REPORT OF EVIDENCE IN THE DEMOCRATS’ IMPEACHMENT INQUIRY IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES Republican Staff Report Prepared For Devin Nunes Ranking Member Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence Jim Jordan Ranking Member Committee on Oversight and Reform Michael T. McCaul Ranking Member Committee on Foreign Affairs December 2, 2019 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY On November 8, 2016, nearly 63 million Americans from around the country chose Donald J. Trump to be the 45th President of the United States. Now, less than a year before the next presidential election, 231 House Democrats in Washington, D.C., are trying to undo the will of the American people.* As one Democrat admitted, the pursuit of this extreme course of action is because they want to stop President Trump’s re-election. † Democrats in the House of Representatives have been working to impeach President Trump since his election. Democrats introduced four separate resolutions in 2017 and 2018 seeking to impeach President Trump.‡ In January 2019, on their first day in power, House Democrats again introduced articles of impeachment. § That same day, a newly elected Congresswoman promised to an audience of her supporters, “we’re going to go in there and we’re going to impeach the [expletive deleted].”** Her comments are not isolated. Speaker Nancy Pelosi called President Trump “an impostor” and said it is “dangerous” to allow American voters to evaluate his performance in 2020.†† The Democrats’ impeachment inquiry is not the organic outgrowth of serious misconduct; it is an orchestrated campaign to upend our political system. The Democrats are trying to impeach a duly elected President based on the accusations and assumptions of unelected bureaucrats who disagreed with President Trump’s policy initiatives and processes. They are trying to impeach President Trump because some unelected bureaucrats were discomforted by an elected President’s telephone call with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky. They are trying to impeach President Trump because some unelected bureaucrats chafed at an elected President’s “outside the beltway” approach to diplomacy. The sum and substance of the Democrats’ case for impeachment is that President Trump abused his authority to pressure Ukraine to investigate former Vice President Joe Biden, President Trump’s potential political rival, for President Trump’s benefit in the 2020 election. Democrats say this pressure campaign encompassed leveraging a White House meeting and the release of U.S. security assistance to force the Ukrainian President to succumb to President Trump’s political wishes. Democrats say that Mayor Rudy Giuliani, the President’s personal attorney, and a “shadow” group of U.S. officials conspired to benefit the President politically. The evidence presented does not prove any of these Democrat allegations, and none of the Democrats’ witnesses testified to having evidence of bribery, extortion, or any high crime or misdemeanor. * H. Res. 660, 116th Cong. (2019) (Roll call vote 604). Weekends with Alex Witt (MSNBC television broadcast May 5 2019) (interview with Rep. Al Green). ‡ H., Res. 705, 115th Cong. (2018); H. Res. 646, 115th Cong. (2017); H. Res. 621, 115th Cong. (2017); H. Res. 438, 115th Cong. (2017). § H. Res. 13, 116th Cong. (2019). ** Amy B. Wong, Rep. Rashida Tlaib profanely promised to impeach Trump. She’s not sorry., Wash. Post, Jan. 4, 2019. †† Emily Tillett, Nancy Pelosi says Trump’s attacks on witnesses “very significant” to impeachment probe, CBS News, Nov. 15, 2019; Dear Colleague Letter from Speaker Nancy Pelosi (Nov. 18, 2019). † i The evidence does not support the accusation that President Trump pressured President Zelensky to initiate investigations for the purpose of benefiting the President in the 2020 election. The evidence does not support the accusation that President Trump covered up the summary of his phone conversation with President Zelensky. The evidence does not support the accusation that President Trump obstructed the Democrats’ impeachment inquiry. At the heart of the matter, the impeachment inquiry involves the actions of only two people: President Trump and President Zelensky. The summary of their July 25, 2019, telephone conversation shows no quid pro quo or indication of conditionality, threats, or pressure—much less evidence of bribery or extortion. The summary reflects laughter, pleasantries, and cordiality. President Zelensky has said publicly and repeatedly that he felt no pressure. President Trump has said publicly and repeatedly that he exerted no pressure. Even examining evidence beyond the presidential phone call shows no quid pro quo, bribery, extortion, or abuse of power. The evidence shows that President Trump holds a deepseated, genuine, and reasonable skepticism of Ukraine due to its history of pervasive corruption. The President has also been vocal about his skepticism of U.S. foreign aid and the need for European allies to shoulder more of the financial burden for regional defense. Senior Ukrainian officials under former President Petro Poroshenko publicly attacked then-candidate Trump during the 2016 campaign—including some senior Ukrainian officials who remained in their positions after President Zelensky’s term began. All of these factors bear on the President’s state of mind and help to explain the President’s actions toward Ukraine and President Zelensky. Understood in this proper context, the President’s initial hesitation to meet with President Zelensky or to provide U.S. taxpayer-funded security assistance to Ukraine without thoughtful review is entirely prudent. Ultimately, President Zelensky took decisive action demonstrating his commitment to promoting reform, combatting corruption, and replacing Poroshenko-era holdovers with new leadership in his Administration. President Trump then released security assistance to Ukraine and met with President Zelensky in September 2019—all without Ukraine taking any action to investigate President Trump’s political rival. House Democrats allege that Ukraine felt pressure to bend to the President’s political will, but the evidence shows a different reality. Ukraine felt good about its relationship with the United States in the early months of the Zelensky Administration, having had several high-level meetings with senior U.S. officials between July and September. Although U.S. security assistance was temporarily paused, the U.S. government did not convey the pause to the Ukrainians because U.S. officials believed the pause would get worked out and, if publicized, may be mischaracterized as a shift in U.S. policy towards Ukraine. U.S. officials said that the Ukrainian government in Kyiv never knew the aid was delayed until reading about it in the U.S. media. Ambassador Kurt Volker, the key American interlocutor trusted by the Ukrainian government, said the Ukrainians never raised concerns to him until after the pause became public in late August. The Democrats’ impeachment narrative ignores Ukraine’s dramatic transformation in its fight against endemic corruption. President Trump was skeptical of Ukrainian corruption and his Administration sought proof that newly-elected President Zelensky was a true reformer. And ii after winning a parliamentary majority, the new Zelensky administration took rapid strides to crack down on corruption. Several high-level U.S. officials observed firsthand these anticorruption achievements in Kyiv, and the security assistance was released soon afterward. The Democrats’ impeachment narrative also ignores President Trump’s steadfast support for Ukraine in its war against Russian occupation. Several of the Democrats’ witnesses described how President Trump’s policies toward Ukraine to combat Russian aggression have been substantially stronger than those of President Obama—then under the stewardship of Vice President Biden. Where President Obama and Vice President Biden gave the Ukrainians nightvision goggles and blankets, the Trump Administration provided the Ukrainians with lethal defensive assistance, including Javelin anti-tank missiles. The Democrats nonetheless tell a story of an illicit pressure campaign run by President Trump through his personal attorney, Mayor Giuliani, to coerce Ukraine to investigate the President’s political rival by withholding a meeting and security assistance. There is, however, no direct, firsthand evidence of any such scheme. The Democrats are alleging guilt on the basis of hearsay, presumptions, and speculation—all of which are reflected in the anonymous whistleblower complaint that sparked this inquiry. The Democrats’ narrative is so dependent on speculation that one Democrat publicly justified hearsay as “better” than direct evidence. ‡‡ Where there are ambiguous facts, the Democrats interpret them in a light most unfavorable to the President. In the absence of real evidence, the Democrats appeal to emotion—evaluating how unelected bureaucrats felt about the events in question. The fundamental disagreement apparent in the Democrats’ impeachment inquiry is a difference of world views and a discomfort with President Trump’s policy decisions. To the extent that some unelected bureaucrats believed President Trump had established an “irregular” foreign policy apparatus, it was because they were not a part of that apparatus. There is nothing illicit about three senior U.S. officials—each with official interests relating to Ukraine— shepherding the U.S.