IN THE CRIMINAL COURT OF TENNESSEE
FOR THE THIRTIETH JUDICIAL DISTRICT AT MEMPHIS
DIVISION I

STATE OF TENNESSEE,
Respondent.

SEDLEY ALLEY 
Ex rel. Estate of Sedley Alley, Death Penalty
Petitioner? Post?Conviction



v. Nos. 85-05085
85-05086
85-05087


 

ORDER DISMISSING FOR POST-CONVICTION DNA 

 

This matter came before the Court October 14, 2019, for a hearing on the above-
referenced petition, filed April 30, 2019, and followed by additional pleadings by both
parties. Having reviewed the pleadings and the relevant case law, and having considered
the arguments of counsel, the Court concludes Mr. Alley?s estate does not have standing
to file a petition for DNA analysis under the Post-Conviction DNA Analysis Act, and as a
result this Court does not have subject matter jurisdiction to consider the petition.
Accordingly, the petition is DISMISSED.

This Court?s order should not be treated as a ruling on the merits ofthe substantive
claims raised in the petition for DNA testing. Because the Court has no jurisdiction to

consider the petition, the Court cannot consider the substantive claims raised therein.

1. Background
A Shelby County jury convicted Mr. Alley of first degree murder, kidnapping, and

 

For ease of reference, in this order Mr. Alley?s estate and April Alley, the executor, shall be referenced collectively
as?Petitioner.? Sedley Alley will be referenced by his full name or?Mr. Alley.?

aggravated rape, for the 1985 beating, rape, sexual assault, and murder ofnineteen -year-
old Marine Lance Corporal Suzanne Collins. Thejury sentenced Mr. Alley to death, and
the trial court imposed sentences for the other convictions. Mr. Alley?s
convictions and sentences ultimately withstood the three-tier appellate review process.
See State v. Alley, 776 506 (Tenn. 1989) (direct appeal); Alley v. State, 958
138 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997) Alley v. Bell, 307 F.3d 380 (6th

Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 540 US. 839 (2003) (federal habeas corpus). Mr. Alley was

executed on June 28, 2006.

II. Petitions for Post-Conviction DNA Analysis

A. Prior Petitions

Before his execution, Mr. Alley sought DNA testing of certain items in support of
his contention that he did not commit the offenses against LCpl. Collins. On May 4,
2004, Mr. Alley filed a petition for post-conviction DNA testing3 in Shelby County
Criminal Court, seeking the testing of eleven different biological samples. After a
hearing, the post-conviction court denied the petition in a written order. The Court of

Criminal Appeals summarized the post-conviction court?s ?ndings as follows:

In denying DNA testing, the post-conviction court found that ?the petitioner has
failed to demonstrate that a reasonable probability exists that . . . he would not
have been prosecuted or convicted if exculpatory results had been obtained
through DNA analysis of the requested samples.? The post-conviction court
further found that ?the petitioner has failed to demonstrate that a reasonable
probability exists that analysis of said evidence will produce DNA results which
would have rendered the petitioner's verdict or sentence more favorable if the

 

2 The Tennessee Supreme Court denied application for permission to appeal in the post-conviction case on
September29, 1997.

3 The late Judge Otis Higgs presided over proceedings involving the two post-conviction DNA petitions filed before
Mr. Alley?s execution.

results had been available at the proceeding leading to the judgment of
conviction.?

Sedley Alley v. State, No. W2004-01204-CCA-R3-PD, 2004 WL 1196095, at *1 (Tenn.
Crim. App. May 26, 2004). On appeal, the Court of Criminal Appeals af?rmed the post-
conviction court, and the Tennessee Supreme Court denied permission to appeal on
October 4, 2004.

On May 19, 2006, Mr. Alley ?led another petition for post?conviction DNA
analysis. In the second petition, Mr. Alley sought the testing of three items which were
not identi?ed in the 2004 petition for testing, including(1) cellular material from a pair of
men?s underwear found next to the victim?s body; (2) cellular material from the stick
used to violate the victim; and (3) material from underneath the victim?s ?ngernails. Mr.
Alley asserted the DNA results from these and other items could be matched to the
victim?s boyfriend or to another person?s DNA stored in a state or federal database. The
post-conviction court denied the petition, and the Court ofCriminal Appeals affirmed the

trial court?s ruling. Of particular note, the Court of Criminal Appeals concluded that the

Post-Conviction DNA Analysis Act

created a limited interest of a defendant in establishing his/her innocence and did
not create an interest in establishing the guilt of a speculative an unknown third

party.

. . . . The results of DNA testing must stand alone and do not encompass a

speculative nationwide search for the possibility of a third party perpetrator. Thus,
the DNA analysis is limited to showing that the biological specimen did not

belong to either the Petitioner or the victim.

Sedley Alley v. State, No. W2006-01179-CCA-R3-PD, 2006 WL 1703820, at *9 (Tenn.

Crim. App. June 22, 2006). The Tennessee Supreme Court denied application for

permission to appeal on June 27,2006.

B. Powers

Five years after Mr. Alley?s execution, the Tennessee Supreme Court concluded
the Post-Conviction DNA Analysis Act ?authorizes a comparison between the DNA
pro?le developed from crime scene evidence that does not match the petitioner?s profile,
which is in a human biological specimen,? with from another biological
specimen.? Our interpretation is that this includes a comparison with other pro?les
contained in the database.? Powers v. State, 343 36, 50 (Tenn. 2011). The
Supreme Court?s ruling overruled the portion ofthe 2006 Alley opinion which concluded

that comparing DNA specimens to third parties was impermissible.

C. Current Petition

On April 30, 2019, attorneys for April Alley, Sedley Alley?s daughter, ?led
another petition for post-conviction DNA testing. The motion was initially ?led in
Division of Criminal Court, but the matter was transferred to Division I. The State
subsequently ?led a response May 31, 2019. At a short hearing held in June 2019, the
Court determined the most pressing issue in this case is whether Mr. Alley?s estate has
standing to pursue this post-conviction matter. The Court ordered counsel for the estate to
?le a reply to the State?s response; the estate did so on August 26,2019. On September

12, 2019, the State filed a response to the estate?s reply.

