2 J I F]ED 331 He was not. Was anybody from NSC? Charlie Kupperman. 6 Okay. And Charlie Kupperman didn't get back to with a result of his A He gave me a readout, and I just, you know, 7 repeated that 4 5 8 a A No, with the Kash Patel issue. a Well you 1l did not. But I wouldn't necessarily have expected him to, but my experience with Charlje Kupperman is he always followed up, always, on any jssue that I brought to 12 him. 9 l0 l3 t4 He , 'if there's some conf usi operating in the Ukraine policy A a l5 t6 on about somebody space dealt with this. you would think that he would follow up with Then he would have t7 you. l8 I've heard most recently is that Kash Patel has been moved to counterterrorism, where there's not a lot of terrorism going on in Ukraine. a Okay. But I guess my point was, if there was an issue that needed to be deconflicted and Mr. Kupperman went and djd that but didn't come back to you, I mean, what -A He did not, but, I mean, he would not necessarily. if there was any disciplinary or anything else as a result of 19 20 2l 22 23 24 25 A From what UNCLASS I FIED UNCLASS I FIED to 332 that. That's I that, 2 personnel issue that he would deal with. J 4 5 6 7 8 9 l0 ll he would not come back a A a A a me on a Dld he jndicate to you that he had handled it? He said he would. He said he would handle it. Okay. But you never had any closed loop I did not, no. I'm going to ask you about the Politico article from January L7th again. A a A Okay. I just want to warn you in advance. A11 right. I mean, I have to go back and read that 22 all over again. a And we have copies if anybody wants one. A You don't work for Politico, do You? a What's that? A Well , j t's j ust you' re touti ng thi s , you know, ki nd of Po1 i ti co arti c1e a I 'm not touti ng i t. No. I'm j ust you know, thi s i s, you know, a news account. 1t's rather i n depth. You know, this is a reporter that A Who's the reporter? Jog mY memory. a Mr. Voge1, Kenneth P. Voge1. Do you know 23 l'4r. Vogel? t2 l3 t4 l5 l6 t7 l8 t9 20 2t . 24 A 25 things. I mean, I know of him. I've UNCLASS I FIED seen his bio and other UNCLASS I F]ED JJJ 4 Rlght. I mean, h€'s gone on to The New York Times at thi s poi nt. And, you know, thi s arti cle goes through entreati es to the Ukrai ni an Embassy, you know, here in the United States. And l'lr. Vogel interviews 5 and gets people on the record 6 was interested in. I 2 a J a 7 And 8 thi s arti 9 l0 ll A a A I'm just cle, talking about what all the guffawing over the veracity of I 'm j ust This is in January 20L7, this article. Yes. Yes. So, remember , I go 'into the government, 'into the t2 administration in Aprit of l3 t9 a Ri ght. A By which time, I receive or when I go jn an awful 1ot of briefings a Ri ght. A from the Intelligence Community, and I read all of the documents pertaining to 2015. And I am then in endless meetings about this to try to push back against the 20 Russ'ians t4 15 l6 t7 r8 21 a A 20L7. . Ri ght. 23 all of the materiats that I have from a classi fi ed context, there i s none of that, anythi ng, you 24 know, related to 22 25 a And so 0kay. But, I mean, i t's - - you know, reporti ng i s UNCLASS I EIED UNCLASS I 2 A a A a 4 5 6 No, I 'm not. outright fabrication, right? No, I 'm not. Okay. Are you able to characterize what parts of the story concerns you? I mean, we yeah, I'd like to know why we're DR. HILL: I really MR. W0L0SKY: 8 9 10 doi ng thi s. Just wait before we get to that. ll MR. W0L0SKY: t2 DR. l3 MR. WOLOSKY: You know, l4 l5 t6 334 a compi lati on of talki ng to sources. And you' re not sayi ng the whole story is just J 7 I FIED you' HILL: Yeah. OkaY. re talki ng about. MR. CASTOR: 0kay. MR. WOLOSKY: We I don't know what document can make an exhibit. I haven't read it. The witness hasn't t7 read i t. l8 23 I read it a long time ago. MR. WOLOSKY: A long time ago. It's not been entered as an exhibit -MR. CASTOR: I 'm goi ng to enter i t MR. W0LOSKY: -- or offered as an exhibit. Do you want us to sit and read the article? I mean we're here. We'11 do 24 whatever you want. 25 MR. CASTOR: t9 20 2t 22 DR. HILL: We11, . This is exhibit UNCLASS IFIED 4. UNCLASS I FIED 33s ty t No. 4 I lMi nori 2 Was marked f or j denti f i cat'ion. l J t'4R. W0L0SKY: Exhi bi If you are going to ask her about, you 4 know, generally what's accurate and what's not accurate, you 5 know, why don't you point her 6 art'icle. to specific portions of the 15 'd be happy to. DR. HILL: Yeah, I remember, I mean, of course, th'is artjcle. And as I sa'id before, I could g'ive you a long t'ist of people who were reach'ing out on at1 ki nds of di f f erent fronts to all of the campaigns, all of the campaigns, from all k'inds of di f f erent sources who were tryi ng to do something like thjs. MR. CASTOR: So you don't discount the fact that was probably doing what's reported here? I mean, l6 you're an expert 7 8 9 l0 11 t2 l3 t4 t7 l8 l9 20 2t 22 23 24 25 MR. CAST0R: Yeah, I DR. talk'ing HILL: It's not we11, what specifically are we about? MR. WOLOSKY: We11, what specifically are you referring to because we're not going to have her answer -- you know, affirm broad statements: Is this accurate? Is this 30-page art'icle accurate? DR. HILL: Yeah. And i t's a1so, you know, talki ng about people in the Ukrajnian Amerjcan community, which is pretty extensive, people with meetings at the Embassy. And as you UNCLASS ] EIED UNCLASS I EIED 336 4 all kinds of peace projects that were being put around at that time. I received about three of them from di fferent people. I had people asking to talk to CoIin Powe11 and would I, 5 you know, help set things up with that I 2 J know, there were BY MR. CASTOR: 6 7 a 8 A 9 Sure. before, you know, for example, Jeb Bush, know, you name it. you There were people coming forward trying 2t to use any contact that they possibly could to talk to people. And there aren't art'ic1es about a1t of them. So, when i go back to Brookings, perhaps I could start wri ti ng a lot of arti cles about the people I knew prev'iously in the runup to the 20L5 election who were trying to do some of these things too. It does not amount to a large-scale Ukrainian Government effort to subvert our elections which is comparable to anything that the Russians did in 2015. And if we start down this path, not discounting what one indiv'iduaI or a couple of individuals might have done, ahead of our 2020 elections, we are setting ourselves up for the same kind of failures and intelligence failures that we had 22 befo re l0 ll 12 l3 14 l5 l6 t7 18 t9 20 23 24 25 . a A a Okay. I Look, and I feel very strongly about this. Evi dently . UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASS ] I 2 J 4 5 6 7 8 9 l0 1l 12 l3 t4 l5 A a A I'm not trying to 22 23 24 25 our Iet me help you understand here. I'm trying to understand: Is jt the whole thing, everything? a Wel1, MR. WOLOSKY: Ask her a question about a specific thing of whjch she has personal knowledge, and she'11 respond. She's not going to respond to an L8-page article based on some general MR. CAST0R: article. I into it. I'm not asking her to respond to an L8-page marked and we're about to her something specific, Mr. it as an exhibjt, MR. W0L0SKY: We11, ask get Castor. HILL: Are you tryi ng to suggest - - sorry. MR. W0L0SKY: 21 in terms of nati onal securi ty. 17 20 mess about here. Yes, and so you should, too, DR. t9 337 Evidently you do. 16 l8 FIED 0kay. Just ask her a quest'ion, and she will respond. BY MR. CASTOR: a Okay. Page two A Al l r'ight a Ukrainjan American operative this is the a third paragraph on page two who was consulting for the Democratic National Committee met up with top officials of the Ukrajnian Embassy in Washington in an effort to expose UNCLASS I E]ED UNCLASS I FIED I tjes 2 Manafort, and Russia, according 338 between President Trump, top campaign aide Paul 5 to people with knowledge of the si tuat jon. The Ukra'ini an ef f orts had an impact i n the race helpi ng to force Manafort's resi gnati on. MR. W0L0SKY: Answer to the limit of your personal 6 knowledge J 4 7 8 that you had. DR. HILL: WeI1, this is the conclusion of and David Stone. BY MR. 9 l0 ll t2 13 t4 l5 t6 t7 Kenneth Vogel ght. And so Thi s i s not the conclusi on of the U. S. i nte11 i gence a A agenc i es a A Ri . Okay. I 5o cannot make arti c1e ei ther a A CASTOR: that conclusion just based on that . OkaY. This is an assertion, the conclusion that the of this article are making. t8 authors l9 2t a 0kay. A Now, should we have been looking, all of us, overall, at every effort to jnterfere in our election? 22 we should have been. 20 Yes, , I 'm tryi ng to fi gure out whether thi s complete fiction that was pitched to a reporter and At 24 a is just 25 has been completely debunked based on information you have or 23 my peri 1 UNCLASS T FIED UNCLASS I I E] 339 ED whether there's any other explanation for this J It is a fiction that the Ukrainian Government was launching an effort to upend our election, upend our electjon 4 to 2 A mess with our Democratic systems. 8 Okay. But there could have been some Ukrainians that were i nterested i n i nj ecti ng i nformati on A And this appears to be a Ukrainian American, which we're also talking about 14r. Fruman and Mr. Parnas are 9 Ukrainian Amerjcans who were also trying 5 6 7 a 10 democracy and who managed to l1 sacked. t2 a to subvert our get one of our ambassadors 0n page 1l. i s where i t starts getti ng 'into l3 Leshchenko's jnvolvement. Like, what do you know about l4 t9 efforts to expose the Manafort issue? A 0n1y what I have read in the press. a 0kay. So there is nothing that you have A Again, th'is is jn January of 2017, and the period jn which I entered into the government and, you know, the period in which you're working there, we unearthed more and 20 more information on what the Russians were doing. 2t a A a A 1 i ne of l5 t6 t7 l8 22 23 24 25 Leshchenko's Okay. I'm not And i t's not to trying to compare what they're doing Yes, but I'm not sure where we're going with this i nqui ry here UNCLASS I FIED UNCLASS a A I I F]ED I'm just asking 340 You about 6 if you're also trying to peddle an alternati ve vari ati on of whether the Ukrai ni ans subverted our election, I don't want to be part of that, and I will not be part of j t. a I'm not tryi ng to peddle anythi ng. I'm tryi ng to 7 ask you about what 'information you have regarding these. 8 And, you know, 2 J 4 5 A 9 l0 t2 13 j ust t4 l5 t6 t7 18 l9 20 2t 22 ./.) 24 25 frankly, if we didn't have such a -- But you're asking me about an written in Pofitico in January of a was just 11 Because articte that was 20L7. to i t, but i t such a passionate rebuke of this article that And I probably wouldn't have returned it's of the thrust of the question that you're asking here, which 'is to basically you know, what we're dealing with now is a s'ituation where we are at risk of saying that everything that happened in 2015 was a result of Ukraine in some fashion. a Yeah, I 'm not saYi ng that. I 'm not A Well, that's certainly what it sounds like to me. a I'm not goi ng down that path. I'm j ust simply trying to understand the facts that are djscounted or recounted in this storY. 0n page 13, it talks about the Ambassador Chaly penning an op-ed. Do you have any familiarity with the op-ed that A We11, UNCLASS I EIED UNCLASS I EIED 341 I the Ambassador wrote that was negative to the President, the 2 President when he was a candidate? 8 of people from every imaginable country at this particular point trying to game out where thi ngs were goi ng to go 'in our electi on. We can we had to do this, by the way, before find an awful lot every head of state v'isi t. We had to comb through what any of them might have said in the course of the election 9 campaign 3 4 5 6 7 A There were an awful 1ot that might be negative toward the President, and l0 there were an awful lot of people who said negative things. ll public in the Rose Garden wi th Prime M'ini ster Tsi pras of Greece, and i got my ass chewed out for this one afterwards because we hadn't noticed because I don't happen to speak Greek and didn't t2 l3 t4 You might remember a moment in t7 staff member, but John Roberts of CNN did a gotcha moment for Tsipras in public, fu1l pointing out to Tsipras view I remember it very vividly 18 negative things that he had sa'id about the President and 19 much he hoped 20 duri ng the Pres j dent'ial campai gn. l5 t6 2l 22 23 24 25 have on hand a Greek-speaking how that President Trump was not basically elected And the President was not at all happy, and the press staff said to me: How could you have missed that? We11, jt was all in Greek. So I presume that CNN has a whole Greek staff on board who are poring over things at, you know, vast expense. Wel1, we don't have lots of UNCLASS I FIED UNCLASS I I Greek-speaking staff F]ED members 342 poring over everything. J to this again, many individuals t ryi ng to game out ou r po1 i t'i ca1 sys tem , many othe r 4 governments. The Russians are the government that have been 5 proven from the very top 6 systems. 2 So, getting back 8 9 to be targeting our democratic Okay. Fai r enough. And I'm sorry to be very passionate, but this is a A 7 were prec i sely I'm just trying to get your -why I joined the administrat'ion. I didn't join a A l0 l1 t2 it 13 Presi dent because i thought the Ukrainians had been going after the . I didn't t4 a l5 reacti on to l6 A say you did. I'm just trying to get your We11, my reaction obviously 'is pretty strong t7 because, again l8 22 I know. I t' s proven very i nteresti ng. I'm extremely concerned that this is a rabbit hole that we' re all goi ng to go down i n between now and the 2020 election, and it will be to all of our detriment. a I'm just asking you to give your reaction and if 23 you have any firsthand information given your area of 24 expertise. 19 20 2t 25 a A A t'ly fjrsthand reaction UNCLASS I FIED is exactly of certain UNCLASS I i nf I FIED 343 ormat'ion i s exactly what I've sai d, that there may be , and I 2 J 4 5 6 7 lots of other American cit'izens with various appellates to them who were running around trying to do can name similar things with sim'i1ar embassies. a Okay. But you don' t have any f i rsthand i nf ormat'ion about Ambassador Chaly? Was that ever a point of discussjon? A 8 9 l0 It was not. But Ambassador Chaly was always trying to obviously push President Poroshenko's interest and, you know, obviously has now been removed by President Zelensky. a A 1l tz Ri ght. He was the former chief of staff to President l3 Poroshenko. t4 18 a Was Pres'ident Poroshenko, you know, i n f avor of Hillary Clinton over President Trump to the extent you know? A I do not know. I do know that Pres'ident Poroshenko spent an inordinate amount of time in the early stages of the administration trying to create as good a relationship as he 19 possibty could with both the Vice President and the 20 P l5 16 t7 2l 22 23 24 25 res i dent a . 0n page L4, Ukrai ne's Mi ni ster of Internal Affai rs, Avakov A a Mr. Avakov, yeah. Yeah. He had some disparaging remarks about the President on Twitter and Facebook. Do you have any firsthand UNCLASS]FIED UNCLASS I FIED 344 I information about that, or can relate any additional 2 i nformati on? J A 4 made 5 di 6 7 8 9 l0 ll l2 I can't. As I sajd, we found di sparagi ng remarks by pretty much every world leader and official at fferent poi nts about the President. So, you know, thi s i s not surprising but, again you know, and the fact of this was in the course presumably of the campaign. Again, this is January of 20L7, this article. a Okay. And this will be my last passage that I point you to, page 15, a Ukrainian Parliamentarian Artemenko? A Artemenko. Yeah, I don't really know him. a It was quoted you know, it was very clear that t7 they, presuming the Poroshenko regime, was supporting Hillary Clinton's candidacy. They did everything from organizing meetings with the Cljnton team to publicly supporting her to criticizing Trump. I think they simply didn't meet -- that is with the Trump 0rganization because they thought Hillary 18 would l3 t4 l5 t6 wi n . 20 I think that this is the kicker here. As you well know and as we all know, there was an awful lot of 2l people who actually thought 22 the election. So an awful lot of countries and indiv'iduals 23 were already preparing 24 curry favor with the t9 25 A a WeI1, that Secretary Clinton would win for that eventuality by trying campaign. Okay. UNCLASS I E]ED to UNCLASS I 345 7 certainly, as I said earlier on, before President Trump was selected as the candidate, I mean, if you're at all interested, at some point, I can sit down with you privately and go through a1I of the people I know who tried to go through every single one of your colleagues' campaigns from every kjnd of djfferent people who came up to us, because I had colleagues who were working on Senator 8 Rubio's campaign, on Bush's campaign, on Jeb Bush's campaign. I 2 J 4 5 6 9 A F]ED And And, beli eve me, there were Ukrai ni ans, Ukrai ni an l1 all of whom wanted to talk to those campaigns too because they didn't think that President Trump t2 would become the candidate. l0 Americans, Russians, 2t r enough. Yeah. And at the end of today, I am pretty certa'in you and maybe your lawyer won't want to see me agai n, but A No. No. It's totally fine. I'm just trying to basically say here that I have very you know, obviously strong feelings about our national security. And I just want to, if I've done anything, leave a message to you that we should all be greatly concerned about what the Russians jntend to do in 2020. And any jnformation that they can 22 provide, you know, that basically deflects our attentjon away 23 from what they djd and what they're planning on doing is very 24 usefut to 13 t4 15 t6 t7 l8 19 20 25 a a Faj them. The bottom of exhibit 3, on each page there's UNCLASS ] FIED a UNCLASS 1 2 J 4 5 6 7 8 9 l0 l1 date stamp July A FIED 346 3L. That was when my assistant printed it out. As you not actually there at the time. And do you have any firsthand information about why can be aware, a 1 I was this was printed then? A Because that was his last day in the office. And before I 1eft, after I'd been in to talk to our lega1 team, I asked i f I could have a copy of the contacts and the calendar for reference purposes so that I could help Tim Morrison with transi tion. And I wasn't actually able the contacts is also l3 I wasn't savvy enough to be able to print it out. Every time I printed it, it didn't t4 print. t2 date-stamped the same time because Fai r enough. l5 a t6 And t7 A Si l8 a It t9 A And he held onto i t, and 20 a When 2t A 22 23 24 25 then i t was pri nted mple i ncompetence. was printed on the 3Lst and then in Basi ca11y, yep. you came I picked it up jn Septembe r ? My printer -- picked it uP from him, yep. that the information that Mr. G'iuliani was communicating to the various persons, to the extent the jndividuals he was communicating that informatjon a To the extent UNCLASS I FIED UNCLASS I I 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 l0 1l 12 13 14 15 16 l9 20 2t 22 347 to A That was a 1ot of us, I think, you know, but anyone who was watching. a A a A a took i t at face value Ri ght. and Ri didn't undertake their own fact checking ght. investigation. If they simply took it at f ace va1ue, you know, i s i t f ai r to say that 'if people genuinely believed what was being provided, I mean, is it fajr to say that that could have yielded some of the results that we saw? A What results? MR. WOLOSKY: I don't understand. Too much breadth in that question. Could you sort of maybe break it down? DR. HILL: Yeah. t'/hat results? or own BY MR. CASTOR: t7 l8 FIED O Well , some of the results about the 'inf ormati on Mr. Giulianj was proffering A a Ri ght. you testjfied yielded the unpleasant result of Ambassador Yovanovitch being recalled? 