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PERMANENT SELECT COM]'4ITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE,

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j oi

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CO]'4MITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND REFORM

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and the

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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,

nt wi th the

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WASHINGTON, D.C.

HOUSE OF REPRESENTAT]VES,

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INTERVIEW

OF: GEORGE KENT

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Tuesday, 0ctober 15, 2019

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Washi

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ngton,

D. C.

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interview in the above matter was held in

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The

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HVC-304, Capi

Room

to1 V j si tor Center, commenci ng at l-0:08 a. m

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Present:

Representati ves Schi

ff,

Hi

mes,

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Speier, Quigley, Swalwe11, Heck, Maloney,

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Kri shnamoorthj

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,

Sewe11

,

Carson,

Demings,

Conaway, Wenstrup and Hurd.

Also Present: Representati ves Norton,

Ma1

i nowski

,

Raskin, Rouda, Ph'i11ips, Engel, Perry, Meadows, and Zeldin.

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Appea rances:

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For the

PERMANENT SELECT C0MMITTEE

0N INTELLIGENCE:

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For the

COMMITTEE

For the

C0MMITTEE 0N F0REIGN AFFAIRS:

0N OVERSIGHT AND

REF0RM

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For

GEORGE KENT:

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ANDREW WRIGHT

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BARRY

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NANCY IHEANCHO

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K&L GATES LLP

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1501 K

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Washington, D.C. 2005-1600

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M. HARTMAN

Street

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THE CHAIRMAN: The committee

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Good morning, Deputy

will

come

to order.

Assistant Secretary Kent,

and

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to the House Permanent Select Commi ttee on
Intelligence, which, along with the Foreign Affairs and
0versi ght Commi ttees, i s conducti ng thi s i nvesti gati on as
part of the official impeachment inquiry of the House of

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Representati ves.

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welcome

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is being conducted as part of the
impeachment inquiry. In light of attempts by the State
Department in coordination with the White House to direct you
not to appear and efforts to timit your testimony, the
committee had no cho'ice but to compel your appearance today.
We thank you for complying with the dually authorized

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congressional subpoena, as other witnesses have done as wel1.

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We

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like yourself.

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Today's deposition

expect nothi ng less f rom a ded'icated career civi 1 servant
Deputy Assistant Secretary Kent has served with

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sti ncti on as a Forei gn Servi ce offi cer wi th deep experi ence
relevant to the matters under jnvestigation by the

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commi

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the European and Eurasian Bureau you oversee policy towards

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Ukrai

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di

ttees. In

hi

s

capaci

ty as Deputy Assi stant Secretary i n

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ne, MoIdova, Belarus, Georgi a, Armen'ia and Azerbai j ani
Previously he was deputy chief of mission in Kyiv from 20L5

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until

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current pos"ition.

20L8 when he returned

to

Washington

to assume his

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In

2014 and 2015, he was the senior ant'icorruption

coordi nator i n the State Department's European Bureau. Sj nce

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joining the Foreign Service in t992 he has served among other
postings in Warsaw, Poland, Kyiv, Tashkent, Uzbek'i stan, and
Bangkok, Thailand. Given your unique ro1e, we look forward
to hearing your testimony today, including your knowledge of
and involvement in key policy discussions, meetings and

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decision on Ukraine that relate directly to areas under

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i nvesti

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gation by the

commi

ttees.

Thi

s i ncludes developments

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related to the recal1 of

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President's July 25,2019 call with Ukrainian President

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that has come to
life about efforts before and after the call to get the
Ukrainians to announce publicly investigations into two areas
President Trump asked President Zelenskyy to pursue: the
Bidens in Burisma, and the conspiracy theory about the
Ukrai ne-supported i nterference i n the 20L5 U. 5. electi ons.
To state clearly on the record, I want to let you and
your attorneys know that Congress will not tolerate any
reprisal, threat of reprisal, or attempt to retaliate against
you for complying with a subpoena, and testifying today as
part of the impeachment inquiry. This includes any effort by
the State Department, the White House, or any other entity of
the government to clajm that in the course of your testimony

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under dua11y authori zed subpoena today, you are di sclosi

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Ambassador

Yovanovitch, the

Zelenskyy, as well as the documentary record

ng

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i nformati

on i n a nonauthori zed

manner.

also expect that you will retain your current
position after testifying today, and that you wj11 be treated
We

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in accordance with your rank, such that in the normal course
of the rema'inder of your career, you wi 11 be of f ered

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assignments commensurate

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with your experjence and long
service. Should that not be the case, we expect you to

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notify us immediately and we will hold those responsjble to

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account.

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I turn to committee counsel to begin the
deposition, I invite the ranking member, or in hjs absence a
mi nori ty member from the Forei gn Affaj rs or Oversi ght
committees to make an opening remark.
MR. J0RDAN: Secretary Kent, thank you. Thank you,
 .4r. Chairman. Secretary Kent, thank you for appearing today.
0n September 24th, Speaker Pelosi unilaterally announced that
the House was beginning j ts so-ca11ed impeachment inqui ry.
0n 0ctober 2nd, the Speaker promi sed that the so-called
impeachment inquiry would treat the President with fairness.
However, Speaker Pelosi , Chaj rman Schi ff, and the
Democrats are not living up to that promise. Instead,

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Democrats are conducting

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Before

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a rushed, closed-door and
unprecedented impeachment inqui ry. Democrats are ignoring

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years

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of

of

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parti san procedures desi gned to provide elements

fundamental fairness and due

process. In past impeachment

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ty and mi nori ty had coequal subpoena
authority and the right to require a commjttee vote on all
subpoenas. The President's counsel had the right to attend
alt depositions and hearings, including those held in
executive session. The Pres'ident's counsel had the right to
cross-examine the witnesses and the right to propose
witnesses. The President's counsel had the right to present
evidence, object to the admission of evidence, and to review
all evidence presented, both favorable and unfavorable.
i nqui

ri es, the

maj

ori

Speaker Pelosi and Chairman

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Schiff

so-ca11ed impeachment

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inquiry has none of these guarantees of fundamental fairness
and due process. Most di sappoi nti ng, Democrats are

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conducti ng thi

u

s i nqui ry

behi nd

closed doors.

We' re

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in a SCIF, but
Democrats have been clear every single session that there's
no unclass'ified material being presented in the sessions.
Thjs seems to be nothing more than hiding this work from the

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American people.

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conducting these depositions and intervjews

The Democrats 'intend

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to undo the will of the American

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people L3 months before the next election, they should at

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least do so transparently and be willing to be accountabte

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or the'i r acti ons.
Chairman, I believe the ranking member from the Foreign
Affajrs Committee would like to say something as wetl as

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we11.

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MR. MCCAUL: Thank you

As you know,

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,

Mr

.

Chai rman.

conduct myself as both chairman

and

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in a very bipartisan way, and I think that
should apply here as we1l. I am next to declaring war,
this is the most important thing that the Congress can do
under Article I. To hide behind that, to have it in a 5CIF,
to defy historical precedent that we conducted under both

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Nixon and Clinton, which guarantees the participation of

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counsel, White House counsel

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ranking

member

in the room in an adversarial

way.

To also provide the minority the power of that subpoena.

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prior impeachments, because both
sides recognized that with a fair. It's really about
fa'i rness. If
I would just urge you, if you're going to
continue, and I've been back in my district for 2 weeks,
talking to my const'ituents both Repubfican, and Democrat, and
Independent, above all what they had in common was they
wanted to see this done the right way. I know you're a fair
man. We've known each other for a long tjme. I hope that
this resolution will come to the floor so that we can
parti ci pate i n a democrati c system, wi th a democrat'ic vote,
up or down, to proceed wjth this inquiry, so that it is

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backed by the American people.

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To do so otherwise,

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That was done during both

f ai

I think, defies

democracy,

it defies

rness, and i t def i es due process. And 'if we're goi ng to

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do th'is, f or God's sakes, 1et's do i t the ri ght

I yield

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way.

back.

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I thi nk my colleagues wi ll certai n1y have
an opportunity to discuss these matters further, but in the
'interest of moving ahead with the depositjon I recognize

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Mr.

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THE CHAIRMAN:

Goldman.

MR. GOLDMAN: Thank

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you, Mr. Chairman. This is

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deposition of Deputy Assistant Secretary of State,

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Kent conducted by the House Permanent Select

Commi

ry

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Intelligence, pursuant to the

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by the Speaker of the House on September 24th.

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Mr. Kent, could you please state your ful1
spe11 your last name for the record?

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THE WITNESS: George

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impeachment inqui

a

George

ttee

on

announced

name and

Peter Kent, K-e-n-t.

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you. Now, along with other
proceedi ngs and furtherance of thi s i nqui ry, thi s deposi ti on
a part of a joint investigation, led by the Intelligence
Committee, in coordination with the Comm'i ttees on Foreign
Affairs, and Oversight and Reform.
In the room today are equal numbers of majority staff
and minority staff from the Foreign Affairs Committee and the

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Oversight Committee, as well as majority and minority staff

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from the Intelligence Committee. Thjs

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deposition, but Members, of course,

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thei

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MR. GOLDMAN: Thank

is a staff-1ed

may ask

questions during

r allotted time, and there will be equal allotted

t'ime

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for the maj ori ty and the mi nori ty.
My name is Daniel Goldman, I am the senior adviser and
di rector for investigations for the HPSCI majority staff.
And i thank you very much for coming in today. I would like
to do bri ef i ntroductions before we begi n. To my ri ght i s
j cholas Mi tche11 , who i s the sen'iorinvesti gati ve counsel
f or the HPSCI ma jori ty staf f . And l'lr. l'li tchetl and I wi 11 be
conducting most of deposition for the majority. And I'll let
my counterparts from the minority staff introduce themselves
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as we1l.
t"lR. CAST0R: Good morni

Republican

ng, si r, Steve Castor

wj

th

the

staff of the Oversight Committee.

MR. BREWER: Good morning,

I'm David Brewer, Republican

staff , 0versight.
HS. GREEN: Meghan Green, senior counsel

for

HPSCI

ty.

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mi nor i

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this depositjon wj11 be conducted
enti rely at the unclass j f i ed leveI. However, th'is

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deposition, as you no doubt know,'is being conducted in

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HPSCI's secure spaces, and

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appropriate security clearances, and, as we understand as of

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thj s morni ng, your attorneys

MR. GOLDMAN: Now

in the presence of staff with
all

the

have appropri ate securi ty

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clearances. We understand that you received a letter from
the State Department that addresses some of the concerns

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about the disclosure

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of classified information. But we want

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to rest

that, in

any event, any classified

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you

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information that is disclosed is not an unauthorized

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di sclosure today.

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assured

t i s the comm'i ttee' s expectati on, however, that nei ther
the questions asked of you nor the answers that you provide
or your counsel provide wi 11 requi re di scussion of any
information that is currently, or at any point could be
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properly classifjed under Executive 0rder L3525. As you no
doubt know, E0 13526 states that, quote "In no case sha1l
on be class'if i ed, or conti nue to be

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classi fi ed,

mai

ntai ned

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or fai 1 to be declassi fi ed" unquote, for the
purpose of concealing any violations of law or preventing
embarrassment of any person or entity.
If any of our questions can only be answered with
classified information. We would ask you to jnform us of
that before you provide the answer, and we can as just the

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depos j t i on acco rd i nglY

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Today's deposi ti on i s not bei ng taken i n executi

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on, but because of sensi ti ve and confi denti at nature of
some of the topics and materials that wj11 be discussed,
access to the transcript of the deposition will be limited to
the three committees in attendance. You and your attorney
will have an opportunity to review the transcript at a later

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date.

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SeSSi

Now

before we begin the deposition,

I

would

like to go

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of the ground rules. We will be following the
House regulati ons for deposi ti ons. We have previ ously
provided counsel with a copy of those regutations, but let us
know if you need additional copies.
The deposi ti on wi 11 proceed as follows today. The
majority L hour to ask questions, and the minority wj11 be
given L hour to ask questions. Thereafter, we will alternate
back and forth i n 45 mj nute rounds. We'11 take peri odi c
breaks. But if, at any time, you or your counsel need a
break, please just 1et us know. Under the House deposition
rules, counsel for other persons or government agencies may
not attend this proceeding, and we understand that none are
here. You, however, are allowed to have personal attorney
present during thjs deposition, and I see that you have
brought a couple. At this time if counsel could please state
his or her name for an appearance for the record.
MR. WRIGHT: My name is Andrew Wright with K&L Gates.
over

some

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MR. HARTMAN: Barry Hartman, K&L Gates.

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M5. IHEANACHO: Nancy Iheanacho with K&L Gates.

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 .,1R.

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taking

G0LDt"lAN: To

down

your 1ef t there i s a stenographer

everything that is said, alt questions

and

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that there is a written report for the
deposition. For that record to be cIear, please wait until

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questions are completed before you provide your answers,

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all staff

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answers, so

and members here

will wait until you finish

and

your

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response before asking the next question.

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cannot record nonverbal answers such as

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or an uh-huh so please make sure that

a

The stenographer
shaki ng

you answer

of the head

questi ons

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with an audible verbal answer.
We ask that you give complete replies to questions

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on your best

4

based

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recollection. If a question js unclear or you
are uncertain about the response, please let us know and WC

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can rephrase the questi on.
And

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if

you do not know the answer

so.

to a question or

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only refuse to
answer a question to preserve a privilege recognized by

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committee. If you do refuse to answer a question on the

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basis of privilege, staff may ejther proceed with the

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cannot remember, simply say

You may

deposition, or seek a ruling from the chairman on and
objection, in person or otherwise, during the deposition at

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's choos'ing. If the cha j r
overrules any such objection, you are required to answer

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questi on.

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the

ti

me

of the ma j ori ty

a

staf f

the

Finally, you are reminded that it is unlawful to
deliberately provide false information to Members of
Congress, or to staff of Congress. It is imperative that you
not only answer our questions truthfully, but that you give
ful1 and complete answers to all questions asked of you.
0mi ssi ons may also be consi dered false statements.
Now as thi s depos'iti on i s under oath, Deputy Ass j stant

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Secretary Kent, would you please stand and raise your

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right-hand to be

sworn?

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or affjrm the testimony that you are about
to give is the whole truth and nothing but the truth?
THE WITNESS: I swear that the testimony I am about to
give is the truth and nothing but the truth.
l'lR. G0LDMAN: Thank you. Let the record ref lect that

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the witness has been sworn. But before we begin,

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Assistant Secretary Kent, now is the time for you to

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Do you swear

openi

Deputy

make any

ng remarks.
MR. ZELDIN: Mr. Goldman, can we

and have everybody

identify

MR. GOLDI'IAN: You want

table here. Mr.

just go around the room

themselves?

back?

Why

don't we start at

Qu'igley.

Quigley from I11inojs.

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MR. QUIGLEY: 14ike

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MS. SPEIER: Jackie Speier.

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MR. SWALWELL:

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Eric 5walwell.
PlS. SEWELL: Terri Sewe11.

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MR. ROUDA: HarIey Rouda.

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MR. RASKIN: Jamje Raskin,

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MR. HECK: Denny Heck, Washi ngton State.

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MR. MALINOWSKI: Tom Maljnowskj, New Jersey.

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MR. PHILLIPS: Dean Phi11ips, Minnesota.

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MR. R00NEY: Francis Rooney, Florjda.

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MR. l'lEADOWS: Mark Meadows, North Carolina.

for

Maryland.

the

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MR.

MCCAUL:

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t"]R. J ORDAN :

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MR.

GOLDMAN:

Mi

ke l'lcCaul.

Jim Jordan,0hio.
And then

if

we could

start behind here

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MR. GOLD['4AN: Mr . Kent.

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MR. KENT: Good morning, as you've heard, my name js

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Kent. I'm the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for
Europe and Eastern Europe, and the Caucasus in particular. I

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have served proudly as a nonpartisan career foreign service

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George

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five Presidents, three
Republican and two Democrats. As you all know, I am
appeari ng here i n response to your congressi onal subpoena.
If I did not appear I would have been exposed to being held
in contempt. At the same time, I have been instructed by my
employer, the U.5. Department of State, not to appear. I do
not know the Department of State's views on disregarding that
order. Even though section 1.05(c) of the Foreign Service Act
of 1980, wh'ich is 22 U.5. Code 3905 expressly states, and I

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quote, "This section shall not be construed as authorizing of

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withholding of informatjon from the Congress or the taking of

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of a member of the service who discloses
j nformati on to Congress, " end quote.
I have always been w'i11ing to provide f acts of which I'm
aware that are relevant to any appropriate invest'igation by
ejther Congress or my employer. Yet, this is where I find

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myself today, faced with the enormous professional

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of dealing with a conflict between
the executive and legislative branches not of my making.
Wjth that said, I appear today in same spirit that I
have brought to my entjre career, as a Foreign Service
officer and State Department employee, who has sworn to
support and defend the Constitution of the United States, as
one of thousands of nonpolitical career professionals in the
Foreign Service who embody that vow daily around the world

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officer for

more than 27 years, under

any action

personal cost and expense

and

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often in harsh and dangerous conditions.

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to service in defense
of the Constitution and U.S. national interests for nearly 60

4

consecutive years and counting, ever since my father

2

There has been a George Kent sworn

was

8

at Annapolis in June 1951,
commi ssi oned i n 1965 , after fi ni shi ng fi rst i n hi s class, and
serving honorably for 30 years, including as captain of a
ballistic mjssjle nuclear submarine. Principled service to

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country and community remains an honorable professional

5

6
7

sworn in as a midshipman

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choice, not just a family tradition dating back to before

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World War

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II, one that survived the Bataan Death March, and a
3-year st'int in a Japanese POW camp unbroken. I hope the

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drama now playing

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out does not discourage my

son

,

, from seriously consjdering a life of service.
After two internship on a State Department Soviet desk
in the late 1980s, I f ormally joined the Foreign Serv'ice in
L992, and have not, for a moment, regretted that choice to
devote my life to principled public service. I served twice
in Ukraine for a total of 6 years, posted 'in Kyiv, first
during and after the Orange Revolution from 2004 to 2008, and
again, from 2015 to 2018, in the aftermath of the Revolution
of Dignity when I worked at deputy chief of missjon.
In between, I worked in Washington from 20L2 to 2015, in
several policy and programming posi tions di rectly affecting
U. S. strategi c i nterests i n Ukrai ne, most notably, as

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director for

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for

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anti cor rupti on coordi nator.

1aw enforcement and

Europe and

justice sector

Asia, and then as the

programming

European Bureau's senior

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In the summer of 2018, then-Assistant Secretary for
European and Eurasi an Af f a'i rs, Wess t-'li tche11 asked me to come
back from Kyiv to Washington early to join hjs team as Deputy
Assjstant Secretary of State to take charge of our eastern
European Caucasus portfolio, covering six countries in the
front line of Russian aggression and malign influence,
Ukrai ne, Moldova, Belarus, Georgi a, Armeni a, and Azerbai j an.

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The administration's national security strategy, which

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helped

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wrjte,

clear the strategic challenge before us
great power competition, with peer or near-peer rivals, such
as Russia and China and the need to compete for positive
i nfluence wi thout taki ng countri es for granted. In that
makes

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front lines, not just of
Russia's war in eastern Ukraine since 20L4, but of the

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greater geopoli t"ical challenges f ac'ing the

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tod ay .

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sense, Ukrajne has been on the

ne's success, thus, i s very

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Ukrai

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'interest i n the

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23

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Wess

Uni

much i

ted States

n our nati onal

or nati onal i nterests
broadly jn Europe for the last 75 years, and specifically in
central and Eastern Europe, for the last 30 years, since the
fal1 of the Wal1 in 1989. A Europe whole, free, and at
peace our strategic aim for the entjrety of my foreign
way we have def i ned

 20
-- is not possible without a Ukraine fu11 free

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Service career

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and

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occupi ed by Russi a.

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at peace, including
I

am

Crimea and Donbas, both current

grateful for all of you on the key congressional

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to Ukraine jn the past
5 years and I had occasion to speak to many in the 3 years
I was in Kyiv and appropriating billions of dollars in
assi stance i n support of our primary strategi c goa1s, i n
particular, increasing Ukraine's resiliency in the face of
Russian aggression in the defense, energy, cyber, and
informatjon spheres, and empowering institutions in civil
society to tackle corruption and undertake systemic reforms.
I believe that all of us in the legislative and the
executive branches in the interagency community working out
of our embassy in Kyiv, with Ukrainians in government in the
Armed Servi ces j n ci vi 1 soci ety, and wi th our transatlanti c
allies and partners, can be proud of our efforts and our
resolve in Ukraine over the past 5 years, even though much
more remains to be done.
U.S. officials who have spoken publicly in Ukraine to

2t

push back on Russian aggreSsion and corrupt influences have

22

been subject

23

even online threats

24

Ambassador

25

Ambas sado

5

6
7
8

9

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committees who have traveled

r

to

defamatory and disinformatjon campaigns,

and

for years. Starting in 2015 for former
Pyatt, in 20L7 for me, and in 2018 for former

Yovanov i

tch.

 21
That was, frankly, to be expected, from Russian proxies

I

5

indicators that our efforts were
hitting their mark. You don't step in to the public arena of
international diplomacy jn active pursuit of U.S. principled
interests against venal vested interests without expecting

6

vi gorous pushback.

2
J
4

and corrupt Ukrainians, and

0n the other hand,

7

I fully share the concerns

in

Yovanovitch's statement on Friday expressing her

8

Ambassador

9

incredulity that the U.S. Government chose to

move

an

12

tell, on unfounded and false
claims by people wjth clearly questionable motives, at an
especially challenging time in our bilateral elections with

l3

newly elected Ukrajn'ian President.

t4

19

final note, I will do my best to answer your
questions today and I understand there are going to be a 1ot
of them. I suspect your questions may well involve some
jssues, conversations and documents that span a number of
years. The State Department is in the process of collecting
documents in response to the subpoena, not to me, but to the

20

Department

21

I

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22

ambassador based, as best she

One

that

may

contajn facts relevant to my testimony.

have no such documents

or materials with

me today.

With the exception of a few documents related to the

23

State Department inspector general's submiss'ion to Congress

24

thi s month, nei ther the Department nor the comm'ittee has

25

provided documents

at issue in this inquiry. I wi11,

thus,

a

 22
to answer as accurately, completely and truthfully
as I can to the best of my recollection.
And with those introductory words, I'm ready to answer
aII your questions regarding the subject of the subpoena,
whjch has ordered me to appear before you today.
do my best
2
J
4
5

you, Mr. Kent.

6

MR. G0LDMAN: Thank

7

MR. J0RDAN: Could we

8

9

of the Secretary's opening statement for us, please.
MR. G0LDMAN: Yeah, we can

l0

deal with that.

EXAMINATION

ll
t2

get a copy, could staff get a copy

BY ]'4R.

a

GOLDMAN

:

Mr. Kent, I'm going to pick up just where you left

l6

off there about the documents. You are aware of a request of
you as well to provide documents. Is that right?
A In the letter that was emailed to me on September
27tn there was a request to appear voluntarily and to provide

t7

documents, yes.

13

l4
15

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a

What

did do you, if anything, in relation to

providing documents in response to that request?

23

A I received direction that from the State Department
that at the Same time you issued the letters to me you issued
a subpoena to the Department, and therefore the documents
would be collected as part of that subpoena request since

24

they are considered Federal records.

25

THE CHAIRMAN: Ambassador, you

20

2l
22

don't

need

to turn the

 23
mi

c off.
BY I"IR GOLDI"IAN:

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a

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production

5

doc umen t s

6
7
8

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Are you awa re
by the

State

of the status of that document
Department related to your personal

or professional documents, I should say?
A
I collected all the d'if f erent types of records that
possibly could be considered part of the request and provided
them to the listed authority at the State Department.

O

And have you had any followup conversations about

of those documents?

production

A
a

I

have not.

Have you had any

conversations, separate and apart,

l5

letters that we understand you received? Have you
had any type of conversations with the State Department -anyone at the State Department about your testimony here

l6

tod ay ?

13

14

t7

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from the

A
a

l4y testi mony

Okay.

today? No.

So you di

dn't have sorry, I

don'

t

t9

the substance of your testimony, but did you have any

20

conversations about whether you would be

2t

testi fy?

22
23

24
25

A

The interaction consjsted

mean

testifying or will

of letters

through

counsel.

a
A

So you had no personnel conversations

I

had no personal conversation.

with

anyone?

 24
a

1

2

Did

you have any

conversations with anyone

at

the

State Department about the document request?
Yes.

5

A
a
A

6

a

All right. Well, who did you speak to about the

a

J
4

7

Can you descri be those conversat'ions?

Define conversations.

documen t?

t9

0kay. So the first interaction was with somebody I
presume many of you are famifiar with
, who
works wi th our congressi onal 1 i ai son. And i ni ti a11y, when I
asked i n ema'i1 f orm whether I should start collecti ng
documents, because I had received a personal request, I was
instructed to await formal guidance, meaning formal
instructions on how to fulfill the document production
request, so that was the fi rst i nteracti on.
a And what was the second interaction?
A The second interaction with the Department issued
written guidance on how to be responsive to the subpoena for
documents to the Department late on October 2nd and that was

20

j

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9

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A

22

secretary

a

24
25

ng.

a
A

2t

23

n wri ti

i

nstructi

From

whom?

The instructions were sent from the executive

of the Department, Lisa Kenna.
And what
ons?

did you do upon receiving

those

 25
I

A

That was after close

of business.

The senior

7

at the time was ["laureen Cormack (ph), and
Maureen gave me a paper copy and said that the European
Bureau staff on whom most of the requirements would fatl
would convene at 9 o'clock the next morning to discuss how we
could futly be responsive to the request.
a And did that meeting at 9 o'c1ock the next day

8

occur?

2
J
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5

6

9

bureau of f icial

A
a
A

It

occurred.

l6

at that meeting?
We had roughly 20 members of European Bureau still
there and fotlowed the overatl staff meeting of the morning
which was from 8:30 to 9:00. Most people 1eft. Those
related to the inquiry stayed. And we had several additional
staff who joined us at that meeting.
a And can you just summarize the conversation at that

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meeti ng?

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20

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23

24
25

A

And what happened

We

started going through the instructions of the

State Department,

whi

ch j nj ti a11y, the fi rst paragraph

identified a number of indivjduals as key record collectors.
And so we the first questjon that came up was when jt said
"inctuding co1on" and it ljsted names, was that an"inclusive
or exclusive tist? Was it only those individuals or more?
We had two people in the room who are not members of the
European Bureau staff, there could have been more, but they

 26
1

2
3

4
5

6

from congressi onal 1 i ai son

self- i denti fi ed as

0ffice of Legal Counsel at the
State Department. They clarified that that was not an
exclusive 1ist, meaning not only those people listed, but
from the

and

others who mlght have records should also be responsive.
a Okay. At any I just want to back it up a 1itt1e

ll

bit and a 1itt1e bit more generally here. I appreciate your
detail, but we are somewhat we didn't want to stay here
all night. So I'm just trying to get a sense of, sort of,
the back and forth. Was there, at any point, did you take
issue with any of the directives or suggestions that you

12

received from the State Department?

7
8

9

l0

20

A The letter of instruction that was issued after the
close of business on 0ctober 2nd was the first formal
instruction that any of us had received in response to the
subpoena to the Department and the personal letters which had
been sent at the end of September 27th, so there was not any
formal structured i nteracti on, as I menti oned, that I 'd had
, and she directed me to
i ni ti a1 i nteracti on wi th
await formal guidance. I did have several interactions with

2l

other State Department offj ci a1s on Tuesday, 0ctober Lst.

l3

l4
15

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O
A

22
23

24
25

and

Wi

th

whom?

Wjth the director general of the Foreign Service'

with the acting L, so to speak, Marek String.

a

And what was

the purpose of those conversations?

 27

5

A I approached the director general late in the
afternoon mid-afternoon on 0ctober Lst, because I had not
had any contact f rom any member on the leadership of the
Department. And there was a letter sent to these committees
that characterized interactions that I do not feel was

6

accurate.

I

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a
A

7
8

Can you expla'in what you di

We11, there was

dn't

f

ee1 was accurate?

a line in there that the committees

20

to bu11y, int'imidate, and threaten career
foreign service officers. And I was one of two career
foreign service officers which had received letters from the
committees, and I had not felt bulfied, threatened, and
j nt'imi dated. There was another 1i ne i n there that suggested
that the career Foreign Service offjcers had requested the
commi ttee's to route all communi cati ons through House 1 i ai son
and I think your colleague who
, who sent me the
injtial email on Friday night received my repty, whjch
indicated that I acknowledged receipt, and that our
congressional ljaison had requested that the information be
routed to them. So I was concerned that the letter itself

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dj

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22
23

24
25

had been attempting

d not accurately characteri ze the i nteracti

a

When you'

on.

re talki ng about the letter, you're

talking about the letter from Secretary Pompeo?

A
a

Correct.
And what was

the response of the two individuals

 28
1

that you spoke

A

2

to?

We1l,  \4s. Perez, who 'is one of the top two career

4

foreign Services officers and overSeeS the perSonnel system,
I had worked for her previously directty in a previous job.

5

And because

6

Department outside

7

it

8

since representations were being

J

was time

a
A
a
A

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I'd

of the European Bureau, I

the

suggested that

that somebody engaged me personally, particularly
made

about

me.

0h, the letter?
Ri ght, the language i n the letter.

What representation?

And what was Ambassador Perez's response?
She needed

to go and give a response to

150 people

of your people. And she said when that was
fin'ished, She would reach out and find somebody that would
reach out to me. And So she came back after an hour and said
that the acting tegal counselor of the Department, rrLrr in our
parlance, l'larek String, would reach out to me; that if I did
not hear from him in 24 hours, I should contact her again.

about taking care

a
A
a

And

23

A

I djd.

24

Center

25

a

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22

of

had no contact with the leadership

D'id hear from him?

I did after I wrote him an email.
did you ult'imately have a conversation

wi th

him?

He ca11ed me back through

in the evening

when

I

was already

And can you summarize

at

the 0perations
home.

that conversatjon for

us?

 29
A

1

2

to

He apologized

me pr i or

.

He sa'id i

t

for not having

had anyone reach out

was a very busy day,

that they

had

t2

and but I'd known Marek
previously and respected him. If i t weren't f or l'4arek, we
would not have had Charge Taylor out in Kyiv. He helped with
the process of getting him brought back on board as an Active
Duty person. So I respected his professionalism previously,
so it was a professional conversation.
a Did you voice the same simi lar concerns?
A I did.
a And what was his response?
A He apologized, because I mentioned that there had

13

not been an exchange.

J
4
5

6
7
8

9

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responsive and were doing a 1ot

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5orry. Did you voice your concerns about the two
statements in the letter that you disagreed with?
A
To the best of my recollection, again, it was a
phone cal 1 at night when I was in my kitchen eating dinner at
about 9
between 8 and 9. So I cannot say i t was more, I
th i nk, the tonality. It was a pleasant, professional

20

exchange.

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a

And was there any fo11ow-on conversations

A

Not

that

you

had?

23

24

the

25

wri

ni ght on

ti ng came

with Marek, not wjth Marek. That was again, on
the Lst. The guidance that we recejved in
shortly after close of business on the 2nd. And

 30
of point was the meeting, the gu'idance,
the European Bureau'S meeting at 9 o'clock on October

then the next sort
2

our

3

3

rd

.

s anythi ng else

5

i

6

you've

7

3rd, unti1 today, 0ctober L5th,
any other further conversation that

And si nce 0ctober

a

4

had?

A

I

have not . That was also the time where

8

the 3rd was when we

9

Wright as my counsel

I formally

fo rmal 1y

in this process.

And

therefore, there

were addi ti onal engagements, 'interacti ons wi th

l1

counsel.

a

Are you aware that

as

we

th'ink

engaged Andrew

l0

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I

through

sit here today, we have

t4

not received one document from the State Department?
A I can read the news, but as I've answered you

15

before, I'm not aware i

l3

role. Obviously there were
that i had that I needed to

d1d my

t7

a lot of documents and records
provide, based on the subPoena and the guidance that the

l8

State Department issues.

t9

22

I do not know the process on reviewing them'
a After your conversation with Marek String, did you
have any additional conversations with anyone in L?
A I did. There was a representative from L, as I

L)

previ ously menti oned,

24

European Bureau guidance meeting on 0ctober 3rd.

t6

20

2t

25

a

But

having provided those records,

,

who attended the

Did you have any private conversations with

him?

 31
I

A

We have

a very public exchange in front of the

ll

in the meeting. And then subsequent to
that, I was called out into the ha1l where I had a continued
conversation wi th him and
a Can you describe the public exchange?
A We11, public in a room, closed-door room. The
exchange started when we were d'iscussing the issue of who
needed to be responsive to the records collectjon. The
individuats listed primarily were in the European Bureau.
And I noted several people who should have been listed who
played key roles on staff at the embassy in Kyiv. And then I

12

menti oned Consular

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he had spoken

2
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5

6
7
8

9

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roughly 20 people

Affai rs Assi stant Secretary

Ri

sch, because

l5

to Rudy Giufiani several tjmes in January
trying to get a visa for the former corrupt prosecutor
general of Ukraine, Viktor Shokin. And my read of the

l6

request would include that.

t7

took i ssue

t4

wi

th

my rai si ng

the

addj

about

ti onal

l8

jnformation, and the conversation rapidly, I would

t9

either escalated or degenerated into a tense exchange.
a 5o what was his response to your suggestions of
addi t'ional custodi ans?

20

2t
22

say,

MS. SPEIER: What d'id he say?

24

I've got two questions here, so I don't know
how you want to manage Representat'ive Spei er asked me a

25

quest i on and you

23

MR. KENT:

.

 32
MS. SPEIER: No,

I
2

mysel

a

MR. KENT:

4

I"lR.

6
7

was

just talking

to

f.

J

5

I didn't. I

0h.

Sorry.

BAIR: 1t was the same question.
MR. GOLDMAN: It's the same question.
MR. KENT: He objected to my rajsing of the additional

information and said that he didn't think

I do not

ll

his exact words, but he made clear that he did
not think it was appropriate for me to make the suggestjon.
I took the opportunity, then, to point out that that was the
first
the meeting was the first time that we were

t2

djscussing guidance

8

9

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20

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23

24
25

remember

for being responsive to a subpoena. At
this point, it was already 0ctober 3rd. The request for the
documents and the request for submjssion had been delivered
on September 27th and we had less than 2 business days to be
has then said, I don't think I should
respons i ve.
be even talking to you. It's not approprjate. I should only
talk to counsel, and I talked to your counsel last night.
That was, as I knew, a factually incorrect statement at that
point. He never had a conversation with my counsel. The
conversation ended at that point, but later on when I then
picked up this issue of guidance and our responsib'i1ities, he
raised his voice again, suggested, as I told you before, I
should not be talki ng to you, i t i s aga'inst the bar eth'ics,
for me to contact and talk to you directly. I took issue

 33

J

th that. I said I'm under no obli gation to retai n private
counsel. I said somebody provided information to the
Secretary that he said publicly in Italy that the

4

congressional committees were preventing me from talking to

I
2

wi

8

legal counsel. And I said I've got 1-5 witnesses in a room
hearing you say that you don't want to talk to me. So I'm
worried that you as working for this office, are adopting
positions at odds with the language that your office is

9

providing the Secretary of 5tate.

5

6
7

l0

My

jnterest in this process

was so

that the

State

ll

Department and the Secretary would be protected, and being

t2

fu1ly responsive to the legal
BY MR.

r3
14
15

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subpoena

that had been issued.

GOLDMAN:

hjs concern more of a process concern or dld
take any objection to your substantive suggestion that
addi ti onal custodi ans should be i ncluded?

a

Was

A

I honestly cannot answer what he was thinking. I

he

23

to me.
a That's what I'm asking. What djd he say?
A He said to me that he represented the Secretary of
State and the Department's interest in this process. And
that was the end of that and he also said that he was the
of the letter that included
author of the fines about the

24

the language about the bul1yi ng and i nti mi dati on.

l8
t9
20

2l
22

25

can only say what he said

I pointed out to him that I thought the language he had

 34
I

then drafted, since he said was the drafter, was inaccurate.

2

And he asked why

ll

did I say that. I said, we11, you say that
the career Fore'ign Services are being intimidated. And he
said, who are you speaking about? And I asked him, about
whom are you speaking? And he said, you're asking me to
reveal confidential information. And I said, no, I'm not.
There are only two career Foreign Service officers who
subject to this process. I'm one of them. I'm the only one
working at the Department of State, and the other one is
Ambassador Yovanovitch, who is teaching at Georgetown. So
I'm not asking to you reveal anything that isn't already

t2

commonly known.

3

4
5

6
7
8

9

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So

13

a
A
a

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15

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in

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20

22

Di

was

d he d'isagree that Mr. R j sch should be i ncluded

did not return to that toPic.

A
a
A

We

a

And then you said there was an additional

th the others i n the room?
This is in the room with the 15 to 20 other people,
Now

thi s was

all

wi

yes.

23

conversati on i n the hallway wi th

24

descri be

25

me.

the

l8

2t

that part of that conversation.
What his response when you said that?
He spent the next 5 minutes glaring at

that

A

Can you

that conversati on?
Correct.

I

then said, opened the door

after

a

 35
I

2
J
4
5

6
7
8

9

of minutes and asked if I could come out. So I
excused myself before my colleagues. I apolog'ized for them
having had to hear an uncomfortable conversation. I said
that it was important that they had been there as wjtnesses,
since that was likely the only such only conversatjon
engagement I would have wi th the legal staff of the State
Department. I walked out, closed the door. And I stuck my
hand out and sai d, Hi , I 'm George Kent. We've never met. We
shook hands. And then I said, that was unprofessional. And
couple

l0

he then said, you were unprofessional. He got very angry.

ll

He

t2

What you

l3

l6

to sort of control, or
change the process of collecting documents. And what I sajd
to him was what I hear you saying I said that's cal1ed
projection. What I hear you saying 'is that you think that I

t7

am doi

l8

trying to do was make sure that the
Department was being ful1y responsive. He then told me, I
don't think it is appropriate for you to go back into that
room. I totd him that's not your business, that's my
meeting, but I will agree with you, though, I wilI go back in
and te11 my cotleagues that sjnce I'm one of the chief
records collectors, I will go back to my office and resume
collecting records to be responsive to the request.

l4
l5

l9
20

2t
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23

24
25

started pointing at

me

djd'in there, if

with a clenched jaw and saying,
Congress knew what you were doing,

they could say that you were trying

ng that.

What

I

was

 36
I

And the only other thing we did was

I

gave him

my

ll

his name and phone number in my
notebook. And he sa'id, I imagine you witl be writing up your
version of this conversation and i will be too. And that was
it.
a And did you write up your version?
A I did.
a Did you provide that memo to the State Department
to be turned over?
A I bet i eve yes, I dl d.
a Were you aware that the original request to the

t2

Department was made on September 9th?

2
J

4
5

6
7
8

9

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business card, he wrote

t9

that there was a letter sent, yes. I
was traveling through much of that next week. So I am not a
lawyer and I understand there are different ways of signaling
how serjous the issue is, but yes, I was aware that an
earfier set of letters were sent prior to the September 27th
letters.
a Were you asked to collect your records prior to, I

20

believe, you said 0ctober

l3
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18

A

I

am aware

2nd?

22

A There was no request for anyone to collect records
prior to the subpoena that was issued, to my understanding,

23

on the 27tn.

24

a

2t

25

And

I

assume you

conversati ons wi th

did not have any further
?

 37

4

I think as counsel can confirm, once our
relationshi p was establ i shed, h€,
, was taken off
of my account, and whi 1e I di d not parti ci pate i n further
conversat'ions, my understanding is that the tone and further

5

back and forth between L and my counsel was fu11y

6

professional and respectful.

1

2
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7
8

9
10

A

No,

and

All right. Before I move on, Mr. Kent, is there
anything else on the topic of the State Department's response
to the Congress' subpoena that you think the committee should
a

know about

A

ll

that you haven't

addressed?

No.

l8

If I cou1d, I take it, at some point, you
were instructed by the State Department not to provide the
documents directly to the committee, but rather to provide
them to the State Department?
MR. KENT: The initial document request under the
subpoena was to the State Department and the State Department
as part of its guidance did share the consideration that

t9

communications would be considered Federal records, and that

20

they would be handfing them, and that

2t

accepted.

t2

l3

l4
l5

l6
t7

THE CHAIRMAN:

THE CHAIRMAN:

22
23

24
25

is a position that I

But in terms of your own documents, the

in your possession that we had requested, did you get
instructjons from the State Department that rather than
provide them to the committee, you should provide them to the

ones

 38
I

State Department?
MR. KENT: The

2

to

me

J

came

4

subpoena

5

6
7
8

9

letters that came in, the letter that

on September 27th was sent concurrently with

a

for those documents. And so they are considered
Federal records. And all executive branch employees are
reminded of that. So I was responsive to the request under
subpoena to the Department for those records to be collected.
THE CHAIRMAN:

But did you recejve any instructjons from

the State Department that you should not provide the

t4

directly to the committee?
MR. KENT: I would have to go back and look at the
written guidance that was issued on October 2nd. But I will
say it was my understanding that I would provide the
documents as part of the subpoena to the Department for the

l5

documents. f4y documents are not my personal documents.

l0

ll
t2
13

documents

Any

t7

I create 'in the performance of my professional
duties would be considered a record of the Department of

l8

State.

l6

t9

record that

THE CHAIRMAN: And

I

assume

that any records that you

20

had on a personal device, those would have been provided to

2t

the State Department to be turned over as well?

is the

22

MR. KENT: That

23

THE CHAIRNAN: Thank you.

BY MR.

24
25

a

right, correct.

GOLDI4AN:

Did you have any conversat'ions

wi

th

anyone

else in

 39
I

the State Department about your interactjon wjth

A
a
A

2
J
4
5

i

Yes.
Who?

Now

former, I guess, technically retired, he sent

n h'is resi gnat j on letter,

Mi

chael

l'lcKi

nley,

seni

or

adv'iser

t7

to the Secretary of State. I had had no prior interactjon
with Mr. McKinley until the weekend after the tetters were
issued, and the story became news, and he reached out to talk
to me.
a He reached out to you?
A Correct. I was out picking apples with my wife
Stribling 0rchards, a very nice place in Markham, Virginia,
if you ever want to get good apples and he reached out to
me through the Operations Center and said that he felt the
State Department should stand up f olits career Forei gn
Service officers and wanted to know if I had any objection to
him trying to get the Department to issue a statement of that

l8

natu re.

l9

a
A

6
7
8

9

l0

ll
t2

l3
t4

l5

l6

What

did you say?
th jnk i

2t

t is enti rely appropriate for
the State Department leadership to stand up for its career

22

foreign service officers.

20

23

24
25

I think sa'id I

did you say about the statement?
He di dn' t share the statement wi th me. I asked
'i f he'd al ready f loated the i dea, and i f he got any

a
A

And what

h'im

 40
I
2
J

4
5

responses.

a
A
agreement

a

What
He

did he say?

said he had not yet succeeded in securing

an

to issue such a statement.
Had he heard about

your interaction with

?

6

8

our first conversation
was on September 28th, Saturday, when I was picking apples.

9

He then subsequently came

7

l0

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13

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l6
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18

t9
20

2t
22
23

24
25

A

So

that

came

later,
to

because

my

office,

and he was the only

offjcer outside the European Bureau who
initiated contact and came to my office.
So he checked in with me several times over the last 2
weeks to see how I was doing. And i did describe my the
guidance meeting and what had occurred on the 3rd of October.
a And what was his response to
A He was concerned about that. He asked if i had
written it up. And I said, I wrote a note to the fi1e. And
he asked if , in his capacity as a sen'ior adviser to the
Secretary, i n part, responsi ble for ensuri ng that the
Department leadership was connected to the career Foreign
Service, if I would mind sharing it with him so that he could
share it with other leaders of the Department, and I said I
had no problem. And so I shared with him a copy of my note
to the fi1e.
a Did he say who he was going to share it with?
Foreign Service

 41

7

it with the Deputy
Secretary Su1livan, Under Secretary Ha1e, and I bef i eve the
counselor sorry acti ng 1ega1, Marek Stri ng.
a And d'id he i ndi cate to you what the any response
was to sharing the memo?
A No.
a Did he indicate to you who he had discussed a

8

statement

I
2
J
4
5

6

A

A
a
A

9

l0

He

later told

me he shared

wi th?

Not speci fical1y.
Generally?

l3

said leadership of the Department. That's
I presume that included people outside of the European
Bureau, but I did not ask specifically which individuals

t4

had engaged.

l5

a

ll
t2

so

He

he

Did you have any further conversations about that

l6

statement with

t7

l8

A I did ask him, one of the times he dropped by my
office, I asked him if that statement had gone anywhere, and

t9

he said, no.

a
A

20

2t
22

25

Did he indicate why not?

I don't know recall if he gave any specific

i nformati on on why.

a

)1
24

him?

wi

th

Anything else noteworthy about your conversations

Ambassador l''lcKi nley?

A

I

had had never met

him. I actually

had

to

Google

 42

J

ne. He's been an
ambassador in four p1 aces
three times in South America and
Afghani stan. But he appeared to me in person to be a

4

genui

5

happeni ng.

I

2

6

hi m. Hi s

career has not crossed

nely decent person who
And so

was

mi

concerned about what

WAS

I very much appreciated him reaching out on a

7

personal 1eve1 and showing, as someone who's been

8

ambassador

an

l3

jn four missions, including Afghanistan,
understanding jt's important to be responsive and engage the
people who work for you.
a Djd you share his concerns?
A Which concerns?
O About how the career Foreign Service officers were

t4

bei ng

9

l0

ll
t2

15

t6
t7

l8
l9
20

2t
22

Z)
24
25

treated duri ng thi s process?

A We11, as I ment'ioned before, that's why I reached
out to the director general, Carol Perez, on 0ctober Lst
because I had concerns that outsjde of the European Bureau,
the leadership jn the Department was not actually signaling
jts support for the career Foreign Service officers.
a A11 ri ght. Mr. Kent, we're goi ng spend some time
today discussing Ukraine policy as well as efforts by
nongovernment individuals to jnfluence Ukraine policy. As
you no doubt are aware one of the central players in this
investigation js Rudy Gjuliani. When did you first learn
that Rudy Giulianj had taken an interest in Ukraine?

 43
1

2
3

4
5

6
7

A Well
a 0r any Ukrai nj ans?
A I think it's a matter of record that the former
mayor of New York and the current mayor of Kyiv have known
each other for over a decade. Mayor Klychko is a former
heavyweight boxing champion of the wor1d. And so I beljeve
that Giulianj first met Klychko, roughly, in 2008.

8

a

0kaY.

9

A

SoI thi nk

l0

i ndi vi dual

ll

last

t2

l3

has

uli ani , as

a

per5on, a pri vate

traveled to Ukraine over the course of the

decade.

a

When

A

I

you were

in Ukraine, did you ever meet with

him?

t4
l5

,

Gi

never met w'ith him, never been i n

him, never had any

t6

So other

a

th hi m.
than, as of 201.8, at some point, did you

communi

cati on

wi

learn that Mr. Giuliani was actively

t7

come to

l8

matters relati ng

the presence of

engaged i n

2l

to Ukrai ne?
A The first indication that I heard of contacts in
2018 came in May 2018. The then-prosecutor general of the
country, Yuriy Lutsenko, had planned to go to New York and

22

hi

23

that his intent to go to

24

Giuliani.

t9
20

25

s p1ane,

a

KLM

And

plane, was canceled. But my understandi ng
New

York was to meet with

Rudy

did you understand what the purpose of that

was

 44
I

meeti ng was?

8

At the time, 0o, because the meeting didn't happen.
How did you learn about it?
There were stori es i n the Ukrai ni an medi a that he
intended to go. I'd heard the story about the cancelation,
KLM. Some of the stories later claimed that he did not have
a visa. That was not true, because I know the plane had been
canceled and he later traveled to New York. And also the

9

head

l0

told

2
J
4
5

6
7

A
a
A

of

Ukrai ni an di aspora organi zati on

ll

that he had had a conversation with Lutsenko and
Lutsenko said his intent was to go to New York and meet with

t2

Gi

me

uf iani

a
A

l3
t4

.

sti1l in
I teft Kyiv, Ukrajne on August L2th,
I was in

Were you

l5

2018.

l6

did you learn about Mr. Giuliani's
interactions with Mr. Lutsenko after that initial aborted
trip?

a

And what

t9

A

The next time

20

was on

t7

l8

I

heard 14r. Giuliani's name mentioned

2t

the 9th of January this year,2019, when I was copied
on an emai 1 that Gi u1 i ani WAS ca11i ng the State Department

22

regardi ng the inabjlity of the previous prosecutor general

23

Vi

ktor Shok'in to get a visa

24

a

25

A

to come

to the United States.

did you learn about that?
I was copied on an emai1. Because I'm the

How

Deputy

 45
1

2

Assistant Secretary of State covering Ukraine, and it was a
matter about Ukraine.

a

J
4

did you have any involvement in that visa

i ssue?

A

5

6

And

I

was involved extensjvely

exchanges over

a
A

7

in conversatjons

and

the next 2 days, yes.

Descri be bri

efly

who Vi

ktor

Shokj

n

i s.

l3

Viktor Shokin served as prosecutor generat of
Ukraine from, I believe his appointment date was February
L0th, 2015, until sometime of the spring, perhaps late
February, early March 201-6. He was a longtime prosecutor.
He was known to have been the godfather of then-President
Poroshenko's kids. And he was someone with whom and about

t4

whom

15

period of time as prosecutor general.

8

9

l0

ll
t2

the U.5. Government had many conversations over that

a

l6

Was

there a broad-based international assessment of

or not he was a credible or corrupt

l7

hjs,

l8

general?

l9

24

A There was a broad-based consensus that he was a
typical Ukraine prosecutor who ljved a ljfestyle tar jn
excess of his government salary, who never prosecuted anybody
known for having committed a crime, and having covered up
crimes that were known to have been committed.
O Who was the email from that you recejved on January

25

9th?

20

2t
22
23

whether

prosecutor

 46

t2

A I do not recall. I believe it may have been from
one of the staff in the 0ffice of the Secretary of State,
because Rudy Giuliani was trying to call into that offfce.
0 And did you fo11ow up on this email?
A The i ni ti al redi recti on was to the Assi stant
Secretary of Consular Affai rs, Mr. Ri sch.
a 0kay. The redirection by who?
A I was just copied on the emaj1. Since it was about
a visa, I think it was entirely appropriate for the matter to
be referred to the part of the State Department that deals
wi th vi sas.
a And what was Mr. Gi u1i an'i 's i nvolvement i n thi s

13

matter?

t4

A

I
2
J
4
5

6
7
8

9

l0

lt

He was pushing

a

visa.

He wanted

Viktor Shokin to

l5

get a visa.

l6

l8

O Had Viktor Shokin been denied a visa at that point?
A Apparently, Mr. Shokin did not have a valid visa at
the time. i do not know whether he had been denied a visa

l9

recen t1y

t7

.

24

spell "Risch"?
MR. KENT: I believe, with apologies to any German
Americans, I think it is R-i-s-c-h, but sometimes names
changed. My original German name was Kindt, K-i-n-d-t,
then my great-great-grandmother changed to anglicize it

25

K-e-n-t.

20

2l
22
23

MR. SWALWELL: Ambassador, can you

get
and

to

 47
l'lR. SWALWELL: Thank you.

I

BY I",IR.

2

a

J
4

GOLDMAN

So describe generally what your

role was in thjs

vi sa matter, i f any?

7

of conversations between members
of the Consular Affairs front office and European Affairs
front office. For the European office, that included

8

Assi

9

And

5

6

A

There was a series

stant Secretary

Wess Mi tche11 and

myself pri nci pa11y.

ll

to the best of my recollection, on the side of Consular
Affairs, it would be Assistant Secretary Risch and the deputy
assjstant secretary for visas, who I believe is Ed

t2

Romatowski.

l3

l8

a Just to try to get to the bottom line,
Mr. Gjuliani, what was the State Department's view about the
propriety of a visa for ['lr.5hokin?
A Mr. Shokjn, as I mentioned, was well and very
unfavorably known to us. And we fe1t, under no
circumstances, should a visa be 'issued to someone who

l9

knowingly subverted and wasted U.5. taxpayer money. And as

10

t4
l5

l6
t7

22

a fiduciary responsibility for
anticorruption programs, I felt personally strongly, Wess
Mitchell felt very strongly that it was jncorrect and so we

23

stated that view clearly to our congressjonal to or

24

Consular Affaj

20

2t

25

somebody who had

a

rs colleagues.
Okay. And what did you learn

why Mr. Giuliani

 48
I
2
J

4
5

was pushing

to

have a visa granted?

of my recollection, the story that he
conveyed to my colleagues in Consular Affajrs was that Shok'in
wanted to come to the United States to share information
suggesting that there was corruption at the U.S. embassy.
A

To the best

12

a And did you understand what he was referring to?
A Knowing Mr. Shokin, I had fu11 faith that it was
bunch of hooey, and he was looking to basically engage in a
con game out of revenge because he'd lost hjs job.
a And do you know whether there was any engagement
wi th Mr. Gi u1i ani on behalf of the State Department?
A To the best of my recollection, to my awareness

l3

based on the ema'i1 exchanges, He may have had between two and

t4

three conversations with the Assistant Secretary in that

15

period of time, Giuljani to Risch. No time did Wess Mitchell

l6

or I

6
7
8

9

l0

ll

t7

engage Gi u1 i ani

a

And

.

did you learn about the substance of

l8

conversati ons from Mr.

l9

I
that was in
A

those

Ri sch?

shared what

I reca11, and I

presume

that either

23

of those conversat'ions were an email
exchange, but I couldn't te11 you for sure.
a What ultimately happened wi th the vi sa application?
A When the State Department was not being responsive,

24

my understandi ng i

20

2t
22

25

one

s that f ormer Mayor G'iu1i ani attempted to
call the White House, and deputy chief of staff, my

 49

l9

of staff , Rob B1air, then calted
the State Department to ask for a background.
a Who did Mr. BIair speak to in the State Department?
A In the end, I believe it was a conference ca11. I
participated sitting in Wess Mitchell's office. I believe
Consular Affairs may have also been on the ca1l.
a And can you describe the conversation?
A We laid out enough frank detail about U.S.
Government engagement and assessment of Mr. Shoki n. And ["1r.
Blaj r sai d, thank you very much, I 've heard enough. He
'identified his role at that point to ground truth the
situation and look out after the interest of the 0ffice of
the President. And I took from his response to us that he'd
heard what he needed. And that was the tast I heard about
that, and 14r. Shokin, to the best of my knowledge, did not
ever receive a visa and has not come to the U.S.
a So after l'lr. Giuliani reached, attempted to
convince the State Department to jssue the visa directly, and
was told no, he then went around to the chief of staff's

20

office?