Current Post-Conviction DNA Petition: Standing Issue

A. Estate?s Initial Petition

As relevant to the standing issue, the April 30 motion states,

4

In an order entered February 21, 2019, granting April Alley?s petition to probate
her father?s estate, the probate court in Davidson County explicitly held that April
Alley, as personal representative, is granted the authority to exercise any and all
rights of her father Sedley Alley as provided in the Post-Conviction DNA

Analysis Act of 2001 .4

The initial petition for DNA testing made no other references to the standing issue.

B. State?s Response

The State ?led its response to the petition for DNA testing on May 31, 2019. In
addition to responding to the Petitioner?s substantive claims, the State?s initial response
raises several arguments related to its claim that the Alley estate lacks standing under
both the Post-Conviction DNA Analysis Act of 2001 and the doctrine ofjusticiability.
First, the State argues Mr. Alley?s estate is not a ?person convicted of and sentenced for
?rst degree murder? within the meaning of Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-30?
303. The State asserts an estate does not qualify as a ?person? within the meaning of
other sections of state law, nor does the estate qualify as a ?person? within the meaning
of the Post-Conviction Procedure Act. The State asserts the Act contemplates actions
?led by a petitioner whose sentence has not been fully executed, not by the estate ofa
deceased petitioner.

Second, the State argues any rights Mr. Alley may have had to post-conviction
DNA testing did not survive his death. Specifically, the State argues the Post-Conviction
DNA Procedure Act does not contain a provision authorizing the survivability of such a
claim. Other sections ofTennessee law explicitly provide for the survivability of certain

actions on behalf of deceased litigants, the State claims, but the right to bring a post-

 

4 The Davidson County Probate Court order wa filed as an exhibit to Petitioner?s motion for DNA testing.

5

conviction claim is not so enumerated.

Third, the State asserts the Davidson County Probate Court was without
jurisdiction to enter an order allowing April Alley (and the Alley estate) to qualify as a
?person? under the post-conviction DNA testing statute. The State argues the only court
in which jurisdiction for this case lies is the convicting court; thus, a court in Davidson
County has no jurisdiction over a post-conviction matter in Shelby County. The State also
argues the Davidson County court has no authority over the evidence collected in Shelby
County and entered into the record in Mr. Alley?s Shelby County court proceedings.

Fourth, the State asserts the present petition is not ?otherwise justiciable.? In
addition to the lack of standing, the State argues the estate has not suffered any injury,
nor can this Court provide any redress to the estate given that Mr. Alley has been
executed. Furthermore, the State claims Mr. Alley?s execution (and the Court?s inability
to provide relief) renders the motion for reliefmoot, as Mr. Alley?s sentence has expired.

Fifth, the State argues the current motion is untimely. While Tennessee Code
Annotated section 40-30-303 allows a motion for post-conviction DNA testing to be filed
?at any time,? the State claims the phrase ?at any time? does not encompass a period
beyond a petitioner?s death or the expiration ofhis sentence (which in this case are one in

the same).

Finally, the State argues the current motion is precluded by the principles of res

judicata and collateral estoppel.

C. Estate?s Reply

Following the Court?s June 2019 hearing the estate filed a memorandum of law

responding to the State?s assertions. In its response, the estate contends:

6

l. The authority to which the State cited in arguing that post-conviction
matters are not civil in nature actually supports the Petitioner?s contention
that civil rules of procedure apply to this case. Mr. Alley?s right to DNA

testing is therefore not abated by his death.

2. The plain language of the post-conviction DNA testing statute does not
preclude the estate?s right to DNA testing, as the act does not require that
the ?person? seekingtesting be in custody or subject to supervised release,
and the act allows the ?person? to bring the claim ?at any time.?

3. The plain language of other statutes, including statutes dealing with
exoneration, expunction, compensation, and the like, make clear that the
legislature intended such claims to survive a petitioner?s death.

4. Ms. Alley did suffer ?distinct and palpable injuries? as a result of her
father?s execution; these injuries are traceable to state action, and these
injuries could be redressed by a favorable decision of this Court, which
would in turn entitle the estate to compensation. Therefore, the estate does

meet the traditional standing requirements.

5. The Davidson County Probate Court, as a court with chanceryjurisdiction,
properly concluded Mr. Alley?s estate could pursue the post-conviction
DNA claim presently in this Court.

6. Collateral estoppel, res judicata, and law of the case doctrines do not bar
litigation ofthe current petition.

7. The estate has a constitutional right to DNA testing.

D. Further Response by State
The State ?led an additional responsive pleading on September 12, 2019. In the

response, the State asserts, among other things: (1) Post-conviction proceedings are not
bound by the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure or statutes governing survivorship of

tort actions; and (2) the estate has no constitutional right to bring a post-conviction

action.

IV. Analysis

A. Post-Conviction DNA Testing

As relevant to this case, the Post-Conviction DNA Analysis Act of 2001 permits

?a person convicted ofand sentenced for the commission of?rst degree murder? to,

at any time, file a petition requesting the forensic DNA analysis of any evidence
that is in the possession or control of the prosecution, law enforcement,
laboratory, or court, and that is related to the investigation or prosecution that
resulted in the judgment of conviction and that may contain biological evidence.

Tenn. Code Ann. 40-30-303. The post-conviction DNA testing statutes establish the
circumstances under which such testing is mandatory, see Tenn. Code Ann. 40-30-304,

and in which testingis discretionary, see Tenn. Code Ann. 40-30-305.

B. Standing and Subject Matter Jurisdiction

The Tennessee Supreme Court has stated,

Subject matter jurisdiction involves a court?s lawful authority to adjudicate a
particular controversy. Northland Ins. Co. v. State, 33 727, 729 (Tenn.
2000). Tennessee?s courts derive subject matter jurisdiction from the state
constitution or from legislative acts. See id.; Meighan v. US. Sprint
Communications Co., 924 632, 639 (Tenn. 1996); Kane v. Kane, 547
559, 560 (Tenn. 1977). Courts may not exercise jurisdictional powers that
have not been conferred on them directly or by necessary implication. See First
Am. Trust Co. v. Franklin?Murray Dev. C0., 59 135, 140 (Tenn. Ct. App.
2001); Dishmon v. Shelby State Coll, 15 477, 480 (Tenn. Ct. App.