24 A 0h, Ambassador Yovanovitch being recal1ed. We11, yes, if you beljeve in conspiracy theorjes and, as you said, 25 you know, and you don't have any 23 UNCLASS I FIED UNCLASS a A I Ri I FIED 348 ght. 4 alternat'ive ways of fact checkjng or looking i nto i ssues, 'if you bel i eve that George Soros rules the world and, you know, basicatly controls everything, and, you know' 5 if 2 J a A 6 7 8 you Was Mr . Gi ul i ani pushi ng that? He mentioned George Soros repeatedly, and The H'i11 art'ic1e as well did and many others. t9 a But just the March 24tn Hill article? A I th'ink i t was the 20th or somethi ng 1i ke that, that I saw. a Okay. A And I was very sensi ti zed to thi s i ssue because 'in the whole first year at the NSC a Rl ght. more people, myself included, were being accused A of being Soros moles. And, indeed, I'm out on InfoWars again with Roger Stone, Alex Jones purporting that jndeed from the very beginning I've been involved in a George Soros-led 20 conspi racy. 9 l0 ll t2 13 t4 l5 t6 t7 l8 a A 2t 22 Okay. So, if you believe things tike that, I mean' in 23 general, and a 1ot of people seem to do, or some people seem 24 to 25 do t"lR. W0L0SKY: I just wanted the record to reflect that UNCLASS I E]ED UNCLASS I FIED 349 Mr. Castor laughed in response to that question. 4 , no. No MR. WOLOSKY: Let me finish. And thjs is a very serious matter, okay. This js a matter where people are being 5 targeted and people -- 2 J MR. CASTOR: We1 1 . l0 is an outrageous -- that is outrageous to say that I laughed at that. MR. W0L05KY: You did laugh, and I want the record to reflect it because thjs is a very serious matter where peopte's lives potentially are in danger. And i t's not a ll laughi ng matter t2 t3 of individuals and situations that I have no familiarity with, and so to the t4 extent you think that 6 7 8 9 15 t6 t7 l8 r9 20 2t 22 23 24 25 MR. CASTOR: That . MR. CASTOR: She discussed a number l'lR. W0LOSKY: And when she mentioned Soros and InfoWars fact that she is now back into that cyc1e, laughed about i t. MR. CASTOR: i didn't bring up InfoWars. DR. HILL: I did. I did. and the MR. W0LOSKY: And you you laughed. So the record will reflect'it. 14R. CASTOR: We1l, that is, you know, an absolutely ridi culous characteri zation. DR. HILL: Look, I think the unfortunate thing that we're aIl in at the moment -- and as I said, you know, I try UNCLASS I FIED UNCLASS I FIED 3s0 8 at all times to, you know, maintain this nonpartisan, you know, expert approach, but we're in an environment where people befieve an awful 1ot of things. I mean, Mr.Soros and a whole lot of other people were sent pipe bombs. I had a call from one of the detailees from the FBI who was in my office previously, my previous special assi stant, who told me to seal up my door slot today before I came down here because he'S been following the a1t right out 9 of those I 2 a J 4 5 6 7 and wh'ite suPremac j sts. BY MR. l0 a A ll CASTOR: Who was that? l3 at the FBI, who was detailed, special assistant, and he said I'm lighting up the t4 Twi t2 My colleague back my ttersphere. 20 0kay. I have no I don't follow all of this stuff, so I have to rely on other people tipping me off about this. a Okay. I know nothing about Alex Jones or anything 1i ke that. I'm s'imply i nterested i n The Hi 11 reporti ng and, you know, what Lutsenko may or may not have said to Solomon 2t and l5 t6 l7 l8 19 a A 24 But i t's become part of what's become a very large universe of information and stories that are out there on the 'internet that is rea1ly affecting an awful lot of people's 25 j udgments. 22 23 A UNCLASS]FIED UNCLASS MR. CAST0R: 1 2 J 4 5 I FIED 351 Mr. Jordan? Okay. Dr. Hill, I just want to go back to where I was last hour, if I cou1d. Again, Ambassador Yovanovitch 'in her statement last week talked about corruption is not just prevalent'in Ukraine but is the MR. JORDAN: l1 , Zetensky, who 'is running a campaign on you know, totally on cleaning up the corruption, I mean, it's a central issue of his campaign, and wins. And my understanding is he won rather big. DR. HI LL: He di d wi n bi g, yeah MR. JORDAN: But as you ind'icated earlier, you still t2 don't know. r3 and then they get elected and sometimes they do things that t4 aren't consjstent wjth what they told the voters they were going to do. DR. HILL: Right. l,lR. JORDAN: So you wanted to wait, see how things happen j n the part i amentary electi ons 6 7 8 9 l0 l5 t6 t7 l8 system. And then along comes thi s guy . DR. t9 HI You know, people run campaigns and say things, LL: Yep. 2t himself. And so you wajt and the parliamentary elections go well for his party, 22 right? 20 MR. J0RDAN: -- see how he handled 24 HILL: Well, this happened, you know, in July, July 2l.st, by which I had already 1eft, but that'is correct, 25 yeah. 23 DR. UNCLASS I FIED UNCLASS I FIED 352 J Right. You're kind of waiting. And you I guess you were probably also also said earlier that waiting to see what happened what kind of feedback you got 4 from the fo1ks, Secretary Perry, Senator Johnson, who went to I 2 MR. JORDAN: 6 the inauguration, see what their feedback was. And my understanding, that feedback was positive for President 7 ZeIensky. 5 10 testified earlier that MR. G0LDMAN: Sorry to 'interrupt, but i f that's a you're nodding, so I just want the record to reflect you're l1 sayi ng yes. 8 9 And you 18 HILL: 0h, I'ff so sorry. Yes. I forgot the yes. That i s correct. Yes. I'm sorry. fi rst MR. JORDAN: And then you said earlier that, you know, OMB holds up dollars all the time. DR. HILL: Uh-huh. MR. JORDAN: It happened i n your, you know, extensive experi ence, 'i t's happened several times, even happened wi th t9 Ukrai t2 l3 t4 l5 t6 t7 20 2t 22 23 24 25 DR. ne, ri ght? DR. HILL: That's correct. Yeah. And then, in the end, it sort of all worked out, the J avel i ns happened, the securi ty assi stance dollars happened, continued to flow. And then, when MR. JORDAN: like many people have told US, it seems to me they actuatly hit it off when President Trump and Presjdent Zelensky meet, UNCLASS I FIED UNCLASS I they met 'in 353 New York. So we've 2 ] FIED got all this stuff going on, and I get it, and 6 it all. But as I look at it all, in the end, it k'ind of worked like it normally does. I understand there were d'ifferent people talking and doing d'ifferent things, and you talked a lot 7 about Ambassador Sondland and Mayor Giuliani and d'ifferent 8 thi ngs. 3 4 5 we've spent several hours talking about But in the end, what needed to get done, everything 9 you 2t . You agreed with the security assistance happening. You felt, I think, like the rest of the folks that we have spoken to, that if President Zelensky and Presjdent Trump get together, they're actually going to get a1ong. And you felt that when the Senator and the Secretary went there for the inauguratjon, they liked this guy too. All that kjnd of worked out. Is that fair to say? DR. HILL: Well, it depends on what you mean about working out. The President and President Zelensky did, in f act, meet at the U. N. GA. That j s correct. The m'i1i tary ass'istance appears to have been delivered, to the best of my 22 knowledge and also l0 u t2 l3 t4 l5 t6 t7 18 t9 20 23 24 25 have sa i d you agreed w'i th the J avel i ns goi ng there to yours. But in terms of the overall U.S.-Ukrainian relationship, no, I wouldn't say that this has worked out because we're in the m'idd1e of now what i s a scandal about Ukrai ne. So the UNCLASS ] FIED UNCLASS I FIED 354 8 to this point has been extraord'inarily corrosive, the removal of our Ambassador and what we have done, which is laying open what appears to have been an effort in which a number of unsanctioned individuals, including Ukrainian American busjnesspeople, seem to have been involved in these efforts MR. JORDAN: Dr. Hill, why do you think President Zelensky was jn favor of a new Ambassador to Ukraine from the 9 Uni manner 2 J 4 5 6 7 10 1l t2 13 t4 l5 in which we got ted States? HILL: I only see what I see in the transcript, in whi ch he's talki ng to the Presi dent. He di dn't say that he was necessarily in favor. He's just responding to what he has been told i n thi s transcri Pt. MR. JORDAN: I mean, I can look at th'is transcript again, but I think he said he favored it 100 percent. He was DR. l8 pretty emphatic about DR. HILL: He's responding to what the Presjdent said, as far aS I can tel1 here. I can't speak to what President l9 Zelensky'is thinking. I rea1ly can't. t6 t7 20 2t 22 23 24 25 MR. JORDAN: You th'ink he's simply responding to the President's suggestion? It seems to me, if that was the case, he would say: Okay. I think that would be fine. He says: No, I agree with you L00 percent. She was Poroshenko. DR. HiLL: He also says that he agrees l-00 percent, UNCLASS I FlED for UNCLASS 2 I F]ED 355 actually L ,000 percent, on, you know, Angela l'4erke1 and other European countri es not helpi ng Ukrai ne, whi ch actually i sn't 4 true. It i s true, as the President has asserted, that they're not helping on the military front, but the Germans 5 and the French and other Europeans are giving an awful 1ot of 3 7 technical assistance and funding and money to Europe. We were tryi ng to get them to do more, but 'it's not true that 8 they' re not doi ng 6 much. l0 I can't speak to what either of the Presidents were thi nki ng 'in thi s moment. I can only read and respond lt the transcri pt. 9 t2 Look, 1'4R. JORDAN: Wel1, okay, l3 Pres'ident Zelensky t4 Ambassador said. He fine. I to mean, we have what obviously wanted a new t6 just f ike President Trump did. DR. HILL: We11, he doesn't say he wanted a new Ambassador here. He wants his own new Ambassador. President t7 Zelensky also removed Ambassador ChaIy because he's newly l8 elected, and Ambassador Chaly used to be President 19 Poroshenko's National Security Advisor and Special Assistant, 20 Special Diplomatic Advisor. l5 24 I'm just reading what President Zelensky said. I agree with you 100 percent -- page four, second paragraph, President Zelensky, near the bottom: I agree with you L00 percent. Her attitude towards me was far from the 25 best as she 2l 22 23 MR. JORDAN: admi red the previ ous Pres'ident and she was on hi s UNCLASS I E]ED UNCLASS I I FIED 356 side. 4 HILL: Look, I can't speculate about why Presjdent Zelensky was saying this and about what he was thinking about at thi s particular time. He also doesn't have her name 5 correct. 2 J 6 DR. MR. JORDAN : You don ' t thi nk l3 HILL: And he says: It was great that you were the fi rst one who told me that she was a bad Ambassador. He said: It was great that you were the first one who told me that she was a bad Ambassador. MR. JORDAN: I understand. I'm not saying DR. HILL: No. But I'm just saying that this seems to suggest something e1se, so perhaps all of us shouldn't be t4 speculating on what they were basically both th'inking or l5 saying. 7 8 9 l0 ll t2 t6 t7 DR. MR. JORDAN: he sai d. I'm not speculating. I'm just saying what I 'm aski ng you 24 HILL: We11, he says: It was great that you were the first one the first one who told me that she was a bad Ambassador because I agree wi th you 100 percent. That doesn't mean to say that he thinks that she was a bad ambassador. He's responding to what the Presjdent has sai d to hi m. MR. JORDAN: So, when he sajd, "I agree with you 100 25 percent," he's not agreeing with the President 100 percent? 18 t9 20 2t 22 23 DR. UNCLASS ] FIED UNCLASS I EIED I 2 a J 4 5 6 7 8 9 l0 ll 357 HILL: Well, he's agreeing with the Pres'ident 100 percent if the President has told him that she is a bad Ambassador, as the fi rst one who i s telling him. DR. MR. JORDAN: A11 I'm HILL: I'm just saying to you what I'm reading here as weI1. And, look, I don't want to start parsing what either the President is saying or President Zelensky MR. JORDAN: I didn't posit why he wanted her. I just said what he said. You're the expert on Ukraine, not me. DR. HILL: LooK DR. 14 I'm asking you what you think DR. HILL: I am saying that he MR. JORDAN: -- why did Presjdent Ze1ensky, the guy who ran on corruption, the single biggest'issue, that was his l5 campaign, he wins, he gets 12 13 l"lR. JORDAN: t7 elected. He wjns the parliamentary races, and he says he wins overwhelming in his Presidential election, he says he wants a new Ambassador. l8 I 'm j ust aski ng you l6 t9 20 2t 22 Z) 24 25 DR. HILL: You'11 actually see here that there's an error i n translati on here. So, remember , Presj dent Zelensky doesn't real1y speak English. He speaks some English but not a lot of English. I would like to actually know whether this was, you know, fully interpreted or whether he himself was to speak in English for thjs actual ly see i t ' s qui te garbled attempting . UNCLASS I FIED because you'11 UNCLASS I I 2 FIED 358 So, if you start to actually look at this paragraph here, and I worked as a translator as we11, as an 5 interpreter, just to be clear here, and I do speak Ukrainian, although not as well as I speak Russian, and what he's saying here i s he has got confused between the Ambassador to the 6 United States from Ukraine, which cou1d, J 4 in actual fact, to the United be 8 his Ambassador, the Ukrainian Ambassador States. So he's getti ng himself confused i n thi s parti cular 9 poi nt here. 7 MR. JORDAN: What was l0 ll her name or his name, excuse me? l8 HILL: That's Ambassador Chaly. But you see, he says here: 1t'd be very helpful for the investigation to make sure that we admi n'ister j usti ce i n our country wi th regard to the Ambassador to the Un'ited States from Ukraine. So that ' s a1 ready a confus i on MR. JORDAN: We11, but he didn't say he didn't, but DR. HILL: So what I'm saying here is t9 he ' s l2 l3 t4 l5 t6 t7 DR. . gett'i ng conf used . 20 t'4R. J0RDAN: He 2l DR. said Yovanov'itch. HILL: Yes, but as I say, h€'s getti ng confused he's talkr'ng about the Ambassador to the United 22 because 23 States from Ukraine. 24 MR. JORDAN: 25 DR. HILL: OkaY. Fine. So what I'm saying here is, and then he said: UNCLASS 1 FIED UNCLASS I F]ED 3s9 t2 It was great that you were the first one who told me the first one who told me that she was a bad Ambassador because I agree with you 100 percent. And then he says her attitude to me was far from the best as she admired the previous President and she was on his side. And thi s 'is what we understand as be'ing sai d by Rudy Giuliani. Because I know from working with Ambassador Yovanovitch that she wasn't personally close to Poroshenko. MR. JORDAN: Dr. Hi11, that is fine. DR. HILL: And tet me j ust te11 you thi s, there's been there's been two two instances -- just 1et me finish instances jn which ambassadors have been refused agrement or l3 been refused cons'ideration by the countries because they've t4 been accused l5 P I 2 J '4 5 6 7 8 9 10 ll res i dent of being close to the previous incumbent . l9 with our Ambassador to Georgia, and she'd been previ ously servi ng 'in the Embassy i n Georgi a under Saakashvili, and the current President said that she was close to him and purported to prov'ide information to me and 20 to others, and thi s wasn't true. 2t anyone who had worked l6 t7 l8 22 23 24 25 This happened MR. JORDAN: Agai n, as I've sa'id bef ore, with President Poroshenko Doctor, I'm not asking about Georgia. I'm aski ng about Ukrai ne. HILL: No. But I'm poi nti ng out to you that thi s a common refrain that we get from other embassjes jn other DR. UNCLASS I F]ED i s UNCLASS I 2 J 4 7 8 360 countries when they don't necessarily, you know, want to either have an ambassador that we're trying to send to them or that they want to curry favor with many of our officials. They will often refer to things like thjs. MR. JORDAN: A11 5 6 I EIED right. Thank you. Dr. Hi11, do you have a relationship with f ormer Ass'istant Secretary of State Vi ctori a Nuland? DR. HILL: In what way, a relationship? MR. ZELDIN: MR. 9 ZELDIN: Professional. l5 HILL: A professional relatjonship, yes, when I was working jn the previous capacities as the national intelligence officer. She's a long-term, yotl know, Foreign 5ervice officer. 5he'd been the Nat'iona1 Security Advisor to Cheney, for example, to Vice President Cheney at that tjme. I do not have a personal relat'ionshi p wi th her beyond the t6 professional relationship. 10 l1 t2 r3 t4 DR. l'4R. 17 ZELDiN: Are you aware of her directing anyone at l8 State to talk to Christopher Steele during her tenure t9 Assi 20 2t 22 23 as stant Secretary? HILL: i was aware from the exchanges that she asked Kathy Kavalec to talk to him after we had thjs discussion already, when I suppose Christopher SteeIe had asked to talk to her, and she asked Kathy Kavalec to talk to him instead. DR. 24 MR. ZELDIN: In your opinion, would that be proper? 25 DR. HILL: I wouldn't have talked UNCLASS I EIED to him "in that UNCLASS I 1 2 3 4 FIED position, but whether jt's proper or not, I think, is j udgment for Assi stant Secretary Nuland and others. MR. ZELDIN: 361 a This was in the midst of the 20L5 election, correct? t7 HILL: I believe that's the case. I mean, I read about this 1ater, and Kathy Kavalec told me that she'd been i nstructed to go and talk to h'im. MR. ZELDIN: Has anything been stated so tar today that you would describe as classified, or would you say everything up to thi s poi nt 'is unclassi f i ed? DR. HILL: I don't think that anything that I have said is classified. 