-Ukraine relationship and reporting their actions to State Department and NSC leadership. There is nothing inherently improper with Mayor Giuliani’s involvement as well because the Ukrainians knew that he was a conduit to convince President Trump that President Zelensky was serious about reform. There is also nothing wrong with asking serious questions about the presence of Vice President Biden’s son, Hunter Biden, on the board of directors of Burisma, a corrupt Ukrainian company, or about Ukraine’s attempts to influence the 2016 presidential election. Biden’s Burisma has an international reputation as a corrupt company. As far back as 2015, the Obama State Department had concerns about Hunter Biden’s role on Burisma’s board. Ukrainian anticorruption activists noted concerns as well. Publicly available—and irrefutable—evidence shows how senior Ukrainian government officials sought to influence the 2016 U.S. presidential election in opposition to President Trump’s candidacy, and that some in the Ukrainian embassy in Washington worked with a Democrat operative to achieve that goal. While Democrats reflexively dismiss these truths as conspiracy theories, the facts are indisputable and bear heavily on the Democrats’ impeachment inquiry. ‡‡ “Impeachment Inquiry: Ambassador William B. Taylor and Mr. George Kent”: Hearing before the H. Perm. Sel. Comm. on Intelligence, 116th Cong. (2019) (statement of Rep. Mike Quigley). iii * * * In our system of government, power resides with the American people, who delegate executive power to the President through an election once every four years. Unelected officials and career bureaucrats assist in the execution of the laws. The unelected bureaucracy exists to serve the elected representatives of the American people. The Democrats’ impeachment narrative flips our system on its head in service of their political ambitions. The Democrats’ impeachment inquiry, led by House Intelligence Committee Chairman Adam Schiff, is merely the outgrowth of their obsession with re-litigating the results of the 2016 presidential election. Despite their best efforts, the evidence gathered during the Democrats’ partisan and one-sided impeachment inquiry does not support that President Trump pressured Ukraine to investigate his political rival to benefit the President in the 2020 presidential election. The evidence does not establish any impeachable offense. But that is not for Democrats’ want of trying. For the first phase of the Democrats’ impeachment inquiry, Chairman Schiff led the inquiry from his Capitol basement bunker, preventing transparency on the process and accountability for his actions. Because the fact-finding was unclassified, the closed-door process was purely for information control. This arrangement allowed Chairman Schiff—who had already publicly fabricated evidence and misled Americans about his interaction with the anonymous whistleblower—to selectively leak information to paint misleading public narratives, while simultaneously imposing a gag rule on Republican members. From his basement bunker, Chairman Schiff provided no due process protections for the President and he directed witnesses called by the Democrats not to answer Republican questions. Chairman Schiff also ignored Republican requests to secure the testimony of the anonymous whistleblower, despite promising earlier that the whistleblower would provide “unfiltered testimony.” When the Democrats emerged from the bunker for the public phase of their impeachment inquiry, Chairman Schiff continued to deny fundamental fairness and minority rights. Chairman Schiff interrupted Republican Members and directed witnesses not to answer Republican questions. Chairman Schiff refused to allow Republicans to exercise the limited procedural rights afforded to them. Chairman Schiff rejected witnesses identified by Republicans who would inject some semblance of fairness and objectivity. Chairman Schiff denied Republican subpoenas for testimony and documents, violating the Democrats’ own rules to vote down these subpoenas with no notice to Republicans. Speaker Pelosi, Chairman Schiff, and House Democrats seek to impeach President Trump—not because they have proof of a high crime or misdemeanor, but because they disagreed with the President’s actions and his policies. But in our system of government, the President is accountable to the American people. The accountability to the American people comes at the ballot box, not in House Democrats’ star chamber. iv FINDINGS Democrats allege that President Trump pressured Ukraine to initiate investigations into his political rival, former Vice President Biden, for the purpose of benefiting the President in the 2020 U.S. presidential election. The evidence does not support the Democrats’ allegations. Instead, the findings outlined below are based on the evidence presented and information available in the public realm.  President Trump has a deep-seated, genuine, and reasonable skepticism of Ukraine due to its history of pervasive corruption.  President Trump has a long-held skepticism of U.S. foreign assistance and believes that Europe should pay its fair share for mutual defense.  President Trump’s concerns about Hunter Biden’s role on Burisma’s board are valid. The Obama State Department noted concerns about Hunter Biden’s relationship with Burisma in 2015 and 2016.  There is indisputable evidence that senior Ukrainian government officials opposed President Trump’s candidacy in the 2016 election and did so publicly. It has been publicly reported that a Democratic National Committee operative worked with Ukrainian officials, including the Ukrainian Embassy, to dig up dirt on then-candidate Trump.  The evidence does not establish that President Trump pressured Ukraine to investigate Burisma Holdings, Vice President Joe Biden, Hunter Biden, or Ukrainian influence in the 2016 election for the purpose of benefiting him in the 2020 election.  The evidence does not establish that President Trump withheld a meeting with President Zelensky for the purpose of pressuring Ukraine to investigate Burisma Holdings, Vice President Joe Biden, Hunter Biden, or Ukrainian influence in the 2016 election.  The evidence does not support that President Trump withheld U.S. security assistance to Ukraine for the purpose of pressuring Ukraine to investigate Burisma Holdings, Vice President Joe Biden, Hunter Biden, or Ukrainian influence in the 2016 election.  The evidence does not support that President Trump orchestrated a shadow foreign policy apparatus for the purpose of pressuring Ukraine to investigate Burisma Holdings, Vice President Joe Biden, Hunter Biden, or Ukrainian influence in the 2016 election.  The evidence does not support that President Trump covered up the substance of his telephone conversation with President Zelensky by restricting access to the call summary.  President Trump’s assertion of longstanding claims of executive privilege is a legitimate response to an unfair, abusive, and partisan process, and does not constitute obstruction of a legitimate impeachment inquiry. v TABLE OF CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ............................................................................................................. i FINDINGS ...................................................................................................................................... v TABLE OF CONTENTS ............................................................................................................... vi TABLE OF NAMES....................................................................................................................... x I. The evidence does not establish that President Trump pressured the Ukrainian government to investigate his political rival for the purpose of benefiting him in the 2020 U.S. presidential election. ..................................................................................................................................... 1 A. The evidence does not establish that President Trump pressured President Zelensky during the July 25 phone call to investigate the President’s political rival for the purpose of benefiting him in the 2020 election. ............................................................................... 3 1. The call summary does not reflect any improper pressure or conditionality to pressure Ukraine to investigate President Trump’s political rival. ............................................. 3 2. President Zelensky has publicly and repeatedly said he felt no pressure to investigate President Trump’s political rival. ................................................................................. 6 3. President Trump has publicly and repeatedly said he did not pressure President Zelensky to investigate his political rival. .................................................................... 8 4. Read-outs of the phone call from both the State Department and the Ukrainian government did not reflect that President Trump pressured President Zelensky to investigate his political rival. ........................................................................................ 9 5. The National Security Council leadership did not see the call as illegal or improper.11 6. The anonymous, secondhand whistleblower complaint misstated details about the July 25 call, which has falsely colored the call’s public characterization. ................. 12 B. The evidence does not establish that President Trump withheld a meeting with President Zelensky to pressure Ukraine to investigate the President’s political rival for the purpose of benefiting him in the 2020 election. ............................................................................. 14 1. Ukraine has a long history of pervasive corruption. ................................................... 