Case 8:18-cv-02098-CEH-JSS Document 60 Filed 11/29/19 Page 1 of 13 PageID 6605

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
TAMPA DIVISION

TYRONE KEYS,
Plaintiff/Counter-Defendant,
v.
BERT BELL/PETE ROZELLE NFL PLAYER
RETIREMENT PLAN and the NFL PLAYER
DISABILITY & NEUROCOGNITIVE BENEFIT
PLAN,
Defendants/Counter-Plaintiffs.

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Case No. 8:18-cv-02098-CEH-JSS

MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF / COUNTER-DEFENDANT
TYRONE KEYS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

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TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ......................................................................................................................... ii
INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................................................... 1
ARGUMENT & AUTHORITIES .................................................................................................................. 2
I.

THE COURT SHOULD DISREGARD KEYS’ STRAW MAN ARGUMENTS. .......................... 2

II.

KEYS IS NOT ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON COUNT I BECAUSE HE
CANNOT SHOW THAT THE BOARD’S DECISION WAS UNREASONABLE. ....................... 3
A.

The Board Reasonably Determined the Car Accident Was the “But For” Cause of Keys’
Total and Permanent Disability. .............................................................................................. 3

B.

The Board Reasonably Determined Keys was Subject to Loss of Benefits Due to a History
of False, Incomplete, and Contradictory Statements and Submissions. .................................. 4

C.

The March 2003 Report from Howard Hochman Does Not Make the Board’s Decision
Unreasonable. .......................................................................................................................... 5

D.

Keys Cannot Overturn the Board’s Decision By Blaming Plan Counsel. ............................... 7

III.

KEYS HAS ABANDONED COUNT II. ......................................................................................... 8

IV.

KEYS RAISES NO AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES OR OTHER BARS TO THE PLANS’
COUNTERCLAIMS......................................................................................................................... 9

V.

EVEN IF THE BOARD’S DECISION WAS UNREASONABLE, KEYS IS NOT ENTITLED TO
THE JUDGMENT REQUESTED. ................................................................................................... 9

CONCLUSION .............................................................................................................................................10

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases
Blankenship v. Metro Life Ins. Co., 644 F.3d 1350 (11th Cir. 2011) ............................................................. 7
Boyd v. Bert Bell/Pete Rozelle NFL Player Ret. Plan, 410 F.3d 1173 (9th Cir. 2005) .................................. 6
Courson v. Bert Bell NFL Player Ret. Plan, 75 F. Supp. 2d 424 (W.D. Pa. 1999),
aff’d, 214 F.3d 136 (3d Cir. 2000) ............................................................................................................. 7
Evans v. Eaton Corp. Long Term Disability Plan, 514 F.3d 315 (4th Cir. 2008) .......................................... 2
Frame v. Hartford Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 257 F. Supp. 3d 1268 (M.D. Fla. 2017) ..................................... 2, 4
Howard v. Hartford Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 929 F. Supp. 2d 1264 (M.D. Fla. 2013)....................................... 5
Johnson v. Bert Bell/Pete Rozelle NFL Player Ret. Plan, 468 F.3d 1082 (8th Cir. 2006) ............................. 7
Manning v. Johnson & Johnson Pension Comm., 504 F. Supp. 2d 1293 (M.D. Fla. 2007) .......................... 5
Morris v. Nat’l Football League Ret. Bd., 833 F. Supp. 2d 1374 (S.D. Fla. 2011),
aff’d, 482 F. App’x 440 (11th Cir. 2012) ................................................................................................... 7
Till v. Lincoln Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 182 F. Supp. 3d 1243 (M.D. Ala. 2016),
aff'd, 678 F. App’x 805 (11th Cir. 2017).................................................................................................... 9
Townsend v. Delta Family–Care Disability and Survivorship Plan, 295 F. App’x 971 (11th Cir. 2008) ..... 5
Turner v. Delta Family-Care Disab. & Surv. Plan, 291 F.3d 1270 (11th Cir. 2002) .................................... 2
Useden v. Acker, 947 F.2d 1563 (11th Cir. 1991) .......................................................................................... 7
Watkins v. Goodyear Pension Plan, No. 4:17-CV-461-VEH, 2018 WL 1964591
(N.D. Ala. Apr. 26, 2018)........................................................................................................................... 9