0r are you referring to just questions that you have asked? I mean, I think that when we've got jnto and this is why, you know, perhaps I've been a fittle harsher in my responses to the questions about the Politico piece and things about Ukraine because I have a lot of classified jnformation that leads jn other directions, and, obviously, I l8 can ' t sha re those. 5 6 7 8 9 l0 1t t2 l3 t4 l5 t6 DR. t9 20 2t 22 23 24 25 UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSITlED I [5:15 p.m.] 2 MR. ZELDIN J MR. 4 5 6 9 l0 : But i t' s your - - BITAR: Just as a matter of record for the interview, this interview, as we said at the outset, has been conducted at the unclassified 1eve1. We have not flagged anything at this moment in time as classified. DR. 7 8 362 HiLL: No, and I have confined all my answers to the things that have either been in the public d'iscussion MR. BITAR: I just don't want to leave any ambiguity, in light of the question ll MR. ZELDIN: t2 So That's why I'm asking the question. specifically with regards to the first round of l3 questions, you stated something about Venezuela and Russia. t4 Do l5 HILL: Yes. I said that the Russi ans si gnaled, including publicly through the press and through press articles that's the way that they operate that they they lajd'it out in articles, I mean a were interested in 1ot of them in Russian but, you know, obviously, your staff and Congressional Research Service can find them for you positing that, as the U.S. was so concerned about the Monroe Doctrine and its own backyard, perhaps the U.S. might also be then concerned about developments in Russja's backyard as in Ukraine, making it very obvious that they were trying to set up some kind of let's just say: You stay out t6 t7 18 l9 20 21 22 23 24 25 you recall talking about some type of DR. UNCLASS ] FIED UNCLAS S I FIED 363 I of Ukraine or you move out of Ukraine, you change your 2 posi ti on on Ukrai ne, and, you know, we'11 rethi nk where we J are wi th Venezueta. 6 I said that I went to Moscow. It wasn't a classified trip because I was going to meet with Russians. And in the course of those discussjons, it was also apparent, 7 including with a Russian think tank and other members, that 8 the Russian Government was'interested in having a discussion 9 about Venezuela and Ukraine. 4 5 And ZELDiN: And just il for that's something that it's all t2 everything's unclassif ied there? l3 that the Russjans, the Russians themselves made it very clear in unclassjfjed public and, settings that they were interested at some point in 'in f act, i t was even reported i n the press that I had gone to Russia, by someone that asked a question of our State Department officiats in doing a press briefi ng: Had I gone to Russia at the time to make a trade between Venezuela and Ukraine? It was asked as a question to Christopher Robinson during a press briefing at the State Department. MR. ZELDIN: Did you state earlier that there was a nexus between Rudy Giulianj associates and Venezuela? DR. HILL: I was told that by the directors working on the Western Hemi sphere. I d'idn't have a chance to look i nto l0 t4 l5 t6 t7 l8 l9 20 2t 22 23 24 25 MR. DR. HILL: It's my own knowledge been so publicly reported, been reported and UNCLASS I EIED then, UNCLASS I 364 J told that the same individuals who had been jndicted had been interested at different points in energy i nvestments 'in Venezuela and that th'is was qui te 4 well-known. 1 2 this in any way. I FIED was 6 maintained after you left the U.S. Government, have you been in contact with any Ukrainjan 7 Government 5 MR. DR. 8 ZELDIN: Have you offi ci a1s? HILL: I have not. t2 with any U.S. Government officials sharing any information with you about when Ukraine became aware of a hold on aid? DR. HILL: I have not. I've only read about it in the l3 paper. 9 10 ll NR. ZELDIN: Have you had contact MR. ZELDIN: So t4 the sole source of information that you with regards to the hold on aid to Ukraine has been l5 have t6 based on press reports? l8 HILL: No. Well , you said about Ukra'ini an offjcials, when they knew about when the aid had been put on l9 ho1d. 17 DR. th regard to Ukrai ni an offi 20 t4R. ZELDIN: 2t through press reports? 22 ./.) 24 25 Wi ci a1s, so1e1y HILL: I only know about that from press reports. When I 1eft, it had just been announced internally, and I was not aware at that point whether the Ukrainians knew about that. So I left on Ju1y 19th. DR. UNCLASS I FIED UNCLASS I I MR. ZELDIN 2 DR. HILL: a J MR. ZELDIN 5 MR. 7 8 9 365 And you were snorkeling on Ju1y 25th? : I was snorkeling quite a bit in that timeframe, yeah. 4 6 F]ED : HECK: How much Three mi time do we have left? nutes. yield back. MR. HECK: Turn now to the gentleman from Californja, Mr. Rouda, who has a couple of questions. MR. ZELDIN: We MR. ROUDA: Thank you very much. l0 Dr. Hill, thank you for a long day of testimony. l1 MR. GOLDMAN: t2 l'lR. ROUDA: Just a couple quick Mr. Rouda, can you use the microphone? questions. You talked a t6 little bit about the aid that was approved in a bipartisan fashjon that it is typical for the agencies and departments involved to slow down and move forward, step back as the process goes through for them to get to their final l7 approvals. l8 24 if I understood your testimony correctly, it did appear that all approvals had been made at the time that this aid was delayed and that that would be characterized as unusual. DR. HI LL: That i s correct MR. ROUDA: And equally unusual that the communication from Mulvaney to the respective departments, that there was no speci f i c reason f olit. Would you characteri ze that as 25 unusual as well? 13 t4 l5 t9 20 2t 22 23 . UNCLASS I EIED UNCLASS I 2 J 4 I F]ED 366 HILL: That i s correct. MR. ROUDA: Thank you. And then I just want to get a 1itt1e bit of better understanding on the voice memorandum the call memorandum, excuse me. And if I understand DR. 8 correctly from your testimony, we have individuals who are repeating exactly what the Pres'ident of the United States has sa'id as well as what the President of Ukraine has said that's go'ing i nto voi ce analyti cs , and that that i s more than one 9 person 5 6 7 , i s that cor rect , that ' s doi ng that acti vi ty? DR. HILL: I think there may be more than one person l0 1l at times. MR. R0UDA: So do we know t2 in this t6 HILL: I know I personally myself know of one person who usually does thjs, but there could be two at the same time, particularly if it's, you know, kind of a long call or, you know, maybe one person does one person, one t7 person does another. 13 t4 l5 DR. MR. ROUDA: 18 t9 sit here right 20 who 2l DR. So, in this situation, we don't know as we now whether there was one or more people HILL: I do not know. 23 But, regardless, it's being dictated into the voice recognition, and then there's a process to go back 24 and check against people's notes 25 memorandum 22 t"lR. ROUDA: to make sure that the is as close aS possible to what they believe UNCLASS I FIED they UNCLASS I FIED 2 that call? DR. HILL: That's right. J MR. R0UDA: And I 367 heard during then, once that's completed, various 4 individuals, including 5 the ability to review that 6 add'iti onal edi ts? DR. 7 HILL: members of the White memorandum Say agai n. Members House staff, have as well and make any of the l4 of the White House staff would have the ability to look at that call summary? DR. HILL: 0nly the Executive Secretari at wouId. MR. R0UDA: 0kay , the Execut j ve DR. HILL: But usualty for punctuation or, you know, ki nd of style punctuati on- related j ssues. MR. ROUDA: And is'it possible that the memorandum that l5 was t6 HILL: It's poss'ible, but it doesn't necessarily indicate this in looking at thjs. This is not 'incons'istent wi th other transcri pts that I've worked on. t"lR. ROUDA: Thank you, Chairman. I yield back. 8 9 l0 ll t2 l3 t7 l8 l9 MR. ROUDA: Members circulated coutd have had redactions from it? DR. 20 MR. HECK: 14r. Goldman. 2l MR. GOLDMAN: BY I,IR. 22 23 24 25 a So Mr. Noble wi 11 take i t. NOBLE : I'd like to go back and ask about some more of the meetings on your calendar. A Sure. UNCLASS ] FIE D UNCLASS I a I 2 Actua11y, this FIED one 368 is not on your calendar, but the day before the meeting on the 5th that we were talking about, 8 of celebrat j on hosted by Ambassador Sondland in Brussels to celebrate independence 1 month ear1y. Were you aware of that? A I was . Yeah , that was 'i n J une. And thi s was the dinner that he had invited President Zelensky to attend. a Ri ght. Do you know why he i nvlted Presi dent 9 Zelensky? J 4 5 6 7 there was a d'inner or some k'ind t6 Yes. Basically, this was in the course of, you know, the discuss'ions that it would be very difficult for us to necessarily get a high-1evel meeting scheduled with Presi dent Zelensky, you know, 'i mmedi ately after hi s electi on We'd already talked at great length about, you know, kind of all the back-and-forth about what we were going to do about trying to have a Pres'idential meeting or a meeting with t7 the Vi ce Presi dent. 10 ll 12 l3 l4 l5 A . And the Germans and the French and others were already 18 ti ng Presi dent Zelensky to vi si t . And Ambassador t9 i nvi 20 Sondland, what was tradi we11, 2l States has a July Fourth party. 22 For whatever reason, Ambassador Sondland was going 23 his a month early. 24 25 Embassy always You know, 'it tionally traditionally was w'ith'in guess the Uni ted to have the respectable period after election of President Zelensky. UNCLASS I IFIED We all wanted to have a the UNCLASS I 1 touch of some FIED 369 description at a high level with him, something 5 that would, you know, show that the United States was paying, you know, attention to him. And Gordon Sondland came up with that idea and, in fact, we all supported it. a Who else attended the dinner, do you know, on the 6 U.S. side? 2 a J 4 A 7 I never saw a full invitation list. I mean, I read l3 that Jay Leno was there, which was quite jnteresting and I guess makes sense. He's one comedian, you know, and another. And I do know that Jared Kushner was there. There was even a discussion about that because he was going to Europe for other business. And 'it was discussed that this would be a signaling, you know, on the part of the Whjte House that, you t4 know, Zelensky was being treated seriously by having a l5 l6 of the President's family and also another senior White House off icial attending that dinner. So we did not see this as t7 untoward 'in any way. 8 9 l0 tl t2 a A l8 member Did you get a readout from the meeting? 24 I dld not get a readout. I mean, this was being bi1led more as something social, and jt was to introduce Zelensky to the European Diplomatic Corps and other European heads of state. And I believe that he Pres'ident Zelensky had some other meetings around that with European officials. a Okay. 0n page 42, on June L3, you had a meeting 25 with t9 20 2l 22 23 Ambassador Votker and Ambassador BoIton. UNCLASS ] FIED UNCLASS A a I 2 J I FIED 370 Yes. Do you recall what that meeting was about on the L3th? 9 Yes. That meeti ng was, agai n, looki ng forward to where we were go'ing to try to go with Ukrainjan policy, whether there was going to be any hope of having the Russians revisit Some kind of process again with Ambassador Volker. I mean, at this point, he's been waiting for some response from Sokov aS to whether he'S intending to meet with l0 him again and whether we should anticipate the Russjans doing ll anything before the Rada, the parliamentary elections. And he was relating to Ambassador Bolton, you know, all of his 4 5 6 7 8 12 A l8 efforts to talk to the Europeans and to others at that time. a Di d you recal l that that , on J une l'3 th , that was the same day that Presjdent Trump told George Stephanopoulos i n an i nterview that he'd be wl11i ng to accept di rt f rom a foreign government on a political opponent? A I did not make that connection. No, I did not t9 recal1 that. 20 a 2t Volker l3 t4 l5 16 t7 5o you d j dn't di scuss that w1th Ambassador -- 23 A a 24 Did you ever discuss that statement by the President 22 25 with No. and Ambassador Bolton? Ambassador Bolton? UNCLASS I EIED UNCLASS I EIED A a I 2 J I did not, no. Did that raise 371 any concerns for you when you heard the President say that? 19 jt raised general concerns about, you know, what does that mean? I mean, obviously, you know, I'ln sure, based on my responses to some of these questions, you can be sure I don't approve of that kjnd of thing because, again, this is where we've all got ourselves into a predicament. a And did you discuss that concern with anyone else at the NSC? A I did not. a 0n the next page, on the L7th, you met with General Kel ogg abou t Ukra i ne A Yes. a Do you recall what that meeting was about? A Yes. Thi s was , aga i n , you know, f ol low'ing up wi th him on my previous concerns and also trying to check to see if there was any more chance that perhaps the Vice President might consider, you know, going to Ukraine at some point in 20 the 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1l t2 l3 t4 15 t6 t7 18 2t 22 23 24 25 A I mean, 1 . summer. a A And the next day you met with Ambassador Sondland? is correct. That was the day that I was told by Ambassador Sondland that he was in charge of Ukraine. a Okay. We've gone over that. Ski ppi ng forward to the 3rd of July, it's on page 45, you had a meeting with That UNCLASS I FIED UNCLASS I F]ED I Michael E1lis and John Eisenberg, and 2 handwrote thi J 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 372 it looks like you s transi tion and question mark? A Yes, because I thi nk that was my f i rst i n'iti aI transition meeting, and i just wanted to, you know, kind of double-check for myself because, you know, this is already in the month that I'm leaving, and there was an awful 1ot of things I had to make sure that I was complying with. I was also asking them, were there any of the issues that we'd all worked on together that I should specifically think about handi ng off to others , other i ndi vi duals . a ll t2 that 13 push'i ng This was a week before the meeting on July 10th we talked about earlier where Sondland blurted out about 15 that hadn't actually hadn't been fu11y scheduled at that partj cular tjme. We were l6 working on having 0leksandr Danylyuk and Andrey Yermak t7 but we didn't at that l8 Sondland and Ambassador t9 wel1. t4 20 2t 22 23 24 25 A That i s correct. And come, that Ambassador Volker were going to participate as moment actually know in actual fact, they weren't on the initial list to parti ci pate because I '11 j ust say i t was actually hi ghly unusual for both of them to be at a meeting with a senior Ukrainian official that was with Ambassador Bolton. I mean, the normal thing would have been to have Ambassador Volker have his own meetings with them at State Department, but And UNCLASS I FIED UNCLASSIEIED I Ambassador Sondland was 2 meeti ng along a J 4 5 with a Was A And then 373 pretty insistent on getting jnto the Ambassador Volker. he admitted to the meeting over the objection of that's actually when we also determined 6 that Secretary Perry should be there as we11, because 7 obviously we were having Ambassador Volker and Ambassador 8 Sondland, and Secretary Perry was having 9 basjcally, you know, in the process of initiating work on sector. Then, if we were going to have was rea1ly l0 the Ukrainian energy ll the two of them, we should then have Secretary Perry as well t2 t7 of issues. It also seemed, to be frank, to be an opportunity for coordination that we obviously sorely needed at that point. a Fai r enough. The l'lay 20th i naugurati on, the U.5. delegation, its composition, was there ever any debate about whether or not Ambassador Sondland should attend the l8 i nauguration? t9 A Yes. He wasn't on our i ni ti al li st. a Okay. How did he A We were trying to determjne and the Chief of Staff 's Office kept putting him back on. And Ambassador Sondland, in any case, said he was going. a Mick Mulvaney's office kept putting hjm back on? A That's ri ght. l3 t4 l5 t6 20 2t 22 23 24 25 and cover the whole range UNCLASS I FIED UNCLASS I a A 1 So did FIED Ambassador 374 Bolton essentially get overruled? 