14 2. President Trump has a deep-seated, genuine, and reasonable skepticism of Ukraine due to its history of pervasive corruption. .................................................................. 16 3. Senior Ukrainian government officials publicly attacked President Trump during the 2016 campaign. ........................................................................................................... 17 4. U.S. foreign policy officials were split on President Zelensky, a political novice with untested views on anti-corruption and a close relationship with a controversial oligarch. ...................................................................................................................... 19 5. President Trump extended an invitation to the White House to President Zelensky on three occasions without conditions. ............................................................................ 21 6. Despite difficulty scheduling a face-to-face presidential meeting, senior Ukrainian officials interacted often with senior American officials between May and September 2019............................................................................................................................. 23 vi 7. The evidence does not establish a linkage between a White House meeting and Ukrainian investigations into President Trump’s political rival. ................................ 25 8. The evidence does not establish that President Trump directed Vice President Pence not to attend President Zelensky’s inauguration to pressure Ukraine to investigate the President’s political rival. ........................................................................................... 29 9. President Trump and President Zelensky met during the United Nations General Assembly in September 2019 without any Ukrainian action to investigate President Trump’s political rival. ............................................................................................... 31 C. The evidence does not establish that President Trump withheld U.S. security assistance to Ukraine to pressure Ukraine to investigate the President’s political rival for the purpose of benefiting him in the 2020 election. ............................................................................. 32 1. President Trump has been skeptical about U.S. taxpayer-funded foreign assistance. 33 2. President Trump has been clear and consistent in his view that Europe should pay its fair share for regional defense..................................................................................... 35 3. U.S. foreign aid is often conditioned or paused, and U.S. security assistance to Ukraine has been paused before. ................................................................................ 37 4. Despite President Trump’s skepticism, the Trump Administration’s policies have shown greater commitment and support to Ukraine than those of the Obama Administration. ........................................................................................................... 40 5. Although security assistance to Ukraine was paused in July 2019, several witnesses testified that U.S. security assistance was not linked to any Ukrainian action on investigations. ............................................................................................................. 41 6. President Trump rejected any linkage between U.S. security assistance and Ukrainian action on investigations............................................................................................... 48 7. Senior U.S. officials never substantively discussed the delay in security assistance with Ukrainian officials before the July 25 call. ......................................................... 50 8. The Ukrainian government denied any awareness of a linkage between U.S. security assistance and investigations....................................................................................... 53 9. The Ukrainian government considered issuing a public anti-corruption statement to convey that President Zelensky was “serious and different” from previous Ukrainian regimes. ....................................................................................................................... 54 10. President Zelensky never raised a linkage between security assistance and investigations in his meetings with senior U.S. government officials. ....................... 60 11. In early September 2019, President Zelensky’s government implemented several anticorruption reform measures. ....................................................................................... 62 12. The security assistance was ultimately disbursed to Ukraine in September 2019 without any Ukrainian action to investigate President Trump’s political rival. ......... 64 D. The evidence does not establish that President Trump set up a shadow foreign policy apparatus to pressure Ukraine to investigate the President’s political rival for the purpose of benefiting him in the 2020 election. ............................................................................. 65 vii 1. The President has broad Constitutional authority to conduct the foreign policy of the United States. .............................................................................................................. 66 2. President Trump was likely skeptical of the established national security apparatus as a result of continual leaks and resistance from the federal bureaucracy..................... 67 3. The President has the constitutional authority to remove Ambassador Yovanovitch. 68 4. Ambassador Volker, Ambassador Sondland, and Secretary Perry were all senior U.S. government officers with official interests in Ukraine policy. ................................... 69 5. Referencing Ukrainian corruption, President Trump told Ambassador Volker, Ambassador Sondland, and Secretary Perry to talk to Mayor Giuliani. ..................... 70 6. At the Ukrainian government’s request, Ambassador Volker connected them with Mayor Giuliani to change his impression about the Zelensky regime........................ 73 7. The Ukrainian government understood that Mayor Giuliani was not speaking on behalf of President Trump. ......................................................................................... 74 8. Ambassador Volker, Ambassador Sondland, and Secretary Perry kept the National Security Council and the State Department informed about their actions. ................. 75 9. Although some in the U.S. foreign policy establishment bristled, the roles of Ambassador Volker, Ambassador Sondland, and Secretary Perry and their interactions with Mayor Giuliani did not violate the law or harm national security. . 76 E. President Trump is not wrong to raise questions about Hunter Biden’s role with Burisma or Ukrainian government officials’ efforts to influence the 2016 campaign. ................... 78 1. It is appropriate for Ukraine to investigate allegations of corruption in its country. .. 78 2. There are legitimate concerns surrounding Hunter Biden’s position on the board of Ukrainian energy company Burisma during his father’s term as Vice President of the United States. .............................................................................................................. 80 3. There are legitimate questions about the extent to which Ukrainian government officials worked to oppose President Trump’s candidacy in the 2016 election. ........ 85 F. The anonymous whistleblower who served as the basis for the impeachment inquiry has no firsthand knowledge of events and a bias against President Trump. ........................... 90 1. The anonymous whistleblower acknowledged having no firsthand knowledge of the events in question. ....................................................................................................... 90 2. Press reports suggest that the anonymous whistleblower acknowledged having a professional relationship with former Vice President Biden. ..................................... 91 3. The anonymous whistleblower secretly communicated with Chairman Schiff or his staff. ............................................................................................................................ 92 II. The evidence does not establish that President Trump engaged in a cover-up of his interactions with Ukrainian President Zelensky. .................................................................... 95 A. President Trump declassified and released publicly the summary of his July 25 phone call with President Zelensky. ................................................................................................... 95 B. President Trump released a redacted version of the classified anonymous whistleblower complaint........................................................................................................................... 96 viii C. President Trump released publicly the summary of his April 21 phone call with President Zelensky. ........................................................................................................................... 96 D. The Trump Administration has experienced a surge in sensitive leaks, including details of the President’s communications with foreign leaders. ..................................................... 96 E. The evidence does not establish that access to the July 25 call summary was restricted for inappropriate reasons. ....................................................................................................... 97 III. The evidence does not establish that President Trump obstructed Congress in the Democrats’ impeachment inquiry. ........................................................................................................... 