No. 64 

November 15, 2019 695
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF OREGON
STATE OF OREGON,
Respondent on Review,
v.
MARIO ARREOLA-BOTELLO,
Petitioner on Review.
(CC C151713CR) (CA A161566) (SC S066119)

En Banc
On review from the Court of Appeals.*
Argued and submitted March 4, 2019, at the Lewis &
Clark School of Law, Portland, Oregon.
Joshua B. Crowther, Deputy Public Defender, Office of
Public Defense Services, Salem, argued the cause and filed
the briefs for petitioner on review. Also on the briefs was
Ernest G. Lannet, Chief Defender.
David B. Thompson, Assistant Attorney General, Salem,
argued the cause and filed the brief for respondent on
review. Also on the brief were Ellen F. Rosenblum, Attorney
General, and Benjamin Gutman, Solicitor General.
Rosalind M. Lee, Eugene, filed the brief for amici curiae
Oregon Criminal Defense Lawyers Association and Oregon
Justice Resource Center.
NELSON, J.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed. The
judgment of the circuit court is reversed, and the case is
remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Garrett, J., dissented and filed an opinion, in which
Balmer, J., joined.
______________
 
*  On appeal from Washington County Circuit Court, D. Charles Bailey, Jr.,
Judge. 292 Or App 214, 418 P3d 785 (2018).

 696 

State v. Arreola-Botello

Case Summary: An officer stopped defendant for changing lanes and turning without a signal, and, during the stop, asked defendant questions about contraband and for consent to search the vehicle. Defendant consented, the officer
discovered drugs, and defendant was charged with possession of a controlled substance. Defendant moved to suppress the evidence, but the trial court declined to
do so, concluding that the officer’s inquiries had been permissible because they
occurred during an “unavoidable lull.” The Court of Appeals affirmed. Held: (1)
Article I, section 9, of the Oregon Constitution requires that all investigative
inquires during a traffic stop be reasonably related to the purpose of the stop or
have independent constitutional justification; (2) the officer’s inquiries were not
reasonably related to the purpose of the stop; and (3) defendant was therefore
unlawfully seized, and the trial court erred in not suppressing the evidence discovered during that unlawful seizure.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed. The judgment of the circuit
court is reversed, and the case is remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

 Cite as 365 Or 695 (2019) 697
 

NELSON, J.

 
In this criminal case, we consider the constitutionally permissible scope of a traffic stop under Article I, section 9, of the Oregon Constitution. Defendant was lawfully
stopped for failing to signal a turn and a lane change. During
the stop, while defendant was searching for his registration
and proof of insurance, the officer asked him about the presence of guns and drugs in the vehicle, and requested consent
to search the vehicle. Defendant consented, and during the
search, the officer located a controlled substance. Defendant
contends that the officer expanded the permissible scope
of the traffic stop when he asked about the contents of the
vehicle and requested permission to search it because those
inquiries were not related to the purpose of the stop. For the
reasons that follow, we agree with defendant that the trial
court erred in denying defendant’s motion to suppress, and
we reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals.
 
In reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress evidence, we are bound by the trial court’s factual findings to
the extent that those findings are supported by evidence in
the record. State v. Stevens, 311 Or 119, 126, 806 P2d 92
(1991). Additionally, “if the trial court does not make findings on all pertinent historical facts and there is evidence
from which those facts could be decided more than one way,
we will presume that the trial court found facts in a manner
consistent with its ultimate conclusion.” Id. at 127. We state
the following facts in accordance with that standard.
 
Officer Faulkner of the Beaverton Police Department
observed defendant’s vehicle change lanes and turn without signaling. Faulkner initiated his patrol car’s overhead
lights, and defendant pulled over. Faulkner approached
defendant’s vehicle and requested his driver’s license, registration, and proof of insurance. Defendant was able to
immediately produce his license but spent about three to
four additional minutes searching for his registration and
proof of insurance.
 
While defendant was searching, Faulkner asked
him questions. Defendant, who primarily speaks Spanish,
was having difficulty understanding the questions in
English. At the beginning of the traffic stop, a passenger

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State v. Arreola-Botello

in the vehicle helped interpret Faulkner’s questions, but
she left after Faulkner told her that she was free to do so.
Faulkner asked defendant about the presence of weapons,
drugs, or other illegal items in the vehicle and requested
consent to search the vehicle. Defendant responded, “Sure,
okay,” and consented to the search.1 During the search,
Faulkner located a small package on the floor between the
driver’s seat and the door. Faulkner examined the package,
found it to be consistent with drug packaging, and observed
a substance in the package that he believed was methamphetamine. Faulkner placed defendant under arrest.
 
The state charged defendant with possession of
methamphetamine, ORS 475.894. Before trial, defendant
moved to suppress the evidence obtained during the traffic
stop, arguing that Faulkner had violated his constitutional
rights by unlawfully expanding the scope of the lawful traffic stop into matters unrelated to the purpose of the stop,
such as whether defendant possessed drugs. Faulkner testified that his questioning had been a routine inquiry, “[a]ll
the same spiel every time.” He stated,
“Every time I walk up, I ask him, I [say], ‘hey, Officer
Faulkner, Beaverton Police Department,’ do my contact
with them. ‘Do you have anything illegal in the car? Would
you consent to a search for guns, drugs, knives, bombs, illegal documents, or anything else that you’re not allowed to
possess?’ ”

Defendant maintained that Faulkner’s questioning went
beyond the lawful the scope of the traffic stop. The trial
court disagreed and concluded that Faulkner had asked
the unrelated questions during an “unavoidable lull,”2 and
 The record from the suppression hearing is unclear about whether that
line of questioning occurred before or after the translating passenger left the
scene, but, during the later bench trial, Faulkner testified that the passenger had
already left before defendant had authorized consent to search. No issue is raised
on review concerning defendant’s understanding of Faulkner’s request.
 2
  As explained below, the Court of Appeals has held that, during an “unavoidable lull,” an officer may ask unrelated questions during a traffic stop if those
questions do not extend the duration of the stop. See State v. Nims, 248 Or App
708, 713, 274 P3d 235 (2012) (so stating); see also State v. Gomes, 236 Or App
364, 372, 236 P3d 841 (2010) (concluding that an officer’s unrelated inquiries did
not violate constitutional protections because they occurred simultaneously with
activities related to the traffic stop and did not extend its duration). This court
has not previously addressed that line of reasoning.
 1

 Cite as 365 Or 695 (2019) 699
that defendant had voluntarily consented to the search of
the vehicle. Thus, the trial court denied defendant’s motion
to suppress. Defendant waived his right to a jury trial, and
the trial court convicted defendant of unlawful possession of
methamphetamine.
 