5 Essentially. I mean, that actually is not uncommon for us to put forward a ljst and then others to put forward lists. The State Department often puts lists forward of people that they want to be attending as we11. And 6 Ambassador Sondland 7 Kenna, who 2 J 4 8 9 l0 is the Executive Secretary at the State Department, to make it clear that he should attend. a What do you mean, he got Lisa Kenna to make it clear that he should attend? A ll He contacted me when he 12 Ambassador l3 list 14 l5 t6 t7 18 l9 20 2t 22 23 24 25 also got the State Department, Lisa wasn't on the list that Bolton had put forward and said he wasn't on the that he would be contacting Lisa Kenna to write to the NSC to make sure that he was on the 1ist. And he wanted to know why he wasn't on the 1ist. And I related to him that and the ljst had been drawn up according to people responsible for, you know, Ukrainian affai rs. who were s i s May 20th, bef ore he's announced to me that he's in charge of Ukraine on June L8th and that there was, you know, kind of no reason to see at that po'int why he should be goi ng to the Presi dent'ia1 inauguration of the Ukrainian President as Ambassador to EU. It was just simply as simple as that. And he sa'id that he had been i nstructed by the State Department and that he would have Ulrich Brechbuhl, you know, Th'is i s bef ore remember, thi UNCLASS I FlED UNCLASS] FIED 1 2 J 4 5 6 7 8 9 37s if necessary, ca11, but he was going to have Lisa Kenna send a note to the Executive Secretariat. a 0f the National Securi ty Counci 1? A 0f the National Securi ty Counci 1. a Do you know whether she sent that note? A I believe she did. We'd also invited quite a lot of people. I th'ink, you know, Senator Portman as well as Senator Johnson and a range of other people. But the scheduling was so tight that very few people were able to l0 come. ll 14 O Was Sondland, Ambassador Sondland originally on the fist of attendees for the July L0th meeting? A No. Ini ti ally I mean , thi s 'is a meeti ng that was requested with Ambassador Bolton, and they asked jf they 15 could attend, Ambassador Sondland and Kurt Volker. Then t2 l3 t6 t7 l8 l9 to that we should atso have Secretary Perry come. a Who did they ask to attend, Ambassador Bolton? Whose permission did they have to get? decided A They went through Ambassador Bolton's we were 2t attend. So we had some back-and-forth 22 about thi s. 24 25 offjce. And also then asked to push f orward 'if they wanted to 20 23 we with Because, agai n, j n the spi ri Ambassador Bolton t of coordi nation at this particular juncture, it seemed like actually a good thing to do. a Okay. We may have talked about thjs one, so UNCLASS I FIED UNCLASS] FIED 376 1 forgive me, but on page 46, there was a meeting with 2 Kent J A a A George Yes. 13 8th. What was that about? That was basically in the course of my you know, I mentjoned before I was trying to do handover meetings. And I wanted to fill in DAS Kent about the Deputy Assistant Secretary Kent about the fact that we were working very closely with Secretary Perry on trying to promote energy-related issues. And given h'is portfolio, I asked him if he would take the lead in making sure that there was fu11 coordi nation wi th Secretary Perry on the energy i ssues. a Okay. On page 47, we may have talked about this t4 one as wel1, 15 Taylor - - 4 5 6 7 8 9 l0 ll t2 l6 t7 A a on Monday, July July L9th, your meeting with Ambassador Yes. about Ukraine. Was that another -- that was a l8 transition l9 A It was a secure phone call with him. a OkaY. he was actually in A He wasn't at this point jn Kyiv. This was actually a secure phone ca1l. a And is this the conversation you had where you went through the taundry list of concerns with him? A That i s cor rect 20 2l 22 23 24 25 meet'ing? . UNCLASS I FIED UNCLASS a A 1 2 J I FIED 377 OkaY. And this was because, you know, obvi ous1y, the previous week we had, you know, had thi these epi sodes, s l0 I hadn't been abte to tatk to h'im s i nce I was trying to schedule a call with him. And as you can see, I've also got Phjl Reeker. We had lunch and I basically was trying to hand off. It wasn't j ust, agai n, about Ukrai ne i n hi s case. A1t these i ssues that I was worried were loose threads that needed to be wrapped up, and I was worried there wouldn't be coordjnation l1 on. t2 t4 a Got it. A And then, as you can see here, Mr. Danylyuk ca11ed me as well, because he was sti1l worried about not having 15 reached a conclusion on who he should engage l6 the National Security Council reform jn Ukraine. And I 4 5 6 7 8 9 l3 and . to wjth to work on 20 that he work with Deputy Assistant Secretary Taylor -- Kent and also with Ambassador Taylor, because that would be appropriate, because normally the State Department carrjes out this kjnd of technical ass'istance or 21 advisory ro1e. And we'd already done this, of course, with 22 the Ukra'inian military, with Generat Abizaid and also with 23 Kei t7 l8 t9 24 25 suggested him again th Dayton. a Did Danytyuk raise anything about the any concern about setting up a meeting between President Zelensky UNCLASS I EIED UNCLASS I I 2 J 4 and President FIED 378 TrumP? that there was no sign of the meeting. And I assured him that Ambassador Bolton was treati ng i t seriously and that we would do 'it, you know, when A He kept expressing concern 8 in terms of the schedule. I also stressed you again that, at this juncture, we needed to wait for know, as I've said to our colleagues, that we needed to wait for the Rada elections and then to See about the formation of 9 the government. 5 6 7 it waS appropriate Which were scheduled for the following week l0 a ll poi nt? t2 A The fo1 lowi ng week , cor rect l3 a Okay. And then, on July 23rd, the next t4 15 there's a Ukraine A at that . page, PCC meeting? Yes. 20 I take it you did not attend that meeting? I did not. And I actually d'idn't attend the A meet i ng that's also on the calendar for the L8th, because I'd a1 ready handed over to Tim Morri son. The last series of meet i n gs that I went to in mY formal capaci ty were on the 2t L5th, the redacted meet i ngs l6 t7 l8 19 22 23 z4 25 a . after that, w€'d agreed wi th Ambassador Bo1 ton and Charlie Kupperman that, You know, because of the short nature that we should hand over to Tim. But T'im had been of the traveling 'in th'is period. He d jd return on the Thursday, you And UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASS I FIED 379 I know. And then the point was to have this meeting on the 2 Tuesday, wh'ich was actually supposed J to discuss what was going on with the hold on the military 4 ass'istance. 5 6 7 8 9 l0 lt t2 l3 t4 l5 t6 a to be where they started Did Mr. Morrison, do you know, did he attend that sti11 traveling? A I would have to check. He might have I remember he came back I think on the Thursday, but he might have mjssed the meeting. But this, looking at this, you know, often when it says Vindman, this is a meeting that is being held at the director 1eve1, whjch could have been, you know, kind of preparing for the Iarger meeting on the Tuesday, which Tim Morrison in that new role would have been meeting on the L8th, a A a or was he Would have attended? That's ri ght. 0kay. That's i t on the calendar. Thank you. t9 th your consent, would you mjnd if I took over this round, even though ordinarily we understand the rules are that counsel, just since we don't 20 have a time timit? 17 l8 MR. G0LDMAN: Mr. Jordan, 21 MR. JORDAN: Are you guys 22 MR. GOLDI{AN: 23 MR. JORDAN: Go ahead. 24 MR. 25 GOLDMAN : BY MR. wi planning on using i don't know. Thank you . GOLDMAN: UNCLASS I EIED all 45? UNCLASS I FIED 380 J Briefly, you mentioned earlier Dmytro Firtash. I don't want to get into too much detajl about him. But I'm curious whether you know, whether you learned at any point 4 whether Parnas and Fruman had any association I 2 a a A a 5 6 7 I did not learn that, to 9 A a l0 extrad'iti on ll A 8 t2 Giulianj had any Fi rtash? I also do not know that. Do you know who represents Firtash in his to the Uni ted States? I actually didn't know that either. Who was it? Do we know that? a l3 t4 no. And do you know whether Rudy connection with Firtash? J I mean, the public reporting right oe d i Genova and Vi c tor i a Toens i ng now is that it's . t9 A I see. No, I don't know either of those names. I mean, all of my knowledge of Fi rtash comes f rom my t'ime when I was at the DNI and then, you know, subsequently, to some degree, when I was in the think tank world because, of course, hjs role in RosUkrEnergo and the, you know, various 20 middleman dealings between 2l sectors was very well-known. But he l5 l6 t7 l8 22 23 24 25 the Russian and Ukrainian energy didn't really come onto the radar screen very much in my time in the administration. a Are you familiar I'm going to switch gears now to Na flogaz agai n . Are you fami 1 i ar wi th the publ i c reporting that Secretary Perry tried to convince Naftogaz to UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASS ] FIED 381 J of thei r board? A I was not familiar jn the way that it's been publicly reported. I know that, you know, we were focusing 4 on Naftogaz. Secretary Perry hadn't opposed Amos Hochstejn 5 bei ng 6 discussion about how was Naftogaz going 7 into the future. 1 2 8 9 change members on the board i ni ti a1Iy, but there was defi ni tely part of that would have required probably getting, you know, kjnd of a pretty robust oversight board. And there were concerns expressed to me by the Naftogaz executives when they came l1 under a 1ot l3 t4 15 l6 t7 l8 t9 20 2t 22 23 24 25 to be moving forward And 10 12 a a A to vjsit that they were of pressure at that part'icular point. Pressure from whom? that there was pressure coming from Ukrain'ian Americans. They didn't get into any detaits because they clearly felt uncomfortable about th'is. But one of the women on the board who actually at that point was potentially slated to be Deputy Foreign Minjster told me that i t was comi ng f rom these Ukrai n'ian Ameri cans who were deal i ng wi th Gj uf i ani a Fruman and Parnas? A That's exactly the case, yes. a Did you ever become aware of a memo or an open letter wrjtten by Dale Perry? A No. I don't know who that is. a Did you ever come to learn whether there was a They djd mentjon to . UNCLASS I FIE D me UNCLASS ] FIED 382 2 of this year in Houston between an executive on Naftogaz, wi th Naftogaz, Andrey Favorov, and Parnas and J Fruman? I meeting in March ll I did not know, but this could be what they were referring to, because it's after that time when they came in to See me. And this is around the time when Amos Hochstein came in and said the Naftogaz people being on the board are coming under an awful 1ot of pressure. a So just one last tittle bit on this. What was the ratjonale, that they would need a stronger board, you said, or I don't want to I don't know that that was your 12 exact terminology, but 4 5 6 7 8 9 l0 A A 13 Well, I mean, that was part of the discussion about l5 to become self-sufficient. They had debt i ssues. Thi s 'is, you know, ki nd of a company that t6 rea11y needed an overhaul, and although the people who t7 been 'involved there had, you know, been 18 prof essional - - t9 some t4 20 2t 22 23 24 25 how Naftogaz was goi ng had tryi ng to be very th'is i s, you know, a f ar cry f rom, you know, of the days of Russian and Ukrainian energy interactions there's obviously sti11 a lot of work to be done. I also just want to reiterate here that, as the National Security Council, you know, we weren't having a major role in a lot of these i ssues . I mean, v,Ie were rea1ly tryi ng at that point, you know, at the direction of Ambassador Bolton others, beginning back at the beginning of the UNCLASS I FIED and UNCLASS I I FIED 383 administration, to play more of a coordinating ro1e. And in J of the energy sector reform, this was rea11y Department of Energy in conjunction with the State Department. 4 So, when people were approaching me with these concerns, 2 5 6 7 8 9 terms at alt tjmes. Hence, why I was havi ng regular consultat'ions wi th Deputy Assi stant Secretary Kent and also to then, now Charge Ambassador Taylor in Kyiv, because that would be the appropriate place for them to fol1ow up. There wasn't any expectation, even on the I was referring them back 10 National Security Council reform, that we would play ll kind of meaningful role in that. t2 Dr. Hi11, I have to step out. I'm going to make every effort to return, but in the event that I am not able to return before you conclude, which I think everybody l3 14 some l,lR. HECK: 16 is aspiring to at this point, jt js important to me that I express my personal appreciatjon for your presence here t7 today. 15 18 l9 20 2t 22 23 24 25 I would say that, in the years that I've been jn the Congress, I've never seen anybody testify for 9 straight hours and have every bit as much energy and recall in the njnth hour as they did in the first hour. And I'm very, very grateful to you for your presence today and for your consi derable publ i c servi ce. DR. HILL: Thank you, si r. Thank you. Indeed, BY MR. GOLDMAN: UNCLASS ] F]ED UNCLASS ] FIED 384 7 a Did you understand how the Naftogaz executives could feel pressure from two bus'inessmen, Parnas and Fruman, 'in such a meani ngf ul way? A We11, I think there were lots of efforts i n the Ukrainian energy sector, as'in the Russian energy sector at many times, to, you know, move away from, you know, the sort of state supervision, to hive off parts of djfferent 8 compan i es 1 2 J 4 5 6 . l0 In my previ ous gui se i n the th'ink tank wor1d, I 've written a lot of articles and publications on the energy ll sector t2 heavily in analysis of the energy sector in Ukraine and in 9 l3 t4 . And when I was at the DNI , I was 'involved very a and elsewhere. Th'is was, you know, an area, obviously, there's a 1ot of money to be made. Russi t7 in the Russian energy sector, a 1ot of the people who are in charge of that sector are very close to Pres jdent Put'in. He himself has taken a 18 personal i nterest 'in thi s. 15 l6 l9 20 2t And, you know, as you know, And RosUkrEnergo, Mr. Firtash and others, a1I of the oligarchs involved in these energy sectors, have been close one way or another to the Kremlin, because, in many respects, 23 the Ukrainian energy sector is dependent on Russian energy, both as a transit route to the rest of Europe and also 24 because an awful 25 place in areas close to Russja, and at different points, 22 1ot of the energy exploitation was taking UNCLASS I FIED UNCLASS I I 2 FIED 385 in energy sector development. And, of course, after the annexation of Crimea, a number Russians were invested l3 of potenti a1ly promi si ng Ukrai ni an gas and oi 1 fi elds were actual ly annexed by the Russ'i ans as wel l So, you know, this is a kind of fairly complicated procedure, and there's a lot of opportunity for a number of i ndi vi duats , you know, ki nd of be they Ukrai ni an Ameri can businesspeople or people who have been you know, Western businesspeople who have been involved in the energy sector, to get involved in investments there. I also came across, I just have to say, people who were not Ukrainian American but Americans who I was also wondering what they were up to, in terms of their own interest in the t4 energy sector. l5 19 ght. But that doesn't necessari 1y answer the question as to how two businessmen from Florida could make the Naftogaz executives feel significant pressure. A Their connections. The connections that they were ei ther imputi ng or purporti ng 'in the context of these 20 meet i ngs J 4 5 6 7 8 9 l0 l1 t2 t6 t7 18 2t 22 . a a A Ri . to whom? To Rudy Giuliani, and through that by, you know, The connections 23 usurpation, I presume, of 24 authority, or purporting to be doing this on the kind of 25 behalf of , i n some way, some of UNCLASS kind of Presidential Rudy Gi ut'ian I F]E D j . UNCLASSlFIED I a Was it not the case that 386 Naftogaz had significantty l0 its dependence on Russia? A It had, but there's sti11, you know, kjnd of a way to go. And they were also having financial problems at this particular juncture, and they were hoping that the United States and other international entities would help them wjth funds that they needed, both for restructuring but also for purchases of gas, you know, for the winter. a So do you bef ieve that two oi1 and gas executives or finance executives from Texas was the solution to ll revamping the board? 2 J 4 5 6 7 8 9 12 l3 t4 15 t6 reduced A I am not quite sure who you're talking about there, agai n. a A a A I'm sorry. That was the public reporting. 0h, I see. That Secretary Perry was advocating for 22 I wasn't familiar at all with who Secretary Perry and others might be advocating. I'm just relating that the Naftogaz executives told me that they felt under pressure. And, again, I referred them to the State Department and to, you know, obviously, our colleagues at Department of Energy. And I did talk to Ambassador Taylor, Deputy Assistant 23 Secretary Kent, and also Phil Reeker about this. t7 l8 l9 20 2l 24 25 a Because it wouldn't necessarily be your area of focus? UNCLASS I F]ED UNCLASS I A a I 2 FIED 387 Correct. Understood. I have a few final questions a 1jttle t later , but I 'm goi ng to turn i t over to Mr. Rask'in to see J bi 4 jf he has any questions. 6 Dr. Hitl. Thank you for your remarkable service to our country. And speaking as 7 one l'lember , 5 8 9 MR. RASKIN: Thank you very much, I can say I 'm extremely proud of you, especi a1ly because you're my constituent. And thank you for the way you've conducted yourself through thi s very di ffi cult process l0 as we1l. ll of the reasons that you've taken umbrage at being 1ed down a path wh'ich looks ljke the conspiracy theory that i t was Ukra'ine and not Russi a that i nterf ered i n our electi on in 2015 is that you said that it undermines our capacity to respond to 2020 property, to understand what's happening or what's about to happen in 2020. And I wonder if you would expound upon that a little bi t. Vn/hat i s about to happen, best you can te11 , i n terms of Russian interference in our current Presidential election? DR. HILL: I think, as we have gone on over the past, you know, 2 and a half years, and sjnce the whole proceedings and the l'lue1ler report, you know, i n terms of press reporti ng t2 l3 t4 15 16 17 l8 l9 20 21 22 One 24 social media, we realize, you know, how sophi sticated and how extens'ive the Russi an 25 'interf erence has been. 23 and more in-depth investigations by UNCLASS I FIED UNCLASS I F]ED 388 I But the Russians, you know, can't basically exploit 2 cleavages if there are not cleavages. The Russian can't J 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 ll t2 l3 exploit corruption if there's not corruption. They can't exploit alternative narratives if those alternatjve narrat'ives are not out there and getti ng credence. What the Russians do is they exploit things that already exist. And 'if you look at actually how President Putin himself has responded to what he fears would be our, or other interference in his elections, you can see, you know, what he has done. He's made it impossible to have foreign money into h'is electi ons. He's cut down NGOs and other f orei gn entities, you know, from everything from Transparency Internat'iona1 to IRI and NDI and other enti ti es. t6 basically designated anyone wjth any kind of foreign experience as a fifth column and as a traitor to the country. He has gone after people fike Alexei Navalny and t7 Vladjmir Kara-Murza, both people t8 Congress t4 15 He has who you here as Members of 19 know Vladimir Kara-llurza has been here and met as stooges of the West and as with congressional staff 20 people who are being played. 2t And, a1so, he has, you know, created a good degree of 23 plausible deniability by sending out patriotic hackers to from, you know, for example, Mr. Prigozhin, his, you know, 24 erstwhi1e cook or kind 25 paying 22 for of catering ofigarch, who has been and sponsoring the IRA, the Internet Research UNCLASS I FIED UNCLASS I I Agency, FIED that has been basicalty doing the 389 same kind of 4 all of our campaigns and all of our individuals, to di g up di rt and to, 'in f act, exploi t any weakness i n our system and to throw back all kinds of informatjon on our 5 candi dates 2 J research on So the more 6 7 . that we denigrate ourselves, the more that we end up 'in across-the-aisle screaming matches, the more t4 rt that we put out on our own poli tical cand'idates 'in the course of our own race, the more that the Russians will use that to ampl i fy thi s. And I think it's been very well documented right now how they've tri ed to exploi t race. They've tri ed to exploi t religious differences. And if you look very carefully at what Putin does, he never does anything like this in his own l5 establishment. Putin presents himself as the President to t6 everybody. t7 19 r race or thei r religion or thei r ethnic background. He Iets other people do that, and he plays with it, but he has basically harnessed he's the first populist President, and 20 he has harnessed that populism very effectively. 