101 A. Democrats have abandoned long-standing precedent by failing to guarantee due process and fundamental fairness in their impeachment inquiry. ................................................ 102 B. Democrats have engaged in an abusive process toward a pre-determined outcome. ..... 103 C. President Trump may raise privileges and defenses in response to unfair, abusive proceedings. .................................................................................................................... 106 D. Although declining to submit to the Democrats’ abusive and unfair process, President Trump has released information to help the American public understand the issues. .... 107 IV. Conclusion ............................................................................................................................ 109 ix TABLE OF NAMES Christopher Anderson Michael Atkinson Arsen Avakov Hunter Biden Joseph R. Biden Robert Blair Andriy Bohdan John Bolton T. Ulrich Brechbuhl Alexandra Chalupa Valeriy Chaly Laura Cooper Catherine Croft Oleksandr Danylyuk Michael Duffey John Eisenberg Michael Ellis Rudy Giuliani Preston Wells Griffith David Hale Fiona Hill David Holmes Foreign Service Officer, U.S. Department of State Inspector General of the Intelligence Community (May 2018– present) Ukrainian Minister of Internal Affairs (February 2014–present) Board Member, Burisma Holdings (April 2014–October 2019) Vice President of the United States (January 2009–January 2017) Senior Advisor to the White House Chief of Staff (January 2019– present) Head of Ukrainian Office of Presidential Administration (May 2019–present) U.S. National Security Advisor (April 2018–September 2019) Counselor to the U.S. Secretary of State, U.S. Department of State (May 2018–present) Former contractor, Democratic National Committee Ukrainian Ambassador to the United States (July 2015–July 2019) Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Russia, Ukraine, and Eurasia, U.S. Department of Defense Foreign Service Officer, U.S. Department of State Director for European Affairs, National Security Council (July 2017–July 2018) Secretary of the Ukrainian National Security and Defense Council (May 2019–September 2019) Associate Director for National Security Programs, U.S. Office of Management and Budget (May 2019–present) Legal Advisor, National Security Council (2017–present) Deputy Legal Advisor, National Security Council (March 2017– present) Mayor of New York City (1994–2001) Personal Attorney to President Trump (April 2018–present) Associate Director for Natural Resources, Energy & Science, U.S. Office of Management and Budget (April 2018–present) Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, U.S. Department of State (August 2018–present) Senior Director for European and Russian Affairs, National Security Council (April 2017–July 2019) Political Counselor, U.S. Embassy Kyiv §§ (August 2017–present) §§ Consistent with the U.S. Board on Geographic Names, this report spells the Ukrainian capital as “Kyiv” throughout. x Keith Kellogg George Kent Igor Kolomoisky Charles Kupperman Serhiy Leshchenko Yuriy Lutsenko Joseph Maguire Brian McCormack Michael McKinley Tim Morrison Mick Mulvaney Nellie Ohr Mike Pence Rick Perry Mike Pompeo Petro Poroshenko Vadym Prystaiko Philip Reeker Mark Sandy Viktor Shokin Oksana Shulyar Gordon Sondland William Taylor Andrii Telizhenko Donald J. Trump National Security Advisor to the Vice President (April 2018– present) Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs, U.S. Department of State (September 2018– present) Co-owner, PrivatBank Co-owner, 1+1 Media Group U.S. Deputy National Security Advisor (January 2019–September 2019) Ukrainian Member of Parliament (November 2014–July 2019) Prosecutor General of Ukraine (May 2016–August 2019) Acting U.S. Director of National Intelligence (August 2019– present) Associate Director for Natural Resources, Energy & Science, U.S. Office of Management and Budget (September 2018–present) Senior Advisor to the U.S. Secretary of State, U.S. Department of State (November 2018–October 2019) Senior Director for European and Russian Affairs, National Security Council (July 2019–November 2019) Director of the U.S. Office of Management and Budget (February 2017–present) Acting Chief of Staff to the President (January 2019–present) Contractor, Fusion GPS Vice President of the United States (January 2017–present) U.S. Secretary of Energy (March 2017–present) U.S. Secretary of State (April 2018–present) President of Ukraine (June 2014–May 2019) Minister of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine (August 2019–present) Acting Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs, U.S. Department of State (March 2019–present) Deputy Associate Director for National Security, U.S. Office of Management and Budget (December 2013–present) Prosecutor General of Ukraine (February 2015–March 2016) Deputy Chief of Mission, Embassy of Ukraine to the U.S. U.S. Ambassador to the European Union (July 2018–present) U.S. Ambassador to Ukraine (June 2006–May 2009) U.S. Chargé d’Affaires, a.i., U.S. Embassy Kyiv (June 2019– present) Political officer, Embassy of Ukraine to the U.S. President of the United States (January 2017–present) xi Alexander Vindman Kurt Volker Russell Vought Kathryn Wheelbarger Jennifer Williams Viktor Yanukovych Arseniy Yatsenyuk Andrey Yermak Marie Yovanovitch Volodymyr Zelensky*** Mykola Zlochevsky Director for European Affairs, National Security Council (July 2018–present) U.S. Special Representative for Ukraine Negotiations, U.S. Department of State (July 2017–September 2019) Acting Director, U.S. Office of Management and Budget Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Affairs, U.S. Department of Defense (November 2018–present) Special Adviser for Europe and Russia, Office of the Vice President President of Ukraine (February 2010–February 2014) Prime Minister of Ukraine (February 2014–April 2016) Adviser to President of Ukraine Volodymyr Zelensky U.S. Ambassador to Ukraine (August 2016–May 2019) President of Ukraine (May 2019–present) Co-founder, Burisma Holdings (2002–present) Ukrainian Minister of Ecology and Natural Resources (July 2010– April 2012) *** Although some sources use alternate spellings of the Ukrainian President’s surname, this report uses the spelling “Zelensky” for consistency throughout. xii I. The evidence does not establish that President Trump pressured the Ukrainian government to investigate his political rival for the purpose of benefiting him in the 2020 U.S. presidential election. Democrats have alleged that President Trump exerted pressure on Ukrainian President Zelensky to force the Ukrainian government to manufacture “dirt” or otherwise investigate a potential Democrat candidate in the 2020 U.S. presidential election for President Trump’s political benefit.1 Democrats allege that President Trump sought to use the possibility of a White House meeting with President Zelensky and release of U.S. security assistance to Ukraine as leverage to force Ukraine to help the President politically. Democrats allege that President Trump orchestrated a “shadow” foreign policy apparatus that worked to accomplish the President’s political goals. The evidence obtained in the Democrats’ impeachment inquiry, however, does not support these Democrat allegations. In fact, witnesses called by the Democrats denied having any awareness of criminal activity or an impeachable offense. Rep. John Ratcliffe asked Ambassador Bill Taylor and Deputy Assistant Secretary George Kent whether they were “assert[ing] there was an impeachable offense in [the July 25] call.” 2 Neither said there was.3 Rep. Chris Stewart asked Ambassador Marie Yovanovitch if she had any information about President Trump’s involvement in criminal activity. 4 Ambassador Yovanovitch said no.5 Rep. Ratcliffe asked National Security Council (NSC) staff member LTC Alexander Vindman and Office of the Vice President special adviser Jennifer Williams if they have labeled the President’s conduct as “bribery.”6 Both said no.7 Rep. Elise Stefanik asked Ambassador Kurt Volker, the U.S. special envoy for Ukraine negotiations, and Tim Morrison, the NSC senior director for Europe, whether they saw any bribery, extortion, or quid pro quo.8 Both said no.9 Contrary to Democrat assertions, the evidence does not show that President Trump pressured President Zelensky to investigate his political rival during the July 25 phone call. The best evidence of the conversation—the call summary—shows no evidence of conditionality, threats, or pressure. President Zelensky and President Trump have both said there was no 1 “Whistleblower Disclosure”: Hearing of the H. Perm. Sel. Comm. on Intelligence, 116th Cong. (2019) (statement of Rep. Adam Schiff, Chairman); Rep. Adam Schiff (@RepAdamSchiff), Twitter (Oct. 12, 2019, 2:53 p.m.), https://twitter.com/repadamschiff/status/1183138629130035200; Lieu accuses Trump of asking Ukraine to “manufacture dirt” on Biden, The Hill, Sept. 25, 2019. 2 “Impeachment Inquiry: Ambassador William B. Taylor and Mr. George Kent”: Hearing before the H. Perm. Sel. Comm. on Intelligence, 116th Cong. (2019). 3 Id. 4 “Impeachment Inquiry: Ambassador Marie Yovanovitch”: Hearing before the H. Perm. Sel. Comm. on Intelligence, 116th Cong. (2019). 5 Id. 6 “Impeachment Inquiry: LTC Alexander Vindman and Ms. Jennifer Williams”: Hearing before the H. Perm. Sel. Comm. on Intelligence, 116th Cong. (2019). This report abbreviates military titles consistent with the U.S. Government Printing Office style manual. See U.S. Gov’t Printing Off., Style Manual 227 (2016). 