I
2
3

4
5

6
7
8

9

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18

2l
22
23
24
25

understanding deputy chief

A That I do not know who he tried to reach at the
Whi te House. I only know that l'lr. BIai r reached out to us to
ground truth the si tuati on.
a To your knowledge, had anyone in the State
Department informed Mr. Blai r or the chief of staff's office?

 50
A
2

were responsive

a

3

4

My understanding

And

is

he

reached

to him reaching out to us

did you understand the he learned about it

A I do not i f he had a d'i rect conversation. To the
of my recollection, he said he was asked, which suggests

6

best

7

that he did not have the conversati

9

l0

ll
l2

from

Mr. Giuliani?

5

8

out to us, and we

on

himself .

I don't

know

this the first that you had heard about any
concerns about the embassy in Kyiv?
A No. I was at the embassy in Kyiv when a series of
a

Was

corrupt prosecurtors, including Shokin's team accused us of
not sharing our assistance to improve the prosecutor service

t9

in Ukraine. And to my understanding, because it was released
as part of the disinformation campaign, that inctuded a
letter from April 201.6 which I signed as Charge.
a Was that were those accusations accurate?
A The accusat'ions were completely wi thout meri t.
a Followi ng thi s January 9th meeti ng, when i s the
next time that you learned about any involvement of Rudy

20

Gi u1i

l3
t4

l5

l6
t7

l8

2t
22
23

24
25

ani i n Ukra'ine

matters?

A 0n February LLth, there was a seminar hosted at the
U.S. Institute of Peace, about the conflict in Donbas, and
the Mi ni ster of Interi or, Arsen Avakov, came and parti ci pated
presenting his plans for what he cal1s a plan of smal1 steps.
We had

a separate meeting, since I'm the teading

 51
I

policymaker focused on the

let

region.

And during

that

meeting,

7

that Yuriy Lutsenko, the then-prosecutor
general of Ukraine, had made a private trip to New York jn
which he met Rudy Giuliani. I sajd, did he know what the
purpose was, and the ["ljnister of Interior Avakov said it was
to throw mud. And I said, throw mud at whom? And he said, a
lot of people. I asked him, whom? And he said, towards

8

Masha, towards you, towards others.

2
J
4
5

6

9

l0

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he

me know

a
A
a
A

Masha i

s

Marj

e Yovanovi tch?

Former Ambassador Yovanovitch, yes.

say name any other names?
At that point, to the best of my recollection,
Did he

specifically

Masha and me, and

l3

mentioned

t4

d'id not menti on the others.

l5

a
A

Where was

this

he

then sajd others but

meeting?

t7

It would have either happened at the U.S. Institute
of Peace or in my offjce, which is right across the street.

l8

The State Department and USIP are across the street.

l6

t9

a

Did he explain

in

any more detail what he

20

learned about the conversations between Lutsenko

2t

Giuliani?

22

A

and

just passing along information. That was
of the meeting. The meeting was to talk

He was

24

not the purpose
about our assistance programs.

25

enforcement

23

had

reform. It

was

He oversees

the

law

to talk about Ukrainian politics.

 52
I

Frankly, at the time, he was the second most powerful person

5

jn the country after President Poroshenko. It was to talk
about his ideas about trying to bring peace to the Donbas.
And hi s comment about Lutsenko's tri p and meeti ng wi th
Giuliani was and, 0h, by the way, probably the last thing he

6

sa'id before we finished the meeting.

2
3

4

d he express - - why di d he menti on th1s to

a
A

Di

l8

a

Yes.

l9

A

Mr. Avakov i s a very well- i nformed person, and I 'm

7
8

9

l0

ll
t2
l3
t4

l5

l6
t7

20

you?

I don't know. I would say that Mr. Avakov likes to
keep lines of communication open to all sides and but I
cannot say why he chose to share that i nf ormat'ion.
a Did he express any concerns about this?
A He thought it was the wrong thing to do. He
thought Lutsenko was a fool to have made a private trip and
to have done what he did.
a Do you know whether he was aware of Mr. Giuliani's
connection to President Trump?
A Mr. Avakov?

absolutely sure he knew who Giuliani was connected to.

22

a Di d you, after learni ng thi s i nformati on, what, i f
anything what if any conversations did you have with

23

anyone

2l

24
25

else about the informatjon you learned?

A I cannot say with complete certainty, but I know
that I shared the information that Avakov passed to me with

 53
I
2
J

others.

a
A

Who else?

Based on my normal procedures

I

would guess that I

20

jn the European
Bureau, as well as with the leadership of or embassy in Kyiv.
O Do you know what mud Lutsenko and Giuliani were
di scussi ng i n connecti on to you?
A I did not know, no.
a At that time you did not know?
A I sti1l don't know.
a You haven't seen memoranda that
A I've seen the letter that I signed in Aprit 20L5.
I don't know 'if that's all. I 've seen a f ake 1i st that had
my business card that I used temporarily in 2015, when I was
at the embassy as acti ng DCI'I. The busi ness card was the one
I used i n 2015, the letter i tself was completely fake wi th
lots of misspellings. But I have never -- no one has ever
shown me what Lutsenko m'ight have been passing to Giuliani.
So I did not know then and I sti11 do not know now.
a You mentioned the documents that the State IG had

2t

provided to Congress. Have you reviewed those?

4
5

6
7
8

9

l0

ll
t2
13

t4

l5
l6
t7

l8
l9

22

)7
24
25

shared

it with

people who followed Ukraine

A They were not no one shared this with me, no.
5o I -- what I have been to1d, I first learned about it from
reporter who emailed me, a person I'd never had
I
contact with, and to whom I did not respond, who claimed that

 54
I

she had seen the documents and asked me a question, and with

2

the many dozens of emails from media over the last several

J

weeks, si nce th'is story

4

started, I d'idn't answer a si ngle
one, I forwarded them all to our press officer.

a
A

5

6
7
8

9

Was

this

recent?

This was after -- it was probably a day or 2 after

the IG came up and passed documents.
a Did you speak to Ambassador Yovanovitch about the
conversation that you had with Mr. Avakov?

A

l0

I

di

d not

well

, I cannot say for certai n.

ll

mean, again, the conversation was February

t2

the day of the seminar. I could say

l3

certai n whether

a
A

t4

l5
l6

whether

was

I cannot say for
I sent a bri ef ema'i 1

.

OkaY.

My guess

is, to the best of my recoltection,

I

conveyed the i nformati on.

a

t7

l8

I talked or

1.1th. That

I

Did you become aware of whether Ambassador

Yovanov'itch had also spoken wi th Mr. Avakov around thi

A

I believe it

s

time?

2t

that conversation that
she shared that she had had a similar conversation with him.
a At that point did you understand what Rudy

22

Gi

t9
20

may have been

24

's i nterest was j n meeti ng wi th Lutsenko?
A I did not have any vjsibillty. I had better
insights into the mind of Yuriy Lutsenko than I did of

25

Giuliani.

.(.)

uli

an'i

Rudy

 55
a
A

I

2

And what were those

Mr. Lutsenko i s

insights into Mr. Lutsenko?

somebody wi

th

whom

the

embassy had

4

a long relationship dating back to the 0range Revolution
period, which is when I first met him. And at that time

5

was

3

6

he

a seemingly pro-Western politician. We met with him,
he's a very gregarious, outgoing person. He was imprisoned

t2

for 2 years under former President Yanokovitch, and he came
out and resumed potitics. When Shokin was forced out, the
intent of then-Presjdent Poroshenko was to appoint someone he
trusted. Yuriy Lutsenko js also the godfather of his kids.
And the quest'ion was whether someone who di dn't have a law
degree coutd be a reliable partner to try to reform the

13

prosecutori a1 servi ce.

8

9

l0

ll

So

t4

I

had a series

of

meetings with him

in the spring of

t7

to judge and assess whether he would be a serious
partner for us. And so, that was the initjal, if you wi11,
renewal of a relationship. Subsequent to that time, it was

l8

very clear that Mr. Lutsenko was not any more serious about

t9

reforming the corrupt prosecutorial service than Viktor

20

Shoki

2t

personal to me, but the relationship between the embassy

22

["1r. Lutsenko began

l5
t6

23

24
25

20L5

n had been. And at that poi nt, our relati onshi p

a

So

it

to

sour.

was the embassy and the U.S. view that

['4r. Lutsenko was another corrupt prosecutor general?

A

That was our assessment, yes.

not
and

 56
a

1

2
3

4
5

6

When

you spoke

to Mr. Avakov, djd you learn whether

Mr. Giuliani was working with anyone else on matters related

to Ukrai ne?
A He just mentioned his his this is, by the
way, aside. Again, he's a Ukraine politician serving as
minister of interior, he was talking about another Ukraine

8

ti ci an servi ng as prosecutor general, and hi s focus was
on that dynamic. And because he sajd he'd heard my name

9

menti oned,

7

po1 i

a

l0

ll

i

he'd passed that

When was

n conversati

the next time that

Rudy

Giuliani

came up

on?

THE CHAIRMAN:

t2

a1ong.

l3

clarification.

t4

forgery.

You mentioned

KENT:

if I cou1d, just for
a letter with misspellings

A question

l5

t'4R.

16

THE CHAIRMAN: Can

and

Yes?

of i ts

you te11 us what

that letter

was and

t7

what you know

l8

that was part of serjes of news
articles that came out I believe starting March 20th, this
spring. There with a number of art'icles that were initially

l9
20

provenance?

MR. KENT: We11,

22

Ied by John Solomon of The Hi11, who gave who took an
jnterview with Yuriy Lutsenko earlier in March. And so,

./.)

there was, I believe, video somewhere, there certainly

24

pi

25

of articles, it

2t

were

ctures of them doi ng i ntervi ew. And i t' s part of a seri
was an intense campaign. One of those

es

 57
1

2
J
4
5

6
7
8

9

l0

articles released

because

the interview on the first

day

that Ambassador Yovanov'itch had given
hjm a list in their first meeting of people not to prosecute.
Several days later, a list of names was circulated on the
internet, with the photograph had a copy of my temporary
busjness card that I used for a short period of time in 2015.
it didn't look like a regular business
So it was a reaf
card. It was the one that we did on the embassy printer. So
I think the card was genuine, and someone attached that to a
Lutsenko had claimed

list of

ll

names

Some

that

was a hodgepodge

of the people I

had

names.

to google, I

had not heard of.

misspelled. Not the way that

t2

Half the

l3

Ameri

t4

Ukrainian names. My best guess,

names were

of

can, or even Ukrai ni an, or

Russi an

any

would transl i terate

l8

just from a linguistics
semantic point is the person who created the fake list was
either Czech or Serbian.
THE CHAIRMAN: So when you referred earlier to a forged
letter, you were referring to the forged do-not-prosecute

l9

1i st?

l5
t6
t7

20

l'lR. KENT: That

was

2t

a letter, it was just

22

card attached.

23

THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you.

BY MR

24
25

a

yeah. Thi s was the i t wasn't
list of names with my actual bus'iness

a

GOLDMAN:

When was

the next time that you learned anything

 58
I

being Mr.

2

11th?

J

4

A

Giuliani's involvement in Ukraine, after

February

Giuliani was almost unmissable starting
in mid-March. As the news campaign, or campaign of slander
We11, Mr.

6

against, not only Ambassador Yovanovitch unfolded, he had a
very high a media promise, so he was on TV, his Twitter

7

feed ramped up and it was all focused on Ukraine, and it

8

focused on the

9

between March 20 and 23rd.

5

l0

ll
t2
l3

a
A

Where

days

do those story lines unfold?

They unfolded both

Ukrai ni an medi

a
A

four story lines that unfolded in those

was

in the U.S. media and the

a, simultaneously i n peri 1.

What U. S. medi a outlets?

18

off in The Hi1I, as I
reca11. There was a 1ot of tweeting, and of people that I
had not previously been aware of, and then that also then
played i nto late ni ght televi si on, subsequent days, both the
Hannity Show and the Laura Ingraham Show covered this topic

t9

extensi veIy.

20

a

t4
l5
t6
t7

2l
22
23

24
25

Wel1, l4r. Solomon started

That original John Solomon

article,

was

that

based

on accurate i nformati on?

A
a

It

was based on an interview

And was

accurate, to your

A

with Yuriy

Lutsenko.

the information that 14r. Lutsenko provided
knowledge?

No. It was, if not entirely made up in ful1

c1oth,

 59
I

i

t

was primari 1y non-truths and non-sequi turs.

6

into two parts. The first part
was focused on any corruption efforts in wh'ich he went after
the Ambassador and other actors on anticorruption issues. I
thi nk that i s where he claimed that we hadn't shared h'is
money, meani ng hi s assi stance to the prosecutor Seneral's

7

offi

2
3

4
5

The interview was broken

ce.

And the second

8

9

back

half of the first

at the 2015 campaign

wave theme was looking

and allegations

that the National

l0

Anti-Corruption Bureau head, a person

ll
t2

list of people taking money from the
di scredi ted pro-Russi an party, Party of Regi ons, back i n

l3

2015.

t4

18

one. There were two story lines that
were launched more or less in parallel that were covered
extensively i n the U. S. press, fi rst by The Hi 11 and
amplifiers, and in Ukraine by what are known as Porokhobots,
trolls on the internet, particularly Facebook, in support of

l9

then-President Poroshenko and against the people that are

20

pe

l5
t6
t7

somehow

So

name Artem

Sytnyk,

had

provided the

that

was day

23

to be Poroshenko's opponents.
You sa'id there were some, I think you said,
a
surprising Twi tter
A
I honestly I have forgotten my Twi tter password

24

I 'm not

25

did not mean anything to

2t
22

rce i ved

on

the

Twi

ttersphere.
me

So they are j ust names that

untjl they all ofa

sudden became

 60
I

very active, talking about Ukraine and particularly the

2

acti vi ti es

a

3

4

this

of our embassy i n Ukrai ne.
Were you aware of whether the President

retweeted

John Solomon article?

6

of my recollection, the President may
have retweeted something affiliated with the Hannity Show the

7

second day.

5

8

A

a
A

To the best

Did it reference John Solomon, as you reca1l?

t9

I honestly, again, I have started following Twitter
more than I did before March, but I was not an active
follower at that point.
a Pri or to the i ni ti al Hj 11 arti c1e between February
lLth and lvlarch 20th, was there any engagement that you had,
on the Ukrai ni an si de, or wi th
ei ther wi th the Ukrai ni an
any State Department officials about any of these issues
related to Rudy Gi uI i ani ?
THE CHAIRMAN: If I could - - j ust for clari f i cati on
again, I think I mentioned one or two of the story lines, but
you said there were four story lines. Can you tel1 us what

20

the other story lines

9

l0

ll
t2
13

t4
l5
16

t7

l8

were?

third story line that

23

out the next
day was focused on the Bidens and Burisma, that was the th'ird
story line. The fourth one that came out of day after was

24

going

25

anticorruption action center that were described as

2t
22

MR. KENT: The

came

after some civil society organizations, including
Soros

 61
1

organi zati ons?
BY MR.

2

GOLDMAN:

4

I want to we're going to go through these four
ljttle bit in more depth, but I want to make sure that

5

there's nothing else that occurred between February L1th and

6

March 20th

3

a

a

of note on this topic?

ll

I received an email from our embassy on March 19th,
the deputy dl rector of the Nati onal Ant'i-Corrupt'ion Bureau
for Ukraine, usually referred to as NABU, that was set up in
2015 and proved very effective at trying to investigate
high-1evel corruption as it was intended to do. The deputy

t2

director

l3

And he came

t4

l6

the night before with a completely inebriated, drunk, Yuriy
Lutsenko, and Lutsenko was angry. He said he'd given an
jnterview with an American journaljst 2 weeks prior and that

t7

interview that he had accused the

l8

and

7
8

9

l0

l5

A

was a former Georgian national named Gizo Uglava.

into the embassy and described his

embassy

of

conversation

undermining him,

22

his motivation, and that the embassy had been
supportive of the Democrat party, and was not supportive of
so basically the lines of attack
the Trump party and that
that then came out in the subsequent artjcles, Lutsenko
shared with this other 1aw enforcement individual, who then

23

came and shared what he had heard

24

befo re

l9
20

2t

25

that

was

.

a

To the

embassy?

from Lutsenko the night

 62
A
a

I
2
J
4
5

6
7
8

9

To the embassy, yes.
And

Hill reached
out to us in the early evening, or the very end of the work
day on the L9th, and asked the press officer of the European
Bureau whether we had reaction to a number of assertions,
the best of my recollection,

allegations.

ll

a

l3

mi

All ri ght. Let's go through

lD'iscussi on of f

j

ust give

me one

BY MR.

a

So

the record. l

GOLDMAN:

did you understand why the Ukrainian

l6

enforcement source went

t7

drunk Lutsenko had said?

l8

somebody from The

nute.

t4
l5

March L9th, there was no other

indication other than television or
A To the best of my recollection, the story was not
in play publicly untjl the first articles appeared. And to

l0

t2

prior to

A

1aw

to the embassy to describe what a

I believe, first of all, Mr. Uglava had a very

l9

working relationship with the embassy. His organization,

20

NABU, was one

2t
22
23

24
25

good

of the key anticorruption organizations that
had been stood up after the Revolution of Dignity. It was in
i ts fi rst year, i t was functioni ng surpri si ngly well, meani ng
i t was putting together investigations on high-1eve1 corrupt
individuals. And because of its initial effectiveness, which
I think surprised a 1ot of people, it then became a target of

 63
people 'in places

2

it had been effective.
And one of the people that was looking to destroy NABU as an

J

effective

I

4
5

of influence,

Bureau was

because

Yuriy Lutsenko.

did the information that you received about
this, was that in writing or was it on the phone?

a

And

2l

I received it in an email from the embassy. And
that email should be part of the records collected, not
individually, but the State Department has a system, that is
supposed to automaticatly be able to pu11 all emails and
cables that have key words. That's my understanding of how
that material should be provjded eventually to the committees
after review.
a Could you just summarize for us the four lines that
you lines of
A I think the four story lines that played out in the
media, the first one was the anticorruption line'in which the
embassy was attacked, and anticorruption actors in Ukraine
were attacked. The second line was the 2015 cycIe,
altegati ons that somehow, somebody, whetherit was Ukrai ni ans
or people at the embassy had animus towards Paul Manafort.
The thi rd line was a line of reporting related to the B'idens,

22

and the interconnectivity between Vice President Biden's role

23

alleged interconnectivity between Vice Pres'ident Biden's role

24

and pushing our antjcorruption agenda, and the presence of

25

his son, Hunter Biden, on the board of the gas company

6
7
8

9

l0

ll
t2

l3
t4

l5
t6
t7

l8
l9
20

A

 64

2

Burisma. And the fourth line of attack was alleging that
certain civ'il society organizations were funded by the Soros

J

organi zati on.

I

6

there, whjch would
have overlapped wjth some of these events, as well as your
expertise in the area and your current role as the Deputy

7

Assistant Secretary of State, did you believe that there

8

any merit

4
5

A
a

9

l0
l1

Now, based on your time as DCM

O

to any of those four story lines?
I did not.
I believe our time is up so I yield to

was

the

minority.
BY MR.

t2

a

13

CASTOR:

officials do to try
stories that you believe were totally

What did your State Department

t4

to counteract

l5

fabri cated?

l6

23

A Correct.
a What did you or State Department officials do to
try to counteract these stories?
A When stories, medja occurs about any of the issues
in our area of responsibility, particularly when they touch
on allegations or assertions about U.S. policy, or U.S.
issues, the responsjble part of the State Department with the
press officers and the team in embassies work together to

24

prepare press guidance, and that can be a combination of

25

ei

t7
18

l9
20

2t
22

ther

these

gui dance, i

f asked, or i f a si tuati on warrants i t,

 65
I

statements that would usually come out by the

a
A

2
J

spokeswoman.

Right, so what did you do?
5o jmmediately since our Ambassador and embassy

was

4

being attacked with allegations that we felt were completing

5

baseless, we prepared press guidance, and

6

record the public record would

7

quoted that press guidance.

I believe the
show that the media outlets

t7

that i t?
That was it for those initial days, yes. In terms
of the public stance in response to media articles.
a Was that sufficient to counteract the narrative?
A The narrative continued to be pushed until the
narrative was st'i11 out there. It accelerated on whatever
that Sunday was, because the son of the President issued a
Tweet in which he suggested that we needed more like
Ambassadors like Rjck Grenell and fewer, I beljeve he may
have hashtagged 0bama appoi ntee was the poi nt, and 'i t was

l8

taken by people as an attack on Ambassador Yovanovitch.

8

9

l0

ll
t2

l3
t4
l5

l6

a
A

a

l9

And was

So what

else did the State Department do? I

mean,

22

like it is a major threat to the Ambassador, and
major threat to the State Department. What type of
addi tional fu11-throated maneuvers did the State Department

23

take here?

20

2l

24
25

this

seems

A

The request from the embassy endorsed by the

European Bureau,

there should be a high-1eve1 endorsement of

 66
I

Ambassador Yovanov i tch

.

2

a

And then what happened there?

J

A

There was no high-1eve1 Department endorsement of

4
5

6

Ambassador Yovanov i tch.
a

What

did the State Department do?

seri es of complete falsehoods

7

A

Yes.

8

a

Fabri cati ons,

9

a

You described

a

in your words.

fake 1ist, that

i

s

goi ng

to

the

heart of the ability of the Ambassador to serve effecti vety

t9

A Correct.
a And so is it fajr to say this was a big league
crisis for the Ambassador?
A This particularly after there were Tweets by
members of the Presidenti al fami 1y, i t was clearly a cri si s
for Ambassador Yovanovitch and a crisis that was threatening
to consume the relationship. So our recommendation to our
superiors was that there should be a clear statement of
support for Ambassador Yovanovitch.
a Clear statement of support, and obviously there was

20

a media statement --

l0

ll
t2

l3
t4
l5
t6
t7
r8

2l

A

The

initiat

media guidance

22

quoted extensively was,

23

nonsense as

24
25

I think,

that

complete

we released and

was

fabrication, utter

well as in rebutting Prosecutor General
Lutsenko's allegation that somehow we had misdirected
assistance met for the prosecutor general. We said something

 67
to

I

along the lines that we had a fiduciary responsib'ility

2

American taxpayer and when our assistance was not going to

the

6

t f or more product'ive purposes.
And so, those were the initial lines in that first
couple of days. When we got to the weekend, past the Sunday
morning talk shows, saw the President's Tweet against the

7

Ambassador. The question that consumed us was what do we

8

need

9

Yovanovi tch?

J

4
5

good use, we redi rected i

next?

And how do we show support

for

Ambassador

2l

a And what does the State Department do? It didn't
seem like the efforts were sufficient.
A There were exchanges at thi s poi nt wi th offi ci als,
including, to the best of my recollection, Under Secretary
Hale. It may have 'included the Counselor of the Department,
Brechbuhl, at that point. And there was a suggestion made,
and I can't remember by whom, injtially, but eventually,
Gordon Sondland, our Ambassador to U.S. EU also joined some
of the back and forth that Ambassador Yovanovi tch should
issue a statement, or do a video or tweet declaring fu11
support for the foreign policy of President Trump,
essentially asking her to defend herself as opposed to having

22

the State Department defend her.

l0

ll
t2

l3
t4

l5
t6
t7

l8
t9
20

a

Z)

You talked about the

four 1jnes.

And the

first

one

24

you said was the anticorruption actors were being attacked,

25

was

that part of the non prosecution tjst?

 6B

18

or the allegation that
Ambassador Yovanovitch, in her fi rst meeting with Yuriy
Lutsenko, which, if I reca11 correctly, occurred in 0ctober
2015. He alleged that there had been this list. There was
no such 1ist, and that was part of our reason for pushing
back firmly. And but that was part of, I would say, a
cluster of issues around the anticorruption theme.
a Has the embassy ever communicated names not to
prosecute for any reason?
A That's not what the purpose of our advocacy, or our
program is. 0ur advocacy is to help, in terms of
programming, is to build capacity, so they can have the
ability to go after corruption and effectively investigate,
prosecute, and then a j udge a11ege crj mj na1 acti vi ti es. The
issue of whether we asked at any time that they fo11ow up on
a prosecution, if there is a criminal nexus in the United
States, we have several different ways of conveying that
interest. We have something cal1ed the Mutual Legal

t9

Assistance Treaty, or t"'lLAT. We also have FBI agents known as

I

2
J
4
5

6
7
8

9

l0

ll
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13

l4
l5

l6
t7

A

The non prosecution,

2l

legaI attaches overseas. So we can do it in writing direct
from the Department of Justice, or we can have the legal

22

attaches engage

20

23

their counterparts.

But what Lutsenko alleged was that we were not doing

24

1aw-enforcement-to-law-enforcement request based on

25

criminal nexus in the United States but that

we were

a

a

 69
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2
a

J

4
5

6
7
8

9

l0

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l3
14

l5
r6

t7

l8

l9
20

2t
22
23

24
25

ti ca11y aski ng them not to prosecute
j ust don' t do that.

pol i

Ukrai ni

ans.

And

we

 70
I

[L].:37 a.m.l
BY MR. CASTOR:

2

7

At any point in time were names of officials,
whether it was for any reason, shared with the prosecutor's
office in connection with do not prosecute?
A We11, again, we don't go in and say do not
prosecute. The types of conversations that we have that

8

mi

J
4
5

6

9
10

a

ght be construed are d'if f erent.

O
A

You mentioned

the so-ca11ed

t2

Ukraine.

t4
l5

l6
t7

l8
t9
20

2t
22
23

24
25

a
A
a
A

name Sytnyk

Artem Sytnyk who is the

ll
l3

the

NABU,

earlier?

sti11 and the first

head of

National Anti-Corruption Bureau of

And was he ever

in the cross hairs of

Lutsenko?

He was.
Was

he bei ng i nvesti gated?

To the best

of my knowledge, yes, there were open

prosecutor general investigations on Mr. Sytnyk.

a

Do you know

if

anyone

at the embassy ever asked

to investigate Sytnyk?
A What I would say, I would characterize the
interactions as different because what we warned both
Lutsenko and others that efforts to destroy NABU as an
organi zatj on, i ncludi ng openi ng up i nvesti gati ons of Sytnyk,
threatened to unravel a key component of our anticorrupt'ion
cooperat'ion, whi ch had started at the request of Petro
Lutsenko not

 71
I

Poroshenko.

I

2

a

J

request not

4

A

5

6
7
8

9

l0

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r3

I

mean, could reasonable people

to investigate
am

interpret that as a

Sytnyk?

sure that l4r. Lutsenko

has claimed

that,

but

that there was a fist, and there WAS no tist,
and he made a lot of other claims. And so as I said, thi s i s
an i ssue of bef i evabi f i ty about someone who routi nely f ies.
O You ' re f am'i 1i a r wi th the name Shabun i n?
A Vi tal i Shabuni n perhaps? Is that
a Yeah. And could you identify him for us?
A He is one of the leaders of the NGO known as AnTAC,
'it's the antjcorruption center in Ukraine.
he also claimed

a
A

What's AnTAC's role?

t7

is an advocacy group that is designed to both
publicly bring attention to i ssues related to corruption, to
advocate for better laws and better prosecutions, and on
occasion it has also participated in some of the

l8

capaci ty-bui ldi ng acti vi

l9

Government.

20

23

a Who funds AnTAC?
A AnTAC is an organization, has funding that, to the
best of my knowledge, includes primarily funds from the
European Union and the U.S. Government. It has also received

24

grants from the Internat'i onal

25

is the Ukrainian name and arm of the 0pen Society lnstitute.

t4
15

t6

2l
22

AnTAC

tj es that were funded by the U. 5.

Renai ssance Foundati

on,

whj ch

 72
1

2
J
4
5

6
7
8

9

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t7

l8
t9
20

2t
22
23

24
25

a
A

And who runs the 0pen Society

The Open Soci ety Insti

institute?

tute was i ni ti ated 20-odd

years ago by George Soros.

a Can you remember -- sorry. Do you know if the name
I apologi ze f or these pronunc'iati ons.
Vi tal i
A That's okay.
a I'm not familiar with how to do this properly, and
I apologize. I mean no disresPect.
A I 'm not Ukrai ni an, so
a Vitali Shabunin, do you know if he was ever the
subject of a prosecution in Ukraine by Lutsenko?
A I do not know. To the best of my knowledge, he was
subject to harassment by the Securit'ies service known as the
Securi ty Bureau of Ukrai ne. There was an i nci dent where
Someone threw what's known aS bri ght green, i t's i odi ne-based
disinfectant, and they actually threw it on his face near his
house. It can damage eyes but is oftentimes done as a form
of i nti mi dati on i n the former Sovi et Uni on
.

5o because Shabunin was outspoken, he was certainly the

target of harassment. But I don't know for certain whether
there was an active criminal investigation by the prosecutor
general's offi ce.

a
something

A

Was

he ever up on charges

of hooliganism or

to that effect?
I believe when the person who was picketing his

 73
I

house and throwing

this

green material on him, and claiming

l3

to be a journalist even though he wasn't, provoked him, and
Shabunin pushed him near his house. Yes, he was then -- I
thi nk there was a charge of alleged hoof i gani sm.
a Do you know if anyone ever tried to communicate
with Lutsenko's office that this was not a worthwhile charge
to pursue?
A I th'ink, you know, if we're going back I don't
know specifically about that particular incjdent or charge,
but as a matter of conversation that U.5. officials had with
Ukrainian officials in sharing our concern about the
direction of governance and the approach, harassment of civjl
soci ety acti vi sts, 'includi ng Mr. Shabuni n, was one of the

t4

i ssues we rai

2
J
4
5

6
7
8

9

l0

ll
t2

a

l5

sed, yes.

Was Shabunin

on

this list that

you described

as

l6

fake?

t7

if that list has been provided to the
committee. You could show me the list and I might have some
recollection. But I --

l8

l9
20

2t
22
23

24
25

A

I don't

a

Okay.

know

Do you have any

recollection of

who was on

that f ist?
A There were about L5 names, and I remember i t WAS
very odd. It included the country's leadi ng rock star SIava
Vakarchuk, who is now the leader of one of the part'ies in
parliament. It included very bjzarrely a person who was a

 74
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4
5

6
7
8

9

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14

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20

2t
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23

24
25

friend of the current -- the ex-President

Poroshenko and was

of the overseer of the defense industry named
Gladkovskiy, and i n parentheses i t had hi s previous name,
Svinarchuk. The reason why that's memorable js because it
means a pig or a pig farmer, and he changed his name before
he went into government so he didn't have a name that said
basically Mr. Piggy. But no one knew that that was rea11y
knew that was his name when the list alleged1y was created in
2015. That was a story line from 2019.
There were a couple of young so-ca11ed Euro opti j st l'lPs
where f r i ends had j oi ned Poroshenko' s pa r ty but then become
sort of cri tics of President Poroshenko. Thei r names include
Mustafa Nayyem, Svi t1 ana Za1 i shchuk, and Serhi y Leshchenko.
I believe the former defense minister, who was running for
President at the time, Anatoliy Hrytsenko, was at the 1i st.
There was a judge I'd never heard of. And there may have
I just don't remember the
been other people on that list.
fult list.
a What do you know about Leshchenko?
A Serhiy Leshchenko was a journali st f or Ukra'inskaya
the leadi ng onl i ne news sou rce
Pravda, whi ch i s an on1 i ne
in Ukra'ine. He ran for parliament as one of the young
pro-western members of then-President Poroshenko's party. He
conti nued to act as an i nvesti gati ve-style publ i c fi gure even
as a member of parliament.
head

m

 75

2

did not get reelected in the parliamentary elections
in September. And because he was an active parliamentarian,

J

because he had been an invest'igative

1

He

6

journalist, he was
someone that the U.S. Embassy had known for years.
a What was his role in the Manafort issue?
A To the best of my recollection he was one of the

7

i ndi vi

8

out of the black book. i believe Andy Kramer from The

9

York Times was the

4
5

duals who helped populari ze the i nformati on that

came
New

t6

to write a story in English
about it. Andy came and talked to me sometime in late 2015,
2015. I do not reca11. He was based in Moscow, so he was
not there in Kyiv that often.
But at some point Andy shared with me where he had heard
the fj rst information. And so I believe, although I cannot
say f or sure, that t'{r. Kramer may have shared that he had
talked to Leshchenko as one of his sources for that early

l7

art'ic1e.

l8

20

a Were there other sources of informat'ion regarding
Manaf ort pushi ng out of Ukra'ine?
A About -- we11, Mr. Manafort operated in Ukraine for

2l

over a decade. 5o are you speci fi cal1y sayi ng about hi s

22

enti re time, or what's the specific

l0

ll
t2

l3
14

l5

t9

first

person

24

that timeframe, whjch of course i s
know, mid-2015 i s when he became 'involved wi th the

25

Presi

23

a

Around

dent's

campai gn.

you

 76
A

I

Right.

Because Mr. Manafort had spent

a decade in

ne, Ukrai ni ans followed h'i s reemergence as a U. S. fi

2

Ukrai

J

very closely.

gure

6

the primary person bringing that
to the attention of The New York Times and the other -A No. I thi nk, alt Ukrai nj ans, they di dn' t need a

7

si ngle person doi ng i t.

8

j

9

Yanukovych who

4
5

a

And was Leshchenko

n Ukrai ne i n 2005

Because Mr. l'lanaf ort f i

when he was hi

rst

appeared

red by f ormer Prime l"4i ni ster

20

tried the steal the election that became the
0range Revolut'ion, that was the end of 2004.
To the best of my recollecti on, 'in thi s case i t's
actually quite good because I was with Ambassador Herbst at
the time when Yanukovych told us that he'd hired Manafort,
and that was the spring of 2005. So Mr. Manafort's time in
Ukraine started in 2005, and according to public records, he
participated up through the campaigns of 20L4.
a Now, the allegation that the embassy shared an
animus about Manafort or was interested in pushing
i nformati on to the forefront, i s that an accurate descri pti on
of the second narrative that was pushed in the March 20L9

2t

ti

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t4
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l6
t7

l8
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22
23

24
25

mef rame?

A

That

is part of what Yuriy

Lutsenko

in that

narrati ve pushed, yes.

a
A

Okay.

It's, again, inaccurate, not accurate

 77
I

characteri zati on.

J

Okay. Is jt accurate that somebody in the Ukraine,
not from the embassy, but somebody, maybe Ukra'inians, were

4

pushi ng

2

5

6
7
8

9

a

th'is narrati

ve?

to say, given what
Presi dent Yanukovych d'id to the country, whi ch was loot tens
of billions of do11ars, that there were many Ukrainians who
in part blamed Paul Manafort for that success because he
proved to be a britliant political technologist in giving
A

I th'ink it

would be accurate

l2

that helped him w'in the presidency.
a And do you think people in the U.5., supporters of
President Trump that saw this information come out of the

l3

Ukraine may have wondered

t4

President

l0

ll

l5

Yanukovych advice

if this

was an

effort to attack

or the President when he was a candidate?

THE CHAIRMAN:

Counsel, are you asking what the American

l6

public -- an opinion about what the Amerjcan public might

l7

bef i eve?
BY MR.

t8
t9
20

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22

a
A

CASTOR:

No. Is i t reasonable I '11 restate i t.
Wel1, I will just say, I was in Ukraine at the time

so I don't know what the reaction

a

the

Is it

reasonable

was.

to conclude that if you are in

23

Presjdent Trump's world and you're seeing these storjes

24

coming out

25

a pot i ti ca1 attack?

of the Ukrajne that it

appears

to have the look

of

 78
THE CHAIRMAN: The

I

2
J

you're asking the State Department witness
how to evaluate the public response to
MR. MEAD0WS: Mr . Chai rman, wi

4

if they wish, but
a

th a1 1 due

due respect, we didn't cross-examine you

5

all

6

the counselor.
THE CHAiRI4AN: Mr . Meadows,

7
8

witness can answer

answer, but
 V1R.

9

l0

it

CASTOR: Okay .

that's

answer

t2

wi tness.

sai

d

respec

or

t,

wi

th

you're not

the wi tness can

seems

THE CHAIRMAN:

ll

I

questi on about

Thank you

.

But it seems that you're aski ng for

beyond

the knowledge of a State

Depa r tmen

an

t

BY MR. CASTOR:

l3

2T

that part of the second narrative that you
described that, you know, jnjecting the l{anafort was an
ef f ort to attack then-cand'idate Trump?
A Agai n, I can't say how any i ndj vi dual , any Ameri can
would react to a narrative. I can only answer for myself and
the knowledge I had. And I'11 tel1 you what I told
Ukrainians in 201.5. I said that Paul Manafort was an
extremely successful political adviser who had helped

22

President Yanukovych win, and no one should underestimate his

23

abi 1i

24

was my assessment

t4
l5
t6
t7

l8
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20

25

a

Was

ti es to help any candi date that he adv'ised. And that

of his professional ability to help a
candidate win, regardless of the country.

 79
I
2
3

narrative that ejther
Lutsenko is pushing or the journalist he was dealing with in
the United 5tates were pushing, do you thjnk that related to

a

Do you

think the

second

ll

trying to spin up Pres'ident Trump's supporters?
A You're asking me to speculate on what Yuriy
Lutsenko, Rudy Giuliani, and John Solomon were doing, and I
would suggest that's a question for those three individuals.
a Djd it have the effect of that though?
A It's hard for me to make an assessment since there
were so many story lines put in play at the same time to
assess how any one of those story lines had an effect on any

t2

gi ven aud i ence.

4
5

6
7
8

9

l0

t4

a D.id the State Department zero jn on that parti cular
story line, or did they approach all of these four at the

l5

same

l3

ti

me?

l6

A

t7

embassy were

l8

as situational awareness,

t9

because the volume was intense, the various

20

stor i es.

2t
22
23

24
25

a
A
a
history

A

Our primary concern was

that our Ambassador

to inaccurate accusations.
we followed or tried to fo11ow

being subjected

The third story 1ine was
Cor

and our
But

different

relating to

Burisma?

rect.

And what's your knowledge

of

Buri sma's corrupti on

efforts to prosecute Burisma?
I first became aware of the owner of

and

Burisma,

 80
I first went to our embassy in
20L5. I went for a short period of time. At

I

Mykola Zlochevsky, when

2

mid-January

J

ti

the

5

or anti corrupti on coordi nator, but I 'd
already been selected to be the next deputy chief of mission.
so my predecessor had a 3-week break. He was going back

6

to

7

to go out,

4

8

9

l0

ll
t2

l3

me

I

was the seni

because so much was happening

, and I was asked
at the time, the

final push to take as much
terrjtory aS they could, that they needed an extra officer.
And as well, Ambassador Pyatt thought I could be helpful in
Russians were pushing the

the anticorruPtion front.
I was asked by our professional Department of Justice
former prosecutor, who was engaged in capacity bu'ilding, I

t7

if I would be willing to go in and talk
to the prosecutor general's office, because in late
December 2014, somebody in the prosecutor general's office of
Ukraine this is, to be c1ear, pre Lutsenko, pre Shokin, a

l8

di

t4
l5
t6

20

rupt, i neffecti ve prosecutor who i nexpl i cably
had shut the criminal case that had been the basis for a
Brjtish court to freeze $23 million in assets held by Mykola

2l

Zlochevsky.

l9

22
23

24
25

fferent

cor

That was an issue

of our interest

because we had made a

to the Ukrainian Government in 20L4 to try to
recover an estimated tens of billions of dollars of stolen
assets out of the country. The first case that U.S., U.K.,

commitment

 81
I

and Ukrainian investigators worked on was a case against

2

Zl,ochevsky, and

J

0ffice

4

Zlochevsky.

that's because the Brjtish Serjous Crimes

had already opened up a case, an investigation against

l0

half a million dollars of State
Department money in support of the FBI and this investigation
and to build capacity to track down stolen assets. And so,
again, I had a fiduciary responsibility I'd previously
been the djrector of the office whjch provided that funds to
find out what had happened and why were our monies being

ll

wasted.

5

6
7
8

9

We

spent roughly

that the DOJ rep gave me, we
at the prosecutor general's office. They

5o armed w1th the f acts

t2
13

asked for a meeting

t4

made

l5

And so

l6

how much was

t7

l8

said, ha ha ha ha, that's what President Poroshenko
last week. And I sa'id, and what did you tel1 him?

t9

said $7 milIion, and it happened in l'lay before our team

20

i

2t

I said, wrong. Somebody, a prosecutor under your
whjch is not
command, signed a letter on December 25
Christmas in Ukraine. They celebrate it late
and provided
it to the lawyer who provided it to the British judge before
the FBI and the Serious Crimes 0ffice could react. So that

22
23

24
25

n,

the deputy prosecutor general

I went into his office,

May

of

named Donylenko

February

3,20L5,

available.

and said,

the bribe and who took it? And he laughed

and

asked us
And

he
came

20L4.

 82
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4
5

after your team came into the office.
He did not offer the name of anyone he suspected of
havi ng taken the bri be. He di d, however, say, well , I 've
been friends with Zlochevsky for 2L years, and he'S in Dubaj
ri ght now. Here's hi s phone number. Do you want i t? And I

was 5 months

8

said, no, I think you should actually arrest him next time he
comes back to Ukraine.
But I want to make very clear the seriousness with which

9

the U.S. Government takes this because we spent months and

6
7

l0

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t2
13

t4
l5

of dollars trying to help your country
get your stolen assets back, and somebody in your office took

hundreds

of

thousands

a bribe and shut a case, and we're angry
So that was my introduction. And the focus at that
point was on Zlochevsky the person, the ex-mjnister, when he
was minister of ecology, which overSees the unit that issues

t7

the licenses to do substrata geologic exploration for gas.
He awarded it to a Series of companies that happened to be

l8

either through shell

l9

holdi ngs, whj ch was known as Buri

l6

companies

or affiliated with

the

sma.

20

But the f ocus at the ti me, the case i n 201-4, i n the

2t

frozen assets, was the assets frozen for Zlochevsky, the

22

mi ni

23

company.

24
25

ster, not di rected to the conduct of
O
A

Buri sma, the

Okay. But he controlled Buri sma?
Yes. Whatever the roster may say, he's

the

 83
1

benefj ci

a

2
J

the

al owner, as they say.
And

did they suffer from allegations of corruptjon,

company?

l3

is actually a major player,
thanks to all the licenses he granted to himself, when he was
a mjnister, is a serious gas producer, but its reputation in
the industry is a company that throws elbows and uses
political strings. So it's a legitimate company, but it does
not have a good reputation in Ukraine.
a Because it has a history of corruption?
A Because jt has a history of not just competing on
qual i ty of servi ce.
a Okay. But is that a euphemism for corrupt

t4

activities?

4
5

6
7
8

9

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A

A

l5

The company, which

He was

the minister and he granted himself licenses

t7

to exptore gas.
a Okay. But you' re agreei ng wi th me, ri ght, thi s

l8

is

l9

A Yes. And it was the position of the U.5. when I
went into that office in February 3 that the prosecutor
general should, first of all, prosecute whoever took the
bribe and shut the case, and second of all, there was stil1
the outstanding issue of trying to recover the stolen assets.
a You had some firsthand experience with
anticorruption issues in 2014, 2015, and then you went to

l6

20

2t
22
23

24
25

 B4
I

Kyiv l'n 201-5, correct?

A
a

2
J

4
5

6
7
8

9

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Cor

What

on?

Well, I think, that pretty much sums it up. If
you're asking about the corruption of the company, there js
the issue of how they got the licenses and then their
reputation. And so our concern was primarily focused on the

A

fact that we, working with the U.K. and Ukrainian 1aw
enforcement authorities, had frozen assets that, to the best
of my knowledge, were in accounts that were under his name.

l3

a
A

t4

the best of

l6

else can you telt us about issues relating to

the company, related to corruPti

t2

l5

rect.

When

djd that

The acti

on

occur?

thi s was alt

n,
why thjs was the first
i

n 20L4. And,

agai

to

the reason
effort to try to recover stolen assets i s because the
U.K. Serious Crimes 0ffice had opened up a case in the spring
my knowledge,

l8

of 20L4, and as we were talking to the Ukrainians, how can we
be of help, there was a stolen assets recovery conference in

t9

London co-hosted by

20

U.K. counterpart and the World Bank that

2t

case

t7

the attorney general and the

this

became

the test

22

for our ability as partners in the U.S., U.K. ptaying a
key role together to try to recover stolen assets from the

23

previ ous government.

24
25

a Did the company ever engage in, you know, public
efforts to rehabilitate their image?

 B5
A
a
A

I
2

Yes.

And what were those?

5

aware I did not know it at the
time because, again, my focus was on Zlochevsky that one
of the ways that they did was to appoint westerners to their

6

boa rd

3

4

8

9

became

.

a
A
a
A

7

I later

Corporate governance experts?
Westerners.

But not corporate governance experts?

l4

all the members' backgrounds. And
I've served my enti re 1if e in government serv'ice, so I'm not
famj 1 i ar wi th corporate boards.
a Do you know who they appointed to their board?
A The b j g name j n Ukrai ne was f ormer Pres'ident of

l5

Poland, Aleksander Kwasniewski.

r0

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O
A

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to the board?
I don ' t know. I 've never met lvlr . Zlochevsky,

And why was he appointed

a
boa rd

Anybody

A

It's

Biden, the son

23

appointed

25

and I

else that you recall appointed to the

?

22

24

know

do not know why they did what they did.

l9
20

I don't

a
A

become

clear in public

knowtedge

that

Hunter

of then-Vice President Biden, was also

to the board.
Any idea why they wanted

to name him to the board?

Again, I've never had a conversation with

 86
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a

2
J

how people have

a

Did he have any experience

A

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Hunter

l3

a

I

have never met nor do

t7

l8
t9

Okay.

So you

i do not know.
Do you know if
I don't know.

don't

know

the background of

know i f he spoke any

he moved

Do you know how much he

I

to

of

the

Ukrajne?

got

Paid?

have not seen any documents.

I've

heard people

make suggesti ons

get paid a 1ot?

2t

a

Did

22

A

I'm a .s.

25

I

Bi den.

A
a
A
a
A

l6

24

gas

relevant languages?

l5

23

in the natural

busi ness?

ll

20

interpreted it.

Mr. Tlochevsky.

9

t4

nk,

That's a reasonable interpretation, right?
As I sa'id, I have never had a conversati on wi th

a
A

7

l0

dad was the Vice

That's a questi on for Zlochevsky. That's, I thi

A

6

8

his

because

Presi dent?

4
5

I don't know.
But it was probably

Zlochevsky, so

he
U

Government employee.

I don't

know how

get in any country, but I
understand a 1ot of people get paid a 1ot of money.

much

corporate board

O

It

members

wasn't a

nomi

na1 fee.

 87
I

2

A
don't

Again, I don't work in the corporate sector so I

know what standard board compensation would be.

13

0kay. I mean, i t's been reported that i t's
somewhere in the neighborhood of $50,000 a month or more?
A I have read articles, and I have no idea how much
Burisma may pay its board members.
a Have you ever met with during your time in Kyiv,
did you ever meet with anybody on the board of Burisma? Djd
they pay a courtesy call on the embassy?
A I personally never met and I don't know if board
members met with the embassy. I don't know.
a Did anybody affiliated with the company ever pay a
courtesy call in the embassy to try to help the embassy

t4

understand the company i s engagi ng i n rehabi 1 i tati ng thei r

l5

i mage?

3

4
5

6
7
8

9

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20

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23

24
25

a

A

Again, I can only speak for myself. And there

was

affiliated with Burisma that asked to come to the
embassy to meet me. But that's me as the DCM over a 3-year
period of time.
a In engaging with some of these
anticorruption-focused organizations, whether it's NABU or
AnTAC, did you have any firsthand experience of the efforts
that Burisma was trying to rehabjlitate thei r image,
whether -- you know, did NABU communicate that to you?
A That would not have been a conversation that we had
no one

 8B
I

with NABU. I will say that

2

apparently was an effort

now

4

to help cosponsor, I
guess, a contest that USAID was sponsoring related to clean
energy. And when I heard about it I asked USAID to stop that

5

sponsorshi p.

6

a

why?

7

A

Because Burisma had

J

8

business, and I

9

Government

for

that you mentjon it, there

Burisma

a poor reputation in the

didn't think it

to be cosponsoring

was appropriate

something

for the U.S.

with a company that

l0

had a bad reputation.

1l

t4

a When was that?
A I would bel i eve that would be someti me i n mi d- 201.6.
a Okay. Any other communications with, you know,
AnTAC officials or NABU about Burisma and their effort to

l5

rehabi 1i

t2
l3

tate

themselves?

22

I do not recal1 djrect communjcations with anybody
from AnTAC. I do know that the former Ambassador to Ukraine,
John Herbst, whom I mentioned previously, had been on the
board, I believe, of AnTAC. And he recounted to me an
exchange with another member of the AnTAC board named Daria
Kaleniuk, who criticized him because the Atlantic Council,
where he runs the Ukraine Project, agreed to take Burisma as

Z)

a corporate sponsor. And so Dari a cri ti ci zed the Atlanti

24

Counci

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18

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20

2t

25

A

c

1 for doi ng so.

a

When was Ambassador

Herbst

when was

his

tenure?

 B9
I

2
a

J

A
a
A
a

Well, before

A

Again, I went to

He was Ambassador

to Ukraine between 2003 and 2006.

So before

Before

Bl

11 Taylor.

6

okay. t"laybe it would be helpful to
just go through the chronology of the ambassadors. We've got
Herbst, and then to the extent you remember. This isn't a

7

quiz.

4
5

8

9

I

was then serving

in

Thailand

afterwards, so I wasn' t necessari 1y focused on Ukrai ne.

We

t2

Herbst. We had Ambassador Taylor, I believe
from 2006 to the 2009. The next Ambassador, I believe, was
John Tefft. And then the next Ambassador after that was

l3

Geoff

l0

ll

t4
l5

t6
t7
18

t9

had Ambassador

Pyatt. And then there was Ambassador Yovanovitch.
a The fourth narrati ve you i denti fi ed, you know,
going after the civil society organizations
A Ri ght.
and you ident'ified NABU and AnTAC, right?
a
A Right. NABU was a -- well, it was -- AnTAC was a
civil society organization, and the other one that I recal1

22

early on was something ca1led the Ukraine
Crisis Media Center, which was set up to help be a sort of
platform for i nformation about Ukrai ne starti ng duri ng the

23

Revoluti on

20

2l

24
25

be'ing mentioned

of

Di gni

ty,

2014.

a Any other organizations you can think of that
into that fourth bucket?

fa11

 90
I

2
3

4
5

6
7
8

9

A

In the i ni t'ia1 press coverage, AnTAC was clearly
the main target, but these story lines continued to repeat
and combi ne. So, for i nstance, i n May former Mayor Gi u1 i ani
alteged that former Ambassador Yovanovitch was going to work
for a Soros organization and after she left post, which was
fa1se. She went to work, stitl as a U.S. State Department
employee, as a diplomat teacher/lecturer at Georgetown.
a Was there any basis to that allegation? Like, had
she consi dered 'it, or t,,,as there any talks wi th any of these

l0

organi zati ons?

ll

t6

A Absolutely none.
a Okay. So it was totally, from your point of view,
totally fabri cated?
A Fake news. It was, you know. He stated something
that was fake, not true, publicly.
a So you sa'id the U. K. or, I'm sorry, the Ukrai ne

t7

Cr j

t8

organizations sort

t2
l3
t4
l5

si s Med'ia Center, NABU, and AnTAC. Any other

A

l9

Those were the

20

been mentjoned,

2t

the re

22
23

24
25

of fit into that
only ones that I

remember having

but, again, there are a lot of stories

out

.

a

Going back

to Shokin's tenure as prosecutor

general.

A
O

Yes.

You indicated

that he was not well regarded for his

 91
legi timate prosecuti

A
a
A
a

2
J

4
5

6

IMF and

7

Shoki

ons?

Correct.
And the same can be sajd
Cor

of

Lutsenko?

rect.

With regard to Shokin, it really seemed that the

the U.S. Government adopted an official position that

n had to

go?

9

A
a

that's the subject obviously of the Vice

l0

President.

l1

l5

role in removing Shok'in, and
as a result, you know, $1 billion in aid was freed up. Are
you familiar with that?
A Yes.
a And is jt fa'i r to say that jt was the U.5.

t6

Government's of f i ci a1 posi t'ion Shoki n needed

8

t2
r3

t4

Correct.
And

You know, he made some statements

that

have been

videotaped about how he played a

t7

A

Yes.

l8

a

And what

A

Ri

to

go?

t9

did the U.S. Government do to demonstrate
that position, in addition to what the Vice President did and

20

said?

2l
22
23

24
25

ght.

n, as I've stated before, U. S. State
Department offi ci a1s feel when we' re spendi ng taxpayer money
jn a country we have a fiduciary responsibility. 5o I'd like
at thi s point to explain what we felt our fiduci ary
responsibility had been and why this became an issue of
Agai

 92
I

po1 j

cy.

