STATEMENTOF

DAVID A . HOLMES
U . S. EMBASSY KYIV , DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BEFORE THE

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
PERMANENT SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ,

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND
COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT & REFORM
CONCERNING

THE IMPEACHMENT INQUIRY

PRESENTED ON

NOVEMBER 15 , 2019

I

Introduction

My name is David Holmes, and I am a career Foreign Service Officer with the Department of State.
Since August 2017 , Ihave been the PoliticalCounselor at the U . S. Embassy in Kyiv, Ukraine. While it is an honor
to appear before you, want to make clear that I did not seek this opportunity to testify today . You have
determined that mayhave something of value to these proceedings , and it is therefore my obligation to
appear and tell you what know . Indeed, Secretary Pompeo stated last week , I hope everyone who testifies
willgo do so truthfully , accurately . When they do, the oversight role willhave been performed , and I think
America will come to seewhat took place here .
ismygoaltoday : to testify truthfully and accurately to
enable you to perform that role . And to that end, I have hurriedly put together this statement over the past
couple days to describe as best I can myrecollection of events thatmay be relevant to this matter.
II. Background

have spentmy entire professional life serving my country as a Foreign Service Officer . Prior tomy
current post in Kyiv , Ukraine, I served at the Embassy in Moscow , Russia as Deputy and Internal Unit Chief in
the Political Section , and before that as Senior Energy Officer in the Economics Section . In Washington ,
served on the National Security Council staff as Director for Afghanistan and as Special Assistant to the Under
Secretary of State . Myprior overseas assignments include New Delhi, India; Kabul, Afghanistan ; Bogotá ,
Colombia ; and Pristina, Kosovo .
graduate ofPomona College in Claremont, California , and received
graduate degrees in international affairs from the University ofSt. Andrews (Scotland) and Princeton
University ' s Woodrow Wilson Schoolof Public and International Affairs .

the Political Counselor at the U . S . Embassy in Kyiv , lead the PoliticalSection covering Ukraine' s
domestic politics, foreign policy , and conflict diplomacy, and serve as the senior policy and political adviser to
the Ambassador. The job of an embassy political counselor is to gather information about the host country' s
internalpolitics, foreign relations, and security policies, report back to Washington, represent U .S . policies to
foreign contacts, and advise the Ambassador on policy development and implementation .

 In this role , I am a senior member of the Embassy ' s Country Team and continually involved in
addressing issues as they arise. I am also often called upon to take notes in meetings involving the Ambassador
or visiting senior U .S . officials with Ukrainian counterparts , particularly within the Ukrainian Presidential
Administration . For this reason , Ihave been present in many meetings with President Zelenskyy and his
administration , some ofwhich may be germane to this inquiry . Other issues that may be relevant to this
inquiry, including energy and the justice sector, did not fall under my specific portfolio and I was not the expert,
but I followed those issues inasmuch as they had a political component.
the Political Counselor at the Embassy , it is important to note that am not a political
appointee or engaged in U .S . politics in any way . It is notmy job to cover or advise on U .S . politics . On the
contrary, I am an apolitical foreign policy professional and my job is to focus on the politics of the country in
which I serve so that we can better understand the locallandscape and better advance U .S . nationalinterests
there. I joined the Foreign Service through an apolitical,merit-based process under the George W . Bush
While

am

administration and I have proudly served administrations of both parties and worked for their appointees, both
political and career.