7 Id. 8 “Impeachment Inquiry: Ambassador Kurt Volker and Mr. Timothy Morrison”: Hearing before the H. Perm. Sel. Comm. on Intelligence, 116th Cong. (2019). 9 Id. 1 pressure, the initial read-out from the State Department and the Ukrainian government reflected no concerns, and the NSC leadership saw no illegality or impropriety with the call. The evidence does not show that President Trump withheld a meeting with President Zelensky to pressure Ukraine to investigate his political rival. The evidence shows that President Trump has a long-standing, deep-seated skepticism of Ukraine due to its history of pervasive corruption. President Zelensky was a political newcomer with untested views on anti-corruption and a close association with a Ukrainian oligarch. Even so, President Trump agreed to invite President Zelensky to the White House, and in the interim, Ukrainian officials had several highlevel meetings with U.S. officials. President Trump and President Zelensky met in September 2019 without Ukraine ever taking any action on investigating President Trump’s political rival. In addition, the evidence does not show that President Trump withheld U.S. security assistance to Ukraine to pressure Ukraine to investigate his political rival. The evidence shows that President Trump has a skepticism of U.S. taxpayer-funded foreign aid and believes Europe should carry more financial burden for its regional defense. Although U.S. security assistance was paused temporarily, Democrats’ witnesses denied there being any direct link to investigations of the President’s political rival. Both the Ukrainian government and President Trump separately denied any linkage. U.S. officials did not tell the Ukrainian officials about the delay because they thought it would get worked out. Ambassador Volker, a senior U.S. diplomat and primary interlocutor with senior Ukrainian government officials, testified that the Ukrainians did not raise concerns to him about a delay in aid until after the pause was made public in late August 2019. The U.S. security assistance to Ukraine was ultimately disbursed without Ukraine taking any action to investigate President Trump’s political rival. The evidence does not show that President Trump established a “shadow” foreign policy apparatus to pressure Ukraine to investigate his political rival. The President has broad Constitutional authority over U.S. foreign policy, and President Trump is likely suspicious of the national security apparatus due to continual leaks of sensitive information and the resistance within the federal bureaucracy. The three U.S. officials who Democrats accuse of conducting an “irregular” foreign policy channel had legitimate responsibilities for Ukraine policy. They kept the State Department and NSC aware of their actions. To the extent Mayor Giuliani was involved, he was in communication with these officials and the Ukrainians did not see him as speaking on behalf of the President. Although Democrats reflexively criticize President Trump for promoting “conspiracy theories” about Hunter Biden’s role on Burisma’s board or Ukrainian attempts to influence the 2016 election, evidence suggests there are legitimate questions about both issues. The Democrats’ witnesses testified that it would be appropriate for Ukraine to investigate allegations of corruption in Ukraine. Finally, there are fundamental flaws with the anonymous whistleblower complaint that initiated the Democrats’ impeachment inquiry. The complaint contained inaccurate and misleading information that prejudiced the public understanding of President Trump’s conversation with President Zelensky. The whistleblower had no firsthand knowledge of the events in question and a bias against President Trump. The whistleblower communicated with 2 Chairman Schiff or his staff prior to submitting the whistleblower complaint to the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community. Several witnesses contradicted assertions made by the anonymous whistleblower. The whistleblower’s complaint did not accurately reflect the tone and substance of the phone call, which is unsurprising given the whistleblower’s reliance on secondhand information that had likely already been colored by biases of the original sources. A. The evidence does not establish that President Trump pressured President Zelensky during the July 25 phone call to investigate the President’s political rival for the purpose of benefiting him in the 2020 election. On July 25, 2019, President Trump and President Zelensky spoke by telephone. 10 This conversation would later serve as the basis for the anonymous whistleblower complaint and the spark for the Democrats’ impeachment inquiry. Contrary to allegations that President Trump pressured Ukraine to investigate a domestic political rival during this call, 11 the evidence shows that President Trump did not pressure President Zelensky to investigate his political rival. The call summary and initial read-outs of the conversation reflect no indication of conditionality, coercion, or intimidation—elements that would have been present if President Trump had used his authority to pressure President Zelensky to investigate his political rival. Importantly, both President Zelensky and President Trump have said publicly there was no pressure or anything inappropriate about their conversation. The anonymous whistleblower complaint—which sparked the impeachment inquiry—contains sensational rhetoric about the July 25 phone conservation that has prejudged subsequent views of the call. 1. The call summary does not reflect any improper pressure or conditionality to pressure Ukraine to investigate President Trump’s political rival. The best evidence of the telephone conversation between President Trump and President Zelensky is the contemporaneous summary prepared by the White House Situation Room. The Democrats’ witnesses described how National Security Council (NSC) policy staffers and White House Situation Room duty officers typically listen in on presidential conversations with foreign leaders to transcribe the contents of the conversation. 12 This process occurred for President Trump’s July 25 phone call with President Zelensky. 10 President Trump had spoken with then-President-elect Zelensky on April 21, 2019, to congratulate him on his election. See The White House, Memorandum of Telephone Conversation (Apr. 21, 2019). This conversation too contained no indication of pressure, intimidation or threats. See id. 11 See, e.g., Josh Dawsey et al., How Trump and Giuliani pressured Ukraine to investigate the President’s rivals, Wash. Post, (Sept. 20, 2019). 12 See, e.g., Deposition of Dr. Fiona Hill, in Wash., D.C., at 297-300 (Oct. 14, 2019) [hereinafter “Hill deposition”]. Although some have alleged that the presence of ellipses in the call summary connotes missing text, witnesses testified that call summaries often use ellipses to denote unfinished thoughts and not to “read too much” into the use of ellipses. See, e.g., id. at 307. LTC Vindman testified in his closed-door deposition that any editing decisions or missing words were not done maliciously. See Deposition of LTC Alexander Vindman, in Wash., D.C., at 253 (Oct. 29, 2019) [hereinafter “Vindman deposition”]. In his public testimony, LTC Vindman explained that although the summary did not mention the word “Burisma,” it was “not a significant omission.” Impeachment Inquiry: LTC Alexander Vindman and Ms. Jennifer Williams, supra note 6. Morrison testified in his deposition that he believed 3 As transcribed, the call summary denotes laughter, pleasantries, and compliments exchanged between President Trump and President Zelensky. The summary does not evince any threats, coercion, intimidation, or indication of conditionality. Democrats even acknowledged that the call summary reflected no quid pro quo.13 The summary bears absolutely no resemblance to House Intelligence Committee Chairman Adam Schiff’s self-described “parody” interpretation of the call, which the Chairman performed at a public hearing on September 26. 14 The summary of the July 25 phone call begins by President Trump congratulating President Zelensky on a “great victory,” a “terrific job,” and a “fantastic achievement.” 15 President Zelensky reciprocated by complimenting President Trump, saying: Well, yes, to tell you the truth, we are trying to work hard because we wanted to drain the swamp here in our country. We brought in many, many new people. Not the old politicians, not the typical politicians, because we want to have a new format and a new type of government. You are a great teacher for us and in that. 16 President Trump expressed his concern that European countries were not providing their fair share in terms of assistance to Ukraine17—a topic about which President Trump has been vocal. 18 President Zelensky responded that President Trump was “absolutely right” and that he had expressed concerns to German Chancellor Angela Merkel and French President Emmanuel Macron.19 President Zelensky thanked President Trump for U.S. military support and said Ukraine was “almost ready to buy more Javelins from the United States for defense purposes.” 20 President Trump then transitioned to discuss the allegation that some Ukrainian officials sought to influence the 2016 U.S. presidential election. Although Democrats have seized on the President’s phrasing—“I would like you to do us a favor though” 21—to accuse the President of pressuring President Zelensky to target his 2020 political rival for his political benefit, 22 they omit the remainder of his sentence. The full sentence shows that President Trump was not asking President Zelensky to investigate his political rival, but rather asking him to assist in “get[ting] to the call memorandum was an “accurate and complete” reflection of the substance of the call. Deposition of Timothy Morrison, in Wash., D.C., at 60 (Oct. 31, 2019) [hereinafter “Morrison deposition”]. 