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INTRODUCTION
Keys refuses to accept responsibility and continues to blame others for the consequences of his
own actions. According to Keys, the Board mistakenly reduced and suspended his benefits because it did
not have or did not understand the entire record. According to Keys, Plan Counsel—allegedly driven by a
desire to reap attorneys’ fees—“hatched” a plot to accuse him of fraud. The Court should see through it.
The Board always had the entire record, a fact that is established by the record itself. And that
record included various falsehoods perpetrated by Keys, not Plan Counsel. Keys is the one who, a year
after the car accident, represented that nothing contributed to his impairments—although he undeniably
sustained injuries during the car accident—but NFL football. Keys is the one who falsely claimed the
extensive medical care he received, beginning just three days after the car accident, was to treat NFL
football injuries exclusively. Keys is the one who withheld the first three pages of a four-page accidentrelated medical report, concealing the accident and misrepresenting the purpose of the treatment discussed
in the report. Keys is the one who repeatedly failed to tell the Plan he received workers’ compensation
benefits. Keys is the one who deceived the Social Security Administration. Yet, Keys denies all of this
and more.
The Court should not let Keys’ denials and his attempts to blame others be a distraction. As Keys
concedes, Pl.’s Mot. for Summary Jgmt. (“Keys Mot.,” ECF 57) at 2, 19, the basic legal issue is whether
the Board’s decision to suspend and then terminate Keys’ disability benefits was reasonable. To answer
this question, the Court must determine, based on the mountain of evidence before the Board, and whether
a reasonable person could conclude that (1) the car accident that Keys concealed was the “but for” cause of
his total and permanent disability, or (2) Keys failed to provide full and complete information to the Plan.
If the answer to either question is “Yes,” then the Board’s decision to reduce Keys’ benefits should be
upheld. And if the Board’s decision to reduce Keys’ benefits is upheld, then Keys was overpaid, and the
Plans are entitled to recover those overpayments. Keys’ brief does not advance a single affirmative defense
or other bar to the Plans’ recovery.

1

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ARGUMENT & AUTHORITIES
I.

THE COURT SHOULD DISREGARD KEYS’ STRAW MAN ARGUMENTS.
Much of Keys’ brief argues the Board’s decision was de novo wrong and contrary to the terms of

the Plan. See generally Keys Mot. at 11-19. These arguments miss the point, because under the abuse-ofdiscretion standard of review applicable here, the ultimate question is not whether the Board’s decision was
de novo wrong, but whether there was a reasonable basis for it. This standard applies because the Board
has “full and absolute discretion, authority and power to interpret, control, implement, and manage the
Plan,” RPD § 8.2 [AR-35- 36], including the authority to construe the terms of the Plan, adopt procedures
and rules for administering the Plan, and decide claims for benefit. RPD § 8.2 (a), (b), (d) [AR-36]; 1 see
Frame v. Hartford Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 257 F. Supp. 3d 1268, 1274 (M.D. Fla. 2017) (“It is undisputed
that Hartford was vested with discretion. Therefore, even assuming that [Hartford’s] decision was ‘de novo
wrong’... the dispositive question is whether [Hartford’s] decision was arbitrary and capricious.”) (internal
quotation marks and citations omitted).
Application of the abuse-of-discretion standard means that the Court need not agree with the
Board’s decision to uphold it. See Evans v. Eaton Corp. Long Term Disability Plan, 514 F.3d 315, 322
(4th Cir. 2008) (“At its immovable core, the abuse of discretion standard requires a reviewing court to show
enough deference to a primary decision-maker’s judgment that the court does not reverse merely because it
would have come to a different result in the first instance.”); Turner v. Delta Family-Care Disab. & Surv.
Plan, 291 F.3d 1270, 1274 (11th Cir. 2002) (upholding plan administrator’s reasonable decision, noting
that “[i]t is irrelevant that the court or anyone else might reach a different conclusion”). Put another way,
the Board’s decision can be de novo wrong, but the Court must still uphold it if it is reasonable. Therefore,
argument regarding whether the Board’s decision is de novo wrong is a meaningless exercise.

1

Cites like “AR-36” refer to specific pages within the Administrative Record (ECF 56). The AR cites omit a bates
prefix and any zeros preceding the page number. Unless stated otherwise, “RPD” cites refer to the 2001 Bert
Bell/Pete Rozelle NFL Player Retirement Plan in effect when Keys first applied for and was awarded total and
permanent disability benefits.