III. Service in Ukraine Priorto Zelenskyy ' s Inauguration
arrived in Kyiv to take up my assignment as Political Counselor in August 2017 , a year after
Ambassador Yovanovitch received her appointment. From August 2017 untilher removal from Post in May
2019 I was Ambassador Yovanovitch ' s chief policy advisor and developed a deep respect for her dedication ,
determination , and professionalism . During this timewe worked together closely , speaking multiple timesper
day, and I accompanied Ambassador Yovanovitch to many of hermeetings with senior Ukrainian counterparts .
I was also the note-taker for senior U .S . visitors with PresidentPoroshenko, whom I met at least a dozen times.
Our work in Ukraine focused on three pillars addressing peace and security, economic growth and
reform , and anti- corruption and rule of law . These pillars match the three consistent priorities of the Ukrainian
people since 2014 asmeasured in public opinion polling, namely , an end to the conflict with Russia that
restores national unity and territorial integrity , responsible economic policies that deliver European standards
of growth and opportunity , and effective and impartial rule oflaw institutions that deliver justice in cases of
high- level official corruption . Our efforts on this third pillarmerit specialmention because itwas during
Ambassador Yovanovitch ' s tenure that we achieved the hard - fought passage of a law establishing an
independent anti-corruption court to try corruption cases brought by the National Anti-corruption Bureau
(NABU ), another independent institution established with U . S . support . These efforts strained Ambassador
Yovanovitch ' s relationship with President Poroshenko and someof his allies, including Prosecutor General Yuriy
Lutsenko , who resisted fully empowering truly independent anti-corruption institutions that would help ensure
that no Ukrainians, however powerful, were above the law . However , the Ambassador and the Embassy kept
pushing anti-corruption and the other pillars of our policy toward Ukraine.
Beginning in March 2019, the situation at the Embassy and in Ukraine changed dramatically .
Specifically , our diplomatic policy that had been focused on supporting Ukrainian democratic reform and
resistance to Russian aggression became overshadowed by a political agenda being promoted by Rudy Giuliani
and a cadre of officials operating with a direct channel to the White House .

That change began with the emergence ofpress reports critical of Ambassador Yovanovitch and
machinations by Mr. Lutsenko and others to discredit her. In mid -March 2019, an Embassy colleague learned
from a Ukrainian contact that Mr. Lutsenko had complained that Ambassador Yovanovitch had destroyed
him with her refusalto support him untilhe followed through with his reform commitments and ceased using
his position for personal gain . In retaliation , Mr. Lutsenko made a series ofunsupported allegations against
Ambassador Yovanovitch ,mostly suggesting that Ambassador Yovanovich improperly used the Embassy to

 advance the Democrats' politicalinterests. Mr. Lutsenko claimed that the Embassy had ordered NABU to
investigate the former head of Ukraine' s tax service solely because the former head was themain Ukrainian
contact of the Republican Party and of President Trump personally . Mr. Lutsenko also claimed that the
Embassy had pressured former Prosecutor General Shokin to engineer the closing of the case against former
Minister of Ecology Zlochevsky because of the connection between his company Burisma and former Vice
President Biden ' s son . Mr. Lutsenko said that afterAmbassador Yovanovitch ' s posting in Kyiv, she would face
" serious problems” in the United States.

Embassy colleagues also heard from a reporter thatMr. Lutsenko hadmade additional unsupported
claimsagainst Ambassador Yovanovitch , including that she had allegedly given him a " do not prosecute list"
containing the names of her supposed allies, an allegation that the State Department called an " outright
fabrication ," and thatMr. Lutsenko later retracted. Mr. Lutsenko also alleged henever received $ 4 . 4 million in
U .S . funds intended forhis office. Finally , he alleged that there was a tape ofthe current head ofNABU saying
hewas trying to help Hillary Clinton win the 2016 election . Public opinion polls in Ukraine indicated that
Ukrainians generally did notbelieve Mr. Lutsenko' s allegations, and on March 22 President Poroshenko issued
a statement in support ofAmbassador Yovanovitch .
Around this same time, the Ukrainian presidential election was approaching , and Volodymyr Zelenskyy
was surging in the polls, ahead ofMr. Lutsenko' s political ally, President Poroshenko . On April 20 I was
present for Ambassador Yovanovitch ' s third and finalmeeting with then - candidate Mr. Zelenskyy ahead ofhis
landslide victory in the runoff election the next day . As in her two priormeetings that also attended , they had
an entirely cordial, pleasant conversation and signaled their mutual desire to work together.

On April 26 , Ambassador Yovanovitch departed for consultations in Washington , DC, where she
learned she would be recalled. I did not know the details ofher conversations in Washington until read her
deposition statement, but itwas clear at the time that she was
removed early . The barrage of allegations
directed at Ambassador Yovanovitch , a career ambassador, which included aggressive reporting against her in
the U . S. media, is unlike anything I have seen in myprofessional career .