8

to help w'ith a
proj ect i n
to reform the prosecutor general's offi ce. The
previ ous year we'd worked wi th M'ini ster of Interi or Avakov,
whom I mentioned earlier to the launch of what was known aS
the patrol police. It was an'immediate success. They were
trai ned by the Caf i forni a Hi ghway Patrol , brand new pol i ce,
highest female police officer percentage in the world at the

9

time.

2
J

4
5

6
7

We had been asked

by Presi dent Poroshenko

ll

to do something similar in making a
qui ck vi ctory reform i n the prosecutor general's offi ce. He

t2

appojnted, h€, Poroshenko, appointed a new deputy prosecutor

l3

general

t4

Just fike the deputy head of

15

Georgians

l6

record

t7

t9

to work with him and another deputy
prosecutor general, with whom we had a good relatjonship via
the FBI, named Vitaly Kasko. And the focus was to create an

20

inspector general'S

2l

could go after corrupt prosecutors.

l0

l8

22

And so he asked us

named Davi

in

Sakvarel i dze, that'
NABU,

s a Georgi an name.

there were a 1ot of

that Poroshenko brought jn

who had

a proven track

Georgia.

And asked us

So

that

23

February.

24

appojnted

25

d

un'i

t inside the prosecutor'S offjce that

was stood up

We

started

in the

Shokin was appointed in

I think Sakvarelidze

may have been

in March. We started working on that project,
they hired a bunch of young, enthusiastic prosecutors.

and

 93
I
2
3

4
5

in the summertime they launched what was going
to be thejr first case, in the central province of PoItava,
as a test case. They had a busjnessman who complained he was
being shaken down by a couple of corrupt prosecutors. He
agreed to be a cooperating witness.
And then

They worked

6
7
8

9

with the security service, which had wiretap

authority, and they tapped these two prosecutors whose names
I bef ieve are Shapakin and Korniyets. Don't know their first
names. And then they went in to get the warrants and arrest

l0

them.

ll
l3

the reason why I'm going through all this detail is
it's important to understand that one of those two
prosecutors that was the first case turned out to have been

t4

the former driver of Shokin, who he made his driver

l5

prosecutor.

l6

20

in the IG unit had no idea that the fjrst
corrupt prosecutor and there were a 1ot of them that
they were targeting happened to have been the former driver
and very close, personat friend of the prosecutor general.
and the only reason they could
When they arrested him

2t

arrest him 'is because the deputy prosecutor general heard

t2

t7

l8

l9

22
23

24
25

And

a

5o the people

off, except he tipped off the wrong
corrupt prosecutor in the province Shokin went to war. He
wanted to destroy anybody connected with that effort. They
tried to fjre and put pressure on the judges who would issue
about it and tipped them

 94
the warrants. They tried to fi re atl of the inspector
2

general prosecutors.

7

to force out everybody associated
wjth that, including the deputy head of the security service,
the intel servjce, who had provided the wiretapping coverage.
It was absolute warfare protecting his associate, and he
destroyed the inspector general unit that we'd been standing

8

up.

3

4
5

6

He

eventually

managed

ll

that was the wasting of U.S. taxpayer resources,
and so that i s the reason why the IMF, the U. S. , and the
European Uni on sai d collecti vely the j usti ce sector and the

t2

prosecutor

9

l0

So then

l3

is so important for the success of this country
and it's so important to reform it that Victor Shokin has

t4

shown

l5

he's preventi ng reform.

l6

l8

in the conditionality of our sovereign loan
guarantees, the U.S. Government guaranteed loans for Ukraine
to bor row i n the market, 20L4, 201.5 , and 2015, ref orm,

t9

ant'icorruption reforms, and the prosecutor's reforms were

20

condi

t7

2l

that he's acti vely wast'ing

U.

S. taxpayer dollars

And because

ti

The conversations

that went

between the embassy and the

State Department were then brought ahead of the Vice

23

President going

24

removal then became a condition

a

key

onal i ty.

22

25

and

to Ukraine in

What year was this?

December

of 2015, and Shokin's

for the loan guarantee.

 95
I
2

A

Presi dent

J

4

o
Gove r nmen t

The

vi si t that we're

wa5

i n Decembe r

And

what official

talking about by the Vice

2015,

I believe

overt acts did the

take with regard

to

U.5

Lutsenko?

6

At that point he was not the prosecutor general.
he was Oas'ica11y the ma j ori ty
He was actually the head of

7

leader in parliament.

5

A

9

No.

a

8

I 'm tal kj

about duri ng Lutsenko's rei gn as

ng

the prosecutor general.

A

ll

Okay. So we're now shifting from the 2015 period
to 2015 to 2019. When you say official acts, what do you

t2

mean?

l0

Wel1, there

a

13

t4

know,

l5

Shoki

it
n

was the

needed

to

was

official U.5.

A

Rlght.

t7

a

And there were

wasn't a tremendous

l9

A

Government's position that

Correct.

similar issues with Lustenko that
prosecutor. Is that correct?
But we never said that Lutsenko should

20

go.

2t

Okay. So the U.S. Government never took an
official position that Lutsenko needed to go?

22
23

24
25

you

go.

l6

l8

a number of official acts that,

he

a

A

We

didn't.

We compla'ined

about some

of

hi

s

acti ons, but
a

It djdn't

amount

to the concern that you have with

 96
1

Shoki

n?
A

That, I believe, would be an accurate

4

a

0kay.

5

MR.

6

said Mr.

7

earlier was he's a typi ca1

2
J

yes.
Mr

.

Jordan.

J0RDAN: We11,
Shoki

I

n was terri

8

t4R.

KENT:

9

MR.

J ORDAN

would

mean, you

Ukrai ni an prosecutor

Yeah.

didn't do hjs job, and that you all
hi m and
You said his kids were

wanted him gone.

ll

Poroshenko were godfather

t2

MR. KENT: Yeah.

13

MR. J0RDAN: And then you

you said

just ask, why? I

ble. I thi nk the term you used

l0

14

assessment,

to

each other's kids.

get the new guy, Lutsenko,

is just as bad, also kids are

who

you know, kids

t7

with Mr. Poroshenko and him are godfather to each other's
chi 1dren. Lutsenko i s showi ng up drunk, maki ng statements.
And, oh, by the way, he's not even a lawyer. And so I think

l8

the counselor's questjon was, where was the outrage with

19

Mr. Lutsenko that was there for Mr. Shokin?

l5
t6

23

rst of all, the fi rst phase Yuriy
Lutsenko was prosecutor general for over 3 years, almost
and a half years. Shokin was for a year. And his
unwi 11i ngness to do anythi ng and hj s venali ty and hi s

24

undermi ni ng U.S.

25

months.

20

2t
22

MR. KENT: Fi

-supported proj ects started

wi

3

thj n several

 97
Yuriy Lutsenko, as I say, is a charming person, and so
2

jt

was not

being as a prosecutor
activety undermining reforms 'immediately. Several

clear

how he would end up

6

in
months after he became prosecutor general in the spring of
2015, for instance, former President Poroshenko in one of his
cal1s with then-Vice President Biden asked for a former, I

7

bel'ieve,

J

4
5

general

New

Jersey State prosecutor

by

8

name

20

for 2 years as an anticorruption
adviser under contract to the Department of Justice in
Ukrai ne and spoke Ukrai ni an fluently. And, i n fact,
Poroshenko had thought about appointing him as the first head
of the NABU, this National Ant'i-Corruption Bureau. It turned
out he was too o1d. He was already 65, and you had to be
under 65 to be appointed.
So Poroshenko had actually helped recruit him for a
previous anticorruption job. So he asked by name whether the
U.S. Government would be willing to bring him back to Ukraine
as an adviser. The U.5. Government agreed and so the
embassy's part of the sectjon that does anticorruption work

2l

and law enforcement reform brought

9

t0

ll
t2

l3
t4
l5
t6
t7
18

l9

had served

on contract

23

office to help
mentor Lutsenko, to help stand up an IG unit to replace the

24

informal team that had been destroyed by Shokin.

22

25

as an adviser insjde the prosecutor generat's

So

for the first period of time it

appeared

that

we were

 98

3

th Mr. Lutsenko on prosecutori a1
reform, which was both a necessary precondition for a
successful country and a priority for the U.S. Government

4

programmi ng.

1

2

5

6
7
8

9

l0

ll
t2
13

goi ng

to be able to

work

w'i

that there was broad
international consensus on Shokin. Who 1ed that charge? Was
that everyone was equally involved and jnvested jn moving
him, or was that led by the U.S.?
MR. KENT: When i t comes to certai n condi t'ional i ti es,
the IMF, particularly in the economic sphere, has, I would
say, the primary voi ce. When i t comes to certa'in other
efforts the U.S. oftentimes is the lead voice. That'includes
'in the securi ty sector where we provide the most mi f itary
MR. JORDAN:

It's

been reported

l8

assjstance. And we coordinate through the European Command
with willing a11ies, like the Poles, Lithuanians, U.K.,
Canada, and i n the j usti ce sector, as well , the U. S.
played also had a lead voice.
MR. JORDAN: So the United States would be the lead one

t9

pushing

t4
15

l6
t7

20

2t

for the new prosecutor?
MR. KENT: I would say the U.S. has had more skin in

game on

22

MR. J0RDAN:

L)

MR. KENT:

24
25

the

0h, of course.

-- justice sector reform over the last

5 years.
MR. JORDAN:

That's understandable. Right. Thank you.

 99
MR.

I

2
J

4
5

6
7
8

9

l0

ll
t2
l3
t4
l5

l6
t7
t8

l9
20

2t
22
23

24
25

mi

ZELDIN:

If I could fol1ow up to that, if

you don't

nd, Steve.
So

did

Shoki

n ever i nvesti gate actual corruption?

I am not aware of any case that came to
conclusion, but I do not have insight into what all the
prosecutors do in Ukraine, and there are about about 25,000
of them.
MR. ZELDIN: Are you aware of hjm ever having an
investigation into actual corruption?
MR. KENT: I do not know, again, what happens behind
closed doors. I think proof is in the pudding. Am I aware
of any case on corruption that went to court and was settled
when he was prosecutor general? I'm not aware of that.
MR. KENT:

MR.

ZELDIN: I 'm not aski ng that.

0kay. What are you asking?
MR. ZELDIN: If you ever had an i nvesti gati on. I 'm not
aski ng about the conclusion of the investigation.
I,IR. KENT: Honestly, si r, I can' t answer that questj on.
I do not know.
MR. ZELD] N
0kay. Earl i er on i n response to the
questions you were asked with regards to Burisma and
Zlochevsky, it sounded like you were talking about actual
corruption. No?
MR. KENT: When I was tatking about Zlochevsky, when I
was talking to 14r. Danilenko, the deputy prosecutor general,
MR. KENT:

:

 100

J

in, that was based on a specific case
that had been developed in 20L4 before I came to Ukraine.
And by time I got there, that case had been dismissed by the

4

team against Zlochevsky, the person, by the team of

5

prosecutors that were there

6

office.

I

2

prior to

MR. ZELDIN: But you

7
8

9

prior to Mr. Shokin going into

did testify that Shokin had an

investigation into Burisma and Zlochevsky, correct?
MR. KENT: I did not say that.
MR. ZELDIN: Are you aware

l0

lt

Shokin coming

i nvesti gati

on i nto Buri sma and Zlochevsky?

MR. KENT:

12

that Shokin had an open

I

have read claims by people

nvest'igat'ions, but

I

have no speci f i c knowledge about

l3

i

t4

whether those investigations were open

l5

them might be.
MR. ZELDIN: When did you

t6
t7
18

Shoki

that there were

or what the nature of

learn of an investigation

n j nto Buri sma and Zlochevsky?
MR. KENT: I just told you, I djd not learn of

by

an

t9

investigation. I've read claims that there may have been an

20

i nvesti gati on.

2t

MR. ZELDIN: When

did you first read of claims that

23

there may be an investigation into Burisma and Zlochevsky?
l"lR. KENT: I read stories referencing that in the last

24

several months after the series

25

brought

22

of art'ic1es starting in

this set of issues to the fore.

March

 101
MR. ZELDIN:

I

Okay.

So before

the last several

months

started reading about a case against Burisma

2

when you

J

Zlochevsky, you were never previously aware of

4

investigat'ion into Burisma and Zlochevsky?

and

an

l0

s t'ime, no.
MR. ZELDIN: And one followup. With regards to the EU
and the IMF, was there a U.S.-1ed effort to get the EU and
the Il'lF to also target Shok'in, or was that somethi ng that EU
and IMF did totally on their own?
MR. KENT: The It'lF keeps i ts own counsel , but of tenti mes

ll

when they go on

t2

conversati ons wi th embassi es. Here i n Washi ngton, the

l3

Treasury i s the

5

6
7
8

9

MR. KENT: Spec i f i ca11y

du

ri ng Shoki

n'

factfinding missions they often

have
U. S .

t5

th the IMF.
In terms of the European Union, tradi tionally in a
country like Ukraine, the European Union Ambassador and the

l6

U.S. Ambassador coordinate very c1ose1y. And since 2014 and

t7

l8

of the G7, there is a coordinating
process for the G7 ambassadors plus the head of the European

l9

Union

20

issues and they go into issues

t4

the

German

U.

S. Government

1

i ai son wi

presidency

mission.

And they meet almost weekly, and they djscuss

like this in very deep detail.

23

the United States and the EU were
coordinating with regards to the effort to target Shokin?
MR. KENT: The U.5. and the EU shared their assessments

24

at the time.

2t
22

25

MR. ZELDIN: So

to say that jn particular, if we're
talking about the period of time between Thanksgiving,20L5,
And

I

have

 102

4

of 2016, I was not in Ukraine. I was back here to
take Ukrainian for several months.
My understanding is that the ambassadors spoke and
compared vi ews on thei r concerns that Shok'in's conti nued

5

presence as prosecutor general prevented any hope of

6

prosecutori a1 reform.

I
2
J

and March

MR. J0RDAN:

7
8

sure i f

9

Buri sma was

Shoki

Mr. Secretary, you said you didn't know for

n was j nvesti gati ng Buri sma, but you

a troubled, corrupt company, ri

knew

ght?

l3

I said, Burisma had a reputatjon for
being, first of all, one of the largest private producers of
natural gas in Ukraine but also had a reputation for not
being the sort of corporate, cleanest member of the business

t4

communi

l0

ll
t2

MR. KENT: As

ty.

MR. JORDAN: And you were

l5

to do any type of

l6

you advised USAID not

t7

activity

l8

MR.

KENT: Correct.

19

MR.

J0RDAN:

20

coordjnated

-- sponsoring any type of corporate or

contest wi th them? 0kay.

21

MR.

KENT: Correct.

22

l"lR.

MCCAUL:

23

thank

24

it

25

so concerned about that that

you

had

a

MR.

Sort of following up on that questi on,

and

for your service, yeah, you referred to Burisma

as

bad reputat'ion essenti a1ly?

KENT: That

is what I

was

told by the

members

of

our

 103
I

embassy community who focused on economic

2

1i a'ison wi

th the U . S. busi ness communi ty,

for a clean energy

4

funding

5

Buri sma was headl i ni ng?
MR. KENT: To

6
7
8

9

l0

13

14

yes.

instructed

USAID

the best of my awareness, it was one of

it invited school kids or young
Ukra'ini ans to come up wi th i deas f or a clean energy campai gn,
and there may have been something like a camera for the best
these sponsor programs where

proposal.

ll
t2

had

to pull back on
conference, is that right, that

MR. MCCAUL: And so you

3

issues and

And the cosponsorship was between a

part of

USAID

that

issues. And when I heard about
it I had concerns, so I raised those with the mission head of
USAID in country at the time and she shared my concerns.

worked on energy and economic

MR. I'ICCAUL: So when

l5

the State Department evaluates

for

l6

forei gn assi stance to countri es i sn't i t appropri ate

t7

23

to look at the 1eve1 of corruption in those countries?
MR. KENT: Yes. Part of our forei gn assi stance was
speci ficalty focused to try to limi t and reduce corruption.
And we also tried, to the best of our knowledge and
abilities, to do due diligence to make sure that U.S.
taxpayer dollars are being spent for the purposes that they
were appropriated and that they are as effective as they can

24

be.

l8
t9
20

2t
22

25

MR. MCCAUL:

them

In fact, jf you look at Central America,

 104

2

corrupt governments down there, i sn't i t approprj ate to
evaluate the corruption factor and where the money goes to

J

f

4

on

ore'ign ass'istance?
MR. KENT:

I

wj

11 be honest

wi

th you, si r, I've

ne.ver

7

in the Western Hemisphere, and I've only made one trip
to Panama as part of my National Defense University
industrial study group. So I would defer to my colleagues

8

who are working on Central American policy.

5

6

9

served

MR. MCCAUL:

But in f ine with your previous statements,

l0

the whole notion of looking at corruption in foreign

ll

governments and predicating foreign assistance on

t2

appropri ate thi ng

13

MR. KENT:

I believe that my colleagues

that, is

an

who have worked

t4

on international narcotics and law enforcement see when there

15

are funds appropriated by Congress to try to fight drug

2t

trafficking and improve the 1aw enforcement systems in
Central America. It's intended to help our national
'interests to both stop the drug trafficking and improve the
justice system so that corruption can be contained.
MR. MCCAUL: And I think based on your testimony,
Ukraine has a strong and long history of corruption. Is that

22

cor rect?

l6
t7

l8
t9
20

23

24
25

that corruption is part of the
reason why Ukrainians came out into the streets in both 2004
when somebody tried to steal the election and again in 201,4
MR. KENT:

I

would say

 105
of a corrupt, kleptocrati c,

pro-Russi an government,

I

because

2

which eventually collapsed. The Ukrai ni ans decided

J

was enough.

4
5

6

enough

yes, is a country that has struggled
with these issues, but I would say also in the last 5 years
has made great progress.
And so Ukraine,

l3

just for the record, I signed with
Chajrman Engel a letter to obligate the funding security
ass j stance to Ukra'ine. But i s 'it not appropri ate f or the
President of the United States to bring up with a foreign
leader issues of corruption when the foreign leader brings up
Javelin missiles? Is it not appropriate to discuss going
after corruption'in a country where we are providing foreign

t4

assi stance?

7
8

9

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t2

MR. MCCAUL: And

MR. KENT: Issues

l5

of corruption have been part of

the

l6

hi gh-leve1 di alogue between U. S.

t7

leaders regardless of who is the U.S. leader and who the

l8

Ukrainian leader

t9

di plomati

is.

So

that is a normal issue of

c di scussion at the

20

l4R. MCCAUL: Thank you.

2l

MR. MEAD0WS:

22
23

24
25

I

leaders and Ukrai ni an

hi

Steve, can

the

ghest 1eve1.

I just get one clarification?

t's not 1ong.
MR. CASTOR:

0f

course.

Did I hear you

that Shokin, prosecutor
Shokin, rea11y, his reputation within 3 months of bei ng
MR. MEADOWS:

say

 106
I

appointed was rea1ly negative from your standpo'int?

2

what you said?

J

MR. KENT: That'

s what I

sa'id

Is that

.

8

it's not just my personal opinion. If you look at
the political po11ing, if you go to IRI or NDI, both of whjch
have done extensive polling in Ukraine since 20L4, President
Poroshenko, who was elected with roughly 55 percent of the
vote in 20L4, maintained that support through the first year.

9

And then as

4
5

6
7

And

th'is controversy over the corrupt godfather of

l0

his kids, Prosecutor General Shokin, exploded in what was

ll

known

t2

things they confiscated from his former driver was a cache of

r3

diamonds

l4
l5

l6

as the di amond prosecutor affai

-- his support 1eve1s,

r

because one

of

the

Poroshenko's support 1eve1s,

Institute in
particular, plummeted from about 55 percent to the mid-20s
over that period of time.
as po11ed by the International Republican

l8

that was the issue that destroyed Poroshenko's
credibility and his high-1eve1 support in the eyes of the

l9

Ukrai ni an people.

t7

And so

20

MR. MEAD0WS: So timeframe, was

2t

MR. KENT: Yes,

22

MR. MEADOWS: And so when

23

24
25

have been

20L5?

sir.

this is a bad guy,

MR. KENT:

that

in

we

2015 would your opinion

can't trust

him?

0ur concerns about Shokin's conduct in office

were triggered by the reaction

to the so-ca11ed diamond

 107
I

prosecutor case.

Yeah. And when was that?

2

MR. MEADOWS:

3

MR. KENT: That took place

4

in late

summer,

early fal1 of

201_5.

l5

right. Steve, go ahead.
MR. CASTOR: With all the time I have 1eft, I'd like to
open up a new topic. I'm just kidding. I'm out of time.
l"lR. KENT: And i f we could take a break.
THE CHAIRMAN: Yeah. Actually, what I was going to
suggest is 1et's take a half an hour lunch break. Let's
resume promptly at L:00.
I want to remind all Members that may not have been here
for prior sessions, although we have not d'iscussed classif ied
information today, we are in a closed deposition, and under
House Rules, Members are not to discuss testimony in a closed

t6

sess i on.

5

6
7
8

9

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14

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l8
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20

2t
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23
24
25

1"1R.

MEADOWS: A11

I've had very fittle luck jn getting
members to ab"ide by that. But those are the ru1es, and I'm
just reminding Members and staff they're not to discuss the
substance of the testimony.
I

know, Mr. Jordan,

lRecess. l

 108
1

2
J
4
5

6
7

[].: L0 p.m. l

Okay. Let's go back on the record.
Mr. Secretary, I want to just ask you a few questions to
fo1low up on my colleague's questions, and then I'm going to
THE CHAIRMAN:

turn it over to Mr. Mitchell to continue going through
timeljne with you.
One

question

I

have though

the

is, we've come to learn of

a

l0

Giuljani and Mr. Lutsenko, and there were
some Ukrainians that were apparently apparently came to
believe that President Trump had cal1ed into that meeting.

ll

Do you know

8

9

t2

meeting between Mr.

l'4R.

anything about that?

KENT:

I do not.

l5

Okay. Earlier in response to some
questions from my colleagues in the minority you mentioned
that there was an effort to get the top level of the State

t6

Department

t7

the Ambassador and that statement was not forthcoming. Is

l8

that ri ght?

l3
t4

THE CHAIRMAN:

to issue a statement of fu11-throated support for

t9

MR. KENT: Correct.

20

THE CHAIRMAN: And was

2t
22

would come from SecretarY
1'4R.

the hope that that statement

PomPeo?

of that nature could come from
or levels. 5o I think we were looking

KENT: The statements

./.)

a variety of people

24

for a statement of support from a high-ranking

25

Department

offi

ci a1.

State

 109
THE CHAIRMAN: And

I

2

would

it

have been most helpful

coming from the Secretary himself?
MR. KENT:

J

It's

always most

helpful jf the top leader

to be honest, I cannot reca1l during
he was on travel. If he were on travel

4

issues a statement, but

5

that

6

then Deputy Secretary Sullivan m'ight have been the

7

top-ranking

8

9

l0

ll

week whether

official in the building. I just don't recal1 on
those part'icular days who was essentially in charge.
did you ever learn why no statement
was issued by a top-1eve1 official at the State Department?
THE CHAIRMAN: And

MR. KENT: No.

t4

I th'ink, that in this
context that the suggestion was made to the Ambassador that
instead of or because there would be no statement coming from

l5

the top that

l6

defend herself, and express her personal support

t7

Presi dent.

t2

l3

THE CHAIRMAN: You

maybe

mention,

the Ambassador should go out herself

l8

MR. KENT: Correct.

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THE CHAIRMAN: Where

20

2t
22
23

24
25

for

,

the

did that idea come from?
MR. KENT: I think I recatl being copied on emails in

which Under Secretary Davjd HaIe made the suggestion.

i think
with Gordon he made the suggestion specifically to be
aggressive on Twitter or to tweet. But in any case, there
were a number of suggestions that Ambassador Yovanovitch
Separately, Gordon Sondland made the suggestion.

 110

2

herself speak out against the campaign against her.
THE CHAIRMAN: And how did you come to know Ambassador

J

Sondland'

I

s

advi ce?

5

I believe I was copied on the emai1. It may
not have been I don't think it was from him, but it was an

6

exchange between Ambassador Yovanovi

7

leaders in the European Bureau. Again, that is an email that

8

should be a record that was collected and

9

document

4

l,lR. KENT:

ll

not yet been provided to

t4

l5

l6

Congress?

in that email communicat'ion, that's
where you would have learned of Ambassador Sondland's
suggestion that the Ambassador tweet out a defense of herself
and express her support for the Presjdent?
THE CHAIRMAN: And

l"lR. KENT: And

l8

THE CHAIRMAN:

the Presi dent' s f orei gn pol i cy, yes
You ment'ioned that there are appropri ate
.

l9

1egal channels that can be used i f the

20

conducti ng an i nvesti gation

22

has

MR. KENT: Cor rect.

t7

2t

the

Part of the document collection that

THE CHAIRMAN:

l3

is part of

be

collection.

l0

t2

tch and my guess would

MR. KENT: Cor

Uni

ted States

j

s

rect.

--

to get overseas evidence
through LEGAT and through the MLAT process. Is that right?
THE CHAIRMAN:

and wishes

24

MR. KENT: Correct.

25

THE CHAIRMAN: There have been

a number of public press

 111
reports that Attorney General Bill Barr and others at the
usti ce Department are essenti a1ly doi ng an i nvesti gati on of

2

J

J

a

the i nvesti gators i nto the ori gi ns of the

4

i nvesti gati on.

Do you know whether

5

6
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8

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J

Russi

a

Mr. Barr or anyone else at the

usti ce Department has sought i nformati on

to bolster,

I

is a bogus theory about the 2015
election that had been part of that John Solomon series?
MR. KENT: I am not aware of any Justice Department
i nqui ri es to Ukrai ne regardi ng 20L5, no.
THE CHAIRI"IAN: I thi nk you testi f i ed i n an answer to my
colleague's questions that at the time that it was U.S.
policy and Il'lF policy and the pof icy of other allies and
all i ed organi zati ons that Shoki n needed to go. Thi s was
think,

what you descrjbe

t7

essentially dismantling an inspector general
offi ce the U. S. had helped fund to fi ght corrupti on i n
Ukraine, particularly in the prosecutor's offjce. Is that

l8

right?

l5

l6

based on Shokin

That's correct.

t9

MR. KENT:

20

THE CHAIRMAN: And

at the time that the State Department

2t

and these other international organizations were seeking to

22

have Shokin removed, you weren't even aware whether Shokin

23

had any i nvesti gation

24

MR. KENT:

25

of

Buri

sma?

I do not reca11 that bejng part of

conversation. The conversation was very

much

the

focused,

fi rst

 1

12
I

and foremost, on the so-ca11ed d'iamond prosecutors case that

2

jnvolved these corrupt prosecutors, Korniyets and Shapakin,

J

and the campaign

4

that Shokin conducted to destroy and remove
from office anyone associated with it regardless of what part

5

of

6

officjals served in, prosecutors,
investigators, judges, even security officials who had been

7

i

government those

nvolved i n the wi retappi ng.
THE CHAIRMAN: And what was

8

your position at the time?

13

At the time th'is was occurring, in 2015, I
was in the capacity of the number two at the embassy, the
deputy chi ef of mi ssi on.
THE CHAIRMAN: So as the number two in the embassy, at
this time, you weren't even aware of even an allegat'ion that

t4

there

l5

Bu r

9

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t2

MR. KENT:

MR.

comi

l8

an i nvesti gati on underway by Shoki n 'involvi

ng

i sma?

l6
t7

was

ng up

KENT: That was not something

or

it

20

di scussion

reca11 ever

bei ng di scussed.

THE CHAI RMAN:

l9

that I

was appropriate

My colleague

also asked you about whether

to bring up the

conversation

bring up a

2t

of corruption 'in the context of the Presi dent of
Ukrai ne aski ng for more j aveli ns or expressi ng the need for

22

more javelins.

)7
24
25

I want to ask you actually about what the Presi dent
sai d, because he dj dn' t talk generi cally about corrupti on.
He asked f or a f avor i nvolvi ng an 'investi gati on i nto

 1

13
I

CrowdStrike and that conspiracy theory and

for

an

4

investigation into the Bidens. Is it appropriate for the
Pres'ident of the Uni ted States i n the context of an aIly
seeking military support to ask that a1ly to investigate his

5

political rival?

2
J

ll

first time I had detajled knowledge of
that narrative was after the White House declassified the
transcript that was prepared not transcript, the record of
conversatjon that was prepared by staff at the White House.
As a general principle, I do not believe the U.S. should ask
other countri es to engage i n po1 i ti ca1ly associ ated

t2

i nvesti

6
7
8

9

l0

MR. KENT: The

THE CHAIRMAN:

l3
t4

gat'ions and prosecuti ons.

w'i

Particularly those that

may

interfere

th the U. S. electi on?

t6

a general principle, I don't think that as
a matter of policy the U.S. should do that period, because I

t7

have spent much of my career

l8

20

in countries like Ukraine and Georgia, both of
which want to join NATO, both of which have enjoyed billions
of dollars of assistance from Congress, there is an

2t

outstandi ng i ssue about people i n

l5

l9

22
23

24
25

MR. KENT: As

Iaw.

trying to

improve the

rule of

And

offi ce j n those countri es
using selectively politically motjvated prosecutions to go
after their opponents. And that's wrong for the rule of 1aw
regardless of what country that happens.
THE CHAIRMAN: And since that is rea11y U.5. policy to

 1

14

2

further the rule of 1aw and to discourage political
jnvestigations, having the President of the Uni ted States

7

effectively ask for a political investigation of his opponent
would run directly contrary to all of the anticorruption
efforts that we were making. Is that a fair statement?
MR. KENT: I would say that request does not align with
what has been our policy towards Ukraine and many other

8

countrjes, yes.

J
4
5

6

THE CHAIRMAN: Mr . t"li tche11

9

.

BY MR. t.,IITCHELL:

l0

ll

a
A
O

t2

Good

afternoon, sj r.

Afternoon.

l5

I'm going to pick up where Mr. Goldman left off,
whjch was the end of March of this year, 2019. And you
testified earljer that you met with the deputy director of

l6

NABU

t7

22

I did not. I was here in the United States.
Somebody at the embassy did.
a And you received correspondence regarding a meeting
that the deputy dlrector of NABU had with someone in the
embassy in Kyiv. 1s that correct?
A Correct. Somebody in the embassy sent an emajl

23

recounting a conversation that was held with Mr. Gizo Uglava,

24

deputy head of

13

t4

l8
t9
20

2t

25

on about March L9.

A

a

And

NABU.

that email relayed a conversation that

the

 1

15
deputy director had with Mr. Lutsenko

A
a

2
J
4
5

w'i

th

Correct.
about an interview that 14r. Lutsenko had given

an American journalist?

A
a

Correct.

l8

that the first time that you got wind of this
'intervi ew that Mr. Lutsenko had had wi th, what you later
learned to be, Mr. Solomon?
A Yes.
O Okay. And the following day, March 20, was the day
that Mr. Solomon published the artjcle in which there was
vjdeo of part of the interview that he had with Mr. Lutsenko.
Is that correct?
A That's my recollection of what happened on the 20th
of March.
a And once you saw that article, is this when the
5tate Department issued or shortly thereafter jssued these
denials saying that it was a complete fabrication, it was

t9

false?

6
7
8

9

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l1

l2
l3
t4
l5

l6
t7

20

A

Was

Yes. It

woutd have been on March 20

'is 7 hours

2l

Embassy, whi ch

22

the European Bureau would

23

response

24
25

a
A

of us, and the press team at
have worked to prepare guidance in
ahead

to attacks against our Ambassador.
Were you involved jn that?
Yes,

I

was.

that the U.S.

 1

16
Okay. What was your involvement?

a
A

I
2

I

reviewed the language, as

I do any proposed

press

7

to any of the six countries over which I
have poticy oversight, and I have the ability to either
clear -- with just that word "c1ear" or make suggestions
and edits for the text.
a 0kay. And in this particular case, what did you

8

do?

J
4
5

6

9

guidance related

I believe I

A

may have toughened up

the language,

so

t2

me. But I cannot
teIl you in detait because press guidance is just that. It's
then provided by a press officer in response to press

l3

inquiries.

l0

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complete fabrication may have been from

16

a Okay. But you agreed at the t'ime, as you do now,
that i t was, i n fact, a complete fabri cati on?
A Yes. I can te11 you that it was my language about

t7

the fiduciary responsibility, the

t4
l5

same language you heard

l9

of my background jn being the
di rector of the offi ce whi ch had the responsi bi 1i ty for

20

undertaking these programs.

l8

2l

me

use here today, because

that language about we have the fiduciary
bi 1i ty to ensure that U. S. taxpayer dollars are bei ng

And so

22

responsl

L)

used appropriately, and when they're not we redirected them

24
25

to better purposes, that was language that I added.
a And based on your personal experience and your

 1

17
I

personal knowledge

A
a

2

Cor

of these allegations?

rect.

6

at some point -- and the chairman asked
you questions about this as well -- there was an effort or
discussion, let me say it that way, about whether the State
Department should issue a fu11-throated defense for the

7

Ambassador?

J
4
5

And then

And

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A
a
A

ll

a

And

8

9

Yes.

that

was done over email?

that

was Ambassador Sondland, Under Secretary

Yes.

counselor you think

Counselor Brechbuhl mi ght

12

Ha1e, and

l3

have been on those emails as welI?

t4

t6

stri ngs. Ambassador Sondland's
communi cati ons would have been with Ambassador Yovanovitch,
and then she would ha ve commun jcated w'i th the Department.

t7

There would have been potenti a1ly

t8

European

19

Brechbuhl.

l5

a

20

2t
22
23
24
25

Two separate

A

j

front offi ce wjth
Were you on

communi

cati ons

wi

th

the

Under Secretary Hale and Counselor

all of those communications that you've

ust descrj bed?

that I've described are because I was
copied on the emails, and that's why i n the process of
collecti ng documents relevant to the subpoena research, my
memory was refreshed of the email traffic on which I was

A

The emai 1s

 1

1B
I

copi ed.

2

a

And what was

the t'ime period for that email traffic

J

in relation to the article that

4

March 20?

A

5

6

It

came about on

or

about

would have been over the next perhaps 10 days,

last L0 days of March.
0kay. And duri ng that time period,

basical1y the

a

7

add'itional arti cles that

were there also

ll

out by Mr. Solomon?
A The articles came out, if not dai1y, almost dai1y,
and they of tentimes combi ned two of the f our themes I 1a'id
out before. To the best of my recollection, there was never

t2

a

l3

previ ous

8

9

l0

new

line of attack, but many articles

combjned two

of

the

four themes.
Okay. And the suggestion was made to the

a

t4

came

2t

to release a tweet or make some sort of strong
statement herself. Is that right?
A Correct.
a 0kay. And did the Ambassador do that?
A Thi s back and forth was done i n the context of the
upcomi ng, at that poi nt, f i rst round i n the Ukrai n'ian
presi dentj al electj ons that took pIace, I bel i eve, on

22

Ma

l5

l6
t7
18

t9
20

Ambassador

rch

31.

.

So Ambassador Yovanov'itch, i

L)

24

press attache,

25

some

made

n consultati on wi th her

a decision, she informed us, to record

preelection videos encouraging Ukrainians to vote.

And

 1

19

5

of that process, she included in that a statement of
support of the adminjstration and the foreign policy, the
admi ni strati on of Presi dent Trump and i ts forei gn pol i cy.
a Okay. And those videos that you just described,
the purpose of them was to publish them in Ukraine. Is that

6

correct?

I
2
3

4

as part

A

t2

Correct. These were videos that the embassy was
already planning to issue in a preelection encouragement for
Ukrai ni ans to engage i n thei r ci vi c duti es. And so
Ambassador Yovanov'itch used that metaphor of ci v'ic duty i n
making reference to support as a career nonpartisan public
offjcial who supported and carried out the foreign policy of

l3

President Trump as she had with other Presidents.

7
8

9

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O

l4
l5
16

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l8
t9
20

2l
22
23

24
25

wi

So was

th'in the

Uni

the intended audience of those videos people

ted States as welt?

A My understanding based on the email back and forth
that I recei ved from Ambassador Yovanovi tch, i ncludi ng her
press officer, was that her intent was to send a signal such
as was being suggested by her wjthjn the context of something
that was already being planned that
and presidential politics.

O
forwarded

A
a

was focused on electoral

Okay. And do you know whether that video

was

to anyone wjthin the White House?
I do not know.
Do you know why the Department of State elected not

 120
I
2
J

to do a fu11-throated defense of the Ambassador?
A I thjnk that's a question that the committees could
ask those outside of the European Bureau.

a
A
a

4
5

6
7

You do

not

know

whY?

I do not know why.
Did you have any conversations

anyone who would have made

A

8

at

any point wjth

that decision?

The State Department

is a hierarchical

l3

on. I work for the acti ng assi stant secretary.
Normally the acting assistant secretary is the one who
engages offi ci als above our bureau, to i nclude the Under
Secretary of Political Affai rs, Davjd Ha1e, who has oversight
over our bureau; on occasion, the counselor of the

t4

Department, Ulrich Brechbuhl; and then depending on the

l5

t9

situation, as approprjate, the Secretary himself.
a 0kay. So these are all the individuals that would
have made that dec'i si on?
A These are the leaders of the Department of State.
a 0kay. But dj d you have any conversati ons wi th

20

them

9

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t7

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22
23

24
25

organi zati

A
a

No.

their decision not to issue a
fu11-throated defense of the Ambassador?
A I did not have conversations with them, no.
a Are you aware of anyone from the Department of
about

 121
I

State at around the end of March or beginning of April

2

reaching out

J

4

A
a
A

to

Sean Hannity?

Yes.

What do you know about that?

7

I beljeve, to the best of my recollection, the
counselor for the Department, UIrich Brechbuhl, reached out
and suggested to Mr. Hannity that 1f there was no proof of

8

the allegatjons, that he should stop covering

5

6

9

l0

ll

O
A
a
A

them.

And how do you know that?
Because

By

I

was informed

of that in an email.

who?

l3

I cannot say for certain who was the sender. It
could have been from the counselor, and it could have been

t4

f rom Acti ng

l5

a

l6

communi

t7

24

I'm the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State
overseeing our relations with Ukraine, and I am normally the
one who would have primary communications with our
ambassadors or charges for the six countries over which I
have policy oversight.
a 0kay. So is it fa'i r to say that you were in
communication wi th Ambassador Yovanovi tch pretty frequently
duri ng thi s ti me peri od, end of March, begi nni ng of Apri 1

25

about these i ssues?

t2

l8
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20

2t
22
23

A

Ass'istant Secretary Reeker.

Okay. And why would they have informed you of thjs
cation to

Hanni ty?

Because

,

 122

J

It is fair to say that when she was Ambassador and
I was Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, we were in regular
communjcation about everythjng that went on in the

4

U. S.

I
2

5

6
7
8

9
10

A

-Ukrai ne relationshi p.

a

0kay.

And do you know whether thi

from Counselor Brechbuhl

to

s

commun'icati on

Sean Hannity had any

effect?

to the U.S. and so
we don't have a TV at home, so I do not watch TV at night.
a Okay. But the sjtuation regarding Ambassador
A

I

unplugged when we moved back

Yovanovitch and the allegations against her was something

l6

that you were keenly aware of during th'is time period?
A Correct. However, the week you're referring to is
the week of the Ukrainian presidential election, and so my
focus that week was on the first round of results and what
would be the potential impact on U.S. national interests if,
as seemed 1ikely at that time, there would be a new

t7

Presi dent.

ll
l2
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20

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23

24
25

a

Do you have any

recollection as to

when Counselor

to Hanni ty?
A I do not. If you had asked me that question before
you gave me a timeframe, I would have given you a rough
tjmeframe. I do not remember the exact days. End of March,
early April is what I would have said.
a But, agai n, i t's memori al i zed i n an emai 1 to the
best of your recollection?
Brechbuhl reached out

 123

4

of my recollection, there is some sort
of emaj 1 regardi ng that, yes.
a Okay. Are you aware that at the beginning of March
Ambassador Yovanovitch was asked to extend her stay in

5

Embassy Kyi v?

I

2
J

A

To the best

A
a
A

6
7

Yes.
How

do you know that?

l3

to consider
extending her stay was me, and that was in January when she
was back for the chief of mission conference. We had a
challenge in the process of finding someone that we would
nomjnate to replace her. And because of a different
assignment, it was clear that that was not going to happen on

t4

schedule.

8

9

l0

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t2

The first person who asked her

And we

l5

had

concern I

had

concern

that the country,

t6

Ukrai ne, would be going through t rans'i t j on and we

t7

have

l8

cons i de r

l9
20

an Ambassador

period did
A

So I

initially

i n Ukrai ne.

you say through the elect'ion season, what time

When

tha

ght not

asked her to

staying on through the election season

a

2l

there.

mi

t

encompass?

elections scheduled for this year in
was presidentjal elections in the spring and

There were two

22

Ukrai ne.

23

then there were parl i amentary electi ons scheduled no

24

than

25

The re

the fal

a

1

later

.

So when you

talked to

Ambassador Yovanov'itch i

n

 124
of

2019 and

you floated the idea that she extend her

I

January

2

stay you thought of extending her stay through the fa11 of

J

20L9?

4

A

5

us a chance

My proposal was through

to find a potential

the end of the year to give

number

-- another

nominee

7

that the White House could put forward and possibly be
confirmed and be out in Ukraine, or at the very least having

8

an experi enced Ambassador there through the most cri ti cal

6

l0

part of transition and then possibly have the Charge.
a Had you talked to anyone else at the Department of

ll

State prior to making this proposal to the Ambassador in

12

J

9

anuary 20L9?

t4

I recal1, but it is possible that I talked
w'ith Wess Mitche11, who was our assistant secretary at the

l5

time.

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A

l6

a

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p

roposed

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i

t

A
a

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20

2t

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25

Okay. Is it fair to say that you wouldn't have
this to Ambassador Yovanovitch had you thought that
have met any resi stance at the Department of State?
Cor

rect.

that's

And

well- respected

A

22
23

would

Not that

Eu

rope,

a

tch was a

Ambassador?

She was
yes

because Ambassador Yovanovi

the senior-most career Ambassador in

.

And

what was Ambassador Yovanovitch's reacti on

you offered her thi s possi bi 1 i ty i n J anuary of

20L9?

when

 125

8

willing to stay
longer, and she said that she would think about it. And she
came back and said she would be willing to consider it.
a Okay. When did she say that?
A Again, we started the conversation'in January. t"'ly
guess is that she thought about it for a 1itt1e bjt and got
back to us, to me some point over the next month, which was
prior to the conversation that you were referring to in

9

Ma

I
2
J
4
5

6
7

A

rch

We11,

I

asked her

if

she would be

.

23

0kay. 5o between the time that she came back to
you and said that she was willing to extend her stay and the
conversation that you had in March, what happened with regard
to th'is extensi on?
A So the conversation in March was not w'ith me. It
was wjth Under Secretary David Hale. He visited Ukraine the
f i rst week of March. I accompani ed that v j s'i t. And Under
Secretary HaIe asked her to stay until 2020.
a Had you spoken to Under Secretary Hale about his
proposal before he made i t to the Ambassador?
A No.
a OkaY.
A Not that I recal1.
a And did you speak with Ambassador Yovanovitch about

24

Under Secretary Hale's offer?

l0

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21

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a

A

Well, I was there on the trip, and so by tjme she

 126
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that she was willing to stay, because what she said
was she wanted to have clarity because she had a 9l-year-o1d
mother with her and needed to also plan for other issues, by
told

him

5

time Under Secretary Hale flew away she had indicated her
willingness to stay essentially an extra year through 2020 to

6

give the State Department and the administration time to find

7

a nominee that could be nominated and confirmed and sent out

8

so that we would have an experienced Ambassador in

9

important country

4

l0
1l

a

an

at a time of transi tion.
When did you first learn that the offer for

an

extension had been rescinded?

16

I heard, per se, that the offer for an
extension had been rescinded. The offer was on or about the
5th of t"larch. The 5th to 7th of March, I think, was the time
when Under Secretary Hale was there. The media storm that
was launched wi th ["4r. Solomon's i ntervi ew of Prosecutor

t7

General Lutsenko started on March 20, 2 weeks later.

t2
13

t4
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18

A

a

I don't

0kay.

know

t9

Ambassador Yovanovitch

20

were one and the

2t
22

A

talk about potentia1ly recalfing
and the rescinding of the extension

So the

same?

clear, there were two people representing
leadership of the State Department, first I, the deputy
To be

24

assistant Secretary, and then the under Secretary who asked
Ambassador Yovanovitch about her willingness to stay longer.

25

What then happened was a media campaign against

Z)

her, and then

 127
1

a

2
J

to that was a request for her to come back.
Okay. And when was that request made for her to

subsequent

come back?

5

A To the best of my recollection, she indicated on
April 25 that she'd been instructed to get on a plane to come

6

back

4

to

Washington as soon as possible.

a
A
a

7
8

9

So she indicated

to

you?

Yes.

Was

that the first that you heard that she'd

been

l0

recalled?

ll
t2

I believe that was the first time I heard that
instructions had been sent for her to come back to the U.S.,

l3

yes.

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t7

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20

2t
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23

24
25

A

a

Okay.

So you learned

for the first time that

she

to come back from the Ambassador herself?
To the best of my recollect'ion, yes.
And did she provide any at any tjme, has she

had been instructed

A
a

provided any reasons why she was recalled?

A

I

part of her
opening statement that was published, she referred to a
conversat'ion she had wi th the Deputy Secretary of State.

a
A

Other than her opening statement?

understand

that,

because

it

was

I believe that I did hear about that conversation
subsequentty, and I cannot say whether it was from her or
from one of the people above me, like acting assjstant

 128

J

secretary. But I did hear an account of that session.
heard of i t before readi ng i t on Fri day, yes.
a Okay. And whatever you heard before, was it

4

consistent with what you read on Friday?

I
2

I

l0

A Yes.
a 0kay. Who else did you speak to, if anyone, on the
7th floor regarding the reca11 of Ambassador Yovanovitch and
the reasons for that recall?
A I was not having conversations with anybody on the
so-ca11ed 7th floor State Department leadership about this

ll

i ssue.

5

6
7
8

9

t2

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a
A

Anyone

else at the State

Department?

I or other people havi ng conversat'ions

wi

th the 7th

l4

floor?

l5

20

a People that you had conversations with.
A I did not have further conversations about that
effort. It was presented as a decision, so it was, she was
reca11ed. And I believe she came back on the 26th of April
for consultati ons.
a We11, what was your reaction to learning that she'd

2t

been recalled?

l6
t7
18

t9

24

I, on a personal level, felt awful for her because
it was within 2 months of us asking her, the Under Secretary
of State asking her to stay another year. And within a very

25

short order she was being

22
23

A

reca11ed.

 129
But you never sought a time

a

to investigate why or

t7

find out why she was being recalled?
A My position is not to investigate. Decisions had
been made by the leadership of the State Department and
ambassadors serve at the pleasure of. So when an instruction
comes down that is a decision that was being made.
a So on May 5 the State Department issued a statement
saying that Ambassador Yovanovitch was ending her assignment
in Kyiv as planned.
A I believe
a Do you recall that statement?
A I believe that was something jssued by the embassy
in Kyiv not by the State Department, and it was in the form
of a management notice.
a Do you recall seeing that at the tjme?
A I did.
a 0kay. And what was your reaction to that embassy

t8

not i ce?

t9

A

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5

6
7
8

9

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If I'd

20

would

I don't think that's how I
have had that news be released to the embassy

2t

commun

i ty

.

23

a
A

24

have cal1ed

22

25

been the DCM,

0kay

.

Can you expl a i n?

I think of a sjtuation of that

magnitude

I

would

a townhall meeting and talked to people face to
face. Also the fact that it was teaked to the Ukrainian

 130
I

press within 2 hours was another indication

2

management

of why issuing a

5

notice to roughly 600 people would not have been
the way to introduce that information to 600 employees that
their boss was no longer going to be their supervisor.
a Okay. So I take i t that you took i ssue wi th the

6

way i n whi ch i t was commun'icated, but what about the

7

substance

8

said that she was leaving her post as

J
4

A

9

sti11

of the message i tse1f,

been the deputy

had

ll

handled noti fi cati on

t2

that,s

l3

My j ob now i

15

catly that i t

planned?

Again, this was an embassy management notice' If I

l0

t4

and speci fi

chief of mission, I would

have

of the embassy staff di fferently, so
I am now the that was my job from 2015 to 2018.

s as a deputy ass'istant secretary f or oversi ght
of policy and programming. It's not running an embassy.
a 0n I'lay L4, Rudy Giulianj told Ukra'inian journalists

22

that the Ambassador waS recalled because she was part of the
efforts against the President. Were you aware of
Mr. Giuliani's statement at the time?
A I do not know that I saw that statement at that
time, flo, but I did see an interview that he gave with a
Ukrainian publication, censor.net, that I believe was
published on May 27 that expressed a variant of that opinion,

23

yes.

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25

 131
I

[1

:40

p .m. ]

BY MR. MITCHELL:

2

4

And what was your react'ion

a

J

to

Mr

.

Gi u1i an'i

's

statement?

Mr. Giulianj, at that point, had been carrying on

A

5

for several

months fu11

of lies

and incorrect

6

campaign

7

information about Ambassador Yovanovitch, so this was a

8

cont'inuati on

a

9

of

h

j

s

campai

gn

of

1i es.

true at the time that
was removed because she was part of the

So you

did not think it

was

l0

the Ambassador

ll

t4

efforts agai nst the Presi dent?
A I believe that Mr. Giuliani, as a U.S. citizen,
First Amendment rights to say whatever he wants, but he's
private cit'izen. His assertions and allegations against

l5

former Ambassador Yovanovitch were without basis, untrue,

l6

pe

t2
13

a

has
a

ri od.

t7

a

How

l8

Charge

d'affai

t9

A

did Bill Taylor

come

to be appojnted as the

res?

When i

t

became

clear that

Ambassador Yovanov'i tch

22

of my responsibjlities as the
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State was to try to find and
resolve how we are going to ensure that our key missions have

23

appropri ate leadershi p.

20

2t

24
25

was going

One

we were

to be recal1ed,

one

of the timing was that
a transitjon in my old job as deputy

of the unfortunate

also undergoing

elements

 132

5

chief of mission. The person who replaced me had already
been moved early to be our DCM and Charge in Sweden, and so
we had a temporary acting deputy chief of mission. So that
left the embassy not only without the early withdraw of
Ambassador Yovanovi tch left us not only wi thout an Ambassador

6

but without

7

of mi ssi on.

I

2
J

4

somebody who had been

selected

to be deputy chief

t3

collectively we all knew and the "we" is the
people who ran our policy towards Europe that we needed to
find an experjenced hand that could hetp the embassy in
tranSi ti on, help the relati onshi p i n transi ti on, and also be
a mentor to the new incoming deputy chief of mission, who had
not yet arrived and had never been the deputy chief of

t4

mission.

8

9

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20

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23

24
25

So

of looking to see who was available,
who might be good. I had at one point thought of Bill
There was a process

Taylor, but because he had not been a career Foreign Service
officer but had been a senior executive civil Servant, I knew
that it would be very difficult to go through the process of
recalling him and getting in him in a positjon to go out.
1n a conversation with Kurt Volker, then the special

for Ukraine negotiations, Kurt mentioned again
that he thought Bill would do a good job. And I told him, I
agree, but I just don't know if it's possible. So I started
that process of engaging the lawyers and the people who deal
representative

 133
th personnel

i ssues

to see i f i t

were actually possi bIe to

I

w'i

2

recal1

a

executive, but had not been a senior Foreign Service officer

J
4
5

6
7
8

9

l0

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t4

l5

l6

someone who had been an Ambassador, had been

a senior

to serve as Charge. And that took us 3 or 4 weeks, but
we eventuatty got to the answer that we achjeved, which was
yes, and he went out as Charge, arrjving June 1.7th or L8th.
a And did you have conversations with Bill Taylor
about thj s possj b'i 1i ty of him becomi ng the Charge d'affai res
during this time period?
A Extensi ve conversati ons.
a 0n April 29th, Bill Taylor sent a WhatsApp message
to Kurt Volker describing a conversation that you had with
8111 Taylor in which you talked about two, quote, two snake
pits, one 'in Kyiv, and one in Washington. And then 14r.
Taylor went on to say that you, Mr. Kent, described much more
than he knew, and it was very ug1y.
back

Do you

t7

recaIl having that conversation along these ljnes

24

th Mr. Taylor?
A I had many conversations with Charge Taylor, and my
reference to the snake pits would have been in the context of
havjng had our Ambassador just removed through actions by
corrupt Ukrainians jn Ukraine as well as private American
ci ti zens back here.
a And what corrupt Ukra'in j ans i n the Ukrai ne were you

25

talki ng about?

l8
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20

2l
22
23

wi

 134
I

A

The series

of corrupt former -- or sti11 current

2

prosecutors who engaged for.mer Mayor Giulianj and his

J

aSsociates, and those included former Prosecutor General

5

Shokin, the then Prosecutor General Yuriy Lutsenko, who no
longer is, the special anticorruption prosecutor, Nazar

6

Kholodnytsky, and a'nther deputy prosecutor general

7

Kosti antyn Ku1yk.

4

8

9

l0

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a

named

And when you say engaged, what do you mean by

engaged?

I say engaged, they
apparently met, they had conversations. Some of them were
by
i ntervi ewed Mr. Kulyk was i ntervi ewed, I be1 i eve
A

We11, those

individuals --

when

Mr. 5o1omon. 14r. Giulianj publicized his meeting with
Kholodnytsky in Paris about the same time that he gave

Nazar
an

l6

interview to censor.net and accused former Ambassador
Yovanovi tch, me, and the enti re U. S . Embassy of parti san

t7

acti vi

l8

engagement

t5

t9

ty i n 2016. And we' ve al ready talked about hi s

a

with Shokin and Lutsenko.
Do you have any any

information about money being

of these Ukrainians that you described

20

exchanged between any

2t

to Mr. Giuliani?
A I have no knowledge of any money bejng exchanged.
a It doesn't mean that they didn't exchange money,
you j ust have no knowledge of i t?
A I have no information to suggest that happened.