1999).
Osborn v. Marr, 127 737, 739 (Tenn. 2004).

The Court in Osborn continued, ?When a statute creates a cause of action and
designates who may bring an action, the issue of standing is interwoven with that of
subject matterjurisdiction and becomes a jurisdictional prerequisite.? Id. at 740. Thus,
when the legislature ?specifically designate[s] who may ?le? a particular action ?a court

does not have subject matterjurisdiction to hear such an [action] unless the party filing

the [action] has standing. Standing, therefore, is a necessary prerequisite to the court?s
exercise ofsubj ect matterjurisdiction? in any case. 1d. (alterations added).

The Tennessee Supreme Court has summarized standing as follows:

Courts employ the doctrine of standing to determine whether a particular
litigant is entitled to have a court decide the merits of a dispute or of particular
issues. Warth v. Seldin, 422 US. 490, 498, 95 S. Ct. 2197, 45 L.Ed.2d 343
(1975); Knierim v. Leatherwood, 542 806, 808 (Tenn.1976) (holding that
courts use the standing doctrine to decide whether a particular plaintiff is
?properly situated to prosecute the action?); City of Brentwood v. Metropolitan
Bd. ononing Appeals, et al., 149 49, 55 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2004), perm.
app. denied (Tenn. Sept. 13, 2004). Grounded upon ?concern about the proper?
and properly limited?role of the courts in a democratic society,? Worth, 422 US.
at 498, the doctrine of standing precludes courts from adjudicating ?an action at
the instance of one whose rights have not been invaded or infringed.? Mayhew v.
Wilder, 46 760, 767 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001), perm. app. denied (Tenn.
April 30, 2001). The doctrine of standing restricts ?[t]he exercise of judicial
power, which can so profoundly affect the lives, liberty, and property of those to
whom it extends, . . . to litigants who can show ?injury in fact? resulting from the
action which they seek to have the court adjudicate.? Valley Forge Christian
College v. Americans United for Separation of Church State, Inc. 454 U.S. 464,
473, 102 S. Ct. 752, 70 L.Ed.2d 700 (1982). Without limitations such as standing
and other closely related doctrinesl5] ?the courts would be called upon to decide
abstract questions of wide public significance even though other governmental
institutions may be more competent to address the questions and even though
judicial intervention may be unnecessary to protect individual rights.? Worth, 422
US at 500; see also Corp. v. Cuno, 547 US 332, 126 S.
Ct. 1854, 1856, 164 L.Ed.2d 589 (2006) (explaining that standing enforces the
constitutional case?or-controversy requirement that is ?crucial in maintaining the
?tripartite allocation of power? set forth in the Constitution?).

 

To establish standing, a plaintiff must show three ?indispensable?
elements ?by the same degree of evidence? as other matters on which the plaintiff
bears the burden of proof. Petty v. Corp., 91 765, 767
(Tenn. Ct. App. 2002), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Sept. 9, 2002). First, a plaintiff
must show a distinct and palpable injury: conjectural or hypothetical injuries are
not sufficient. City of Brentwood, 149 at 55?56; see also Lujan v.
Defenders of Wildlie, 504 US. 555, 560, 112 S. Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351
(1992). Standing also may not be predicated upon an injury to an interest that the

 

5 ?The standing question thus bears close affinity to questions of ripeness?whether the harm asserted has matured
sufficiently to warrant judicial intervention?and of mootness?whether the occasion for judicial intervention
persists." Wart/2, 422 US. at499 n. 10, 95 S. Ct. 2197 (original footnote at 195 at620 

plaintiff shares in common with all other citizens. Mayhew, 46 at 767.
Were such injuries sufficient to confer standing, the State would be required to
defend against ?a profusion of lawsuits? from taxpayers, and a purpose of the
standing doctrine would be frustrated. See Parks v. Alexander, 608 881,
885 (Tenn.Ct.App.l980) (stating that one purpose of standing is to protect the
State from a ?profusion of lawsuits?).

The second essential element of standing is a causal connection between
the claimed injury and the challenged conduct. Mayhew, 46 at 767. A
plaintiff may satisfy this element by establishing the existence of a ?fairly
traceable? connection between the alleged injury in fact and the defendant?s
challenged conduct. Corp1861.
The third and final element necessary to establish standing is a showing that the
alleged injury is capable of being redressed by a favorable decision of the court.
Petty, 91 at 767; Corp1861.

 

American Civil Liberties Union ofTennessee v. Darnell, 195 612, 619-20 (Tenn.

2006) (hereinafter v. Darnell?).

C. Application to Current Case

After reviewing the parties? extensive briefing, the Court concludes Petitioner

lacks standing to bring this action and the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to

consider the estate?s claims. In filing this Order, the Court focuses on five areas which, in
?a

the Court?s view, address all concerns raised by the parties.

1. Statutory Interpretation

The Court begins by examining the relevant statutes addressing post-conviction

cases generally and post-conviction DNA testing in particular, as well as by examining
Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 28. When interpreting statutes, the reviewing court?s duty
?is to ascertain and give effect to the intention ofthe legislature.? Eastman Chem. Co. v.

Johnson, 151 503, 507 (Tenn. 2004). ?Legislative intent is to be ascertained

10

whenever possible from the natural and ordinary meaning of the language used, without
forced or subtle construction that would limit or extend the meaning of the language.?
Lipscomb v. Doe, 32 840, 844 (Tenn. 2000) (quoting Hawks v. City of
Westmoreland, 960 10, 16 (Term. 1997)). ?When the statutory language is clear
and unambiguous, [the reviewing court] must apply its plain meaning in its normal and
accepted use, without forced interpretation that would limit or expand the statute?s
interpretation.? Eastman Chem, 151 at 507 (alteration added).