13 See, e.g., MSNBC Live with Craig Melvin (MSNBC television broadcast Sept. 25, 2019) (interview with Rep. Ro Khanna) (saying evidence of a quid pro quo on the call summary is “irrelevant”). 14 Whistleblower Disclosure, supra note 1. 15 The White House, Memorandum of Telephone Conversation 1 (July 25, 2019). 16 Id. at 2. 17 Id. 18 See infra section I.C.2. 19 Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, supra note 15, at 2. 20 Id. 21 Id. at 3. 22 See, e.g., Whistleblower Disclosure, supra note 1 (statement of Rep. Adam Schiff, Chairman). 4 the bottom” of potential Ukrainian involvement in the 2016 election. 23 This reading is supported by President Trump’s subsequent reference to Special Counsel Robert Mueller, who had testified the day before about his findings,24 and to Attorney General William Barr, who had initiated an official inquiry into the origins of the U.S. government’s 2016 Russia investigation. 25 President Zelensky did not express any concern that President Trump had raised the allegations about Ukrainian influence in the 2016 election. In fact, President Zelensky responded by reiterating his commitment to cooperation between Ukraine and the United States and mentioning that he had recalled the Ukrainian Ambassador to the United States, Valeriy Chaly. 26 Ambassador Chaly had authored an op-ed in The Hill during the height of the presidential campaign in 2016 criticizing a statement that President Trump had made by Crimea. 27 President Zelensky said he planned to surround himself with “the best and most experienced people” and pledged that “as the President of Ukraine that all the investigations will be done openly and candidly.”28 President Zelensky also raised former New York Mayor Rudy Giuliani, saying “we are hoping very much that Mr. Giuliani will be able to travel to Ukraine and we will meet once he comes to Ukraine.”29 The call summary shows that the discussion then intertwined several different topics. In response to President Zelensky’s statement about new personnel, President Trump and President Zelensky discussed the position of prosecutor general. 30 President Zelensky did not express any discomfort discussing the prosecutor general position. He said the new prosecutor general would be “100% my person, my candidate” and said the prosecutor would look into the matters raised by President Trump to “mak[e] sure to restore the honesty” of the investigation. 31 President Zelensky later said “we will be very serious about the case and will work on the investigation.” 32 In response to President Zelensky’s reference to Mayor Giuliani, President Trump said Mayor Giuliani is “a highly respected man” who “very much knows what’s happening and he is a very capable guy.”33 President Trump said that he would ask Mayor Giuliani to call President Zelensky, along with Attorney General Barr, to “get to the bottom of it.” 34 President Zelensky did not express any concern about Mayor Giuliani’s engagement—in fact, President Zelensky, not President Trump, first referenced Mayor Giuliani in the conversation. 23 Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, supra note 15, at 3. The President’s reference to “Crowdstrike” during the conversation refers to a cybersecurity firm that examined the Democratic National Committee server following intrusion by the Russian government in 2016. 24 “Oversight of the Report on the Investigation into Russian Interference in the 2016 Presidential Election: Former Special Counsel Robert S. Mueller, III”: Hearing before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 116th Cong. (2019). 25 See, e.g., Adam Goldman et al., Barr assigns U.S. Attorney in Connecticut to review origins of Russia inquiry, N.Y. Times, May 13, 2019. 26 Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, supra note 15, at 3. 27 Valeriy Chaly, Ukraine’s ambassador: Trump’s comments send wrong message to world, The Hill, Aug. 4, 2016. 28 Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, supra note 15, at 3. 29 Id. 30 Id. at 3-4. 31 Id. at 4. 32 Id. at 5. 33 Id. at 3-4. 34 Id. at 4. 5 President Trump then raised former U.S. Ambassador to Ukraine, Marie Yovanovitch, saying that she was “bad news” and “the people she was dealing with in the Ukraine were bad news.”35 President Zelensky did not express any hesitancy in discussing the ambassador. Contrary to Democrats’ assertion that he felt obligated to agree with President Trump’s assessment, President Zelensky stated his independent negative assessment of Ambassador Yovanovitch: Her attitude toward me was far from the best as she admired the previous President and she was on his side. She would not accept me as a new President well enough. 36 President Trump also raised in passing—using the transition phrase “the other thing”— the topic of Vice President Joe Biden’s son, Hunter Biden, referring to his position on the board of a Ukrainian energy company, Burisma, known for its corruption. 37 President Trump said “a lot of people want to find out about that so whatever you can do with the Attorney General would be great.”38 President Zelensky did not reply to President Trump’s reference to the Bidens, and the two did not discuss the topic substantively. The call concluded with President Zelensky raising energy cooperation between Ukraine and the United States and with President Trump reiterating his invitation for President Zelensky to visit the White House.39 Although some later expressed concern about the call, the call summary—the best evidence of the conversation—shows no indication of conflict, intimidation, or pressure. President Trump never conditioned a White House meeting on any action by President Zelensky. President Trump never mentioned U.S. security assistance to Ukraine. President Zelensky never verbalized any disagreement, hostility, or concern about any facet of the U.S.-Ukrainian relationship. 2. President Zelensky has publicly and repeatedly said he felt no pressure to investigate President Trump’s political rival. Since President Trump declassified and publicly released the content of his July 25 phone conversation with President Zelensky, President Zelensky and other senior Ukrainian officials have publicly and repeatedly asserted that President Zelensky felt no pressure to investigate President Trump’s political rival. President Zelensky has variously asserted, “nobody pushed . . . me,” “I was never pressured,” and there was no “blackmail.” 35 Id. Id. 37 Id. 38 Id. 39 Id. at 5. 36 6 On September 25, President Zelensky and President Trump met face-to-face for a bilateral meeting on the margins of the 74th United Nations (U.N.) General Assembly in New York. The presidents jointly participated in a media availability, during which President Zelensky asserted that he felt no pressure.40 President Zelensky said then: Q. President Zelensky, have you felt any pressure from President Trump to investigate Joe Biden and Hunter Biden? A. I think you read everything. So I think you read text. I’m sorry, but I don’t want to be involved to democratic, open elections — elections of USA. No, you heard that we had, I think, good phone call. It was normal. We spoke about many things. And I — so I think, and you read it, that nobody pushed — pushed me.41 President Zelensky again reiterated that he was not pressured to investigate President Trump’s political rival during an interview with a Kyodo News, a Japanese media outlet, published on October 6. Kyodo News quoted President Zelensky as saying, “I was never pressured and there were no conditions being imposed” on a White House meeting or U.S. security assistance to Ukraine.42 President Zelensky denied “reports by U.S. media that [President] Trump’s requests were conditions” for a White House meeting or U.S. security assistance.43 On October 10, during an all-day media availability in Kyiv, President Zelensky again emphasized that he felt no pressure to investigate President Trump’s political rival. President Zelensky said there was “no blackmail” during the conversation, explaining: “This is not corruption. It was just a call.”44 In addition, on September 21—before President Trump had even declassified and released the call summary—Ukrainian Foreign Minister Vadym Prystaiko denied that President Trump had pressured President Zelensky to investigate President Trump’s political rival. 45 Foreign Minister Prystaiko said: I know what the conversation was about and I think there was no pressure. There was talk, conversations are different, leaders have the right to discuss any problems that exist. This conversation was 40 Press Release, The White House, Remarks by President Trump and President Zelensky of Ukraine Before Bilateral Meeting (Sept. 25, 2019), available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarkspresident-trump-president-zelensky-ukraine-bilateral-meeting-new-york-ny/. 41 Id. (emphasis added). 42 Ukraine president denies being pushed by Trump to investigate Biden, Kyodo News, Oct. 6, 2019. 43 Id. 44 Ukraine’s president says ‘no blackmail’ in Trump call, BBC, Oct. 10, 2019. 45 “Trump did not pressure Zelenskyy, Ukraine is independent state” – Foreign Minister Prystaiko, Hromadske, Sept. 21, 2019. 