22
23

24
25

 135
a
2
J

4
5

6
7

appeared

0kay. Now, Mr. Parnas and Mr. Fruman have also
in the news recently?

A
a
existence

A
a
A

Yes.

Were you aware

of f{r.

Parnas and Mr. Fruman's

at the end of Apri1, beginning of

June 20L9?

Yes.
How d'i

d you become awa re of

them?

l0

I first heard their names through a series of
conversations wi th a variety of people.
a Okay. When was the first time you heard of Mr.

l1

Parnas and Mr. Fruman?

8

9

l3

js a U.S. -- I'll give you a series of points
and I'm trying in my mind sort out what I heard from whom,

t4

when, but we're

t2

A

There

l5

talking about the period primarily starting
in Apri1, possibly in March. f'm not sure that I heard of

l6

their

t7

l8
t9
20

2t
22
23

24
25

names

before then.

There i s a

U.

S.

busi nessman who's acti

ve i n gas tradi

ng

to Ukraine named Dale Perry, his name came up publicly last
week because he was interviewed by AP. He sent an open
letter complaining about corruption and pressure that he was
facing, including he said, an effort to unseat the American
Ambassador in Ukraine.
And he fingered three indivjduals that he said were
attempting to move into the gas business, and those 'included
Harry Sargeant iII from Florida and then two, he said, people

 136
I

who came from Odesa, referencing Lev Parnas and

2

So

Igor

Fruman.

4

first source that I recall hearing.
Second, I heard from people when I went to Ukraine in
the f i rst week of t'lay that Gi u1i ani associ ates were comi ng to

5

Ukraine, and the names that were mentioned were Fruman

5

that

was the

and

20

affiiiate of the new
Pres'ident Presi dent-e1ect at that poi nt; he was not yet
President and his name was Ivan Bakanov. He has since
become head of their security service. And he mentioned
Fruman's name, and he said and there's another one, I don't
remember his name. And later on he WhatsApp'd me the
business cards of Fruman and Parnas.
And also on that trip before I met with Bakanov, I met
with Minister of Interior Avakov, the person whom I'd had the
conversation I detailed in Washington in February, and he
mentioned them as we11, and said that they were coming in to
Ukraine and that he that was the first time that I heard
that Rudy Giulianj was planning to come that week as we1l.
a So the first time that you spoke with Mr. Avakov in
February he did not mention Mr. Parnas and Mr. Fruman is that

21

correct?

6
7
8

9

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23

24
25

Parnas.

A
a
A
a

One

of the people I

met was an

Correct.

Okay. But then he did at the beginning of

May?

Correct.
And when what day say

exactly about Mr. Parnas

and

 137
I

Mr.

Fruman?

A

2

He

J

town and

4

we11.

a
A

5

6

said that he had heard that they were coming to

that thei r assoc'iate Rudy Gi u1i ani

was comi ng as

Okay. You said it was the first week of

May?

That's when I was in Ukraine, yes. So I was 'in

l0

I believe May 8th and 9th, and I believe I may have
met Avakov the first day I was there, that would be the 8th,
and he mentioned that he heard that Parnas and Fruman were
coming, and that they were coming with their associate, the

ll

Mayor Gi ul i ani

7
8

9

Ukraine

He

t2

.

also told

me

that

when he had been,

hc, Avakov,

had

l8

in the United States in February, he had communication
that Mayor Giuliani had reached out to him and invited him to
come and meet the group of them in Florida. And he told me
that he declined that offer.
a Did l'lr. Avakov explain why he declined that offer?
A He told me he had a tight schedule and needed to

t9

get back Ukraine. But he sajd did say that he was planning

l3
t4

l5

l6
t7

20

2t
22
23

24
25

been

to have coffee with them, they had asked, and he was planning
to meet them in Kyiv. I don't know if they met or not. I
met him before that, but he said that 1f they want to meet,
I'11 meet and have coffee with them.
a Duri ng the May tri p?
A The l4ay trip, yes.

 138
I
2
a

J
4
5

6

did Mr. Avakov explain to you why l"lr. Parnas,
t4r. Fruman, and Mr. Giuliani were traveling to Ukraine at the
begi nni ng or mi d-May?
A He did not, no.

a

And

a
A
a

No i ndi cati on whatsoever?

did not.
If I recall

He

l0

this conversation with Mr.
Avakov in February, Mr. Avakov thought it was unwise what
Mr. Giulian'i was doing. Did I get that right?
A He told me in February that he thought that it had

ll

been unwise

7
8

9

when you had

t2

that Yuriy Lutsenko, the prosecutor general of
Ukraine, made a private trip to New York to see Rudy

l3

Giulian'i

t4

t8

that because we11, whY?
I can't answer that question. I mean, that was his
asseSsment aS the minister of interjor that the prosecutor
general of his country should not make a private trip to the
Uni ted States. That was my understandi ng of hi s asserti on i n

t9

February.

l5

l6
t7

20

2t
22

.t)

.

a
A

a

Was

conversati on wi th

A
a

that you had another
I can't read my own wri ti ng,

Now, you indicated

Bakanov?

Bakanov.

Bakanov. And what was his retationship with

24

then-candidate Zelenskyy

25

beginning

of

May?

at the time of this

meeting

at

the

 139

4

A He was President-e1ect Zelenskyy's oldest childhood
friend. Zetenskyy told me the first time we met the December
of 2018 that the person he had known the longest, that he had
grown up on the same corridor in their apartment block from

5

kindergarten was Ivan

1

2
3

Bakanov.

Okay. And can you describe that conversation?

9

a
A
a
A

l0

a

Yes.

1l

A

To the best

6
7
8

In
No

December 20L8?

,

I 'm sor ry, i n May of

So my conversation

201.9

with Ivan

.

Bakanov?

of my recollection that was a
it

t2

conversation where we tatked about what might happen since

l3

was

t4

what jobs he thought he might be interested

l5

to

l6

and he descri bed

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23

staff or the new prosecutor general.
a And what d'id Mr. Bakanov say wi th regard to
Mr . F ruman, Mr . Parnas , and 14r . Gi ul i ani ?
A He did not mentjon Mr. Giuliani. To the best of my
recollection, the only name in that meeting that I wrote
down and that's part of the records which I provided to
the State Department -- was Fruman. And then later on he

24

followed up because he couldn't remember the other

25

which turned out

l8
t9
20

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in

between post election,

pre-inauguration. I asked

si nce h'is chi ldhood f ri end was now

to

me hi

him

jn or appointed

the President-e1ect,

s 'interest i n ei ther bei ng chi ef

to be Parnas.

name,

of

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I

2

And he

think?

said,

And since

these guys want

I

had

met

4
5

make any commitments.

6

repeated what Avakov

a

0kay. At the

meet

me,

what do you

with Mr. Avakov in the

told me.
meet and have a cup of coffee

J

to

morn i

ng, I

told me, you can always
w'i th people, you don't have to
He

time di d you have any understandi ng

7

of what Parnas and Mr. Fruman

8

Mr. Giuliani?

mi

ght be doi ng i n Ukrai ne wi th

t4

A I understood that they were associates of Mr.
Giulianj, and this was now 2 months into the campaign that
had 1ed to the, ultimately, unfortunately, to the removal of
our Ambassador. But I did not know the'ir specific purpose in
comi ng to Ukrai ne on or about the 10th and 11th of May.
a Did there come a time when you did learn what their

15

purpose would

9

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be?

24

I only read subsequent to leaving Ukraine the press
coverage of the former Mayor of New York's stated intent to
go to Ukraine, and then to notice that he canceled his trip.
a And when you say Mr . Gi ul i anj ' s publ i c statements
about the purpose of his trip that he ultimately canceled,
what is your recollection of what Mr. Giuljani said?
A I don't recall what Mr. Giuliani said in the paper
about hjs reasons for canceling, other than the fact that I
believe he may have criticized some indjviduals around

25

Presi dent-e1ect Zetenskyy.

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And do you reca1l

about i nvesti gati ng the

that his statements were also

Bi dens?

A

I honestly don't remember what he may have been
saying or tweeting. As I said earlier, at this point I was
not a regular I don't tweet personally, and I don't follow
all the tweets of everybody.
a When you learned that ["lr . Gi ul j ani was goi ng to
travel to Ukrai ne at the begi nni ng of l'lay, May 9th or May
L0th, did you have any discussjons with anyone at the
Department of State about his upcoming trip?
A Not that I recall, no. I learned about it when I
was in Ukraine.
a Were you at all concerned about his trip?
A He's a private citizen. Private cit'izens have the
right to travel. The extent that I might have had concern,
it would be what he might try to do as a private citizen

l9

relatj onshi p.
a To the extent that i t could i nterfere wi th the
ordjnary diplomatic channels that would be handled by the

20

Department

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l8

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23

j

nvolved i n the

A

-Ukrai ne

offi

ci a1

State?

To that extent,

yes. Again, I did not know the

of his trip, I only heard that he might be coming in.
a I think my time is up.

purpose

BY MR.

24
25

of

U. S.

a

We

CASTOR:

talked this morning about what the State

 142
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6

Department

A
a
A
O

did in the press to counteract these narratives?

Correct.
The John Solomon

storjes and so forth.

Yes.

Did the State Department undertake any effort to

convince the White House, not the press, but the White

House,

t2

that these stories are not grounded in good facts?
A That i s not relati ons between or communi cati ons
between the leadership of the State Department and the White
House at that leve1 do not go through the regional bureau.
a 0kaY.
A So I'm not aware of the conversations that would

13

have happened.

7
8

9

l0

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2t

jf there was any effort, I mean, they
would have kept you i n the loop 'if they were tryi ng to make
the case that, hey, you can't be believing this stuff. And
i f you' re thi nki ng about removi ng Yovanovi tch, hold on, 1et
me 1et us make our case. Did that opportunity occur?
A l'ly understandi ng i s that there were hl gh-1eve1
discussions between the leadership of the State Department
and the White House prior to the decision to recall

22

Ambassador Yovanovitch,

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16
17
18

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a

Do you know

24

but those obviously were ultimately
unsuccessful, and the account that I heard at the time is in
accordance with what I read Ambassador Yovanovitch had in her

25

statement on Friday.

23

 143

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at one point the White
House got involved with the visa application for Shokin?
A I didn't say that. What I said was that after the
State Department made clear that it was not ready to issue,
i t was our understandi ng that f ormer Mayor G'iu1i ani reached
out to the White House, and then that was the point at which
Deputy Chief of Staff Btajr was tasked with calling us to
find out the background of the story.
a And ultjmately Shokin didn't get the vjsa?
A He djdn't get the visa, correct.
a 5o Mr. Blajr was sympathetic to your point of view
and didn't push the issue anymore?
A My understandi ng i s -- what I reca1l him sayi ng i s
I heard what I need to know to protect the interest of the
President. Thank you. And that was the end of that

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conversati on.

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Okay.

Because you mentioned

certainly was at least one jncident
where you had some positive back and forth with the White
House that 1ed to a result consistent with your interests?
A Correct. That was I believe that conversation
occurred on the LLth of January, specifically about this
issue of a visa for the corrupt former prosecutor.

a

0kay.

a

Do you know

on a vi sa before?

A

Yes.

So there

if

Shokin had come

to the United States

 144
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5o he

J

a

0kay.

4

A

He had had vi sas

5

had

been granted vi sas i n the past?

at

some

correct.

6

a

And do you know when?

7

A

I do not know.

8

a

Okay.

9

when you were

in

recall i f j t

Do you

A

I do not know.

ll

a

Was

the deni a1 of hi s vi sa, was thi

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he had made an attempt to travel

13

been deni

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was duri ng your time

Kyiv?

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point in the past,

s

the first time

to the Uni ted States but had

ed?

A I do not know that. To the best of my knowledge he
didn't try to travel to the U.S. and was denied, he did not
have a visa. To the best of my recoltection, because of the
acts of corruption affiliated with undermining U.5.
programming and policy goaIs, we probably, if the visa had

20

not expired prudentially, revoked the vjsa under the
assumption that we don't want corrupt individuals coming to

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the

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23

ted States.
Was Lutsenko

on par with Shokin

in terms of

being

an unreli able prosecutor?

A

24
25

Uni

p

Wel1,

rosecu to r?

I thi nk

how would you defi ne

unreli able

 145
a

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2

Wel1, you talked

not prosecuti ng corruption

A
a

J

4

Cor

rect.

at great tength that

Shokin

was

cases?

Yeah.

There were cases

of corruption

where he just

5

simply, you know, looked the other way and caused them not to

6

be prosecuted. And then

7

prosecuted people

8

9

I think

you mentioned

that

that weren't doing anything wrong?
A Yeah, I thi nk Shoki n's record and hi s nearly year
tenure was not of prosecuting crime. Lutsenko was in office

10

3 years, and so he had more opportunity to take

ll

He

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14

he

some

action.

did lead a number of cases that 1ed to sma11 scale
convictions as well as settlements and payments of fines to
allow companies to continue to operate in Ukraine.

a

But what was the positjon

of the embassy about

l5

Lutsenko, was he a --

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of our
disillus'ionment with Yuriy Lutsenko came in late 20L7, by
that point he had been in office for a year and a ha1f, and
there was a specific case, and it was as emblematic as the
diamond prosecutor case had been for Shokin.

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A

So

I

would say the breaking point

24

Anti Corruption Bureau, NABU, became aware
because of complajnt that there was a ring of Ukra'inian state
off i ci a1s that were engaged i n se11 i ng bi ometrj c passports,
Ukrainjan passports, to peopte who did not have the right to

25

the passports, i ncludi ng forei gners.

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23

The Nat'ionat

 146

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ring included deputy head of the migration
serv'ice, a woman named Pimakova (ph), as well as people
collaborati ng j n the securi ty servi ce of Ukrai ne.
And, obviously, for our own integrity, you know, t,,,e want
to know that a passport from a country is issued to the
correct person. And as this case was developing, Lutsenko
became aware of it, and this corrupt officjal who was sort of
the apex of the scheme went to him or to the prosecutors and
became essentialty a cooperating witness for them. And so
they basically busted up the ring or they busted up the
investigation by NABU. And then he went further and exposed
the undercover agents that had been a part of this case.
So that's obviously a fundamental perversion of law and
order to expose undercover agents. They were actually
engaged in pursuing an actual crime, whereas, he was
essenti a1ly colludi ng wi th a corrupt offi ci a1 to undermi ne

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the i nvesti gati

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24

critical to us because when we
searched the database 'it turned out that a number of the
passports that had been i ssued as part of these schemes had
gone to individuals who had applied for U.S. visas.
So we were very angry and upset because this threatened
our securi ty, and i t potenti a1ly also threatened thei r
abi 1i ty to retai n the j r v'isa f ree status j n the European

25

Union.

And the

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Z)

And so

on.

this

case was

 147
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So

did the State Department take a position that

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to go?
A We didn't say that. What we said was that all the
offjcials that were involved jn thjs ring needed to be held
to account and prosecuted, and we needed to see that they
were taking seriously our concerns about the integrity of
thej r passports.
a Had Lutsenko had any open investigations at that
time into any otigarchs?
A Again, there are a lot of prosecutors in the
country, and I don't know whi ch nvesti gati ons he mi ght have

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had open.

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Lutsenko had

"i

a

But you

i nvesti gati

A

djdn't

know whether

there was any specific

ons 'i nto somebody 1i ke Zlochevsky?

I do not know j f there was an i nvesti gati on "into

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Zlochevsky, the individual, Yuriy Lutsenko has said publicly

t7

that he investigated Burisma on nonpayment of taxes. And as
I recall, there was a settlement where Burisma paid a penalty
for nonpayment of taxes, and at that point Zlochevsky
returned from his external home in Monaco and resumed a
public life in Ukraine.
a Goi ng back to the passport i ssue. Di d 'it present a
ri sk that terrori sts would get credenti a1s?
A That was a potential theoretical risk, and that is
exactly what I told in the first meeting that we had with the

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24
25

 148

7

ster, the
deputy head of the m'igration service, the deputy head of the
securi ty servi ce, when we had occasi on, the essenti a11y, DCMs
of the European Union Ambassadors, embassies, and with me as
the U.S. DCl4, we aIl raised our great concerns that this
uncovered ring posed a threat to our interests as well as
Ukraine's continued access to for v'isa free travel to the

8

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new deputy

ropean

Un

forei gn mi ni ster, the deputy j usti ce

mi

ni

i on .

l0

for the U.S. Government to
take a stronger posi t'ion as i t d'id on Shoki n wi th regard to

l1

Lutsenko?

9

a

A

What would

it

have taken

I th'ink that the

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Yuriy Lutsenko, apart f rom thi s
NABU case where he actively undercut an 'investigation that
was in our interests, Lutsenko's actions did not raise to the

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same

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request

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19

20

1eve1.

We

did,

of Petro

however,

I

ment'ioned

earlier that at

Poroshenko, we made available a former

the

New

,we

ersey prosecutor

let that contract lapse after roughly 9 months because'it was
clear that Lutsenko was not going to push forward reform as
he had promi sed to us.

23

did was we curtailed our capacity building
assistance to the prosecutor's office under Lutsenko while we
contjnued to engage Lutsenko personally as well as other

24

leaders on the continuing need for reform. And we made clear

25

that

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So what we

we were

willing to

resume assistance

with their

 149
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political will to actually take the steps that were necessary
to reform the prosecutor's offi ce.
a What type of deci s'ionmaki ng would have had to have
occurred at the State Department to take an offjcjal position
that Lutsenko needed to go?
A Wel1, I mean, it's -- I would say that we're now
talking about late 20L7, and we were beyond having the
potenti a1 leverage of soverei gn loan guarantees. Ukrai ne's
economy had stabilized. And I would say that there was less
stent

hi gh-1evel engagement

on Ukrai ne.

l0

consi

l1

Okay. In March of this year, Ambassador
Yovanovitch gave a speech at the Ukrajne Crisis media Center?

t2

a

t4

A
a

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Kholodnytsky

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22

A Correct.
a What can you tell us about that.
A Nazar Kholodnytsky was selected by Viktor Shokjn
as, in our view, the weakest of the three final candidates to
become the speci al ant'icorrupti on prosecutor. Th'is 'is a new
uni t that was semi -i ndependent wi thi n the prosecutor's
office, and it was set up specifically to prosecute cases of

23

high corruption that were developed by NABU.

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25

Correct.
Are you familiar wjth

that?

Where she

called

on

to be removed?

We worked

intensively with Nazar for almost 2 years, until we reached
breaking point with him. And that intensive work included

a

 150

5

n, and FBI agents embedded
as mentors. Intensive traj ni ng tri ps to the U. S. , trai ni ng
i n Ukrai ne. A mentori ng tri p to Romani a where Laura Kovesi
is a very well-known anticorruption prosecutor and now the
lead prosecutor in Europe. Because even though we saw

6

Kholodnytsky as an imperfect person, he was the

7

anti corrupti on prosecutor, and hi s success, would

8

Ukraine's success, would be our success.

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U.

S. prosectors

who were

brought

i

new
be

point in a case that was
known as the fish tank case. There was Suspicion that he had
been involved in corrupt acts, and under a Ukrainian warrant
However, we reached a breaking

l3

a bug, a tap was put in hjs fish tank jn his office. And in
the course of the first 2 weeks, he was caught trying to

t4

suborn a witness, coach him

t2

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18

to 1ie, as well as obstruct
justice in a caSe that involved his hometown, in an effort to
bribe the minister of health, Ulyana Suprun,
agreed to wear a tap
So
for NABU and caught the effort on trying to give her a brjbe.

22

involving corruption, and he was caught
on tape suborning the witness and trying to obstruct justice.
At that point it was no longer possjble for the
U. S. Government, despi te 2 years of i nvestment, to conti nue

23

to

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25

So we had a case

work with Nazar.

into the embassy to have a conversation.
This is before it went public. And I and the djrector of the
We ca11ed

him

 151
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internat'iona1 narcotics and taw enforcement section

2

embassy had

of

the conversation, tough conversation with

the

him,

t2

that if he were to resign quietly, given the
information that was clearly available, that he was young
enough that i t woutdn't necessari 1y destroy h'i s career, but
that we, the U.S. Government, could no longer work wjth him.
And that if he were to remain as the anticorruption
prosecutor, we would cease cooperating with him. And he
stood Up, walked out, and you know, tweeted, you know, before
he left the embassy compound that he was going to have a
defjant attitude. So we stopped cooperating with hjm once
presented with evidence that he was actively suborning a

l3

wi

t4

of many, many
minutes today about the deep issues of corruption in the
Ukraine. You talked in extensive detail that the problems
are in the Shokin era, during the Lutsenko era, and even now
with Kholodnytsky. Is it fair to say that if the President
had a deep-rooted skepticism in Ukraine's ability to fight
anticorruption, that was a legi timate belief to hold?
A It is accurate to say that Ukraine has a serious
problem wi th corrupti on, and the U.5. i s commi tted where
there's a politicat will to work with Ukrainians, inside and
outside government to make changes, but absent that politjcat
wi11, this wj11 be a problem that wj11 stick with Ukraine and

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and suggested

tness and obstructi ng j usti ce.

a

You have regaled us over the course

 152

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th the U. S. -Ukrai ne relati onshi p.
a So we send a lot of money to Ukraine, correct?
A I would not say that we send money. Congress

4

appropriates money. The accusation by former prosecutor

5

Lutsenko

6

fundamentally misunderstood how our assistance is

I

sti ck

2

wi

is that we didn't

show him

the money, but that

8

administered. And this was the issue in the letter that I
think is part of the packet that you may have received that I

9

signed

7

in April

2015.

t7

or they accused because i t was before
Lutsenko came in, of
and then he just picked up the
accusation, that somehow we didn't hand them the money. I
talked to one of h'is temporary deputy prosecutors who was a
reformist who later chose not to work with him. And she told
me that they actually thought that we, the U.S. Embassy, had
bags of cash that we would hand to her or to her
predecessors, and that's how we, the U. S. Government, di d

l8

busi ness.

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l5

l6

He accused US,

The way the U.S. Government and the Embassy supports

l9
20

anticorruption programming in Ukraine is that we sign

2t

agreements

with implementers. 0ne of those is the

Department

23

of Justice. They have this program, 0PDAT, Overseas
Prosecutorj al Development and Trai ni ng. Another was wi th

24

U.

25

0rganization. Another

22

N. organi zati on calted IDL0, Internati onal Development

the

Law

was the 0ECD, which has a strong and

 153
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vigorous anticorruption component. And final1y, a

society association,
Those are the

AnTAC,

Government signed contracts

5

justice

6

General's 0ffi ce.

8

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a
A
a
A
a
A

How much

ch the

whi

U.

S

or grants to administer our
for the reform of the Prosecutor

4

7

the anti-corrupt'ion center.

four organj zati ons wi th

programming

civil

grant money does

AnTAC get?

I do not know the exact amount.
Do you know

a ballpark?

Huh?

Do you know

a ballpark?

l3

I do not. I would hesitate to offer a number
i t's been years si nce I've seen any
because I don't

t4

spreadsheets.

l5

. Kent , I j ust want to go bac k
to questjons Steve asked earlier. What was it going to t ake
f or the government to take the same posi ti on wi th lulr.
Lutsenko that you took with Shokin, and I've just been maki ng
a list. He wasn't a lawyer. He actually talked about
showing him the money, I thjnk you just said. We know tha t

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MR. J0RDAN: Sec retary,

["lr

he's been drunk on certa'in occasions.
passports, potenti a1ly to terrori st.

He was

selling

not

se1 t i

ng passports.

an i nvesti gati on of people

se11 i

ng passports.

MR. KENT: He was

MR. JORDAN:

He unde rm

Okay. I guess we'11 live with that

i ned

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distinction. It's pretty minor. And the guy he hired for
this new prosecutor's office was every bit as bad. The one
guy he picked he hired Kholodnytsky, right?
MR. KENT: Shokin hi red Kholodnytsky. 5o his

predecessor hi red Kholodnytsky.
MR. J0RDAN: Kholodnytsky was working when

Mr. Lutsenko

was prosecutor?
MR. KENT: CorreCt.

d'idn't bring him in line?
he did not.
MR. KENT: After
MR. J0RDAN: So I think it sort of underscores Mr.
Castor's question. What was it going to take for the United
States Government to say this guy has got to go as well?
MR. JORDAN: He

MR. KENT: We made our concerns about the

l5

ineffectjveness of Mr. Lutsenko clear to his patron, the then

t6

President

t7

of Ukraine, Petro Poroshenko, but that assignment
is made by the nom'ination of the Ukrain'ian President, and the

l8

di smi ssal requi res a

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23

24
25

vote i n the Ukrai ni an part i ament.

MR. JORDAN: Thank you.

you. Scott Perry, down here, f rom
Pennsylvania. I just want to clarify something that's been
kind of veered on numerous occasions before you got here and
today. Are you fami 1i ar wi th the transcri pt of the call
between the President of the United States and President
Zelenskyy? Are you fami 1 i ar wi th j t?
MR. PERRY: Thank

 155
MR. KENT:

I
?.

Whi

I read i t after i t

was declassi

fied by the

te House, yes.

6

0kay. So you have some, and if you need it,
we can give it to you. But in a kind of exchange on the last
round the implication was is that there was a favor asked by
the Presjdent for an investigation. Do you know anywhere in

7

the transcript where the President uses the

8

i nvesti gation?

J
4
5

MR. PERRY:

word

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I don't have the transcri pt i n front of
MR. G0LDMAN: Can we admit it as an exhibit?

ll

MR. PERRY: Sure.

9

MR. KENT:

t2

IMaj

ori

ty

Exhi bi

me.

t No. 1

23

for identi fication. l
 .,lR. KENT: But I wj11 say that at the time I didn't have
access to the transcript, so
MR. PERRY: But you've had i t now.
MR. KENT: After it was declassified.
MR. PERRY: You had it up until today. And I just want
to let you know, it doesn't say an investigatjon. The
President doesn't say an investigation. When he uses do
you see it as, or it was implied that the President is asking
for a favor for him, but when he says, do us a favor, do you
see that as the United States or the President of the United

24

States when he says do us a favor?

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Was marked

MR. KENT:

Sir, I

was not on the ca1l.

 156
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2

I know you weren't, but I'm reading jt
you right now. 1t's on page 3 at the top.
MR. PERRY:

3

MR. G0LDMAN: Could we

4

MR. KENT: So

5

one?

sir, could you repeat.

Could you repeat

your preci se question agai n.
MR. PERRY: The

6
7

provide him

to

implication was in the last round that

the Pres'ident was asking to do him a favor. Do the President

t4

of the United States a favor, but the verbiage says do us a
favor. Do you see that as doing a favor for the United
States or the President himself personally?
MR. KENT: As I'm reading the paragraph, it refers to
CrowdStrike and Mueller and then so on and so forth, and so
that is the first time I'd ever heard of this line of
thought. That does not strike me as being related to U.S.

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po1 i

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9

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Okay. And, again, 'in regard to the, do us a
favor line,"it has nothing to do with Biden or Burisma in
this paragraph on the top of top page 3?
MR. PERRY:

MR. KENT:

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20

2t
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Z)
24
25

cy.

That's, as I'm reading through this

again,

it's
I'11 let you know
MR. KENT: It's not in that paragraph. Yeah
MR. PERRY: There's nothing referred to in on page 3
regarding Biden or Burisma that can be connected with the
1ine, do us a favor. The words, do us a favor.
MR. PERRY: Wel1,

 157
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2

MR. KENT:

I

would agree with you

that it's not in that

paragraph.

J

NR. PERRY: Right.

4

MR. KENT: As

5

Security Council.

6

MR. PERRY:

put together by the staff at the National

Right. 0kay.

And do you remember anywhere

l6

in this transcript where the President says, you know, for
the the President of the United States says to Presjdent
Zelenskyy to dig up or get some dirt?
MR. KENT: Again, I think the National Security Council
account is what it is.
MR. PERRY: Yeah. It's not in there is my point. It's
not in there. And I just want to make the record clear
because for hours and hours in testimony over the course of
days here there's a continual charactertzation of these
events that are not true, that are not correct, per the

t7

transcript.

t8

on, i n the past round you were asked about your
opinion about the President, is it proper for the President
to ask another country f or an i nvesti gati on 'into a pol i ti caI

7
8

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Mov'ing

rival? I think that was the general characterization. I
want to explore that a 1i ttle bi t. And 'in your answer you
said that it would not be the standard. And my quest'ion js,
do you have does the Department of State have a standard
in that regard?

 158

6

I beljeve it is a matter of U.S. policy and
practice, particularly since I have worked in the area of
promoting the rule of 1aw, that politically related
prosecutions are not the way of promoting the rule of 1aw,
they undermine the rule of 1aw.
MR. PERRY: But js that written as a policy somewhere or

7

'is that j ust standard practi ce?

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2
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4
5

8

9

MR.

KENT:

MR. KENT:

where

I've

i

have never been

heard somebody suggest

in a position or a meeting
that poli tically motivated

S. nati onal i nterest.

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prosecuti ons are i n the

ll

that if the United
States was i nterested i n pursui ng j usti ce of a past i nci dent,
of an inc'ident that occurred in the past regarding someone
that had a political office, is that off limits to the United
States of America?
MR. KENT: I think if there's any criminal nexus for any
activity involving the U.5., that U.S. law enforcement by at1
means should pursue that case, and if there's an
international connection, that we have the mechanisms to ask
either through Department of Justice MLAT in writing or
through the presence of indiv'iduals representing the FBI, our
legal attaches, to engage foreign governments directly based
on our concerns that there had been some criminal act
vjolating U.S. 1aw.

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MR. PERRY:

0kay.

U.

So would you say

MR. PERRY: One more, Steve.

 159
Regarding your conversation about Ambassador

I
2

Yovanovitch's release, and you heard her viewpoint

J

you heard

4

openi ng statement

5

6

'it

because

previ ous, and then you saw i t related j n her

here.

Ri

ght?

Do you

thi nk there's another

viewpoint? I know you know that viewpoint, is there
potential for another viewpoint?

7

MR. KENT: A viewpoint about what?

8

MR. PERRY: About

a

her release. You heard her viewpoint.

l5

s i s what happened to me. Th'is i s why I was released.
This is why she was released as the Ambassador. That's her
viewpoint. You heard that, you knew that. Correct?
MR. KENT: As I ment'ioned, I hea rd that that was the
view expressed and conveyed by the Deputy Secretary of State
to her . Correct.
MR. PERRY: Right. And do you think there could be

t6

another viewpoint other than hers?

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Thi

MR. KENT: That was the viewpoint

Secretary

of

of the Deputy

State.

t's also hers, correct?

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MR. KENT: And i

20

MR. KENT: She conveyed what she heard from

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Deputy

Secretary of State
MR. PERRY: But there could be another

23

my poi nt.

24

 VlR.

25

the

viewpoint, that's

KENT: Theoretically there are multiple points about

 160
Right.

And whose decis'ion

ultimately is

MR.

PERRY:

J

MR.

KENT: What dec'i s i on about what?

4

MR.

PERRY: Who serves as an Ambassador from

2

5

that?

States to another country?

MR.

9

reason,

So

PERRY:

is that

that i s wi thout questi on,

understands that.
MR. PERRY: A11
BY MR.

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a

When

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20

the exhi bi t?

22
23

24
25

whatever

right.

gated

Thank

the pleasure of the
eve rybody

you. i yietd.

CASTOR:

is the first time you heard about the call

between the President and President Zelenskyy?

A
a

2t

the

State?

dent.

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of

A11 Ambassadors serve at

And

for

that would normally be 'investi

MR. KENT:

Presi

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an Ambassador i s rel i eved

something

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if

by the Secretary Department

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at the pleasure of

Presi dent

8

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KENT: A11 Ambassadors serve

MR.

6
7

the United

A
a
A

Which call?
The

July 25th cal1, the one that is the subject of

WeI1, can you repeat the question.

did you hear about the call?
I heard that the call was going to take place on
I heard that it would take place the day before on the 241h.
a Okay. Di d State Department offj ci a1s want the call
When

 161
1

to

occur?

A

2

Yes. I

was informed

that it

was

finally

scheduled

J

by Lieutenant Colonel Alex Vjndman, who's the director

4

National Securi ty

Counci

at

the

1 respons'ib1e f or Ukra'ine. And I

7

that they send a
communications officer over to the presidential office to
check the quality of the line because it had been a long time

8

since we had had a formal ca11, and sometimes those lines

5

6

9

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then emajled the

Embassy

suggesting

don't work when they get calls. So as far as I know, the
embassy did that to ensure that when the White House
situation room ca11ed out the call would go through.
a 0kay. You sajd finally scheduled, so there had
been some process over time to get this call scheduled?

l5

off for awhile
for a followup call to the congratulatory call on April 2l.st,

l6

the day that Zelenskyy won the presidency, and the timeline

t7

after the parl i amentary electi ons.
Those occurred on July 2Lst, and the call eventually happened
4 days later on the 25th.
a Everyone was in favor of making thjs call happen
after the parli amentary elections?
A The State Department was supportive of a ca1I.
a And was there anybody who was not supportive of the
caIl in the U.S. Government?
A I have read that there were officials that had some

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23

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25

A

s1

i pped

There had been discussions on and

unti 1 i t was

 162
I

reluctance.

5

a What did you read?
A I think that's a question you could ask people that
work at the Nati onal Securi ty Counci I
a So you read there were some issue from the National

6

Security Council about scheduling the call?

2
J

4

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8

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.

I read that there were some peopte who had some
mi sgi vi ngs about the call , yes.
a Okay. But you di dn't know about those mi sgi vi ngs
pri or to the call?
A I may have heard that there were some vjews, I djd
A

not understand what the v'iews were behind that expression.
O 0kay. Who held those views?

A
a

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I don't know.
Okay.

So you

didn't

have any personal knowledge of

at the Nati onal Securi ty Counci 1 bei ng
uncomfortable with the idea of having a call?
A I got the impression that there was at least one
official uncomfortable, but I didn't understand what that was
about. I, the State Department, was in favor of a
congratulatory call after the election.
O Did Alex Vindman tetl you anything that gave you
any

offi

ci a1s

pause?
24
25

A
a

caII, no.
Okay. So i t's fi nally scheduled, j t
Before the

happens on

 163
JuIy 25th.

You weren't on the

2

A

Correct.

J

a

Was anyone

4

call, ri ght?

from the State Department, to your

knowl edge?

6

I believe I was aware that the White House 5it
was going to try to patch through the counselor of the

7

department,

5

8

9

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A

a
A

U1

Room

ri ch Brechbuhl.

0kay.

Any other folks from the Department?

That was the only

name

that I or office that

I

heard menti oned.

a
A

0kay

It

.

Nobody 'i n

Ky i v?

would not be normal

to have the embassy patched

jnto the phone cat1.
a

Okay. And then after the call occurs, did you get

l5

a read-out from

l6

2t

A I did.
a Who did you get the read-out from?
A From Lieutenant Colonel V'indman.
a And when was the read-out?
A It was not the same day. It may not have been the
day after, but it could have been either July 26th or 271n,

22

several days after.

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z)
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25

a
recollecti

A

What

anybody?

did he tell you to the best of

your

on?

It

was

different than any read-out call that I

had

 164

2

I could hear it in his voice and his
received. He felt
hesitancy that he felt uncomfortable. He actually sa'id that

J

he could not share the majority

I

of what was discussed because

8

of the very sensitive nature of what was discussed.
He first described the atmospherics and compared it to
the previous ca11, which was April 21st. That had been a
short, bubbly, posi ti ve, congratulatory call from someone who
had just won an election with 73 percent. He said this one

9

was much more,

4
5

6
7

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the tone was cooler, reserved. That President
Zelenskyy tried to turn on the charm, and he is a comedian
and a communicator, but that the dynamics didn't click in the

t2

way

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that they had on Apri1 2Lst.
Again, he did not share the majority of what was said.
I learned the majority of the content after reading the
declassified read-out. He did share several points. He
mentioned that the characterization of the Ambassador as bad
news. And then he paused, and said, and then the
conversation went into the direction of some of the most
extreme narratives that have been di scussed publicly. That's

20

all he said.

13

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Later on, he said that he made reference to a back

and

forth about the prosecutor general, that would be Lutsenko,

24

saying, you've got a good guy, your prosecutor general, and
he's being attacked by bad guys around you, is how I recall

25

Li eutenant Colonel Vi ndman characteri zi ng i

23

t.

And then he,

 165
1

in

summation, he said in his assessment, Zelenskyy

f

did

not

2

cross any 1 i ne. He sai d that Zelenskyy sai d,

J

had happened i n the past, that was the old team. I'm a

4

guy, I've got a new team,

5

transparent and honest.

6
7
8

9

a

And i s

A

And then there

that

and anyth i ng we

as much

i

anythi ng bad
new

do wi 11 be

as you can remember from

you r

was I think the last thing that

Lieutenant Colonel Vindman mentioned was there about a brief

t9

-- jnterested in working on
energy-related issues. Previously, I should have said, at
the front earlierin the conversation, that he said that
Ljeutenant Colonel Vindman told me that President Zelenskyy
had thanked the U.5. for all of i ts mi 1i tary assi stance.
That the U. S. di d a lot f or Ukra'ine. And Li eutenant Colonel
Vjndman told me that the President replied, yes, we do, and
i t's not reci procal.
a Is that pretty much what you can remember?
A That is I think the summation of everything I can

20

reca11.

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22
23

24
25

mention by Zelenskyy about U.5.

Did he te1l you anything about the Bjdens?

did not mention, to the best of my recollection,
including the notes that I took, which I've submitted to the
State Department. He dj d he Li eutenant Colonel Vi ndman,
did not mention the specifics. He just said, as I said at
He

 166

2

the beginning, he sajd the majority of the conversation
touched on very sensitjve topics that I don't feel

J

comfortable sharing.

I

a
A
a
A
O

4
5

6
7
8

9

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Did he mention
He di

d not

And he

Burisma?

menti on any sPeci

didn't

mention

fi

cs.

20L5?

did not mention that to me, no.
And did you make any followup inquiries with him
like, hey, can I come over and speak with you in a secure
environment or learn more about this call --

A
a

ll

He

None.

l5

tike there's some issues relating to one
of the countri es that I have responsi b'i1i ty f or?
A I d1d not, and no.
a What was your expectation where you would next

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learn

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seems

more?

A

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It

That was the second conversation between the two

in Apri1, l'4ay, June, Ju1y, 4 months. We at that
point were focused on trying to sort through why the Office
of Management and Budget had put a hold on security
Presidents

23

assistance. We were also focused on the way forward and
potentially trying to arrange a meeting possibly on the Lst
of September in Warsaw on the 80th anniversary of the start

24

of

25

Assembly.

2l
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World War

II, possibly in

New

York during the

UN General

 167
So those were the next step issues
2
J

both functionally in terms of mi 1i tary assi stance, as well
i n procedurally 'in terms of the possi bi 1i ty of a meeti ng.

a

4
5

A

The start

7

September 1939, so

8

September 20L9

a

9

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24tn

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week

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mo

wi th

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commemorations were

Lst of

the Lst of

Warsaw.

if

I'm

that call from any other officials?

No.

So between the time

Vindman,

it

was on

that you had the conversation

the telephone, right?

A

A secure call between

NSC

O

And the time when the

transcript

22

did

23

the call?

25

was the

and the State Department,

yes.

2t

24

II

A That week, I believe the Monday may have been the
or the 23rd, so maybe the 23rd through the 27th was the
of the leaders' participat'ion.
a Okay. And so then you never -- did you learn any
A
a

1,7

20

the

Wortd War

You said the General Assembly was the 26th,

re about

l6

l8

in

of

to be?

correct?

ll

l5

as

And the meeting you said could have happened in

Warsaw. What was the date that Warsaw was supposed

6

l0

in the relationship,

anybody

A
a

was declassjfied,

else give you a read-out or any information

about

No.

When

the transcript was released on September

I

 168
I

think it

2

i

t

was September 25th,

did you have an advanced copy of

or

4

in New York engaged in meetings with
leaders in my area of responsibility and, flo, i did not have

5

any advanced knowledge.

J

A

I

was up

7

a 0kay. Now, did you have any communications after
the call after you spoke with Vindman, did you then

8

subsequently debrief anybody about what happened on the call?

6

13

A I may have shared with other people in the European
front office, which had a focus on that, and that includes
people like Tyler Brace, who is our one political appointee,
schedule C, former staffer for Senator Portman, who has a
specific interest in Ukraine and Russia, as well as the

l4

acti ng ass'istant secretarY.

9

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a Uh-huh. Any other individuals that you discussed
the call with?
A In terms of giving a substantive read-out, I do not
reca11 havi ng a substanti ve di scussj on. We have a weekly
secure video conference call with the leadership of Embassy
Kyiv, now led by Charge Bill Taylor, it is possible that i
di scussed part of that wi th h'im subsequently.
a Now, duri ng thi s time period had you been havi ng

23

commun'icati ons wi

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25

th Ambassador Yovanovi tch?
A At this point she was back in the United States,
and so we did have reason to have communications, yes.

 169
1

2

I

a
A

6

8

A

would say we're now talking about the end

through the month of August, perhaps once or twice a

5

7

Okay. And how frequently were you speaking with

her?

J

4

a

th

week.

And j nto September?

Right.

The second

half of August I

was on vacation

, so there's no contact
We got together for djnner in early September. Her
wi

of July

my fami

ly

mother and my wife were very close

9

in

there

socially

when

I'm sorry, in Kyiv, so it essentially

l0

we were

ll

was

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t4

did you relate anything to her when you had
djnner with her jn early September about the call?
A I may have made some reference to the negative

l5

characterization of her.

l6

2t

0kay. Do you remember anything else that you may
have related to her about that call?
A I would not have to the best of my recollection
in general, I wouldn't have discussed the substance of the
calf in part because the read-out of the call I got was not
substantive, and second of all, I wouldn't have been

22

appropr i ate.

l3

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20

a

Washington,

soci a1 gatheri

a

ng, a meal shared.

And

a

24

0kay. 5o you' re havi ng di nner wi th Ambassador
Yovanovi tch, i t's early September, and you made brj ef

25

menti on?

23

a

 170
I
2
J
4
5

A

I

may have made bri

ef

menti on

of

negat'ive

characterization of her personally.

a
A
a

And what was

her react'ion?

I honestly don't
How

remember.

long were you having

this discussion with

7

at di nner?
A Generally, this

8

conversation because her mother and my wife were part

9

and we generally avoided

6

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her

would have been a very short

of it,

talking about anything related to

work when we were together.

a

Did she have any followups

for you? I

mean, the

20

of the Unjted States you know, you related to
her that the Pres'ident of the Uni ted States may have
mentioned her on a call with President
A As I think she may have said to you Friday, in part
because of the what the Deputy Secretary of State told her,
she aware of the Presi dent's vi ews of her.
a So presumably this was rea11y interesting
information that you had and you related to her, and I'm just
wondering whether there was any additional back and forth. I

2t

mean,

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22

President

did

A

she

No, not

that I reca11.

Ambassador Yovanovitch

is

23

an i ntensely pri vate person, she's an i ntrovert. And, agai n,

24

she's also

25

proper and proprietary, and so

someone who

follows very strict what is

that's

we

deemed

did not linger

on

 17
I
2
J

4
5

6
7
8

9

1

any conversatjon

of that

Now, when you

a

nature.

related this jnformation to her, did

you provide any characterization about your view

A
a
view of
A
a

Not that

of the call?

I recal1.

0kay. Did you provide a characterizalion of
how

your

the President conducted himself on the calt?

No, that wouldn't have been appropriate, and

after the dinner, early part
September, you know, leading up to the release of
0kay.

And

no.

of
the

t2

transcript on the 25th, did you have any additional
di scussi ons wi th her?
A I was on travel for the mid-part of the month.

r3

was back

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for the U.N. General Assembly meetings, which was, as you
said on the 25th, I was in New York when that occurred. 50,
again, to the best of my recollection, no.
a And she was at Georgetown at thi s poi nt on a

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feltowshi

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23

24
25

A

for a couple of days, and then I

I

was up i n New York

p?

She was

teaching yes, a course on diplomacy

at

Georgetown.

offjce is at the State Department. Did
you have an occasjon to vjsit with her during the workday?
mean, did she come over to the State Department? Djd you
appear at Georgetown at any point in time?
A No. She at one point asked commented that the
a

And your

I

 172
I

students

in the Masters program at

Georgetown had superior

10

oral briefings ski11s, but lacked fundamental writing ski11s.
And I had mentioned that previously we used to run
essenti a1ly remedi a1 wri ti ng semi nars for the offi cers i n the
European bureau as well as Embassy Kyiv, that I hetped
conduct, and she asked if I had the notes from that, and I
said I did. And so I passed her essentially the notes of
presentations I had made about writing we11.
a Okay. And then you mentioned that you spoke to her
on a somewhat regular basis, but the call never came up other

ll

than the dinner?

2
3

4
5

6
7
8

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24
25

A
a

To the best

of my knowledge, I cannot recall.

Okay. The commun'icati on you had w1th Vi ndman on

the 29th, and that was an estimated date.

A

It could

have been a day

or two earlier. It

could

honestly. It's several days 1ater,
depending on what day the call happened, during the week, it
could have been the next Monday, it could have been the
Friday, I just don't remember.
a Fair enough. And you said that was your only
communication you had with the NSC about it?
A I did not seek to revisit that issue nor d1d I talk
to anybody else at the NSC about the caI1.
a Who else was on the call with NSC, do you remember?
A That call between Lieutenant Colonel Vindman and i
have been the 29th,

 173
I

2

was

just a call
a 0kaY '

between the two

of

us.

4

I thi nk I 'm out of t'ime here.
MR. ZELDIN: How much time is left?

5

MR. CASTOR: About

6

MR. ZELDIN:

I"lR. CASTOR:

J

7

Okay. i

am i

nterested.

Why

wouldn't

you

asked for more information about the call?
MR. KENT: Lieutenant Colonel Vindman was

8

9

1 minute.

clearly

extremely uncomfortable sharing the limited amount of
on that he d'id . 5o he shared what he f el t

l0

i nf ormati

l1

comfortable sharing, and that const'ituted the read-out that I

12

received from him.
MR. ZELDIN: But you

l3
t4

didn't want to have more

i nformati on?

MR. KENT: He made

l5

clear to

me

that he felt

l6

uncomfortable sharing as much as he had actually shared.

t7

the relationship

l8

22

p, i t's i ntense, i t's
frequent, and you have to develop a trust factor. And he
made clear to me that he had shared as much as he felt
comfortable sharing, and I respected that.
MR. ZELDIN: We're out of time, but we might revisit

23

that.

l9
20

2l

24
25

someone

at

between a

my 1eve1 i

director of the

s a relati

THE CHAiRMAN: Why

NSC

5o

and say

onshi

don't we take a L0-minute break and

use the faci 1 i ti es, and we'11 come back. And

try to

be

 174
I
2

prompt

in

L0 minutes.

lRecess. l

l0

right. Let's go back on the record.
Secretary, I have a few questions for you. I think a
couple of my colleagues do, and then we'11 go back to the
t i me1 i ne wi th [''lr . Goldman
I just very briefly wanted to go through a bit of the
call records si nce that was ra'ised by my colleagues 'in the
minority. If you turn to page 2 of that call record at the
bottom, this is again the July telephone call between

ll

Presjdent Trump and President Zelenskyy. The very last

3

4
5

6
7
8

9

THE CHAIRMAN: A11

.

l6

this is President
Zelenskyy: We are ready to cont'inue to cooperate f or the
next steps, specifica11y, we are almost ready to buy more
javelins from the Unjted States for defense purposes.
And there, Mr. Secretary, he's referring to Javelin

t7

anti - tank

12
13

t4
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sentence

reads:

We

are ready to

weapons?

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MR. KENT: That'

t9

THE CHAIRMAN:

20

off either

Russia

s

cor

rect.

in terms of fighting
troops or separatists in Donbass?
That are important

s

rect.

2t

MR. KENT: That'

22

THE CHAIRMAN: immediately

cor

after President Zelenskyy
more javelins, the President

23

raises this desi re to purchase

24

says, I would like you to do us a favor, though, because our

25

country has been through a 1ot and Ukra'ine knows a

lot

about

 175
I
2
a

J

it, I

like you to find out what happened with this
whole situation with Ukraine, they said CrowdStrike. Do you
know what that refers to, CrowdStri ke?
would

I

4

MR.

5

newspaper medi

6

a reference to.

7

KENT:
a

would not have known except

for

the

coverage afterwards explaining what

THE CHAIRI'IAN: And

that was

the President goes on to say, I

8

you have one of your wealthy people, the server they say

9

Ukraine has

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20
21

22
23

24
25

it.

Do you know what

guess

server the Pres'ident

bel i eves Ukrai ne had?
1'lR.

KENT:

I

can only again

refer to the med'ia articles

this explaining that
there is, the founder of CrowdStrike who is a Russian
American, and the media as said that that was a confused
the only basi s I have to j udge
i denti ty. But that's agai n
that passage is what I've read in the media.
that I

have read subsequently about

THE CHAIRI'IAN: And f

ljke to have the Attorney General
call you or your people, and I would like you to get to the
bottom of it. Do you have any reason to question the
accuracy of that part of the call record?
l4R. KENT: I wasn't on the ca11, and the first time I
saw thi s declass'i fi ed document record of conversati on was
after it was declassified by the White House.
President

says: I

urther on i n the paragraph, the

would

THE CHAIRI4AN: Now, you mentioned

that you when you

 176
I

spoke wi th

i

s it

General Vi ndman?

2

MR. KENT: Lieutenant Colonel Vindman.

J

THE CHAIRMAN: Li

4

spoke

5

sensi

6
7
8

9

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to Colonel

eutenant Colonel Vi ndman.

Vindman, he said there was

MR. KENT: This whole passage, which you

through, he made no reference to it.
THE CHAIRNAN:

If this

MR. KENT:

20

2t
22
23

24
25

of standard

is

If he had read this to me, I

CrowdStrike and what does

just not clear to me just reading it.

l9

went

U.S.

policy of fighting corruption, that wouldn't be a sensitive
topi c, would i t, i f the President was actually advocati ng
that Ukrai ne fi ght corrupti on?

l5

l8

just

Was

That's correct.

were a matter

him what

t7

certain very

ti ve topi cs he di d not feel comfortable menti oni ng.
this one of the topics that he did not mention?

t4

l6

When you

that

would have asked

mean, because

it's

I said, other
people interpreted what the context was for that, but again,
I'11 go back to what I said before.
Understanding that this is a reference to concerns about
2015. If anybody di d anythi ng i n 2015 that vi olated U. S.
elections or election laws that, you know, there's a reason
to investigate something with the U.S. nexus, we should open
that investigation. And if the Ukrain'ians had a part in
that, then that would be natural for us to formally convey a
request to the Ukrainians.
THE CHAIRMAN: But i f i t were a legi t'imate law
As

 177
request

or i f i t

were a generi c di scuss'ion of

I

enf orcement

2

corruption jn line with U.5. policy, it wouldn't have been a

3

sensi

4

wi

tive matter and Colonel Vi ndman could

'i

t

th you, ri ght?
MR. KENT:

5

have rai sed

If it

was a normal matter, he probably would

8

have. Again, when he sajd that there were sensjtjve issues
that he didn't feel comfortable talking about, I did not know
what exactly he meant unt'i1 I read thi s declassi f i ed

9

memorandum

6
7

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of

conversation.

THE CHAIRMAN:

Let me ask you about another matter that

did not bring up with you. The President, on
the top of page 4, says: The other thing, there's a 1ot of

it

appears he

t8

tatk about Biden's son. That Bjden stopped the prosecution
and a 1ot of people want to find out about that, so whatever
you can do with the Attorney General would be great. Biden
went around bragging that he stopped the prosecut'ion. So if
you can look into it.
Was that another one of the very sensitive topics that

t9

Colonel V'indman di d not f ee1

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t4

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comf

ortable shari ng wi th

you?

24

passage he made no reference that
would have in h'is timited read-out to me that would have
matched that passage of the memorandum of the conversation.
THE CHAIRMAN: So the dual request to look into the
Bidens and to look into this CrowdStrike 2016, for lack of

25

better description, conspiracy theory, Colonel

20

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23

MR. KENT: That

Vjndman

didn't

 178
of

I

feel comfortable informing you that either

2

things was raised by the President during the call?

J

a

MR. KENT: That'

4

THE CHAIRI4AN:

s

cor

Mr.

one

those

rect.

Qui

gley.

8

rman. l'lr. Secretary,
thank you for your service and for being here. Earlier you
mentioned that media campaign against the Ambassador took
p1ace. Were you aware of who was involved with that media

9

campai gn?

5

6
7

l"lR. QUIGLEY: Thank you, Mr. Chai

t7

i could only see the figures that voluntarily
associ ated themselves wi th that campai gn i n both countri es.
 \4R. QUIGLEY: And who was that in Ukraine and who was
that in the U.S?
l'4R. KENT: Well in Ukraine, very c1ear1y, the prosecutor
general at the time, Yuriy Lutsenko, his press spokeswoman
retweeted the tweet of Don Trump, )r. attacking the
Ambassador. So very c1ear1y, it wasn't just him personally

l8

as a Ukrai ni an, but the i nsti tut'ion.

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MR. KENT:

There
known

were I

made references

earlier to what were

as the Porokhobots, the trol1s on social media who were

22

active jn support of Poroshenko. And L0 days before the
electi on, rather than attacki ng Russi a or attacki ng hi s

23

political

24

attacking Ambassador Yovanovitch and me by

2l

25

So

I

opponents, as they normally

would say

did, they were
name.

that is cluster of the Ukrainians who

 179

5

actively promoting this campaign. And then obviously
the people in the United States that were promoting jt.
MR. QUIGLEY: Sure. Referenci ng Mayor Gi uIi anj , you
became aware of his activities in Ukraine. What was your
understanding while this was happening of what his role was?

6

A personal attorney working

7

working as a campaign person's attorney?