Defendant appealed, assigning error to the denial of
his motion to suppress. At the Court of Appeals, defendant
argued that Faulkner had unlawfully expanded the scope of
the traffic stop by asking investigatory questions that were
unrelated to the purpose of the stop without independent
constitutional justification. The state responded that Court
of Appeals case law authorizes an officer to request consent
to search a vehicle during an “unavoidable lull” in an investigation, such as when a person is searching for requested
documents. The Court of Appeals agreed with the state and
affirmed defendant’s conviction in a per curiam decision. See
State v. Arreola-Botello, 292 Or App 214, 418 P3d 785 (2018)
(per curiam) (citing State v. Hampton, 247 Or App 147, 268
P3d 711 (2011), which held that questioning about consent
to search a vehicle while the driver was searching for registration occurred during an “unavoidable lull” and, thus, did
not extend the traffic stop in violation of Article I, section 9,
protections against unreasonable seizure).
 
Defendant petitioned for, and we allowed, review. In
this court, defendant renews his argument that Faulkner
violated his Article I, section 9, rights when Faulkner asked
him questions about drugs and weapons, and requested
consent to search his vehicle, because those inquiries were
unrelated to the purpose of the stop. Defendant proposes
that officer questions or requests for consent to search that
expand either the duration or the subject-matter scope of
the traffic stop are not reasonably related to the purpose of
the stop, and are thus impermissible under Article I, section
9, unless the officer has independent constitutional justification for making such inquiries. Accordingly, defendant
argues that, in this case, Faulkner’s questions exceeded the
scope limitations inherent within Article I, section 9—that
is, the questions were not reasonably related to the investigation of defendant’s failure to signal—and also were not
supported by any independent constitutional justification.
According to defendant, when that questioning exceeded

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State v. Arreola-Botello

the lawful scope of the stop, the stop became an unlawful
seizure.
 
In response, the state contends that questions that
are unrelated to the purpose of a stop do not implicate
Article I, section 9, unless the questioning extends the duration of the stop. The state maintains that defendant’s proposed rule is too rigid and prohibits an officer from making
any unrelated inquiry without constitutional justification.
The state argues that, as the Court of Appeals has held,
additional questioning is permissible during an “unavoidable lull” in an investigation of the traffic violation, such
as when the driver is searching for requested documents.
Further, the state argues that, when an officer asks questions and requests consent to search a vehicle, it does not
amount to a constitutional violation because neither action
imposes any additional restraint on a motorist’s liberty or
freedom of movement beyond what is already in place by
virtue of the traffic stop itself.
 
In addressing the party’s arguments, we first reiterate that there are both statutory and constitutional limitations on an officer’s authority to investigate unrelated crimes
during a traffic stop. For example, ORS 810.410 governs an
officer’s ability to conduct an investigation during a traffic
stop for a traffic violation, and, under that statute, officers
are permitted to make additional, unrelated inquiries only
in specific circumstances. See ORS 810.410(3)(c) (An officer
“[m]ay make an inquiry into circumstances arising during
the course of a detention and investigation * * * that give
rise to a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.”); ORS
810.410(3)(e) (When circumstances give rise to reasonable
suspicion of criminal activity, an officer “[m]ay request consent to search in relation to [those] circumstances.”).
 
Notwithstanding that statute, however, any evidence obtained when an officer exceeds that authority
cannot be suppressed unless the exclusion of the evidence
is required by the state or federal constitutions. See ORS
136.432(1) (so stating); State v. Rodgers/Kirkeby, 347 Or 610,
620-21, 227 P3d 695 (2010) (discussing ORS 136.432(1)).
Since ORS 136.432 was enacted, defendants seeking to
exclude evidence have, as defendant does here, asserted

 Cite as 365 Or 695 (2019) 701
constitutional arguments in support of their motions to
suppress. See State v. Watson, 353 Or 768, 778, 305 P3d 94
(2013) (so stating). Thus, we turn now to the parties’ constitutional arguments.
 
Article I, section 9, establishes “the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable search, or seizure.” For purposes of
Article I, section 9, a seizure occurs when (1) a police officer
intentionally and significantly interferes with an individual’s liberty or freedom of movement; or (2) a reasonable person, under the totality of the circumstances, would believe
that his or her liberty or freedom of movement has been
significantly restricted. State v. Ashbaugh, 349 Or 297, 316,
244 P3d 360 (2010). In those circumstances, Article I, section 9, protects a person’s liberty or freedom of movement by
defining the authority of law enforcement officers in their
encounters with citizens.
 
However, not all encounters between law enforcement officers and citizens implicate Article I, section 9. This
court has previously identified three general types of policecitizen encounters and has categorized them according to
the requirements for their initiation by law enforcement.
See, e.g., Watson, 353 Or at 774 (setting out three categories
of police-citizen encounters); State v. Holmes, 311 Or 400,
407, 813 P2d 28 (1991) (same). One type of encounter is a
“mere conversation,” or a “non-coercive encounter,” and it
does not involve any restraint on the liberty of an individual or his or her freedom of movement, and is not a seizure
under Article I, section 9. Rodgers/Kirkeby, 347 Or at 621.
On the other end of the spectrum, an arrest is recognized as
a “seizure” under Article I, section 9, and requires probable
cause. Id. This case involves a traffic stop, which falls somewhere in between: This court has recognized that, when a
motorist is stopped for a traffic infraction, that stop implicates Article I, section 9, because:
“[I]n contrast to a person on the street, who may unilaterally end an officer-citizen encounter at any time, the
reality is that a motorist stopped for a traffic infraction is
legally obligated to stop at an officer’s direction * * * and
to interact with the officer, * * * and therefore is not free

 702 

State v. Arreola-Botello

unilaterally to end the encounter and leave whenever he or
she chooses.”

Id. at 622-23.
 
