UNCLASSIFIED

MEMORANDUM
November 12, 2019
To:

Committee Members

Fr:

Chairman Adam Schiff

Re:

Procedures for Impeachment Inquiry Hearings

At 10:00 a.m. tomorrow—Wednesday, November 13, 2019—in Room 1100 of the
Longworth House Office Building, the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence will hold
its first of several open hearings as part of the public phase of the House of Representatives’
impeachment inquiry. Like the depositions preceding them, these hearings will address subjects
of profound consequence for the Nation and the functioning of our government under the
Constitution. The House’s inquiry into whether grounds exist for President Trump’s
impeachment has been, and will continue to be, a sober and rigorous undertaking. The purpose
of this memo is to provide Committee Members with information regarding procedures to be
observed during the open hearings.
The hearings will be conducted in a manner that ensures that all participants are treated
fairly and with respect, mindful of the solemn and historic task before us. The hearings will
therefore adhere to the Rules of the House and of the Committee, and to H. Res. 660, which
established the format the Committee will use during the hearings. These procedures are
consistent with those governing prior impeachment proceedings and mirror those used under
Republican and Democratic House leadership for decades.
•

Attendance and Participation. As provided by House Rule XI and H. Res. 660, only
Members of the Committee may participate in hearings conducted by the Committee.1
Although Members who are not assigned to the Committee are not permitted to sit on the
dais, make statements, or question witnesses, they may of course sit in the audience.
Seating for non-Committee Members wishing to attend will be available.

•

Decorum. The Code of Official Conduct for Members of Congress requires that every
Member “shall behave at all times in a manner that shall reflect creditably on the
House.”2 As Chair, I will do my utmost during the hearings to safeguard the rights of the
witnesses and all Members of the Committee, just as Committee Members should strive
to conduct themselves with “dignity, propriety, courtesy, and decorum.”3

1

See Rules of the House of Representatives, 116th Cong. Rule XI, Cl. 2(g)(2)(C) and 2(j)(2)(A) (Jan. 11,
2019) (“House Rules”); H. Res. 660, 116th Cong. § 2 (Oct. 31, 2019) (“H. Res. 660”).
2

House Rule XXIII, Cl. 1.

3

House Rule XI (4)(c).

 •

Opening Statements. House Rules do not provide for opening statements by Members,4
but, consistent with Committee practice, the Committee will allow equal time for the
Chairman and Ranking Member to make opening statements at the beginning of the first
hearing.

•

Swearing of Witnesses. Witnesses will be sworn in before they testify and will have the
opportunity to deliver an opening statement.5

•

Extended Questioning by the Chair, Ranking Member, and Committee Counsels.
Pursuant to H. Res. 660, the Chair and Ranking Member may conduct at the outset of
each open hearing extended rounds of questioning for periods of up to 90 minutes, as
determined by the Chair and split evenly between the two sides.6 As specified in H. Res.
660, the Chair and Ranking Member may not yield time to other Members during these
extended question periods, though either may yield time to Majority and Minority
Committee Counsels, respectively.
A similar rule put in place initially by House Republican leadership in 1997 authorized
committees to allow extended periods of time for the questioning of witnesses, in excess
of traditional five-minute rounds. The 1997 revision also allowed staff to question
witnesses at hearings.7 Under this approach, which was also adopted in subsequent
Congresses, staff questioned witnesses during the Clinton impeachment hearings8 and in
numerous other investigative hearings.9
As Chairman, I expect to yield extensive time to Majority Committee Counsel during the
extended questioning periods permitted under H. Res. 660. After I announce the
conclusion of extended questioning, Committee Members will be recognized for
customary five-minute rounds pursuant to House Rule XI.

4

House Rule XI(2)(k)(1).