I
2
3

4

8

were

MR. KENT:

somehow

for the government

His role'in orchestrating the connections

t4

to be a classic,
you scratch my back, I scratch yours, issue. Yuriy Lutsenko
to1d, as I mentioned, Gizo Ugtava, that he was bitter and
angry at the embassy for our posi tions on anti -corruption.
And so he was looking for revenge. And in exchange, it
appeared that the campaign that was unleashed, based on his

l5

interview,

l6

Ambassador, as

9

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with information from Yuriy Lutsenko

was

seemed

directed towards Americans, principally the

20

well as organizations that he saw as his
enemies'in Ukraine, the National Anti Corruption Bureau as
well as the Anti Corruption Center.
Several Ukrainians at the time told me that they saw
what Lutsenko was trying to do was get President Trump to

2t

endorse President Poroshenko's

t7

l8
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z3

reelection. This was
happening in March before the election. That djd not occur.
It would not have made a difference either because Zelenskyy,

24

as noted before, won with 73 percent.

22

25

MR. QUIGLEY: To

your knowledge, was Mr. Giuliani ever

 180
I

tasked, coordinated, briefed with anyone

at the State

8

to do what he was doing?
MR. KENT: To the best of my knowledge, in the first
phase of Mr. Gi ul i ani 's contact wi th Ukrai ni ans and hi s
efforts to orchestrate the media campaign, nobody from the
State Department had contact wjth hjm. When I say the first
phase, that is essentially the phase 'involving Prosecutor
General Lutsenko through the election of President Zelenskyy,

9

which occurred on Apri 1 2lst.

2
a

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4
5

6
7

Department

MR. QUIGLEY: So

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the first phase, but at any time other

after the fact, were you aware of
briefing, coordination that took place?
t'ime and

MR. KENT: Yes

13

.

detail that?
MR. KENT: At a certa'in poi nt, I bel i eve i n J u1y, then
spec i a1 representati ve f or Ukrai ne negoti at'ions, Volker, told
me that he would be reaching out to Rudy Gjuliani.
MR.

QUIGLEY: And could you

l8

MR.

QUIGLEY:

l9

THE

CHAIRI4AN:

t4
l5

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t7

any tasking,

ANd

I just

want

to mention,

we intend

to

go

22

this in a timeline.
MR. QUIGLEY: Fi rst of all, i t's somewhat news to me,
and I'11 pass j t back i f that' s what you want, but i t

23

seems

20

2t

th rough

24

THE

CHAIRI"IAN: We'

25

MR.

QUIGLEY:

re goi ng to get i nto all of thi s.

Alt right

 181
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THE CHAIRMAN: And

it

may be more

orderly to do it in

chronologi ca1 order though.

good. I'11 ask one more question.

MR. QUIGLEY: Very

4

In your belief, in your understanding, jn your

5

why was the Ambassador recalled?

6
7
8

9

l0

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MR. KENT: Based on what

I

experience,

know, Yuriy Lutsenko,

as

prosecutor general, vowed revenge, and provided informatjon

to Rudy Giuliani jn hopes that he would spread it and lead to
her removal. I believe that was the rationale for Yuriy
Lutsenko doing what he did.

Separately, there are i ndividuals that

I

mentioned

t2

before, i ncludi ng Lev Parnas and Igor Fruman, who started

l3

reaching out actively

l4

starting in

l5
t6

to

undermine Ambassador Yovanovitch,

with a meeting with former Congressman Pete
Sessions on May 9th, 2018, the same day he wrote a letter to
Secretary Pompeo impugning Ambassador Yovanovitch' s loyalty
2018

2t

that she be removed. And others also jn 2018
were engaged in an effort to undermine her standing by
claiming that she was disloya1.
So that's the early roots of people following thejr own
agendas and using her as an jnstrument to fu1fi11 those

22

agendas.

t7

l8
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20

and suggesting

.

IGL EY

:

0kay

23

MR

24

THE CHAIRT'IAN:

25

QU

covered so far?

.

Ms.

Spei

er,

any questi ons on what

we

 182
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4
5

MS. SPEIER: Thank you f or your f if et'ime

of State for Eastern Europe and the Caucasus, it
would seem to me that you would be familiar with the efforts
by the administration to engage with Ukraine. Is that
Secretary

MR. KENT: Correct.

7

MS. SPEIER: So

9

on

behalf of the country. Secretary, as the Deputy Assistant

6

8

of serv'ice

'in that

c'i rcumstance, you were

read i nto

that July 25th phone conversation by the Lieutenant Colonel
but were not actually on the call?

15

Correct. I've never in 27 years been on a
call made by a President of the United States.
MS. SPEIER: So that is not consistent with your role
then. Okay.
MR. KENT: I have never served at the Natjonal Security
Councjl, I've only served at the State Department and at

l6

embassi

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MR. KENT:

es overseas.

l9

ER: A1t ri ght. You sai d earl i er that you
provided all of your documents to the State Department for
them to make available to us. Forgive me if I don't think

20

they' re re goi ng

t7

l8

2l
22
23

24
25

MS. SPEI

to be f orthcomi ng. But 'if

you were to

fy certai n documents i n parti cu1ar, you menti oned a few
already today, but if you were to mention certain documents
that you think are particularly important for us to have
access to, what would they be?
MR. KENT: The, if you wi11, I guess, the unique records
i denti

 183
1

2
J

4

that I generated in the course of my work would include
to the file and conversations that I took down in my
handwri tten notes.
MS. SPEIER: Anythi ng else that comes to mi nd?
MR. KENT:

5

6

exchange between me and

or sorry, Charge Taylor.
MS. SPEIER: So is it typical for you to use WhatsApp

in

th your colleagues?
MR. KENT: In parts of the world,

a

Ambassador,

7
8

LikeIy the WhatsApp

notes

communi

9

cati ng

wi

WhatsApp has become

l0

very active method of communication for a variety of reasons,

ll

t thi nk text
messages are secure. I believe the voice encryption is sti11
secure. And in countries like Ukraine there's actually no
data charge for use WhatsApp, and that's what drives the use
of social media, so they pay for text messages, but when they
use social media apps they don't actually pay for that data.
So that has altered communications in parts of world by rate

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l3
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i

t's

consi dered encrypted, although

I

don'

20

setting and how people communicate.
So in Latin American, for instance, and in parts of
Europe and Asia, applications like WhatsApp have become the

2t

dom'inate f orm

l8
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22
23
24
25

of

communi

cati on.

MS. SPEIER: There has been a 1ot

of

conversation

earlier today from our colleagues on the other s'ide of the
aisle about Burisma as being a company that lacked some
ethical comm'itments and moral compass of sorts. Are there

 184
I

other companies in Ukrajne that would fatt in that

2

category?
MR. KENT: There

J

4

same

are many companies in Ukrajne that

might fa11 into that category, yes.
MS. SPEIER: Could you give us some examples?

5

7

If you took the roster of the richest
Ukraj ni ans, they di dn' t bui 1d value, they largely stole i t.

8

So we could go down

9

conversation about the structure

6

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MR.

the richest 20 Ukrainians and have a long

of the Ukrainian economy,
and certainly most of the billionajres in the country became
bi llionai res because they acqui red state assets for largely
under valued prices and engaged in predatory competi tion.
MS. SPEIER: Buri sma doesn't stand

l3
t4

KENT:

different from

any number

MR. KENT:

l5

in

I

of

would say

companies?

that Mr. Zlochevsky's actions

that he was the actual minister who
himself the licenses to explore for gas exploration.

t6

stood out

17

awarded

one way

l8

MS. SPEIER: 0kay.

l9

MR. KENT: Other people may have

20

just

had the minister

on thei r payro1l.
MS. SPEIER:

2t
22

out as bei ng

Okay. Going back to that July 25th

ca11,

there was a 1ot of exchanges between Ambassador Sondland,

Mr.

24

Volker, and also the Charge Taylor about whether or not the
aid would be forthcoming, whether or not the statement would

25

be

23

written.

Were you

privy to any of that?

 185

6

I did not participate in those exchanges by
virtue of the fact that, to the best of my knowledge, you
don't have me as a participant in those exchanges, and none
of those have been released.
I did have my own dialogue wi th Charge Taylor i n the
course of our work, in the same way that I had a dialogue

7

with

8

Moldova, Azerbai j an, Armeni

9

Belarus.

I

2
J

4
5

MR. KENT:

Ambassador Yovanovitch and

with our

ambassadors in

a, and our Charges i n Georgi a and

t6

I would like to address my colleague
we're going to get to that through the ti meI i ne.
Are
14S. SPEIER: I'm parti cularly interested in 20L7
you going to take care of that?
THE CHAIRMAN: We are. Can I suggest that we have the
counsel conti nue wi th the ti mel i ne, and then as we get
through i t members can add 'in wi th questi ons. Thank you.

t7

Mr.

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THE CHAIRMAN: And

Goldman.

MR. G0LDI'4AN: Thank
BY MR.

l9
20

a

you, Mr.

Cha'i rman.

GOLDMAN:

Focusing your attention on May of

this year when I

2t

believe you sajd that Rudy Giulianj met in Paris with

22

Kholodnytsky, who was the prosecutor

23

24
25

A
a

Nazar

of the ant'i-corruption.

anti corruption prosecutor, yes.
Anti corruption, okay. And he had already been
removed by that point, right?
The special

 186

8

for over a year. We
stopped cooperating with them approximately in March of 20L8
when the so-ca11ed fish tank scandal emerged.
a Okay. Just to summarize. You have testified today
that Mr. Giuliani met with Yuriy Lutsenko in January, that he
advocated to get the former Prosecutor General Shokin a visa
in January. And then he met with a special prosecutor in
May, who the U.S. had ceased all former relations wjth. And

9

Lutsenko and Shokin are generally, the general consensus

I
2
J

4
5

6
7

A

No, he had been under pressure

2l

beljef is that they either are or, at this point, or were
corrupt prosecutor generals. Is that an accurate summary of
14r. Gi uIi ani 's meeti ngs wi th prosecutors j n Ukrai ne?
A Yes.
a Okay. And you also indicated that by May of this
point, Mr. Giuliani had been on television and in the media
advocating for the four story lines that you summarized from
those March art'ic1es. Is that ri ght?
A Correct.
a Okay. And then in l4ay you went to Ukraine and you
had meetings with Ukra'inian officials, two of whom mentioned
to you that Mr. Giulian'i wanted to meet with them. Is that

22

ri ght?

l0

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20

A

23

. I can't reca11 i f
Giuliani when we first tatked, the one

Mr. Avakov menti oned

24

Mr. Bakanov mentioned

25

name

Gi u1 i ani

that I wrote down 'in my notes was that

he menti oned

 187
I

Fruman, he sa'id he di

dn't

remember

the other name, and later

13

of Fruman and Parnas.
a Thank you for clarifying that. But he knew that
Fruman and Parnas were associates of Giuliani, right?
A Correct.
a Now, you would agree, right, that hlgh-1evel
Ukra jnian of f icials don't meet with every private American
ci ti zen who travels to Ukrai ne. Correct?
A Correct.
a So the Ukrai n'ians certai nly understood that Mr.
Giulian'i was not a regular private citizen. Is that right?
A Correct.
a And would you assess that they understood that he

t4

represented President

2
J
4
5

6
7
8

9

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he sent me the business card

Trump?

A

They understood

A

Ukrajnians such as Arsen Avakov are experienced

that 14r. G'iu1i ani asserted he
represented Mr. Trump in his private capacity. Yes.
a D'id they understand what that meant? Private
capaci ty versus offi ci al capaci ty?

20

players willing to meet with anybody. The team of the

2l

i ncomi

22

had spent the'i

23

entertainment company executives who had no experjence'in

24

politics.

25

understand

ng presi dent

at that time,

Presi dent-eIect Zelenskyy,

r enti re careers as a ti ght-kn"it

group of

to try to figure out to
how to navigate political networks.
So they were looking

 188

4

did you speak to any of the incoming officials
about Mr. Gi uli ani 'in thi s May, June timef rame?
A My conversation with 14r. Bakanov, as I recounted
part of it before when he gave the names of the associates,

5

one

1

2
3

6
7
8

9

a

And

of whom he knew, the other he couldn't remember, when he
asked for my counsel, I had suggested, as I said, someone
like you who's an associate could meet and hear somebody out
wi thout maki ng comm'i tments. But at thi s ti me i t would be my
best counsel to you to shield your President-e1ect from

l0

private ci tj

1l

a

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l3
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l5
t6
t7

offi

ci a1

A

zens.

And

to your

knowledge was Mr.

Giulianj

promoting

cy i n Ukrai ne at thi s poi nt?
l{r . Gi u1i ani 'is a private c'it'izen who was not

U.

S.

po1 i

a

U.S. Government official.

a

But I understand that, but is what he was pushing

consistent wjth official U.S. policy?

A

Mr. Giuliani was not consulting with the State

t9

in the first half of 2019.
And to the best of my knowledge, he's never suggested that he

20

was promoti ng U.5.

l8

Department about what he was doing

po1 i

cy.

22

efforts that he was making, just to
be very c1ear, were they consistent with what official State

23

Department

2t

24
25

a

And the actual

policy

was?

of policy interests in Ukraine.
It involved promoting the rule of 1aw, energy independence,
A

The U.S. has a 1ot

 189
1

defense sector reform, and the

rule,

2

As a general

3

our own domesti c

we

ability to stand up to Russia.

don't want other countri es i nvolved

in

6

ti cal process, no
a So around this at the end of l'4ay, there was the
I s that r i ght?
i naugurati on of Presi dent Zelenskyy.
A Correct. I believe it may have been May 20th, to

7

be preci se.

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5

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a

po1 i

who would represent

A
a

at all i n the di scuss'ions about
the United States at that inauguration?

Were you i nvolved

Yes.

Can you

just

summarize

for us what your involvement

was and what those discussions entailed?

A

The starting point was the conversation between

Presidents Trump and President-e1ect Zelenskyy on electjon

22

day. Pres'ident Zelenskyy asked j f i t would be possi b1e f or
Presjdent Trump to come to inaugural. There was no date at
that point. Pres"ident Trump suggested that he would talk to
Vice President Pence, and schedules wi11ing, that he hoped it
could work out, but in any case, the U.S. would have
representati on at the i naugural. That was Apri 1 2Lst.
By the time we got close to when the inauguratjon date
was set, which was on very short notice, the outgoing

23

Ukrai ni an parl i ament voted on May

24

to have the inauguration on May 20th, which

25

leavi ng almost no t'ime f or ei ther proper preparations or

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L6th, wh'ich was a Thursday,
was a Monday,

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forei gn delegations to vi si t.
So we scrambled on Friday

the LTth to try to figure out

avaitable. Vice President Pence was not available.
Secretary of State Pompeo was traveling. And so we were
looking for an anchor, someone who was a person of stature
and whose job had relevance to our agenda.
I suggested to Lieutenant Colonel Vindman, since there
oftentimes is thjs dialogue between the State Department and
the NSC for inaugural delegations, to having the NSC ask
Secretary of Energy Perry. Because he had traveled to
Ukraine, understood the issues, and energy was one of the top
three 'issues that we were worki ng wi th Ukrai ne. So that was
the start of that conversation, and then it was a matter of
building out possibilitjes.

who was

Inaugural delegations are determined by the White

the

House.

and the State Department worked together

t6

So whatever

t7

as options, ultimately the decis'ion'is made elsewhere. As

l8

example, when President Yushchenko was inaugurated

l9
20

2t
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23

24
25

NSC

an

in Ukra'ine
in 2005, and I was the control officer on the ground at the
time, the delegation was Secretary Cof in Powe11 in his last
act as State of State, and five Ukrainian Americans. That's
it.
In this case, we proposed a group of officials that we
thought were relevant, those included a number of Senators
and as well as Marcy Kaptur, the head of the Ukrainian

 191
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American Caucus

2

Ameri can

J

offi

in the House. 1t 'included some Ukrainian

leaders here i n the Un'ited States, as well

as

6

a1s. That was about 1.5 i n total to play wi th.
Former National Securi ty Advi sor Bolten wei ghed i n at
some point in the process, and eventually the Whjte House
settled on a 1ist, which was, in the end, Secretary Perry,

7

Lieutenant Colonel Vindman representing the NSC, Ambassador

8

Sondland, Ambassador VoIker, and then our Charge

4
5

ci

in

country

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at the time, Acting Joseph Pennington.
a Was Ambassador Sondland on the State Department's
original list?
A He was not somebody that we jnitially proposed, but

13

Ambassador Sondland has

14

including chief of staff 14ulvaney. So it did not surprise

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when he wei ghed

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a

'in,

his

own networks

s name emerged.
Why did it not surprise you.

understand Ambassador Sondland's

l8

March LTth

A

What

did

you

role in Ukrajne to be by

of this

Ambassador Sondland had

started cultivating

20

relationship with the previous Ukrainian President

2t

Poroshenko. He vjsited, as

22
23
24
25

us

hi

t7

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of influence,

a

I recaI1, a ship visit to Odesa,
which may have been where he first met Poroshenko and other
Ieaders. And so in the same way that he had expressed an
i nterest 'in our relati onshi p wi th Georgi a starti ng late j n
2018, early this year he expressed an interest jn playing a

 192
role i n managi ng our relati
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onshi p wi th Ukrai ne.

 193
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13:24 p.m. l
BY MR.

2
a

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4

a

GOLDMAN:

And you described an independent

he had with the chief

of staff.

relationship that

What do you know about that?

l0

I thjnk the proof in the pudding is, after
the delegation went to the inauguration on May 20th and had a
meeting with President Zelenskyy and that included Senator
Ron Johnson, who was there not as part of the Presidential
delegation but separately. But he sat in the meeting with
Zelenskyy, and then he joined a briefing to the President in

1l

the 0val Office on May 23rd.

5

6
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8

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A

It

We11,

was Ambassador Sondland's connections

with

Mulvaney

with the President. It was not

13

that got

14

done through the NSC staff, through Lieutenant Colonel

l5

Vindman and Ambassador Bolton.

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a
A

them the meeting

I don't

understand what you

We11, normally

mean.

for jnternational issues,

meetings

l8

would appear on the President's calendar because they were

t9

staff and pushed through
the National Security Advisor. In this case, the out-brief
to the President of the inaugural happened because of
Ambassador Sondland's connections through Chief of Staff
Mulvaney, to the best of my knowledge.
a So you' re talki ng about Presj dent Trump' s
debri efi ng after the i naugurati on on May 23rd.

20

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25

proposed by the National Security

 194
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A

The inauguration on l'4ay

to talk about that

meeting

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the Oval Offjce on May 23rd.

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The 0va1 0f f ice

and the way forward occurred in

2

4

20th.

Before the inauguration, you

just

mentioned that

that Ambassador Sondland was added to
the list because of his relationship with the chief of staff.
Were you aware of Ambassador Sondland having any significant
role i n Ukrai n'ian pol i cy f or the State Department by mi d-14ay?
A Again, I don't remember when the ship visit was to
0desa, but I think Sondland's visit to Ukraine to 0desa for
the U. S. port vi si t was the start of hi s i nvolvement.
a I understand that. I'm asking way ahead. If that
was during the time that President Poroshenko was the
President, that was earlier.
A But it was the last month of his presidency. So he
you were not surprised

t7

did call President Poroshenko in March for instance after the
attack started on Ambassador Yovanovitch to suggest the

l8

Porosheno back

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off. So his acceleration of his involvement
in Ukraine and in our relationship was in one phase, just
starting the last month or two of Poroshenko's presidency,
and it accelerated after President Zelenskyy's assumption of

22

offi ce on May 2Lst.

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a

Djd it also accelerate after Ambassador Yovanovitch

24

was recalled?

25

A

Ambassador Yovanovitch was

recalled on the 26th of

 195
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April,

2

Zelenskyy

J

She

of the country by the time President
was inaugurated on May 20th. So it was coterminus.

and she was out

essentially ceased serving as Ambassador, the functions

ll

of Ambassador, on April 25th.
a Ri ght. And after that, di d Ambassador Sondland's
role increase in Ukraine?
A Yes.
a Were you aware of whether that went through
official channels or how that came to be?
A The way that came to be was the main three U.S.
offi ci als, executi ve branch offi ci als, Secretary Perry,

t2

Ambassador Sondtand, and

l3

l7

part of that briefing of the President. And they came out of
that meeting asserting that going forward they would be the
drj vers of the relati onshi p wi th Ukrai ne.
a Before the inauguration did you have any
conversations with the Ambassador Sondland about Ukraine

l8

gene r aI 1y?

l9

of my knowledge, before May, likely
during the chjef of mission conference where all ambassadors
come back for several days'in mid-January, Ambassador
Sondland came through the office suite where my office js to
see my colleague who works wlth Western Europe. Julie Fisher
(ph) is her name. And she introduced him to the other people
in the office. So I shook his hand. There was no

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To the best

Special Representative Volker,

were

 196

7

first time I had met him,
without a substantjve conversation, in January.
a So you did not speak to him again after January?
A To the best of my recollection, we had no direct
conversation and were not in each other's presence until the
U.N. General Assembly week, the last week in September.
a So you did not attend that Oval 0ffice meeting on

8

May

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5

6

conversation, but that was the

23rd, right?

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A I did not.
a 0kay. D'id you get a readout of what occu r red?
A There were several readouts. That particular week
I was my eldest daughter graduated from Boston University
and I then took my kids and my wife up to Acadia National
Park we were hiking on Cadillac Mountain so I was not in

l5

Washington those days where

9

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A

the readout occurred May 23rd.
So d"id you subsequently learn what occurred?
So there were several readouts provided secondhand

in that

meeting

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from representatives who had been

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wilt be part of the documents that were
collected as part of your requested documents and
a So you're sorry. You're referring to written

22

readouts?

20

23

24
25

and

presumably those

Written readouts. I believe there were three
separate readouts. Again not from anyone that I got that
forwarded by emai 1 . Speci fi cally Fi ona Hi 11 whom I 'm

A

was

 197
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3

4

gathering that the committee talked to yesterday. She gave

office director who was probably acting for me
that week,
, normally office director of Eastern
Europe. Kurt Volker gave a readout to his then-special
readout

to

my

6

assistant, Chrjs Anderson (ph), who 'is currently a language
student. And Gordon Sondland would have given a readout to

7

somebody

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a

that would

have been forwarded

to us.

I came back from my New England vacation, I had
three different vers'ions of that conversation in my inbox.
a And so what d1d you just quickly, what did you
understand to have occurred at that meeting?
A I should say that in addjtion to those secondhand
accounts I eventually heard Kurt Volker's account directly
from him, the way he characterized it to a number of
interlocutors when we were together in Toronto on the 1st and
2nd of July for the Ukraine Reform Conference and the
interlocutors'included President Zelenskyy himself. He said
that President Trump had been very angry about Ukrajne, he
said that they were corrupt, and they had wished him i11 in
2016. So that was one part of the discussion.
0n the other hand, by the end of the meeting there was
agreement that they would work moving forward to work towards
an 0va1 Office visit, a visit to the White House which
Presidents Zetenskyy and Trump had talked about in that
jnitial catl on April 21st. And that energy issues would be
So when

 198
in

I

of

2

Secretary' Perry's presence, but the concern that the

J

Russians were going

4

New

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8

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to cut atl

gas

transit through Ukraine on

You

And

State Department.

a

Were you aware

of

any evidence

i

l3

way 'in i nterf eri ng w'ith the 20L6 electi

t6

that Ukraine was

nvolved i n any way, Ukrai ni an of f i ci a1s were 'involved i n

t2

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2006.

finatly sorry. The last point that I recal1
from the readouts was that there would be an accelerated
search for a political nominee for Ambassador, as opposed to
having a career Foreign Service officer proposed from the
A

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mind not only

Year's day the way they had done three times since

a

5

6

importance going forward, keeping

A
O

any

on?

I'm not aware of any evidence to that effect, no.
And you' re fami 1 i ar wi th the Intell i gence Communi ty

assessment about Russi

I

a's 'interf

erence?

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A

18

available to

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Intelligence and Research briefs

20

does not mean that

have read the documents
me

as part

of

my

read.
me

I've read every

that have been made
The

0ffice

of

twice a week, but that

document about Russia, no.

23

O No, I understand, there is specific document that
the Intelli gence Communi ty assessment about Russi an
interference in the 2016 election. Are you fam'iliar with the

24

conclusion?

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25

A

I

know

that it exists. I can't say

I don't

 199

20

recall reading any special confidential version of it. And
to the extent that it has been discussed in general jn the
med'ia I'm aware of those findings.
a And you're aware that the Intelligence Community
un'i formly determi ned that Russi a i nterfered i n the election?
A I'm aware of that general conclusion, yes.
a And are you aware that Special Counsel Mueller
indicted I believe L2 Russians and laid out an indictment
A Yes.
how Russi a i nterfered. Ri ght?
a
A Yes.
a Do you have any reason to befieve that both of
those ej ther the 'i ndi ctment or the Intel1 i gence Communi ty
assessment is wrong jn any way?
A I have no reason to believe that, no.
a Okay. You mentioned thi s Apri 1 2Lst call. And we
haven't touched upon it touch. You said you were not on the
cal1. Did you get a readout of that call as well?
A r did.
a And what di d you learn that was d'iscussed on that

2t

call?

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A

Again, I rece'ived that readout from Lieutenant

Colonel Vindman.

It

was a very short and nonsubstantjve

cal1, as you might expect. As I reca11 April 2Lst was Easter
Sunday j n the Uni ted States. Agai n, Ukrai nj ans are 0rthodox.

 200
And we were very pleased

that the

I

Different calendar.

2

President agreed to

J

presumed

4

Monday. And as you might expect on a Sunday call when it

5

probably past midnight

6
7
8

that i t

mi

call on election

day on a Sunday. We had

ght happen the next workday, wh'ich was a
was

in Ukraine on election night,
Presjdent Zelenskyy was in a good mood, President Trump was

very positive and congratulated him on a great win
And President Zelenskyy, as I recall what Alex told fi€,

10

said that he had studjed President Trump's win in 2015
running as an outsider and had adopted some of the same

ll

tacti cs. And i nvi ted Presi dent Trump to hi s i naugural, the

9

l3

date to be determined. And President Trump, as I said,
acknowledged he would try to find somebody appropriate to

t4

attend.

l5

Wash

t2

i ngton

And

t6

And

said, we'11 try to work on getting you to

.

that

was more

t7

something more

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poi

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L)

24
25

or less the extent that probably

was

said, but you know on an etection day the

nt i s what Alex summed up was, Li eutenant Colonel V'indman,
those types of ca11s are designed to build rapport and he
thought it was successful doing so.
a Following the May 23rd Oval Off ice meeting, where
there was a -- you testified there was a decision to try to
arrange a White House meeting. You know, what if any actions
did you take or were did other Ukrajne-focused government
officials take to try to set that uP?

 201
I

A

That's the f uncti on of the nat'ionaI securi ty staf f

4

that there is input, they ask for input from
other offi ci als, other offices. We obviously stand ready to
that's thei r functi on. That' s
be supportive but that's

5

not our function

2
3

.

To the extent

20

of a White House meeting?
I was, the State Department was. Ukraine is an
important country that Congress appropriates roughly in the
ballpark $700 m'i11jon a year in assistance and Zelenskyy won
a clear mandate for change and so we were supportjve of a
visit to the White House, yes.
a Did you have any reason to doubt Zelenskyy's
si nceri ty about hi s anticorruption vjews?
A I had no reason to doubt the sincerity of Zelenskyy
trying to represent change for his country based on the
series of meetings I had with him dating back to December
2018. Starting from the beginning it was clear that he had a
prior association with a fai rly notorious oligarch named Ihor
Kolomoisky and that was going to be a mark of his willingness
to really make a break from past relationships and stand on

2t

principle.

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A

Were you

supportive

23

fjrst conversation 'in
December, but in the second conversation in March prior to

24

the electjon,

25

the down sides of association with somebody who had such

22

So from not necessarily our

we were

already talking about Kolomoisky

and
a

 202
I

bad reputati on.

t7

would a White House meeting
a And how important is
be to President Zelenskyy?
A The President of the United States is a longtime
acknowledged leader of the free wor1d, and the U.S. is
Ukraine's strongest supporter. And so in the Ukraine
context, it's very important to show that they can establish
a strong relationship with the leader of the Unjted States.
That's the Ukrainian argument and desire to have a meeting.
The forei gn poli cy argument i s i t's a very important
country in the front lines of Russian malign influence and
aggress'ion. And the U. S. spends a considerable amount of our
resources supporti ng Ukrai ne and theref ore 'i t makes sense.
But that's the arguments f or a meeti ng. The t'ime on a
President's schedule is always subject to competing
priorities.
a Following that meeting you said that Secretary

18

Perry, Ambassador Sondland and Ambassador Volker had asserted

2
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that they were leadjng Ukrainian policy efforts? Did I get
that ri ght?
A Correct.
a Who had asserted that?
A We1l, the three of them asserted that. And citing
the fact that they had briefed the President coming out of
that meeting, they felt they had the mandate to take the lead

 203
efforts to

the

I

on coordinating

2

leadershi p.

)

8

with the new Ukrainian
leadership occurred following that meeting up until the
conference on July Lst that you're aware of?
A I do not I do not recall. SPecial
Representat'ive Volker traveled frequently to Ukraine so it is
possi b1e that he may have gone i n Iate t"lay. I j ust don't

9

reca1l precisely. He traveled frequently there.

4
5

6
7

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a

engage

new Ukrajnian

And what engagements

There was a coordinating meeting

in the Department of

ll

Energy

in mjd-June, on June 18th. 5o Secretary Perry chaired

t2

that.

Ambassador SondIand, Ambassador

l3

Department, Acti ng Assi stant Secretary Reeker, my di rect

t4

supervjsor, Tyler Brace, all attended that meeting in

l5

Secretary Perry's offi ce, and they also connected recently

t6

arrived Charge Taylor from Kyiv.

t7

2t

that, to the best of my knowledge, after
that May 23rd meeting, this June LSth meeting was the next
meeti ng where a number of offi ci a1s got together speci fi ca11y
to talk about policies and programs towards Ukrajne.
a And in June and early Ju1y, are you aware of any

22

conversations that Ambassador Sondland might have had with

23

the Chief of Staff Mulvaney about Ukraine and President

24

Zelenskyy?

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25

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A

I

Volker from the State

would say

I'm not

aware of conversations between Sondland and

 204
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5

6
7
8

9

that's a relationship that I would not
be a part of. To the best of my what I am aware of is
that subsequent to the June LSth meeting, there was a
June 28th conference call between Secretary Perry, Sondland,
Volker, and jnvolving Charge Taylor, at the end of which they
were patched through to President Zelenskyy.
a And what did you learn about that conversation?
A I do not recalI. I got a readout of that
conversati on. In'i ti a1ly I have an emai I suggesti ng that
Mulvaney, but frankly

27tn had written Charge Taylor to

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Ambassador Sondland on June

ll

15

that that would be a U.S.-on1y meeting or a U.S.-onIy
ca11. But in the end, on the next day, it turned into a call
with President Zelenskyy after a pre-conversation among the
Amerjcans, based on what Charge Taylor has told me.
a Was it unusual that you were not included on that

l6

conference call?

t7

l9

of Energy i t's
not necessarily unusual. But again, that was I think a
period of tjme where the direction of our engagement with

20

Ukrai ne sh j f ted

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13

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23

24
25

suggest

A

a
A

Wel1, i f i t i nvolves the Secretary

'into sha11 we say unusual channels.

And what do you mean by unusual channels?
We11,

I th'ink it's

somewhat unusual

to

have

an

to the E.U., plus the Secretary of Energy engaged
deeply in the policy towards a country that is not a member
of the E.U. It was just -- again, we had our Special

Ambassador

 205
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2

for Ukraine Negotiations, and I know you've
talked to former Ambassador Volker. His listed

Representative

4

responsibilities were focused on negotiating with Russia over
their war in Ukraine, and then Charge Taylor as the lead

5

representatjve in country.

J

7

frankly, in that constellation Charge Taylor was
the primary voice for our futl interests as the Charge of our

8

mi

6

And so

ssi on i n Kyi v.

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a And one more question, you said that you learned of
the calt from Charge Taylor.
A Correct.
a But he did not give you a substantive readout of

r3

the call?

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did give me a readout, yes.
readout of prebrief with the Americans.

A

He

He gave me

a

a And what was that readout?
A He indicated that there was a discussion about the
need to raise a sensitive'issue with Zelenskyy. And jn that
discussion Ambassador Volker volunteered that he would be
seeing Zelenskyy in person the next week in Toronto and that
was the meeti ng i n whi ch I partj ci pated on J u1y 2nd.
a Do you know what the sensitive issue was?
A Kurt Volker told me that it was giving guidance to
Zelenskyy on how he needed to characterize his willingness to
be cooperative on issues of interest to the President.

 206
I

a

2

A

Such as?

I did not have the fu11 details of what exactly
but I think it was sending signals about potenti a1

3

that

4

j nvesti gati ons.

was,

a

5

I think our time is up.
BY MR.

6

We

yield to the minority.

CASTOR:

the July 25th call?

a
A
a
A
a

Vindman was on

t3

A

t4

O

I do not know and I think not.
Okay. You said you got three readouts, one from

7
8

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The

J

u1y

yes.

And was he on the Apri1 2Lst call?
Yes.
Was

he jn the meeting with the President on

May

23r d?

Fiona H'i11, one from Sondland, and

A

The i ni ti al readouts

It

I

one

from Volker?

got were, yes secondhand

t7

from these three people.

l8

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in on the meeting?
a
A My understanding is again Fj ona di dn't gi ve i t
di rectly to me. My understandi ng i s that she may have gotten
i t from deputy then deputy natjonal securi ty advi sor

22

Kupperman.

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20

23

24
25

a
A

She sent you

No.

was

my

understandi ng.

the readout?

She had a conversation with

was the act'ing deputy assistant secretary

who

at the time.

To

 207
I

the best of my knowledge. I received the readout from I

8

I came back from my vacation.
a Okay. You said when you returned to your office
you had three ema'i1s. Is that
readout
A Yes. I believe i got an email with I
of a conversat'ion wi th F'iona, Chri s Anderson's readout that
he got from Kurt Volker and a third readout from someone in
the State Department who worked with our mission to the

9

European Union

2
J

4
5

6
7

l0

once

that would

have had Ambassador Sondland's

version.

ll

a

5o Sondland gives a readout

tes i t up, sends an ema i 1

to his staffer

who

t2

wri

l3

21

A Yes.
O Volker produces one with Christina Anderson?
A Chris Anderson.
a Chris Anderson. And so then help me understand
again. Like who produced the one from the NSC?
A So Fiona had a conversation. To the best of my
recollect'ion, she had a conversation wi th
, who is
normally the director for Eastern Europe and, while I was
away at my daughter's
, was acting in my

22

stead as acting deputy assistant secretary.

t4
l5

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t7

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20

23

24
25

a
A
a

.

0h, okay. 5o he's a State Department

employee.

He's a State Department employee, yeah.
Was

she

in the meeting?

 208
A

I

2
3

4
5

6
7
8

9
10

ll
t2

l3

My understanding

is

again, I did not talk to

that her version of the readout
came from Mr. Kupperman, the then deputy to Ambassador
Bolton. But I 'm not sure.
her, but

my understanding was

a Was he in the meeting?
A I'm not sure. l4y understanding again, thjs is now
is that Fiona's readout came from
third hand from I
Kupperman, not from her participation in the meeting. But I
don't know. I have not talked to Fiona about that.
a 0kay. Was Kupperman in the meeting?
A My understanding from what I heard from I
relaying what he heard from F'iona h'is impression was that
that came from Kupperman who was in the meeting. But I can't

t4
l5

l6
t7

l8

l9

22
23

24
25

That

a

Did any

He was
Huh?

He was

in the meeting?

is the impressjon I received from talking

I

20

2l

in the meeting?

a
A
a
A

i

n the

A
a

to

of these readouts have a list of officials

meeti ng?
No.

Okay. Can we j ust go through who we thi nk was 1n
the meeting? We know Secretary Perry, Senator Johnson.
A To the best of my knowledge, the principals

 209
I
2

a
A

Ambassador Volker.

the briefers to the President were those that

J

represented lead offi ci ats and that would be Secretary Perry,

4

Ambassador Sondland, Ambassador

6

a
A

7

status.

5

8

a
A

Volker and Senator Johnson.

staff to the meeting?
I do not know. I was again, I was on leave

And they brought

0kaY

'

l8

I wasn't in the meeting and wouldn't have been
'in the meeti ng even i f I were i n Washi ngton.
a 0kay. Who from the NSC was in the meeting?
A To the best of my understanding, all I know js that
Charl i e Kupperman or Kupperman. I don' t know fi rst name,
sorry. Kupperman, former deputy Natj onal Securi ty Advi sor
Kupperman may have been in the meeting.
a 0kay. But Vi ndman wasn' t?
A That is my understanding, correct.
a Did Vjndman tel1 you subsequently that he wasn't in

l9

the meeti

9

l0

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And

ng?

23

I d'idn't ask 'if he was in the meeting, because when
I returned from work I had three different version or
readouts of the meetings f rom others.
a But you had regular communi catj ons wi th Vi ndman.

24

Ri gh t?

20

2l
22

25

A

A

I did.

 210
a

1

2

he wasn't i n

AWe

3

4
5

6
7
8

9

l0

ll

And

did he ever at any point in time te11 you that
the meet i ng or was being ex c 1 uded from thi ngs?
di dn'

t

have

a conversat'ion along those 1 i nes.

No.

a
A

think he was excluded?
I honestly don't know. And I had three different

Do you

of the meeting so I wasn't looking for a fourth.
a And in your regular communications with Vindman do
you have any reason to believe that he's been cut out of any
of these discussions? Not just about the May 23rd meeting,
versions

t2

but about subsequent relevant events?
A Again, I don't I go over to the

l3

are meetings that the

t4

Department

NSC

does not want

NSC when

there

to al1ow the State

l8

to be on the secure video conference system, but
apart from speci fi c meeti ngs that I'm i nvi ted over, I don't
go over there on a regular basis just because it takes time.
It's easier if they'11 al1ow us to be on vjdeo conference.
It is a better use of my time. So I would say I have more

t9

communications

20

phone ca11.

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l6
t7

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a

0kay.

with Lieutenant Colonel
And in any

22

has he alerted you that

23

process?

24
25

A

he

Vindman by email and

of those emails or

phone ca1ls

he's been cut out of the

a lieutenant colonel and colonels who have
served in staff positions generally aren't people who
He is

 21

1

J

complain. He's a -- he was a campaign planner before he came
over to the NSC and he has that campaign planning mentality'
you know, what's the goal and he'11 plow forward. That's

4

j

1

2

5

ust

hj

a
A

s

personal i ty.

Okay. And do you thjnk he is plowing forward?

8

s very acti ve at schedul i ng i nteragency meeti ngs
and asking the State Department to write papers for hjm.
a But plowing forward, does it have some sort of

9

connotation that he's going through a tough time and he's

6
7

l0

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l5
16

t7

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20

2l
22
23
24
25

He'

No. He's a lieutenant colonel who spends his day
that was hi s
worki ng on campai gn plans. That's what hi s
job at the Jojnt Chiefs of Staff before he was brought over
as a detailee to the NSC. I think if you talk to most State
Department employees wj11 have an opinion that the role of
the National Security Council is to coordjnate the work of
other agencies, not to task us. We don't respond to them.
And occasionally we have to remind them of that.
a You have to remind him of that?
A My staff oftentjmes complains that they feel that
he thinks that they work for him the way he works for other
people at the JCS and have asked me on numbers of occasions
to gently point out to him that we don't report to hjm. So I
have supported my staff in gently suggesting that he remember
what the roles of the National Security Council staff are
vjs-a-vis a bureau and an executive agency like the State
A

 212
I

Department.

a
A

2

Did he receive that

warmly?

5

it with a smile and that's -- we have a
good worki ng relati onshi p. I would say there' s more tensi on
perhaps between him and the staff that work for fie, but we

6

have

a

J
4

8

a respectful working relationship.

O

7

He received

Okay. And in Fiona Hj11's readout what was her

what can you remember from her readout?

A

9

I think

what

I recall

and

I can't say the

l3

fi c detai 1s parti cularly si nce there were three versi ons
floating around that I read in rap'id succession, just by
tonality that the meeting was perhaps more problematic than
the initjal readouts that we got through secondhand knowledge

l4

of

l5

23

I believe one element and I can't remember where this
came from that initially the President did not want to sign a
congratulatory letter. And he actually ripped up the letter
that had been written for him. But by the end of the
meeting, he'd been convinced and the version I recal1 hearing
was Ambassador Sondland helped draft it. And to be honest,
the second version of the letter actually read better than
the fi rst versi on. I wasn't i nvolved i n ei ther of them
because I had been on leave and eventually that letter was

24

signed.

25

a

l0

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16

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20

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22

speci

what Ambassador Sondland and Ambassador Volker said.

At the State Department in the wake of

Ambassador

 213
Yovanovitch's, her reca11, can you describe the morale with
2

those closest

A

3

to

When

her?

you say those closest

4

referring to the

5

in

embassy

staff that

to her, are you

had been working

for

her

Kyiv?

t2

a And her close confidants here in Washington.
A I don't know who her close confidants in Washington
would be. I was, as I mentioned, in Ukraine and Kyiv at the
embassy on May 8th. i did offer to have a restricted
townhall meeting for Americans, essentially, in our version
of the SCIF, and the country team, the meeting room, where
we'd have and anyone who wished to have a conversation

l3

about what had happened and the way forward.

t4

t9

was one of them actually said that when
the attacks started jn March, particularly after members of
the President's family started attacking her, at some level
they realized that she was going to be recal1ed, and it was a
matter of when, not 'if . Their question, as people working at
the embassy, was what was going to be the impact on them, on

20

the embassy, and on our policy towards Ukraine.

6
7
8

9

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t6
t7

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And my sense

23

so, whjle I did basicatly I was wilting to answer
any questions, I think they were more focused, at that point,
already, having digested that she had been removed, and they

24

wanted

2t
22

25

And

to know what was going to happen next. So I assured
them that our policy was our pot'icy and it would remain our

 214
'in the process of tryi ng to f i nd an

I

pol i cy. And

2

experi enced person

J

and would be a good leader

that

we were

that

temporari 1y would lead the

mi

ssi on

for the people working there,

the
I

4
5

6
7
8

9

in our embassy, and also someone that
could be a voice and face for U.S. policy in Ukraine.
I honestly cannot remember, but probably did not say
that i t was goi ng to be Ambassador Taylor. He was the one we
all wanted at that point, but we sti11 had to work out
whether we could bring him back. And those details with the
250 Americans working

l0

personnel system had not yet been finalized.

ll
t2

a
type of

l3

Presi dent?

t4

A

Would Ambassador Taylor have

person

When

that

was discussed

fit the mold for

the

in the meeting with the

you sajd the person discussed

in the meeting

t7

with the President, meaning what?
a We11, the meeting with the President, you related
that President Trump seemed angry, that he was, you know,

l8

Ukra'ine was

l5
t6

23

corrupt. That there are those i n the Ukrai ne
that wished him i11 in 2016 and they were going to work
towards an 0va1 0ffice meeting, energy issues were important
and then you menti oned that there was a deci s'ion to put i n a
new political Ambassador.
A So Charge Taylor, notwi thstandi ng the fact he was

24

nominated and confirmed by the Senate, nominated under

25

president George Bush, was not a permanent nominee for the

l9
20

2t
22

 215
I

position of

a
A

2

Ambassador.

0kaY.

6

called back essentially to government
service because he knew all the players. He's a bundle of
positivity and gets along with everyone and he's a real
leader. He was a long time senior executive at the State

7

Department, but he was a graduate

J

4
5

8

9

l0

ll

He was

of

West Point who joined

the L0Lst, and he was platoon leader jn Vietnam and in
Germany. 5o it is hard to find anybody hasn't been impressed
by

Bj

11 Taylor.

a

And

is there still an effort afoot to fjnd

a

t2

permanent pof i ti ca1 Ambassador?

l3

that is the job of the White House
because i t i s the Presi dent's prerogati ve to appoi nt,
nominate an Ambassador and then the Senate's role to confirm.
a Duri ng hi s tenure as Vi ce Presi dent, Joe Bi den had
a role with regard to Ukraine. Is that correct?
A Correct.
And what was the role as you understood j t? And
a
you were in country at the time, right?
A
I was, although his-jnvolvement in Ukraine predated
i t should be
my return to the Ukra'i ne account . I bel i eve
a matter of record, but I believe as Vice President he
visited Ukraine six tjmes, which probably is unusual for any
country outside of the usual countries like Germany, ljke

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t7

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)7
24
25

A

There

js.

And

 216
of which I believe would've

1

one

2

Yanukovych was there and then

J

afterwards.
By the time

4

I

came back

been when

the former leader

the subsequent visits

on the account,

it

was clear

7

of his administration,
had delegated several foreign policy issues in Europe to Vice
Presi dent B'iden to take the 1ead. Ukrai ne was one of them;

8

Cyprus was the other.

5

6

that President 0bama,

towards the end

So, if you wi11, Vice President Biden was the top cover.

9

offi

l0

The State Department's lead

ll

post- Russi an- i nvasi on-of - Ukra j ne/occupati on-of -Cr i mea was

t2

Assi

ci al

l5

stant Secretary V'ictoria Nuland. And then we had a very
active Ambassador, Geoff Pyatt, at the time. And so those
were the chief voices on our Ukraine policy: Pyatt as chjef
of mission, Toria as the assistant secretary, and Vice

l6

Pres'ident Biden as V'ice President.

t7

2t

for the
removal of Shokin, what type of planning went into that? Was
that something that was planned for on the Vice President
side of things or did the embassy or the State Department tee
him up with the right information he needed to weigh it into

22

that?

l3
t4

l8

l9
20

23

he got involved with advocating

a

When

A

Geoff Pyatt allowed me to go back to my family at

24

Thanksgiving. I had

25

predecessor

come

out on an emergency basis for

my

 217
.

I

And

I

came

out on 24 hours' notice to

4

of 0ctober for my thi rd sti nt. 5o I
was not in country at the time of the visit and planning.
My understanding is that the conversations that were

5

near-dai1y between Ambassador Pyatt and Toria

6

regarding what to do on the way forward then included

7

pitching the 0ffice of the Vice President to push President

8

Poroshenko

2
a

J

Ukrai ne

the

begi nni ng

to

Nuland

remove Shoki n.

t2

similar push against Prime l.,linjster Arseny
Yatseni uk, who had several di fferent corrupt poli tical
backers. And there was one named llartynenko who was jnvolved
j n all sorts of d'i rty bus'iness, i ncludi ng nuclear f ue1

l3

suppl i es f rom Russi

l4

one

9

l0
1l

l5

There was a

a.

And so we pressured Yatsen'iuk

of hjs corrupt cronies resign, and Martynenko

to have

resigned.

And there was also the pressure on Poroshenko, on the

l6

corrupt prosecutor general, and Shokin was not dismissed, I

t7

20

believe, until early March, so 3 weeks after Vice President
Bi den's vi si t i n December 20L5
a The Vice President, he relates to some of these
detajls on a video that's been published on I think the Wa1l

2t

Street Journal.

l8
l9

22

.

A

Have you seen

that

video?

I did. To the best of my recollection, he was at
Council on Foreign Relations,

23

some conference, maybe

24

in 20L8, and he was te11ing the story in a sort of folksy

25

manne r

.

somet'ime

 218

l8

folksy. And he describes a quid pro quo
where, you know, $1 billion worth of aid would be held up
unti1 they fired Shokin. Is that what your understanding of
the way he tells i t?
sounds more or less like what he said on
A That is
that stage. Yes.
a And going back to 2016 when it actually happened,
was that the way i t went down?
A Again, I was jn briefly in Ukrainian language
training at the time of his visit so I was not in Ukraine. I
would think that the State Department could produce documents
related to the sovereign loan guarantees and the timing of
those three guarantees to align the timing.
We provided one in 20L4, one in 2015, and one in 20L5.
And I do not recal l the exact t'imi ng of the i ssuance of those
loan guarantees, but I'm not aware that they aligned
perfectly with his visit to Ukraine on December 20L5.
a Okay. But you think it is fair to say that this

l9

was a bottom up

1

2
a

J

4
5

6
7
8

9

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20

O

A

He was

initiative?

To the best

of my knowledge, the idea came from

22

Pyatt in d'iscussion with Assistant Secretary
Nuland and then was pitched to the Office of the Vice

Z)

Presi dent.

2t

24
25

Ambassador

0kay. So i f we' re goi ng to pursue addi t'iona1
information on that, we would probably have some documents to
a

 219
1

inform us that we could ask for.

A

2

That would be my impression.

I

would

just

note

J

having read the subpoena that the document request was date

4

timed

5

I believe starting January 20 or 21st, 20L7. And we're
talking about events that happened 'in November, December,

6

2015.

7
8

MR. ZELDIN:

5teve, if I can ask, did you

know

at

the

time of the Vice President's visit when he had made that

l5

that threat? I mean, or was
it some other expectation more narrowly tailored towards
advocating for Shokin to be removed?
l'lR. KENT: Yeah. I know as was discussed earlier, the
U.S. the IMF, the European Union countries, we had at1 come
to the conclusion in the wake of the djamond prosecutors
affair that there was going to be no progress for reform on

t6

the prosecutor general under Shokin.

t7

But speci fj ca11y about how the

9

l0
l1

t2
l3
t4

threat that he was going to

make

Vi

ce Presi dent's tri

ps

20

that point. I left the day before
Thanksgiving to f1y back to the U.5. and to go into Ukraine
language train'ing. So at that point I was not privy to those

2t

discussions

22

visit.

l8
l9

Z)
24
25

messaging was managed by

in the two weeks prior to the Vice President's

MR. ZELDIN: So you

don't

know whether

or not the Vjce

to threaten the loss of $1 billion?
MR. KENT: My understanding, as I explained, is that

President was go'ing

 220
1

2
J

that was an approach that

was discussed between Ambassador

Pyatt and Assistant Secretary Nuland to use his visit as
leverage. This was an jssue that Ambassador Pyatt and

6

Assistant Secretary Nuland jn her visits that was an agenda
item that they were pushing. And in the same way that the
Department of Just'ice of f ici a1 asked me to go 'in to the

7

prosecutor general office

4
5

8

office in February 2015 and ask who
took the bribe and how much was it to shut down the case

9

against Zlochevsky, the Ambassador and Assistant Secretary

l3

office of Vice President if the Vice
President could push this tough message.
t4R. ZELDIN: And to be c1ear, was Ambassador Pyatt and
Assistant Secretary Nuland advocating to threaten the loss of

t4

$1 bi tlion?

l0

ll
t2

Nuland asked the

20

that i s the case. But agai n , we' re
now relying on my memory of almost 4 years ago. So I believe
i t was pushi ng the Ukrai ni ans essenti aIly for an addi ti onal
what would be ca11ed a prior action before we would issue the
sovereign loan guarantee. But I think that's something that
we would have to look at the documents from that period of

2l

time.

l5

l6
t7

l8
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22

Z)
24
25

MR. KENT:

I

bel i eve

MR. ZELDIN: You

as the

dePutY

chief of mission were not

involved in that process.

in parts of 201-5 I went out as essentially
the acti ng deputy chi ef of mi ssi on. I then came back to the
MR. KENT: So

 221
S. the day before

I

U.

2

months

for

language

Thanksgi

trai

v i ng

ni ng and

and was i n the

U

.S. for

3.5

then returned to Kyiv in

5

late March 2015. So in the 2 weeks prior to the Vi ce
Presi dent's vi si t, I was already back in the U.S asa
language student as opposed to being an actjve participant

6

the conversations.

J

4

7

MR. ZELDIN: And you referenced Ambassador

0f

Pyatt,

8

referenced Assistant Secretary Nuland.

9

that process, are you aware of anyone'in contact with

ll
l2

l'4R. J0RDAN: 0ne

Hunter

Biden

quick questjon.

t4

Mr. Secretary, you leave 2 weeks before the Vice
President gets there. But this policy, this idea that

l5

were goi ng

l6

develop i n those two weeks.

l3

to call for

Shoki

t7

MR. KENT: Correct.

l8

MR. JORDAN: You

t9
20

2t
22
23

24
25

you

anyone involved in

at the time other than the Vice President?
MR. KENT: I am not aware of, no.

l0

in

n's removal i t didn't

we

j ust

weren't involved in a discussion and

a

decision to say thjs is going to be our offjcial policy we're

to ask the V1ce President to do this.
t'4R. KENT: I thi nk someone made a ref erence to
Ambassador Pyatt's speech in September. Eartier
at some
poi nt today, he gave a strong, hard-hi tti ng speech agai nst
corruption, and it was ctear then that we were pushing for
Shok'in's ouster. And so we had taken a harder 1i ne agai nst
going

 222
in the wake of the diamond prosecutor affair

1

Shokin

2

mi d- 2015

in

.

7

or to Vi ce Pres j dent B'iden's vi si t, thi s
was an issue that U.S. officials including our Ambassador and
our Assistant Secretary of State were pushing in thejr
meeti ngs wi th the Ukrai nj ans.
MR. J0RDAN: I guess I'm asking, though, was there a

8

decisjon

9

say, we're going to ask the Vice President to do it on this

J
4
5

6

l0

ll
t2

So months pri

made between Ms.

Nuland, the Ambassador, and you to

if so when was that made?
I could not I was not
MR. KENT: Again, I do not
part of
I would say that on a daily basis Ambassador Pyatt
trip.

And

l5

that was
conversations that the Ambassador would have on his office
with her on a Secure phone and I'm Sure there Were addjtional

16

email back and forths. But

t7

other than to say that

l3
t4

l8

and Assistant Secretary Nuland had conversations,

I

would say

I cannot give you a precise date

that on the record

Ambassador

Pyatt's

speech

t9

jn 0desa, which I betieve

20

powerful public statement of U.S. concern about the lack of

2l

progress. And I believe it

22

both the shortcomings of prosecutor Shok'in and reference to

L)

our concern that the case against Zlochevsky had been shut

24

down and

25

was

in

September

may have

of

201.5 was

specifjcally

a

mentioned

frozen money was released.