In this case, a plain reading of the relevant statutes at issue shows that the estate 0 
a deceased inmate has no standing to bring a post-conviction DNA claim. For instance,
the language of the post-conviction DNA statute clearly and unambiguously states ?a
person convicted ofand sentenced for the commission of? certain offenses, including ?rst
degree murder, is entitled to ?le a petition for post-conviction DNA testing; no language
in the statute allows anyone to bring a DNA testing action on such a person?s behalf.
Additionally, a plain reading of the applicable post-conviction statutes and Tennessee
Supreme Court Rule 28 reveals that they (statutes and Rule 28) contain no provisions
which would allow someone to ?le a post-conviction action of any kind on behalf ofa
deceased person.

Additionally, none of the other statutory provisions cited in the Petitioner?s
various ?lings reference post-conviction actions. Those statutory provisions will be
addressed elsewhere in this order. In the Court?s view, had the General Assembly?or the
Tennessee Supreme Court, in Rule 28?intended for someone to be able to ?le a motion
for post-conviction DNA testing on behalf ofa statutorily eligible person who had died,
such a provision would have been placed in the appropriate statutes. Because such a

provision was not included in the statutes or Rule 28, this Court must presume that the

11

drafters did not intend to confer such a right, and this Court cannot expand the

interpretations of the statutes and Rule 28 beyond the bounds established by their

drafters.

2. The Nature of Post?Conviction DNA Proceedings (Criminal vs. Civil)

Petitioner argues that between the fact that the Tennessee Supreme Court has
concluded post-conviction proceedings are ?civil in nature? for purposes of tolling
statutes of limitation and the ?law enforcement? and ?justice finding? purposes of the
DNA Analysis act, motions for post-conviction DNA testing should be considered civil
in nature, and therefore the right to bring a cause of action for post-conviction DNA
testing survives Mr. Alley?s death. This Court disagrees.

Petitioner correctly states the Tennessee Supreme Court has ?held that a post-
conviction petition should be considered as civil in nature for the purpose oftolling the
statute of limitations.? Carter v. Bell, 279 560, 565 (Tenn. 2009) (citing Watkins
v. State, 903 302, 305 (Tenn. 1995)). This Court, however, is unaware of any
other precedent concluding speci?cally that post-conviction cases generally and post-
conviction DNA testing proceedings in particular should be considered ?civil actions? or
?civil in nature.? As the Tennessee Supreme Court has stated, ?Post-conviction
proceedings are best described as proceedings arising out ofa criminal case.? Carter, 279
at 565. ?Post-conviction proceedings are not considered civil actions for the
purpose of the jurisdiction ofthe Court of Appeals.? Id. (citing Tenn. Code Ann. 16-
Furthermore, Rule 28 speci?es, ?Neither the Tennessee Rules of Civil
Procedure nor the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure apply to post?conviction

proceedings except as speci?cally provided by these rules.? Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 28, 3 (B).

12

Thus, whatever the nature of post-conviction proceedings, it is clear that they are not
?civil actions? or ?actions related to a civil proceeding? unless they are designated as
such, in whole or in part, by the Tennessee Supreme Court or the legislature. Thus,
statutes, court rules, and case law relevant to civil proceedings are generally inapplicable
to post?conviction proceedings.

Nothing in the case law or statutes cited by the Petitioner convinces this Court
otherwise. The Tennessee Supreme Court?s opinion in Powers and the statutes creating
the TBI DNA database do not speci?cally reference the ability of a post-conviction DNA
action to be considered civil in nature or allow a post-conviction DNA claim to be
brought by the estate of a deceased inmate. Furthermore, as the State notes in its
pleading, while Tennessee statutes provide for the survivability of civil actions by a
deceased?s personal representative,6 neither the survivability statutes nor other authority
interpreting these statutes designates a post-conviction matter as one which falls within
the purview of the civil survivability statutes. Finally, the statutes referencing the
Governor?s exoneration power and the Board of Claims? power to compensate
wrongfully convicted persons and their heirs do not reference post-conviction claims.
Thus, in this Court?s view a cause of action for post-conviction DNA testing cannot be

considered a civil claim that survives the death of an inmate who, if living, could

otherwise bring the claim.

3. Ability of Davidson County Probate Court to Confer Standing

Generally, a circuit court has no jurisdiction beyond the boundaries ofits judicial

district:

 

6 See Tenn. Code Ann. 20-5-102 through -106.
13

[T]he Tennessee Constitution . . provides the General Assembly with power to
establish ?[t]he jurisdiction of the Circuit, Chancery[,] and other Inferior Courts.?
Tenn. Const. art. VI, 8; see also Tenn. Const. art. VI, 1. The General
Assembly has exercised this constitutional authority by enacting a statute that
divides Tennessee ?into thirty-one (31) judicial districts? and delineates the
county or counties included in each judicial district. Tenn. Code Ann. 16-2-506
(Supp. 2018). Other statutes provide that circuit court judges are to be elected by
the voters of their ?respective judicial districts,? Tenn. Code Ann. l7-l-103(b)
(Supp. 2018), and that each circuit court judge must ?reside in the judicial district
or division for which the judge . . . is elected,? Tenn. Code Ann. 17-1-102
(2009). Another statute confirms that circuit court judges are judges ?for the state
at large? and then declares that, ?as such, [circuit court judges] may, upon
interchange and upon other lawful ground, exercise the duties of o?ice in any
other judicial district in the state.? Tenn. Code Ann. 17-1-203 (2009) (emphasis
added). Still another separate statute states that ?[a]ny judge or chancellor may
exercise by interchange, appointment, or designation the jurisdiction of any trial
court other than that to which the judge or chancellor was elected or appointed.?
Tenn. Code Ann. 16-2-502 (2009) (emphasis added). Read together, the plain
language of the foregoing statutes confines the geographical jurisdiction of a
circuit court judge to the judge?s statutorily defined and assigned judicial district
and authorizes a circuit court judge to exercise ?the jurisdiction of any other trial
court? only by ?interchange, appointment, or designation,? or ?other lawful
ground.? In the absence of interchange, appointment, designation, or other lawful
ground, circuit court judges may neither ?exercise the duties of office in any other
judicial district? nor exercise ?the jurisdiction of any trial court other than that to

which the judge. . . was elected or appointed.?