8 9 10 ll t2 l3 18 2t 22 23 24 25 di He never s'ingles anybody out on the basis of thei I made a mistake when I did my research on Putin in the book that I wrote, because I actually wrote that he doesn't rea1ly fully understand our system and how jt operates. I meant that from a posi tive poi nt of view. But my mjstake was in not fully understanding that he understands And UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASS I 2 J I EIED 390 all the negative aspects of how our system works, and he's playing that right back at us. I'4R. RASKIN: He understands the weaknesses? 8 HILL: Correct. And the more divisjve our politics are, the more that he can pick partisan differences apart and encourage people to go out and exploit that, the more vulnerable that we are. MR. RASKIN: So partisan rancor and division is one of 9 the weaknesses he's exploited, but you also said that 4 5 6 7 DR. l0 corruption i s our Achi lIes' hee1. And I don't 1l you were thi nki ng speci f i ca11y about 12 Mr. Fruman, but 13 DR. HILL: I l'4r . know whether Parnas and was. 2t were will you explain DR. HILL: Because the fa'ilure of imagination for myself, agai n, j n wri ti ng thi s book and I 've forced Lee to buy a copy now is if you read the epilogue and, you know, the final, you know, chapter -- and I'd be happy to send everybody, you know, this -- is basically Putin was a case officerin the KGB. He has said many times that his specialty is working with people, which means manipulating 22 people, blackmai 1i ng people, extorti ng people. He looks at 23 people' s vulnerabili 14 l5 16 t7 18 t9 20 24 25 MR. RASKIN: You ties. s i s why I was concerned about the Steele report because that i s a vulnerabi 1 i ty. Chri stopher Steele goi ng And thi UNCLASS I FIED UNCLASS ] FIED J out and looking for information. He's obviously out there solici ting information. What a great opportuni ty to, basically, you know, present him with informat'ion that he's 4 looking for that can be couched some truth and some 5 di si nformation. I 2 6 7 8 9 391 out there for every opening that he can fi nd, basically, and somebody's vutnerabi 1i ty to turn that against them. That's exactly what a case officer does. They get a weakness, and they blackmail their assets. And Putin So he's looking 20 will target world leaders and other officials like this. He tri es to target everybody. 5o a story from when I was working on the book, I was also looking for information for the book to write about Putin. And my phone was hacked repeatedly, and the Brookings system was hacked repeatedly. And at one poi nt, i t was clearly obvious that someone had exfjltrated out my draft chapters. I mean, you know, they were in draft form. And then, mysteriously, after thjs I started to get ema'i1s from people who purported to have met me at different points in my career, people I kind of vaguely remember. I'd 2t look online, and there would be these, you know, Linkedln l0 ll t2 13 t4 15 l6 t7 18 t9 22 23 24 25 or there might be, you know, something I could find out some information for them. And they'd start offering me information, you know, that somehow purported to, strangely enough, some of the chapters that I was actually working on. pages UNCLASS I EIED UNCLASS I FIED 392 J to meetings in Russia, people would basically, you know so that I was being played, or they were attempting to play me as well. And I've seen this time 4 and time again. I 2 5 6 7 8 9 l0 1l And when I would go that peopte are looking for business opportuni ti es, the more that they' re doi ng somethi ng that i s illegal or certainly shady and nefarious, the more that Putin can step forward and the people around him to exploit this. So the more And you can see this time and time again in every one of the former Soviet republics and real1y across Europe as we11. They've given money to political parties, to all kinds of t9 potitical operatives, or sometimes they've just simply given access to people. MR. RASKIN: The firing or the recall of Ambassador Yovanovitch followed upon a sequence of events that looks to me very much fike a politica1 hjt and propaganda, that there was a campaign out to get her. Please give me your sense of if I'm right about that. And have you ever seen an Ambassador removed'in similar circumstances before in your 20 career? t2 13 l4 15 16 17 l8 2l 22 23 24 25 HILL: Well, that's what I said, that I believe as well that that was atso a political hit on her. And I mentioned in reference to the question about do I know Kathy Kavalec that I believe that there was a hit done on her as well by the Albanjan Democrats, who picked up on information, DR. UNCLASS I FIED UNCLASS I EIED 393 I including the fact that she'd been mentioned in these 2 exchanges J with Bruce 0hr and Toria Nuland on Chris Steele, and used that to denounce her and to basically force the 4 State Department to pul1 back her name. She was already in 5 Albani an language trai ni ng, whi ch mustn't have been a lot of l0 fun, I can imagine, but she was already well progressed on this. And she's now going out to have some role in the OSCE. And there was also something simjlar done to our Ambassador-des'ignate, Brjdget Brink, to Georgia by the Georgians, also, you know, purporting to create a dossier and ll materi a1. t2 And 6 7 8 9 I was also Connie Mack, not the Congressman but l5 his son, went to Vice President Pence's staff and asked for me being removed, providing as an exhibit the InfoWars and all the other information, saying that I was a Soros mole jn t6 the White t7 to a kind of all's well that well suggestion about this situation, you said, jn fact, l3 t4 l8 House. MR. RASKIN: In answer ends the 23 p i s now covered j n scandal. I wonder to what extent is the Ukrainian Government stil1 looking to see how 1t should respond to the request for political dirt on the Bidens. Is that story over, or are they still waiting to see what happens jn the United States 24 now? l9 20 2t 22 25 U. S. -Ukrai ne relationshi DR. HILL: I'm sure they are still waiting to UNCLASS I EIE D see how UNCLASS I FIED 394 8 that happens. But I'm sure that they also want to find out f or themselves i f there's any, you know, ki nd of th'ing there that they should be scared about or concerned about in any way. Not scared, let's just say concerned about. And I was struck by the fact that thei r prosecutor announced that they were, you know, reviewing all of this again. And I think if I were President Zelensky and his new team, having been unfamiliar in actual fact with what was 9 going on I 2 J 4 5 6 7 before remember, President Zelensky was engaged l4 in making, you know, programs and playing a Pres.ident on televisjon. He wouldn't necessarily be f amiliar w'ith all of thjs as we11. So it's not actua11y, you know, completely rid'iculous that he would actually be asking to have some investigations for his own purposes to see, you know, quite 15 what has transpired here. l0 ll t2 l3 l6 t7 18 t9 20 2t 22 23 24 25 Finally, the inspector general of the Department of State gave us a package, essentially, of propaganda materials and conspiracy theory, which I think Rudy Gi uti anj took credi t for later. You've emphasi zed a lot the role that propaganda has played in attacking certain people and advancing this agenda in Ukraine, and I just wonder i f you would expound generally on th'is. Do you think we're in a period where political propaganda is playing a very seriously role in undermining the legitimacy of government, undermining the legitimacy of NR. RASKIN: UNCLASS I FIED UNCLASS I I FIED 395 pubfic officials, and what are your thoughts about what needs 4 to be done about that? DR. HI LL: Wel 1 , I do. Look, I mean the i ssue I mean, this is, you know, obviously a big debate that we're 5 hav'ing nationa11y about campaign finance and about the role 6 of political action comm'ittees. 2 J 7 But what President Putin and others have seen and t2 this gets back, you know, to be fair to you and your kind of question here about, you know, individual efforts by Ukrainian Amerjcans or anybody to, you know, kind of get into campaigns, is they see an opportunity through the existence of these kinds of entit'ies to play out someth'ing similar l3 themselves. t4 I've often described Vladjmi r Putin as heading up a Super PAC, but he's not an American cj ti zen. It's not part of a legitimate campaign, and it's not part of our democracy. But what he's doing is using exactly the same tactics and us'ing, i n f act , the campai gn research that we all produce as part of our, you know, pol"itical efforts, to turn it right back at us. So that is, again, exactly the kind of actions that people ljke Putin take. So the only way that we can keep the Russians out of our politics is to clean up our own act. 8 9 l0 ll 15 l6 t7 l8 19 20 2t 22 23 24 25 MR. RASKIN: ['4a'am, we spend money on our don't allow our politics. UNCLASS I FIED Why own government to should we atlow other UNCLASS I F]ED 396 t7 to spend money on our politics? DR. HILL: That's exactly right. That's the kind of question, that's why I was getting so testy. You know, and I apologize again for getting a bit testy. I've got a bit of a headache now. You know, kind of a long day here. But that's the kind of point that I am trying to get across here, that, you know, these are, you know, as you ri ghtly poi nt out, forei gn governments, be they Ukrai ni an or Russian or others. The scale of what the Russ'ians have done, they ' ve al so opened i t up f or the Chlnese. And when President Pence said that the Chinese make the Russians look Iike junior varsity and he got pooh-poohed somewhat, you know, out'in the press on that, he was absolutely right. The biggest thing that I was most disturbed about in the course of my work js real1y the scale of Chinese efforts. The Chjnese have a 1ot of money. They've infiltrated all of our uni versi t'ies. They've i nf i ltrated a lot of our l8 companies. And we can't get too carried away and, you t9 start w'ith a mass hyster i a about Ch j na . But I 20 shocked, 2t signed up 22 juncture. I 2 J 4 5 6 7 8 9 l0 1l l2 l3 t4 l5 l6 23 24 25 people's governments frankly, know, was completely when former Senator Lieberman WaS basically to represent a ChineSe company at th'is particular all be extraordinarily careful about our former senjor officials and others go'ing on to foreign companies of th'is nature. It's one thing to go and work wlth We should UNCLASS I FIED UNCLASS I F]ED or al1ied 397 companies, the Netherlands I American companies 2 Norway, Sweden, you know, the Uni ted Ki ngdom, J another enti rely when we know that a country has 4 adversarial intent towards us, and also from anyone who has and but i t's some l3 to go jnto lobbying efforts. And I was deeply disturbed to find out that my resume could be put in a filing of a FARA report by Connie Mack and coutd be used as an exhi bi t to try to create a case aga'inst me to ask the Vice President and his staff to have me fired for bei ng a Soros mole i n the Whi te House. I mean, they laughed him out of a hearing and, you know, basically didn't listen to this, but this was, unfortunately, the kind of actions that were taken against l4asha Yovanovjtch. And if 14 you also see with Kathy Kavalec, the Albanian Democratic 15 Party, where they took on an advocacy group and put out l6 information, also in a 5 6 7 8 9 l0 1l t2 had a security clearance her FARA. t7 So we have perm'itted open season on our di plomats, and l8 it could happen to anybody. It doesn't matter whether they' re a noncareer offi ci a1 . It happened, rather disturbingly to me, to rather a 1ot of women, but it can happen to any political person as we11. Any one of us here could be subject to this kind of claims and these kinds of l9 20 2t 22 23 24 25 attacks, any single person who gets crosswise with any of these 'ind'ividuals or any of these countries, if they think that any of us are in the way. And I've been extraordinarily UNCLASS I FIED UNCLASS I 1 concerned about F]ED 398 this. t4 that's the only reason that, you know again, Mr. Castor, I don't mean to jump down your throat, but I'm really worried about this. And, you know, one of the reasons that I actually decided that I wanted to also come out of the administratjon during the campaign was to be able to speak about this pub1ic1y. Now, in the case of right now, I think that, you know, what you're all doing here I know that there is debate is actually very important to get to the bottom about this of what has rea1ly been happening. If nothing else, we should all agree that what happened to Ambassador Yovanovitch is unacceptable, and we should not be letting this happen to our public servants across the board because 'it could happen l5 to congressional staff. It could t6 everybody. 2 J 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 l1 t2 l3 t7 l8 19 20 2t 22 23 24 25 And, again, happen to absolutely I wi11, you know, try to, as I said, keep my head down and, you know, try to keep out of the public spotlight while thjs process is underway because I want to see that it's done in as nonpartisan and as serious a way as possible, but I eventually want to be able to speak out against this ki nd of acti vi ty. I'm not a Russia hawk. What I am is a critic of the way that this government, led by a KGB former case officer who specializes in manipulating people's vulnerabilities and And UNCLASS I FIED UNCLASS I EI 399 ED 2 exploiting corruption it's what Putin did in the 1970s, when he joined the KGB in Leningrad and St. Petersburg. They J went 4 He's been targeti ng the busj ness after American businessmen and set up sting operations. communi ty. t2 I firmly befieve he was also targeting President Trump, and he was targeting all of the other campaigns as wel1. And I think that that was the mistake when the 2015 investigations were launched, not to take it from the point of view what Russia was doing to target Americans, no matter who they were in the system. MR. RASKIN: Based on what you just sa'id, one final question. Why do you believe that Putin was targeting Dona1d l3 Trump from 5 6 7 8 9 l0 ll l5 his days as a busjnessman? DR. HI LL: Because that' s exactly what Presj dent Puti n and others were doing. Again, he was part of a directorate t6 in the KGB in Leningrad. That's what they djd exclusively t7 was targeti ng busi nessmen. t4 l8 And as a result of that work that he had there, he was then the deputy mayor in 24 St. Petersburg under Anatoly Sobchak back in the period when, actual1y, Lee and I were working together for , and we had delegations coming over from Sobchak. As deputy mayor, he was in charge of the 1i a'ison wi th all of the busi nesses 'in Leni ngrad and St. Petersburg. And that was filthy, the politics there at that 25 particular juncture, as we reca11. l9 20 2t 22 23 UNCLASS I FIED UNCLASS]FIED BY l,1R. I GOLDI'4AN just 400 : l0 in this round, and, unfortunately, we are going to need to go to another round on our end, but it won't be a ful1 round. But I do just want to circle back to one thing. You've said earlier today that you have you are aware of no credible evidence that Ukraine was involved at all in the 20L6 A As the Ukrainian Government. a The Ukrai ni an Government, ri ght. And are you aware of any evidence that V'ice Pres'ident Joe Biden in any way ll acted inappropriately while he was Vice President in t2 connec t i on 2 J 4 5 6 7 8 9 l3 l4 l5 16 a A a A a We have a couple minutes I 'm not. to Ukrai ne? I'm not. So you're not actually endorsing the idea of t7 reopening these'investigations by the Ukrainian Government. l8 Is that right? A As a personal t9 20 2l 22 23 24 25 I thjnk if the Ukrainian Government wants themselves to figure out -- this is a new government -- wants to figure out, you know, what may have happened for their own informational purposes, they're perfectly within their rights to do that. a So are you referring then to sort of a review of what has happened in the past, or are you talking about endorsement? UNCLASS IFIED UNCLASS I 2 J 4 5 6 7 A a 9 ll t2 l3 14 l5 16 l7 I am not. these i nvesti gati ons should or not they want to look into Burisma for thei r own purposes, i n terms of any po1 i ti ca1 i nvesti gati ons related to U.S. politics, you're not suggesting that that's somethi ng that they s.hould do? A I am not suggesting that, no. MR. GOLDMAN: A11 right. I will yield to the minority. MR. CAST0R: I've got a couple questions. MR. J0RDAN: Can I go first then? MR. CASTOR: Sure. l9 MR. J0RDAN: 2t 22 23 24 25 -- And so whether l8 20 401 actually reopeni ng thi s i nvesti gati on? A I think what thejr prosecutor has announced is somewhat ambiguous. He has said that they are going to look into this. He didn't say very specifically jn the direction that they' re goi ng a But you're not aware, at least, of any evidence that ei ther of 8 l0 ] FIED So, Dr. Hi11, you sa'id that the Russians particularly Putin uses propaganda to go after people and it could happen to anyone. They can target DR. HILL: Yes, and also kompromat, whi ch j s, you know, basically, you know, what the Steele dossier was, which was, you know, kind of comprom'ising information on jndividuals. MR. iORDAN: And that is my question. Did it happen to and UNCLASS ] F] ED UNCLASS I EIED I 2 J 4 5 6 7 8 9 l0 1l 402 the President in 2016, 20L7? HILL: I think that there's a good chance that was the case and that, you know - - and, agai n, comprom'isi ng material was being collected on a whole range of individuals. And it was most definitely being collected on Secretary, former First Lady and Senator Clinton as wel1. And I did, in the course of public speaking at the time, you know, point this out, that we should be investigating, you know, what the Russ i ans we re t ry i ng to do aga'i ns t alt of DR. our po1 i ti ca1 candj dates MR. JORDAN: And . the material that was used against the l3 President, you don't think that in any way was accurate? You thi nk 'it was thi s propaganda, thi s kompromat, thi s - - that t4 was contained t2 l5 t6 t7 l8 l9 20 2t 22 23 24 25 in the now somewhat famous Steele dossier? DR. HILL: I said that I wasn't in a positjon to assess that, obviously, from my private capacity then. But I said that I felt that it also be looked at and investigated, the kind of information that was being collected. Now, I believe that the Mueller report and 14r. Mueller and h'is team di d look at some of thi s i nf ormati on . But, again, they were looking at, you know, information in a more general sense. I would have much preferred to see, from my own perspective, the Mueller report focusing at the outset on what was it that the Russians were doing and then, as the course of that, following the 'investigatory leads, which, you UNCLASS I FIED UNCLASS I EIED 403 4 did in any case, to fjnd out what doors were opened for them jnto our political system. I think they would have sti11, to be quite frank, come down where they did on 14r. 14anaf ort, because, agai n, these 5 are all back doors, of people who are doing, you I 2 J know, they know, 7 potitical dealings in other countries of the nature that he was that open up the door for Russians and others to step 8 'in 6 . 