And so

i think that speech is a matter of public

record

 223
visit

1

September 2015, Vice President B'iden's

2

0ctober, November, December, 3 months later.

happened

5

think they told the Vice President
the 2 weeks prior to him getting there when you had left do
you think that they talked to the Vice President when he got

6

there in country?

J
4

MR. JORDAN: Do you

MR. KENT: Again, the way

7

a trip would normally

be

8

staffed, there would be conversations prior, there would

9

paper prepared and conversations

prior to the trip.

fike Assistant Secretary

be

And that

l0

oftentimes would be

ll

goi ng

t2

l3

did you learn that the Vice Pres'ident
made thi s demand on the Ukra'ini ans and speci f i ca11y the

t4

Presi dent?

l5

l9

I think I -- I don't recal1 -- I mean, he
gave a public speech and in the well of the Ukrainian
parliament. But this demand would have been delivered in
private in his meeting with President Poroshenko.
MR. J0RDAN: You never got a readout on how it all went

20

down?

t6
t7

l8

2t
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23

24
25

someone

Nuland

over and parti ci pati ng j n a pretri p bri ef.

14R. JORDAN: When

l4R. KENT:

I was a language student for a period of
several months in the U.S. I was aware that he'd made the
request. I was also aware that Shokin remained an embattled
prosecutor general for several months more until there was a
vote held in thejr parliament to remove him.
MR. KENT:

 224
MR. MEADOWS: So

I

1et me fo1low up one last time. So who

J

the decision that Vice President Biden should be the one
that communicated thjs? You know, if you all are having all

4

these discussions

2

made

5

for so many months, who made that decision
that says, 1et's wait until the VP goes over to make thjs

6

request?
MR. KENT:

7
8

Yeah. WelI, there was no wai ti ng, as I

ment'ioned.
MR. MEADOWS:

9

Well 3 months.

l3

a -- I gave an example of a
pubficly avajlable speech that was a statement, a very strong
statement on the record of
MR. MEAD0WS: Yeah, but youlinference was js that that

t4

was the

l0

ll
t2

MR. KENT: Well

that

was

start of it.

l6

I wouldn't say that. It's just that I
thi nk that's a publ i c mark where people could see th'is i s the

t7

American Ambassador speaking on

l5

MR. KENT:

No,

20

the record about our concerns
about the lack of progress and the rule of 1aw reform in 201.5
a year and a half after the Revolution of Dignity. At the
same t'ime, there was constant private messaging, messages and

2t

meetings

22

meetings when Assistant Secretary Nuland would

23

conversations would happen when Vice President Biden would

24

talk to both President Poroshenko as well as then prime

25

mi

l8
t9

ni

that Ambassador Pyatt had in Kyiv, conversatjons

ster Arseny Yatseni

uk.

travel,

and

or

 225
MR. MEADOWS: So before you went away

1

to

language

2

school, you had no recollection that the decision had

3

made

4

your statement?

that the Vice President was going to

make

been

this? Is that

t4

that wetl , agai n, we' re
now talking about conversations, of which I was not a part,
that happened 4 years ago. I do not think my guess, to
the best of my ability, I would anticipate that the issue of
Shoki n's status was ra'ised pri or to the Vi ce Presi dent's
tri p, possi b1y duri ng a conversati on. But I was not on those
ca1ls between the Vice President of the United States and the
Presi dent of Ukrai ne.
MR. MEADOWS: But wouldn't it be a big deal jf the Vice
President is going to demand a curtailment of $f billion?

l5

Wouldn't that have registered with you, since your passion

l6

and

t7

20

Right. We11, as I said, my understanding of
how that decision got to the point of having the Vice
President raise that in the first week of December when he
came to Kyiv started with conversatjons between Ambassador

2l

Pyatt and Assistant Secretary Nuland and then

22

recommendation

23

when he vi si ted.

5

6
7
8

9

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25

MR. KENT:

No. I

would say

MR. KENT:

a

that Vice President Biden pushed that'issue

That's my understanding of how the informatjon, the

idea, the flow pattern occurred and then he made the request

 226
I

when he came out.
MR. t"lEADOWS:

2

BY MR.

J

0kay, Steve.

CASTOR:

2t

a At the time was there any discussion of perceived
conflicts of interest either on the part of the Vice
Presi dent or h"is son?
A You' re now talki ng about a peri od lead'ing up to h j s
visit in December 2015.
a We11, Hunter Biden he was first reported that he
was on the board in mid-20L4?
A Cor rect.
a And the V'ice Presi dent's i nvolvement wi th Ukra j ne
is pretty significant at that point in t'ime and it remained
unti t he, you know, through 2016. Correct?
A Yes.
a And the questjon was, you know, were there any
discussions of a perceived- conflict of interest on the part
of either Hunter Biden or the Vice President?
A When I was the first time I was'in Ukraine as
acting deputy chief of mission in the period of mjd-January
to mid-February 2015, subsequent to me going into the deputy

22

prosecutor general on February 3rd and demanding who took the

4
5

6
7
8

9

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l3
t4
l5
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18

l9
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24

bribe and how much was it to shut the case against Zlochevsky
I became aware that Hunter Biden was on the board. I did not

25

know

23

that at the

time.

 227

7

I was on a catl with somebody on the Vice
President's staff and I cannot recall who it was, just
briefing on what was happening into Ukraine I raised my
concerns that I had heard that Hunter Biden was on the board
of a company owned by somebody that the U.S. Government had
spent money trying to get tens of miltions of dollars back
and that could create the percept'ion of a conflict of

8

i

1

2
J
4
5

6

And when

nterest.

a

9

l0

1

i

ne te1 1

A

ll

And what

did

The message that

Vice President's son

l3

was no

l5

l6
t7

the other end of the

you?

t2

t4

the person on

Beau

I

reca11 hearing back was that the

was dying

of

cancer and

that there

further bandwidth to deal with family related
at that time.
a Was that pretty much the end of i t?
A That was the end of that conversation.
a Okay. That was i n mi d-201.5?

i ssues

22

A That would have been in February, because to the
best of my recollection Beau Biden died that spring. I then
returned to Ukraine in August of 2015 and I believe he passed
before then. So the only t'ime that conversation coutd have
happened is in that narrow wjndow between January, February,

23

2015.

l8

l9
20

2t

24
25

to that, djd you ever think through
with other State Department officials about maybe we should
a

And subsequent

 228
I

2
J
4
5

6
7
8

9

l0

try to get Hunter Biden to leave the board or maybe we should
get the Vice President to transition his key responsibjlities
on Ukrai ne to some other senior U. S. offi ci a1?
A No. It's easy in a conference room like thjs to
have a considered discussion about things. In Ukraine at
that tjme, we had a war with Russia occupation, we had an
embassy staff going from 150 Americans to 250 Americans, from
no Special Force U.S. Government soldiers to close to 70 in
country, our assistance went from $130 million to nearly a
bi1lion.

ll
t2
l3
t4
l5

l6
t7
18

l9
20

2t
22
23

24
25

And we were working nearly

nonstop.

Ambassador

Pyatt,

I

tel1 you from working for him, would wake up between 4:58
and 5:01, because that was when I got the first email from
him, and went to bed between L2:59 and L:01, because that's
when I would get the last email. He had an internal c1ock.
He only slept 4 hours. And it was nonstop,20 hours a day,
7 days a week
a 0kay. Gotcha.
You referenced earlier the President's congratulatory
note to President Zelenskyy.
A Hi s calI.
a No, the note.
A Yes.
a It was ripped up?
A That is what I heard from others, yes.
can

 229

4

that the May 29th letter?
If there's a letter that's signed May 29th that
would be the second versjon that was then signed.
a 0kay. 5o that's the only letter we're talking

5

about, ri ght?

I
2
J

6

7
8

9

l0

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13

l4
l5
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t7

a
A

A
a

Was

Correct.

Okay. In the letter they talk about a White House

meeting as a prospect.

A
a

I
I

bel i eve so.

can make

it an exhibit or I can read it

whatever

your preference is?

If I could look at it that would be he1pful.
0kay. So thi s wi 11 be Exhi bi t 2.
Do you guys need copies or are you good?
A Very positive letter, yes.
IMi nori ty Exhi bi t No. 2
Was marked for identi fi cation. l

A
a

BY MR.

l8

CASTOR:

22

Yes. The penultimate paragraph says, to help show
that commitment -- the last sentence of the penultimate
paragraph says, I'd tike to invite you to meet with me at the
White House in Washington, D.C. as soon as we can find a

23

mutually conveni ent t'ime.

t9
20

2t

24
25

a

A
O

Yes.

So thi s was the spi ffed up

letter

or

 230
I
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J

4
5

6
7

This is the letter that I understand that
Ambassador Sondland helped arrange, yes, sir.

A
a

I think you'd characterize the new letter

as

possibly better than the original?

A
a

Yes.

What were the di fference

to the extent

you

remembe r?

ll

A Just I think stylistically I liked the second
version. I don't know who the drafter of the first version
was and I don't know how many people were involved in
production of the language of the second one. I just thought

t2

the second one read better.

8

9

l0

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a

Okay. And do you know why the President

fi rst

was

t4

di sappoi nted wi th the

l5

l6

A It wasn't he was disappointed with the version of
letter, he based on what the readout I heard from Kurt

t7

VoIker and others that he was disappointed with Ukraine.

l8

20

letter was offered the to the
President for his signature somewhat later in time?
A My understanding, and I think this may have been

2l

the version from Gordon Sondland that while the President

22

angry obviously

t9

23

24
25

a

Okay. And so the

versi

on?

new

was

at the point that he point and tore up the
letter. By the end of the meeting he agreed to sign a
revised version and this is the version that he signed.
a 0kay. And the offer or the invite to come meet at

 231
the Whi te House, 'is that somethi ng that 'is customari 1y
2

offered to an a1ly

J

a

on thi s date?

4

A

wi

thout speci fi c the

I

mentioned before, President Trump and

We11, as

s

5

Presi dent-e1ect Zelenskyy had thi

6

when President-eIect Zelenskyy had

meeti ng wi 11 happen

di scussi on on Apri 1 2Lst

l3

invited President Trump to
come to his inauguration, and he said, we11, I will send
somebody there, but I'd tike to get you to the White House.
So this was following up on that theme. President Trump
had offered it in concept in April. He put it in writing 'in
May. But, you know, as anyone who's ever staffed not just
the President but a principat, you can have an agreement in
principle to meet but then schedules are complicated,

t4

parti cularly when you' re deal i ng wi th two Presi dents of

l5

countries.

7
8

9
10

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t2

t6

a

proposed suggested,

l8

together?

20

2l
22

z)
24
25

A
a
A

That's a fai r statement, yes.

don't actually happen.
That would also probably in certain circumstances

And sometimes the meeti ngs

also be a fair

a
A
O

for the meeti ngs to be
discussed and then take a while to put

So i t i s not uncommon

t7

19

two

assessment.

0kay.

Because these issued are complicated?

Because schedules are busy, yes.

If I

heard you correctly you mentjoned

that

in

 232
I

March Ambassador Sondland contacted President Poroshenko to

2

urge hjm

8

to back off attacks on Ambassador Yovanovitch was
it? Did I hear that right?
A That is probably close to what I said. And it that
is what I recal1 seeing in an email exchange, yes.
a Okay. So in March Poroshenko is about to lose the
electi on? Rl ght?
A He doesn't realize it but the rest of the country

9

does, yes.

J
4
5

6
7

O

l0

0kay.

And so

in urging him to

back

off the attacks

ll

on Yovanovitch, do you have any idea whether Poroshenko

t2

genui

l3

nely knew that h'is apparatus was attacki ng her?
A When I visited in May I had the prime minister,

sters,

and a f ormer pri me mi ni ster te11 me that

t4

three

l5

Poroshenko authorized

l6

authori zed Lutsenko

t7

l8

that 1ed to the attacks on Ambassador Yovanovitch.
a Okay. And where did you learn of Sondland's

t9

content?

m'ini

A
a
A

20

2t
22

the attacks

let

me be

careful.

to share the i nformati on wi th

With Poroshenko

in

March

He

Gi ul i ani

that I referred to.

0kay.

In

an

ema'i

1 I bel i eve f rom the embassy i t could

23

have been Ambassador Yovanovitch,

24

DCM

25

and

it could

have been from the

at the time, Pam Tremont.
a 0kay. Did Sondland te11 you himself?

 233
A
a

I
2
J

conversation was put together?

A

4
5

I d'id not hear it directty from Sondland, no.
Do you have an understanding of tike how thjs
My understanding based

on also seeing

Ambassador Sondland has engaged Georgian

how

leaders, because I

7

also have responsibility for Georgia, is that when he meets
leaders 'in BrusseIs. -- or, in the case of the Ukraine, he met

8

President Poroshenko and other leaders

9

U.S. trip visit, he hands them his business card, he gets

6

in

Odesa

during the

l5

their business card, and then starts direct communication via
WhatsApp or phone ca11s.
a Wi th world leaders?
A With world leaders.
O Okay. And he did that with President Poroshenko?
A Yes. To the best of my knowledge, he did that with

l6

President Poroshenko as well as the then Georgia prime

t7

mi

l0

ll
t2

l3
t4

l8

n'ister.

a

I 'm goi ng

to

mark Exhi bi t

ty

t9

lMi nori

20

was marked
BY MR.

2t
22
23

a

Menendez,

3

.

b'it No. 3
for i denti fi cati on. l

Exhi

CASTOR:

Th'is is a

letter to

Poroshenko from Senators

Durbin, and Leahy about the 14ue1ler investigation

24

Does anybody

25

Take

as

much

need

copies?

Do you have enough?

time as you need to check this out.

 234
I

2
J

4
5

6
7
8

9

l0

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t2
t3

t4
15

t6
17

l8
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20

2l
22
23

24
25

Have you

ever seen

this letter

before?

 235
I

14:23 p.m.l

4

I do not recaIl, but I can't rule out. The
U.S. Congress does not, as a matter of course, copy embassies
on its correspondence with other countries, but we oftentimes

5

do receive courtesy copies sometimes through the State

6

Department.

2
J

MR. KENT:

BY MR.

7
8

9

a

a

CASTOR:

Do you know

if the State Department

has provided

copy?
A

10

I honestty cannot

ll

hearing about a

t2

letter.

l3

a

t4

communi

l5

A

communi

remember,

cati on

whi

Okay. And what do you
cati

but I at least recal1

ch could

have been

remember about

thi

s

this

on?

We11,

that there were some peopte

nterest i n whether

expressing

bIy stopped cooperati ng.

l6

j

t7

This is not the first time I've heard it, but I honestly

l8

could not gi ve you preci sely, you know, i nformati on.

t9

thjs

20

2t
22
23

24
25

us

Ukrai ne had possi

was not a communication

a
A

0f

that went through the

Agai n,

embassy

course.

nor did we go to the prosecutor general to raise

the concerns of the three Senators who sent this letter.

a
A

in the leg affairs
At the time, I was working in Kyiv, so I woutd not
0kay.

Do you know

if

anyone

necessarily have been aware. My predecessor was Bridget

 236
Brink,
2

who

is

now serving as our Ambassador

she was the Deputy Assistant Secretary

in Slovakia.

So

at the time, so I'm

4

not sure if this letter was passed through and was discussed.
a If the State Department found out about this, do

5

you think they would dispatch

J

t3

their legislative liaisons to
talk w'ith the Senators or thei r Senator's staf f to
A HonestIy, aga'in, I was in Kyiv at the time, so I do
not have knowledge of any 'interact'ion between the Senate's
three senators, their staff
a Fa'i r enough
and ei ther Hi 11 li ai son or the European Bureau.
A
a Were you aware of any questions about whether
Lutsenko was failing to cooperate with Special Counsel

t4

Muel I

6
7
8

9

l0
1l

t2

15

.

e

r?

A

Agai

n, I didn't

have any conversations wi th

t7

Mr. Lutsenko as a general ru1e. By this point in May
of 2018, our relations w'ith him had soured. And so we didn't

l8

have a complete break

t9

we, the U.S. Embassy, did not meet with him frequently.

t6

20

a

Do you know

in

communications, but we

if

anyone

did

not

at the State Department had

23

a -- picked up the phone and ca1led the Justice Department
and said, you know, this Lutsenko fel1ow is not so great. if
you are getting information from him, you might want to

24

better understand that he is not well-regarded at this point?

2t
22

25

A

To be honest,

I

have no knowledge

of that,

and I

 237
1

2
a

J

can't say either yes or no.
a Okay. I'11 ask you one last question,
time is about to expire after this round.

and then our

There was some discussion about instances where Mayor

4

an'i was operati ng i n Ukrai ne and havi ng meeti

5

Gi u1i

6

we know

ngs.

And

t4

that he has got some clients and other interests.
It's fair to say the Ukrainians are aware of his celebrity
status, at least some Ukrainians?
A I think some Ukrainians, like many Americans,
remember him from the time he was Mayor of New York at the
tjme of the attacks, September LL. Besides I mentioned, jn a
positive 1ight, former heavyweight boxing champion, Mayor of
Kyiv, KIychko. The other individuals that former Mayor
Giuliani has chosen to associate in Ukraine have far less

l5

posi

7
8

9

l0

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l3

t7

ti ve reputati ons j n Ukrai ne.
a Right. But, you know, he was at least somebody
that was, you know, considered to be an international, you

l8

know,

l6

22

political figure from his time as Mayor of New York.
A Right. Although, again, that would have had less
impact in Ukraine, whjch was focused on jts own issues and
challenges at the time.
a Ri ght. But hi s abi 1 i ty to get meeti ngs i s

23

understandable?

l9
20

2t

24
25

A I mean, he had an existing relationship with the
mayor of Kyiv, and I think Mayor Klychko would probably see

 238

)

at any moment. I would say that is the level of an easy
ask. It was well known in Ukra'ine that his main paying
clients in Ukra'ine at the time were the mayor of Kharkiv and

4

a Russi an Ukrai ni an o1 i garch named Pavlo

1

2

h'im

5

6

ll
t2
13

t4

Is this before 2016 I'm sorry, before

A

I

bel i eve

that

Mayor Gi u1 i ani

's

2018 in

assocj ati on wi th

Mayor Kernes and Pavlo Fuks contractually began

a

9
10

a
the

7
8

Fuks.

0kay.

in

20L7.

Thank you.

if I could take another break.
THE CHAIRMAN: Let's gets a 5-minute break. We sti11
have a lot of material to get through, and we want to try to
get you out as a reasonable hour. So let's try to come back
as soon as possible after a quick break.
MR. KENT: And

l5

lRecess. l

l6

THE CHAIRMAN:

t7

Secretary, I have just a few questions before I hand it

Let's go back on the record.

to l4r. Goldman.

My colleagues asked you

a great deal

l8

back

t9

I want to go back to one of
the origins of the narrative they were getting at. You
mentioned there were four false narratives in the Solomon
article back in April of 20L9. 1s that right?

20

2t
22
23

24
25

about the Bjdens and Burisma.

four narratives that were
introduced, led off by the Solomon articles. But I'm not
sure that all four were introduced by Solomon. The first two
MR. KENT: We11, there were

 239

l3

definitely part one, part two, but there were a number
of different platforms in play that week.
THE CHAIRI4AN: And part one, was that Lutsenko's c1a'im
that Biden pressured Poroshenko to fire Shokin because of the
prosecutor general's offi ce i nvesti gati on of Buri sma?
l"lR. KENT: No. I bel jeve that the f i rst day the two
themes that were introduced were the anticorruption theme,
and that was targeting the embassy, including the letter that
I had signed in April 20L6, and NABU, as in an organization,
and then the 20L6 conversation. The discussions of the
Bidens and Burisma was the third narrative theme that was
introduced a day or two 1ater.
THE CHAIRMAN: So that was the third false narrative you

t4

referred

I
2
3

4
5

6
7
8

9

l0

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t2

l5

l6
t7

l8
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were

l"lR. KENT: Right.

in fact, that false narrative that
the Vi ce President had pressured the f i ri ng of Shok'in over
Burisma, Lutsenko himself would later recant. Did he not?
THE CHAIRt"lAN:

MR. KENT:

20

i ssues

2l

i ssue.

22
23

24
25

to?

And,

Mr. Lutsenko has held many positions on many

that are mutually exclusi ve, and i ncludi ng on th'is

jn

of 20L9, Mr. Lutsenko,
were you aware, di d an i nterv'iew wi th Bloomberg i n whi ch he
said he had no evidence of wrongdoing by Biden or his son.
Are you fami 1 i ar wi th that i ntervi ew?
THE CHAIRMAN:

Wel1,

mid-May

 240

J

familiar with the interview that he
gave to The L.A. Times, in which he said that the activities
related primarily to Zlochevsky's actions as minister, which

4

occurred several years before Hunter Biden came on

I
2

5

6
7
8

9

l0

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t2

l3
t4

MR. KENT:

I

am more

to

the

board. So his interviews this year, subsequent to leaving
office, are more in accord with the facts as I understood
them at the time, than his aSsertions as prosecutor general.
THE CHAIRMAN: 5o let me ask you a little bit more again
about thi s false narrati ve si nce recanted. J ust to be
absolutely clear about this, when the Vice President was
asked to make the case, or help make the case for Shokin's
firing, this was the policy of the State Department, and the
State Department was asking the Vice President to assist with
the execution of that PolicY?

l5

MR. KENT: That would be

16

THE CHAIRMAN: And

it

a correct assessment, yes.

was the

policy of other

t7

'international organizations as well that recognized that

l8

Shokin was corrupt?

l9

MR. KENT:

Correct.

He was

not allowing for reform of

2l

the prosecutor general SerVice, and jn contrast, he actually
was act'ive1y undermining reform of the prosecutor general

22

servi ce and

20

23

24
25

ou

r

assi stance.

this involved, as you said, an effort
to undermine the very inspector general office that the State
Department had assiduously worked to help the Ukrainians
THE CHAIRI4AN: And

 241
I

establish to root out corruption within the prosecutor force?

2

MR. KENT: Correct.

J

THE CHAIRMAN: Mr . Gotdman.

BY MR.

4

GOLDMAN:

Thank you, ["1r. Chai rman.

5

a

6

Picking up off of that June 28 conference call that

7

referenced, follow'ing

that, you said that

you were

in

you

Toronto

t4

for a meeting where President Zelenskyy also was present?
A Correct. This was the Ukraine Reform Conference.
It essentially is the primary friends, donors of Ukraine.
This was the third edition. The first one was he1d, I
believe, in Denmark; second in London; and the third was
hosted in Canada by the Canadjan Government. And Kurt Volker
and I were the ranki ng U. S. of f i c'ia1s who attended f or the

l5

U.S.

8

9

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a
A
a
A

And who was there from Ukraine?

President Zelenskyy himself.

22

of his senjor aides?
Many of his senior aides. In the meeting that we
had on JuIy 2, to the best of my recollect'ion, those included
h'is chi ef of staf f , Andriy Bohdan, who i s a very
controversj a1 fi gure; 'i t i ncluded hi s two closest personal

23

assistants, a person

24

Yermak;

l8
t9
20

2t

25

And any

named

Shefir, and another one named

jt jncluded a professional in the presidential
apparatus, Igor Zhovkva; their ambassador to Canada, Andriy

 242
I
2

Shevchenko, and an interpreter.

a
A

And what was discussed

at that meeting?

5

of U. 5. -Ukrai ne relati ons, because
of special representative for Ukraine negotiation Volker's
focus on the Donbas confljct. That was one segment of the

6

conversati on.

J

4

The whole range

l8

bilateral relations, that
was the first time, I mentioned earlier, that I heard
di rectly from Kurt hi s asserti on that Perry, 5ond1and, and
Volker were now in charge of Ukraine policy. He made that
assertion to Pres'ident Zelenskyy.
Coming out of the meeting with the President, he
explained how the meeting had gone on May 23 in the 0va1
0ffice, that the three officers were the ones leading the
he said that we're working on a phone
charge, and that
call wi th the Presi dent.
And Zelenskyy cut him off at that point and said, just
phone call? How about the vi si t? And Votker sai d, fi rst a

t9

phone ca11, which

20

He sa'id, We'I1 aim for

7
8

9
10

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l2
l3
t4
l5

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When we

got to

more general

this is

a

conversation happening on July

that perhaps next week,

23

24

chai red.

22

25

a

Was

2

and hopefully

that will lead into a meeting by the end of the month,
July 29 and 30, which was roughty, I think, the dates that
were discussed in the June L8 meeting that Secretary Perry

2t

a

there any di scussj on i n that meeti ng i n Toronto

 243
I

on July 2 about the investigations that Rudy Giuljani

2

been promoti

had

ng?

5

in the fu11 format of
everyone on both sides of the table. However, prior to the
meet'ing, Ambassador Volker told me that he would need to have

6

a private meeting separately with the President, that

7

would pu11 him

J
4

8

9
10

ll

A

There was not a discussion

he

asjde. And he explained to me that the
purpose of that private conversation was to underscore the
importance of the messaging that Zelenskyy needed to provide
to President Trump about his willingness to be cooperative.

t7

that happened as the meeting broke up, he
announced that he needed to have a private meeting. He went
around to the Ukrainian side of the table and pulled
Zelenskyy, hi s chi ef of staff, Bohdan, and the translator. I
was standing about L0 feet of the way, introducing myself to
Andriy Yermak and talking to him. 5o that was Volker had
several m'inutes with Zelenskyy, his chief of staff and the

l8

'interpreter.

t9

a

20

cooperation.

2l

A
a
A

12

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t4

l5

l6

22

Z)
24
25

And

You said the messaging about the

witling

or

Yeah.

Cooperation about what?

details at that point were not clear to me. I
would say that Kurt Volker had not provided additional
details. It was more that President Zelenskyy needed to be
The

 244
1

2

signaling something in his cooperative attitude towards
something the President was interested in.

a

J
4

And

at that point you did not know what the

Presi dent was i nterested i n?

6

A At that point, Kurt Volker did not say, nor was I
aware of what the President was interested. Rudy Giutiani

7

was tweeting what Rudy

8

was and

9

the

5

U.

Giuliani thought, but Rudy Giuliani
remains a private cit'izen, not an official of

is

S.

Government.

t2

Right. Did you understand why Kurt Volker needed
to have thi s i n a pri vate pu11-asi de have thi s
conversation in a private pu11-aside meeting rather than with

l3

everyone there?

l4

l6

clear that he both wanted to restrict
knowledge of i t, and consj dered the matter sensi ti ve. But,
again, I had not been on the June 28 conference ca11. I

t7

heard about

l0

ll

l5

l8

a

A

And

We11,

I

it

was

that subsequently from Charge Taylor.

had also not been involved

in

any

of

the

2t

I wasn't there at the
June L8 nor the May 23. 5o sometimes I can get readouts
officially of meetings, but if you're not there, you miss the

22

si debar conversati ons

t9
20

conversations that had gone on.

24

that can take place.
a So it's your testimony that you did not you were
not aware at that point of what the sensitive issue that Kurt

25

Volker needed to talk about related to President Zelenskyy's

23

 245
I

cooperati on wi th Presi dent

4

of was that there was an interest,
and Kurt was sending a signal of a desire to have Zelenskyy
be cooperative, but I djd not know the details of what the

5

ask was on that date, July 2.

2
a

J

A

What

I

Trump?

was aware

7

Okay. Did Kurt Volker explain to you what he
d'iscussed with President Zelenskyy in that pu11-aside

8

afterwards?

6

a

t7

A No. But he explained he was, I would say,
relatively transparent beforehand. This is what I'm going to
do, and this is my message and this is why.
a And how did you what did he say the why was?
A i.'Iell, I think his goa1, to my understanding, based
on my conversatjons with him, he was trying to get through
what seemed to be a hiccup in the communications, and wanted
to get Presjdent Trump and President Zelenskyy together,
counting on Zelenskyy's personal interactjve skj11s to build

l8

rapport and carry the relationship forward.

9

l0

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l4
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l9
20

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23

24
25

a
A
from Kurt

a
A

Okay. But that's the why he was doing it?
That was my understanding, based on what

prior to the meeting,
And what

I

heard

yes.

did he te11 you after about the meeting?

It was, you know it was a several-minute
exchange, and so I just presumed that he had said and raised
the ask in the way that he had described to me right before

 246
I
2

the meeti

ng.

a

And what was your reaction

to the ask as you

t4

it from Volker at the time?
A At the time, I was interested to see where this
thought pattern would go. I do not recal1 whether the
fo1low-on conversation I had with Kurt about this was in
Toronto, or whether it was subsequently at the State
Department. But he did te1l me that he planned to start
reaching out to the former Mayor of New York, Rudy Giuliani.
And when I asked him why, he said that it was clear that
the former mayor had influence on the Presjdent in terms of
the way the President thought of Ukraine. And I think by
that moment i n t'ime, that was self -ev'ident to anyone who was
working on the issues, and therefore, it made sense to try to

t5

engage the mayor.

a

J

4
5

6
7
8

9

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understood

t9

I raised with Kurt, I said, about what? Because
former Mayor Giuliani has a track record of, you know, asking
f or a v'isa f or a corrupt f ormer prosecutor. He attacked
Masha, and he's tweeting that the new President needs to

20

'investi gate

t6
t7

l8

When

Bi

den and the 20L5 campai gn.

24

Kurt's reaction, or response to me at that was,
wel1, if there's nothing there, what does it matter? And if
there js something there, it should be investigated. My
response to him was asking another country to investigate a

25

prosecution

2l
22
L)

And

for political

reaSons undermines

our advocacy of

 247

2

the rule of 1aw. And that was the nature of the exchange, at
some point in July, either at Toronto or perhaps, more

J

1

1

2t

uly i n the State Department.
a Now, Ambassador Volker is a longtime, you know,
Forei gn Servi ce offj cer, ri ght?
A He is.
a What was his reaction when you sajd that this would
undermine the rule of 1aw and everything that we stand for?
A I do not recall him giving a verbal response.
a 0kay. And so presumably you and Kurt Vo1ker were
in Toronto for some tjme, right?
A We arrived, to the best of my recollection, on the
1st and departed late afternoon of the 3rd. We djd not
travel together.
a Did you spend any time together there?
A We were in many meetings together, yes.
a Dld you spend any meals together?
A I do not reca1l us having working meals together,
or hectic, not
but it was a hectic trip and generally, his
trip, but set of meetings. There were a 1ot of Ukrainians
there, and I had a lot of sidebar meetings with attendees at

22

the conference.

4
5

6
7
8

9

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23

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25

i

keIy,

mi

d-J

OSo
A I should also say that there was a -- because Kurt
was head of delegation, the Canadian foreign mjnister hosted

 248

2

a dinner for heads of delegation to which Kurt was invited.
I was not because there was just one U.S. attendee. So, for

J

instance, whatever the anchor night was, he went to the

4

leaders meeti ng, and I met w'i th other Ukrai ni ans who

5

the re

I

6

.

a

Are you fami1iar with a Ju1y L0 meeting

7

White House involving senior Ukrainian

8

American

9

A

I

saw

At the time I

ll

among

l3
t4

officials

at

the

and senior

officials?

l0

t2

were

pictures tweeted outside after the meeting.

was on a

multi-country swing that included,

other countries, Moldova and Ukraine.
a So you were unaware prior to the meeting

occurring, you were unaware that it was happening?
A I knew that there was going to be a meeting.

l6

principals for that meeting were Ambassador Bolton and
0leksandr Danylyuk, who'd been appointed the head of the

t7

National Security and Defense Councjl in Ukraine, which

l8

doesn't have an analogous role to our National Security

t9

Council but has a

l5

The

20

that sounds similar. And 0leksandr
Danylyuk is a Ukrainian official well-known to many of us who

2t

have worked on Ukraine.

22
23

24
25

name

just to be c1ear, the conversation that you
had with Kurt Volker, even if you aren't sure that it was in
Toronto, it occurred before your European swing?
A I can't tell you for certain when in July it was.
a

Now,

 249
I

have since been made aware by seeing the WhatsApp messages

5

that Kurt released that he said he had breakfast with
Giuliani on July L6th, so it would make sense that my
conversation with Kurt happened before then July 1-9th
because he was telling me that he would reach out to Mayor

6

Giulian'i

2
3

4

a

7
8

.

Did you discourage him from reaching out

to

Mayor

Giuliani?

A

I

t2

his purpose was, and that's when
he said, as I relayed earljer, that because, clearly, former
Mayor Giuliani was an influence on the President's thinking
of Ukraine that he, Kurt Volker, felt it was worthwhite

l3

engagi ng

9

l0

ll

a

t4
l5

t8

t9

Right. I know. But did you think jt

was

worthwhi 1e engaging?

A

t6
t7

asked him what

and

I

What

I

understood was Kurt was thinking

was concerned

a

tactically

strategically.

Did you have any discussions with anyone else at

the State Department by mid-July, any time up to mid-Ju1y or

23

prior to, about Mr. Giuliani's potential influence on the
President and the fact that what he was advocating may be
contrary to official U.S. policy?
A I di d not, i n part because af ter G'iu1i ani attacked

24

me, as

20
21

22

25

well as Ambassador Yovanovjtch and the entire embassy,
i n hi s late May i nterv'iew, I was told to keep my head down

 250

2

a

profile in Ukraine.
Who told you that?

J

A

The message was relayed f rom my supervi

I

and lower my

sor, Acti ng

4

Assi stant Secretary Reeker message relayed from Under

5

Secretary HaIe.
a

6
7

Do you know

if it

became from above Under SecretarY

Hale?

13

A A11 I know is that Assistant Secretary Reeker,
after a meeting with Under Secretary Hale said that Under
Secretary Hale had directed me to keep my head down and a
lower profile'in Ukraine.
a And what did you understand a lower profile in
Ukra'ine to mean, gi ven that you oversaw the pol i cy f or the

t4

State Department on Ukraine?

8

9

l0

ll
t2

l5

A

Well, I oversee policy for six countries, and this

or two before I

l6

was a day

t7

attend my daughter's

was going on leave

to go visit

and go hi ki ng i n Maj ne. And

t9

so I said, Fine, you're not going to hear me talk about
country for the next week and a half. And I dld cancel

20

public appearances on Ukraine in June, sort of think tank

2t

sessi ons around Washi ngton.

l8

22
23

24
25

any
some

a And at that point, did you sense that you were cut
out of the loop in terms of State Department policy
discussions and dealings with Ukraine given this Volker,
Sondland, Perry tri umvi rate?

 251
I

2
3

4
5

I wouldn't say that I was cut out of the 1oop. As
I indicated, Kurt and I continued to have a back and forth.
I was aware that obviously other players had come into the
picture. And you had Secretary Perry convening a meeting
wi th a number of State Department offi ci als.
A

You had Gordon Sondland

6

giving a public interview that

7

the three amigos were now in charge of Ukraine, and by that

8

he meant Perry, Sondland, and Volker.

9

that to President

l0

Zelenskyy

I

heard

in Toronto, but I

Vo1 ke

r say

was i n that

meeting.

ll

a
A

Volker called them the three amigos to Zelenskyy?

l5

in a public interview, ca11ed
themselves three amigos. Volker just stated that coming out
of the meeting with President Trump at the Ova1 0ffice, that
those were the three officials that would be taking the lead

l6

on our policy towards Ukraine.

t2

l3
t4

a

t7
18

2t
22
23

24
25

Sondland,

Were you speaking

regularly wjth Bill Taylor in

June and July?

A

19

20

No.

Yes. There's a schedule of

every Monday there

s a generally scheduled secure video conference. It's not
j ust one-on-one. Usualty i t's wi th offj ce di rector, deputy
director from my side, and members of the country team on his
side. That was the schedule that dated back
a Wel1, let me rephrase the questjon. Did you speak
to Charge Taylor about the three ami gos, or Rudy G'iu1i ani or
'i

 252
activities with regard to the advocacy for

I

any

2

i nvesti gati ons?

these

5

are, in your exploration of a timeline, not yet
to the point where that became apparent to me that this is
or not U.S. policy, where U.S.
where U.S. poficy

6

engagement was headed.

J
4

A

a

7
8

9

l0

We

Okay. And we'11 probably get there, but

when woutd

that time is?
A We11, I think jn retrospect, from the release of
the WhatsApp messages, it started earlier than I was aware.

you say

ll

a
A

When were

you ultimatety

aware?

t6

that the middle of August, specificatly
August 15 and 16, was when I became aware that this was
actively in p1ay.
a Okay. So did you get we're going to get there,
but did you get a readout from that July L0 meeting from

t7

a

t2
13

t4

l5

I

would say

ny body?

20

I do not recall. I was on the road for because
it was a multj-country trip. I was on the road for more than
a week. I saw the picture that was tweeted out, maybe from

2t

Kurt Volker, maybe from Gordon Sondland, that had the

22

Ukrainians, wh'ich were 0leksandr Danylyuk and Andriy

23

close assistant and associate to President Zelenskyy, as well

24

as the Americans.

t8
t9

25

A

a

Do you reca11 when Fiona

two

Yermak,

Hill left the National

 253

4

ty Counci 1?
A She was scheduled to leave at the end of July. I
don't recall which particular day of which particular week.
a Did you have a meeting or a conversation with her

5

before she left?

I
2
J

6
7
8

9

Securi

A
a

Yes,

I did.

A

Yes, but

did you discuss any of these issues that
been talking about today with her?
And

to be honest, I don't

reca11 the

we've

last

time

l0

we had a conversation, and when we had the conversation would

ll

be important to what we talked about. A conversation that I

t4

I took notes actually dated to mid-May in which
we talked about the change of attitude and approach towards
Ukraine, and that was in the wake of meetings that President

l5

Trump had, a meeting

12

l3

recatl,

and

l6

with Vjktor Orban, the leader of
Hungary, as welt as a call he had with Russian Presjdent

t7

Putjn 'in early

l8
t9
20

a

May.

And what was

the change following those two

conversati ons w'ith 0rban and Puti

A

n?

Fiona assessed the conversations as being similar

2t

in tone and approach.

22

0rban, extensi vely talked Ukrai ne down, sai d i t was corrupt,

Z)

said Zelenskyy was in the thral1 of otigarchs, specifically

24

mentioning

25

picture of Ukraine, and even President Zelenskyy personally.

this

And both leaders, both Putin and

one oligarch Kolomoisky, negatively shaping

a

 254
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4
5

6
7
8

9

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And

did Dr. Hill think that that had an impact on

Presj dent Trump's outlook?

I cannot recalI what she said in that meeting
bes'ides giving me the brief readouts of those two meetings,
but that was my takeaway, and that those two world leaders,
along wi th f ormer Mayor Gi uf iani , the'i r communi cati ons wi th
Presi dent Trump shaped the Presj dent's vj ew of Ukrai ne and
Zelenskyy, and would account for the change from a very
positive fjrst call on April 2L to his negative assessment of
Ukraine when he had the meeting in the 0val 0ffice on May 23.
a And it was your understanding that Sondland, Perry,
A

Volker, when they came back from the inauguratjon they were
very positive about President Zelenskyy. Is that right?

A
a

t4

l5

That
And

is correct.

that generally the State Department had a

l8

tj ve outlook on Presi dent Zelenskyy?
A We were cautiously optimistic that this was an
opportunity to push forward the reform that Ukraine needs to

l9

succeed i n resi sti ng Russi an aggressi on, bui ldi ng

20

successful economy, and, frankly, a justice system that

2l

treat

22

before the

16

t7

23

24
25

posi

American investors and Ukrainian

a

will

citizens equally

1aw.

a But the message from 0rban, Putin, and Giuliani
different than the message that the State Department was
relaying. Is that right?

was

 255
A

It

2

different than the State Department
assessment, and it was different than the assessment

J

Secretary Perry, 5ond1and, and Volker.

a

4
5

Gi

was

Okay. But the Presjdent was listening to

of

the

uli ani , 0rban, Puti n conti ngent --

24

A I don't know.
accordi ng to Dr. Hi 11?
a
A Accordi ng to Dr. Hi 11, i n assessi ng the change from
late April to late May, but then we had also the instructions
coming out of that meeting leading to the signing of the
letter on May 29 and the efforts to help Ukraine particularly
in the energy sector.
a Dr. Hi11 told us that she departed on July 19, and
that prior to leaving, she had a conversation with you.
A That agai n, I recall us speaki ng sometime i n
Ju1y. I honestly don't recall the content of that. 0ne
reason why I recall more specifics from May is that as I was
looking through my notes to find records to provide to the
State Department to be responsive to the subpoena, I found
notes that I took when I talked to her in May. When I was
going through my notes I did not find notes of our
conversation in July. But, yes, I do recall that we talked
jn Ju1y.
a And did you provide the notes from that May call to

25

the Department --

6
7
8

9

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t6
t7

l8
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20
21

22
23

 256
I
2
a

J

4

A
a

Yes.

for production to Congress and pursuant to

the

subpoena?

A
a

Yes.

8

just make sure I understand. You
heard from Ambassador Taylor at the end of June that there
that at the end
was correct me if this summary is wrong
of June, that there was a conversation with Taylor,

9

Ambassador Sondland,

5

6
7

0kay.

So

1et

me

Volker, and Secretary Perry where they

for President Zelenskyy to initiate

l0

discussed the need

ll

some I think you said investigatjons was the readout you
got in that call?
A We11, sending the right signal without the details
of the
O Without the details. And then Ambassador Volker
reaffirmed that to you directly before the meeting with
President Zelenskyy in Toronto?
A Correct.
a Okay. Up until the July 25 ca1l, from July 2 to

t2

l3
t4
l5

l6
t7

l8
l9
20

2t
22
23

24
25

July 25, did you have any more discussions with anyone about
the not'ion of Ukrai ne pursui ng these j nvesti gati ons ei ther
specifically or more generally in terms of cooperation?
A I do not recal1 any additional conversations that I
had in Ju1y. But I can't rule it out. Again, I had a
conversation with Fiona, I remember that, a sort of farewell

 257

5

call or a meeting, discussion. But, again, I don't remember
the content, and a1so, keep in mind that we had
responslbilities I only had responsibilities for six
countries. She had responsibilities for many more.
a Ri ght. Okay. So you don't remember i f she vo'iced

6

any concerns about what was going on with Rudy

7

anything related

I
2
J

4

to

Giuliani or

that?

l0

I honestly can't remember the content of that
conversation apart from I know that she had some concerns
about nonstandard actors. I believe, in that conversation,

ll

she expressed concern with Gordon Sondland's approach.

8

9

12

l3

A

a
A

did she express wjth Gordon Sondland?
To the best of my recollection, she had concerns

What concerns

l4

possibly based on having been in conversatjons in the

l5

0ffice that

l6

not match wjth what had actually been said in the 0val

t7

0ffice.

20

a
A
a

2l

you weren't

22

A

18

t9

he made assertions about conversations

Can you

I

was

that did

elaborate with any more detail?

not 'in those conversati ons,

so

I'm just asking what she told you. I

in

0va1

understand

them.

I think she may have been as direct as saying that
Sondland l i es about conversati ons that occulin the

23

Gordon

24

0va1 0ff i ce.

25

a

Djd she indicate to you that Gordon Sondtand

had

 258
1

any conversati ons wi th the

2

topi

3

4
5

6

Ch

j ef

of

Staf

f

l4ulvaney on th'is

c?

clear to me that
Ambassador Sondland had a direct connection with Chief of
Staff Mulvaney, and that's actually how the May 23 readout
WaS put on the President's schedule. It was not, to the best

A

As

I

mentioned before,

it

was

ll

of my knowledge, done through the national security staff and
Ambassador Bolton. It was done Ambassador Sondland directly
to Chief of Staff MulvaneY.
a Right. But I'm asking now in July. When Dr. Hill
talked to you and voiced concerns about Sondland, did she

l2

ment'ion anythi ng about Sondland's

13

Mr.

7
8

9

l0

t4

l5

relati

onshi p wi th

Mulvaney?

A
a

She may have,

Okay.

but i do not

Do you reca11

remember.

anything else that she said

in that meeting

was

it a meeting

l6

about Ambassador Sondland

t7

24

or a phone call?
A It was a conversation, but I will say that it was
also not entirely about work. We have a mutual friend whose
wife died of cancer, and he is a Foreign Service officer and
studi ed i n St. Andrews wi th F'iona, and that's where he met
his wife. And so she had passed away. So part of the
conversat'ion was just about our mutual friend who died.
a And the part that was about Ukraine, was there

25

anything more that

l8
t9
20

2l
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 259
That's as much as I reca11. But, again, as I said,

A

I

that

2

it

3

nothing to do with work, and then part of the conversation

4

had

5

6
7

was a conversation

that

had a personal component

to do w'i th work.
a So when did you become

aware

that President Trump

to

July

and President Zelenskyy were going

i believe I

A

speak on

25?

was informed by Lieutenant Colonet

l0

July 24, the day prior. And as I mentioned
before, that's when I sent a message to the embassy
suggesting that they test the line to make sure the call

ll

th rough

t2

a

8

9

l3
t4

l5

Vindman on

from the

And

call

A
a

I believe you said the only readout you got
was from Lieutenant Cotonel Vindman?

Correct.
When

you described

that readout in addit'ion to

emphasizing how Mr. Vindman was uncomfortable and the

t7

l8

sensitive nature of the ca11, so he wasn't comfortable
talking about it, you did say, I wrote down here, that

l9

mentioned

2t
22
23

24
25

went

.

l6

20

had

he

that there was a -- that President Trump had
d'iscussed the extreme narratives that had been discussed
pubticly. Is that
A At that po'int, I don't th'ink he sai d that Presi dent
Trump discussed. What I reca11 is that he said at this point
the conversat'ion went into the most extreme narratives. And
that was him making a summary without providing any detail.

 260
I

O

2

and you

J
4

Understood. But given everything that you knew,

certainty have indicated today that you were aware of
the pubt i c narrati ves

A
a
A

Yeah.

l0

to mean?
I had presumed at the time, and I may have put in
my notes just in parentheses, Giuliani, and that was the way
I i nterpreted what he sai d. But, aga'in, he was very
uncomfortable havi ng the conversati on. He i ni ti ated the
conversation, but it was very clear he was uncomfortable

ll

shari ng th j s l jmi ted summary, i ncludi ng not go'ing i nto the

t2

detail of the call itself.
a Did you come to learn whether or not Ambassador
Volker -- in real tjme, at the time, did you come to learn
that Ambassador Volker di d meet wi th Mr. Gi ul i ani ?
A Kurt told me he was going to meet, and so, I had
every reason to believe that he then followed up on what he
said he was going to do. But he did not share with me the
exact contents of his discussions with the Mayor, no.
a Djd you know at any point whether Ambassador Volker
had introduced Andriy Yermak to Mr. Giufiani?
A I believe I became aware of that in mid-August.
a So you said that earlier, a few minutes ago, you
said that August 15, 15 tjme period was when you seemed to
wel1, I don't want to put words jn your
confirm that

5

6
7
8

9

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15

t6
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23

24
25

what did you understand him

 261

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to August 15 and 15.
What was the significance to those dates in your mind?
A 0n August 15, the new special assistant to Special
Representative Volker, Catherine Croft, came to my offjce and
asked me, said she was trying to find out some information on
behalf of Kurt. And she said, you, George, know about our
relations wi th Ukraine, particularly in law enforcement.
Have we ever asked the Ukra'inians to investigate anybody?
And I told her, I said, we11, Catherine, there are two
ways of looking at that question. If there is a crime that
was committed in the United States and any nexus for us to

t2

take action, we have two mechanisms:

l3

Legal Assistance Treaty, and we have the legal attaches at

t4

the embassy, and that's the way a law enforcement

l5

i nvesti gati

l6

l9

from the context of what
option, which I
has been spoken about in the press, maybe what you're asking
'is the pol i ti caI opti on. And i f you' re aski ng me have we
ever gone to the Ukrainians and asked them to investigate or

20

prosecute jndiv'iduals

2t

hope we haven't, and we shouldn't because

22

everythi ng that we are tryi ng

23

states for the last 28 years, which is the promotion of the

24

rule of

I

2
J
4
5

6
7
8

9

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l8

25

mouth, but there was a significance

We have

the Mutual

on should engage the Ukrai ni ans.

The other

for political reasons, the answer js,
to

that

goes against

promote 'in post Sovi et

1aw.

And

I also then told her, I said, Kurt has a lot

of

I

 262
I

'ideas.

2

And

Some

of

them are

great;

some

of

them are

not so good.

J

part of the role of the special assistant as well as
people 1i ke me i s to ensure that the 'ideas stay wi thi n the

4

bounds

of U. S. pol i cy
O And what was her resPonse?
A She took that onboard.
O But why was that conversation important to you to

5

6
7
8

crystafize what was going

on?

t4

lot of ta1k, you
know. Frankly, what a private citizen tweets is an exercise
in one way of First Amendment rights, but when you have U.S.
Government employees, or i n thi s case, a speci a1 U. S.
Government employee potentially seemingly to align to that
view, that's when it became real for me and a matter of

l5

concern.

l6
t7

that was, as I said, I said the L5th and L5th,
because the next day, I had a conversation with Charge Taylor

18

j

t9

Special Representative Volker had been engaging Andriy

20

Yermak;

9

l0

ll
t2
13

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23

24
25

A

We1l, because there had been a

And

n wh'ich he

ampl i f j

ed the same theme. And he i ndi cated that

that the President and his private attorney, Rudy
Giuliani, were interested in the'initiation of
investigations; and that Yermak waS very uncomfortable when
this was raised with him, and suggested that if that were the
case, if that were really the posit'ion of the United States,
it should be done offic'iatly and put in writing, essentially

 263
I described to Catherine the day before, which is the
t"lutual Legal Assi stance Treaty opti on. And I told Bi 11
Taylor, that's wrong, and we shouldn't be doing that as a
matter of U. S. pol i cy.
a What did he say?
A He said he agreed with me.
a Now, had you had any conversations with Ambassador
Taylor after July 25 and prior to August L6 about this issue?
A Not that I can reca11.
a Had you had any conversations with well
A About th'is issue, I mean, we had a --

what
2
J
4
5

6
7
8

9
10

l1

l2

a

l3

A

t4

l5

Yes.

regularly scheduled weekly teleconference that
involved teams, and if there were anything sensitjve, we
could finjsh up in a one-to-one. We also had a relationship

24

that if there were needs, just like with any ambassador, they
could call me up, you know, for an unscheduled conversatjon.
a And that never occurred in that 3-week span?
A i do not recal1 us having a conversatjon
specifically, you know, if you wi11, out of the regular
schedule until Friday, August 16. And I say it's a Friday,
because I was scheduled to get on a plane, leave my house at
about 5:00 a.m. to go to the airport, fly out to California
to go hiking in Yosemite with my family. So I had a very

25

time-bound 1imit.

l6
t7

l8
t9
20
21

22
23

 264

4

after having had these two conversations, I wrote
a note to the file saying that I had concerns that there was
an effort to initiate politically motivated prosecutions that
were injurious to the rule of 1aw, both in Ukraine and the

5

U.S.

I
2
J

6
7
8

9

l0

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15

And so

I informed the senior official stitl present and the
European Bureau at 7:30 on a Friday night in the middle of
the summer, which was Michael Murphy, and informed him of my
'intent to wri te a note to the f i 1e, whi ch he agreed was the
right thing to do.
a And when you say politically motivated
'i nvesti gations, are you referri ng to i nvesti gati ons that were
also referenced in that July 25 call record?
A At the time, I had no knowledge of the specifics of
the call record, but based on Bill Taylor's account of the

l8

with Andriy Yermak that were the engagements of
Yermak with Kurt Volker, at that point it was clear that the
investigations that were being suggested were the ones that

t9

Rudy Gi u1i an'i had been tweeti ng

20

Bu r

l6
l7

2t
22
23

24
25

engagements

about,

meani

ng

Bi den,

i sma, and 2015.

a And I understand you d'idn' t know the contents of
the call record, but now being able to read the call record
as you have, you are referring to the Biden investjgation
that the President mentioned, as well as the CrowdStrike 2016
investigation. Is that right?

 265
I
2
J

align with the Rudy Giuliani tweet. I thlnk
it was June 2L, as well as some of the other story lines from
earl i er i n the spri ng before Presi dent Zelenskyy was elected.

4
5

6
7
8

9

l0

pot i

A

Those

a

Right. I just want to be clear that

ti ca11y moti vated i nvesti gati on
A That i s what I 'm referri ng to, yeah.
that's what you' re referri ng to.
a
Were you aware

Government

when you say

Okay.

of efforts to convince the Ukrainian

to issue a statement a couple days before

the

August 1.5 time period?

23

of the effort to negotiate the text
of the statement that came out as a result of Ambassador
Volker's testimony here, and the tweets that he released, [o,
not until I had read those.
a So you were completely unaware of those discussions
related to a poss'ib1e statement about investigations?
A Correct.
a Now, at that poi nt, on August 1.5 , when you look
back on the previous 2 months, let's say, the readout from
the June 28 call that you got from Ambassador Taylor, the
conversation that you had with Ambassador Volker in Toronto,
did you have a different view on what this White House visjt
and the interplay between a potential White House visit and

24

these j nvesti gati

ll
t2
l3
t4

l5

l6
t7
18

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20

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25

A

A

I

was not aware

As

I

ons?

mentioned before, arranging

visits

between

 266

8

is never eaSy. President Poroshenko spent several
years also trying to get a visit to the White House, and that
was more happenstance, the visit he made in June 20L7. So I
have an appreciation that just because a leader of a country
wants to visit Washington and have an 0va1 Office visit
doesn't mean j t that haPPens.
So I would say there was one track of trying to get a
visit. There was another track of what we were engaging

9

Ukraine formally through normal channels. And then this

Presidents

2
5

4
5

6
7

ll

particular moment was the time where not just what I read on
tweets by private citizens, but a greater understanding of

t2

actions taken by U.S. officials, in this case,

l3

Volker, that

10

Ambassador

my concerns grew.

t7

just so we can understand, you sort of
descri bed j ust there ki nd of two paralle1 tracks of offi ci al
U. S. poli cy. Is that an accurate assessment?
A I think official U.S. poticy are policies that are

l8

determi ned and endorsed. And i n thi

t4

l5
r6

a

And

2l

strati on there's
the National Security Presidential Memorandum 4 that was
issued in April of 20L7, and that actually is what determines
the formal policy process for formulating U.S. policy on any

22

issue or country.