State v. Frazier, 558 145, 151 (Tenn. 2018) (footnote omitted, some alterations
added, emphasis in original).

In this case, however, Petitioner asserts the Davidson County Probate Court, as a
court with Chancery jurisdiction, had jurisdiction to determine Petitioner was a ?person?
within the meaning of the post-conviction DNA testing statutes. This Court disagrees.

Petitioner correctly states the Davidson County Probate Court?more speci?cally,
Division 7 of the Davidson County Circuit Court?has ?concurrent jurisdiction with
Chancery court and exclusivejurisdiction over the probate ofwills and the administration
of estates, including the estates ofdecedents under guardianships and conservatorships.?
Tenn. Code Ann. 16-2-506. Petitioner argues a court of equity?s rights under Tennessee

14

Code Annotated section 29-14-1027 and other sections permitted the Davidson County
Probate Court to issue a declaratoryjudgment stating that Petitioner has the right to file a
post-conviction DNA action in this case. However, this Court notes that the Tennessee
appellate courts have stated that courts of equity generally do not have jurisdiction in
criminal cases.

This Court ?nds the Court of Appeals? analysis in John E. Carter v. Herbert H.
Slatery, instructive. Carter v. Slatery involved a defendant convicted of ?rst degree
murder under the pre-l982 statute who sought a declaratoryjudgment declaringhe had a
due process right to have his conviction overturned following a change in the language of
the first degree murder statute in the 1989 criminal code. The Chancery court concluded it
had subject matter jurisdiction but dismissed the petition on the basis of collateral

estoppel. The Court of Appeals concluded the Chancery Court had no jurisdiction,

stating:

As noted above, Tennessee Code Annotated section 16?10?102 provides
that ?[t]he circuit court has exclusive original jurisdiction of all crimes and
misdemeanors, either at common law or by statute, unless otherwise expressly
provided by statute or this code.? Tennessee Code Annotated section 40?1?108
further provides that ?[t]he circuit and criminal courts have original jurisdiction of
all criminal matters not exclusively conferred by law on some other tribunal.?
Consequently, ?the Tennessee General Assembly has vested exclusive and
original jurisdiction of all criminal matters in the circuit and criminal courts of

 

7 As cited in Petitioner?s August 2019 reply to the State?s response, the statute provides,

Courts of record within their respective jurisdictions havethe power to declare rights, status,and other
legal relations whether or not furtherrelief is or could be claimed.

No action or proceeding shall be open to objection on the ground that a declaratoryjudgment ordecree is
prayed for.

The declaration may be either affirmative ornegative in form and effect; and such declaration shallhave the
force and effect ofa finaljudgment or decree.

15

this state.? Tennessee Downs, Inc., 15 at 848 (citing Tenn. Code Ann. 
16?10?102, 40?1?107 to 108). Over a century ago, the Tennessee Supreme Court
recognized that ?[c]ourts of equity are not constituted to deal with crime and
criminal proceedings.? J.W. Kelly Co. v. Conner, 123 S.W. 622, 635 (Tenn.

1909). The court explained:

The rule which prevents a court of Chancery from
interfering with the administration of the criminal laws of this state
is a wise one, founded upon sound principles of public policy, and,
if we .had the power to do so, we fear that changing it would result
in much confusion and embarrassment in preserving peace and
order, and enforcing the police power of the state generally, which
would outweigh the good that would follow an immediate decision
of this case upon the merits. The injury to the general public,
which would ultimately result from the exercise of this jurisdiction,
would be greater than that to individuals when left to their

remedies in courts of law.

Id. at 637.

More recently, in Clinton Books, Inc. v. City of Memphis, 197 749
(Tenn.2006), the Tennessee Supreme Court considered whether a court of equity
had subject matter jurisdiction to issue a temporary injunction barring
enforcement of a criminal statute. The court concluded that a court of equity did

not possess such jurisdiction:

The long-standing rule in Tennessee is that state courts of
equity lack jurisdiction to enjoin the enforcement of a criminal
statute that is alleged to be unconstitutional. See, Alexander v.
Elkins, 132 Tenn. 663, 179 S.W. 310, 311 (1915); J.W. Kelly 
Co. v. Conner, 122 Tenn. 339, 123 S.W. 622, 637 (1909). A
lawsuit seeking injunctive relief due to an allegedly invalid
criminal statute asks the Chancery court, rather than the court that
will enforce the criminal law, to enjoin the officers of the state
from prosecuting persons who are conducting a business made
unlawful by a criminal statute until the Chancery court can
detennine the statute?s validity. J. W. Kelly Co., 123 S.W. at 631.
Permitting a court of equity to interfere with the administration of
this state?s criminal laws, which that court is without jurisdiction to
enforce, would cause confusion in the preservation of peace and
order and the enforcement of the State?s general police power. Id.

at 637.

Clinton Books, 197 at 752. The supreme court noted that a court of equity
may enjoin the enforcement of a criminal statute that the supreme court has
adjudged unconstitutional. Id. at 753. In that situation, the court explained, a
person is not subject to criminal prosecution for acts committed in violation of the

16

statute, no controversies are required to be settled by the criminal court, ?and the
equity court is not invading the criminal court?s jurisdiction by issuing an
injunction.? 1d. The general rule, however, is that courts of equity lack jurisdiction
to enjoin the enforcement of a criminal statute. 1d. at 754.

The plaintiffs in Clinton Books argued that some recent decisions from the
Tennessee Supreme Court suggested that courts of equity do have subject matter
jurisdiction to enjoin enforcement of a criminal statute. For example, in Davis?
Kidd Booksellers, Inc. v. McWherter, 866 520, 523 (Tenn.1993), the
plaintiffs sought injunctive and declaratory relief in chancery court when
challenging the constitutionality of statutes that provided for criminal penalties.
On appeal, the supreme court considered the constitutionality of the statutes
without addressing whether the chancery court had subject matter jurisdiction to
grant injunctive relief. In Clinton Books, however, the supreme court rejected the
argument that these cases altered the law regarding subject matter jurisdiction of
courts of equity. Clinton Books, 197 at 752. The supreme court explained
that stare decisis only applies to decisions directly on the point in controversy. Id.
at 753. ?Accordingly,? the court continued, ?the omission of any discussion of the
trial court?s [subject matter] jurisdiction in Davis?Kidd should not be
interpreted as altering the general rule prohibiting state equity courts from
enjoining enforcement of a criminal statute.?1d.

