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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
JACKSONVILLE DIVISION
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
vs.

Case No.: 3:18-cr-89-J-34JRK

KATRINA BROWN
REGINALD BROWN
_______________________________
ORDER
THIS CAUSE is before the Court on Defendant Reginald Brown’s Motion for
Judgments of Acquittal or New Trial and Memorandum of Law (Doc. 284; Reginald Brown’s
Motion), filed on October 10, 2019; Defendant Katrina Brown’s Motion for Judgement [sic]
of Acquittal and Memorandum of Law (Amendment to Docket Number 290 submitted on
October 16, 2019) (Doc. 292; Katrina Brown’s Acquittal Motion), filed on October 17, 2019;
and Defendant Katrina Brown’s Motion for New Trial and Memorandum of Law
(Amendment to Docket Number 291 submitted on October 16, 2019) (Doc. 293; Katrina
Brown’s New Trial Motion) (collectively, Katrina Brown’s Motions), 1 filed on October 17,
2019. 2 The government filed an omnibus response to all three Motions on October 23,
2019. See United States’ Omnibus Memorandum Opposing Defendants’ Motions for
Judgment of Acquittal and for a New Trial (Doc. 294; Response). Without seeking leave
of Court, Katrina Brown filed a reply to the government’s Response. See Pro Se Defendant
Katrina Brown Memorandum in Response to the (294) Government Opposition to

1

The arguments raised in Katrina Brown’s Acquittal Motion are identical to those raised in
Katrina Brown’s New Trial Motion. For convenience, the Court will cite only to Katrina Brown’s New
Trial Motion.
2
Katrina Brown filed her original acquittal motion and new trial motion on October 16, 2019.
See Motion for Judgements [sic] of Acquittal and Memorzandum [sic] of Law (Doc. 290); Motion for
New Trial and Memorandum of Law (Doc. 291).
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Defendants’ Motions for Judgement [sic] of Acquittal and for a New Trial (Doc. 295; Reply),
filed on October 24, 2019. On October 25, 2019, the government moved to strike the
Reply, see United States’ Motion to Strike Defendant Katrina Brown’s Unauthorized Reply
in Support of her Motions for Judgment of Acquittal and for a New Trial (Doc. 296; Motion
to Strike), and Katrina Brown filed a response in opposition on November 4, 2019, see
Defendant Katrina Browns’ [sic] Memorandum in Response to United States’ Motion to
Stike [sic] Defendant Katrina Brown’s Unauthorized Reply in Support of Her Motions for
Judgement [sic] of Acquittal and for a New Trial (Doc. 299; Response to Motion to Strike). 3
I.

Background
Following a seven-day jury trial, on October 2, 2019, the jury returned verdicts

finding Katrina Brown guilty as to Counts One through Thirty-Seven of the Indictment (Doc.
1), see Katrina Brown Verdict Form (Doc. 280), and Reginald Brown guilty as to Counts
One through Twelve, Fourteen through Thirty-Three, and Thirty-Eight of the Indictment,
see Reginald Brown Verdict Form (Doc. 281). 4

Specifically, the Jury found both

Defendants guilty of conspiring to commit mail and wire fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. §
1349 (Count One); aiding and abetting mail fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341 and 2
(Counts Two through Fourteen as to Katrina Brown; Counts Two through Thirteen as to
Reginald Brown); aiding and abetting wire fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1343 and 2
(Counts Fifteen through Twenty-Seven); and aiding and abetting money laundering in