5

See House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Rules of Procedure for the Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence, 116th Cong. Rule 8(b) (authorizing the Chair to “require testimony of witnesses to be
given under oath or affirmation.”).
6

H. Res. 660 § 2(2).

7

H. Res. 5, 105th Cong. § 12 (Jan. 7, 1997) (authorizing Committees to adopt a rule allowing Committee
staff to question hearing witnesses).
8

See, e.g., House Committee on the Judiciary, Impeachment: William Jefferson Clinton, President of the
United States, 105th Cong. (Nov. 19, 1998) (online at www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG105hhrg53367/pdf/CHRG-105hhrg53367.pdf).
See, e.g., House Committee on Government Reform, The FBI’s Handling of Confidential Informants in
Boston: Will the Department of Justice Comply with Congressional Subpoenas?, 107th Cong. (Dec. 13, 2001)
(online at www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-107hhrg78051/pdf/CHRG-107hhrg78051.pdf); House Committee
on Government Reform, The History of Congressional Access to Deliberative Department of Justice Documents,
107th Cong. (Feb. 6, 2002) (online at www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-107hhrg78051/pdf/CHRG107hhrg78051.pdf#page=465).
9

2

 •

Minority Witnesses. As set forth in H. Res. 660, the Committee’s Minority may request
witnesses to testify during open hearings conducted by the Committee in connection with
the impeachment inquiry.10 To allow for their full evaluation, H. Res. 660 provides that
such requests should be submitted to the Chairman within 72 hours of the notice for the
first hearing and include a “detailed written justification of the relevance of the
testimony” of each requested witness.11
On November 6, the Committee noticed its first public hearing, and on that same day, by
letter, I asked that the Ranking Member submit any Minority requests in accordance with
the resolution.12 On November 9, the Ranking Member submitted minority witness
requests.13 The Committee is evaluating the Minority’s requested witnesses and will give
due consideration to witnesses within the scope of the impeachment inquiry.
The report submitted by the Committee on Rules to accompany H. Res. 660 sets forth the
parameters of the investigation conducted by the Committee, in coordination with the
Committees on Foreign Affairs and Oversight and Reform:
1.

Did the President request that a foreign leader and government initiate
investigations to benefit the President’s personal political interests in the United
States, including an investigation related to the President’s political rival and
potential opponent in the 2020 U.S. presidential election?

2.

Did the President—directly or through agents—seek to use the power of the
Office of the President and other instruments of the federal government in other
ways to apply pressure on the head of state and government of Ukraine to
advance the President’s personal political interests, including by leveraging an
Oval Office meeting desired by the President of Ukraine or by withholding U.S.
military assistance to Ukraine?

3.

Did the President and his Administration seek to obstruct, suppress or cover up
information to conceal from the Congress and the American people evidence
about the President’s actions and conduct?14

10

H. Res. 660 § (3).

11

Id.

12
Letter from Chairman Adam Schiff to Ranking Member Devin Nunes, House Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence (Nov. 6, 2019) (online at https://intelligence.house.gov/uploadedfiles/20191106__hpsci_ch_letter_to_rm_re_witness_requests_-_9183653.pdf).
13

Letter from Ranking Member Devin Nunes to Chairman Adam Schiff, House Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence (Nov. 9, 2019) (online at https://republicansintelligence.house.gov/uploadedfiles/rm_letter_to_chm_re_witness_request.pdf).
14

House Committee on Rules, Directing Certain Committees to Continue Their Ongoing Investigations as
part of the Existing House of Representatives Inquiry into Whether Sufficient Grounds Exist for the House of
Representatives to Exercise its Constitutional Power to Impeach Donald John Trump, President of the United States
of America, and for Other Purposes, 116th Cong. (2019) (H. Rept. 116-266), at 2.