24

talking about now are issues and
approaches that were not discussed in the interagency proceSs
as staffed by the NSC and the person of either Lieutenant

t9
20

And what we're

25

s

adm'ini

 267
or his boss, which

I

Colonel Vindman

2

now has become Tim l'lorrison.

was Fiona

Hill

and then

7

a Right. And I thank you for that clarifjcation.
offjcial U.5. policy remain the same, but there's sort of
secondary or shadow policy that was now being perpetrated
U.S. officjals? Was that what you learned?
A I had growing concerns that individuals were

8

pushing communications with Ukrainians that had not

9

discussed and endorsed in the formal policy process, yes.

J
4
5

6

l0

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t2

l3
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So
a

by

been

a Now, it sounds like you went on vacation right
after you wrote this memo to file, which, just as an aside,
assume you atso provided to the State Department -A r did.
to turn over.
a
Did you have any subsequent conversations with

I

anyone

l8

this revelation that you had?
A Well, I believe I went away. I came back after
Labor Day. The next communication or data point that i can

l9

reca1l was a WhatsApp message that Charge Taylor sent

20

September

2t

after Labor Day.
a And what did that WhatsApp message say?
A Charge Taylolindi cated that he had talked to T j
Morrison, who is the senior director for Europe, who replaced
Fiona Hi11. And Tim indicated that he had talked to Gordon.

l6
t7

22
23
24
25

about

7,

wh'ich woutd have been,

me on

I think, the Saturday

m

 268

2

told him, Tim, and Tim told 8111 Taylor, that
he, Gordon, had talked to the President, P0TU5 in sort of

J

shorthand,

4

Zelenskyy to

5

and

I

6
7
8

9

l0

And Gordon had

C1

less than President
to microphone and say investigations, Biden,

and POTUS
go

wanted nothing

i nton.

a
A

And

in return for

what?

That was not clear

to

me

I wasn't part of thi s

Bill Taylor then followed up with a video
conference, our normal Monday call in which he elaborated on
hi s conversations wi th both senior di rector Morri son on the
exchange. But

l5

7th as well as with Ambassador Sondland on the 8th.
a And what did he say?
A He said that Morrison indicated that Rudy Gi uf i ani
had recently talked to the President again, and he sai d, as
you can imagine, that creates di ffi culti es managi ng the

l6

Ukrai ne account.

1l

t2

l3
t4

t7

0n his conversation w'ith Ambassador Sondland on the 8th,

l8

24

I believe they went into more detail about Ambassador
Sondland's efforts to try to facilitate a proper approach, in
his view, to open up the possibility of a visit to the
Whi te House.
a So can you explain a little bjt?
A Well, thi s was taki ng place thi s conversati on
was taking place with Ambassador Taylor and I on the 9th of

25

September. The biggest annual conference on Ukraine in

l9
20

2t
22
23

 269
I

Ukra'ine i s known as the YES Conf erence. That used

2

for Yalta

J

under Ukrai n'ian control

European Strategy back when Crimea and

to

stand

Yalta

were

.

7

to happen, start in a couple of days.
I flew out to Ukraine to take part in that conference as did
Ambassador VoIker. And Charge Taylor indicated that
Ambassador Sondland was pushing a line that included having

8

Pres'ident Zelenskyy give an interview potentially with

9

during the

4
5

6

And

it

was going

CNN

l0

that weekend'in which he would
thi s publ i c si gnal of announci ng a wi 11 i ngness to pursue

ll

investigatjons.

t2

t7

a And did Ambassador Sondland discuss a White House
visit in the context of that statement?
A I think the anticipation or the hope was that
sending that signal would clear the way for both the
White House visit as well as the resumption or the clearing
of the admi ni strative hold on securi ty assi stance, whjch had

l8

been placed by OMB. Although, Charge Taylor asserted

l9

2t

that both Tim Morri son and Gordon Sondland speci fi ca11y said
that they did not believe that the two issues were linked.
a What was Ambassador Taylor's reaction to this whole

22

conversati

l3
t4

l5

l6

20

23

24
25

A

YES Conference

to

send

me

on?

He

told

me

he indicated to Gordon, he said, This is

wrong. That's what I recall him saying to me, again, oral1y
reading out of a conversatjon of which i was not a part.

 270
a

I
2

But he thought that

it

may

have that the aid may

be contingent on this?

5

A I have subsequently seen his tweets, which or
not his tweets, the WhatsApp messages that Kurt Volker
issued. And so it appears to me, having seen those WhatsApp

6

messages,

7

Sondland and Ambassador Volker.

J
4

MR. G0LDMAN:

8

9

yi

e1d

Ambassador

0kay. I thjnk our tjme is up.

So we

wiIl

to the mi nor i ty.
BY I"IR.

l0

ll

that he was sharing his concerns wjth

a

When

CASTOR:

Volker was

commun'icati

ng to you about vari

ous

l3

investigations that would occur in the Ukraine, whether it
relates to Burisma 2015, is it possib1e the way i

t4

understood hi s

t2

l5

A
a

Ri

you know, we spoke'to Volker.

ght.

Z)

in here. The way I understood his the
way he communicated it was that if there were Ukrainians
engaged i n mi sdeeds, corrupti on, then, you know and i t
could relate to Buri sma, i t could relate to bri ngi ng Hunter
Biden on the board, it could relate to Ukrajnians doing
nefarious things in the run-up to the 20L5 election, then the
Ukrai n'ians ought to i nvesti gate f el1ow Ukrai ni ans.
A So you' re sayi ng that's what Ambassador Volker sa'id

24

to you and the

t6
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20

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25

a

He was

commi

ttee?

That was my understanding

of what he said. Is that

 27
I
2
3

1

th your understandi ng?
A Well, I think I can only share the conversation I
had with Kurt, and the conversatjon was framed differently.
i nconsi

a
A

4

stent

wi

Okay.

l5

n, I wasn't here. I haven' t Seen the
transcri pt of what he sa'id to you. 5o I can only share my
recollection of my conversations wi th hjm.
a Sure. And d j d he commun'icate that di f f erently, or
did you just maybe understand it differently, or is there a
possjble disconnect there, or are these two different things?
A I think that there are two people who we're
talking at this point about a conversation that took place
3 months ago, that neither of us were taking notes. We were
standing up. And so, I would say that, you know, he has
shared his recollection of the conversation, and I shared

l6

mine.

t7

Okay. But your recollection was that they were
pushing for political investigations that had no merit?

5

6
7
8

9

l0

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But,

agai

a

A

t9

When

he sajd that he was going

to engage Rudy

2t

ani about Ukrai ne, because Rudy Gi u1 i ani was clearly
influencing the President's views of Ukraine, I reminded him

22

what Rudy Giuliani was doing

23

about which

20

24
25

Gi u1 i

I

in Ukrajne and about Ukraine,

had concerns.

That's why I say that I think Kurt was approaching in
my understandi

ng, he was approachi ng thi s i ssue tacti ca11y.

 272
I
2
J
4
5

for Ukraine. We both wanted the best
for U.S.-Ukraine relations. He saw Rudy Giuliani as an issue
to be addressed, and potentiatly an a1ly to be incorporated
to get the U.S. President to where we wanted our relationship
to be, which is having a meeting.

We

both wanted the best

l{y concern could be

6

summed

up by the means don't

l0

Iy j usti fy you know, the ends don't necessari 1y
justify the means, that if we're trying to put trade space on
the table of an investigation, that can violate a principle
that undermjnes what we're trying to do on a matter of

ll

po1 i

7
8

9

necessari

cy.

l3

a My understanding of what how he looked at Rudy
was that he thought Mr. Giuliani was amplifying a negative

t4

narrative,

l5

Rudy

t2

meaning a

false narrative,

meaning

that

whatever

20

Giuliani was communicating, you know, about to the
Presjdent was something that needed to be fixed. And since
the Presi dent and Rudy Gi u1 i anj had communi cati ons on a
somewhat regular basis, he thought that it was a relationship
he had to try to work on if he could.
A Yeah. That 'is my understandi ng of hi s rati onale

2l

for

t6
t7
18

t9

engaging the former mayor

of

New York.

24

Okay. And by no means was he adopting the
narrati ve that Rudy Gi u1 i anj was proselyti zi ng?
A I don't know what Kurt's view was about the

25

narrative.

22
23

a

What

I

know

is that by September, Kurt

was

 273
actively promoting the request for Ukraine to
2
J

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5

6
7
8

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open these

investigations.

a

Okay. And it would be inconsistent with your

if these investigations were for Ukrainians to
genuj ne mj sdeeds
open matters i nto mi sdeeds by Ukraj nj an
by Ukrai ni ans, whether i t relates to Buri sma or 20L6?
A We obv'iously want Ukraine to have effective law
enforcement and j usti ce sector i nsti tuti ons. That's j n order
to be able to investigate, prosecute, and judge any criminal
acts. Agai n, as I sai d, I th'ink the i ssue f or what we ask
them to do in certain cases should start from whether there's
a cri mi na1 nexus 'in the U. S. because that's our role as the
U.S. Government, not to dictate that you should 'investigate
this person because it's in our political interest.
understanding

a

Okay. You've mentioned

WhatsApp

a few times.

t7

That's a completely standard messaging appt'ication to use for
5tate Department officials, correct, as long as everything js

l8

saved fi rst?

l9

In certai n countr j es "i t' s almost requi red f or
busjness. And I'11 give you the example of how I ended up
first using WhatsApp. When Ambassador Yovanovitch had her
fi rst meeti ng wi th the then new prjme mi nj ster of Ukrai ne,
Votodymyr Hroysman, who is 4L years old, and she arrived in
August, so I'm presuming it was late August or early
September, he asked 'if she were on WhatsApp and V'iber. And

t6

20

2t
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23

24
25

A

 274
I

she said, why? And he says, that'

2

you want

5

Ukraine, you need

4

down 1 oad
So

5

to

communicate with me,

s

how

I

commun

i cate. So i

the prime m'ini ster of

to go back to the embassy

and have them

those apps.
she came back

to

the embassy.

6

communications and Di plomati

7

assessment was

8

that

9

long as records were saved.

we were

c

We checked

Securi ty speci a1i

with

sts.

our

The

that V'iber was not as secure as WhatsAPP,

authorized

to use WhatsApp for

and

communjcations

aS

ll

of WhatsApp by U. S. offi ci al,
State Department offi c'i a1, Whi te House offi ci al , presents no

12

problems as long as everything

l0

l3
t4

l5

a

f

0kay.

So the use

is

saved?

I didn't say that, but at least we're in
Like, what kind of problems would it present as
long as everything js saved?
A
a

23

A We11, I th'ink there always i s a challenge wlth the
integrity of data. And, for instance, Minister Avakov of
Ukraine, who I've referenced several times, minister of
interior, told me and another member of the staff,'in 2018,
that there were now ways, thanks to Israeli code writers, of
cracking the alleged encryption of text messages on WhatsApp.
So for people who thought they were encrypted and therefore
safe, at least the text messages, the texts as opposed to the

24

voice could be accessed by PeoPle.

l6
t7

l8
t9
20

2t
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25

a

Okay.

Moments ago you referenced

the

name

Clinton?

 275
A
a
A
a
A

2
3

I said -Cou1d you just go through that again?

What

Ri

ght.

l0

I haven't heard that name lately.
That was a message that was described jn the
shorthand of the desire to have this was the Gordon
Sondland messaging of what the Ukrainjans need to say in
shorthand 2016. And in shorthand, it was suggested that the
Ukrajnians needed Zelenskyy needed to go to a microphone
and basically there needed to be three words in the message,

ll

and

4
5

6
7
8

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that

was the shorthand.

a
A
a

Clinton was shorthand for

20L6?

2015, yes .

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Okay. Are you aware of the narratjve that there
were some Ukrainians that tried to influence the outcome of

t6

the electi

t7

I recal1 reading a Politico artic.l-e to that effect
in the spring of 20t7, yeah.
IMi nori ty Exhi bi t No. 4
Was marked for i denti fi cati on. l

t4

l8

l9
20

2t
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23
24
25

on?

A

BY MR.

CASTOR:

what are we
a 0kay. I'm goi ng to mark as exhi bi t
up to, 4? These guys love this article. This is a Politico
article by Ken Vogel dated January 20L7. It's, 1ike, L8
pages. It goes into some depth. I'm just going to point you

 276
I

to some things just

2

awareness

5

4

and ask you whether you have any

up. I'm not
going to ask you to, you know, adopt the artjcle as, you
know, personal endorsement or anything.
or ever

remember

Were you aware

5

this issue

coming

that a Ukrainian American

named

7

*rr, you know, a consultant for the Democratic
National Committee and had made some overtures to the

8

Ukrai ni an Embassy?

6

I

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A I was not aware of that. I did at the time read
this article nearly 3 years ago now. But, yes, I read this

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article.

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[5:37 p.m.]
BY MR.

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5

6
7
8

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CASTOR:

thjs artjcle, did you do any
followup, communicate with anybody at the State Department
about the val i di ty of th i s?
A I was in Ukraine. They were jn Washington. And I
presumed that people had read it.
But it's an article by two
j ournal i sts that I don't thi nk I 've met. But, you know, i t
was obviously, people were talking about it because of the
a

And when you read

l0

allegations

ll

a

Are you fami 1 i ar

wi

th the Embassy's posture duri ng

t9

this time period with Ambassador Chaly?
A Again, at this tjme, whjch we're talking about the
period of the election, which is November 15, and this
article comjng out the month of the inaugural in 20L7. I was
in Ukraine, Kyiv, not here in Washington. That said, I do
know Ambassador Cha1y. I met him for the first time in the
falI of 2004 when he was the think tank
a And he had written an op-ed, I guess, that said

20

some

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18

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23

24
25

less than positive things about Candidate

A

It's possible. I

Trump?

mean, "h€" being Ambassador

Chaly?

a
A
focused

Yeah.

If you say so. Honestly, again, I
on that end of the relationship.

was

in

Ukraine

 278
a
A
a

I
2

Who was

It

the Deputy Assistant Secretary at the time?

would have been Bridget Brink, my predecessor.

4

this, you know, reading this story,
you did not ever come into any firsthand information relating

5

to

J

6

So, other than

?

A
a

No.

l0

0r learn about any initiative on behalf of the DNC
to promulgate some of this information?
A No.
a The story walks through Serhiy Leshchenko's role in

ll

publi ci zi ng the Manafort ledgers.

7
8

9

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A
a
A
a
A

The so-ca11ed black ledgers, Yes.
What do you

recall about that?

About the black ledgers?
Yeah.

l8

I recal1 that those were documents apparently found
at the former estate of the previous President who fled to
Russi a, Vi ktor Yanukovych, and i t i ndi cated i ndi vi duals who

l9

had been receiving payments by the former

l6
t7

2t

ruling party.
a And at the time Leshchenko, at least it's reported
here, suggested that his motivation was partly to undermine

22

T r ump?

20

23

A

He's a Ukrai ni an ci ti

zen. I don't know what hi s

24

motivations are. I know that he was an investigat'ive

25

journalist,

and there were, as

I reca11, hundreds of

names,

 279
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4
5

6
7
8

9

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all of which were Ukrain'ian, in the black book.
a Woutd it be fair to say that there were some
Ukrainians that were trying to influence the outcome?
A I honestly do not know. I was jn Ukra'ine, and so I
was not privy to whatever activities may have been happening
here in the United States.
almost

a

I
I
I

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l4
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l7

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! when I would go to the NSC,
the person I would normally talk to directly was the State
Department detailee, the woman I mentjoned previously,
Catherine Croft, who has been working with Kurt Volker, she
was a di rector at the NSC f or Ukra'ine. And pri or to

 280
1

Catherine doing her L-year

2

Ukraine desk

J

offi cer

named

4

Embassy

in

5

NSC.

6

at

stint,

she had worked

at

the

the State Department. And there was an

at the
and he came back and did a Year stint
who had been worki ng

Kyiv,

So my pri nci

Pa1

i nterlocutor when

I

would go

at

to the NSC

7

to have conversations generally was the State Department

8

di rector,

I

9

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a

Generally, directors at the

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NSC

do not

l5

travel on their own, but they often accompany principals.
can say that Victoria Nuland was Assistant Secretary,

l6

sometimes Celeste Wallander and

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with her to countries, whether that would be Russia

l8

Ukrai ne.

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o

20

I

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23

24
25

Charlie

Kupchan would

travel

or

of mY life in
support of others, and so jt hurts me to say this, but
generally people remember who the principal on the trip
and not all the staff who actually do most of the work.
a You talked earlier about Lieutenant Colonel
And, again,

I

I

spend most

was

 281
1

Vj ndman's i

A

2

nteracti ons wi th your staff?

Yes.

He would reach

out

I 'm the Deputy

3

Assistant Secretary, but there's an office that works on

4

Ukrai

5

for

whj

6

was

actually recruited to work on Russja, but he ended

7

working on Ukraine, Moldova, and BeIarus, so he

ne, Moldova, and Belarus, and those are three countri es
ch he had responsi bi 1 i ty

wi

thi n the NSC, although

he

up

is a staff

of

t9

for those three countries. So it was natural that he
would turn to an office that had multiple people working on
those countries to see if they could be supportjve.
a Okay. And you explained that he had, from time to
time, made a lot of requests of your staff?
a very short
A From time to time, he asked for
fuse deta'i1ed documentation that the members fett, first
of all, was impossibte to meet on his deadline and, second of
all, distracted them from the work they had to do. And
usually they would raise their complaints to their office
it he did not f eel his
d'i rec to r
. And I,
conversations with AIex could provide sufficient relief, he

20

woutd ask me

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A

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23

24
25

one

,

to weigh in.

How

long has this he been going on?

I believe that Alex came on to the
account at the end of the summer of 2018. So my return from
Kyiv, I started work the day after Labor Day jn
September 2018, and his arrivat to the NSC staff may have
Wel1,

I

mean,

 282
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been the same week and

2

He came

J

2018.

a
A

4
5

certainly

was wi

thi n the

same month.

over from Joint Chiefs at the end of the
Do you know when

his detail

was

summer

of

uP?

Generally, again, I've never worked at the NSC, but

general understandi ng i s i t's L-year renewable.

And

6

my

7

generally, because of the budget and staffing patterns, they

8

ask

24

for detailees, which the host agencies pay for. And
generatly they come from State,0ffice of Secretary of
Defense, or JCS in the Intel Community, and Treasury also
provides individuals. Under Secretary Tillerson, when he had
our staff freeze, he tried to limit all detailees. So, as a
result, the number of State Department officials on detail at
the NSC dropped dramatically, and that required, in order to
staff it at similar 1eve1s, an increase in detailees from the
Intel Communi ty, the Pentagon, and JCS.
a Do you know when his detail is uP?
A We1l, he's obv'iously in his second year now, and I
get the sense that there are mechani sms to al1ow for
renewable, even though that's not standard. Those jobs are
incredibly draining, so most people are happy to do L year
and move on. But he clearly got an extension to a second
year, but I've never discussed that issue with him. But my
presumption is that, at some point, it was extended by a

25

second year.

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 283
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a

Did you have any communications with anyone

at

the

2

State Department about your testimony here today, other than

J

the ones you've descrjbed with the lawyers

and

6

I described early on a commun jcat'ion about
the document search. Subsequent to that, I did not have any
d j scuss'ions or coordi nation about what I would say

7

personally.

8

counsel, then went through counsel with

9

several letters that were signed by Under Secretary of

4
5

A

Wel1,

The conversations w'ith the counsel,

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l'lanagement Br j an

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conversations that

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parti ci pate i n.

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a

legaI office

,Igot

Bulatao, and then there were a number of
had

But nobody has tried

,

wh

i ch

I d'id

not

to influence your testimony.

l6

Is that correct?
A No. That i s correct.
a And did you talk to Ambassador Yovanovitch after

t7

before her testimony with

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A

When

or

us?

you say "ta1ked,

" what's your timeframe?

What

are your time

a 5i nce she appeared, whi ch was last Fri day?
A I have not had any conversations with her sjnce
then. My wife, I believe, has because of the health of her
mother. And my w'if e vi si ted her mother i n hospi ta1 and then
had a conversation with Masha.
a Okay. But you didn't speak to her about her

 284
I

testimony or your testimonY?

5

I have not talked to l'lasha si nce Fri day, ho.
0kay. And to the extent you reference her
testi mony, i t's the prepared statement?
A It was made available and, I read it online,

6

thi nk The

2
J
4

7

A
a

New

York

I

T"imes.

Okay. This morning, we were talking about the

a

8

State Department's record collection procedure and responding

9

to the subpoena.

10

l1

Have you

ever been involved with

a

congressional records request?

A

The only previous record request

that I

have seen,

l5

not specifically named as a record collector,
waS the Senate's Select Intelligence Committee's request for
documents related to Paul l4anafort and Konstantin Kilimnik.
a How did the as far as you know, the ordinary

l6

process work

t2

l3
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although

I

was

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for producing documents to Congress?
A Well, again, I have been present or seen the
process happen twice, once when I was at an Embassy and, the
other tjme, the past 2 weeks at the State Department. At the

20

Embassy, there was a mechanism where

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management

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18

22
23

24
25

our information

resource, our specialists who work with the

information systems, went through and Were able to extract
from the system of backups any emails that had reference to
the "individuals listed.
And what was

different about this search the last

2

 285
d'id that automatically, but

I

WECKS WAS,

the State

2

there

these other records that would not have

J

accessed automatically, and those included memos

were

Department

been

that

were

7

written but never logged and sent to a principal like the
Secretary, handwri tten notes, or other communications.
a 0kay. Did I understand your testimony that you
were concerned about the integrity of the document collection

8

process?

4
5

6

9

A

What

I said was, when we had our meeting on the 3rd

ll

of 0ctober, based on instructions that had been prepared by
others that I presumed were in our congressional lia'ison in

12

the 1ega1 offi ce, that when they i denti fj ed potenti a1 chi ef

r3

record collectors, that there were i ndiv'iduals that were not

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24
25

in the listing, and, therefore, there were
additjonal people that were asked to check for records.
a Okay. And I may have heard this incorrectly, but
jt's not your understanding that the 5tate Department
officials look for documents and then send them in to
Congress individually, right?
A It was clear in the instructions that, as part of
the process of collecting documents, the records should be
identified, and then there would be a central repository for
the processing of those documents. And that's in an office
that is under our what's known as the A Bureau, the
Administrative Bureau. So I guess there's a un'it that deals
included that were

 286
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wi

th thi s, and that was the mechani sm.
a You don't have concerns with that, do you?
A That sounds like an appropriate centralized way of

gathe r i ng documents f rom many people.

a

5

So the function

of the State Department collecting

6

the documents and going through the documents, organizjng the

7

documents, and producing them

8

understand

to be ordinary

to

Congress

is

what you

course?

13

role as an identified record collector was
to go through all of my records and identify jnformation and
provide that information. So that's what I did. What
happens after that js a process that I don't have
a Okay. You don't have a lot of experience with

14

that?

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A

We11, my

A

Thi

s i s the f i rst ti me that I 've

gone through th'is

t6

process, yes.

t7

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Okay. So you' re not i n a posi ti on to evaluate
whether the process undertaken here has been irregular or

t9

i mprope r?

20

a

A

This is the first time I've done this type of

23

I've had to go through all my handwritten notes
and other forms of communication to find evidence that might
be responsive to the subjects that were listed in the

24

subpoena.

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25

process where

a

Okay. And then a couple times you used the

 287
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termi nology "when Volker released hi

A
a

2
J

I should have said WhatsApp messages; I'm sorry.
And so I just wanted to circle back to that, that I

4

don't believe

5

himself.

6

you know, the

8

Ambassador

Volker has released anything

He provided documents

to the committees, and then,

commjttee is that your understanding?
i do not know how that information made it into the

A

7

s tweets" ?

public domain.

a
A

9

Uh-huh.

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I do not engage the media and have studiously
avoided the media before coming here. I cannot say that's

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been

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Kurt's approach.
a Okay. But you're not aware of hjm releasi ng hi s
text messages like affi rmatively on his own?

A

l5

nto the

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i

t7

a
side, I

l8
l9
20

2l
22

I do not know how hi s WhatsApp messages made i t
publ i

I

c

domai n .

mean,

that might come as a shock, would push certain
messages out. Is that something that
A Tha t ' s one opt'i on
a Okay. So you th'ink that maybe he's pushi ng hi s own
messages out on hi s own?
know

.

24

A
a

25

MR. CASTOR:

23

it's conceivable that somebody on the Hj11

I do not know.
Okay.

Mr. ZeTdin.

 288
MR.

I

2

ZELDIN

:

Assi

stant Secretary Nuland's

up a few time, Kathy Kavalec?
KENT:

Kathy KavaIec.

J

MR.

4

MR. ZELDIN: Are you aware
i

6

duri ng the 2016 campai

8

9

of

Assi

stant Secretary Nuland

nstructi ng Kathy Kavalec to speak to Christopher Steele

5

7

name has come

I

gn?

Kyiv, and Kathy Kavalec was the
Deputy Assistant Secretary for Russia, and so I was not aware
of what the nature of engagement between Assistant Secretary
MR. KENT:

was in

l0

Nuland and Deputy Assistant Secretary Kavalec would have

ll

been, no.
MR. ZELDIN: Are you aware

t2

th

of Ambassador

Ukrai ne of f i c'ials on speci f i c

l3

ever hav'ing conversati ons

t4

individual cases before the prosecutor?
t"lR. KENT: When you

l5

l6
t7

wi

say "specif

l'4R.

conversations Ambassador

20

prosecutor about any of those

24
25

"

what do you

MR. KENT: Which

cases

,

any of

, are you fami 1 i ar wi th any
Yovanov'itch had with that Ukraine

t9

23

cases,

ZELDIN: In any of the prosecutor' s

the Ukrai ne' s prosecutor' s

22

ic

mean?

l8

2t

Yovanovitch

cases

cases?

prosecutor are you referri ng to?

referring to the state
prosecutor, but with regards to Ukraine's state prosecutor or
any cases within the Ukraine Government, are you aware of
Ambassador Yovanovitch having any conversations with any
MR. ZELDIN: We11,

I

was

 289
I

in Ukraine about any of the Ukraine cases?
l'4R. KENT: During the period of time when Yuriy Lutsenko

prosecutor

2
J

was prosecutor general, and he became prosecutor general

4

before Ambassador Yovanov'itch arrived

5

the

6

enforcement, prosecutori a1, and i ntel1 i gence serv'i ces were

7

occasionally harassjng and investigating without merit civit

8

society activists,

9

opponents.

U.

at post in

S. Government had concerns that Ukrai n'ian

it

members

of the media,

and

August

201.6,

law

political

t7

of concern that those in office
were using that offjce not to prosecute crjmjnals but to put
pressure on civil society, the media, and political
opponents. In that context, yes, both the Ambassador and I
rai sed concerns speci fically about actjon taken wi thout
evident merit to pressure civjl society, the media, and
political opponents.
MR. ZELDIN: Was this a conversatjon solely in general,

l8

or were there discussions about specific cases?

l0

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t4

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l6

l9

And so

was a matter

MR. KENT: When, i n a country whose lead'ing j ournaf

20

was murdered on the orders

2t

j ournal i

sts are attacked,

ist

of a President in 2000, when

when an antj

corrupti on acti vi st

has

23

acid thrown jn her face at the orders of people that were
pol i ti ca11y connected and after L2 operatj ons she di ed, yes,

24

we raised

22

25

specific cases of concern regarding the misuse of
state offi ce to go after ci vj I soci ety acti vi sts, members of

 290
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3

4
5

6
7
8

9

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the med'ia, and members of the opposi t j on.

In the year before Presjdent

Poroshenko ran for

reelection, there were over a hundred such attacks against
ci vi 1 soci ety, the medi a, and occasi ona11y pol i ti ca1
opponentS, none of those were prosecuted by Yuriy Lutsenko.
any of the
recall the names of
names of the individual cases that you spoke to or Ambassador
Yovanovi tch spoke to Ukra'ine about?
MR. KENT: I would say that, in the last 3 years, the
most prominent case was this anticorruption activist that I
mentioned. Her name is Katia Handziuk, H-a-n'd-z- i -u-k. She
jn Kherson, and according to activists, civil
:rr in a town
society, and journalists, there were politicians connected to
MR. ZELDIN: Do you

also Prosecutor General Yuriy
Lutsenko's party, as well as the party connected to Yuliya
Tymoshenko. And despite this general knowledge, there was no
Presi dent Poroshenko, wh'i ch was

l8

firm action taken by the prosecutor general.
MR. ZELDIN: And this was a case important to you and

19

Ambassador Yovanovi tch?

t7

20

MR. KENT: This was a case important

for the rule of

24

to change Ukraine, starting
with the Revolution of Dignity. So, jf you were to ask a
Ukrainian over the last year, if they had to cite one case
that encapsulated the failures of President Poroshenko and

25

his team, wh'ich included Prosecutor General Yuriy

2l
22
23

law

under a President who had run

Lutsenko,

 291
a clarion example of the

I

the case of Kati a Handz'iuk

2

fai lure for the country to move forward

J

the murder of Georgiu Gongadze in 2000 encapsulated the

4

fai lure of then President
But

MR. ZELDIN:

5

6

Yovanovi ch would be

7

MR. KENT:

8

9

l0

became

Kuchma

this

to

in the same way that

move

the country forward.

would be a case

very fami 1 i ar

that Ambassador

wi th?

This js a case that was under great

i scuss i on. The i ni

ti a1 attack occurred i n the summer of
2018, I believe, that the acti vj st eventually dj ed i n roughly

d

November

ll

of

2018

Yeah, I

MR. ZELDIN:

just don't want to

put any words in

l3

that's why I 'm aski ng the questi on.
bea case that Ambassador Yovanovi tch would have

t4

fami 1 i

t2

you r

mouth,

ar

Thi

s

would

been very

wi th?

l5

MR. KENT:

l6

t'4R.

I would i magi ne so, yes

.

ZELDIN: And were there many other cases that

you

22

of indivjdual names of cases as you sit here
today, without having to go through the entire list?
MR. KENT: I honestly the number of uninvestigated
assaults on members of civ j 1 soc'iety, the medi a, and the
opposjtion, as I said, eventually reached 100, and that was a
trend line and a message to everybody. 5o I cannot cite all

23

100.

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l8
l9
20

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25

have reca11

MR.

though,

ZELDiN:

I wasn't asking. I just

wanted

to

ask,

if necessary, there are many cases that you recall

 292
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)
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5

6
7
8

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the

names associated

with the cases?

MR. KENT: 0n any given month, there would have been

that rose to the fore as being emblematic of
the d'i rection. For instance, last December, 2018, one of the
candidates for President, Anatoliy Hrytsenko, was assaulted
in a parking garage in the city of Odesa. A former Defense
Minister running for President was assaulted by thugs, and
there was no effort to investigate that. That is a classic
example of intimidation, and the lack of an investigation is
a suggestion that those in power were not interested in
holding the people to account because the accounts indicated
that they were probably connected to the power organizations.
MR. ZELDIN: Did you keep track of these individual
cases that we were engaging Ukraine with?
MR. KENT: The Embassy, as part of its advocacy, would
have no doubt kept a running list and, in my experience from
when I was there, would have discussed this extensively with
perhaps cases

the other likeminded Ambassadors. And there was a collection
of Ambassadors to the G7 countries, plus the Ambassador to

2l

the EU, met almost weekly. And the issue of the
deterioration of the rule of law and the lack of

22

accountability and impunity for these attacks was a frequent

23

topi c.

20

24
25

MR. ZELDIN:

would you speak

Wi

th regards to thi s 1 i st of cases, who

to on the Ukraine side about the individual

 293
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5

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7
8

9

r0

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cases.
communi

Was

cate

there a person, an office, that you would
wi th?

MR. KENT: The Ambassadors,
G7 Ambassadors,

plus the

I believe, co11ective1y, the

EU Ambassador, when

they had a meet

with President Poroshenko, my understanding is this was the
type of j ssue that was ra"ised. Agai n, starti ng i n August 18,
I was back in Washington, so I did not participate in those
meetings. The trend line and the deterioratjon started about
the tjme I came back here to Washington.
MR. ZELDIN: When communicating with Ukraine with these
1ists, was Lutsenko or any of the people from his office

in

of those meetings?
MR. KENT: I can't say for certain. I do not think it
was normal for the prosecutor general to be attending the
meetings when, you know, eight Ambassadors come in to see
President Poroshenko. It's not like they met that often.
Prosecutor General Lutsenko, in my experience, occasionally,
would summon Ambassadors or Embassy representatives to have
meeti ngs wi th h jm f or sort of exchange on the si tuat'ion, the
current status of rule of law in the country.
MR. ZELDIN: It's a possibility that somebody
representing Lutsenko might be present at any of these
present

any

meet i ngs?
24
25

this trend line started last summer
about the time I came back, so I don't know who was in any
MR. KENT: Again,

 294
I

parti cular meeti ngs.

J

policy towards Ukraine
over the course of the last couple of years with regards to

4

aid, support for Ukraine, would you assess it as getting

5

stronger?

2

MR. ZELDIN: The United States

8

that, thanks to the appropriators
on the Appropri ation Comm'i ttee, the amounts made avai 1able
for assistance to Ukraine has increased yearly since 20t4,

9

yes.

6
7

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I"lR. KENT:

I

would say

MR. ZELDIN: And how

access

to

J

important

is it to Ukraine to have

avel i n.

l3

the son of a submarine captajn. I'm not
the Son of an Army cav orinf antry of f i cer, but I understand

l4

from my colleagues who do have such experience and our

15

Belarus desk

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MR. KENT:

I

am

22

Javelins is
that they are jncredibly effective weapons at stopping
armored advance, and the Russ'ians are scared of them.
MR. ZELDIN: Earlier on, in one of the rounds, I befieve
thi s morni ng, there was di scussi on wi th regards to the fi ri ng
of Ambassador Yovanovitch, and later on, you testifjed that
you read the July 25th transcript. Do you reca1l the part of
the transcript where President Zelenskyy is speaking about

23

Ambassador Yovanovi tch?

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t7

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20
21

24
25

officer

MR. KENT:

I

was an

have the

officer

who used

transcript here, and yes, i

believe somewhere our President says something, and then

 295
I

President Zelenskyy

ng back

says somethi

2

MR. ZELDIN: You're looki ng

J

l"lR. KENT: Right.

at

page

4?

6

is a fu11 paragraph of President
Zelenskyy in the middle of the page, and towards the bottom
of that paragraph, President Zelenskyy speaks about

7

Ambassador Yovanovi tch?

4
5

8

I"lR. ZELDIN: There

MR. KENT: Yep.

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in it, part of what President Zelenskyy
says, quote: Her attitude toward me was far from the best as

ll

she had admired the previous President and she was on his

t2

s'ide.

l3

enough, end quote.

9

t4

MR. ZELDIN: And

She would

not accept

Do you know where

me

as the new Presi dent well

President Zelenskyy would

belief that Ambassador

have

Yovanovitch was loyaI to

l5

developed the

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a previous President?

t7

l9

I do know that
President Poroshenko thought she was not a fan of hjm.
MR. ZELDIN: And I recal1 you testifying to that

20

earlier.

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MR. KENT:

I

have no 'idea because

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MR. KENT: Yeah.

22

1"1R.

ZELDIN: That President Poroshenko had targeted

is

I

to ask you

23

Ambassador Yovanovitch, which

24

about !h'is parti cular quote f rom Pres'ident Zelenskyy.

25

you have an opportunity

to

meet

why

wanted

Di d

wjth President Zelenskyy

and

 296

8

at the same time?
MR. KENT: I have not been a part of the meeting with
since
ZelenSkyy since this call happened, and s'ince I also
I first saw this text 2 weeks ago. And of the meetings that
I had w'i th Zelenskyy previ ously, the meeti ng i n March
of 2019, which is when he was running as a candidate that was
Under Secretary Ha1e, Ambassador Yovanovi tch, and myself,
when I came back in May, when he was President-elect

9

Zelenskyy, Ambassador Yovanovitch had already been recalIed.

Ambassador Yovanovitch
2
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5

6
7

that was in the room at the same time
Yovanovi tch and Zelenskyy was 'in ["larch, and

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So the only meeting

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wi

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th Ambassador
the principal in the meeting

MR. ZELDIN: D'id you have an opportuni

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direct interaction

15

Yovanovi tch?

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l8

was Under Secretary Hale.

ty to observe

any

between President Zelenskyy and Ambassador

I only saw when he was Candidate Zelenskyy
w'i th her, and at that poi nt, the f ocus was on Under Secretary
Hale as the ranking visitor.
MR. KENT:

MR.

t9

ZELDIN: So no indications from that exchange that

2t

that statement from President
Zelenskyy with regards to loyalty to a previous President

22

not accepting ZelenskYY?

20

would help uS understand

MR. KENT:

23

24
25

I

have no way

of exptaining why he said that,

no.

MR. ZELDIN: Why

and

weren't you on the July 25th call?

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MR

KENT: As

Forei gn Service,

I

I've

in

stated earlier,
neve r

been on

a

my 27 years

Presi denti a1

in

the

call ,

and

that i s not normal for offjcials that are at the Embassy or
at the State Department. The people who normally are on a
Presidential call are staff at the Nati onal Securi ty Counc'i1
and the White House. And I have not served as a detailee to
the Nati onal Securi ty Counci 1 i n my career.
MR. ZELDIN: As far as the parti ci pants on the catl , you
testi fi ed earl i er that you got a readout of the call from
Lieutenant Colonel

Vindman?

ll

MR. KENT: Correct.

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MR. ZELDIN: Was there anyone

else on the call

who would

22

typically give you a readout of that phone call?
MR. KENT: I would say that it was standard procedure
for the director to give a readout to the Deputy Assistant
Secretary. So, for instance, it was also Lieutenant Colonel
Vindman who gave me the readout in April after the
i naugural sorry, the electi on day vi ctory call . So that
was standard practice, that the director for a country would
give a readout to the DAS so that the policy DAS at State
would know the substance of what was di scussed so we could
make sure that our policy going forward was aligned with the

23

conversations had by the President.

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20

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25

MR. ZELDIN: We

something

only have a couple minutes left, but

that is stil1 outstanding from a previous

round I'm

 298

4

trying to understand. You have a reputation of loving and
cherishing this U.S.-Ukraine relationship and dedicating your
1 i fe toward strengtheni ng the relati onshi p between the Uni ted
States and Ukraine. That is something that I've heard. And

5

you get a readout from Lieutenant Colonel Vindman that

2
J

6
7

doesn't have a 1ot of details, and you don't try to get
more information about the cal1. I just want to better

any

l0

got that readout that
was lacking substance, that you chose not to try to get any
more information. This is what you've dedicated your life

ll

towards strengtheni ng thi

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understand

8

9

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20

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23

24
25

understand your mindset

that.

that,

once you

s relationshi p.

Can you

And

I don't

better explain that?

I th'ink some people try to be i n the mi ddle
of everything, and some people try to do their job based on
the condi ti ons whj ch they are i ssued. So, agai n, I don't
work at the Wh'ite House. There are conversati ons and
meetings that I do not take part in. My job is to represent
the State Department and try to promote our national
MR.

KENT:

interests through the policies that have been discussed and
agreed to in the interagency format and to uSe the mechanisms

that the State Department has under its ability, including
programming funded by appropriations from Congress, to pursue
those national interests. So that's my job. It's also my
job for six countries.
Now, admi ttedly, Ukra'i ne i s the bi ggest country.

 299
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5

6
7

is a country which Congress appropriates over $100
million a year. And so I am juggling responsibilities for
these si x countri es and travel i ng to all si x countri es. So
we are focusing on one of six countries today for which I
have responsi bi 1 i ty. So I do not 1 i ve, breathe every si ngle
second of my life focused on Ukraine, no.
MR. G0LDI4AN: I thi nk that' s ti me.
Georgia

Ambassador

Kent, you've been here a long day and I'm

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MR. KENT:

I'm not

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t'lR. GOLDI'IAN: I 'm sor ry.

8

9

su re

Ambassador.

l6

. Kent . The members are
going to have to go vote I think in about 20 minutes. So I
know you've just sat through another hour and a ha1f. Would
you like to take a 5-minute break
MR. KENT: I'd appreciate that.
MR. GOLDMAN: And then we'11 come right back. Okay.

t7

Let's do that.

l8

lRecess.l

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Mr

20

record. I t' s 6: 20, and i t' s
the majority's round. Mr. Kent, thank for your patience and

2t

di 1i gence today, we are neari ng

t9

l'4R. G0LDMAN: Back

22

14r

Mi

tchel l

the

end.

.

BY MR. M]TCHELL:

73

a

24
25

.

on the

assi

Si

stance.

r, j n the last round, you mentioned securi ty
Can you j

ust generally descri be what Ukrai ne

 300

5

ty Assi stance Ini ti ative j s?
A Wel1, that is a specific term that refers to money
appropriated in the Defense budget as opposed to the State

4

Department

1

2

5

6
7
8

9

Securi

budget. Traditionally, foreign assjstance was
appropri ated under what's known aS forei gn mi 1 i tary fi nanci ng
in State Department budget. Several years ago, Congress
started appropriating monies in the Defense budget. And so
the Ukrai ne Securi ty In'iti ati ve i s moni es that are made
available 'in the Defense budget. And that is something that

in Scope.

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was started maybe 3 years ago and has grown

ll
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fi scal year 2019, whi ch j ust concluded, i t was $250 mi 11 i on.
O Are you generally f amit i ar then wi th both USAI and

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FMF?

t4

l5

l6

familiar, but i did not ever have line
authori ty over securi ty assi stance 'in the way I had f or a
rule of law and justice sector assistance.
A

Generally

"authority," do you mean both when
you were in Ukrajne as well as in your current position?

a

And when you say

t9

A

The way securi

20

what budget

t7

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The

ty

assi stance works, regardless of

22

it is appropriated in, the monies are executed
agents usually affiliated in the case of Ukraine with
European Command, and we have an 0ffice of Defense

23

Cooperat'ion i n the Embassy. And the di recti on i n how we

24

spend

25

commission between

2t

that

money

is usually
EUCOM

determined

in a joint military

and the Ukrainian general

staff

by

 301
I

admi ni

a

2
J

A
i

n

Are you now talking about a budgetary process here

Washi ngton?

a

6
7

Are you generally familiar with the way in which,

the process by which USAI funds are released?

4
5

strati ve heads.

So,

for

example, does Ukraine need

to

meet certain

benchmarks before those funds can be released?

A

8

The authori zers i n Congress have put condi ti onal i ty

l4

for the last several years on the second half. So, for
instance, this past year, $250 milf ion, there was a
condj tionali ty on the second $125 mi 11ion. In a previous
year, I don't know if it was the previous year -- I don't
know if it's the previous 2 years ago or the first year
3 years ago there was that condi tionali ty, but the

l5

approprjators did not appropriate as much money as the

t6

authorizers authorized. So the conditionality did not kick

t7

l8

in. But, yes, generally the authorizers and appropriators
worked together to put conditionality on the monies in the

l9

USAI

9

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13

.

a

20

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And what was your i nvolvement,

'if any, on

determining whether the conditjonality had been met?

A

22

The

conditionality is set by the Office of

the

23

Secretary of Defense. My counterpart, Laura Cooper, plays

24

principal role in that, and the determjnation to

25

made

by the Secretary

of

Defense.

a

Congress is

 302
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5

6
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8

9

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'is there an i nteragency process that takes
place wjth regard to the release of the funds?
A 0nce the funds are in the hands of the U.S.
military and specifically, I believe, they are held with
the Defense Security and Cooperation Agency the State

a

And

a role, no. 0n the front end,
di scussi ng what mi ght be appropri ate condi ti ons, there i s
discussion, but ultimately that 'is a process, and the
Department does not have

a

ti ons, and whether they have been met, i s
determined by the 0ff ice of Secretary of Defense.
a What about with regard to FMF, how does that work?
speci

fi c

A

condi

tary fi

t4

ng, the State Department
has a greater role in determining what the policy goals are
and how that money would be applied, but that js also very

15

much

t2
l3

Forei gn mi 1i

nanci

l6

a collaborative process. And, ultimately, the FMF is
also cut over to the U.S. military, specifically, the DSCA is

t7

the executi ve mi 1 i tary agent.

We don'

t

spend and i mplement

t9

the programming the way that we wou1d, say, for 1aw
enforcement programmi ng. It, agai n, i s moni es where we have

20

a greater pol i cy role

2l

executed by U.S.

l8

22
23

24
25

upf ront and

vo'ice, but i n the end, i t's

miljtary components.
a And what is your personal involvement jn FMF then?
A I have frequent conversations wi th my counterpart'
Laura Cooper, not just about Ukraine. She covers more
countri es, but there's a 1ot of assi stance goi ng to Georgi a,

 303
I

and so we have conversations about multiple countries, and

2

also talk about the condi t'ionali ty in Ukra'ine.

we

8

of the PCC or sub-PCC meetings
i n J u1y regardi ng securi ty assi stance for Ukrai ne?
A Yes.
a Which ones did you attend?
A The first one where this issue came up was
July L8th. It was a sub-PCC, to the best of my recollect'ion,

9

and the intended topic

J
4
5

6
7

a

Did you attend any

was

l0

ll

a

Was

there any discussion of the meeting at the

level on July LSth about any sort of freeze of

the

t2

sub-PCC

l3

ty assi stance to Ukrai ne?
A Yes.
a Can you descri be that di scussi on?
A It was described as a hold, not a freeze. There
was a representati ve of the 0f f i ce of l"{anagement and Budget.
I was at the State Department in a security video conference,
I did not recognize the face. And I believe the individual
representing OMB at the time was not normally the person who
did. It was the summer vacation cycles. And he just stated
to the rest of the those participants, either in person or
video screens, that the head of the 0ffice of l'lanagement and
Budget who was the acting chief of staff, Mick Mulvaney, at
the direction of the President had put a hold on alI security

t4

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20

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23

24
25

securi

 304
I

to the Ukraine.

assi stance
a

2

Mulvaney had put a hold

at

the

direction of the

5

Is that what you heard?
That is what the rePresentative of the 0ffice of
A
Ma n agemen t and Budget stated in the sub-PCC on July L8th,

6

yes.

J
4

Presi dent.

a

7
8

A

There was great confusion among the

because we

ll
l2

there any discussion following that

announcement?

9

l0

Was

a
ha

didn't

understand why

Did anyone ask

at that

rest of

us

that had happened.
sub-PCC meeting why

that

ppe ned?

t4

the individual said that he
apologized, that he normalty dld not deal wjth these issues,

l5

but this was the

l6

conveyed j t.

t7

a
A

l3

A

l8
l9
20

2t
22
23

24
25

meeti

We

d'id.

And

message he was asked

to

convey and

he

the individual being this gentleman from 0MB?
The representati ve f rom the 0t'48 i n that parti cular

And

ng, yes.

a
A
a
A
a

Was

that the

end

of that discussjon on this topic?

Yes.

0n that

day?

Yes.

Did you have any internal discussions

Department

of State on or about July

LSth

at

the

after this

 305
I

pronouncement had been relayed

A
a
A

2
3

4

did you have those d j scuss'ions wj th?
Tyler Brace, our schedule C political appointee,
And who

former staffer

6

processes

a
A

8

9

you?

I did.

5

7

to

for

Senator Portman, who understand budgetary

in great detail.
did you have that conversation?
I befieve I had it subsequent to the

When

sub-PCC,

same

day.

2t

just describe what you talked about?
We djscussed what the significance of that was
because none of us could understand why. Since there was
unanimity that this was in our national interest, it just
surprised all of us.
a When you say "unanimity" that it was jn our
national interest, what do you mean by that?
A I believe that jt is a factually correct statement
to say that there's broad support among both parties in
Congress, both Houses in Congress, and among the 5tate
Department, the Defense Department, Joj nt Ch'i efs, and other
elements of the U.S. Government for the security assistance

22

programs.

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17

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20

23

24
25

a
A

And can you

a Prior to this July 18th meeting, had you gotten any
sort of wind or idea that this aid would be frozen or held?
A No,

 306
a

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5

6
7
8

9

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cond'i

And

it

was your understanding on

July L8th that all

ti ons had been met?

A
a
A

For?

To release funds.
That was my understanding. You're talking about

the funds for USAI and the

a
A
a
A

FMF fund?

Correct.
That was my understanding, Yes.
Has your understanding since changed?

Wel1, eventually, the hold was released

on

t4

l.Lth, and the funds were then apportioned by QMB to
the extent that it was possible to spend them by the end of
the fi scal year, yes.
a So do you know anything that changed between

t5

July LSth and when they were actually released in

ll
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13

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t7

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20

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23

24
25

September

September?

A When you say what changed?
a Any sort of cond'itions.
A In Ukrai ne?
a Anywhere.
A My understanding of what happened after that date
was that Senior Di rector T'im l4orrison started going up the
chain of the interagency process according to National
Security Presidentjal Memorandum 4, and that meant holding a
policy coordinating committee meeting, which he scheduled for
July 23rd, followed by a deputy sma11 group meeting, which I

 307
I

believe may have occurred on July 26th. And then Senior

4

rector Morri son was looki ng to schedule a pri nci pa1 smal1
group meeting that would involve the Secretary of State
personally, Secretary of Defense, and Ambassador Bolton so

5

they could discuss the issue and then take it to the

6

Presi dent.

2
J

Di

a
A

7
8

9

for the PCC meeting on JuIy 23rd?
I believe I was, yes, as a back-bencher. I was not

Were you

present

the pri nci pa1.

2l

I should have asked you. 0n the L8th, did you take
any notes of that meeting?
A I did.
a And are those among to notes thank you provided to
the Department of State to produce to Congress?
A They should be. I photocopied quite a 1ot of
notes, but certa'in1y the statement of conclusions should be
'included, although now I'm thi nki ng I'm not sure j f
sub-PCCs have statement of conclusions. Those may be, only
for PCC meetings. But to the extent I took notes on that
meeting, I would have included them, yes.
a For July 23rd, you said were you a back-bencher at

22

the

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20

23

24
25

a

PCC meeting?

A
a
discussed

Yes,

And was

this topic of the hold of the Ukraine aid

at that meeting?

 308
A
a
A

I
2
5

That was the purpose

of the meeting.

What was discussed?

To the best

of my recollection, the conversation

5

the table and saying they
supported the ljfting of the administrative hold so that the

6

State Department and the 0ffice of Secretary of Defense,

7

Pentagon, could move

4

was everybody going around

l0

forward. We were ending approaching
the end of the fiscal year, and I believe that Laura Cooper,
speaking on behalf of the Pentagon, 'indicated that the D0D
comptroller had determined that they needed to move forward

ll

by August 5th

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i

8

9

spend the money and meet Congress'

ntent.

a

l3
t4

in order to

i 11ega1i

A

l5

Was

there any discussion of the legality or

ty of the hold?
There was discussion about the standing

of ONB to

l8

put an informal hold. Normal1y, the conversations with OMB
prior to noti fjcation to Congress i s a courtesy, not
something required under 1aw. And that is why the position

t9

was expressed by Laura Cooper,

20

recollection, that

2l

move

22

Director Morrison suggesting that the State Department also

16

t7

DOD

to the best of

counsel had determined

forward by August 5th regardless. And

I

my

that they

would

reca11 Senior

24

its legal requirements and be prepared to have that
briefed at the next meeting, which he set 3 days 1ater, as a

25

deputy sma11 group meeting.

23

review

 309

2

So, if

a

I

OMB

did not

move

forward by August 6th, what

would be the implication?

A

J

Again, this is about an account that was not

in

4

appropriated to my department nor executed

5

so

6

best of my recollection, what she said in that meeting

I

would defer

to

my

my department,

colleague, Laura Cooper. But to the
was

ll

that, according to DSCA, they may not be able to execute all
of the requirements by the end of the fjscal year. My
understandi ng j s that USAI moni es are 1--year moni es. The
monies in the State Department FMF account are 2-year monies.
a What did OMB say, if anything, in response to Laura

t2

Cooper'

l3

A

7
8

9

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20

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22
23

24
25

s

OMB's

position was what it had been on the L8th,

that they were under the directjon of their boss to put -hold all securi ty assi stance to Ukrai ne.
a Did they provide a reason?
A They said it was at the djrection of the Presjdent.
a Who was present for the July 23rd meeting?
A That would be a matter of record because that was a
PCC, and there's a statement of conclusions. And in the
statement of conclusi ons, on the fi rst page, there's a
1 i sti ng of all parti ci pants i n the meeti ng.
a Did you receive a copy of the statement of
conclusi ons for thi s meeti ng?
A I believe I did, and that would have been provided

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to the document request.
a Did OMB provide any reasoning beyond simply it was
at the direction of the President?
A Not to my recollection, no.
a So they di dn't descri be why the Presi dent had
placed this hold?
A There was a lack of claritY.
a What do you mean bY that?
A The parti ci pants who up unt'il that poi nt had
thought that there was unanimi ty that th'is was i n our
national interest did not receive an explanation for why this

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parti cular acti on was taken.

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5

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8

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Okay. So, to your knowledge, no one at the PCC
meeting on July 23rd knew why the President was making the
decision or at least they didn't expreSs it at that meeting?

a

I do not recall

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A
a

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i ncoherent?