3

Katrina Brown did not seek leave of Court to file the Reply as is required by the Local
Rules, and the Court finds that a reply is not necessary. See Local Rule 3.01(c), United States
District Court, Middle District of Florida. In any event, much of the Reply is dedicated to challenging
the government’s request that Katrina Brown’s Motions be denied as untimely, which the Court
declines to do for the reasons set forth below.
4
The jury found Reginald Brown not guilty as to the charge in Count Thirteen of the
Indictment. See Reginald Brown Verdict Form at 13. Counts Thirty-Four through Thirty-Seven of
the Indictment charged only Katrina Brown. See Indictment at 50-56.
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violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1957 and 2 (Counts Twenty-Eight through Thirty-Three). The jury
also found Katrina Brown guilty of attempted bank fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1349
and 1344 (Counts Thirty-Four and Thirty-Five) and making false statements to a federally
insured financial institution in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1014 (Counts Thirty-Six and ThirtySeven). Finally, the jury found Reginald Brown guilty of failing to file a Form 1040 Tax
Return in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1014 (Count Thirty-Eight).
In short, the evidence at trial established the following. In 2011, Basic Products,
LLC and Cowealth, LLC obtained a $2,652,600 Small Business Administration (SBA) loan
from lender BizCapital BIDCO I, LLC. Katrina Brown served as a principal for Basic
Products and Cowealth, which were both associated with her father’s barbecue sauce
business, KJB Specialties, LLC. In connection with the SBA loan, KJB Specialties also
obtained a loan and grant from the City of Jacksonville, Florida (COJ). Notably, the release
of the COJ grant funds was contingent on Basic Products first spending at least 2.9 million
dollars, consisting of the SBA loan and COJ loan funds.
The general purpose of the SBA loan was to finance the purchase of inventory,
equipment, and a manufacturing facility for the barbecue sauce business, as well as to
provide working capital for the business. Because the SBA loan authorization specified
how the loan funds could be spent, BizCapital required Basic Products and Cowealth to
submit

invoices

documenting

their

expenditures

before

authorizing

any

loan

disbursements. In mid to late 2013, Katrina Brown developed a fraudulent scheme to
induce BizCapital to disburse the loan funds. Specifically, Katrina Brown created two
entities (A Plus Training and RB Packaging), for which Reginald Brown served as the
principal and opened bank accounts. Katrina Brown provided BizCapital, by email, with

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invoices from A Plus Training and RB Packaging for services that neither entity ever
performed and for products that neither entity ever sold. Relying on those fraudulent
invoices, BizCapital mailed checks in the amounts reflected in the invoices directly to A
Plus Training and RB Packaging. The checks were mailed to Reginald Brown’s home or
to that of his mother. Reginald Brown deposited checks into the A Plus Training and RB
Packaging bank accounts, and later withdrew a portion of the funds from the A Plus
Training and RB Packaging bank accounts, and transferred funds to Katrina Brown, who
then deposited the funds into the Basic Products bank account. Both Defendants retained
some of the funds for various purposes, including for personal use. After the requisite COJ
loan and SBA loan funds had been disbursed to Basic Products, based in part on the
fraudulent invoices that Katrina Brown sent to BizCapital, a COJ representative issued the
grant money by wiring $210,549.99 to BizCapital for the benefit of Cowealth and Basic
Products.
Additionally, in November 2015 and November 2016, after depleting the SBA loan
funds, Katrina Brown submitted altered bank statements from Basic Products and KJB
Specialties in an attempt to fraudulently obtain a merchant advance loan from a federally
insured financial institution. Id. at 50-56. Finally, Reginald Brown failed to file a 2014 tax
return. Id. at 56-57.
II.

Standards
A.

Judgment of Acquittal

Rule 29, Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure (Rule(s)), provides the Court with
authority, where appropriate, to enter a judgment of acquittal following a guilty verdict. Fed.
R. Crim. P. 29(c)(2). A motion for judgment of acquittal under Rule 29 “is a direct challenge

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to the sufficiency of the evidence presented against the defendant.” United States v.
Aibejeris, 28 F.3d 97, 98 (11th Cir. 1994); see also United States v. Ward, 197 F.3d 1076,
1079 (11th Cir. 1999) (“In considering a motion for the entry of judgment of acquittal under
[Rule 29(c)], a district court should apply the same standard used in reviewing the
sufficiency of the evidence to sustain a conviction.”). In ruling on such a motion, “a district
court must ‘determine whether, viewing all the evidence in the light most favorable to the
Government and drawing all reasonable inferences and credibility choices in favor of the
jury’s verdict, a reasonable trier of fact could find that the evidence established guilt beyond
a reasonable doubt.’” United States v. Grigsby, 111 F.3d 806, 833 (11th Cir. 1997) (quoting
United States v. O’Keefe, 825 F.2d 314, 319 (11th Cir. 1987)).
B.