7 long, friendly, and it touched on a lot of questions, including those requiring serious answers.46 Similarly, Ambassador Bill Taylor explained that he had dinner with Oleksandr Danylyuk, thenSecretary of the National Security and Defense Council, the night of the phone conversation between President Trump and President Zelensky.47 He explained that Danylyuk said that the Ukrainian government “seemed to think that the call went fine, the call went well. He wasn’t disturbed by anything. He wasn’t disturbed that he told us about the phone call.” 48 President Zelensky’s repeated denials that President Trump pressured him to investigate domestic political rival—corroborated by Foreign Minister Prystaiko’s similar denial—carry significant weight. 3. President Trump has publicly and repeatedly said he did not pressure President Zelensky to investigate his political rival. Like President Zelensky, President Trump has repeatedly and publicly stated that he did not pressure President Zelensky to investigate his political rival. During the September 25 bilateral meeting with President Zelensky, President Trump said to the assembled members of the media: “There was no pressure. And you know there was—and, by the way, you know there was no pressure. All you have to do it see it, what went on the call.” 49 When asked whether he wanted President Zelensky to “do more” to investigate Vice President Biden, President Trump responded: “No. I want him to do whatever he can. This was not his fault; he wasn’t there. He’s just been here recently. But whatever he can do in terms of corruption, because the corruption is massive.”50 Despite the President’s statements, some allege that an overheard conversation the day after President Trump’s conversation with President Zelensky shows that the President sought to pressure President Zelensky. On July 26, following a meeting with President Zelensky, Ambassador Gordon Sondland, the U.S. Ambassador to the European Union, telephoned President Trump from Kyiv.51 According to a subsequent account of David Holmes, a Political Counselor at U.S. Embassy Kyiv, Ambassador Sondland told the President that he was in Ukraine and stated President Zelensky “loves your ass.” 52 Holmes recounted that President Trump asked Ambassador Sondland, “So he’s going to do the investigation?” 53 Ambassador Sondland allegedly replied, “He’s going to do it.”54 46 Id. (emphasis added). Deposition of Ambassador William B. Taylor, in Wash., D.C., at 80 (Oct. 22, 2019). 48 Id. 49 Remarks by President Trump and President Zelensky of Ukraine Before Bilateral Meeting, supra note 40. 50 Id. 51 Deposition of David Holmes, in Wash., D.C., at 23-25 (Nov. 15, 2019) [hereinafter “Holmes deposition”]. Ambassador Sondland did not mention this phone call in his deposition. See generally Deposition of Ambassador Gordon D. Sondland, in Wash., D.C. (Oct. 17, 2019) [hereinafter “Sondland deposition”]. 52 Holmes deposition, supra note 51, at 24 53 Id. 54 Id. 47 8 This conversation is not definitive evidence that President Trump pressured President Zelensky to investigate his political rival. First, according to Ambassador Sondland, it was not clear that President Trump meant an investigation into the Bidens. In his closed-door deposition, Ambassador Sondland testified that he only had “five or six” conversations with the President and did not mention this particular conversation.55 In his public testimony, however, Ambassador Sondland suddenly recalled the conversation, saying that it “did not strike me as significant at the time” and that the primary purpose of the call was to discuss rapper A$AP Rocky, who was imprisoned in Sweden.56 Ambassador Sondland testified that he has no recollection of discussing Vice President Biden or his son, Hunter Biden, with President Trump. 57 Second, Holmes testified that although he disclosed Ambassador Sondland’s conversation with the President to multiple friends on multiple occasions, he did not feel compelled to disclose it to the State Department or Congress until weeks into the impeachment inquiry.58 Although Holmes testified that he told his boss, Ambassador Taylor, about the call on August 6 and received a “knowing” response, and that he referred to the call often in staff meetings, Ambassador Taylor testified publicly that he was “not aware of this information” at the time of his October 22 deposition, and that he only became aware of the Holmes account on November 8, 2019, two days after his hearing was publicly announced, at which point he referred it (for the first time) to the Legal Adviser for the Department of State. 59 4. Read-outs of the phone call from both the State Department and the Ukrainian government did not reflect that President Trump pressured President Zelensky to investigate his political rival. Immediately following the telephone conversation between President Trump and President Zelensky, senior U.S. and Ukrainian government officials provided read-outs of the conversation. According to witness testimony, none of these read-outs indicated that the conversation between the presidents was substantively concerning. Ambassador Volker testified that he received informal read-outs of the call from both his State Department assistant and his high-level Ukrainian contacts. 60 These read-outs did not indicate any concern with the phone call. Ambassador Volker explained: 55 Sondland deposition, supra note 51, at 56. “Impeachment Inquiry: Ambassador Gordon Sondland”: Hearing before the H. Perm. Sel. Comm. on Intelligence, 116th Cong. (2019). 57 Id. 58 Holmes deposition, supra note 51, at 31, 158-62. 59 Id. at 81-82, 121-22, 167; see generally Taylor deposition, supra note 47; Impeachment Inquiry: Ambassador William B. Taylor and Mr. George Kent, supra note 2. 60 Transcribed interview of Ambassador Kurt Volker, in Wash., D.C., at 102-03 (Oct. 3, 2019) [hereinafter “Volker transcribed interview”]. Ambassador Volker’s assistant at the time, Catherine Croft, testified that she only received a read-out of the phone call was based on what President Zelensky told Ambassador Volker, Ambassador Taylor, and Ambassador Sondland on July 26. Deposition of Catherine Croft, in Wash., D.C., at 16 (Oct. 30, 2019) [hereinafter “Croft deposition”]. 56 9 A. I got an oral readout from the staffer who works for me in the State Department and our chargé, as well as from Andrey Yermak, who had been on the call in Ukraine himself. Q. So you got two readouts? A. Yeah. Q. One from each side? A. Correct. Q. What was the top line message you got from the State Department? A. Well, they were the same, actually, which is interesting. But the message was congratulations from the President to President Zelensky; President Zelensky reiterating that he is committed to fighting corruption and reform in the Ukraine; and President Trump reiterating an invitation for President Zelensky to visit him at the White House. That was it.61 In fact, in his public testimony, Ambassador Volker testified that President Zelensky was “very upbeat about the fact of the call.”62 Ambassador Sondland received a summary of the phone call from his staff. 63 Ambassador Sondland testified that he was pleased to learn that it was a “good call.” 64 George Kent, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State covering Ukraine, testified that he received a readout of the call from NSC staffer LTC Alexander Vindman. 65 According to Kent, although LTC Vindman said the “atmospherics” of the conversation was cooler and reserved, LTC Vindman did not mention Vice President Biden’s name or anything relating to 2016. 66 In addition, the Office of the President of Ukraine issued an official statement following the phone call.67 The official statement also signaled no concern about the call or any indication of coercion, intimidation, or pressure from President Trump. The statement read in full: President of Ukraine Volodymyr Zelensky had a phone conversation with President of the United States Donald Trump. President of the United States congratulated Ukraine on successful holding free and 61 Volker transcribed interview, supra note 60, at 102-03. Impeachment Inquiry: Ambassador Kurt Volker and Timothy Morrison, supra note 8. 63 Sondland deposition, supra note 51, at 116. 64 Id. 65 Deposition of George Kent, in Wash., D.C., at 163 (Oct. 15, 2019) [hereinafter “Kent deposition”]. 66 Id. at 163-65 67 Press Release, Office of the President of Ukraine, Volodymyr Zelenskyy had a phone conversation with President of the United States (July 25, 2019), available at https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/volodimir-zelenskij-provivtelefonnu-rozmovu-z-prezidentom-s-56617. 62 10 democratic parliamentary elections as well as Volodymyr Zelensky with victory the Servant of the People Party. Donald Trump is convinced that the new Ukrainian government will be able to quickly improve image of Ukraine, complete investigation of corruption cases, which inhibited the interaction between Ukraine and the USA. He also confirmed continued support of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine by the United States and the readiness of the American side to fully contribute to the implementation of a Large-Scale Reform Program in our country. Volodymyr Zelensky thanked Donald Trump for US leadership in preserving and strengthening the sanctions pressure on Russia. The Presidents agreed to discuss practical issues of UkrainianAmerican cooperation during the visit of Volodymyr Zelensky to the United States.68 The initial read-outs of the July 25 telephone conversation between President Trump and President Zelensky provide compelling evidence that the key message conveyed during the conversation was about fighting corruption in Ukraine—and not about digging up dirt on President Trump’s political rival for the President’s political benefit. 