13 just you know, and I get it. You were very emphatic about this could happen to anyone, this propaganda machine that Russia engages in using. And then in the, I think, earlier rounds and based on the story that was written about you last month, you sajd you believe Steele t4 could have been played by the 9 10 l1 t2 MR. JORDAN: You t6 like if we're talking about propaganda being used to target a political figure, there is t7 probably no bigger, better example than what happened with 18 the dossier targeting the President of the United States. t9 There's no bigger political figure anywhere. 5o that 15 And it Russi ans. seems to me seems to me 22 to be example number one. DR. HILL: At that point, though, remember he was a cand'idate, as was Secretary Cti nton, to be the President. 23 Thi s was bef ore the electi on when th1s 24 p 20 21 25 roduced . MR. J0RDAN: I understand. UNCLASS I EIED dossi er was bei ng UNCLASS DR. I 2 J 4 5 6 HILL: ] FIED 404 There was also information on other candjdates as we11, you know, who weren't ultimately selected to be, you know, the two Presidential candidates. So, again, I just want to rejterate I think the Russians were targeting everybody, and they were trying to get as much information as possi ble and what l0 Fair enough, but we DR. HILL: What the Russians do, again, is they get information that's not just plausible but often is factual. That's the way that they operate wjth a story. And then they 1l wi 7 8 9 MR. JORDAN: 11 spri nkle i nto that d j s'inf ormati on . l3 Fair enough. But the fact that the dossjer was used to go after the individual who won the election, now t4 President, seems to me to be example number t2 MR. JORDAN: DR. l5 t6 HILL: We11, it No, I was done before he was elected as President. t7 MR. J0RDAN: l8 DR. understand. HILL: But I think it's also 19 examples. A1so, what the Russians did 20 C1 2t 22 23 24 25 one. i nton there are to target two Secretary . : Thank you. DR. HILL: So I think that both of those issues are the case. And, again, that's what I would like to flag to make sure that we're all aware that everyone is a target because their goal was to discredit the Presidency. Whoever was MR. JORDAN UNCLASS I FIED UNCLASS I FIED 405 I elected President, they wanted to weaken them. So, if 2 Secretary Clinton had won, there would have been a cloud over 3 her at this time if she was President Clinton. There's 4 a cloud over Presjdent Trump since the beginning of hjs 5 Presidency, and 6 i n tended 8 9 l0 ll t2 l3 14 l5 l6 t7 18 t9 20 2t 22 23 24 25 I think that's exactly what the Russians . BY MR. 7 a CASTOR: The documents the President, I can't A a A a been I didn't that l4r. Patel purportedly gave to remember whether you know what they were. There was never closure on that? There was no closure on that. And you learned that information from, was jt staff in the Executive A It was staff in Exec Sec. a It wasn't the Exec SecT A It was not. No, I just simply went down to p'ick up something e1se. I would often go over myself because I was worried about, you know, kind of the, you know, the command and control of valuable documents if I needed something to get signed, and I would, you know, kjnd of take it back, you know. And of ten , when I was go'ing over to see Ambassador BoIton, so I just popped in, basically, to pick up a document that I needed, and that was when it was just an aside. They assumed that I knew. UNCLASS I EIED UNCLASS a I 2 J as 6 7 8 9 l0 ll t2 t3 t4 l5 t6 t7 l8 l9 20 2l 22 23 24 25 406 D And my colleague Dav'id Brewer has a quick question we11. A Sure. BY MR. 4 5 I E]E BREWER: , thanks for your pati ence today. Following up on Mr. Castor's line of questioning, how many tjmes during your tenure at NSC did you communjcate with Mr. Patet, by emai 1 or by Phone? A i didn't communicate wi th him at all. a Okay. A He was on a distro list at one point for the just some of the Ukraine issues, but he was on multiple distro lists because he was'in the International 0rgan'izati ons. So the U. N. and other Internati onal 0rganizations felt under h'is purview, aS far as I understood. Agai n, to be honest, I d'idn' t rea1ly know him at all . I knew what he looked 1ike. I knew his name. And he'd sat in Some meetings. I had no reaSon up until that point, rea11y, to think that I needed to know him. And he never introduced himself to me. a I understand. l'la'am, have you ever spoken wi th any members of the med'ia about Mr. Patel A I have not. a Ma'am, today at L: 1.6, Manu Raj u, who I understand i s a reporter for CNN a Dr. Hi 11 ? UNCLASS I FIED UNCLASS I I 2 J 4 5 6 7 407 A Who? a A a Manu Raj u. a That's what I was goi ng to ask you. that i s. Manu Raj u? He's a reporter, I understand, from CNN. He tweeted some substance of your testimony here today. A I don't know how that was possible because I've been jn here with you the whole time. 8 9 FIED s poke I don' t know who Have you n A l3 lots of people in and out, so I suppose you should ask your colleagues if somebody's been talki ng to CNN. a So, just for the record, you have not spoken to t4 Manu l5 20 A I have not had my telephone. I have been in your fu11 and I have not met with Manu Raju in the bathroom here. And I think you can attest you saw me in the bathroom. And they have had full custody of me at all times. a And j ust one last questj on, ma'am: Have you directed anyone on your behalf to speak with Mr. Raju about 2t your testj l0 ll t2 16 17 l8 19 22 23 24 25 There's been Raju sjnce you've been here today? A a A mony? No. I don' t know who Mr . Ra j u 'is. Thank you. I also as you know, I didn't have a written testimony, and I have just been subject to your questions, And UNCLASS I E]ED UNCLASS T FIED 408 5 I djd not know what you were going to ask me. MR. BITAR: Thank you for that. DR. HILL: Although I did suspect that you might ask me about was I Anonymous, because my attorney here I decided picked up some threatening phone calls. to get ahead of it 6 So there you are. I 2 3 4 and MR. 7 BITAR: And just to be clear, the committee I that you or is not 8 in 9 around you has been, quote/unquote, leaking any information. l0 ll t2 13 14 l5 any way suggesting, I am not suggesting that at at1. just want to get the facts, that you have not spoken to Raju or directed your attorney or anyone on your behalf speak to Mr. Raju. DR. HILL: That i s correct. MR. BREWER: Thank you. I thi nk we' re ready , yes BY MR. GOLDMAN: I just have a few, a t8 almost done. t9 A a A 22 ./.) 24 25 I Mr. to . t7 21 anybody I'lR. BREWER: No, 16 20 would hope, but I do want to go back. We're Okay. Honestly, you djd say You to get a p1ane. He's already, you know, I think had his of f ice he sa'id if he didn't appear outside, hi s office, he i ntends to a Wet1, we appreciate you guys' willingness to stay here and to stay late and to answer all of our questions. He has UNCLASS I FIED UNCLASS I EIED I It's 2 Congressman J been a long day. And your 409 -- I think, as one of said, your recatl and attention has remarkable, and we are greatly appreci ative. the been 5 I want to go back to this somewhat unusual circumstance regarding Kash Patet. Am I correct that he had no 6 i nvolvement i n 4 A 7 8 the Ukrai ne portfol j o? Apart from, you know, whatever interaction there would have been, you know, on the U.N. and other kind of t1 front. I mean a In what way would that have manifested? A I'm trying to actually think. At the time, t2 thought, wel1, what 'involvement does he have? You know, i s l3 he the point person t4 my colleagues who 9 l0 in I0A for Ukraine? And I I asked one of interacted wjth the I0A on a regular basis. l5 l'4R. BITAR: For the record, can you clarify l6 DR. HILL: 0h, sorry, the International 0rganizations I0A? l8 I've forgotten what the acronym stands for. International 0rganjzations and Agencjes. I mean, basically, 19 the directorate that covers the United Nations and other t7 and 21 multilateral organjzations, and covers human rights and at different points also dealt with, you know, our responses to 22 public health crises and foreign assistance and things like 23 this as we11. 20 24 25 that was his directorate? DR. HI LL: I t was hi s di rectorate. I mean, agai n , to MR. GOLDMAN: And UNCLASS ] EIED be UNCLASS 1 ] FIED 410 very clear, I didn't really know him very we11. I'd seen him 7 in a couple of meetings, but then there would be you know, large meet'ings like th'is, where everyone would be invited. I was not aware that he had was runni ng poi nt on any 'issues related to this. MR. BITAR: And just to clarify again for the record, you're not suggesting he was the senior djrector for that 8 di 2 J 4 5 6 rectorate, ri ght? DR. 9 l0 d'i HILL: No, he's not. He was not the senior BITAR: So he was a rector among several? rector. ll MR. d'i a director at that tjme, among had more interaction with two other, you He was l3 HILL: several. And I t4 know, directors in that directorate. t2 DR. MR. JORDAN: 15 Dr. Hi11, you used the term "distro." Is t7 stri bution or -DR. HILL: Distribution 1ist, I'm sorry. l8 MR. J0RDAN: l6 t9 20 2t 22 23 24 25 that di I just want to make sure. I figured that was the case. HILL: That's a shorthand for when you, you know, are kind of sending I'm sure you do it here internally, you know, various distribution 1jsts. But I didn't usually send those out. 5o, again, you know, I was kind of also worried about what kind of documents, you know, might have been, you know, sent, beyond talking points for meetings. I DR. UNCLASS I FIED I EIED UNCLASS I 2 J 4 I -- to be honest, I'm a bit surprised that you've raised his name, because beyond after going to talk to Charlie Kupperman, I mean, I hadn't done anything to kind of follow up on this again. mean, again, BY MR. 5 6 7 8 9 l0 411 GOLDMAN: bjt surprised to hear that the Pres'ident thought he was the Ukra"ine di rector . So that's why we' re tryi ng to fi gure out A So was I. That was why I went to speak to Charlie a Kuppe rman ll a We're a . Right. No, I understand the course of action you l5 that you did take, and I understand that there was no follow-on to you from the Deputy National Securi ty Advi sor who handted employment matters. What I'm tryi ng to understand 'is what hi s actual role was at that t6 t'ime t2 l3 14 were taking and . l9 A I'm not entirely c1ear. I just basically asked my staff to fjnd out: Was he being asked to be the point person withjn the agency for that directorate for any partjcular 20 reason on Ukraine? t7 l8 2t 22 23 24 25 a A a And what was the answer? far as they could tel1, no. Had your Ukrai ne di rector , I thi nk i t's As Alex Vindman, had he A He had never spoken UNCLASSIFIED to him beyond seeing him in a UNCLASS I FIED 412 J meeting. And it was the same wjth most of my colleagues. Others knew him, but didn't know that he was thought he was a perfectly nice person and interacted with him. They 4 were I 2 5 6 just as surprised as I was. a And just to be clear, you were the senior director overseeing, A a A 7 8 among other countries, Ukraine? Correct. So in 10 a lot of di rectorates have a poi nt person for Ukrai ne, you know, 'in def ense i ssues , f or example. I ll mentioned before t2 be covering a whole gamut l3 wi 9 And that Alex initially supposed to issues that 'intersected Vindman was of defense t4 th Russi a. And, you know, obvi ously, defense i ssues are very much related to Ukraine, given the fact that there's a t5 war going on between Russian proxies and the Ukrainian l6 forces. t7 streamlining, that most of those defense issues would l8 wi t9 And then it was determined, as part of the be thi n our defense di rectorate. So, you know, there would be interactions with the 20 people 'in our defense directorate on issues related 2l and, you know, representatives coming from international 22 economics z) Ukrainian economy. So there were people who had withjn their 24 bundle 25 Ukrai ne of to this if there was, you know, something purporting to responsi bi 1 i ti es i ssues or other countri es. UNCLASS I FIED that would pertai n to the UNCLASS I 413 [7:].5 p.m.l BY MR. 2 a J 4 ] FIED GOLDMAN: But would all of that information flow ultimately through you on up the chain? ll A Normally. That's why i t attracted my attenti on. And it's also because the Exec Sec staff member clearly thought that thi s r,,,as reporti ng through me. a Ri ght. But I 'm j ust tryi ng to understand that. Even if he were to have had some sort of involvement with Ukrai ne from another di rectorate, that i t stj 11 , ulti mately, in normal channels, will get funneled up through you, on up t2 the 5 6 7 8 9 l0 t3 chai n A Normally. Although, you know, I'm sure I l5 and others wi11, you know, recal1 those often I jurisdictional spats between directorates, particularly if t6 somethi ng was overlappi ng. t4 l7 This happened repeatedly with CT, or the felt that they ought the direct reporting on an l8 Counterterrorjsm Directorate, that they t9 to have, you know, for example, i ssue that fet 1 i nto thei r pu rvi ew. 20 21 22 23 24 25 And we had a few disputes sometimes between some of our directors about who had responsibility, you know, for a particular issue. d'irectors and the a CT But you knew what they were doing on those di sputes. UNCLASS I FIED UNCLASS I 2 3 4 5 6 7 I PIED 414 A I dld know what they were doing, correct. a So can you give us an assessment of how unusual it was that, as you understood j t, someone outs'ide of your directorate was providing information to the President about Ukraine? Had that happened about any of your countries that you oversaw in your 2-L/2 years there? A Yeah, I think you know, normally, there was l0 atso, you know, a very extens'ive clearance process. So anything that was going to the President would have been, you know, fu11y vetted and cleared, you know, across the NSC ll di rectorate i f there'd been t2 request would've come through Ambassador Bolton. l3 t4 a were to l5 up through Charlie Kupperman or Ambassador Bolton, would you 8 9 16 t7 l8 t9 20 2t 22 23 24 25 a request. And, normally, the else. If something come through other channels, related to Ukraine' on And let me ask you something to loop you in on it and ask you about it? A I thjnk it would depend on the nature of the material. I mean, if it fel1 into the purview of, say' our cyber and it might have been, you know, related to something that was classified and that, you know, perhaps I was not read into, then, you know, it's possible that I would not necessarily have known about that. But, in this case, this seemed to be talking about some routine materials. O And just to be c1ear, this was -A And, again, I d1d not want to put the Exec Sec have expected them UNCLASSIEIED UNCLASS I FIED I person, who was totally a 2 posi ti on. a A J 4ls staff member, in a d"iffjcult They Understood. 5 clearly were just relating to me this request just thinking that I already knew and were giving me a 6 heads-up. 4 a A 7 Relating the request from the President? l0 just were, you know, kjnd of I think they thought they were reminding me that the President, you know, wanted to speak to the Ukraine director about the 11 materi als. 8 9 a A t2 13 That they OkaY. And just to give me a heads-up and to say that, t4 know, they might be contacting Kash. And l5 obvi ously t6 17 l8 t9 20 21 22 23 24 25 or , I thought , that's you when, whoa, okay. a When A a A a He was surpri sed. you mentioned this to Charlie Kupperman, d'id he I was goi ng He to say, d'id he know about thi s at all? did not. 0kay. Did he indicate to you whether he understood that Ambassador BoIton knew of this at all? A He indicated that Ambassador Bolton d'id not know about this as well. He acted very surprised. a And that seems is that outside of the normal UNCLASS I FIED UNCLASS I I FIED 4t6 ty Councj 1? Yes. This was unusual, which is why I flagged it. operati ng procedures wi thi n the National Securi A a A 2 J 0kaY. 7 I mean, there have been cases of, you know, general mistaken identity, you know, in the past that have been not parti cularly a bi g deal . But thi s i s, of course, happeni ng in this context 'in which all kinds of other things are go'ing 8 on as wel1. 4 5 6 ll a And just to be clear, you don't believe this is a case of mi staken i denti ty. A No. I mean, it was clear -- I mean, Kash is not a t2 usual name. And Kash i s not 9 10 a A l3 t4 A1ex. 0h. I mean, i t wasn't clear to me, though, that l5 everybody 'i n Exec Sec would know who Alex Vi ndman was anyway. t6 t7 yes, h€'d been on the delegation as a representative, but he wasn't, you know, someone who was particularly l8 well-known. t9 I mean, a During your 2-plus years there, how frequently did 20 the President ask to meet with any directors on any of the 2l countries that you 22 23 24 25 A a A oversaw? Not on any of my countries, he had not. Never. not. But it's possible that he had asked for other people. I mean, we had people with, you know, He had UNCLASS I FTED UNCLASS I F]ED 417 I various specific areas of expertise on other jssues that 2 could easily have asked for and I wouldn't know about that. he 7 of my other staff members at high 1eve1s would request a director to attend a meeting, you know, given the serious nature of meetings, and a number of our di rectors did go to, you know, high-1eve1 meetings and sit in with them. And, often, if I wasn't there, one of our 8 dj rectors would go. J 4 5 6 9 But he had not on any a A But not the President? 