Case 9:19-cv-81179-RAR Document 33 Entered on FLSD Docket 11/19/2019 Page 1 of 6

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
CASE NO. 19-CIV-81179-RAR
ILLOOMINATE MEDIA, INC. and
LAURA LOOMER,
Plaintiffs,
v.
CAIR FOUNDATION and
JOHN DOES 1-5,
Defendants.
_______________________________/
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ JOINT MOTION TO DISMISS
THIS CAUSE comes before the Court on Defendants’ Joint Motion to Dismiss [ECF No.
11], filed on August 29, 2019. Defendant CAIR Foundation1 (“Defendant”) argues that Plaintiffs’
only remaining claim—tortious interference with a business relationship—fails as a matter of law.
On November 18, 2019, the Court heard argument from all parties (“Hearing”). For the reasons
stated on the record, and as explained herein, it is hereby
ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that Defendants’ Joint Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED.
BACKGROUND
On May 3, 2019, Plaintiffs Laura Loomer (“Loomer”) and Illoominate Media, Inc. filed an
Amended Complaint in the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit Court in and for Palm Beach County, Florida
against CAIR Florida, CAIR Foundation, Twitter, and John Does 1-5, alleging five counts: breach
of contract (Count I); tortious interference with an advantageous business relationship (Count II);

1

Although the Motion to Dismiss was filed by both CAIR Foundation and CAIR Florida, Inc., CAIR
Florida was dismissed as a party by this Court. See Order Denying Plaintiffs’ Motion to Remand [ECF No.
19]. Similarly, although Twitter, Inc. was originally a Defendant in this lawsuit, Plaintiffs voluntarily
dismissed their claims against Twitter prior to service, and Plaintiffs have no live counts against John Does
1-5. Accordingly, CAIR Foundation is the only remaining Defendant in this lawsuit.