This court has explained, in various circumstances,
the limits that Article I, section 9, places on investigatory
activities during a traffic stop. For example, in Rodgers/
Kirkeby, we considered what constitutional limitations, if
any, applied to an officer’s ability to ask questions unrelated
to the purpose of the traffic stop at the end of that stop,
rather than issuing a citation or releasing the individual
being questioned. In that case, the state argued that this
court had already rejected the notion that an officer may
never ask questions unrelated to the stop itself. Id. at 618.
The state proposed that, as a rule, police questioning that is
unrelated to a traffic stop, or a request for consent to search
during a lawful traffic stop, does not constitute an unconstitutional seizure if that questioning creates only a de minimis delay during an otherwise lawful stop. Id. We disagreed,
and we held that “police authority to detain that motorist
dissipates when the investigation reasonably related to that
traffic infraction, the identification of persons, and the issuance of a citation (if any) is completed or reasonably should
have been completed.” Id. at 623.
 
In reaching that conclusion, this court agreed with
the state that an officer’s verbal inquiries are not searches
or seizures in and of themselves. Id. at 622. We determined,
however, that the show of authority that is inherent in a
traffic stop, combined with an officer’s verbal inquiries,
resulted in a restriction of a personal freedom that, absent
reasonable suspicion, violated Article I, section 9. Id. at
627-28. Although we limited our analysis to the facts present in that case, we noted that “[p]olice conduct during a
noncriminal traffic stop does not further implicate Article I,
section 9, so long as the detention is limited and the police
conduct is reasonably related to the investigation of the noncriminal traffic violation.” Id. at 624 (emphases added).
 In Watson, this court considered the authority of an
officer to perform unrelated investigatory activities during
a traffic stop. 353 Or at 769. In that case, the defendant

 Cite as 365 Or 695 (2019) 703
was stopped for failing to maintain a lane of traffic, and
the officer requested his driver’s license to verify his driving
privileges and to run a warrants check. Id. at 769-70. While
waiting for the results of the records check, the officer asked
the defendant about community rumors that the defendant
was dealing small amounts of marijuana and requested consent to search his vehicle. Id. at 770. The defendant denied
the allegations and refused to consent to a search. Id. At
that point, another officer arrived and reported a “strong
odor” of what he believed to be marijuana emanating from
the defendant’s vehicle. Id. at 770-71. Ultimately, the officers
searched the vehicle based on probable cause, located drugs,
and arrested the defendant. The defendant moved to suppress the evidence, the trial court denied his motion, and he
was convicted. Id. at 771-72.
 
On review, the defendant argued that an officer’s
authority to search should be strictly limited to the investigation of the initial traffic violation. 353 Or at 772. This
court analyzed each individual police action—the initial
stop, the records check, the warrants check, the questioning, and the ultimate search of the vehicle—to determine
whether the officers’ actions had exceeded the scope of their
constitutional authority. Id. at 783-84. Considering each
action individually, we concluded that each action had been
reasonably related to the investigation of the traffic stop
itself, had not led to the discovery of suppressible evidence,
had not extended the stop, or had been justified by an independent constitutional justification (in that case, probable
cause). Id. at 783-85. In reaching that conclusion, we held
that, under Article I, section 9, investigatory activities must
be reasonably related to the purpose of the traffic stop:
  “Thus, both Oregon statutes and this court’s Article I,
section 9, case law require that law enforcement officers
have a justification for temporarily seizing or stopping a
person to conduct an investigation, and that the officer’s
activities be reasonably related to that investigation and
reasonably necessary to effectuate it. If the officer’s activities exceed those limits, then there must be an independent
constitutional justification for those activities.”

Id. at 781.

 704 

State v. Arreola-Botello

 
The holding in Watson was subsequently applied in
this court’s next case that considered the limits on police
authority during a traffic investigation, State v. Jimenez,
357 Or 417, 353 P3d 1227 (2015). In Jimenez, we considered whether Article I, section 9, permits a routine weapons
inquiry during every traffic stop. Id. at 419. We concluded
that a routine weapons inquiry, absent a showing of reasonable, circumstance-specific concerns for officer safety, fell
outside the permissible scope of Article I, section 9. Id. In
that case, the record did not support a finding that the officer had reasonable, circumstance-specific safety concerns
because the officer had waited until he had completed his
investigation of the traffic offense before inquiring about
weapons. Id. at 430.
 
We again considered the permissible scope of
Article I, section 9, in relation to a weapons inquiry, in State
v. Miller, 363 Or 374, 376, 422 P3d 240 (2018). Although in
Miller we ultimately concluded that the officer had a reasonable safety concern under the specific circumstances
(and, thus, that the weapons inquiry had been justified), we
specifically discussed the constitutional significance of additional verbal inquiries during the course of a traffic stop:
  “Although an officer’s verbal inquiries ‘are not searches
and seizures and thus by themselves ordinarily do not implicate Article I, section 9,’ when a person is already stopped,
the person ‘is not free unilaterally to end the encounter and
leave whenever he or she chooses,’ so questions that are not
reasonably related to the purpose of the stop extend the
stop in a way that requires some independent justification
under Article I, section 9.”

353 Or at 380 n 4 (quoting Rodgers/Kirkeby, 347 Or at
622-23).
 
The foregoing cases significantly inform the nature
of the question before us. As the state recognizes, those cases
stand for the proposition there are temporal limitations on
an officer’s authority in making a stop; therefore, inquiries
that unreasonably extend the duration of a stop violate
Article I, section 9. However, as we will explain, those cases
also stand for the proposition that an officer’s investigative
activities during a stop must be reasonably related to the

 Cite as 365 Or 695 (2019) 705
purpose of the stop or have independent constitutional justification. Accordingly, the narrow question that those cases
leave open is whether an officer’s investigative inquiries
during a traffic stop also must be reasonably related to the
purpose of that stop. Before further discussing those cases
and turning to that question, we briefly address the Court
of Appeals’ “unavoidable lull” doctrine.
 
The Court of Appeals first articulated its “unavoidable lull” doctrine in its own consideration of State v. Rodgers,
219 Or App 366, 182 P3d 209 (2008), aff’d, 347 Or 610, 227
P3d 695 (2010) (Rodgers/Kirkeby). As previously discussed,
that case considered the constitutional question whether, at
the end of a stop after the defendant was free to leave, an
officer may extend the duration of the stop by asking additional questions that were unrelated to the purpose of the
stop. The Court of Appeals concluded that “an officer is free
to question a motorist about matters unrelated to the traffic infraction during an unavoidable lull in the investigation, such as while awaiting the results of a records check.”
Id. at 372. Stated another way, under the unavoidable-lull
doctrine, so long as the officer does not delay the processing
of a citation or extend the duration of the traffic stop, the
officer is permitted to ask unrelated investigatory questions
without constitutional justification. Ultimately, the Court
of Appeals concluded that the doctrine did not apply in
Rodgers because the officer had extended the duration of the
stop when he began making additional inquiries. Id. at 373.
When this court considered Rodgers on review, we affirmed
the Court of Appeals’ disposition, but we did not address
the propriety of the unavoidable-lull doctrine because we
also concluded that the officer had unlawfully extended the
duration of the traffic stop. Rodgers/Kirkeby, 347 Or at 627.
 