New Trial

Rule 33(a) provides that, “[u]pon the defendant’s motion, the court may vacate any
judgment and grant a new trial if the interest of justice so requires.” 5 Although “motions for
a new trial are disfavored,” see United States v. Williams, 146 F. App’x 425, 434 (11th Cir.
2005), the “interest of justice” standard is broad, and the trial court is vested with substantial
discretion in determining whether to grant such a motion, see United States v. Vicaria, 12
F.3d 195, 198 (11th Cir. 1994); United States v. Martinez, 763 F.2d 1297, 1312 (11th Cir.
1985). Thus, the court considers “whether the verdict must be set aside in the interest of
justice.” United States v. Green, 275 F. App’x 898, 899 (11th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted); see also Hall, 854 F.2d at 1271 (concluding that the trial “court

5

As the Eleventh Circuit recognized, there are two grounds for granting a new trial under
Rule 33: “interest of justice” and newly discovered evidence. See United States v. Hall, 854 F.2d
1269, 1270 (11th Cir. 1988). In this case, the only ground potentially implicated in either
Defendants’ motion for new trial is the “interest of justice.”
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has very broad discretion in deciding whether there has been a miscarriage of justice”);
Vicaria, 12 F.3d at 198; Martinez, 763 F.2d at 1312.
When a defendant challenges the weight of the evidence in a motion for a new trial,
the court “need not view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict” and “[i]t
may weigh the evidence and consider the credibility of witnesses.” Martinez, 763 F.2d at
1312; see also Green, 275 F. App’x at 900. Yet, “‘[t]he court may not reweigh the evidence
and set aside the verdict simply because it feels some other result would be more
reasonable.’” Id. (quoting Martinez, 763 F.2d at 1312-13). Indeed, “[f]or a court to set
aside the verdict, ‘[t]he evidence must preponderate heavily against the verdict, such that
it would be a miscarriage of justice to let the verdict stand.’” Id. (quoting Martinez, 763 F.2d
at 1313). Motions for a new trial based on the weight of the evidence are to be granted
“‘sparingly and with caution,’ only in ‘exceptional cases.’” Id. (quoting Martinez, 763 F.2d
at 1313).
III.

Discussion
A.

Timeliness of Katrina Brown’s Motions

The Court first turns to the government’s argument that Katrina Brown’s Motions
are untimely because they were time-stamped after 4:30 p.m. on the day the motions
were due. See Response at 4. Upon consideration, the Court finds this argument
unavailing. Rule 45 sets forth the rules for “computing any time period specified in [the
Rules] . . . .” Fed. R. Crim. P. 45(a). To calculate a deadline when a period is “stated in
days or a longer unit of time,” as relevant here, Rule 45(a)(1) instructs as follows:
(A)
(B)

exclude the day of the event that triggers the period;
count every day, including intermediate Saturdays,
Sundays, and legal holidays; and

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(C)

include the last day of the period, but if the last day is a
Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday, the period continues
to run until the end of the next day that is not a Saturday,
Sunday, or legal holiday.

Id. In addition, Rule 45(a)(4) provides that, unless otherwise specified, the “last day ends:
(A) for electronic filing, at midnight in the court’s time zone; and (B) for filing by other
means, when the clerk’s office is scheduled to close.”
Rule 29 provides that “[a] defendant may move for a judgment of acquittal, or
renew such a motion, within 14 days after a guilty verdict or after the court discharges the
jury, whichever is later.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 29(c)(1). Here, the jury returned its verdicts on
October 2, 2019. As such, Katrina Brown’s motion for judgment of acquittal was due on
October 16, 2019. Because Katrina Brown is proceeding pro se and not authorized to file
electronically, 6 she was required “to file by other means, when the clerk’s office is
scheduled to close.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 45(a)(4)(B). Although the Clerk’s office closes its
doors at 4:00 p.m. (not 4:30, as the government suggests), litigants are permitted to file
documents by using the drop box outside of the Clerk’s office until the courthouse closes
at 5:30 p.m., which is exactly what Katrina Brown did when she filed her original motions
on October 16, 2019, at 5:19 p.m. Thus, based on these facts, the Court finds that Katrina
Brown’s Motions were timely filed.
B.