IV . Zelenskyy ' s Inauguration, RudyGiuliani, and the “ Three Amigos"
Following President-elect Zelenskyy' s victory , our attention in the Embassy focused on gettingto know
the incoming Zelenskyy administration and coordinating with Washington on preparations for the inauguration
scheduled forMay 20, the sameday Ambassador Yovanovitch departed Post permanently. In early May ,
shortly afterMr. Giuliani cancelled a visit to Ukraine alleging Mr. Zelenskyy was " surrounded by enemies of the
[U . S . President]," we learned that Vice President Pence no longer planned to lead the PresidentialDelegation
to the inauguration . The White House ultimately whittled back an initial proposed list for the official
Presidential Delegation to the inauguration from over a dozen individuals to just five : Secretary Perry as its
head , Ambassador to the European Union Gordon Sondland , SpecialRepresentative for Ukraine Negotiations
Kurt Volker representing the State Department, NationalSecurity Council Director Alex Vindman representing
the White House, and temporary acting Charge Affaires Joseph Pennington representing the Embassy. While
Ambassador Sondland' smandate as Ambassador to the European Union did not cover individualmember
states, letalone non -member countries like Ukraine, hemade clear that hehad direct and frequent access to
President Trump and Chiefof StaffMick Mulvaney , and portrayed himself as the conduit to the President and
Mr.Mulvaney for the group. Secretary Perry, Ambassador Sondland, and Ambassador Volker later styled
themselves the " Three Amigos, " andmade clear they would take the lead on coordinating ourpolicy and
engagementwith the Zelenskyy Administration .

Aroundthe sametime, becameaware thatMr. Giuliani, a private lawyer, wastaking a direct role in
Ukrainian diplomacy. On April25, Ivan Bakanov, who wasMr. Zelenskyy' s childhood friend, campaign chair,

 and ultimately appointed head of the Security Services of Ukraine , indicated to me privately he had been
contacted by " someone named Giulianiwho said he was an advisor to the Vice President. " reported Mr.
Bakanov' smessage to Deputy Assistant Secretary ofStateGeorge Kent. Over the following months, it became
apparent thatMr. Giulianiwas having a direct influence on the foreign policy agenda that the Three Amigos
were executing on the ground in Ukraine. In fact, at one point during a preliminary meeting of the
inauguration Delegation , someone wondered aloud about why Mr. Giulianiwas so active in themedia with
respect to Ukraine. My recollection is that Ambassador Sondland stated , Dammit Rudy. Every time Rudy gets
involved he goes and f - s everything up ."
The inaugurationtook place on May 20, and took notesin the delegation' s meetingwith President
Zelenskyy. Duringthemeeting, SecretaryPerrypassedPresidentZelenskyy a list of" peoplehe trusts from
whom Zelenskyy could seek advice on energy sectorreform , which was the topic ofsubsequentmeetings
betweenSecretary Perry andkey Ukrainianenergy- sector contacts, from which Embassypersonnelwere
excludedby SecretaryPerry' s staff.
On May 23, AmbassadorVolker, AmbassadorSondland, Secretary Perry, and SenatorRon Johnson
( who had also attended the inauguration, though notin theofficialdelegation) returnedto the United States
and briefedPresidentTrump. On May 29, President Trumpsigned a congratulatoryletterto President
Zelenskyy, which includedan invitation to visit theWhiteHouseat an unspecifieddate.

It is important to understand that a White House visit was critical to PresidentZelenskyy . Heneeded to
demonstrate U . S. support atthe highest levels both to advance his ambitious anti corruption agenda athome,
and to encourage Russian President Putin to take seriously President Zelenskyy s peace efforts. President
Zelenskyy ' s team immediately began pressing to set a date for the visit . President Zelenskyy and senior
members of his team made clear they wanted President Zelenskyy ' s first overseas trip to be to Washington to
send a strong signal of Western support , and requested a call with President Trump as soon as possible . We at
the Embassy also believed that ameeting was critical to the success of President Zelenksyy ' s administration
and its reform agenda , and we worked hard to get it arranged .