2

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Moreover, Keys misunderstands the Plan’s “Recovery of Certain Overpayments” provision when
he points to it to argue that the terms of the Plan(s) do not allow the Board to offset his disability benefits.
Keys Mot. at 18-19. The “Recovery of Certain Overpayments” provision contemplates cross-plan offsets.
It permits the Retirement Plan, for example, to recover overpayments made by the Disability Plan “[i]f
false information submitted by or on behalf of a Player causes the Player to receive amounts under the NFL
Player Supplemental Disability Plan (‘Disability Plan’) to which such Player is not entitled.” RPD § 11.12
[AR-50]. 2 The Recovery of Certain Overpayments provision does not exclusively define the Plans’
overpayment rights. In fact, a separate provision authorizes the Board to “[r]ecover any overpayment of
benefits through reduction or offset of future benefit payments or other method.” RPD § 8.2(n) [AR-37]. 3
II.

KEYS IS NOT ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON COUNT I BECAUSE HE
CANNOT SHOW THAT THE BOARD’S DECISION WAS UNREASONABLE.
The second half of Keys’ brief focuses on the dispositive issue, and argues that the Board’s

decision had no reasonable basis. Keys Mot. at 19. Keys is incorrect for all of the reasons explained in the
Plans’ separate Motion for Summary Judgment (“Plan Mot.,” ECF 58). Because the Plans’ Motion for
Summary Judgment anticipated many of the arguments advanced by Keys in his motion, to avoid repetition
the Plans incorporate the arguments and authorities set forth in their Motion. 4
A.

The Board Reasonably Determined the Car Accident Was the “But For” Cause of
Keys’ Total and Permanent Disability.

The Board reasonably determined the car accident was the “but for” cause of Keys’ total and
permanent disability on the basis of the Janecki Accident Report, once it came to light. See Plan Mot. at

2

The current version of the Retirement Plan contains the same provision. 4/1/17 RPD § 12.12 [AR-221]. The current
version of the Disability Plan contains a corresponding provision that calls for the reduction of future benefits payable
under the Disability Plan to recover overpayments from the Retirement Plan. 4/1/17 Disability Plan Doc (“DPD”) §
13.11 [AR-364].

3

The current versions of the Retirement Plan and Disability Plan contain the same provision. 4/1/17 RPD § 8.2(o)
[AR-205]; 4/1/17 DPD § 9.2(o) [AR-353].

4

Capitalized terms not defined herein have the meaning ascribed to them in the Plans’ Motion for Summary
Judgment.

3

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15-17 (addressing the import of the Janecki Accident Report). 5 This determination stands irrespective of
whether Keys intended to defraud the Plan, a concept that Keys fails to grasp and his brief does not address.
In other words, if a reasonable person could conclude the car accident was the “but for” cause of his
inability to work, then judgment should be entered in favor of the Plans. Because Keys was found able to
work prior to the car accident, and received extensive medical care beginning just three days after the car
accident for injuries identified in Keys’ 2003 disability benefits application, the Board’s decision is clearly
reasonable. Again, the dispositive question is not whether the Board’s decision was right, but whether it
was reasonable. See Frame, 257 F. Supp. 3d at 1274.
B.

The Board Reasonably Determined Keys was Subject to Loss of Benefits Due to a
History of False, Incomplete, and Contradictory Statements and Submissions.

The Board reasonably determined that Keys’ history of false, incomplete, and contradictory
statements subjected him to a loss of benefits. See Plan Mot. at 17-20 (highlighting some of Keys’
misconduct); 9/13/03 Appl. at 6 [AR-744] (Keys certified he provided “true, correct and complete”
information, and acknowledged he may be subject to a loss of benefits if he “made any false or misleading
statements or omissions.”). The Board found that Keys intentionally concealed his receipt of workers’
compensation benefits when he applied for and received LOD benefits. The Board also found that Keys
(and his wife) provided false and contradictory information to the Social Security Administration on a
range of issues, including his residence, who his physicians were, his employment status, and his
employment capabilities.
Keys’ brief does not mention, much less rebut the reasonableness of, any of these findings. Keys
focuses exclusively on the misstatements in his 2003 application, and tries to explain away his failure to
disclose the car accident, his concealment of the full Janecki Accident Report, and his misrepresentations
concerning the various records he submitted in connection with his 2003 application for T&P benefits.
However, all of these arguments and the evidence allegedly supporting them were before the Board as it

5

As the Plans explained in their motion, Keys’ conduct justifies this aspect of the Board’s decision. He concealed the
accident and withheld the full Janecki Accident Report because he knew that if they came to light a reasonable person
could conclude that the accident was the true, “but for” cause of his total and permanent disability.