In a later case, the Court of Appeals concluded that
the unavoidable-lull doctrine did apply, holding that the officer’s inquiries in that case did not implicate Article I, section
9, because the questioning had not unreasonably extended
the duration of the traffic stop. State v. Gomes, 236 Or App
364, 372, 236 P3d 841 (2010). In Gomes, the Court of Appeals
read our decision in Rodgers/Kirkeby as holding that the
Oregon Constitution recognized only a temporal limitation

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State v. Arreola-Botello

on an officer’s ability to ask questions unrelated to the purpose of the stop. Id. at 371 (“We take that language to confirm our Rodgers opinion and our opinion in State v. Amaya,
176 Or App 35, 29 P3d 1177 (2001), aff’d on other grounds,
336 Or 616, 89 P3d 1163 (2004), that there are no Article I,
section 9, implications if an inquiry unrelated to the traffic
stop occurs during a routine stop but does not delay it.”).
 
We agree with the Court of Appeals that, when an
officer’s questioning extends the reasonable duration of a
traffic stop, Article  I, section 9, requires independent constitutional justification. We disagree, however, with the suggestion in Gomes that Rodgers/Kirkeby confirmed that there
is no subject-matter limitation on the permissible scope of
police inquiries during a traffic stop under Article  I, section 9. Rather, this court in Rodgers/Kirkeby expressly chose
not to address that issue: “We express no opinion about the
effect of unrelated police inquires that occur during the
course of the traffic violation investigation and that do not
result in any further restriction of movement of the individual.” 347 Or at 627 n 5.
 
Here, the state argues that our decision in Watson,
decided after Rodgers/Kirkeby, confirms that Article I, section
9, imposes only temporal limitations on when an officer who
makes a lawful stop may ask unrelated investigatory questions. In support, the state focuses on two conclusions that we
reached in Watson: First, that the records check in Watson,
which had been conducted with the purpose of verifying the
defendant’s driving privileges, was constitutional, and, second, that the warrants check in Watson, which had been run
simultaneously with the records check, did not render the
defendant’s detention unconstitutional. The state acknowledges that, in evaluating the constitutionality of the records
check in Watson, this court expressly considered whether it
had been reasonably related to the officer’s investigation of the
traffic infraction. That is, we considered whether the records
check had been reasonably related to the officer’s investigation of the traffic infraction before turning to the independent
and separate question whether the records check unreasonably extended the duration of the stop. See Watson, 353 Or at
782 (“Because [the officer] conducted the records check with
the purpose of verifying defendant’s driving privileges, [the

 Cite as 365 Or 695 (2019) 707
officer]’s detention of defendant to conduct that check did not
violate Article I, section 9, unless the detention was unreasonably lengthy.”). The state contends, however, that the holding of Watson is captured in how this court addressed the
warrants check: declining to address whether the warrants
check had been reasonably related to the traffic stop because,
in part, that check did not extend the length of the stop. The
state argues that, when this court did not address whether
the warrants check had been reasonably related to the traffic
stop, we necessarily concluded that unrelated investigatory
activities do not implicate Article I, section 9, if they are conducted during activities related to the stop and do not extend
the stop.
 
We disagree. Contrary to the state’s argument, in
Watson, this court determined that it had no need to resolve
the question whether the warrants check had been reasonably related to the stop because that check had not produced suppressible evidence and had not extended the stop.
Watson, 353 Or at 784. If, in Watson, the warrants check—
which had been run simultaneously with the records check
and therefore did not extend the duration of the stop—had
led to evidence that the defendant sought to suppress, we
would have been required to decide whether the warrants
check had been reasonably related to the stop. And, if the
warrants check had extended the stop, that alone would
have required a determination that the check exceeded the
permissible scope of the stop. But, as noted, we determined
that the warrants check had not produced suppressible evidence and had not extended the stop. We therefore declined
to reach the question whether the warrants check was reasonably related to the stop.3 As we stated in Watson: When
conducting an investigation during a lawful stop, “activities” of law enforcement must “be reasonably related to that
investigation and reasonably necessary to effectuate it.”
Id. at 781 (emphasis added).
 
We did, however, leave open in Watson the issue
that this case presents—whether the principle that we
  Here, Faulkner did not perform a warrants check. Therefore, the question
whether a warrants check is, or can be, reasonably related to the purpose of a
traffic stop, is not before us.
 3

 708 

State v. Arreola-Botello

announced in Watson “extends to inquiries during the course
of a stop.” Id. at 779 n 13 (emphasis added). In other words,
Watson held that Article I, section 9, imposes both subjectmatter and durational limits on an officer’s ability to conduct unrelated investigative activities during a traffic stop;
the question expressly left open was whether an officer’s
investigative inquiries also are subject to subject-matter as
well as durational limitations.4 The facts here require us to
address that question, and it is to that question that we now
turn.
 
As stated, Article I, section 9, governs a broad spectrum of law enforcement conduct, and, as this court has
recognized, the degree to which law enforcement conduct
intrudes on an individual’s interest in personal security
varies depending on the circumstances. See State v. Fair,
353 Or 588, 600, 302 P3d 417 (2013) (“The degree to which
law enforcement conduct intrudes on a citizen’s protected
interest in privacy and liberty is significantly affected by
where the conduct occurs, such as in the home, in an automobile, or on a public street.”). Not every intrusion on an
individual’s interest in personal security is unconstitutional;
Article I, section 9, prohibits only “arbitrary, oppressive,
or otherwise ‘unreasonable’ ” intrusions on those interests.
State v. Barnthouse, 360 Or 403, 413, 380 P3d 952 (2016).
Thus, some law enforcement conduct constitutes such minimal intrusion on an individual’s interests that the conduct
is not unreasonable under Article I, section 9. See Holmes,
311 Or at 407 (a police-citizen encounter involving “mere
conversation, a non-coercive encounter” does not require
  The dissent views our cases differently, understanding them to hold only
that police activity that is reasonably related to the purpose of a traffic stop and
reasonably necessary to effectuate it “does not result in an extension of the stop
beyond the time reasonably necessary to conclude it.” 365 Or at 718 (Garrett,
J., dissenting). That view of our cases is incorrect. First, that is not what we
said in those cases. Second, in Watson, we independently considered two different questions when determining whether the officer’s activities exceeded the
scope of the stop—first considering the subject matter of the records check and
then considering its duration. See Watson, 353 Or at 782-83. We did so because
even an investigative activity that is reasonably related to the purpose of a stop
may violate Article I, section 9, if it is unreasonably lengthy. Third, in Watson,
the warrants check did not extend the stop beyond the time necessary to conduct the records check. We did not uphold the warrants check on that basis; we
upheld it on the basis that the check had not produced suppressible evidence.
Id. at 784.
 4