When President Zelenskyy ' s team

did not receive an affirmative reply, they made plans for President

Zelenskyy ' s first overseas trip to be to Brussels, in part to attend an American Independence Day event that
Ambassador Sondland hosted on June 4 . Ambassador Sondland hosted a dinner in President Zelenskyy ' s honor
following the reception, which included President Zelenskyy , Jared Kushner, Ulrich Brechbuhl, Federica
Mogherini, and comedian Jay Leno, among others . In the week leading up to the event, Ambassador Sondland ,
Secretary Perry, and Secretary Perry' s staff were taking a very active and unconventional role in formulating
our priorities for thenew Zelenskyy Administration and personally reaching out to President Zelenskyy and his
senior team

V . Ambassador Taylor and an OvalOffice Meeting
Ambassador Bill Taylor arrived in Kyiv as Charge d 'Affaires on June 17 . For the next month , a focus of
our activities - along with the Three Amigos - was to coordinate a White House visit , and to that end we were
working with the Ukrainians to deliver things wethought President Trump might care about, such as
commercial deals benefitting the United States . Ambassador Taylor reported that Secretary Pompeo had told
him prior to his arrival in Kyiv, "Weneed to work on turning the President around on Ukraine." Ambassador
Volker told us the next five years (i . e . President Zelenskyy ' s term ) could hang on what could be accomplished in
the next three months.

Within a week or two ,it became apparent that the energy sector reforms,commercial deals , and anti
corruption efforts on which wewere making progress were not making a dent in terms of persuading the

 White House to schedule meetingbetween the presidents. On June 27
Ambassador Sondland told
Ambassador Taylor in a phone conversation (the gistofwhich Ambassador Taylor shared
with meat the time)
that PresidentZelenskyy needed to make clear to President Trump that President Zelenskyy
was notstanding
in the way of investigations." understood that this was referring to the
Burisma/ Biden investigationsthat
Mr. Giulianiand his associateshadbeen speaking about in themedia since March .
While Ambassador Taylor
did notbriefmeon every detailof his communications with the Three Amigos , he did
tellmethaton a June 28
callwith President Zelenskyy, Ambassador Taylor, and the Three Amigos, it was made
clear that some action on
a Burisma/ Biden investigation was a precondition for an OvalOfficemeeting.
Webecameconcerned that even
if a meeting could occur it would not go well, and I discussed with Embassy colleagues
whether we should stop
seeking a meeting altogether.

VI. The Freezing of Security Assistance
I was present in the Embassy conference room for the NationalSecurity
Council secure video
conference call July 18 when an Office ofManagement and Budget staff member
surprisingly announced the
hold on Ukraine security assistance near the end of an almost two -hourmeeting.
The officialsaid the order
had come from the President
had been conveyed to OMB by Mr.Mulvaney with no further explanation .
This began a week or so of efforts by various agencies to identify the rationale for
the freeze, conduct a review
of the assistance, and to reaffirm the unanimous view of the Ukraine policy
community ofits importance. NSC
counterparts affirmed that there had been no change in ourUkraine policy , but could
not determine the cause
of thehold or how to lift it. While I am now aware of testimony regarding
discussions between Ambassador
Taylor , Ambassador Volker, and the Three Amigos on July 19-20, I was notaware of those
discussions at the
time

VII. July 26 Meetings and Ambassador Sondland ' s Call to the President
On July 25 President Trumpmadea congratulatoryphone callto President
Zelenskyy, afterhis party
won a commandingmajority in Ukraine' s parliamentary election . Contrary to
standard procedure, the Embassy
receivedno readout ofthe call and I was unawareof what was discussed untilthe
transcriptwas released
September 25 . Upon reading the transcript, I was deeply disappointed to see
that the President raisednone of
whatI understoodto be our inter-agency agreed upon foreign policy priorities in Ukraine
andinstead raised
the Biden / Burismainvestigation and referred to the theory about Crowdstrike, which
was supposedly
connected to Ukraine and allegedly played a role in the 2016 election .