In sum, according to Clinton Books, the ?general rule? is that ?a court of
equity may not enjoin enforcement of a criminal statute.? Id. at 754. The question
that remains is whether the chancery court can issue a declaratory judgment
regarding the enforcement of a criminal statute or judgment, even in the absence
of authority to issue injunctive relief.

In general, chancery courts have subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate
declaratory judgment actions. Estate of Brown, 402 193, 199 (Tenn.2013)
(citing Tenn. Code Ann. 29?14?102). Tennessee?s Declaratory Judgment Act
?conveys the power to construe or determine the validity of any written
instrument, statute, ordinance, contract, or franchise, provided that the case is
within the court?s jurisdiction.? Colonial Pipeline Co. v. Morgan, 263 
827, 837 (Tenn.2008) (citing Tenn. Code Ann. 29?14?103) (emphasis added).
However, ?[t]he Declaratory Judgment Act does not grant the power to courts to
declare and enforce rights outside their scope of jurisdiction.? Morgan v. Norris,
No. 88?70?11, 1988 WL 133479, at *2 (Term. Ct. App. Dec. 16, 1988) (citing
Zirkle v. City ofKingston, 217 Tenn. 210, 396 356 (1976); Hill v. Beeler,
199 Tenn. 325, 286 868 (1956); Nicholson v. Cummings, 188 Tenn. 20],
217 942 (1949)); see also Tenn. Code Ann. (?Courts of
record within their respective jurisdictions have the power to declare rights,
status, and other legal relations whether or not further relief is or could be

claimed?) (emphasis added).

As noted in 26 C.J.S. Declaratory Judgments 124:

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The declaratory-judgment statutes give to courts of record
the power to declare rights, status and other legal relations within
their respective jurisdictions, but do not confer subject matter
jurisdiction. A declaratory judgment act is not an express
independent source of subject matter jurisdiction, and ordinarily
does not by itself grant or otherwise create jurisdiction. In order
that a court have jurisdiction to render a declaratory judgment over
any subject matter, jurisdiction must exist independent of the
declaratory judgment 

A litigant?s request for declaratory relief does not alter a
suit?s underlying nature. Declaratory judgment actions are subject
to the same limitations inherent in the underlying cause of action
from which the controversy arose. Statutory authority to award a
declaratory judgment does not permit litigants to raise such claims,
by their own ?bootstraps,? if jurisd iction is otherwise lacking.

Statutes authorizing declaratory judgments merely extend
the power of the courts to grant relief in cases that are already
within their jurisdiction. Such statutes, therefore, do not confer any
additional jurisdiction on the courts, or modify its jurisdictional
reach over the parties or the subject matter.

For example, ?[t]he Federal Declaratory Judgment Act does not confer
independent jurisdiction but merely provides additional remedies where
jurisdiction already exists. The plaintiff must establish an independent source of
subject matter jurisdiction in order to proceed to pursue declaratory relief in a
federal court.? 22A Am.Jur.2d Declaratory Judgments 188.

Likewise, in Tennessee, our supreme court has held that ?the Declaratory
Judgment Act has not given the courts jurisdiction over any controversy that
would not be within their jurisdiction if affirmative relief were being sought.?
Hill, 286 at 871. Simply put, ?the Declaratory Judgment Act does not
confer an independent basis for jurisdiction.? Baits v. Lack, No. 86?147?11, 1986
WL 13040, at *3 (Term. Ct. App. Nov. 21, 1986) (citing Hill, 286 at 871).
Consequently, the Tennessee Supreme Court has held that declaratory
judgment is proper in chancery, but only if chancery originally could have
entertained a suit of the same subject matter.? Zirkle, 396 at 363 (citing
Gibson, Suits in Chancery 36, n.62 (5th ed.1955)). In Zirkle, for instance, the
supreme court concluded that the chancery court did not have jurisdiction over
any of the theories alleged in the complainants? suit, and therefore, it could not
?take jurisdiction to enter a declaratory judgment.? Id.

In the case before us, the chancery court relied on Blackwell v. Haslam,
No. 2012 WL 113655 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 11,
2012), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Apr. 11, 2012), as recognizing chancery court
jurisdiction over a petition for declaratory judgment regarding the

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constitutionality of a criminal statute. Specifically, in Blackwell, the Middle
Section of this Court held that a Chancery court had subject matter jurisdiction
over a complaint for declaratory relief regarding the constitutionality of a statute
imposing criminal penalties even though the Chancery court lacked jurisdiction to
enjoin the enforcement of the same statute. Id. at The Blackwell court
recognized that Chancery courts of Tennessee do not have original jurisdiction
over criminal cases. Id. at The court then acknowledged but declined to follow
the Tennessee Supreme Court?s holding in Zirkle that declaratory judgment is
proper in Chancery, but only if Chancery originally could have entertained a suit of
the same subject matter.? Id. at The Blackwell court conceded that the
supreme court had not explicitly ovemiled Zirkle, but, nevertheless, it concluded
that the supreme court had ?clearly departed from the unequivocal declaration? in
Zirkle in two subsequent cases: Davis?Kidd Booksellers, 866 at 520, and
Clinton Books, 197 at 749. Blackwell, 2012 WL 113655 at The
Middle Section emphasized that those two cases involved requests for declaratory
relief regarding statutes that assessed criminal penalties, ?and in none of these
cases did the court find that the Chancery court lacked subject matter jurisdiction.?