3

 As explained in my November 9, 2019, response to the Ranking Member, it is important
to underscore that the House’s impeachment inquiry, and the Committee, will not serve
as venues for any Member to further the same sham investigations into the Bidens or into
debunked conspiracies about 2016 U.S. election interference that President Trump
pressed Ukraine to undertake for his personal political benefit. Nor will the Committee
facilitate any efforts by President Trump or his allies to threaten, intimidate, or retaliate
against the whistleblower who courageously and lawfully raised concerns about the
President’s conduct.15
•

Whistleblower Protection and Confidentiality. The Committee has a long, proud, and
bipartisan history of protecting whistleblowers—including from efforts to threaten,
intimidate, retaliate against, or undermine the confidentiality of whistleblowers.
Among other authorities, the Intelligence Authorization Act of 2010 and the Intelligence
Community Whistleblower Protection Act include procedures for Intelligence
Community personnel to make protected disclosures to inspectors general across the
Intelligence Community and to the congressional intelligence committees.16 Among
other things, Intelligence Community personnel are shielded from any action constituting
reprisal or the threat of reprisal for making disclosures in accordance with these
procedures.
The statutory framework also prevents obstruction of lawful communications by federal
employees with Congress, and of congressional proceedings.17 And, as mentioned above,
the Code of Official Conduct for Members of Congress requires that every Member
“shall behave at all times in a manner that shall reflect creditably on the House.”18 The
Committee on Ethics has historically viewed this provision as “encompassing violations
of law and abuses of one’s official position.”19

•

Additional Background on Depositions. During the initial phase of this inquiry, there
was discussion of the Committees’ deposition practices. The Committees’ depositions
have been conducted under longstanding procedures enshrined in House Rules, expanded
15

Letter from Chairman Adam B. Schiff to Ranking Member Devin Nunes, House Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence (Nov. 9, 2019) (online at https://intelligence.house.gov/uploadedfiles/20191106__hpsci_ch_letter_to_rm_re_witness_requests_-_9183653.pdf).
16

See generally 50 U.S.C. § 3033, 5 U.S.C. § 8H; see also, e.g., 50 U.S.C. § 3234 (prohibiting certain
reprisals for protected disclosures by IC personnel).
17
See, e.g., P.L. 116-6 § 713(a) (Feb. 15, 2019) (prohibiting funds appropriated by any law from being
made available to pay the salary of an officer or employee of the “Federal Government” who “prohibits or prevents
or attempts or threatens to prohibit or prevent” any federal employee from contacting or communicating with
Members of Congress, on matters pertaining in any way to their employment or their department or agency); 18
U.S.C. § 1505 (criminalizing corrupt efforts to influence, obstruct, or impede or endeavor to influence, obstruct, or
impede, “the due and proper administration of the law of any inquiry or investigation” by “either House, or any
committee of either House or any joint committee of the Congress”).
18

House Rule XXIII, Cl. 1.

19
Committee on Standards of Official Conduct, House Ethics Manual (2008) (online at
https://ethics.house.gov/sites/ethics.house.gov/files/documents/2008_House_Ethics_Manual.pdf).

4

 repeatedly when Republicans were in the majority, and used by both Republicans and
Democrats to gather evidence from career officials and political appointees.
For decades, House rules have authorized Committees to conduct closed depositions
without agency counsel present. Over time, Republican majority Congresses repeatedly
expanded this authority to additional committees.20 In 2016, while seeking to expand this
authority to all Committees, Rep. Jim Jordan, then-Rep. Mike Pompeo, and others
explained the value of confidential depositions as an investigative tool:
The ability to interview witnesses in private allows committees to gather
information confidentially and in more depth than is possible under the fiveminute rule governing committee hearings. This ability is often critical to
conducting an effective and thorough investigation.21
Under Republican leadership, deposition authority has also been granted to Committees
for specific inquiries, such as the investigation into the 2012 terrorist attacks in
Benghazi.22
To preserve the integrity of investigations, it has been standard practice for depositions to
remain confidential until their release by the committees. Indeed, during the Nixon and
Clinton impeachments, the governing rules provided for information to remain
confidential until release by the respective Committees.23 Although some Republican-led
Committees kept depositions confidential for an extended period, our Committee began
releasing hearing transcripts within weeks of the depositions.24
When investigating Democratic Administrations, Republican-led Committees have made
liberal use of deposition authority. For example, a single Committee, the Committee on
Government Reform and Oversight, deposed 141 officials in the Clinton Administration.
20
See, e.g., H. Res. 5, 114th Cong. (Jan. 6, 2015) (expanding deposition authority to the Committees on
Energy and Commerce, Financial Services, Science, Space and Technology, and Ways and Means); H. Res. 5, 115th
Cong. (Jan. 3, 2017) (expanding deposition to additional committees).
21