4

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considered Keys’ situation throughout 2017 and 2018. See, e.g., (undated) Ltr. fr. G. Culverhouse to
Retirement Board [AR-4249- 379]; 8/30/17 Ltr. fr. M. Miller to T. Keys [AR-4045- 67]; 2/26/18 Ltr. fr. M.
Miller to T. Keys [AR-5277- 87] (explaining the Board’s decision). The Board reasonably rejected Keys’
excuses and explanations for the reasons outlined in its decision letters. Keys has no credibility.
C.

The March 2003 Report from Howard Hochman Does Not Make the Board’s
Decision Unreasonable.

Keys’ brief emphasizes the March 2003 chiropractic report from Dr. Howard Hochman [AR-400610], which Keys says proves “that Keys had no objective residual signs of injury related to the car
accident.” Keys Mot. at 20; id. at 17 (same). The Hochman report does not render the Board’s decision
unreasonable.
The Board reasonably concluded the car accident was the “but for” cause of Keys’ total and
permanent disability notwithstanding the Hochman report. Dr. Hochman, a chiropractor, evaluated Keys
once on March 21, 2003, in the context of an independent medical examination, and remarked that
“Today’s examination… revealed no objective residual signs of injury related specifically to the 5/7/02
[motor vehicle accident].” 3/21/03 Hochman IME at 4 [AR-4009]. Putting aside Dr. Hochman’s potential
bias, 6 the Board could disregard Dr. Hochman’s conclusion given his credentials and the timing of his
evaluation. See Howard v. Hartford Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 929 F. Supp. 2d 1264, 1288 (M.D. Fla. 2013)
(“[A] plan administrator is entitled to weigh the evidence and resolve conflicting evidence about the
claimant’s disability.”) (quoting Townsend v. Delta Family–Care Disability and Survivorship Plan, 295 F.
App’x 971, 977 (11th Cir. 2008)); Manning v. Johnson & Johnson Pension Comm., 504 F. Supp. 2d 1293,
1301 (M.D. Fla. 2007) (“[A]n administrator’s decision that rejects certain evidence and credits conflicting
proof may nevertheless be reasonable.”). Dr. Janecki, an orthopedic surgeon, treated Keys more
extensively, and later reported in August 2003 that Keys’ neck, back, and knee injuries still existed, and

6

Dr. Hochman likely performed the independent medical examination on behalf of Keys’ insurer. His finding that
Keys had no residual injuries from the car accident would clearly benefit the insurer.

5

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were “the direct result of injuries” sustained in the car accident. Janecki Accident Report at 3 [AR-3588]
(emphasis in original). According to Dr. Janecki:
•

Keys “continue[d] to have symptoms without remission during the course of the last year and 3
months since his accident;”

•

Keys had “permanent impairment with permanent loss of important bodily functions and
permanent restrictions in terms of his activities of daily living and his occupation;”

•

Keys had “not been restored to his pre-injury state and continue[d] to have substantial
symptoms in his cervical and lumbar spine as well as his left knee;” and

•

Keys’ “symptoms ha[d] worsened during the course of the last year” following the accident.

Janecki Accident Report at 1, 3 [AR-3586, 3588] (emphasis in original). These findings undercut the
Hochman report and provide substantial support for the Board’s decision. See Boyd v. Bert Bell/Pete
Rozelle NFL Player Ret. Plan, 410 F.3d 1173, 1179 (9th Cir. 2005) (upholding the Board’s determination
and noting that “a single persuasive medical opinion may constitute substantial evidence upon which a plan
administrator may rely in adjudicating a claim”).
The Hochman report also bolstered the Board’s determination that Keys submitted false and
incomplete information. The Hochman report was first provided to the Board in June 2017, when Keys’
representative submitted it in response to the Board’s requests for information. 6/7/17 Ltr. fr. G.
Culverhouse to Benefits Cmte. [AR-3820]. It is reasonable to conclude that Keys withheld it from the Plan
given the report’s discussion of the car accident, turning it over after the chips had fallen, when he thought
it might help him regain his benefits. On its face, the report does not support any claim of disability by
Keys, and it supports the reasonable conclusion that Keys misrepresented the nature of the treatment
records he submitted to the Plan in 2003. See 8/9/17 Memo fr. J. Wilson to D. Ell at 2 [AR-4003] (The
IME “documents claims of pain that started ‘within hours of the accident’ and refers to the records of
ensuing medical treatment throughout 2002 for that pain. Significantly, the claims of pain and medical
records referenced in the car accident IME appear to be the very same claims of pain and medical records
used for Mr. Keys’ disability claim filed under the Plan in late 2003.”).