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unlawful agreement in restraint of trade (Count III); civil conspiracy (Count IV); and violations of
Florida’s Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act (Count V). On August 22, 2019, CAIR
Foundation removed the case to the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida
on the basis of diversity jurisdiction. See Notice of Removal [ECF No. 1]. On August 23, 2019,
Plaintiffs moved to remand. See Motion to Remand [ECF No. 7]. On October 22, 2019, the Court
denied Plaintiffs’ Motion to Remand, finding Plaintiffs had failed to state a cause of action against
the non-diverse party, CAIR Florida, and dismissing all claims against CAIR Florida. As such,
the only remaining claim in this lawsuit is Count II for tortious interference of a business
relationship against CAIR Foundation.
LEGAL STANDARD
When reviewing a motion to dismiss, a court must view the complaint in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff and accept the plaintiff’s well-pleaded facts as true. Hunt v. Aimco
Properties, L.P., 814 F.3d 1213, 1221 (11th Cir. 2016). However, a court need not accept
plaintiff’s legal conclusions as true. Sinaltrainal v. Coca–Cola Co., 578 F.3d 1252, 1261 (11th
Cir. 2009); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Therefore, “[t]o survive a motion
to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to
relief that is plausible on its face.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (emphasis added) (quoting Bell Atlantic
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A pleading is facially plausible when the plaintiff
states enough facts for the court to draw a “reasonable inference” that the defendant is liable for
the alleged conduct. Id. The factual allegations must provide more than a “sheer possibility.” Id.
ANALYSIS
To state a valid claim for tortious interference of a business relationship under Florida law,
“the plaintiff must demonstrate (1) the existence of a business relationship under which the
plaintiff has legal rights; (2) an intentional and unjustified interference with the relationship; and
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(3) damage to the plaintiff as a result of the tortious interference with that relationship.” AdVantage Tel. Directory Consultants, Inc. v. GTE Directories Corp., 849 F.2d 1336, 1348–49 (11th
Cir. 1987).
To satisfy the first prong of a tortious interference claim, the plaintiff may allege “tortious
interference with present or prospective customers but no cause of action exists for tortious
interference with a business’s relationship to the community at large.” Ethan Allen, Inc. v.
Georgetown Manor, Inc., 647 So. 2d 812, 815 (Fla. 1994) (citation omitted). “As a general rule,
an action for tortious interference with a business relationship requires a business relationship
evidenced by an actual and identifiable understanding or agreement which in all probability would
have been completed if the defendant had not interfered.” Id. at 815. As such, “in order to establish
the tort of tortious interference with a business relationship, the plaintiff must prove a business
relationship with identifiable customers.” Ferguson Transp., Inc. v. N. Am. Van Lines, Inc., 687
So. 2d 821, 821 (Fla. 1996).
In Count II, Plaintiffs allege that Defendant tortiously interfered with an advantageous
business relationship by orchestrating the ban of Loomer’s Twitter account, thereby eliminating
her expected financial gains from the use of her Twitter handle. When pressed at the Hearing to
identify the nature of the business relationship at issue, Plaintiffs identified two relationships: (1)
Loomer’s business relationship with her Twitter followers, some of whom are potential donors to
her ventures and (2) Loomer’s business relationship with Twitter itself as a user of the platform.
However, as explained by the Court during the Hearing, neither of these relationships demonstrate
the existence of a business relationship under which Plaintiffs have a legal right. As such
Plaintiffs’ claim for tortious interference with a business relationship necessarily fails.
With respect to the relationship between Loomer and her Twitter followers, the Court finds
that Loomer has failed to establish an actual business relationship with identifiable customers. See
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Ferguson, 687 So. 2d at 821. As the Florida Supreme Court has made clear time and again, an
action for tortious interference with a business relationship does not lie where the business
relationship alleged is one with the “community at large” as opposed to one with identifiable
customers. See Ethan Allen, 647 So. 2d at 815; see also Ferguson, 687 So. 2d at 821. Here,
Plaintiffs fail to identify discernable customers and instead allege a business relationship with
Loomer’s Twitter community at large.
Specifically, Loomer contends that Defendant tortiously interfered with the business
relationship between Loomer and her Twitter followers by convincing Twitter to ban Loomer from
its platform. While the Court accepts all well-pleaded allegations as true, Loomer’s relationship
with her Twitter followers—no matter how economically beneficial such a relationship may have
been—is a relationship with the community at large, not with identifiable customers. See Coach
Servs., Inc. v. 777 Lucky Accessories, Inc., 752 F. Supp. 2d 1271, 1273 (S.D. Fla. 2010); See also
Hill Dermaceuticals, Inc. v. Anthem, Inc., 228 F. Supp. 3d 1292, 1301 (M.D. Fla. 2017). Given
that Loomer’s alleged business relationship with her followers does not sufficiently identify
customers, Plaintiffs fail to satisfy the first prong of a claim for tortious interference with a business
relationship.
Similarly, with respect to Loomer’s alleged business relationship with Twitter, Plaintiffs
have pleaded nothing to suggest Loomer and Twitter had a business relationship as “evidenced by
an actual and identifiable understanding or agreement which in all probability would have been
completed if the defendant had not interfered.” See Ethan Allen, 647 So. 2d at 815. For starters,
Count II of Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint is devoid of any allegations suggesting the existence
of a business relationship between Loomer and Twitter. Still, at the Hearing, Plaintiffs’ counsel
argued that Defendant interfered with Loomer’s right to use Twitter as a platform. However, when
pressed to identify the nature of the business relationship between Loomer and Twitter, and
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Plaintiffs’ corresponding legal rights pursuant to that relationship, Plaintiffs could not do so. Put
simply, no business relationship can be inferred merely from Loomer’s decision to use Twitter,
and Defendant cannot be found liable for tortious interference with a business relationship where
no business relationship has been established.
Moreover, even if Plaintiffs had established a business relationship between Loomer and
Twitter, Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act (“CDA”), 47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(1)-(2),
insulates internet providers, such as Twitter, from exactly the kind of liability Loomer now seeks
to impose upon Defendant. Under the CDA, Twitter cannot be held liable for its decision to
exercise traditional editorial functions, such as moderating content on its platform. Mezey v.
Twitter, Inc., No. 1:18-CV-21069-KMM, 2018 WL 5306769, at *2 (S.D. Fla. July 19, 2018). Here,
Plaintiffs seek to hold Defendant liable for just that.
At the Hearing, Plaintiffs’ counsel argued that by urging Twitter to ban Loomer, Defendant
had interfered in Loomer and Twitter’s business relationship. However, even accepting as true
Plaintiffs’ proposition that Defendant reported Loomer’s account and convinced Twitter to ban
Loomer, doing so does not create a cause of action for tortious interference with a business
relationship. Plaintiffs’ suggestion that the mere reporting of a Twitter user—however insistent
such reporting may be—is sufficient to constitute tortious interference in a business relationship
between Twitter and the targeted user is, to put it mildly, nonsensical. A cause of action for tortious
interference simply cannot exist each time an individual reports another Twitter user. And at the
Hearing, Plaintiffs’ counsel could not overcome this line-drawing problem. Put simply, Plaintiffs
cannot use a claim of tortious interference with a business relationship as an end-run around the
CDA’s explicit prohibition that Twitter cannot be held liable for its decision to moderate content
on its platform.

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In sum, Plaintiffs’ pleading fails to allege sufficient facts to satisfy the first prong of the
tortious interference requirement and also runs afoul of the CDA. As such, the Court must dismiss
Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons it is,
ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that Defendants’ Joint Motion to Dismiss [ECF No. 11]
is GRANTED. The above-styled action is DISMISSED.

DONE AND ORDERED in Fort Lauderdale, Florida, this 19th day of November, 2019.

_________________________________
RODOLFO RUIZ
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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