General Challenges to the Sufficiency of the Evidence

Next the Court addresses Defendants’ arguments that the Court erred in denying
their oral motions for judgment of acquittal during trial because there was insufficient

6

The Middle District of Florida’s Administrative Procedures for Electronic Filing
(Administrative Procedures) provide that “[a] pro se litigant . . . is not permitted to file electronically,
absent authorization by the Court. A pro se litigant must file all pleadings and documents in paper
format with the appropriate divisional Clerk’s Office.” See Administrative Procedures at 5, available
at www.flmd.uscourts.gov. The Court has not authorized Katrina Brown to file electronically.
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evidence for the jury to conclude that Defendants knowingly and willfully conspired to
commit mail and wire fraud, or that Defendants knowingly and willfully committed the
substantive counts of aiding and abetting mail fraud, wire fraud, and money laundering. 7
See Reginald Brown’s Motion at 1-2;

Katrina Brown’s New Trial Motion at 9-10.

Defendants also contend that the jury’s verdicts are contrary to the weight of the evidence.
See id. Upon consideration, the Court finds that Defendants’ challenges to the sufficiency
of the evidence are due to be rejected for the reasons the Court articulated during trial in
denying their oral motions for judgment of acquittal. Indeed, “viewing all the evidence in
the light most favorable to the [g]overnment and drawing all reasonable inferences and
credibility choices in favor of the jury’s verdict,” the Court finds that “a reasonable trier of
fact could find that the evidence established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” Grigsby,
111 F.3d at 833. Moreover, having considered the evidence adduced in this case as set
forth above, the Court cannot conclude that it preponderates heavily against the jury's
verdicts or that this case is one of those “really exceptional cases” where a new trial
should be granted based on the weight of the evidence. Martinez, 763 F.2d at 1313.
Accordingly, Defendants are not entitled to relief based on their generalized challenges
to the sufficiency of the evidence at trial.

7

Reginald Brown’s only specific challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence as to “the
substantive counts of mail [fraud], wire fraud and money laundering,” is his argument that “a number
of the checks which were endorsed and deposited do not bear Mr. Brown’s signature.” See
Reginald Brown’s Motion at 1-2. This argument is unavailing. As the Court stated in ruling on
Reginald Brown’s oral motion for judgment of acquittal during trial, the evidence established that
BizCapital mailed checks to Reginald Brown’s home or his mother’s home, the checks were
deposited into the A Plus Training and RB Packaging bank accounts, after which, in some cases,
funds were then withdrawn and deposited into the Basic Products’ account. The evidence also
reflected that Reginald Brown was the only signatory on the A Plus Training and RB Packaging
bank accounts. Thus, there was sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to convict Reginald Brown
of these charges, regardless of whether he endorsed every check mailed by BizCapital.
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C.

Denial of Pretrial Motions

Both Defendants also argue that the Court erred in denying their pretrial motions.
See Reginald Brown’s Motion at 2; Katrina Brown’s New Trial Motion at 9. However,
Defendants do not explain how the Court’s denial of these pretrial motions entitles them
to a new trial or judgment of acquittal. Nor do they point to any specific deficiency in the
Court’s prior rulings that would entitle them to such relief. As such, the Court declines to
grant a new trial or enter judgments of acquittal as to either Defendant on the basis of its
pretrial rulings.
D.

Evidence regarding the SBA Audit of BizCapital

Both Defendants contend that the Court erred in restricting the cross-examination
of Frank Palmisano and other BizCapital representatives concerning the SBA’s decision
to recover a portion of the loan proceeds from BizCapital. See Reginald Brown’s Motion
at 2; Katrina Brown’s New Trial Motion at 9. Katrina Brown also asserts that the Court
erred in excluding emails from November 7, 2018, through June 26, 2019, between the
SBA and BizCapital regarding the SBA’s audit of BizCapital in connection with the SBA
loan. See Katrina Brown’s New Trial Motion at 9. During trial, Defendants argued that
the SBA’s audit and, more specifically, its decision to recover a portion of the loan
proceeds from BizCapital was relevant to BizCapital’s credibility and to the materiality of
the fraudulent invoices that Katrina Brown sent to BizCapital. The Court prohibited
Defendants from asking BizCapital witnesses about the details of the SBA’s audit. In
doing so, the Court cited Eleventh Circuit authority instructing that materiality turns on the
objective reliability of the misrepresentation and not on any negligence of the victim. See
United States v. Svete, 556 F.3d 1157, 1165 (11th Cir. 2009) (“A perpetrator of fraud is