The next day, July 26 , 2019, I attended meetings at the Presidential Administration
Building in Kyiv with
Ambassador Taylor, Ambassador Volker, and Ambassador Sondland and took notes during those meetings.
We first had ameetingwith Andriy Bohdan, the Chiefof Staffto President
Zelenskyy. Themeetingwas
brief, asMr. Bohdan had alreadybeen summonedby PresidentZelenskyy to prepare for a
subsequentbroader
meeting, buthe did say that PresidentTrumphad expressedinterest during
thepreviousday ' s phone callin
PresidentZelenskyy' s personneldecisionsrelated to the ProsecutorGenerals Office.

The delegation then met with President Zelenskyy and several other senior officials . During the
meeting, President Zelenskyy stated that during the July 25 call, President Trump had three times” raised
" some very sensitive issues," and that he would have to follow up on those issues when
they met " in person ."
Not having received a readout of the July 25 call, I did notknow what those sensitive issues were .

After the meeting with President Zelenskyy, Ambassador Volker and Ambassador Taylor
quickly left the
Presidential Administration Building for a trip to the front lines. Ambassador Sondland , who was to fly
out that
afternoon , stayed behind to have a meeting with Andriy Yermak, a top aide to President Zelenskyy .

 As Iwas leaving the meeting with President Zelenskyy , I was told to join the meeting with Ambassador
Sondland and Mr. Yermak as note -taker. I had not expected to join that meeting and was a flight of stairs
behind Ambassador Sondland as he headed to meet with Mr. Yermak . When I reached Mr. Yermak ' s office ,
Ambassador Sondland had already gone in . Texplained to Mr. Yermak ' s assistant that I was supposed to join
themeeting as the Embassy ' s representative and strongly urged her to let mein, but she told me that that
Ambassador Sondland and Mr. Yermak had insisted that the meeting be one-on -one, with no note - taker.
then waited in the anteroom

until themeeting ended , along with a member of Ambassador Sondland ' s staff

and a member of the U .S . Embassy Kyiv staff .
When themeetingended, the two staffers and I accompaniedAmbassadorSondlandoutof the
PresidentialAdministration Buildingand to the embassy vehicle . AmbassadorSondland said thathe wanted to
go to lunch. I told AmbassadorSondlandthat I would be happyto join ifhewanted to briefmeon hismeeting
with Mr. Yermak or discuss otherissues, and AmbassadorSondland said that I should join. The two staffers
joined for lunch as well.

The four of uswent to a nearby restaurant and sat on an outdoor terrace . I sat directly across from
Ambassador Sondland and the two staffers sat off to our sides. At first , the lunch was largely social.
Ambassador Sondland selected a bottle of wine that he shared among the four of us, and we discussed topics
such as marketing strategies for his hotelbusiness .
During the lunch , Ambassador Sondland said that hewas going to call President Trump to give him

an

update . Ambassador Sondland placed a call on his mobile phone , and heard him announce himself several
times, along the lines of "Gordan Sondland holding for the President." It appeared that he was being
transferred through several layers of switchboards and assistants . I then noticed Ambassador Sondland ' s
demeanor change , and understood that he had been connected to President Trump . While Ambassador
Sondland ' s phone was not on speakerphone , I could hear the President' s voice through the earpiece of the
phone. The President' s voice was very loud and recognizable , and Ambassador Sondland held the phone away
from his ear for a period of time, presumably because of the loud volume.

heard Ambassador Sondland greet the President and explain that hewas calling from Kyiv . I heard
President Trump then clarify that Ambassador Sondland was in Ukraine . Ambassador Sondland replied , yes, he
was in Ukraine and went on to state that President Zelenskyy " loves your ass ." I then heard President Trump
ask , "

, he' s gonna do the investigation ?" Ambassador Sondland replied that "he' s gonna do it," adding that

President Zelenskyy will do " anything you ask him to . Even though I did nottake notes of these statements ,
have a clear recollection that these statements were made. I believe that my colleagues who were sitting at
the table also knew that Ambassador Sondland was speaking with the President .