 Cite as 365 Or 695 (2019) 709
constitutional justification). On the other hand, some law
enforcement activity rises to the level of a search or a seizure, which constitutes a more substantial intrusion on an
individual’s personal security interest.
 
Generally, an officer cannot seize an individual
without probable cause to believe that that individual has
engaged or is engaging in criminal activity, and obtaining
a warrant permitting the seizure. There are exceptions,
however, to both the warrant requirement and the probable
cause requirement for seizures that are limited in scope and
duration. See State v. Cloman, 254 Or 1, 6, 456 P2d 67 (1969)
(police can stop a car to determine identity of vehicle and
its occupants based on reasonable suspicion, and reasonable suspicion is “of less quantum” than probable cause to
arrest). In Cloman, this court stated that “there is nothing
ipso facto unconstitutional in the brief detention of citizens
under circumstances not justifying an arrest, for purposes
of limited inquiry in the course of routine police investigations.” 254 Or at 7. The Oregon Legislative Assembly codified that decision in statutes regulating the authority of
law enforcement to stop individuals. See ORS 131.605 to
131.625. Relevant to this case, as part of the enactment
intended to codify Cloman, the legislature specified in ORS
131.615 that an officer “who reasonably suspects that a person has committed or is about to commit a crime may stop
the person and * * * make a reasonable inquiry.” See also
State v. Valdez, 277 Or 621, 624, 561 P2d 1006 (1977) (discussing statute). Additionally, ORS 131.615(2) specifies that
such a stop shall last no longer than a reasonable time, and
ORS 131.615(3)(a) further provides that “[t]he inquiry shall
be considered reasonable only if limited to * * * [t]he immediate circumstances that aroused the officer’s suspicion.” Brief
stops to investigate whether an individual has committed
a traffic infraction are of that nature. See ORS 810.410
(2)(a)-(b) (so stating).5 Article I, section 9, permits brief traffic stops to investigate unlawful, noncriminal activity when
the stops are of limited scope. See Rodgers/Kirkeby, 347 Or
  Whether the statutory requirement that an officer have probable cause to
believe that a person has committed a traffic offense to justify a traffic stop is
also a requirement under Article I, section 9, is a question that this court has
reserved. State v. Matthews, 320 Or 398, 402 n 2, 884 P2d 1224 (1994).
 5

 710 

State v. Arreola-Botello

at 623 (“Police authority to perform a traffic stop arises
out of the facts that created probable cause to believe that
there has been unlawful, noncriminal activity, viz., a traffic
infraction.”).
 
Whether an officer is investigating criminal or unlawful noncriminal activity, the officer’s authority to stop an
individual—based on reasonable suspicion of criminal activity or on probable cause of unlawful noncriminal activity—
is founded on the assumption that temporary, investigative
stops to investigate particular conduct are permitted for
that particular purpose only.6 It therefore follows that limits
apply to an officer’s ability, during such a stop, to use that
stop for other purposes. As we explained in Watson, it is “the
justification for the stop” that “delineates the lawful bounds
of the traffic stop.” 353 Or at 778-79.
 
Here, the state argues that we should conclude that
defendant’s Article  I, section 9, rights were not violated
because Faulkner’s request for consent to search defendant’s
vehicle did not impose any restraint beyond the stop itself.
To support that argument, the state makes two points. First,
the state contends that the right to be free from unlawful
seizure is a right that protects only the freedom of movement. Article I, section 9, protects at least the right to move
freely, and we agree that our test to determine when a seizure has occurred is based on the degree to which an officer
has interfered with an individual’s freedom of movement.
For example, in Rodgers/Kirkeby, we stated that a person is
seized when an officer “intentionally and significantly interferes with the person’s freedom of movement.” 347 Or at 621.
However, the question here is not whether defendant was
seized—he was. The question, rather, is whether the officer
who seized defendant was limited by Article I, section 9, in
the inquiries he could make during that seizure.
 
Second, the state contends that, because an officer’s
request for consent to search during a consensual policecitizen encounter does not restrict a defendant’s liberty
and constitute a search or seizure, a request for consent to
  When an officer stops an individual based on probable cause of a traffic violation, an officer may issue a citation for that traffic violation but may not arrest
an individual for the violation. ORS 810.410(2)-(3)(a).
 6

 Cite as 365 Or 695 (2019) 711
search during a seizure has no significance under Article I,
section 9. We agree that a request for consent to search is
not, by itself, a search or a seizure. See State v. Highley, 354
Or 459, 461, 313 P3d 1068 (2013) (so stating). However, we
disagree that, when a request for consent to search is made
during a lawful seizure, that request is not of constitutional
significance. In Watson, the question whether the warrants
check was reasonably related to the traffic investigation was
of constitutional significance even though that check itself
did not impose an independent restraint on the defendant’s
liberty. 353 Or at 788-84. And we explained the reason for
the significance of an officer’s verbal inquiries in Miller:
  “Although an officer’s verbal inquiries ‘are not searches
and seizures and thus by themselves ordinarily do not implicate Article I, section 9,’ when a person is already stopped,
the person ‘is not free unilaterally to end the encounter and
leave whenever he or she chooses,’ so questions that are not
reasonably related to the purpose of the stop extend the
stop in a way that requires some independent justification
under Article I, section 9.”