Id. at 

This Court disagreed with the Blackwell decision in Memphis Bonding
Co., Inc. v. Criminal Court of Tennessee 30th Dist, No. 
RIO-CV, 2015 WL 7575093, at *7 (Term. Ct. App. Nov. 25, 2015). We noted
that neither Davis?Kidd nor Clinton Books contained any discussion regarding a
Chancery court?s subject matter jurisdiction over a request for declaratory relief.
In Clinton Books, the supreme court remanded a request for declaratory relief due
to a procedural issue but did not discuss the issue of subject matter jurisdiction as
it pertained to declaratory relief. Moreover, as previously noted in this opinion,
the Clinton Books court acknowledged the lack of any discussion of subject
matter jurisdiction in Davis?Kidd and specifically cautioned that ?the omission of
any discussion of the trial court?s jurisdiction in Davis?Kidd should not be
interpreted as altering the general rule prohibiting state equity courts from
enjoining enforcement of a criminal statute.? Clinton Books, 197 at 753.
In other words, we should not assume that subject matter jurisdiction existed
based on the fact that the issue was not addressed in the opinion. This seems to be
the same approach the court of appeals used in Blackwell. We respectfully
disagree with its conclusion that the supreme court ?clearly departed from the
unequivocal declaration? in Zirkle by its silence on the issue in Davis?Kidd and
Clinton Books. We consider the supreme court?s unequivocal statements in Zirkle

and Hill to be controlling.

According to Hill, ?the Declaratory Judgment Act has not given the courts
jurisdiction over any controversy that would not be within their jurisdiction if
affirmative relief were being sought.? Hill, 286 at 871. Zirkle specifically
holds that declaratory judgment is proper in Chancery only if Chancery
originally could have entertained a suit of the same subject matter.? Zirkle 396
at 363. As a result, we conclude that the Chancery court lacked subject

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matter jurisdiction to enter a declaratory judgment regarding the legality or
constitutionality of the criminal judgments entered against Carter.

John E. Carter v. Herbert H. Slatery, No. M2015-00554-COA-R3-CV, 2016 WL

1268110, at (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 19, 2016), perm. app. denied, (Tenn. Aug. 18,

2016).

The Court also ?nds a Court of Appeals decision addressing a declaratory
judgment action brought by an inmate whose case originated in this judicial district
instructive. After Pervis Payne was convicted of ?rst degree murder and sentenced to
death, he brought several actions in the Shelby County Criminal Court alleging he was
intellectually disabled and ineligible for the death penalty. They all proved unsuccessful.
He then sought a declaratoryjudgrnent in the Davidson County Chancery Court declaring
him intellectually disabled and ineligible for the death penalty. The Chancery court
rejected Mr. Payne?s claims; the Court of Appeals affirmed. In addition to concluding the
claim was barred on sovereign immunity grounds, the appellate court concluded the

Chancery court had nojurisdiction to determine intellectual disability matters:

Tenn. Code Ann. 16-11-101 grants Chancery courts ?all the powers,
privileges and jurisdiction properly and rightfully incident to a court of equity?;
Tenn. Code Ann. 16-11-102 adds subject matter jurisdiction, concurrent with
the circuit courts, over all civil cases with certain exceptions. Exclusive Oliginal
subject matter jurisdiction over all crimes and misdemeanors is vested in circuit
courts pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. 16-10-102 ?unless otherwise expressly

provided by statute.?

Criminal offenses are codified in Title 39 of the Tennessee Code; pan 2 of
chapter 13 governs criminal homicide. Tenn. Code Ann. 39-13-201 defines
criminal homicide and 39-13-202 defines and prescribes the punishment for first
degree murder, including death, life imprisonment without the possibility of
parole, and life imprisonment. Tenn. Code Ann. 39-13-203 prohibits defendants
with an intellectual disability at the time first degree murder was committed from
being sentenced to death, with ?[t]he determination of whether the defendant had
an intellectual disability. . . [to] be made by the court.? Tenn. Code Ann. 39-13-
204 provides that sentencing for first degree murder is to be fixed by the jury in a

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separate sentencing hearing, and sets forth the procedures to be used in the
hearing and the requirement that the judge instruct the jury orally and in writing to
weigh and consider the statutory aggravating and mitigating circumstances in
?xing punishment. Criminal procedure is codified in Title 40, chapter 1, which
governs jurisdiction and venue. Under Tenn. Code Ann. 40-1-108 circuit and
criminal courts ?have original jurisdiction over all matters not exclusively

conferred by law on some other tribunal.?

In addition to the absence of any statute vesting subject matter jurisd iction

in the Chancery courts to adjudicate any aspect of Tenn. Code Ann. 39-13-203,

the determination of whether the defendant had an intellectual disability at the

time of the offense is a part of the prosecution and sentencing processes; the

statute directs that the determination is to be made by ?the court.? We do not

agree with Mr. Payne that Tenn. Code Ann. 39-13-203 limits the criminal

court?s exclusive subject matter jurisdiction to the point where ?the prosecution

has concluded.? Construed together, the relevant statutes operate as a further

limitation on the Chancery court?s exercise of subject matter jurisdiction over this

case. In any event, Tenn. Code Ann. 16-10-102 and 40-1-108 require that the

grant of subject matter jurisdiction to the Chancery court be express; there is no

such express grant in the intellectual disability statute.

Pervis Payne v. Wayne Carpenter, et al., No. M2014-00688-COA-R3-CV, 2016 WL
4142485, at *4 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 2, 2016) (emphasis added, footnote omitted),perm.
app. denied, (Tenn. Nov. 16, 2016).

As explained earlier in this order, post-conviction matters are not traditional
?criminal cases.? And in this case Petitioner is not arguing a Chancery court would have
the jurisdiction to decide the ultimate issue in this case whether post-conviction
DNA testing is appropriate). However, the Court still ?nds the Court of Appeals?
reasoning in Carter and Payne helpful. There is no authority, statutory or otherwise,
specifically granting a court of equityjurisdiction in post-conviction cases. Petitioner is
not suggesting the post-conviction DNA testing statute is unconstitutional, so it would
appear the Davidson County Probate Court had no authority to enter a declaratory

judgment regarding the statute?s application. A post-conviction DNA proceeding would

not be within a Chancery court?sjurisdiction as an original cause of action, so it appears

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the chancery court cannot issue a declaratoryjudgrnent in a post-conviction action either.
The reasoning on these points does not only prohibit a Chancery court from resolving the
ultimate issue in this case, but it also prevents a Chancery court from ruling on any
component ofa post-conviction proceeding, including a determination as to who quali?es
as a ?person? under the statute.