The conversation then shifted to Ambassador Sondland' s efforts , on behalf of the President, to assist a
rapper who was jailed in Sweden , and I could only hear Ambassador Sondland ' s side of that part of the
conversation . Ambassador Sondland told the President that the rapper was " kind off
there , " and " should
have pled guilty . He recommended that the President "wait until after the sentencing or it willmake it
worse ,"

that the President should " let him get sentenced , play the racism card, give him a ticker-tape

when he comes home." Ambassador Sondland further told the President that Sweden
him on your word ,”

should have released

that "you can tell the Kardashians you tried .

After the call ended, AmbassadorSondland remarked that the Presidentwas in a badmood, as
Ambassador Sondlandstated wasoften the case early in themorning. I then took theopportunityto ask
AmbassadorSondland forhis candid impression of the President's viewson Ukraine. In particular, I asked
Ambassador Sondlandif itwas true that the Presidentdid not" give a
t about Ukraine." Ambassador

 Sondland agreed that the President did not" give a s--t about Ukraine. " asked why not, and Ambassador
Sondland stated that the Presidentonly cares about " big stuff.
noted that there was" big stuff going on in
Ukraine, like a war with Russia, and Ambassador Sondland replied thathemeant"big stuff" that benefits the
President, like the Biden investigation
Mr. Giulianiwas pushing. The conversation then moved on to
other topics
Upon returning to the Embassy, I immediately told the Deputy Chief ofMission and others at the
Embassy aboutthe callwith the President andmy conversationwith Ambassador Sondland . I also emailed an
Embassy officialin Sweden regarding the issuewith the U . S. rapper that was discussed on the call.
July 26 was mylast day in the office ahead of a planned vacation that ended on August 6 . After
returningto the Embassy , I told Ambassador Taylor about the July 26 call. I also repeatedly referred to the call
and conversation with Ambassador Sondland in meetings and conversations where the issue of the President' s
interest in Ukrainewas potentially relevant. Atthat time, Ambassador Sondland' s statement of the President s
lack of interest in Ukrainewas of particular focus. We understood thatin order to secure a meeting between
President Trump and President Zelenskyy, we would have to work hard to find a way to explain Ukraine' s
importance to President Trump in terms thathe found compelling.

VIII. Lifting the Hold on Security Assistance
Over the ensuing weeks, we continued to try to identifyways to frame the importance of Ukraine in
ways that would appeal to the President, and to try to move forward on the scheduling of a White House visit
by PresidentZelenskyy . On July 28, while President Trump was still notmoving forward with a meeting with
President Zelenskyy , hemetwith Russian President Putin at the G20 Summit in Osaka, Japan,
sending a further
signalof lack of support for Ukraine.

Ukrainian IndependenceDay is August 24 and presented a good opportunity to show support for
Ukraine. Secretary Pompeo had considered attending (NationalSecurity Advisor Bolton attended in 2018 and
Defense SecretaryMattis attended in 2017 ), butin the end nobody senior to Ambassador Volker attended.

Shortly thereafter, on August 27 , Ambassador Bolton visited Ukraine and broughtwelcomenewsthat
PresidentTrump had agreed to meet PresidentZelenskyy on September 1 in Warsaw. I took notes in
Ambassador Bolton' s meetingwith PresidentZelenskyy and Chief of StaffMr. Bohdan. Ambassador Bolton told
Mr. Bohdan thatthemeetingbetween the presidents in Warsaw would be" crucialto cementingtheir
relationship. "
Between meetings that day, I heard Ambassador Bolton express to Ambassador Taylor andNational
Security CouncilSenior Director Tim Morrison his frustration about Mr. Giuliani's influence with the President,
making clear there was nothing he could do about it. He recommended that new Prosecutor General Ruslan
Ryaboshapka, who would replaceMr. Lutsenko, open a channel with Attorney General Barr in place ofMr.
Yermak ' s channel with Mr. Giuliani. He also expressed frustration about Ambassador Sondland' s expansive
interpretation ofhis mandate, musing that he should ask his staff to confirm that themandate of the U .S .
Ambassador to the European Union was limited to the European Union and had no authority with the
individualmember states, let alone non-members like Ukraine. Ambassador Bolton further indicated the hold
on security assistance would notbe lifted prior to the Warsaw meeting, where it would hang on whether
PresidentZelenskyy was able to " favorably impress President Trump.