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no less guilty of fraud because his victim is also guilty of negligence.”); United States v.
Neder, 197 F.3d 1122, 1128 (11th Cir. 1999) (“Because the issue is whether a statement
has a tendency to influence or is capable of influencing a decision, and not whether the
statement exerted actual influence, a false statement can be material even if the decision
maker did not actually rely on the statement.”). The Court also noted that the SBA’s audit
and decision to recover loan proceeds from BizCapital occurred years after Katrina
Brown’s last fraudulent invoice to BizCapital. As such, the evidence was not relevant to
any of the issues the jury had to determine. Nevertheless, because the Court determined
that the SBA’s decision to demand that BizCapital repay a portion of the loan could be
relevant for credibility purposes, the Court permitted Defendants to ask BizCapital
witnesses if they were aware of the demand, and Reginald Brown argued the issue to the
jury. Thus, for the reasons articulated by the Court during trial, Defendants’ requests for
a new trial and judgments of acquittal are not warranted on this basis.
E.

The Forbearance Agreement

Similarly, Katrina Brown asserts that the Court erred in excluding a forbearance
agreement between BizCapital, Cowealth, and Basic Products. See Katrina Brown’s New
Trial Motion at 9. During trial, Katrina Brown argued that the forbearance agreement was
relevant to show that BizCapital improperly used $127,000 of the COJ grant funds to
repay the COJ loan. The Court permitted Katrina Brown to ask Mr. Palmisano whether
any portion of the COJ grant funds was used for that purpose. The Court also instructed
Katrina Brown that she could use the forbearance agreement to attempt to refresh Mr.
Palmisano’s recollection on that issue.

After doing so, Katrina Brown asked Mr.

Palmisano, over the government’s objection, whether he recalled BizCapital using a

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portion of the COJ grant funds, to which he responded, “Yes.” Katrina Brown never
attempted to introduce the document. Indeed, it appeared that Katrina Brown only wanted
the jury to hear that BizCapital had used a portion of the COJ grant funds, and she
accomplished this through her questioning of Mr. Palmisano. The Court also notes that
the relevancy of the forbearance agreement itself was questionable, as it occurred well
after the time period alleged in the Indictment. Accordingly, Katrina Brown’s Motions are
due to be denied on this basis.
F.

Reginald Brown’s Opening Statement

Next, Katrina Brown argues that Reginald Brown’s opening statement violated her
rights under the Confrontation Clause. See Katrina Brown’s New Trial Motion at 1-4. In
support of this argument, Katrina Brown relies on the following comments:
[A]s you probably figured out by now, Mr. Brown will give
up that valuable important right to remain silent and take the
stand in his own defense to these serious conspiracy charges
of mail, wire fraud, and money laundering.
And in the -- it may seem obvious to you already, and if
it doesn’t now, it will by the time the trial is completed, that he
should have been more suspicious.
Where is this money coming from? What’s it for?
But sadly for Mr. Brown, ladies and gentlemen, the
evidence will be it was not until late 2016 and late – early 2017,
after he learned that he too might be the target of this mass of
ongoing federal investigation by the federal authorities that he
starts asking questions of Ms. Brown about – about RB
Packaging.
...
In late 2016 and early 2017, he learns that he is also the
subject of this ongoing investigation, and he has the opportunity
for the first time to seriously question Katrina Brown about the
source of the money.