House Select Committee on the Events Surrounding the 2012 Terrorist Attacks in Benghazi, Final
Report of the House Select Committee on the Events Surrounding the 2012 Terrorist Attacks in Benghazi, 114th
Cong. (2016) (H. Rept. 114-848), at 404-05.
22

H. Res. 567, 113th Cong. (May 8, 2014).

23

See, House Committee on the Judiciary, Impeachment of William Jefferson Clinton, President of the
United States, 105th Cong. (1998) (H. Rept. 105-830), at 307; Deschler’s Precedents of the U.S. House of
Representatives, 94th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1977, Vol. 3 Ch. 14, Sec. 6, at 2050 (discussing confidentiality procedures
adopted during Nixon impeachment proceedings).
24

For example, in 2015, more than a year after the commencement of the Benghazi investigation,
Chairman Trey Gowdy stated: “[T]he Committee does not plan to release the transcript of any witnesses. …
Releasing transcripts can impact the recollections of other witnesses, jeopardize the efficacy of the investigation,
alert witnesses to lines of inquiry best not made public, and publicize personal information.” Letter from Chairman
Trey Gowdy to Ranking Member Elijah Cummings, House Select Committee on Benghazi (June 22, 2015) (online
at https://archives-benghazi-republicansoversight.house.gov/sites/republicans.benghazi.house.gov/files/TG%20letter%20to%20EEC%206.22.15.pdf).

5

 These included depositions of senior Executive Branch officials, including multiple
White House Chiefs of Staff and White House Counsels.25
No Member of our Committee or the other two Committees participating in these joint
depositions has been excluded. To the contrary, all Members of these Committees have
had equal opportunity to attend, many have chosen to participate, and questioning has
been equally divided between the majority and minority. Together, more than 100
Members of these three Committees, including 48 Republican Members, were able to
attend.
Consistent with House Rules and longstanding practice, Members who do not sit on any
of the three relevant Committees have not been permitted to attend depositions.26 The
deposition rules regarding confidentiality and Member attendance adopt the same
approach put in place during Republican majorities.27 Similarly, the rules governing the
Clinton impeachment proceedings limited deposition attendance to Members of the
relevant Committee.28

25

Committee on Government Reform, Democratic Staff, Congressional Oversight of the Clinton
Administration (Jan. 17, 2006) (online at https://wayback.archive-it.org/4949/20141031200116/http://oversightarchive.waxman.house.gov/documents/20060117103516-91336.pdf).
26

House Committee on Rules, 116th Congress Regulations for Use of Deposition Authority (Jan. 25, 2019).

27

See, e.g., House Committee on Rules, 115th Congress Staff Deposition Authority Procedures (Jan. 13,
2017). In one noteworthy incident involving enforcement of these rules, Oversight Committee Chairman Darrell
Issa was escorted out of a deposition of the Benghazi Committee by that Committee’s Chairman, Trey Gowdy. See
Rep. Darrell Issa Escorted Out of Benghazi Panel, NBC4 (June 16, 2015) (online at
www.nbcwashington.com/news/national-international/Rep-Darrell-Issa-Escorted-Out-of-Benghazi-Panel307739641.html).
28
House Committee on the Judiciary, Impeachment of William Jefferson Clinton, President of the United
States, 105th Cong. (1998) (H. Rept. 105-830), at 307.

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