Accordingly, the Court concludes the Davidson County Probate Court was without
jurisdiction to enter a declaratoryjudgment or other order stating Petitioner constituted a

?person? for purposes ofthe post-conviction DNA testing statute.

4. Applying Standing-Related Case Law

As stated above, a party must show three indispensable elements to establish

standing:
1. A ?distinct and palpable injury? rather than a conjectural or
hypothetical one;

2. A causal connection between the claimed injury and the challenged
conduct; and

3. A showing that the alleged injury is capable ofbeing redressed by a
favorable decision ofthe court.

See ACLU v. Darnell, supra, 195 at 620.

In reviewing the three-part test for standing outlined in ACLU v. Darnell and the
cases cited therein, it appears to this Court that Petitioner does not have standing to bring
this case, nor would Sedley Alley have a surviving right even if such a claim could be
said to survive. While Mr. Alley can be said to have suffered a distinct and palpable
injury in fact for standing purposes, Petitioner has not. April Alley and Mr. Alley?s other

family members have not been convicted for or incarcerated for ?rst degree murder?

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Sedley Alley was. Ms. Alley?s assertion her father was wrongfully convicted of and
executed for murdering ch1. Collins is certainly important to the Alley estate, but
Petitioner has not pointed this Court to any authority stating that the execution of a family
member is an ?injury in fact? for standing purposes. Because Petitioner has not suffered
?injury? for standing purposes, the second prong of the standing test?a relationship
between the injury and the challenged conduct ofthe opposing party?must also fail.

Third, this Court is incapable of providing a remedy that would redress any
potential injury in this case. Mr. Alley?s sentence has been carried out?he has been
executed. Thus, even if this Court were to order DNA testing, such testing, even if
favorable to the Alley estate, would not redress the effects of Mr. Alley?s conviction and
sentence. Mr. Alley is deceased, and therefore he is unable to bene?t from a favorable
ruling ofthis Court. Thus, the third prong ofthe standing test must fail as to Mr. Alley.

Petitioner claims the estate is entitled to ?exoneration? due to newly discovered
evidence, per Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-27-109. However, the statutes do
not appear to confer the right of exoneration to deceased persons or their estates; that
right?a right which is purely a creation of statute?belongs to the inmate, not his heirs.
Because exoneration does not appear to be a remedy which this Court could bestow upon
Petitioner, the third prong must fail as to Petitioner.

Accordingly, the Court concludes traditional standing principles do not entitle Mr.

Alley?s estate to bring this post-conviction DNA claim.

5. Due Process Concerns
Finally, Petitioner argues due process concerns, both in the form of property rights
and in the form of a liberty interest in proving innocence, entitle the estate to bring this

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claim for post-conviction DNA testing. This Court disagrees.

Regarding Petitioner?s liberty interest Claim, as the State points out, the United
States Supreme Court has rejected a still-living inmate?s claim that he had a substantive
due process right of access to evidence held by the state of Alaska so the inmate could
prove his innocence through DNA testing. See Dist. Atty ?s 0fc. for 3d. Jud. Dist. v.
Osborne, 557 US. 52, 72-75 (2009). Petitioner has not pointed this Court to any
authority which states speci?cally that a Petitioner has a property-based due process right
to exoneration or exoneration-based compensation. If anything, certain federal courts
have ruled there is no right to exoneration. See, United States v. Quinones, 3 13 F.3d
49, 62 (2d Cir. 2002) (?the continued Opportunity to exonerate the
natural course ofone?s life is not a right ?so rooted in the traditions and conscience ofour
people as to be ranked as fundamental?? (quoting Rochin v. California, 342 US. 165,
171-72 (1952)); Robert C. Butler v. Bill Haslam et al., No. 3:19-cv-00416, 2019 WL
2327523, at *8 (MD. Tenn. May 30, 2019) (?No constitutional right to exoneration
exists, and, under the procedure established by state statute and regulation, the governor
owes no particular process to an individual who seeks exoneration?).

Instead, due process concerns relative to post-conviction procedures require a
person to be given the opportunity to raise a claim at a meaningful time and in a
meaningful manner. Whitehead v. State, 402 615, 623 (Tenn. 2013). Mr. Alley
was given that opportunity, as he made two separate attempts to raise post-conviction

DNA claims before his execution. Petitioner?s due process-based claim is without merit.

6. Other Claims
The Court has reviewed all standing-based claims raised by Petitioner. To any

24

extent Petitioner has raised claims which are not addressed explicitly above, those
standing-based claims should be considered to have been reviewed by the Court and
found to be without merit.

The Court?s conclusion that Petitioner is without standing to bring this post-
conviction DNA claim?and that the Court is without subject matter jurisdiction to
consider it?renders the State?s assertions regarding the untimeliness ofthe petition and
res judicata moot. And because the Court concludes it is withoutjurisdiction to consider
Petitioner?s claims, the substantive issues raised by Petitioner (including the issue of

whether an order for DNA testing is proper in this case) are rendered moot as well.

V. Conclusion

This Court does not wish to minimize the Alley family?s sincerely-held beliefthat
Sedley Alley is innocent of the rape and murder of LCpl. Collins. However, this Court
concludes the post-conviction DNA testing statutes, the post-conviction statutes,
Supreme Court Rule 28, and relevant case law do not permit the estate of a deceased
inmate to file a petition seeking post?conviction DNA testing on the inmate?s behalf. The
Alley estate?s arguments are best addressed to the General Assembly and the Tennessee
Supreme Court (under its authority to amend Rule 28).

The estate of Sedley Alley does not have standing to bring the post-conviction
DNA claim presently before the Court. Because Petitioner has no standing, the Court
does not have subject matter jurisdiction to consider the petition. Accordingly, the

petition for DNA testing brought by the estate of Sedley Alley is DISMISSED. Costs of

these proceedings are taxed to the estate.

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ITIsso ORDERED thisthe 18 dayof WIN/embu ,2019.

mam

Paula Skahan, Judge
Criminal Court, Division 1.
30th Judicial District, at Memphis

Filed -
Heidi Ku ?8 
BY lerk

DOC



 

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