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It is after he learns that he might be implicated in this
allegation that he confronts Ms. Brown directly about those
allegations.
It is at this meeting he asked her, he tells [sic]: The FBI
is investigating me. What’s going on?
It’s at this meeting Katrina Brown admits tearfully that
she did it. She prepared the false invoices. She e-mailed the
lender. She oftentimes picked up the deliveries from his home.
Reginald Brown had no knowledge of the – that she
submitted false invoices to the lender.
...
Ladies and gentlemen, much of the evidence in this case will
come from Mr. Brown himself. And some of that testimony, as
you’ve already probably determined, is going to be pretty
embarrassing for him.
Jury Trial Transcripts (Excerpts from Opening and Closing Statements) (Doc. 288; Trial
Tr.) at 32-33, 37-39. Katrina Brown did not raise any objection during or immediately after
Reginald Brown’s opening statement.
Five days later, however, Katrina Brown moved for mistrial based on these
comments.

Similar to the arguments raised in the instant motions, Katrina Brown

maintained that Reginald Brown’s attorney was acting as a “third prosecutor.”8 The Court
denied the motion for mistrial, finding that it was untimely and without merit. Despite his
attorney’s statement that Reginald Brown would testify regarding Katrina Brown’s alleged

8

Katrina Brown asserts that she “openly objected to the Court that Attorney Thomas Bell
stipulated that his client Reginald Brown will testify that Katrina Brown confess guilt . . . .” Katrina
Brown’s New Trial Motion at 2. Contrary to this assertion, Katrina Brown never specifically objected
to Reginald Brown’s opening or closing statements on the basis of his attorney’s assertion that
Reginald Brown would testify at trial. Instead, during Reginald Brown’s closing argument she
objected on the following grounds: “First of all, he’s insinuating that I committed a crime; number
two, he’s insinuating that I use other people and he’s acting like the prosecutor.” Trial Tr. at 101.
Katrina Brown further argued that, because they were being tried jointly, Reginald Brown could not
insinuate that she had committed crimes. Id. The Court overruled the objection, determining that
any objection based on the opening statement was untimely, and Reginald Brown was free to take
the strategic position that his co-defendant was guilty but that he was not. Id.
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confession to him, he ultimately decided not to take the stand during trial. Based on these
events, Katrina Brown now argues that her Confrontation Clause rights were violated
when “Reginald Brown did not take the stand to testify to the confession his Attorney Mr.
Bell stated in the opening statement.” Katrina Brown’s New Trial Motion at 2. She further
contends that if Reginald Brown’s attorney had not stated that “Reginald Brown would
testify to a confession Katrina Brown made to him which his client did not take the stand
the results of this case proceeding would have been different.” Id. at 4.
The Court finds that Katrina Brown’s reliance on the Confrontation Clause is
misplaced. The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment provides a defendant in a
criminal trial the right “to be confronted with the witnesses against” her and to crossexamine them. U.S. Const. amend. VI. However, Reginald Brown’s attorney’s comments
during opening statement were not testimony, and the jury was instructed as much
multiple times. Indeed, it is well-settled “‘that juries are presumed to follow the instructions
of the Court.’” United States v. Kabbaby, 672 F.2d 857, 863 (11th Cir. 1982) (quoting
United States v. Vaughn, 546 F.2d 47, 51 (5th Cir. 1977)). See also United States v.
Shenberg, 89 F.3d 1461, 1472 (11th Cir. 1996) (“We presume that a jury follows the
court’s instructions.”). Nothing in the record suggests that Reginald Brown’s decision not
to testify rendered his opening statement so prejudicial so as to be incurable by the
Court’s repeated instruction that what the lawyers say is not evidence. Accordingly, the
Court finds that Katrina Brown is not entitled to a new trial or judgment of acquittal on the
basis of Reginald Brown’s opening statement.

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G.

Counts Thirty-Four through Thirty-Seven

Finally, Katrina Brown argues that there was insufficient evidence to support the
charges of attempted bank fraud (Counts Thirty-Four and Thirty-Five) and making false
statements to a financial institution (Counts Thirty-Six and Thirty-Seven). See Katrina
Brown’s New Trial Motion at 4-9. Specifically, Katrina Brown asserts that the government
failed to establish that Lendcore, Bizfi, and Credibly are federally insured financial
institutions, as required by the Court’s instructions to the jury. Id. This contention is
unavailing. It appears that Katrina Brown misunderstands what the government was
required to prove to convict her of attempted bank fraud and making false statements to
a federally insured financial institution.
To convict Katrina Brown of the attempted bank fraud charges, the government
had to prove the following facts beyond a reasonable doubt:
(1) the Defendant knowingly carried out or attempted to carry
out a scheme to defraud a financial institution to get money,
assets, or other property from a financial institution by using
false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises
about a material fact;
(2) the false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or
promises were material;
(3) the Defendant intended to defraud the financial institution;
(4) the financial institution was federally insured; and
(5) the Defendant’s intent was strongly corroborated by her
taking a substantial step toward committing the crime.
Court’s Instructions to the Jury (Doc. 279) at 23.