22 in the context of a Presidential head of state meeting'if I -a Sorry. I just meant the President had never -A No. spec i f i ca1 Iy requested a A Never. a di rector wj thi n any of your portfolios. a A Not in my portfolio, he had not. a Okay. And did you I would imagine it was relatively important for you to understand what jnformation the President was reviewing related to Ukraine, given that that's part of your portfolio. A That's correct, which is why I took jt to Charlie 23 Kupperman. l0 ll 12 l3 t4 l5 l6 t7 18 t9 20 21 24 25 a A They might be there did you ever figure out what it I did not. And UNCLASS I FIED was? UNCLASS 418 After having brought it the first tjme, djd you go a I I FIED 2 back and make a subsequent request, given the importance for J you 4 Ukra i ne? to understand what the President was seeing related to t6 A Wel1, I started to be concerned around this, that then it was obviously, you know, material that was not part of the national securi ty process. And i f a What do you mean bY that? A We11, obviously, it wasn't related to the i-ssues that we were working on. It had to be something eIse. And then, you know, as I expressed Chartie had already I'd already expressed to Charlie Kupperman my concerns about the Gi uf iani accusati ons , and I had no i dea whether th'is was related to this or to any other issue. Again, I don't want to speculate. But I was confident that if I needed to know what this was, Charlie Kupperman would te11 me and would t7 i nform me. 5 6 7 8 9 l0 1l t2 13 t4 r5 l8 t9 20 2l 22 23 24 25 a A a And he He did not. Are you aware of whether Kash Patel ever met Rudy Gi u1 i anj A a A a did not. ? I do not know. How about wi th M'ick MulvaneY? I don't know that ei ther. And Ambassador Sondland? UNCLASS I FIED wi th UNCLASS I A a 1 2 FIED 419 I also don't know that. And so, after that initial conversation with 4 Charlie Kupperman, you heard nothing else about this? A I, at one point later on, asked Charlie Kupperman, 5 you know, what was generally going on with Kash Pate1, and 6 told 7 Counterterrori J a 8 9 me he that he was going to be transferred to And sm. did you understand that there was a reason for that? t5 I inferred from that that it was to basjcally in response to what had happened. a Was that perceived how was that jn response? A He said to me that that was more fitting with the issues that he was interested in, that Patel was interested i n. I mean, agai n, 1ook, these are personnel matters. 16 That's l0 il t2 l3 t4 t7 l8 t9 20 21 22 23 24 25 A a A Ri ght. normally handled by Charlie Kupperman. And Kash Patel was not in my directorate. And I flagged my concern. I also djd not want to start, you know, jumping down the throat of the Exec Sec staff person, who clearly had just told me something that they did not realize, you know, I d'id not know. And I immediately went upstairs to flag it. O Are you aware of whether any other United States Government offic'ia1s ever engaged any Ukrainian officials in UNCLASS I FIED UNCLASS I FIED 420 2 to request that they initiate these investigations that Rudy Gjuliani was and President Trump referenced on J the J u1y 25th call? any way 4 A a I'm not aware of that, no. 8 Okay. Are you aware whether any Congressmen or Senators were involved at all in this effort? A I 'm not . I mean , I 've only read, you know, what ' s been reported in the press most recently about some of the 9 involvement jncluding CongreSsman Sessions. 5 6 7 Related t9 a Okay. 20 You, obviously, 11 t2 13 t4 l5 l6 t7 l8 2t 22 23 24 25 was Surprised. to Parnas and Fruman? Correct. And Ambassador Yovanovi tch. I mean ' I djd not expect that that was, you know, the originating source for the pressure against her. a Uh-huh. And is there anything more about Mr. Mulvaney's role in th'is whole Ukrai ne i ssue i n connecti on wi th , you know, Mr. Gi uli an"i 's ef f orts? A Not beyond what I've already told you. a A l0 I left July 19th. And you've exhaustively answered our questions today, and we are very appreciat'ive of that. You've mentioned repeatedly concerns that you had about, in particular, Mr. Giuliani and his efforts. When you read the call transcript of July 25th, the call record, which you must have done just a couple weeks ago, did UNCLASS]FIED UNCLASS I FIED 421 t2 it crystallize in your head in any way a better understanding of what was transpiring while you were there? A In terms of providing, you know, more information wi th hi ndsi ght, unfortunately, yes. a And i n what way? A The specific references, also juxtaposed with the release of the text messages by Ambassador Volker you know, what I sajd before rea11y was kind of my worst fears and ni ghtmares, 'in terms of , you know, there bei ng some ki nd of effort not just to subvert the national -security process, but to try to subvert what real1y should be, you know, k'ind of, a diplomatic effort to, you know, kind of, set up a 13 Presidential meeting. I 2 J 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1l t4 l5 a A Thi s may There seems to be an awf ul Iot of people 'involved 23 in, you know, basically turning a White House meeting jnto some k'ind of asset. a What do you mean by "asset"? A We11, something that was being, you know, dangled out to the Ukrai n'ian Government. They wanted the Wh'ite House meet'ing very much. And thi s was ki nd of layi ng out that i t wasn't just a question of scheduling or having, you know, the national security issues worked out, that there were all of 24 these alternate d'iscuss'ions goi ng on behi nd. t6 t7 l8 19 20 2t 22 25 a And you have discussed UNCLASS I FIED the July LOth meeting where I FIED UNCLASS 422 Ambassador Sondland 'ind'icated J that. We've gone through the Kurt Volker text on July 25th. You've now read the transcript of the Presidential call between President Trump 4 and President Zelensky. 1 2 Would you agree 5 6 seemed 7 time? this doesn't seem to be a one-off; this to be a fairly considered campaign over a period of 14 it certainly dovetails with the activity that we started to see after the ouster of Marie Yovanovitch, of Masha Yovanov'itch. So, f or fle , l'lasha Yovanovi tch's ouster was some kind of tipping point or turning point. a And thj s wasn't A Because it was after she was removed from her position that you started to see, you know, more of this 15 acti vi ty. 8 9 l0 l1 t2 l3 A a l6 We11, And, even then , I bel i eve you sa1d that you l8 at least from Ambassador Yovanovitch, that she was told that the President had ordered her removal. Is that t9 right? t7 understood, A 20 2t 22 23 24 25 She didn't tell me that at the time when I saw her a I'm sorry. May 1st. She was being discreet, but she told A me that there had been a lack or a loss of confidence in her posit'ion and that, although they told her that she wasn't UNCLASS I FIED UNCLASS I EIED ng I bei 2 tenable - - 3 a 4 A 5 6 7 8 9 l0 ll t2 l3 t4 l5 t6 t7 l8 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 for cause, her positjon removed 423 was no longer But and that she had wrap up her she stated thi in her public testimony. a Ri ght. And Deputy Secretary Su11 i van told you, though, that the State Department was quite supportive of and jt had nothing to do with her work performance. A That' s cor rect s her . aSo I was also surprised to read in her pubfic testimony that there'd been a pressure campaign, that she'd been told there was a pressure campaign going back to the summer of 20L8. a 0kay. We11, Rudy Giuljani doesn't have the authority to remove the Ambassador, correct? A I don' t be1 i eve that he does. That's correct. a Right. So did you infer at the time who made the decision to remove her? A I actually inferred at the time that jt had been made at the top of the State Department a So you think it was Secretary Pompeo? jn response to, you know, obviously, concerns A that had been ra'ised against her which one could trace right back to what Mr. Giuliani had been saying and he had been A And UNCLASS I FIED UNCLASS I EIED 424 I building up into a crescendo of criticism about her in that 2 period. J a 4 have a 5 6 A a A And now having read the different view of call transcript, do you what occurred? Well The call record. 20 I read in the transcript and what she said in her testimony, which was obviously told to her, then I have a different view we11, I have the view that we're now di scussi ng, that the Pres'ident asked f or her to be removed. a OkaY. And I don't mean to belabor thjs, but Rudy Giufiani was not a government official. And so, did you have an understanding of for whom he was acting on behalf of? A I did not, actual1y. I mean, I was often worried, 'in 1i steni ng to h'im, that he was acti ng on hi s own behalf a Ri ght. Now, I 'm sort of sayi ng, now that you ' re looking back at the text messages, the call record, and putting it together with a1I the meetings and other 2t interactions that you saw -- 7 8 9 l0 ll t2 l3 l4 l5 l6 17 l8 19 We11, based on what . 23 I st'i11 have questions of whether he was acting on his own behalf, particularly after the indictment of 24 Mr. Parnas and 14r. 22 25 A a Fruman. Understood. But do UNCLASS I FIED UNCLASS I FIED 425 J A I think you also understand that the Pres'ident adopted a a 1ot of Rudy G'iuliani 's views, to the extent they are Rudy 4 Gi I 2 a ul i ani 's? l5 of Rudy Gi u1i ani 's views on the televjsion, I think if you listen to that long enough, you know, it kind of God knows what anybody would think, getting back to, you know, questions that have been posed before. He seemed to be, you know, basically engaged'in a concerted effort to propagate these vjews. O Uh-huh. A But I cannot say that this was all of the things that he was doing was at the direction of the President. I can' t say that. a But you did not'ice in the call transcript that the 16 Presjdent said several times that President Zelensky should t7 speak 5 6 7 8 9 l0 ll 12 l3 t4 l8 19 20 2l 22 23 24 25 A We11, given the drumbeat with Rudy Giuliani, right? A a A I did. did that give you an understanding But that suggests that Rudy Giuliani has all of So the . I mean, agai n, he's bei ng di rected to talk to Rudy Giuliani. And, you know, when we refer to the ellipses, you know, the President isn't laying out in fu11 all of these issues. So, you know, kind of , a 1ot of thjs information 'is comi ng f rom Rudy j u1i ani , and Rudy Gi ul i an'i seems to be, i n i nformati on G UNCLASS ] FIED UNCLASS I some ] FIED 426 fashion, orchestrating a lot of these discussions. 2 a J i nvesti If Ukraine actually did initiate gatjons, who would these they have benefi ted? 6 , they mi ght have benef i ted Mr . Gi u1 i ani and his business colleagues just as much as anyone else. a How so? An investigation into Joe Biden, how would 7 that 4 5 A We11 have helped t2 A It's an investigation, but it wasn't just into that. There was investigat'ions writ 1arge. So if there's upheaval in the Ukrainian energy sector and people are removed, perhaps this gives the opportunity for these i ndi vi duals and other i ndi vi duals to get i nvestments or 13 lucrative board 8 9 l0 ll t4 l5 a posi tions. Did President Trump mentjon the energy sector or corruption in the energy sector in the July 25th call? 2t A He doesn't seem to have done so. I mean, he refers to directly, as I stated but, overall, we were again, there have been lots of references to energy sector and to corruption in the energy sector. And, technically, Burisma is part of the energy sector in Ukraine. a Right. But you understood as we discussed, you 22 understand Rudy Giulian'i and, c1ear1y, President Trump's v jew 16 17 l8 19 20 23 24 25 of the Burisma to the extent that they wanted an investigation related to the Bjdens? A I see what was in the transcript, but I'm also UNCLASS I FIED UNCLASS I EIED 427 2 referring to all of the discussions that were out there in public on the television and all the statements by J Mr. Giuliani. They seemed to cover a 1ot of ground and a 1ot I t6 of terri tory. I thi nk i t's enti rely possi b1e and, agai n, I 'm presumi ng that thi s 'is what you' re all tryi ng to get to the bottom of that many things were being put onto thjs set of i ssues. Thi s i s a So i t's not j ust one thi ng. A This is a bundling of a number of jssues. a So am I correct i n understand'ing that there could be a number of different interests that are A l"ly view, jn looking at this, js that individuals, private indivjduals, like Mr. G'iuliani and his busjness associ ates, are tryi ng to appropri ate Presi denti al power or the authority of the President, given the position that 14r. Giuliani js in, to also pursue their own personal t7 i 4 5 6 7 8 9 l0 ll t2 r3 t4 l5 18 l9 nterests. a But the President was wjlling Presjdentjal power in that JuIy 25th to provide the ca11. 22 A Wel1, that's the Juty 25th ca11, but before that it seems to me that there was a lot of usurpation of that power. a But you do agree that jn that July 25th call the 23 President 20 2l 24 25 A a was That's what it seems OkaY. UNCLASS I FIED to suggest. UNCLASS I A ] FIED 428 And, agai n, f 'm readi ng that i n a context 'in whi ch, l5 at other information and I don't have a complete picture of what transpired between when i left and when the call was made and then subsequently to all the information that we're seeing out in the press as well . I 'm learni ng thi ngs from the press, i f i ndeed all of thi s i s accurate, for the fi rst time. O R'ight. I understand that. And I guess the f j na1 questi on I have i s, you 'indi cated earlier on today that this was sort of your worst nightmare and that these requests for investigations appear to be political in nature. Is that accurate? A Correct. My worst n'ightmare js the politicization of the relationship between the U.S. and Ukraine and, also, the usurpation of authori ties, you know, for other people's t6 personal vested interests. 2 J 4 5 6 7 8 9 l0 11 t2 l3 t4 you know, I've been looking 2l ght. But whose And there seems to be a large range of people who were looki ng for these opportuni ti es here. a If the Ukra'ine I thi nk you used thi s term dug up dirt on Joe Biden, whose potitical prospects would that 22 assi st? 23 A t7 l8 l9 20 24 25 a A Ri Well, depending on how it plays out, that could assist a wide range of a PeoPle. Potentially. 1s it going to assist UNCLASS I FIED Rudy Giuliani's ] F] UNCLASS I political 2 Trump's? campaign, 429 ED or is it going to assist President lt A Well, again, it depends on how this all plays out. everybody At this particular -- look, this is now, kind of could be damaged by all of this, which basically gets back to my point. Everybody's campaign could be severely damaged by how this plays out now. 0r it could be benefited. I thjnk what you're saying is, was the intent to promote the campaign of President Trump. Yes. But you're asking the question, a1so, about how this might play out. a That was rea11y just the former, but I understand t2 what you ' re J 4 5 6 7 8 9 l0 I say i ng. have L t3 Can l4 All ri ght. I thi nk we' re done here. I l5 t6 17 mi nute? don' t know i f you guys have anything. MR. CASTOR: Who was the staffer in the Exec Sec that brought up Kash Patel? HILL: I'11 be honest, I actuatty can't l8 DR. l9 MR. CAST0R: 0kay. 20 DR. 2t NR. CASTOR: Thank you. 22 DR. HILL: Because HILL: it staff, was one just simply they were relaying to 24 MR. CASTOR: Thank you. 25 DR. HI LL : - - i nformatj on UNCLASS of the front office and i t wasn't someone 23 I FIED . remember. me a piece of And I honestly who can' t i t was UNCLASS 1 4 5 6 7 8 9 l0 l1 FIED 430 remember. NR. JORDAN: Doctor, who's on 2 ) T this distribution list that you reference? I don't know how that operates and how that works. DR. HILL: Wel1, it's usually for, you know, meetings related to Ukraine. So if we're having one of these interagency meetings at the directors level or, you know, kind of, a poli tical coordination commi ttee, you would add on everybody who you thought would be, you know, related to this i n some way. MR. J0RDAN: And would the ind'ividuals -- 13 to parse through and see, you know, what individuals were on and then to see what it would t4 be about fo11ow-on materi a1s. t2 15 t6 t7 18 l9 20 2t 22 23 24 25 DR. HILL: So I asked them just to be kind of clear about this, I mean' a 1ot of these distribution ljsts are on our classifjed System, not just on our unclass system. And sometimes they have attached to them a 1ot of background materials. So, MR. JORDAN: That was my next question. HILL: And thjs gets back to our, you know, concerns about leaking in the past. I mean, you asked me about this question about CNN. Just an enormous amount of our material, before you've even had a meeting, is out on CNN or Politico or Buzzfeed. And I would lose my mind, sometimes, before routine meetings by the fact that, before I'd even started DR. UNCLASS I FIED UNCLASS I EIED I 2 431 of the background material with some of the deli berations already seemed to be somebody publi shi ng i t. the meeting, a some '4R. JORDAN: J Yeah. No, I've 10 HILL: So, you know, I mean, obviously, you've been fami l i ar wi th that, and I 'm sure i t' s an occupati onal hazard for people here as we1l. MR. JORDAN: It sure'is. DR. HILL: So I started to worry about, you know, kind of: Were materials that were just meant for the interagency, you know, for people, that were deliberative drafts of, you 1l know, policy memorandum going backwards and forwards, you t2 know, 4 5 6 7 8 9 DR. l3 that weren't intended for, you know, kjnd of, other people, being distributed or information that was attached to t4 that? But, in actual fact, l5 when I looked at this, there'd been l6 very ljttle l7 wasn't, you know, ki nd of, fai r1y routi ne i n these l8 23 Okay. That was my question. 