363 Or at 380 n 4 (quoting Rodgers/Kirkeby, 347 Or at
622-23).
 
As our cases demonstrate, Article I, section 9, limits
not only when a stop may be made, but also the purpose for
which it is conducted. A stop that is reasonable for a limited investigatory purpose is not necessarily reasonable for
all purposes, and we see no reason to distinguish between
the activities that law enforcement officers conduct during
such a stop and the questions that they ask; both must be
reasonably related to the purpose that permits the officer to
stop an individual in the first place. If we were to hold otherwise, then an officer who lacks a warrant, probable cause, or
even reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, could stop an
individual for a minor traffic offense, and, during that stop,
conduct a criminal investigation anyway, making meaningless the rule which requires an officer to have reasonable
suspicion before stopping an individual to conduct a criminal investigation. Thus, when determining whether a stop
that was reasonable at the outset has become unreasonable,
we must consider the totality of its circumstances, not only
its duration.

 712 

State v. Arreola-Botello

 
In sum, we conclude that, for the purposes of
Article I, section 9, all investigative activities, including
investigative inquiries, conducted during a traffic stop are
part of an ongoing seizure and are subject to both subjectmatter and durational limitations.7 Accordingly, an officer
is limited to investigatory inquiries that are reasonably
related to the purpose of the traffic stop or that have an
independent constitutional justification. Put simply, an
“unavoidable lull” does not create an opportunity for an officer to ask unrelated questions, unless the officer can justify
the inquiry on other grounds.
 
We realize that our decision precludes officers from
asking certain investigative questions during investigatory
stops—those unrelated to the purpose of the investigation
and without independent constitutional justification. But
that is as the constitution requires and, for statutory purposes, what the legislature intends.8 See ORS 131.615(3)(a)
(officer’s inquiries during traffic stop reasonable only if limited to the “immediate circumstances that arouse the officer’s suspicion”). Given the near necessity of driving today,
it is certainly not uncommon for a citizen to be lawfully
stopped for a minor traffic violation. See Wayne R. LaFave,
The “Routine Traffic Stop” From Start to Finish: Too Much
  The dissent criticizes us for failing to expressly justify a rule that police
activities and inquiries during a traffic stop must be reasonably related to the
purpose of the stop and reasonably necessary to effectuate it. 365 Or at 719
(Garrett, J., dissenting). The dissent may not accept the reasons for those rules,
but we have stated them both in Watson and here: Police have authority to interfere with an individual’s liberty interest and to stop that individual on reasonable suspicion and without probable cause of criminal activity for only a limited
purpose—to investigate the matter that gives rise to the reasonable suspicion. It
is the justification for the stop that delineates its lawful bounds. Article I, section
9, does not permit a stop that is authorized for a limited purpose to be used for
all purposes. If it did, then in many cases there would be no need for an officer
to develop the reasonable suspicion necessary to stop an individual to conduct a
criminal investigation, and that protection would be meaningless.
 8
  The dissent is concerned about what an officer can do during a ten-minute
wait other than conduct activities and make inquiries reasonably related to the
purpose of the stop and reasonably necessary to effectuate it. 365 Or at 720
(Garrett, J., dissenting). We do not share that concern. If an officer develops reasonable suspicion that the stopped individual has engaged in illegal activity in
addition to that for which the individual was stopped, then the officer may investigate that activity. Without such suspicion, an officer should limit investigative
activities and inquires to matters that are, as statute requires, limited to the
“immediate circumstances that arouse the officer’s suspicion” or that will not
result in the discovery of suppressible evidence. ORS 131.615(3)(a).
 7

 Cite as 365 Or 695 (2019) 713
“Routine,” Not Enough Fourth Amendment, 102 Mich L Rev
1843, 1852-53 (2004) (describing the ease of unintentionally
committing a minor traffic violation while driving); David
A. Harris, Essay, Car Wars: The Fourth Amendment’s Death
on the Highway, 66 Geo Wash L Rev 556, 567-68 (1998)
(describing how an officer can easily develop constitutional
justification to stop a driver by simply following a vehicle for
a short period of time until they observe a traffic infraction).
If, after stopping an individual based on probable cause that
the individual committed a traffic offense, an officer may
inquire into criminal activity without reasonable suspicion
of a specific crime, an officer will have less of an incentive
to develop the requisite reasonable suspicion of that crime
which ordinarily would be required to stop the individual
for a temporary criminal investigation. By applying subjectmatter limitations to investigative activities and questioning, Article  I, section 9, ensures that officers do not turn
minor traffic violations into criminal investigations without
a constitutional basis for doing so.9
 
With that understanding of Article I, section 9,
we conclude, in this case, that Faulkner’s questioning and
request to search defendant’s vehicle violated Article I, section 9. Although Faulkner had probable cause to believe that
defendant had committed a traffic infraction when he failed
to signal a turn and, therefore, was permitted to stop defendant to investigate that infraction, Faulkner then asked
questions that were not reasonably related to that investigation and exceeded its lawful scope. Faulkner stopped
defendant for failing to use a turn signal, but then inquired
about the possession of guns or controlled substances. The
 A subject-matter limitation requires that all additional questioning be
based on constitutionally sufficient grounds and not on implicit or explicit biases.
The amicus brief submitted by the Oregon Criminal Defense Lawyers Association
and the Oregon Justice Resource Center presents significant statistical data to
illustrate the disparate treatment of black and Hispanic motorists during the
course of traffic stops, showing specifically that nationwide, and in Oregon, people of color are statistically more likely to be searched during traffic stops than
their white counterparts. See Frank R. Baumgartner et al, Racial Disparities in
Traffic Stop Outcomes, Duke Forum for Law and Social Change Vol 9:21 at 33
(2017). Furthermore, there may be additional biases that motivate an officer to
ask unrelated investigatory questions without independent constitutional justification. Our conclusion today—that all questioning must be reasonably related
to the purpose for the traffic stop—will ensure that an officer’s questions are not
based on such biases.
 9

 714 

State v. Arreola-Botello

record does not demonstrate that the latter questioning was
reasonably related to the investigation of the former investigation. The investigation of defendant’s failure to signal a
turn may have warranted questions about whether or why
defendant acted or failed to take that action, other questions or actions reasonably related to that inquiry, or other
questions or actions reasonably necessary to the issuance
of a warning or a citation, such as questions to address reasonable officer-safety concerns. But, here, the state does not
claim any such connections or concerns, and the record does
not support the notion that any exist.
 
In addition, if there were evidence that, during
the stop, Faulkner had learned facts giving rise to reasonable suspicion that defendant had engaged or was about to
engage in criminal conduct, an expanded investigation could
have been justified. But here, Faulkner did not testify to any
particularized suspicion that defendant had weapons, controlled substances, or any other contraband in his vehicle.
To the contrary, Faulkner testified that he asks such questions every time he makes a stop. Accordingly, Faulkner’s
questioning and request to search the vehicle were impermissible and a violation of Article I, section 9, protections
against unreasonable seizure.
 