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To convict Katrina Brown of the making false statements to a federally insured
financial institution charges, the government had to prove the following facts beyond a
reasonable doubt:
(1) the Defendant made a false statement or report;
(2) the Defendant did so knowingly and with intent to influence
an action of the institution described in the indictment
regarding an application, advance, commitment, or loan, or a
change or extension to any of those; and
(3) the deposits of the institution were insured by the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation [(FDIC)].
Id. at 25.
At trial, the government introduced evidence that Katrina Brown emailed false bank
statements to representatives of Lendcore and BizFi in order to obtain merchant advance
loans on behalf of KJB Specialties and Basic Products. The evidence also established
that Lendcore and BizFi were brokers of merchant advance loans for Credibly, whose
loan funds originated from WebBank. Thus, the government was required to prove that
WebBank was federally insured, not that Lendcore, BizFi, or Credibly were federally
insured. The government established WebBank’s federally insured status through FDIC
employee Ian Kemp who testified that in 2015 and 2016, WebBank’s deposits were FDIC
insured. Importantly, the government was not required to prove that Katrina Brown knew
the lender was a federally insured bank. 9 See United States v. Key, 76 F.3d 350, 353
(11th Cir. 1996) (“Whether the defendant knew of the victim institution’s insured status is
not important. That the defendant knowingly directed [her] conduct at a bank that the

9

Similarly, contrary to the arguments raised by Katrina Brown, the government was not
required to prove that WebBank ever received the false bank statements or actually disbursed any
funds. See Court’s Instructions to the Jury at 23-25.
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 Case 3:18-cr-00089-MMH-JRK Document 305 Filed 11/25/19 Page 16 of 17 PageID 4398

government can prove was insured is enough.”). Moreover, “the focus of the scienter
inquiry is whether the defendant’s purpose was to influence the action of a federally
insured institution, rather than whether the defendant’s fraudulent representations were
made directly to a federally insured institution.” United States v. Jack, 216 F. App’x 840,
844 (11th Cir. 2007) (collecting cases). Applying these principles and considering the
evidence presented at trial, the Court concludes that the jury reasonably could have
inferred that Katrina Brown knew the fraudulent bank statements would influence a
federally insured institution engaged in lending activity. Accordingly, the Court finds that
Katrina Brown is not entitled to a new trial or judgment of acquittal.
Accordingly, it is
ORDERED:
1.

Defendant Reginald Brown’s Motion for Judgments of Acquittal or New Trial

and Memorandum of Law (Doc. 284) is DENIED.
2.

Defendant Katrina Brown’s Motion for Judgement [sic] of Acquittal and

Memorandum of Law (Amendment to Docket Number 290 submitted on October 16,
2019) (Doc. 292) is DENIED.
3.

Defendant Katrina Brown’s Motion for New Trial and Memorandum of Law

(Amendment to Docket Number 291 submitted on October 16, 2019) (Doc. 293) is
DENIED.
4.

The United States’ Motion to Strike Defendant Katrina Brown’s

Unauthorized Reply in Support of her Motions for Judgment of Acquittal and for a New
Trial (Doc. 296) is GRANTED.

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 Case 3:18-cr-00089-MMH-JRK Document 305 Filed 11/25/19 Page 17 of 17 PageID 4399

5.

Pro Se Defendant Katrina Brown Memorandum in Response to the (294)

Government Opposition to Defendants’ Motions for Judgement [sic] of Acquittal and for a
New Trial (Doc. 295) is STRICKEN.
DONE AND ORDERED at Jacksonville, Florida on November 25, 2019.

lc23
Copies to:
Pro Se Defendant
Counsel of Record

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