President Trump ultimatelypulled out of theWarsaw trip, so the hold remainedin placewith no clear
meansto getit lifted. Afterthe trip was cancelled, AmbassadorTaylor also told methatAmbassadorBolton
recommendedthat AmbassadorTaylor send a first-person cableto Secretary Pompeo articulating the

 importance ofthe security assistance . At Ambassador Taylor ' s direction , drafted and transmitted the cable
August 29, which further attempted to explain Ukraine' s importance and the importance of the security
assistance to U . S . national security .
During this time,wewere still trying to appealto President Trump in foreign policy and national
security terms. By this point, however, my clear impression was that the security assistance hold was likely
intended by the President either to express dissatisfaction that the Ukrainianshad not yet agreed to the
Burisma/ Biden investigations or as an effort to increase the pressure on them to do so . I have since read in
Ambassador Taylor ' s testimony an account of a meeting in Warsaw in which Ambassador Sondland told Mr.
Yermak (according to Mr. Morrison ) that the security assistance freeze would notbelifted until President
Zelenskyy committed to the Burisma/ Biden investigation. I have also read Ambassador Taylor' s testimony
about the text exchange and phone call between Ambassador Taylor and Ambassador Sondland in which
Ambassador Sondland admitted that " everything" was dependent on such an announcement and that
PresidentTrump wanted PresidentZelenskyy " in a public box.
On September 5, I took notes at Senator Johnson and Senator Chris Murphy' smeeting with President
Zelenskyy in Kyiv . President Zelenskyy asked aboutthe security assistance . Although both Senators stressed
bipartisan Congressional support for Ukraine, Senator Johnson cautioned President Zelenskyy that President
Trump has a negative view ofUkraine and that President Zelenskyy would have a difficult time overcoming it.
Senator Johnson further explained that he was shocked by President Trump' s negative reaction during an
OvalOffice meeting on May 23, when he and the Three Amigos proposed that President Trump meet President
Zelenskyy and show support for Ukraine.

I wasnot aware until I read Ambassador Taylor' s testimony of the various exchanges on September 7 -8
about President Trump apparently insisting that President Zelenskyy personally go to a microphone and say he
was opening investigationsof the Bidens and 2016 election interference, orMr. Yermak ' s message to
Ambassador Sondland that PresidentZelenskyy was prepared to make a statement on CNN . However,
Ambassador Taylor did tellme on September 8
they' re insistingZelenskyy commit to the investigation in
an interview with CNN." I was surprised the requirementwas so specific and concrete. While we had advised
our Ukrainian counterparts to voice a commitment to following the rule of law and generally to investigating
credible corruption allegations, this was a demand that PresidentZelenskyy personally commit to a specific
investigation of President Trump's politicalrival on a cable newschannel.
On September 11, the hold on security assistance was lifted , though it remained unclear why itwas
imposed in the first place. Although we knew the hold was lifted , we were still concerned that President
Zelenskyy may have committed to give the interview at the annual YES! Conference in Kyiv on September 12-14
where CNN ' s Fareed Zakaria was one of the moderators. On September 13, an Embassy colleague received a
phone callfrom a colleague at the U .S. Embassy to the European Union (under Ambassador Sondland) and
texted me regarding the call, Sondland said the Zelenksyy interview is supposed to be today orMonday
(Sept 16 and they plan to announce that a certain investigation that was ' on hold ' will progress ." The text also
explained that our European Union Embassy colleague did notknow if this was decided or if Ambassador
Sondland was advocating for it.