Having concluded that defendant was unlawfully
seized in violation of Article I, section 9, we must now determine the effect of that constitutional violation on the admissibility of the evidence obtained during the consensual search
of defendant’s vehicle. Generally, evidence will be suppressed
if the evidence was the product of an unconstitutional act.
State v. Juarez-Godinez, 326 Or 1, 9, 942 P2d 772 (1997)
(so stating). Here, defendant’s voluntary consent to search
the vehicle was granted in response to Faulkner’s unlawful
line of questioning and request for consent. In some cases,
“a defendant’s voluntary consent itself may be sufficient to
demonstrate that the unlawful conduct did not affect or had
only a tenuous connection to the evidence produced.” State
v. Unger, 356 Or 59, 77-78, 333 P3d 1009 (2014). It is the
state’s burden to prove that the consent was “independent
of, or only tenuously related to, the illegal police conduct.”
Id. at 84. Here, the state reasonably does not argue in this

 Cite as 365 Or 695 (2019) 715
court, and did not argue in the Court of Appeals, that defendant’s consent was only tenuously related to Faulkner’s illegal inquiries. Accordingly, the trial court erred in denying
defendant’s motion to supress the evidence.
 
The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed.
The judgment of the circuit court is reversed, and the case
is remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
 

GARRETT, J., dissenting.

 
This court has held that, in ordinary police-citizen
encounters (that is, encounters that are not seizures), police
may engage citizens in “mere conversation” and generally
ask questions of them without implicating Article I, section
9. State v. Warner, 284 Or 147, 161, 585 P2d 681 (1978); see
also State v. Holmes, 311 Or 400, 407, 813 P2d 28 (1991) (comparing ordinary “noncoercive” encounters with stops and
arrests, which are both seizures requiring constitutional
justification). We have also held that, because a traffic stop
is a seizure, police may continue the traffic stop for only so
long as the basis for that seizure exists; thus, police may not
extend the stop with questioning, “mere conversation,” or
other activities unrelated to the original basis for the stop,
unless they have an independent and constitutionally sufficient basis to continue the detention for such activities. See
State v. Rodgers/Kirkeby, 347 Or 610, 623-24, 227 P3d 695
(2010) (so stating).
 
The question left unanswered until today is what
subject matter restrictions, if any, apply to police activity
that is not related to the original basis for the traffic stop
but that also does not cause any prolongation of the stop.
The Court of Appeals has addressed the issue and concluded that, so long as unrelated activity occurs during
an “unavoidable lull” in the traffic stop, then such activity
effects no greater restriction on liberty than was already
in place. See State v. Gomes, 236 Or App 364, 370-71, 236
P3d 841 (2010). Therefore, it is of no constitutional import.
See id. (“there are no Article I, section 9, implications if an
inquiry unrelated to the traffic stop occurs during a routine
stop but does not delay it”).

 716 

State v. Arreola-Botello

 
That “unavoidable lull” rule is consistent with the
decisions of this court that have defined a “seizure” for purposes of Article I, section 9, to occur “when either (1) a police
officer intentionally and significantly interferes with the
person’s freedom of movement; or (2) the person believes, in
an objectively reasonable manner, that his or her liberty of
movement has been so restricted.” Rodgers/Kirkeby, 347 Or
at 621 (internal quotation marks omitted). Simply put, when
an officer’s question unnecessarily extends a traffic stop,
that question represents an additional interference with
that liberty interest and may therefore require an additional justification. But if a person has already been seized
as a result of a lawful traffic stop, and the length of the stop
is not extended, then questioning on unrelated matters does
not cause any additional interference with the person’s freedom of movement.
 
Today, the majority rejects the “unavoidable lull”
rule, concluding that, unless they have independent constitutional justification, police are prohibited from engaging in
activity or inquiring into any matters unrelated to the original basis of the stop, even if such activity does not extend
the stop. Thus, if an officer observes behavior during a traffic stop that causes the officer to be concerned about past,
present, or future criminal activity, but the officer does not
yet possess enough information that would support an objectively reasonable suspicion or pose officer-safety concerns,
then the officer may not ask questions or take other steps
to investigate. That limitation does not govern police-citizen
interactions in other contexts. Indeed, it will only partly govern police-citizen interactions in this context—the surprising result of the majority’s decision is that, during a lull, an
officer may make inquiries of the passenger of a stopped car
but be absolutely forbidden from asking the same questions
of the driver. See State v. Stevens, 364 Or 91, 93, 97-100,
430 P3d 1059 (2018) (explaining that certain inquiries do
not restrain a passenger’s liberty or freedom of movement
in a significant way and, thus, do not implicate Article  I,
section 9).
 
There may be sound reasons for such a rule. I dissent from today’s decision because those reasons have not

 Cite as 365 Or 695 (2019) 717
been adequately explained, and, as a result, today’s decision
raises significant questions without providing an analytical
framework that will help lower courts answer them.
 
The majority bypasses crucial steps in the analysis
by interpreting this court’s precedents to have already
decided the key question. According to the majority, we have
already held that “an officer’s investigative activities” during
a traffic stop must be “reasonably related to the purpose of
the stop or have independent constitutional justification,”
and today’s decision simply addresses the “narrow question”
of whether an officer’s “inquiries” are treated any differently. 365 Or at 704-05 (emphasis in original). That is not
an accurate statement of our case law. Our past statements
considering whether an officer’s activities were reasonably
related to the purpose of a traffic stop arose in the context
of considering whether the officer had unlawfully extended
the stop. The statements on which the majority relies can be
correctly understood only in that context.
 