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D.

Keys Cannot Overturn the Board’s Decision By Blaming Plan Counsel.

Keys’ portrayal of Plan Counsel as the author of his misfortune is scurrilous. See Keys Mot. at 2023 (citing Plan Counsel’s pre-meeting Overview and Board minutes, and accusing Plan Counsel of not
providing or highlight aspects of certain documents at the August 2017 Board meeting). Plan Counsel’s
motivations are irrelevant to whether the Board’s decision should be upheld.
The relevant question is whether the fiduciary has a structural conflict. See, e.g., Blankenship v.
Metro Life Ins. Co., 644 F.3d 1350, 1354 (11th Cir. 2011) (explaining Eleventh Circuit’s six-step
framework for reviewing ERISA benefits decisions, and noting that the court should “determine if the
claims administrator operated under a conflict of interest”). Keys has never alleged the Board operated
under a conflict of interest, and every court to consider the question has held that the Board has no conflict
as a matter of law. See Johnson v. Bert Bell/Pete Rozelle NFL Player Ret. Plan, 468 F.3d 1082, 1086 (8th
Cir. 2006) (Board has no conflict of interest); Courson v. Bert Bell NFL Player Ret. Plan, 75 F. Supp. 2d
424, 431 (W.D. Pa. 1999), aff’d, 214 F.3d 136 (3d Cir. 2000) (no conflict of interest requiring a more
stringent standard of review); Morris v. Nat’l Football League Ret. Bd., 833 F. Supp. 2d 1374, 1386 (S.D.
Fla. 2011), aff’d, 482 F. App’x 440 (11th Cir. 2012) (same).
An ERISA fiduciary can (and most do) engage and rely on consultants and advisors. See, e.g.,
Useden v. Acker, 947 F.2d 1563, 1577-78 (11th Cir. 1991) (discussing role that advisors, such as attorneys,
permissibly have with ERISA plans). The Retirement Plan explicitly authorizes the Board to retain
advisors. 4/1/17 RPD § 8.2(f) [AR-205]. Groom Law Group is one such advisor, and advises the Board
and acts as directed by the Board, not the other way around.
The Board had the entire record. The August 2017 meeting that Keys highlights was one of a
series of meetings where the Board reviewed Keys’ eligibility for T&P benefits. All along, the Board had
access to Keys’ entire file—Plan Counsel did not need to attach anything to a pre-meeting Overview or
memorandum—and the Board therefore had ample opportunity to review the entire record before (and
after) the August 2017 meeting. See, e.g., 8/30/17 Ltr. fr. M. Miller to T. Keys at 1 [AR-4045] (“At its

7

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August 16, 2017 meeting, the Retirement Board reviewed your entire file, including materials recently
submitted and statements made in connection with you claims for benefits.”).
Regardless of what was mentioned in or attached to Plan Counsel’s memoranda, Keys’ own
submissions to the Board raised every issue he accuses Plan Counsel of concealing or misrepresenting in
August 2017. See, e.g., (undated) Ltr. fr. G. Culverhouse to Retirement Board [AR-4249- 379] (appealing
the Board’s decision to reduce and suspend Keys’ benefits and raising arguments laid out in Keys’ motion
for summary judgment). Keys’ claim that Plan Counsel “failed to provide Dr. Hochman’s IME report with
their Chicago Overview,” Keys Mot. at 23, is false. The August 2017 Overview “contain[ed] a memo
describing recent developments relating to Tyrone Keys, and recently received documents.” Plan Counsel
“Overview” at 4 [AR-3996]. That memo attached Dr. Hochman’s March 21, 2003 IME report specifically.
See 8/9/17 Memo fr. J. Wilson to D. Ell at 2 [AR-4003] (“Dr. Culverhouse’s response [to the Board’s
request for information from Keys] include an IME report dated March 21, 2003. The IME is attached.”). 7
III.