Also on September 13, following a meeting with PresidentZelenskyy in his private office in which I took
notes, Ambassador Taylor and I ran into Mr. Yermak on the way out. When Ambassador Taylor again stressed
the importance of staying out of U . S. politics and said hehoped no interview was planned, Mr. Yermak
shrugged in resignation and did not answer, as if to indicate theyhad no choice. In short, everyone thought
there was going to be an interview , and that the Ukrainiansbelieved they had to do it. The interview
ultimately did not occur .

 On September 21, Ambassador Taylor and I collaborated on inputhe sent to Mr. Morrison to brief
President Trump ahead of a September 25 meeting that had been scheduled with President Zelenskyy in New
York on themargins of the UN General Assembly . The transcript ofthe July 25 callwas released the same day .
As of today, I still have not seen a readout of the September 25 meeting.

As the current impeachment inquiry has progressed , I have followed press reports and reviewed the
statements of Ambassador Taylor and Ambassador Yovanovitch . Based on my experience in Ukraine , my
recollection is generally consistent with their testimony and I believed that the relevant facts were therefore
being laid out for the American people . However , in the last week or so , I read press reports expressing for the
first time that certain senior officials may have been acting without the President' s knowledge in their dealings
with Ukraine . At the same time, I also read reports noting the lack of first -hand evidence in the investigation
and suggesting that the only evidence being elicited at thehearings was hearsay. " I came to realize had first
hand knowledge regarding certain events on July 26 that had nototherwise been reported , and that those
events potentially bore on the question ofwhether the President did, in fact, have knowledge that those
officials were using the levers of our diplomatic power to induce the new Ukrainian President to announce the
opening of a particular criminal investigation . It is at that point that I made the observation to Ambassador
Taylor that the incident I had witnessed had acquired greater significance , which is what he reported in his
testimony earlier this week .
IX .

Conclusion

I would like to take a momentto turn back Ukraine. Nextweek marks six years since throngsof pro
Western Ukrainiansspontaneously gathered onKyiv' s Independence Square to launch whatbecameknown as
the Revolution of Dignity. While the protestsbegan in opposition to a turn toward Russia and away from the
West, they expanded over three monthsto reject the entire corrupt, repressive system that the President
oversaw and ultimately led to his flight from Ukraine to Russia. Those eventswere followed by Russia's
occupation of Ukraine's Crimean peninsula and invasion of Ukraine's eastern Donbas region,masterminding an
ensuing war that, to date, has cost Ukraine almost 14,000 lives. Over the past five years, they have rebuilt a
shattered economy, adhered to a peace process, andmoved economically and socially closer to the West toward our way of life.
Earlier this year, largemajorities of Ukrainians again chose a fresh start by voting for a political
newcomer as president, replacing 80 percent of theirparliament, and endorsing a platform consistentwith our
democratic values , reform priorities, and strategic interests. This year' s revolution at the ballot box
underscores that, despite its imperfections, Ukraineis a genuine and vibrant democracy and an example to
other post-Soviet countries and beyond - from Moscow to Hong Kong.
How we respond to this historic opportunity will set the trajectory of our relationship with Ukraine and
our position on core principles central to our vital nationalinterests for years to come. Ukrainianswant to hear
a clear andunambiguous reaffirmation that our long- standing, bipartisan policy of strong support for Ukraine
remains unchanged and thatwe fully back itat the highest levels. Vice President Pence said after his meeting
with President Zelenskyy in Warsaw , " The U . S. Ukraine relationship has never been stronger. Ukrainians and
their new government earnestly want to believe that.

Ukrainianscherish their bipartisan American supportthathas sustainedtheir Euro- Atlantic aspirations,
and they recoilat the thoughtof playing a role in U .S . domestic politics or elections. At a timeof shifting
allegiances and risingcompetitorsin the world , wehaveno betterfriend than Ukraine- scrappy, unbowed,
determined, and above all dignifiedpeoplewho are standing up against Russianauthoritarianism and
aggression. We are now at an inflection pointin Ukraine, and it is criticalto ournationalsecuritythat we stand

 in strong support ofour Ukrainian partners. Ukrainians and freedom -lovingpeople everywhere are watching
the example we set of democracy and the rule of law .
Thank you, I am happy to answer any questions.

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