5o the djstribution list is not just to individuals telling them about a schedute or a meeting. It's also some material that i s actually bei ng transmi tted DR. HILL: That's right, that they need to use to prepare for the and, often, it would be sent, you know, to 24 i 25 director or themsetves, if they were just attending, you t9 20 2l 22 information that we'd been sending out that documents. t"lR. JORDAN: ndividuals in different di rectorates to prepare thei r senior UNCLASS I EIED UNCLASS I EIED I 2 a J 432 to basically, like we're doing here, you know, exhibit A, the Politico thing, or the transcript, for know, example. MR. JORDAN: 4 Right. And was Mr. Patel on the t2 distribution list that was receiving this information? DR. HiLL: In some cases, he was on the larger distributive list for his directorate. MR. J 0RDAN : 0kay DR. HILL: And, in some cases, he was there with a few other people from h'i s dj rectorate, perhaps because, agai n, i f some of the meetings overlapped with things that he was working on, or there had also been a lot of changeover, 13 agai n , t4 or three di rectors 5 6 7 8 9 l0 ll . 'in the di rectorate, so there were someti mes j ust two l6 getting the information that he was getting the same information that everyone else was t7 gett i ng? 15 MR. JORDAN: So was he DR. 18 t9 20 2t 22 23 24 25 HiLL: From what I'm recalling, I think that was the case. MR. JORDAN: Okay. So just like everyone else on the d'istribution list, he was getting that DR. HILL: That's right. -- exact same information DR. HILL: And, as I said, I went -MR. JORDAN: -- at the exact same time in MR. J0RDAN: UNCLASS 1 FIED the UNCLASS I I FIED 433 meet i ngs : 2 DR. J l'lR. J0RDAN: HI LL Cor rect . -- everything the same? 10 HILL: But as you're looking back, you know, over -and I'm looking back on my schedule, there weren't a lot of other -- there weren't a lot of meetings taken, but there's a lot of background materials. 5o I also wanted to know from Alex and others if there was some other djstro list that they had for other communicat"ions for materials. Basically, you know, directors often have their own distro people that ll they' re worki ng wi th. 4 5 6 7 8 9 t2 l3 t4 DR. MR. JORDAN: I guess my concern was, you I think said a littler earf ier you said you were concerned about the material he may have and may present to whomever he was t7 to 'in whatever meeti ng. And I 'm j ust tryi ng to f igure out, if he's on this same d'istribution list and he's getting it just like everyone else and he's getting the same l8 material, l9 22 in April, May DR. HILL: We11, because I wasn't sure when they referred to materials, I thought, what on Earth materials could they be talking about? So I wanted to see, js there 23 any way l5 t6 20 2t 24 25 presenti ng i t why would you be concerned about the material he'd be presenting that any of these background materials that were prepared updates on Ukraine, in other words could've been in the mix and then were being given off being UNCLASSI FIED to UNCLASS I 2 J 4 5 6 9 l0 for the Exec Sec or to be handed on, certainly, to the President. I mean, it would do something'in a totally djfferent nature if you're preparing a background briefing for the President or a background briefing for Ambassador Bolton. They do it in a very di fferent way, i f I 'm prepari ng a background bri efi ng MR. J0RDAN: 0kay. HILL: -- for a routjne d'irectors meeting, wh'ich might have, you know, all of the comments of the d'i rectors, DR. you know, back and forth MR. 1l t2 l3 14 15 t6 t7 J0RDAN : Yeah. I thought to myself, you know, what materials could this be? MR. JORDAN: Yeah. So, just to be clear, though, Mr. Patel is on the same distributjon ljst as everyone else on the list and getting the same material. DR. HILL: That's correct. DR. HiLL: And l8 MR. JORDAN: 0kay. t9 DR. HILL: But then again, I'ffi trying to figure out, that material and what could that material be that 20 would 2l could be getti ng 22 MR. JORDAN: Thank you. 23 DR. HILL: -- you know, sent up to the President? MR. ZELDIN: The next piece of evidence what's 24 25 434 Exec Sec? Because they weren't being prepared 7 8 ] FIED next number? UNCLASS I EIED the why UNCLASS I F]ED 435 J HILL: And, again, just to be very cIear, I did not know what that material would be. I did not know at any time, I was not told, what that material was that was sent to 4 the Presi dent. 1 2 DR. 6 I wasn't asking about that. I was asking about what was sent to Mr. Patel was exactly what everyone 7 else was getting. 5 MR. J0RDAN: HILL: That's correct. MR. J0RDAN: Got i t. IMi nori ty DR. 8 9 l0 Exhi bi for t No. 5 l3 fi cati on. l MR. ZELDIN: Dr. Hi11, we're passing around exhibjt No. 5. This is I'11 wait for a second untjl it gets 14 di 1l 12 l5 Was marked stri buted. This is.a May 4th, 2018, i denti letter sent to Mr. Lutsenko 16 from three Democratic United States Senators. Are l7 f ami 1i ar wi th th'is letter? LL: I 'm not , actual ly. l8 DR. 19 MR. ZELDIN: You have never seen 20 2t 22 23 24 25 you HI this letter before? that I have, no. I'lR. ZELDIN: 0kay. Thi s i s a letter that three Democratjc United States Senators sent to the prosecutor general at the time in Ukraine, demandr'ng that Ukrajne assist with the Robert Mueller probe targeting the President. DR. HILL: Was this letter made public? Was it sent to DR. HI LL: I don ' t be1 i UNCLASS eve I FIED I FIED UNCLASS I the and the public offices? l"lR. ZELDIN: 2 J NSC 436 I don't know the distro of the letter, which is 6 HILL: Right. Because I -MR. ZELDIN: one of the reasons why I DR. HILL: -- have not seen this letter 7 MR. ZELDIN: Okay. 8 Did any DR. 4 5 9 wanted to ask. before. of the people in the NSC ever articulate to you any anti -Trump pol i ti ca1 posi ti ons? HILL: They did not, l0 DR. 1l MR. ZELDIN: Do you no. befieve that it was appropriate for to hire Christopher t2 the Ctinton campaign and the t3 t6 to create the dossier against the Trump campaign? DR. HILL: As I understand, they didn't hire him directly. I don't have any personal knowledge about how he was hired. I don't know that he was hired directly by the t7 DNC. Was he? t4 15 MR. ZELDIN: We11, 18 1t 20 the Clinton campaign and DNC. 22 was through an intermediary, but the money GPS. originated from But if you're not familiar with the source of funding, 1et' s put that asi de . 23 DR. Hi LL : 24 \,lR. 25 Steele they hi red a Iaw fi rm, Fusion l9 2l DNC No, I 'm not. I 'm not fami 1 i ar ZELDIN: Funding aside, do you think appropriate wi th that. it is for Christopher Steele to have been hired as a UNCLASS I FIED UNCLASS I EIE I 2 5 6 7 8 9 437 foreign spy to be collecting jnformation from foreign governments to gain an advantage against the Trump campaign? DR. J 4 D HILL: We11, he's a former forei gn spy. But, national. I don't believe it's appropriate for him to have been hired to do this. And, again, I thjnk I already expressed my shock and surprise when I learned that he had been i nvolved i n th'is. MR. ZELDIN: We've spoken about Burisma a lot today. Are you famifiar wjth the fact that Hunter Biden was paid for nonetheless, a foreign l0 thi s posi ti on w'ith Buri sma? ll 13 HILL: I remember seeing the reports about this when he was first taken onboard. I was stj11 at the Brookings Institution, and I remember there were press reports about t4 this. t2 l5 l6 t7 l8 19 DR. MR. all in ZELDIN: Has his employment with Burisma come up at of your official government posjtions? DR. HILL: It did not, apart from the di scussion wi th Amos Hochste'in where he i nf ormed me that some of these d'iscussions in Ukraine were centered around Burisma, and he any 23 that Hunter Biden sat on the board of. And, as you may also recal1, Amos Hochstejn had expressed concern about that when that appointment went through jn the course of his own official 24 dut'ies. 20 2l 22 25 remjnded me that Burisma was the company MR. ZELDIN: Do you know Hunter Biden? UNCLASS I FIED UNCLASS I 2 n J 4 5 DR. HILL: I I FIED 438 dO NOt. of any experience or qualifications that he would have for that position? DR. HILL: I am not aware. I don't know him. t4R. ZELDIN: Are you aware MR. ZELDIN: And you worked with Vice Presjdent Joe ll of your offjcial capacities? When I was the National Intelli gence 0ffi cer for Russia and Eurasia in the first year of the 0bama administration, yes, I mean, in the same context as I worked with Vi ce Presi dent Cheney f or the 3 years of the Bush administration that I was NI0. I was often asked to do t2 briefings. 6 7 8 9 l0 l3 t4 at all in DR. HILL: Biden any MR. ZELDIN: When Vice President Biden did your official interactions with end? l6 HILL: In November of 2009 when I returned to Brookings after spending my t'ime as the National Intelligence t7 0ff i cer l5 18 t9 20 DR. . the remainder of the Obama administration you were out of the United States Government. DR. HILL: That's correct. I was, as an expert, i nvi ted MR. ZELDIN: So 23 to a couple of dinner briefings on Russia hosted by Vice President Biden, but that's the totali ty of my i nteractions. MR. ZELDIN: I t' s been wi dely reported that he doesn' t 24 have Ukraine experience, he doesn't have energy experience 2l 22 25 DR. HiLL: Who are we referring to? UNCLASS I FIED UNCLASS MR. I ] FIED 439 ZELDiN: Hunter Biden. HILL: 0h, Hunter Biden. MR. ZELDIN: Sorry. Hunter Biden DR. HI LL: Yeah. MR. ZELDIN : i t' s been wi dely reported he doesn ' t DR. 2 J 4 5 6 have any energy experience, doesn't have any Ukraine 7 experience, but was hired by Burisma, which 8 d i gress From 9 l0 c ompany ar wi th Zlochevsky? DR. HILL: I'm not very f amiliar with him e'ither, just more into 18 22 23 24 25 famjliar with the investigations or Zlochevsky? DR. HILL: I was aware that there Burisma were investigations underway, yes. MR. ZELDIN: And these were cor 20 2t in a general sense. MR. ZELDIN: Are you l6 l9 HILL: I don't know a 1ot about Buri sma, I'11 be MR. ZELDIN: Are you fami 1j t4 t7 your knowledge of Burjsma, are they a corrupt f rank. 13 l5 . ? DR. 1l t2 a m'inute is a -- 1et me into rupti on i nvesti gati ons Burisma and Zlochevsky? HiLL: And into the particular individual. So, agai n, the fact that there i s i nvestigations into corruption in the energy sector in Ukrajne, as well as Russia or many other countries, is not a surprise. DR. UNCLASS I FIED UNCLASS I EIED 440 l0 this point, I have to also say there were an awful 1ot of people with political connections and not expertise on particular issues that were being h'ired by all ki nds of ent'iti es. MR. ZELDIN: It's been widely reported, as I started to state, wjth regards to a lack of energy experience DR. HILL: Right. MR. ZELDIN: with a lack of Ukraine experience, he was paid at least $50,000 a month. There are reports that his company he has a partner were paid a substantially 1l hi 1 2 a J 4 5 6 7 8 9 And, a1so, on gher fi gure. Vice President Joe Biden was the point man for the t2 Obama t4 strati on w'ith Ukrai ne. Be'ing the poi nt man f or the Obama administration, what power comes with that, as far as l5 purSestrings, as far as funding that United States provides l6 to t3 adm j ni Ukrai ne? DR. 17 18 that . I HILL: The Vice President mean, thi s i s, agai n , didn't the determi a role in nati on of Congress have 21 of the State Department and Defense Department and others. I mean, the Vice President has no role in determi ni ng the pursestr i ngs . The 0ff i ce of Management and 22 Budget do as wel1. l9 20 and also 23 MR. ZELDIN 24 DR. 25 HILL: : Are you fami 1 i ar And Vice President Pence also wanted a role on Ukrai ne i n thi s UNCLASS I admi ni FIED strati on. to play ] FIED UNCLASS MR. ZELDIN: To I that poi nt, 441 are you f ami 1i ar w'ith 2 video from January 20L8 where Vice President Biden J a about his 4 Have you seen 5 DR. 6 7 8 9 a spoke efforts to have Prosecutor General Shokin fired? that HILL: I video? have not seen that video. Okay. That video I won't ask a question di rectly to that. I'11 ask a di f f erent quest'ion. But f or background, that v"ideo, Vice President Biden is speaking about his efforts, threatening Ukraine with the loss of MR. ZELDIN: t5 if they didn't fire Shokin, and then they i nstantly fi red Shoki n. But the question is, you're saying that the Vjce President doesn't have the ability to be delegated any authority from a President to make those types of threats? DR. HILL: To make those types of threats? You were t6 talki ng about money earl i er. 10 ll t2 l3 l4 $1 billion MR. ZELDIN: Does a Vice President have 17 the power to a threat to a foreign government of the loss of United l8 make t9 States support? 21 HILL: if he is being asked to do that on the behalf of the government, on behalf of the President or the State 22 Department and others. 20 23 24 25 DR. So, when I was working in the Bush administration, Vice Pres'ident Cheney was the heavy on all of these i ssues. And he certainly issued ptenty of threats to a whole range of UNCLASS ] EIED UNCLASS I FIED 442 2 that, you know, I was pri vy to, at the direction or the request of other parts of the J government. I countri es, i ncludi ng Russi a, 7 I thi nk, you know, putt'ing f orward the i dea that, you know, there could be forfeited an assistance and that Vice President Biden was conveying that information on behalf of the government, wel1, yes, of course, he could do that. But 8 he does not make the determination about funding. 4 5 6 So 1'4R. ZELDIN 9 : Do you have any concerns about any member il of the United States Government being delegated the authority to make a threat if their son is receiving $50,000 a month t2 f l0 rom l3 DR. HILL: t4 MR. ZELDIN: l5 DR. HILL: 16 I think you might be a company targeted by an open starti ng to go into some very dangerous terri tory 20 sorry. Let me f inish the quest'ion. DR. HILL: -- at the moment for everybody. MR. ZELDIN: I'm sorry. Do you think that it would be appropriate for a -- do you have any concern with a Vjce 2t President being delegated the authority to make a threat like t7 l8 t9 '4R. ZELDIN: I'm 23 that if their son js receiving $50,000 a month from an entity of that foreign country being targeted by having an open 24 i nvesti gati on? 25 DR. 22 HiLL: I think that there js a problem with UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASS I FIED 443 J of conflicts of jnterest and ethics for any chjld of any senior officjal to be involved in anything that their parents are involved in, period. So this goes not just to 4 Hunter Biden and Vice President Biden but across the board. I 2 perceptions And 5 6 I think, getting back Congressman Raskin asked about to the question that before about corruption and t7 of it, th'is is exactly the problem we have right now in our politics. The rank and file have to sign all kinds of ethical agreements to make sure that members of our family are not involved in anything that we are involved in or to recuse ourselves. And across the board, Members of Congress, the Senate, I mean, this is what you spend your time looking at. Vice Presidents, Presidents, Secretaries of 5tate, Secretaries of Commerce, Secretarjes of Transportation, Secretaries of Interior I could just go on should not have their chi ldren j nvolved i n anythi ng that they' re i nvolved i n as l8 well. 7 8 9 l0 ll 12 l3 t4 15 t6 t9 20 21 22 23 24 25 perceptions that's why I 'm sayi ng 'it's a dangerous terr j tory, because I'm not going to start on giving the long ljst of things that I personally think are a real problem. MR. ZELDIN : There was an open i nvesti gati on 'into Burisma at the time of that trip that Vice President Biden made to Ukraine and that President Trump was concerned with. Are you aware of that? And UNCLASS I FIED UNCLASS .4R. G0LDMAN: Do I 2 J 4 I FIED you have any support HILL: I wasn't aware of the information too. I wasn't in the government. t"lR. W0LOSKY: Congressman , she wasn' t i n the government DR. 5 DR. HILL: NO, ANd ]'M 6 MR. ZELDIN: 7 444 Excuse me. Actual1y, the question was The question was, are you aware of . I 'm sorry. that? And if 8 10 HILL: The answer i s no. Because I'm also not aware of all of this timeline, in terms of the issues that you're ll rai si ng here. 9 DR. t2 MR. ZELDIN : l3 DR. HILL: I 0kay. was not I wilI be, you know, qulte open. l4 I t5 Pres'ident Biden and Hunter Biden were doing l6 peri od . t7 was not monitoring and following exactly what Vice MR. ZELDIN: Well, 1et in thi s time me ask you what you do know. 18 With regards to Burisma, do you know when that investigation t9 was closed? 20 2l 22 23 24 25 HILL: I do not. And as I said, when Amos Hochstein came in to talk to me again about this and mentioned Burjsma, I had to get him to remind me again about why Burisma was significant. In the back of my mind, I knew that there was some issue with Burisma, but it had not come uP, up until then, at any poi nt i n the work that I was doi ng i n the DR. UNCLASS I FIED UNCLASS I I adm'i 4 5 on 445 . Okay. Do you know if the case against at any time? DR. HILL: From what I have read and been told, that the case was closed or dropped or that the case stopped. Burisma was closed MR. ZELDIN: What do you know about when 6 7 strati MR. ZELDiN: 2 J ni F]ED that case WAS l5 HILL: I don't know when that was stopped. I mean, again, I'11 just say that I had to be reminded by Amos Hochstei n about why Buri sma was s'igni f i cant. I remembered, from when I was at the Brookings Institution, reading about Hunter Biden being appointed, thinking this was not a bright idea, and then I did not continue to fo11ow this issue for a long period of time. So it came up again in the context of a1t the things l6 that we're discussing basically around the time that t7 Yovanovitch was removed from her t8 more general, about the 19 My knowledge 20 energy sector. 8 9 10 ll t2 l3 l4 2l 22 23 24 25 DR. position. Masha My knowledge 'is state of the Ukrainjan energy sector. in depth is really about Russia NR. ZELDIN: Are you aware of the and Russia's case the crimina1 investigation against Zlochevsky? that there had been one. But, again, I d'idn't ask for any deta jls of th'is in the position that I was in, because 1t did not seem relevant to the work DR. HILL.: I was aware UNCLASS I FIED UNCLASS that 2 J I FIED 446 we were doing. in the NSC, my job was to coordinate. And the real action was being taken, in terms of our Ukrainian And, again, 5 policy and implementation, by the State Department, the Embassy, the Defense Department, and the Department of 6 Energy. 4 I thi nk we ' re al l 7 I'4R. CASTOR: 8 DR. 9 MR. CAST0R: Thank you so much. HILL: You're HILL: DR. ll MR. GOLDMAN: l3 t4 l5 l6 . sure? don't want to conti nue? Dr. H'i11, on behalf of Chai rman Schi f f You l0 t2 done , I'd just ljke to thank you again for coming in and answering all of our questions. DR. HI LL : Thank you . Thank You. We a re ad j ou rned MR . G0LDl"lAN : [Whereupon, at 7:55 p.m. , the deposi tion was concluded. ] . t7 l8 19 20 2t 22 23 24 25 UNCLASS ] FIED