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20

A OMB placed a hold on a Process that
traditionally, that is the office that has a voice on how the

2l

executive branch spends

l6

22
23

Was

a
A

Was

any coherent explanation' no.

there any explanatjon at all, coherent or

moneY.

that unusual, in your

According

to, in

my conversation

24

who again has worked here as

25

0t4B head

,

Acti ng Chi ef

of

experience?

with Tyler

Brace,

a staffer, the previous cyc1e,

Staf

f

14ulvaney, had attempted

a

 31

1

rescission at the end of the year, and indeed the next
2
J
4

at the beginning of August, he. sent out a data call with the
intent potentially to execute a rescjssion involving billions
of dollars of assistance wortdwide, not just Ukraine.
Okay. So, i n your experj ence, though, was thj s

a

5

6

unusual?

A

7

I

had read about Mr. Mulvaney's attempt

8

rescission at the end of the last fiscal year.

9

understanding was

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and the

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Defense $250

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a

23

24
25

a

My

this year, this

overall greater effort to have a rescissjon held up the
process for much of August, but it was also lifted, and that
left us with just the hold on Ukraine assistance.
a The Ukraine assistance that you just mentioned, is
that FMF, or is that the USAI?

r8

22

push

was then suspended.

And, ultimately, the same thing happened

A

2t

to

that Secretary Pompeo protested vigorously,

effort to have a rescission

t7

20

week,

i

It affected both accounts, the Department of
mi

1l i on, and

0kay.

And you

the $141

mi 11 i

on under

FMF.

said that that was stl11

bei ng held

n August?

A

That hold, the 0MB-directed hold, was lifted

on

September 11th.

at the July 25th deputies' meeting?
I did not participate in that meeting. Under
Secretary Hale represented the State Department, and I cannot
a
A

What happened

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2

recall the exact outcome. That would also be documented in
the document ca11, but i t d'id not change the ultimate

J

si tuati on.

6

a
A
a

7

conclusi ons?

4
5

8

A
a
A

D'id you see

a readout of that parti cular

meeti ng?

I did.
And is it in a similar form as the statement of
To the best

of mY knowledge,

Yes.

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that readout?
The main takeaway for me was that Senior Director
Morrison was trying to find out when Secretary of State
Pompeo and the Secretary of Defense would both be in
Washington so they could have an in-person principal sma11
group meeting to discuss the same issue and then take it to

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the Presi dent.

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a

And what do you reca11 from

Was

there any discussion at the July 25th deputies'

committee meeting about

the reasons for the

hold?

I honestly cannot recalf if there was any detai1.
The bottom line was the hold remained, and we needed a
pri nci pa1 sma1l group to carry the process forward.
a But it's your understanding at the July 26th
meeting that, again, there was unanimous support to release
the funds to lift the ho1d. Is that right?
A With the exception of OMB, Yes.
a Then you mentioned that there was planning to have
A

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a meeting on July 3Lst. Did that meeting actually take
p1 ace?

l4

A I didn't say that, but I believe that may have been
one of the dates that Senior Director Morrison was attemptjng
to schedule a principal sma1l group meeting.
a Was there a principals meeting at any point?
A To the best of my knowledge, because of the travel
schedules of the two Secretaries, no.
a So what happened next, as f ar as you know, wl th
regard to the lifting of this hold?
A I am aware that many Senators, particularly from
the Republican side, who had traveled to Ukrajne from the
relevant committees, ca1led and talked to the President. I'm
aware that
I saw an ema'i1 that Senator Inhof e had had

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about a 20-m'inute conversation. He had vi si ted twice when I

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was

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20

in Ukraine because Oklahoma National Guard was doing
trai ni ng at the mai n trai ni ng base. Senator Portman ca11ed,
i ncludi ng the day i t was 1 i fted. And my understanding is
that Senate 14ajority Leader McConnell also ca11ed.
a Was there any di scussions at State between July

2t

3Lst and when the funds were actually released about the

22

freeze that you partook in?

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23
24
25

A

The State Department was concerned. Obviously,

we

to get the hold lifted so that we could get the money
apportioned by OMB and then obligated. And so we were at

wanted

 314
1

2
3

4
5

the di rection of Senjor

rector MorriSon, exploring what was
the absolute minjmum amount of time that would be necessary
to obligate the money once the lrold was lifted. So we were
preparing for a decjsion so that we could ensure that the
money could be obligated before the end of the fiscal year.
Di

7

the first time that you heard that the
security assjstance might somehow we be ljnked to this White

8

House vi si

6

a

When was

13

t or i nvesti gati ons conducted by Ukrai ne?
A Because everyone was unclear why thjs had happened,
I think, in the vacuum of a clear explanation, people started
speculating. So there was a coincidence of timing, but as I
ref erenced earf ier in the communication w'ith Charge Taylor,
he indicated to me that, in his communications w'ith both

t4

Senior Director 14orrison and Ambassador Sondland, and this

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would have been the weekend

9

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of the 7th and 8th of September,
that both of them insisted that there was not a direct tink.
a And that was based on what?
A This was a conveyed conversation. That was their
asserti ons. Accordi ng to Charge Taylor, separately, Seni or

20

Director MorriSon, with

2t

of

22

conversation on the 8th

23

two were not di rectlY 1i nked.

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24
25

whom

he had a conversation on the 7th

September, and Ambassador Sondland,

a
A

of

with

whom

he had a

September, had asserted

that

And how do theY know?

I cannot answer for them. That would be the

the

 315
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question to direct

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Sond 1 and

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.

to

Sen'ior Director Morrison and Ambassador

 316
16:44 p.m. l

I

BY t"IR. MiTCHELL:

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a

They

didn't provide any information as to thei r

sou rce?

I

5

A

6

a conversati

was

on

not part of that conversat'ion. I was having

with

Charge Taylor.

l3

this conversation with Charge Taylor, was that
over WhatsApp or was that in person or
A That was a part of our regularly scheduled l4onday
secure ca11s, video conferences. And that part of the
conversation we ask all of our staff to leave, so it is just
one on one in a secure communication.
a Okay. And what else did Charge Taylor tell you

l4

about these conversations that he had had?

7
8

9

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A

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And

I

recounted

to the best of my knowledge what those

20

were. That was Senior D'i rector Morri son
talking about his concern that Rudy Giuliani had had another
conversation with the President, as well as what Sondland
relayed Rudy to be hjs interaction.
a And djd you memorialize that conversation that you

2t

had

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22
23

24
25

conversat'ions

had?

Yes. That was part of a note to the file whjch I
provided to the document collection process.
a Did you talk to anyone else at the Department of
State about what Charge Taylor told you?
A

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I betieve I shared my concerns with my colleagues
in the European front office. That would be the ones
immediately near my office. Included Deputy Assistant
Secretary I'li chael Murphy, who oversees our relati ons wi th the
Baltics and Nordics and NATO. And for large stretches of
time earlier in 2019 it was our senior Bureau official and
also the deputy ass'i stant secretary,
, who
oversees our relat'ions with Western Europe, and that includes
A

relations w'ith Ambassador Sondland and the mission he leads
i n Brussels.

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a

When

you said you shared concerns, what do you

mean

by that?

A

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i

shared

the

I

shared the sense that

I

had heard

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from Charge Taylor that Ambassador Sondland was engaged in

l5

l6

the types of conversations that he was engaged in on Ukraine
even though that was not part of hjs portfolio as our

t7

ambassador

a

l8

l9
20

to the European Unjon.
And again, was this a conversation that you had

th Deputy Assi stant Secretary
or jn person?

wi

t'4urphy and Fi sher i

n wri ti

ng

22

A Their offices are between 5 and 10 feet away from
my office and so I -- this was a djrect conversation jn thejr

23

offi

2t

ce.

24

a

And what was thei r reac t i on?

25

A

They were aware of the challenge

of dealing with

 318

)

a, I would say, track record of
freelancing, would be one way of putting jt, but working on
issues other than the reason why he was sent to Brussels to

4

work our relationship

1

2

Ambassador Sondland who has

a

5

6
7
8

9

about i t?

I don't think there is anybody at the level of
deputy assjstant secretary of State who can do anything about
what Gordon Sondland chooses to do.
A

a
A
a

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13

with the European Union.
Djd they indicate that they would try do anything

was

they escalated the

i ssue?

I do not.
At any point were you given a reason why the

put in

A

t4

Do you know when

hold

place?

Not that

I recal1. Wel1, I believe, at least in

20

relation to the USAI, there Were some concernS expressed in
the Pentagon, 0ffice of Secretary of Defense, did a review
and responded that they felt that the conditions and concerns
that we had had been met and that the programmi ng should go
forward. But that was a specific review about USAI, which is
not State Department controlled, and so that was an issue

2t

between the Pentagon and

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16

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a

22
23

24
25

I

guess the White House and

Do you know whether

NSC.

a similar revjew was conducted

th regard to F1'4F?
A We were not asked for a similar review. The media
coverage was focused on the 250 million of USAI. If you look

wi

 319

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at those articles at the time they were not mentioning $391
mi11ion, which would have been the total FMF plus USAI.
a Do you know whether a similar review of FMF has

4

since been conducted?

2

A

5

The hold was

1ifted on September LLth and we moved

6

forward with notifying Congress and ensuring the funds

7

obtigated before the end of the fiscal year.

8

9

We

were

were not

to do in order
obtigate the funds as to meet the congressional jntent in
asked and we proceeded with what we needed

to

l0

appropri ati ng them.

ll

13

0kay. So to the best of your knowledge, you have
no knowledge of any plan to conduct any such review?
A We did not see it necessary nor were we asked to do

t4

50.

12

l5

a

a

All right.

Now, when you were

in Ukraine,

Ukraine

l9

at the time, correct?
A They were receiving F[''lF, yes, and I believe the
start of USAI was while I was there. I do not recall
speci ficalty which fi scal year USAI funds started to be

20

appropr i ated.

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t7

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23

24
25

was receiving USAI and FMF funds

a

0kay.

So based on your experience

in Ukraine,

as

well as your experience here in Washington, D.C., how

for Ukrajne security?
A I would assess that they are cri ti cally important.
The Ukrainian defense establishment was unprepared to fight a
important are these funding programs

 320
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5

6
7
8

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its war in 20L4. And
therefore, the training that we do, wh'ich is probably the
most valuable in training Ukrainians to fight, as well as the
equipping that we do, have been critical to the success of
the Ukraj ni an armed forces i n defendi ng thei r country.
At the same time I would say that we probably derive
more benef i t f rom the relat'ionshi p than the Ukrai ni ans do.
a How so?
A That would be somethi ng to di scuss i n a classi fi ed

war with Russia when Russia began

manner, parti cularly

with

my colleagues

from the defense

and

13

ntel agenc i es
a But suffi ce to say that i t was i n both Ukrai ne's
nati onal i nterests as well as the Uni ted States' nati onal

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i

11

t2

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l6

i

.

nterest that these funds

A
a

t7

you were

l8

in D.C.?

t9

A
a

Very much

be

released to the Ukrai

SO

that's true not just for the ti

And

in Ukraine but also for
Cor

ne?

me per i od

2019 when you were back here

rect.

22

with anyone
what the Ukrainians' perspective was on the freeze?
A They were confused, to the best of my

23

understandi ng.

20

2t

24
25

a
A

that

Have you had any conversations

0kay.
Charge

about

did you get that understanding?
Taylor was in Ukraine try'ing to figure out

And how

 321

5

on. My most recent trip to Ukraine,
I arrived on September LLth. Fortunately that was the day
that the hold was lifted. So by the time I started engaging
Ukrainians in person, it was a good news story.
a Had you prepared to answer their questions about

6

the hold?

I
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4

how

to explain

what went

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I was prepared for the possibility that it would
not be lifted and therefore the conversations would be very
difficult and I would not by able to provide an adequate
understandi ng or answer.
a Djd you try to get an adequate understanding or
answer prior to your trip?
A Fortunately, I didn't have to worry about that
hypothetjcal because it was resolved essentjally as I arrived

l5

i

l6
t7

ght. But pri or to you arri vi ng 'in Ukrai ne di d
you attempt to find out why the hold was in place so that you

l8

could actually have a meaningful conversation wjth the

l9

Ukrai ni ans about thi

7
8

9

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20

2t
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23

24
25

A

n Ukrai ne.

a

Ri

s

i ssue?

A We i t was very clear that thi s i ssue was only
going to be resolved they very highest 1eve1, and that's why
Tim l4orrison wanted to have Secretary Pompeo and SecDef Esper
jn the same place at the same time to have that conversation.
That was the 1eve1 at which the conversation needed to
happen. It didn't matter what the deputy assjstant secretary

 322
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or an assistant secretary or an under secretary or a deputy

2

secretary thought.

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a

Okay. To the best of your knowledge, did that

meeti ng happen?

of my knowledge, there was never a
pri nci pa1 smal1 group meeti ng on thi s i ssue.
a What did Taylor, Charge Taylor, say to you about
hi s conversati ons wi th Ukrai n'ians about the hold?
A I honestly don't reca1l in detail. I think it was
clear starting, if not from July L8th, certainly from JuIy
23rd, that this was an issue that had to be resolved in
Vr/ashi ngton, and i t was a tough nut f or everyone to crack
wi thout a lot of clari ty.
a It was your understanding at the time, though, that
the issue had to be resolved at the principals 1eve1?
A Once we cleared the deputy smal1 group meeting,
whjch I believe was July 25th, it was clear it had to be
resolved at a principals leve1 and above. And so that was
clear I think to everyone after July 25th.
a Okay. And when you say above, yotl mean
speci fi cally the Presi dent of the Uni ted States?
A We11, the principal sma1l group, members of the
Cabinet, who then could take the issue to the President.
a And again there was never a PCC as far as you know?
A There was a PCC on July 23rd. So in the sort of
A

To the best

 323
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climbing the ladder we started with a sub-PCC on the 18th.

2

There was a pol i cy coord'inati ng

commi

J

was a deputy smal1 group on the

25th.

4

attempt

5

was Tim Morrison

6

process

ttee on the 23rd.
And there was

an

to schedule but lack of principals subsequent.
driving the interagency policy

That

review

8

in the way it was intended.
a So to the best of your knowledge, this issue
ultimately was not resolved by the principals, it was

9

resolved by the President?

7

There

t4

A Correct.
a You testified earlier about August 15th and August
l.5th . At the ti me di d you thi nk that the ai d mi ght i n any
way be linked to the investigations that were being pushed by
Mr. Giuliani or that were discussed by the President in the

l5

July 25th call?

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24
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A
a
A

I personally did not associate them, no.
Has your thinking changed jn any way since then?
This js a personal opinion. It strikes me that the

th the Wh'ite House, at the Whi te
House, not related to the securi ty assi stance. But agai n,
that's just my personal opinion, other people may have
di fferent opi ni ons.
a What was Charge Taylor's opi ni on?
A I think there is the WhatsApp exchange where he
expressed concerns that 'i t mi ght be f inked.
associ ati on was a meeti ng w j

 324
a
A

I

2

But what did he

I don't

tell

You?

reca11 having a conversation where

he

that he shared in the
that apparently were leaked, but jn any
to

J

expressed the same opinion

4

WhatsApp messages

5

case were handed over by former Special Representative

6

Volker.

me

t0

did in one conversation with me share a conversation
he had with Ambassador Sondland in which Ambassador Sondland,
who had told him that there was no quid pro quo with the
security assistance, said, on the other hand, you know, the

ll

President's a businessman and if you're going to sign a check

7
8

9

He

l5

mjllion why not ask somebody for something.
Nov.,, that was sort of an 'inf ormal comment that
Ambassador Sondland made to Ambassador -- to Charge Taylor
and that he conveyed to me. But the same person, Ambassador

l6

Sondland, sajd there was no quid pro quo on security

t7

ass'istance.

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24
25

for

$250

a

When

he had had

wi

did

th

Charge Taylor

relay this conversation that

Ambassador Sondland?

A I cannot recall if it was in our secure conference
call that I described on September 9th or, since I then flew
to Ukrai ne and stayed w'i th h jm over that weekend, whether he
may have shared that with me in person. But i believe I did
write that note up and share it with the records. So it's
part of the records that were collected by the State

 325
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Department.

2
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or about September

And the Ukraine

A

I arrived in Ukraine on September LLth, that's

was on

l.1th?

4
5

trip

a

correct.

a

6

What

djd you

do

7

wrote up on or about the

8

5eptembe r?

with the

this memo that you
9th of September or 1lth of

ll

it to the note on file that I had initially
wri tten on the L5th of August and then subsequently amended
'i t wi th the conversations I had with Charge Taylor in person

t2

i

9

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AI

added

n Ukrai ne.

a
A

And who

did you give that

memo to?

l5

It was a note to the file, so it stayed as a note
to the file until I submitted it to the document collection

l6

when those were requested.

t7

)7

0kay. When you say to the document collection,
you're talking about -- were you referring to the subpoena?
A I am referring to the subpoena.
a Okay. 5o you didn't specjfically give this memo to
Deputy Assistant Secretary Murphy, for example?
A To the best of my recollection, when I returned
from Kyiv I wrote the note to the file and I orally briefed

24

Deputy Assi

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25

a

stant Secretary 14urphy, Deputy Assi stant Secretary
Fi sher, and Acti ng Assi stant Secretary Reeker.

 326
a
2
5

4
5

6
7
8

9

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It is a different brief than the ones we were

talking about earlier?
A Correct. The previous time when I talked yes,
because this is sequential. So I had two conversations with
two individuals on the L5th and l-5th of August. That was the

first time I wrote a note to a fi1e. I had subsequent
conversations with Ambassador -- Charge Taylor on the 9th of
September, another note to the fj1e. And then travel to
Ukraine, conversations there, return, note to the fi1e, oral
brief.

0kay.

1l

a

t2

Reeker, and

And the

oral bri efi ng was wj th

Fi sher,

Murphy?

l8

A To the best of my knowledge, yes, but I did I
know that I included in my note to the file the officials
whom I briefed ora11y. So I wrote it up and then I briefed
and I added that as a note in the file that I -- precisety
whom i had oral briefed.
a Was this one oral briefing or multiple oral

t9

briefings?

l3
t4
l5
t6
t7

20

2l
22
23

24
25

It was it would have been sequential because
those are three di fferent i ndi vi duals. And so two of them,
agai n, offj ces are collocated wi th mi ne, then Acti ng
Assistant Secretary Reeker's office is across the ha11.
a And what were the'i r reacti ons?
A At this point it was clear the nature of the
A

 327
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interactions that Special Representative Volker

2

Ambassador Sondland were

J

a

of the conversations that had been clearly

4

Ambassador Sondland and Ambassador

5

6
7
8

9

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20

2l
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Z3

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25

a

And do you

and

having, so it was more confirmation
ongoing between

Volker with Ukrainians.

recall what Reeker's react'ion

was

specifically?

I do not recall precisely. I thjnk they were all

A
conce rned

a
A
a

.

Did they commit to doing anything about this?

I recal1.
Did they say that they were going to escalate
Not that

the

i ssue?

A
a

I do not recalI.
You

A

I

test'if ied earl i er thi s af ternoon about a
conversation that you had with Charge Taylor about Zelenskyy
making some sort of TV interview or address, public address.
mentioned what Ambassador Sondland had told

that he conveyed to me, yes.
a Okay. And when djd Charge Taylor have that
conversation with you?
A I believe that's what I conveyed to you regarding
the conversation I had with Charge Taylor on the 9th of
September, referencing his conversation with Ambassador
Sondland that occurred on the 8th of September.
a Did you have any further conversations with Charge

Charge Taylor and

 328
I

Taylor about this topic after September 1Lth, I guess it

2

A

Yes.

J

a

a

And when was

4

A

The next conversation would have happened

the next conversat i on?

5

breakfast table Sunday morni ng, which

6

15th.

7

a

And where were you at

8

A

I

9

in

was?

I believe

at

the

was September

that time?

was hi s house guest i n the ambassador'

s resi dence

Kyiv.

l5

a Okay. Can you describe who else was at that
A That was just Ambassador Taylor and me. He went
out for a run, and I went down to breakfast, and we met and
talked 7:30 in the morning more or less.
a What did you talk about?
A We talked about the meeting that ambassador --

16

Charge Taylor and Spec'ia1 Representative Volker had had the

l7

night before with Andriy Yermak, the close personat aide of

l8

Presi dent Zelenskyy.

l0

ll
t2
13

t4

l9

O
A

And what were you told?

2t

Well, that meeting was the one meeting on Kurt's
schedule in Ukraine that he felt uncomfortable with me

22

joining.

20

23

24
25

He

said that it was because of numbers. It was not

clear whether it would be just Yermak or whether he would
also bring a gentleman named Novokov (ph), whom I have not
met, and who 'is responsible for U.S. relations in the

 329
I
2
J

Pres'identi

al

of f i ce.

Kurt said he felt that having three Americans on one
Ukraine was too much, and he said if there were a second

7

I could come. I decided not to push 1t since we
were involved in another event, as well as antjcipating that
there was going to be an awkward conversation, which there
was. And Charge Taylor provjded me the details of that

8

conversati on over breakfast.

4
5

6

9

l0

Ukrajnjan

a
A

Whi

ch

were?

Welt, besides the main part of the conversation

ll

was about negotiations

t2

that and that's not

l3

with the Russians, and I won't

mention

germane.

But the more awkward part of the conversation came when

t4

Special Representative Volker made the point that the

l5

Ukrainians, who had opened thei r authorities under Zelenskyy,
had opened 'investigations of former President Poroshenko, he

t6

l9

didn't think that was appropriate.
And then Andriy Yermak said: What? You mean the type
of i nvesti gat j ons you' re pushi ng f or us to do on B'iden and

20

CI i nton?

2t

at that point Kurt Volker did not respond.
Later on in the conversation, when it came to the
potential for Zelenskyy and President Trump to meet,
according to Charge Taylor, Special Representative Volker
said: And it's important that President Zelenskyy give the

t7
t8

22
ZJ
24
25

And

 330
I

messages

a
A
a

5

6

me

that he then said: Don't

do

Who

said don't do that?

Charge Taylor.
So

Taylor was concerned about the way in which this

conversation took place?

A

8

9

told

that.

4

7

we discussed before.

And Charge Taylor

2
J

that

when

Ply

understanding

is that

he was concerned.

Kurt made a suggestion that Charge Taylor felt

And

was

ate he wei ghed i n wi th hi s own personal opi ni on,

l0

i nappropri

ll

whi

t2

l9

directly linking the White House
meeting and the investigations that were being pushed by the
Presi dent. Is that correct?
A It was an elliptical readout that -- by the readout
that I heard from Charge Volker sorry, Charge Taylor
that Kurt, Special Representative Volker, was referring to
prior conversations that he had with Yermak and prior advice,
meaning you should deliver the messages as we've discussed

20

before.

2l

a
A

l3
t4
l5

l6
t7

l8

22
23

24
25

ch that was not appropri ate.

a

And Volker was

Do you know what those messages were?

This goes back to the signaling for a public

appearance. The hoped-for interview with

CNN

with

Zelenskyy

did not happen during the conference. Fareed Zakarja was one
of the hosts, but there was no spec'ia1 i nterv'iew. 5o there

 331
I

was di scussion

that President

2

"interv'iew wi th

CNN

J

a

leaders meetings, which was the week of September 23rd to

4

27tn.

a

5

6

Zelenskyy would have an

the week of the

And the message

that

Mr.

Zelenskyy to provjde during the

A

7

CNN

U. N.

General Assembly

Volker wanted Presi dent
i

ntervi

That Zelenskyy should message that

8

willingness to open investigations in the

9

i

l0

nterest to

We

areas of

that had been pushed previously

.

might subsequently.
MR. G0LDMAN:

l5

I think we're almost finished.

So we'11

take it back for a few minutes.

t7

MR. CAST0R: Thank you.

l8

MR. GOLDMAN: And

then give you an opportunity

end.

20

MR. CAST0R: 0kay.

2t

MR. G0LDt'lAN: 0kay?

22

We

23

IDi scussi on

24

BY MR.

25

his

I think my time is up at this point.
MR. GOLDMAN: Yield to the minority.
l"lR. CASTOR: We don't have any questions at this point.

r3

l9

two

was what?

MR. MITCHELL:

t2

t6

the President and

by Rudy Gi ul i ani

ll

t4

ew

a

are nearing the end. Just L second.

off the record. ]
GOLDMAN:

A few wrap-up questions here.

at

the

 332
That breakfast meeting that you had on September L5th

I
2

that

a

welI?

J

we were

just discussing, did you memorialize that as

13

A I wrote that to note to file when I' returned to the
U. S. , yes.
a When you get back to the U. S.
A Subsequent to Ukra'ine, I went to Belarus, where I
was in Belarus for 2 days, including the three-quarter day
visit of Under Secretary Hale.
And then after that I went to Lithuania to outbrief our
Lithuan'ian a11ies about the advances in the U.S.-Belarus
Under Secretary Hale announced
relationship, because we
that we were going to return an ambassador to BeIarus, which

t4

we have not had since 2008.

4
5

6
7
8

9

l0

ll
t2

?

2t

I returned to the U.S. in the evening of the 19th of
September, I was in the office on Friday, the 20th, and then
took a trai n up f j rst thi ng l'4onday morni ng to be i n New York
for the U.N. General Assembly meetings.
a Were there any conversations that week on the jn
the U.N. General Assembly week that you were aware of or
were present for or that related to these investigations into

22

Biden j n 20L5 that we've been d'iscussi

l5
16

t7

l8
l9
20

23

24
25

So

A
a
A

ng?

No.

You had nei

I

was

ther had any nor heard of

any?

not jnvolved in any meetings, no

of that

 333
It

I

nature,

2

engagement of many

3

time.

no.

was very much focused on the

foreign leaders

who were

'i n

ten se

there at that

6

a Because you said that as of September L5th there
was stitl a hope, for example, that President Zelenskyy would
give an interview wjth CNN when he was in New York for the

7

General Assembly and

8

i nvesti gati

4
5

A

9

specificatly mention those

ons, ri ght?

That was my understanding of what Ambassador Volker

l0

and Ambassador Sondland were requesting

ll

yes.

t2

a
A

of the Ukrainians,

But you don't know whether anything

came

of

that?

20

of my knowledge, President Zelenskyy
d j d not gi ve an j ntervi ew to CNN whi 1e 'in New York w j th that
sort of messaging, no.
a Did you have any meetings with any Ukrainians
officials during that September 1.1th to L5th timeframe
yourself where they expressed where they discussed these
'investi gati ons at all?
A The only meeting that I was a part of where thjs

2t

came up

l3
t4

l5
l6
t7

l8
t9

22
23

24
25

To the best

obtiquely was with the foreign m'inister,

Vadym

Prystaiko. And that was a meeting with Kurt Volker, Charge
Taylor, and myself i n wh'ich the f orei gn mi ni ster sai d: You
guys are sendjng us different messages in different channels.
a And what did you understand that to mean?

 334
Well, 'in that

J

all three of us, Kurt Volker,
Charge Taylor, and I, all reiterated that it would not be
appropriate for the Ukrainians to engage in any activity that

4

could be construed as i nterf eri ng j n the

1

2

A

And so what was the

5

a

6

were recei vi

7
8

9

meeti ng

U.

conflicting

S. elect'ion.

message

that

they

ng?

A Wet1, I would suggest that what was said later on
that night, in the meeting I was not a part of, to Andriy
Yermak was the conflicting message. And as I recounted,

l0

there were two messages, there was what Ambassador Volker

ll

said and what Charge Taylor said, and those themselves were

t2

confl i cti ng

l3
t4
l5

l6
t7
18

t9

messages

.

Because just to be clear -- because Ambassador
Volker was say'ing not to i nvesti gate Poroshenko?
A No. Ambassador Volker suggested that Andriy Yermak
should enSure that the agreed-upon messaging was delivered by
Presi dent Zelenskyy. And Charge Taylor saj d: Don't do that.
a I see.
O

You made some reference

to

Yermak responding to

that either Ambassador Volker or

20

something

2t

about Poroshenko a few minutes ago.

22

/.J
24
25

A
a

Charge Taylor sa'id

Yes.

Explai n

that conversati on agai n. I

di

dn't

qui te

catch the whole thing.

A

So

thls

was - - agai n,

I

dl

d not go i nto detai 1

 335

7

of the conversation because that was about
negotiating tactics vis-i-vis the Russians.
As the conversation was moving away from that into a new
set of issues, according to Charge Taylor, based on his
notes, I didn't participate in the meeting, one of the issues
that Kurt wrote raised was the fact that there were a
series of investigatjons being opened by Ukrainian

8

authorities against former President Poroshenko. And Kurt

9

adv"ised Yermak

I
2
J
4
5

6

about the bulk

l0

coun t ry

ll

a

t2

to

that

was not a wi se way f orward f or the

.

And what

did

how

did

Yermak respond, according

Charge Taylor?

A

t4

to Charge Taylor, hj s response was: 0h,
you mean the types of i nvest'igati ons you' re aski ng us to open

l5

agai

l3

l6
t7

l8
l9
20

2t
22

Z)
24
25

nst

a

Accordi ng

C1

i nton and Bi den?

And j t would seem that as someone who

was

for anticorruption efforts that that's exactly
the message that you would be concerned about on this. Is
that accurate?
A As I 've stated here previ ous1y, i t' s my bel i ef that
it js inappropriate for us to ask another country to open up
an investigation agajnst political opponents, whether it is
politicat opponents domestically in the U.5. context or, jn
the case of countries fike Ukraine or Georgia, opening up
select'ive prosecutions against perceived opponents of those
responsible

 336
I
2
J
4
5

'r

n power.

did you think it was appropriate for Vice
President Biden to condition the release of the loan
guarantees on the firing of Prosecutor General Shokin?

a

And

A

Prosecutor General Shokin was an impediment

to

7

of the prosecutorial system, and he had directly
undermi ned i n repeated fashi on U. S . efforts and U. S.

8

assi stance programs.

6

9

l0

il

the

reform

And

so,

because we had

a strategic interest in seeing

the Ukrainian prosecutor system reformed, and because we have
a fi duci ary responsi bi 1 i ty for U.5. taxpayer dol1ars, j t was

l3

the consensus view that Shok'in needed to be removed so that
the stated goal of reform of the prosecutor general system

t4

could move forward.

l5

l6

that that connection was
a quid pro quo, you're not saying that that was an improper

t7

quid pro

t2

l8

a

A

And so when you mentioned

quo?

I didn't say that it

was a quid pro quo,

t9

the case that both the IMF and the

20

condi t'ionali

2t
22
23

24
25

U.

but it is

S. Government do use

t i s macroeconomic
assistance provided by the INF or, in the case of our
sovereign loan guarantees, we put conditionality that related
to management of the gas system, meeting macroeconomic
stabllity goals proposed by the IMF, social safety nets, and
issues related to anticorruption. And that involved the
ty f or

assi stance, whether i

 337
1, the National

I

National Anticorruption Prevention

2

Anti-Corruption Bureau, as well as the prosecutor general's

J

off i ce.

Counci

5

0kay. lvlr. Malinowski has a few questions.
MR. MALIN0WSKI : Thank you.

6

MR. G0LDI"IAN: 0ne th i ng.

4

7
8

9

l0

ll

MR. GOLDMAN:

just to be clear, what Vice President Biden was
doing was very fundamentally djfferent than any advocacy for
a poli tically oriented investigation. Is that your
And

assessment?

MR. KENT: The request

for the dismissal of

Shokin

was

t2

related di rectty to him, to hi s actions i n the di amond

l3

prosecutors case, i n hi s underm'ini ng

t4

Ukrai ne.

l5

23

that's distinct from your concerns
that you've raised today about advocacy for an investigation
into Biden or the 2016 election?
MR. KENT: That's how I would look at the two issues, as
distinct, yes.
l"lR. MALINOWSKI: The distinction is between
condi tionali ty to advance the national i nterest and
condi ti onali ty to advance a personal i nterest.
MR. KENT: One might say natjonal interest versus

24

parti san i nterest, yes.

l6
t7

l8

l9
20

2t
22

25

of our assi stance to

MR. G0LDMAN: And

l"lR. MALINOWSKI:

I just

have a couple

of other subjects

 338
to ask you about.

And thank you so much for

I

that I

2

your patience and precision today and for the integrity that

J

you have shown in every part

wanted

You mentioned

4

at

of your career, Mr. Kent.

one point a conversation

with Fiona

5

Hill in which she had relayed to you that the President had

6

had phone conversati ons wi th Vj ktor 0rban, the Pri me Mi ni ster

7

of

l5

told you that they had
both, I think you said, talked down Ukraine to the President.
Can you say a litt1e bit more about that? What do you
reca11 of that?
MR. KENT: We11, to the best of my recollection, Fiona
gave me a readout of both conversations at the Same time. It
was a phone call with Pres'ident Putin on or about May 3rd.
It was a meeting at the White House, so it was an in-person
meeting on or about May 13th. The President's engagement of

t6

0rban included a l.-hour one-on-one, and then subsequently the

t7

Hungarian foreign

l8

j oi ned.

8

9

l0
1l

t2
l3
t4

t9

Hungary, and Put'in i n whi ch she

minister, Szijjarto,

MR. MALINOWSKI:

In your judgement, what motivation

20

would Qrban and Putin have had

2t

Zelenskyy,

22
23

24
25

1"1R.

and Ambassador Bolton

to try to talk

down Ukraine,

to President TrumP?

KENT: We11, Putjn's motivation

is very c1ear.

He

of Ukraine aS a nation and a country, as
he told President Bush in Bucharest in 2008. He invaded and
occupied 7 percent of Ukraine's territory and he's led to the

denjes the existence

 339

J

terri tory s'i nce 20L4
as a result of aggression. So that's his agenda, the agenda
of creating a greater Russia and ensuring that Ukraine does

4

not survi ve i ndependently.

I
2

death

of

13,000 Ukrai ni ans on Ukrai ni an

7

Viktor 0rban's beef wi th Ukrai ne i s deri ved j n part to
his vision, in my opinion, of a greater Hungary. And there
are about 130,000 ethic Hungarians who live in the trans-

8

Carpathi an provi nce

5

6

of

Ukrai ne.

t2

of next year, which is the 100th anniversary
of the Treaty of Trianon, post-Wor1d War I, which resulted in
more ethnic Hungarians living outside Hungary than inside,
this issue of greater Hungary is at the top of 0rban's

l3

agenda.

t4

l7

this particular issue and, for
jnstance, blocked all meetings jn NATO with Ukraine at the
mi ni steri a1 1eve1 or above because of thi s parti cular j ssue.
So his animus towards Ukraine is well-known, documented, and

18

has lasted now 2 years.

9

l0

ll

l5

l6

t9

And ahead

And so he has picked

MR. I'IALIN0WSKI: So

both

of these leaders

would have

an

2t

'interest i n the Uni ted States and the Presi dent of the Uni ted
States ending or diminishing our support for an i ndependen t

22

Ukra i ne?

20

23

24
25

I would say that that' s Puti n's
think 0rban is just happy to jam Ukra'ine.
t'4R . MAL I N0W5 KI :
Okay . A1 1 ri ght, okay.
MR. KENT:

posi

ti on. I

 340
I
2

And then f j na1 1y on the broader cor rupt i on j ssue.
know Ukraine extremely

You

we11. You were also responsible for

l0

or some time.
Imagine that the President of the Un'ited States were to
call you in, President Trump, his predecessor, and that he
sai d: George, 1ook, I rea11y, real1y be1 i eve thi s i s a
fundamental issue for the United States in Ukraine. The
corrupti on 'is the obstacle to the transf ormati on to thi s
country that we seek. And I am prepared to use some leverage
to do something about corruption in Ukraine, maybe even hold

ll

up a meeting, maybe even condition some assistance on the

t2

Ukrainians rea11y taking

a

J

4
5

6
7
8

9

anticorrupt'ion ef f orts i n

EUR f

t7

this seriously. George, what would
be the three or four or five top things we should be
demanding, we should be asking the Ukrainians to do if we
real1y wanted to get serious on this issue, what would be
what would you say, what would be on your list?
MR. KENT: i think for Ukraine as well as other

l8

countries that have never prosecuted any large-sca1e crook,

l3
t4
l5
t6

2t

putting one of the big fish, so-ca11ed big fish in jail would
be a great start as a signal that there isn't impunity. And
that's, again, not unique to Ukraine. I think that's the

22

bi ggest one.

23

I

t9
20

th1

nk demonstrati ng that there's i ntegri

24

prosecutor general's offi ce i s absolutely cri ti

25

parti cularly

for

post-Sovi

et countri es.

ty i n the
ca1

,

There were two

 341

J

of oppressi on i n the
Sovi et Uni on. I t was the prosecutor'S office and the KGB or
the secret police. And those two institutions in many of

4

these countries are

5

later.

i

2

nsti tuti ons that were the instruments

So

6
7
8

9

l0

ll
12

if

you want

f

undamentally st'i11 not ref ormed 28 years

to

see the successful transformation of

of the post-Sov'iet countries, reform of the security
service in Ukraine, that's known as the SBU (ph), and reform
of the prosecutor general's office are the fundamental keys
to transforming the country.
MR. MALIN0WSKI: And some of these might require
legislative changes, 1ega1 reforms?
any

l3

MR. KENT: Yes.

14

MR. MALINOWSKI: More

l5

l6
t7

l8

l9
20

than

just go after this

person or

that person?
l4R. KENT: Yes.

then we11, let me
ask you, if that is going to be your policy, if you're going
to condition something that a country wants in exchange for
that country doing something that we want jn our national
NR. MALINOWSKI: To your knowledge,

23

interest, it's logical that we would then tetl that country,
here are the things that we want you to do if you want to get
your meeting, jf you want to get your aid, or whatever it'is

24

worth conditioning, correct?

2t
22

25

MR. KENT: Cor rect.

 342
0kay.

MR. MALINOWSKI:

I

To your knowledge,

did any of

4

the so-ca11ed "three amigos," if we can call them that, ever
i n thei r engagements wi th the Ukrai ni an authori ti es,
especi a1ly i n conversati ons around getti ng thi s meeti ng wi th

5

the President or perhaps getting the aid restored, ever

2
J

6
7

the Ukrai ni ans to pursue those deeper anti corrupti
measures, reforms that you just referred to?
MR. KENT: What

8

9

institutional,
that

l0

And

l1

meeti ng.

I referred to is strategic

t would take to

MR. I4ALIN0WSKI: And i

t2

tactjcal.

send a message

t wasn't

on

and

and what they were working on was

was what i

urge

to send a

ref orm the securi ty

t4

services, it was not reform the prosecutor's office, it was
one i nvesti gati on well , two i nvesti gati ons, 2015 and the

15

Bi den

l3

of intent to open an investigatjon.
MR. MALIN0WSKI: Which is not anticorruption.
MR. KENT: In and of it itself is not anticorruption,
MR. KENT: Signal

t6

l7
l8
l9
20

2t

no.
 \4R. MALINOWSKI:

It is basically selective

prosecution

or i nvesti gati on.
the phrase I used, yes.

22

MR, KENT: That was

23

 VlR. MALIN0WSKI: And

you've worked

in

and around a 1ot

24

of dictatorships in your 1ife, Uzbekistan, Thailand now, you

25

know, not Ukraine, but

certainly a country struggling to

 343

J

racy. Is i t not a very common feature of
authori tari an or semi -authori tarj an regimes that they
selectively prosecute people for corruption for poli tical

4

purposes?

1

2

5

6
7
8

9

l0

ll
t2

buj

ld

democ

that is the case, yes.
l'lR. I4ALINOWSKI: The people who you know in Ukrajne who
are dedi cated to fi ghti ng corrupti on, the acti vi sts, the
reformers, and who saw the United States of America as a
champion of their cause, do they see the United States of
America as a champion of their cause today?
MR. KENT: I sti11 believe they count on the U.S. as
thei r best hope to get through very difficult times, yes.
MR. KENT: Unfortunately

l3

l'4R. MALINOWSKI: Thank you.

t4

MR. GOLDMAN:

l5

two quick questions

l6

BY MR.

t7

l8

Ki sI i

t9
20

2t
22

Before

for

Chairman Enge1,

I just

you.

a

Are you familiar with someone by the name of

n or

Semeon

A

I

a

(ph)

You

famitiar with the
I've read.
h

ave

Sam

Ki s1 i n?

am

on what

ba sed

have

GOLDMAN:

name

only recently and only

no indiv'idua1 or other than press reports

you're not aware of thi

s i ndi vi dual?

23

A

Correct.

24

a

And you, much

25

I go to

earlier today, I think

you were

describing what may have been a conversation that you had

 344
I

with former

2

Ambassador Yovanovitch about

the July 25th ca1l.

A
0

And

A

That's accurate. I would not have

Ri

ght.

l1

I think you said that you may have discussed
some aspects of it and that you don't recall what her
response was. Is that accurate?
A To the best of my recollection. And if there is
other information that people want to provide context to try
to tri gger addi ti onal i nformati on, I 'm open to that.
a So you it appears to us at least as if, A, you
took a lot of notes about these events, and, B, you may have
revjewed them prior to coming here today to testify. Is

l2

that

J
4
5

6
7
8

9

l0

l3

no,

I did not

l8

to testify. In order for the
Department to respond to the subpoena for document
collections I went through my notebooks to find any notes
that
from meetings that would be responsive to those
document request. That's why I reviewed them, as

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i nformati on.

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a

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review them before coming

Did you have any notes from your discussion with

Ambassador Yovanovitch about

the July 25th call?

I did not and would not because that would have
happened i nformal ly, not i n the off i ce.
a 5o if she has a different recollection as to what
you guys discussed, do you think that that
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That's possible. She could have been much more

specific about a conversation we had and the issues we've
been discussing. My timeline starts severat years earlier
than hers. So I do not rule that out.

5

MR. G0LDMAN: 0kay.

6

Chairman Enget, would you 1ike to?

7

MR. ENGEL:

Yeah. Well, I guess in closing I want you

2l

to know I stumbled in here before they told me Clark Kent was
here. So I thought he was you.
But, anyway, thank you so much for your testimony. And
thank you for what you not only for what you're doing now,
but for what you've done through the years.
It's really so critical that we learn the facts and your
detai 1ed, very careful testimony today, i t's j ust so
important, so important for our country, so important. And
it should also not be used by the administration or the
Department of State to retaliate against you or anybody e1se.
I have been very much chagrined over the fact of the way
employees at the Department of State have been treated for
the past coupte of years. Morale i s down. I t's j ust
unconscionable. And I think it takes people like you who

22

have not only had commendable records through the years, but

23

who have

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the guts to

come

'in and speak f rom the heart. It

really helps all of us moving forward.
And of course we will move forward.

We have

to

move

 346
re

ng, si r, i s a

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forward.

2.

accomplishment and tremendously important

J

Department and

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5

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And what you'

doi

tremendous

for the State

for the country as a whole.

Schiff already explained on the
record earljer today why any retaljation against you or
anybody else would be unlawful and just wrong. Your service
know

that

Chairman

8

to our country for nearly three decades is commendable and I
hope it continues without harassment or undue interference

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from the Department you have honorably served.

7

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just again thank you as the chairman of the
House Foreign Affairs Committee, thank you personally, and
let you know that I and the Foreign Affairs Committee will
hold the Department accountable to treat employees properly

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and

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So

let

me

with the respect you deserve.

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Thank you.

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MR. KENT: Thank you,

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MR. GOLDMAN:

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20

Mr

.

Chai rman.

A1I right. I believe that's it from the

majority, we used 20 minutes in this record. So I yield to
the minority if you would like any further questions.
MR. ZELDIN:

I

know we stepped

out. Did we have

did

2t

our side have a round while we were out voting or was that

22

the majori ty the whole

23

t'ime?

For the record, one thing

of

concern

js

Chairman Schiff

24

appropriately earlier made a disclaimer to all

25

all staff that we are in a deposition, that deposition rules

Members and

 347

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that there should not be any leaks. This is
something that the minority side takes extremely seriously,
and it has been disappointing that during the brief time that
we stepped out to go vote that we are reading on Twitter
substance from today's deposition being cited by name to
Chairman Schiff and to Gerry Connol1y.
It's really important that i f the deposi tion rules
apply, where Members are not allowed to talk about the
substance of what is djscussed today, that that is applied
equally to both the majority and minority, and I want to
state that for the record.
We are also sti11 waiting a ruling we started two
depositions ago with a request -- actually it was the second
deposition a request as to what rule is governing this
entire process. We stiIl have not received an answer as to
what House rule governs any of thjs process.
The start of the last deposition we had a phone call

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w'ith the House parliamentarian which started with a question

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of what House rule is governing any of this entire process.
We are reiterating that we sti1l have not received an answer.
The minority whip, Steve Scalise, just made that request on
the House floor and was not provided an answer.
And we would be very interested in knowing, and if that
answer can't be provided now, at the start of tomorrow
morni ng's deposi t'ion, what House rule i s governi ng th j s

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app1y, and

 348
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enti re process

for thi s i mpeachment i nqui ry.

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MR. BITAR: For

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MR. J0RDAN:

the record, your interest

Mr. Secretary, 1et

me

just

go

i

s noted.

back.

So on

5

the July 25th call between President Trump and President
Zelenskyy, just to walk through it again, you were not on

6

that

4

ca11.

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14R.

KENT: Correct.

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MR.

JORDAN: Li eutenant Colonel Vi ndman was.

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MR.

KENT: Yes.

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MR.

JORDAN: And

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you were on a

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some ki nd

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MR.

at

some

point

subsequent

to that call

call with the lieutenant colonel or you had

of meeting with him?
KENT: It was a call and he gave me a very limited

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readout, correct.

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Okay. And on that limited readout on tha t
call with the lieutenant colonel did he te11 you not to tal k

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about what you d"iscuss

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I don't reca1l how he characterized it. It',s
just that he said that the information obviously was of ve ry
sensitive nature and that's why he could not give me the
normal readout of the fu11 content that he normally did.
MR. J0RDAN: And the call you had with Lieutenant
Colonel Vindman, was that the 25th, the 27th? What day wi th

24

a that?

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MR. JORDAN:

wi

th anyone else?

MR. KENT:

MR. KENT:

It

was a subsequent

day. i do not

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 349

6

for certain whi ch day he ca11ed. Normally I kept
my notes in a notebook
0n th'i s particular occasi on I
grabbed a piece of paper and started writing. So it was not
in a sequential notebook day by day.
MR. JORDAN
Was it within a week or was it i n August?
I'lR. KENT: It was within a week, to the best of my

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recol lecti on.

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cannot say

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likely some time in Juty?
l'4R. KENT: I f the cal l happened
the earliest it could
have been was the 26th. To the best of my recollection,
there were several days. So my guess is the 27Ln. There's a
weekend in there somewhere. I'm not sure which the weekend
was. So I would say the last week of July would be the best
I could bound i t.

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MR. J0RDAN: And then you d'iscussed what Li eutenant

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told you wi th whom?
14R. J0RDAN: I cannot recall the exact content,
particularly since I djdn't get as much content as I just got
a tonal poem. 5o I can't reca11 di rectly.
MR. J0RDAN: Did the lieutenant colonel telt you, look,
I'm sharing this with you but no one e1se, or did you get the
impression that he had shared this information with other
people maybe in the State Department or other people in our
government or anyone else?
MR. J0RDAN: I am not aware of who else he might have

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MR. JORDAN: 5o most

Colonel Vi ndman

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to. In the general course of readouts of
that nature, I would be the natural person for hjm to give a
readout at the State DePartment.
okay. So normally
MR. J0RDAN: Is the fact that he

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you would get a

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given a readout

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th'is the normal process that
L'ieutenant Colonel Vindman would 1et you know about this call

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or

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was

this

readout.

somehow

So was

different?

It was the normal process. He had given me a
simj 1ar readout for the Apri 1 2Lst ca11. What was di fferent
his concern that he did not feel at liberty to
was that
share all the substantive details of the cal1. That was what
was d'if f erent. But the readout, that he was gi vi ng me a
MR. KENT:

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readout, was the normal Procedure.
MR. JORDAN: And why wouldn't he share everything with

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you

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'if i t's the normal process that you get bri ef ed, you get
a readout of cal1s between the President of the United States
and foreign heads of state in your area, your area of the
world that you're responsible for and that you deal with?
And on the April call he gave you a fu11 readout. Is that

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right?

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MR. KENT:

Correct, although jt was a short,

nonsubstant'i ve conversati on.
MR. JORDAN:

0kay.

Well

,

were there other occasi

a readout

on

24

where Lieutenant Colonel Vindman gave you

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ca1ls between President Trump and foreign heads of state?

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MR. KENT: To the best

only two ca11s between President Trump and a head of
government of the six countries for which I have
responsibility.
MR. J0RDAN: Got i

t.

got a ful1 readout

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And you

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call , but you

di

from

it.

So you have these two.

the Apri1 2Lst calt or ApriI

In Ju1y, correct.

MR. KENT:

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MR. J0RDAN: And
I"'lR.

Got

dn't

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of my knowledge, these were the

d'id you f i nd that unusual?

KENT: He made clear hi s extreme di scomf ort that

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there was d'iscussi ons i n the call that were

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of the calt was
very sensjtive and he would not be giving me a full readout.
MR. J0RDAN: And, we11, I guess I'm trying to figure out
if he's supposed to give you a readout, why djdn't he give
you the futl readout?
MR. KENT: Again, all I can describe is his djscomfort
in sharing what he shared without -- wjth hjs disclaimer
right up front that he was not going to give me the full

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normal readout.

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described

at the beginning

what

he

was the majority

0kay. Thank you.
MR. ZELDIN: In an earlier round we were discussing
MR. JORDAN:

24

individual cases where the United States Government had
spoken with the Ukrainian Government wjth regards to cases

25

under the

23

jurisdiction of Ukraine. You cited

one case

 352
fi cally as possi b1y the hi ghest profi 1e case that

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speci

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were tracki ng.

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MR. KENT: After

4

MR. ZELDIN:

0r one of highest profile cases?
MR. KENT: For that period of time, the second half

5

6

you

the

2018, yes.

8

of these conversations with the
Ukraine Government about corruption cases that we felt

9

Ukrai ne

7

MR. ZELDIN: Were any

shouldn't prosecute?

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I'm not aware of us ever telling Ukraine not
to prosecute a corrupt individual or a person believed to

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have engaged 'i n cor ruPt i on, no.

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MR. KENT:

MR.

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ZELDIN:

Is it true that Ukraine prosecuted

cases

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that were classified as a corruption case but were
i nappropri ately classi fi ed as such?
MR. KENT: I will give you a specific example. The
National Agency to Prevent Corruption was set up to review

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the asset declarations of the initially top 1,000 and then

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25

they expanded to even more Ukrai ni an offi ci aIs
In the first year of their operations they went after
.

of customs who paid
herself an $18 bonus on Women'S Day when all the women in her
offi ce got i t. And they also had launched an i nvesti gatj on
of Serhiy Leschenko, the aforement'ioned member of parliament
and former investigative journalist, who purchased an
two

individuals. 0ne, the reformist

head

 353
I

apartment. And those were the only two investigations that

2

they did, and they were both reformers who were also crjtics

6

of people who were not engaged in reform.
And there were dozens of billionaire oligarchs and other
jndividuals, and there were no investigations of people whose
reputations were that they had engaged in corruption for

7

years.

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MR. ZELDIN: So

that I

understand your testimony

correctly, you cited two cases where two individuals
accused of corruption but shouldn't have been.

were

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tar as I recall, those are the only two
individuals or officials of Ukraine that the National Agency
to Prevent Corruption went after based on the asset
declarations of high ranking offjcials and members of

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parl i ament.

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MR. KENT: As

to be clear, you just used the word
Ukrai ni an offi ci a1s. Is there a di fferent answer wi th
regards to Ukra'in'ian ci ti zens or when you sai d of f i ci a1s di d
you mean Ukrainjans at large?
MR. KENT: I was just trying to give a very specific
example for a new institution that we initially helped stand
up to help contajn corruption based on asset declarations.
And instead of using the asset declaration system to identify
those who may have used public office to enrich themselves
they went after two reformists who were noted critics of the
l4R. ZELDIN: And

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lack of reform in certain parts of the Ukrainian Government.
MR. ZELDIN: And what was the timeframe for this answer?

I believe the NAPC, as it was known, was
stood up jn 2015, and so this would have been 2015, 2015.
l'4R. ZELDIN: I understand that i n a recent round you
were answering questjons based off of jnformation that you
obtained from others related to aid from the United States to
Ukraine and the allegation of a quid pro quo. Do you have
any firsthand knowledge of United States aid to Ukraine ever
being connected to the opening of a new investigation?
MR. KENT: I do not have djrect knowledge, no.
MR. ZELDIN: Thank you. That's it.
MR. GOLDMAN: Is that it? All right.
MR. KENT:

Two more

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things, 2 minutes.

BY ]"IR.

GOLDMAN:

I just

wanted

to touch upon your

some

of

that you have been discussing today.
Do you have an understanding as to whether there

the

documents

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may be

in the custody of the State
that reflect expreSsions of concern about some of

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emails or other documents

20

Department

23

the topics that we discussed today, separate and apart from
your memos to file or other emails that you have referenced?
A i would have imagined that there are quite a number

24

of

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emai

a

1s, yes.
You discussed having two

specific conversations

 355
I

with Fiona Hi11, one in

2

July.

a

Lieutenant Colonel Vindman and Tim Morrison.

J

you remember less

of in

And obviously you had other conversat'ions wjth

Were you

4

May and one

ever aware of whether there was a separate

ther ind'ividual or individuals at the National Security

5

ei

6

Council who were providing information

7

the Ukraine matter outside of ordinary channels?

to the President on

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A I did not hear about it and have no information
about that, no.
a Are you familiar with someone by the name of Kash

lt

Patel

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9

A

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I

am

not aware that I've ever met anybody by that

name, rlo.

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?

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A

Have you

a
A

How

ever heard that

name?

I think Patel is a fairly

common South

Asian last

n ame

about

Kash?

I -- less common. I do not I cannot imagine
or I can not recall any time where I was either in the
presence of or heard a reference to Kash Pate1.
MR. GOLDMAN:

Okay. Thank you.

I think we are done. And.thank you very much, Mr. Kent,
for a long day. Rea1ly apprecjate it.
re adj ourned.

24

And we'

25

[Whereupon,

at 7:42 p.m., the intervjew was concluded.]