In the seminal case, Rodgers/Kirkeby, we first held
that officers may not extend the duration of traffic stops to
inquire into unrelated matters without independent constitutional justification. 347 Or at 626-28.
 In State v. Watson, 353 Or 768, 769, 305 P3d 94
(2013), an officer stopped the defendant for a traffic violation. Although he decided not to issue a citation, the officer
continued to detain the defendant while running records
and warrants checks. 353 Or at 770. While awaiting the
results of those checks, which took the same amount of
time, officers developed suspicion that the vehicle contained
marijuana, searched it, and found drugs. Id. at 770-71. On
review, the defendant argued that the records and warrants
checks had been unnecessary and thus extended the stop
under Rodgers/Kirkeby, requiring suppression of the evidence discovered during that period. Id. at 781-82. We held
that the records check had been done to verify the defendant’s driving privileges and thus had been related to the
purpose of the stop. Id. at 782. We then explained that it
was unnecessary to further consider the warrants check
because there was “no indication that the warrants check

 718 

State v. Arreola-Botello

produced incriminating evidence or extended the duration
of the stop.” Id. at 784.1
 Following Watson, in State v. Jimenez, 357 Or 417,
430-31, 353 P3d 1227 (2015), we held that the officer’s routine weapons inquiry at the conclusion of his jaywalking
investigation was unlawful because it was not supported by
any reasonable, circumstance-specific concerns for officer
safety. Our holding did not, as the majority implies, rest on
the fact that the weapons inquiry exceeded what we took
to be the “permissible scope” of questioning based on the
purpose of the stop. See 365 Or at 704. Rather, in that case,
once again, the questioning about weapons had caused a
temporal extension of the stop. Jimenez, 357 Or at 420, 424
n 7. Thus, the weapons inquiry—because it had not been
reasonably related to the purpose of the stop or supported by
an independent constitutional basis—caused the extension
of the stop that resulted from that inquiry to be unlawful.
Id. at 433 (Kistler, J., concurring) (so noting).
 
What those cases tell us is that police activity that
is reasonably related to the purpose of a traffic stop and reasonably necessary to effectuate that purpose is part of effectuating that purpose and therefore, by definition, does not
result in an extension of the stop beyond the time reasonably necessary to conclude it. In contrast, if police activity
is not reasonably related to the purpose of the stop, then it
may result in an unlawful extension of the stop. I emphasize
“may,” because the key fact that today’s majority overlooks is
that those cases involved arguments that the stop had been
temporally extended by the challenged activity. Thus, the
  The majority focuses on Watson’s observation that the warrants check was
irrelevant because it did not produce incriminating evidence “or” extend the stop.
I understand the majority to infer from the disjunctive phrasing that the Watson
court meant that, if the warrants check had led to incriminating evidence, then
the court would have proceeded to determine whether the warrants check was
reasonably related to the purpose of the stop, regardless of whether or not the
warrants check caused any additional extension of the stop. From that inference, the majority appears to then conclude that Watson supports the idea that
all police “activity” must be “reasonably related” to the purpose of the stop. But
the inference is debatable; the court in Watson never explained what would have
happened on a different set of facts, and it certainly never explained that it was
adopting the rule that the majority attributes to it. In fact, Watson largely synthesized and applied existing cases and did not purport to announce any new
rule.
 1

 Cite as 365 Or 695 (2019) 719
proposition for which our prior cases stand is that unrelated
police questioning, if it results in an extension of the stop, is
unlawful unless supported by constitutional justification.
 
Thus, when the majority asserts that we have
already “held”2 that “an officer’s investigative activities
during a stop must be reasonably related to the purpose
of the stop or have independent constitutional justification,” 365 Or at 704-05 (emphasis in original), it overstates
what those cases actually decided. And, because the majority views that rule as already having been announced, the
majority does not justify it.
 
The majority insists that justification is found in
our past observation that the “justification for the stop” is
what “delineates the lawful bounds of the traffic stop.” 365
Or at 710 (quoting Watson, 353 Or at 778-79). But, again,
that observation is rooted in the facts of our temporal extension cases; as such, it means that an officer who has temporarily interfered with the driver’s freedom of movement for a
specific purpose may not effect a new and additional interference with that liberty interest by asking about unrelated
matters. That principle tracks our statement in Rodgers/
Kirkeby regarding what, in this context, constitutes a seizure in the first place: “when either (1) a police officer intentionally and significantly interferes with the person’s freedom of movement; or (2) the person believes, in an objectively
reasonable manner, that his or her liberty of movement has
been so restricted.” 347 Or at 621 (internal quotation marks
omitted). Thus, viewed in context, saying that the justification for the stop “delineates the lawful bounds” of the stop
is just another way of saying that the driver’s freedom of
 The key language in Watson on which the majority relies is this: “Thus,
both Oregon statutes and this court’s Article I, section 9, case law, require that
law enforcement officers have a justification for temporarily seizing or stopping a
person to conduct an investigation, and that the officer’s activities be reasonably
related to that investigation and reasonably necessary to effectuate it.” 353 Or
at 781. That language does appear to support the majority’s decision, but only
because the majority mistakenly views that as the “holding” of Watson. See 365
Or App 704. It was not; the quoted language immediately followed the court’s
description of Rodgers/Kirkeby and other cases and was clearly meant to synthesize the rule established by those cases. See Watson, 353 Or at 778-81. And,
because those cases involved arguments that stops had been extended, Watson’s
summary of the rule necessarily incorporated that factual limitation.
 2

 720 

State v. Arreola-Botello

movement may be restricted only for so long as the justification for the stop exists. What the majority fails to explain is
how, if Article I, section 9, is concerned with a person’s “freedom of movement,” it can be offended by an officer’s question
or action that causes no further restriction on movement.
Rather, the majority’s conclusion seems to rest on a reconceptualization of the Article I, section 9, liberty interest that
is never made explicit.
 
That is problematic. Because we have never held
that all investigative activity during a traffic stop must
have constitutional justification regardless of whether it
extends the stop, we have never addressed what that actually means, which will pose difficulties for police trying to
understand this rule and for trial courts trying to apply
it. What constitutes investigative activity? We know from
today’s decision that a request for consent to search goes
too far. But does the majority’s rule encompass less invasive
interaction, or activity that involves no interaction with the
driver at all, such as a warrants check? If an officer develops
an intuition, on the basis of training and experience, that
something is not right, but lacks enough information to have
a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, may the officer
engage the driver in “mere conversation” in the hope of eliciting additional useful information? If not, what can an officer do during a ten-minute wait? And if so, may that conversation include questions—or are questions off limits because
they are “inquiries”? May the officer use the unavoidable
lull to contact colleagues to see if they know anything about
the driver, or take other steps to gather information from
outside sources?
 
It is not clear how those questions are to be
answered. It is clear, however, that the majority’s new rule
means that, during an unavoidable lull in a traffic investigation, police officers must avoid engaging in at least some
of the ordinary police work that they routinely perform in
other settings. As I noted above, there may be good reasons
for such a rule. I am not persuaded, however, by the majority’s view that Article  I, section 9, compels it. Therefore, I
respectfully dissent.
 

Balmer, J., joins this dissenting opinion.