KEYS HAS ABANDONED COUNT II.
In Count II of his Amended Complaint, Keys sought a retroactive award of Football

Degenerative/Inactive A benefits for December 2011 through November 2013. Am. Compl. ¶ 37. Keys
was receiving Inactive/Inactive B benefits during this timeframe, as the Board reviewed the facts and
circumstances surrounding his applications. In July 2015, the Board provisionally reinstated Keys’
Football Degenerative/Inactive A benefits, retroactive to December 2013. 7/23/15 Ltr. fr. M. Miller to C.
Deem [AR-2511- 13]. Keys alleges the Board was wrong at that time, and the Plan should have paid him
Football Degenerative/Inactive A benefits retroactive to December 2011, given the date of his renewed,
2012 application and his Social Security award. Am. Compl. ¶ 38.
Keys bears the burden of proof on this issue. Yet his brief does not address Count II in any detail,
or explain why Keys would be entitled to a retroactive award of benefits during the relevant timeframe.

7

See also 8/30/17 Ltr. fr. M. Miller to T. Keys at Ex. 1, p. 1 [AR-4055] (discussing the March 21, 2003 IME); id. at
Ex. 1, p. 3 [AR-4057] (same); 2/22/18 Appeal Summary at 1 [AR-4386] (summarizing Keys’ appeal, and noting Dr.
Hochman’s March 2003 report).

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Keys has thus waived any argument for a retroactive award of Football Degenerative/Inactive A benefits
from December 2011 through November 2013. See Watkins v. Goodyear Pension Plan, No. 4:17-CV-461VEH, 2018 WL 1964591, at *6 (N.D. Ala. Apr. 26, 2018) (noting that a court should not address
perfunctory or underdeveloped arguments).
IV.

KEYS RAISES NO AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES OR OTHER BARS TO THE PLANS’
COUNTERCLAIMS.
In his answer to the Plans’ counterclaims, Keys raised a number of affirmative defenses, including

waiver, limitations, failure-to-exhaust, and an argument that the Plan Documents do not authorize the
Plans’ counterclaims. Keys’ brief is silent on these defenses, and he has therefore waived them. Watkins,
2018 WL 1964591, at *6.
V.

EVEN IF THE BOARD’S DECISION WAS UNREASONABLE, KEYS IS NOT ENTITLED
TO THE JUDGMENT REQUESTED.
If Keys prevails on the theory that the Board failed to conduct a full and fair review, the

appropriate remedy for this type of procedural defect is remand, not an award of benefits. See Till v.
Lincoln Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 182 F. Supp. 3d 1243, 1261 (M.D. Ala. 2016), aff’d, 678 F. App’x 805 (11th
Cir. 2017) (“When a court determines that an administrator has violated ERISA procedures, the usual
remedy is to remand the case for a full and fair review.”).
Even if the Court believes an award of benefits is appropriate, the benefit amounts presented in
Keys’ motion (Keys Mot. at 24 (noting disability payments of $6,000 per month and $10,250 per month)),
are incorrect, primarily because they do not account for (1) Keys’ age, and (2) a mandatory reduction in
disability benefits due to Keys’ prior receipt of an “Early Payment Benefit” pension. See, e.g., 4/1/17 RPD
§ 4.5(c) [AR-175] (mandating reduction of future total and permanent disability benefits for any Player
who elected an Early Payment Benefit); 4/1/17 RPD § 5.5(d) [AR-190] (mandating reduction of total and
permanent disability payments effective as of the Player’s Normal Retirement Date, i.e., the date the Player
reaches age 55).

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CONCLUSION
The Court should deny Keys’ motion for summary judgment and enter judgment in favor of the
Plans on both Keys’ claims and the Plans’ counterclaims.

Dated: November 29, 2019

By:
_________________________________
Michael L. Junk, pro hac vice
Katherine B. Kohn, pro hac vice
GROOM LAW GROUP, CHARTERED
1701 Pennsylvania Ave. NW
Washington, DC 20006
T: (202) 857-0620
F: (202) 659-4503
E: mjunk@groom.com
E: kkohn@groom.com
Brian D. Equi (Florida Bar ID No. 143936)
GOLDBERG SEGALLA
800 North Magnolia Avenue, Suite 1201
Orlando, Florida 32803
T: (407) 458-5605
F: (407) 458-5699
E: bequi@goldbergsegalla.com
Counsel for Defendants / Counter-Plaintiffs
Bert Bell/Pete Rozelle NFL Player Retirement Plan
and NFL Player Disability & Neurocognitive
Benefit Plan

10