5. The National Security Council leadership did not see the call as illegal or improper. The evidence shows that the NSC leadership did not see the telephone conversation between President Trump and President Zelensky as improper. Timothy Morrison, who served as the Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security, listened in on the conversation. 69 He testified that he was concerned information from the call could leak, but he was not concerned that anything discussed on the call was illegal or improper. 70 LTG Keith Kellogg, Vice President Pence’s National Security Advisor, also listened in on the July 25 telephone conversation. 71 LTG Kellogg stated that like Morrison: “I heard nothing wrong or improper on the call. I had and have no concerns.” 72 LTG Kellogg’s subordinate, Jennifer Williams, testified that although she found the call to be “unusual,” she did not raise 68 Id. Morrison deposition, supra note 12, at 15. 70 Id. at 16, 60-61. 71 The White House, Statement from Lieutenant General Keith Kellogg, National Security Advisor to Vice President Mike Pence (Nov. 19, 2019) [hereinafter “Statement from Lieutenant General Kellogg”]. 72 Id. 69 11 concerns to LTG Kellogg.73 LTG Kellogg similarly noted that Williams never raised concerns to him.74 Morrison’s subordinate, LTC Vindman, listened in on the conversation. 75 At the time of the call, LTC Vindman handled Ukraine policy for the NSC.76 He testified that he was concerned by the conversation and raised his concerns to the NSC’s Legal Advisor, John Eisenberg. 77 Eisenberg, according to LTC Vindman, did not share the concern. 78 LTC Vindman did not raise any concerns to Morrison, his immediate supervisor.79 In his public testimony, Morrison explained that he had concerns with LTC Vindman’s judgment and deviation from the chain of command.80 The evidence suggests that any wider concerns about the July 25 phone call originated from LTC Vindman. Williams testified that she discussed the call with no one outside the NSC. 81 LTC Vindman, on the other hand, testified that he discussed the phone call with two people outside of the NSC, Deputy Assistant Secretary Kent and an unidentified intelligence community employee.82 Deputy Assistant Secretary Kent explained that LTC Vindman felt “uncomfortable” and would not share the majority of the substance of the conversation. 83 According to Kent’s recollection, LTC Vindman did not mention that the conversation included any reference to Vice President Biden.84 6. The anonymous, secondhand whistleblower complaint misstated details about the July 25 call, which has falsely colored the call’s public characterization. The anonymous whistleblower did not listen in on the July 25 call between President Trump and President Zelensky. The whistleblower’s subsequent complaint about the conversation, compiled with secondhand information, misstated key details about the conversation. The whistleblower sensationally alleged that President Trump “sought to pressure the Ukrainian leader to take actions to help the President’s 2020 reelection bid.” 85 The call summary, however, contains no reference to 2020 or President Trump’s reelection bid. 86 73 Deposition of Jennifer Williams, in Wash., D.C., at 129 (Nov. 7, 2019) [hereinafter “Williams deposition”]; Impeachment Inquiry: LTC Alexander Vindman and Ms. Jennifer Williams, supra note 6. 74 Statement from Lieutenant General Kellogg, supra note 71. 75 Vindman deposition, supra note 12, at 18. 76 Id. at 16. 77 Id. at 96. 78 Id. at 97, 258. 79 Morrison deposition, supra note 12, at 59. 80 Impeachment Inquiry: Ambassador Kurt Volker and Mr. Timothy Morrison, supra note 8. 81 Impeachment Inquiry: LTC Alexander Vindman and Ms. Jennifer Williams, supra note 6. 82 Id. 83 Kent deposition, supra note 65, at 163-64. 84 Id. at 165-66. 85 Letter to Richard Burr, Chairman, S. Sel. Comm. on Intelligence, & Adam Schiff, Chairman, H. Perm. Sel. Comm. on Intelligence 2 (Aug. 12, 2019) [hereinafter “Whistleblower letter”]. 86 Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, supra note 15. 12 The whistleblower alleged that President Trump “pressured” President Zelensky to “initiate or continue an investigation into the activities of former Vice President Joseph Biden and his son, Hunter Biden.”87 The call summary, however, shows that President Trump referenced the Bidens only in passing and that the presidents did not discuss the topic substantively.88 The whistleblower alleged that President Trump “pressured” President Zelensky to “locate and turn over servers used by the Democratic National Committee (DNC) and examined by the U.S. cyber security firm Crowdstrike.” 89 The call summary, however, demonstrates that while President Trump mentioned Crowdstrike and “the server,” President Trump never made any request that President Zelensky locate or turn over any material. 90 The whistleblower alleged that President Trump “praised Ukraine’s Prosecutor General, Mr. Yuriy Lutsenko, and suggested that Mr. Zelensky might want to keep him in his position.” 91 The call summary is not clear about which prosecutor general President Trump is referring to— Ambassador Volker testified he believed President Trump was referring to Lutsenko’s predecessor, Viktor Shokin92—and President Trump never specifically referenced Lutsenko. 93 President Trump also never suggested or intimated that President Zelensky should “keep [Lutsenko] in his position.”94 The whistleblower also alleged that T. Ulrich Brechbuhl, Counselor to Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, listened in on the July 25 phone call. 95 Subsequent reporting, confirmed by a letter sent by Brechbuhl’s attorney, indicated that Brechbuhl was not on the call. 96 * * * Setting aside the whistleblower’s mischaracterization of President Trump’s phone call with President Zelensky, the best available evidence shows no coercion, threats, or pressure for Ukraine to investigate the President’s political rival for the President’s political benefit. The call summary shows no quid pro quo, the initial read-outs relayed no substantive concerns, and both President Zelensky and President Trump have repeatedly said publicly there was no pressure. These facts refute the Democrats’ allegations. 87 Whistleblower letter, supra note 85, at 2. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, supra note 15. 89 Whistleblower letter, supra note 85, at 2. 90 Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, supra note 15, at 3. 91 Whistleblower letter, supra note 85, at 3. 92 Volker transcribed interview, supra note 60, at 355. 93 Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, supra note 15. 94 Id. 95 Whistleblower letter, supra note 85, at 3. 96 Christina Ruffini (@EenaRuffini), Twitter (Sept. 26, 2019, 12:41 p.m.), https://twitter.com/EenaRuffini/status/1177307225024544768; Letter from Ronald Tenpas to Adam Schiff, Chairman, H. Perm. Sel. Comm. on Intelligence (Nov. 5, 2019). 88 13 B. The evidence does not establish that President Trump withheld a meeting with President Zelensky to pressure Ukraine to investigate the President’s political rival for the purpose of benefiting him in the 2020 election. Democrats allege that President Trump withheld a meeting with President Zelensky as a way of pressuring Ukraine to investigate President Trump’s political rival. 97 Here, too, the evidence obtained during the impeachment inquiry does not support this allegation. President Trump and President Zelensky met without Ukraine ever investigating Vice Present Biden or his son, Hunter Biden. The evidence strongly suggests, instead, that President Trump was reluctant to meet with President Zelensky for a different reason—Ukraine’s long history of pervasive corruption and uncertainty about whether President Zelensky would break from this history and live up to his anti-corruption campaign platform. The Democrats’ witnesses described how President Trump has a deep-seated and genuine skepticism of Ukraine due to its corruption and that the President’s view was reasonable. Because of President Trump’s skepticism and because President Zelensky was a first-time candidate with relatively untested views, Ukraine and U.S. officials sought to convince President Trump that President Zelensky was the “real deal” on reform. President Trump ultimately signed a letter to President Zelensky on May 29 inviting him to the White House. Although there were several months between President Trump’s invitation on May 29 and the bilateral meeting on September 25, the evidence does not show the delay was intentional or aimed at pressuring President Zelensky. The Democrats’ witnesses described the difficulty in scheduling high-level meetings and how an anticipated presidential meeting in Poland in early September was cancelled due to Hurricane Dorian. Nonetheless, U.S. foreign policy officials believed that the Ukrainian government felt good about its relationship with the Trump Administration because of several high-level bilateral meetings held between May and September 2019, including President Zelensky’s meeting with Vice President Pence on September 1. Ultimately, of course, President Trump and President Zelensky met during the U.N. General Assembly in New York on September 25, without Ukraine taking steps to investigate President Trump’s political rival. 1. Ukraine has a long history of pervasive corruption. Since it became an independent nation following the collapse of the Soviet Union, Ukraine has been plagued by systemic corruption. The Guardian has called Ukraine “the most corrupt nation in Europe”98 and Ernst & Young cites Ukraine among the three most-corrupt nations of the world.99 97 See, e.g., Karoun Demirjian et al., Officials’ texts reveals belief that Trump wanted probes as condition of Ukraine meeting, Wash. Post, Oct. 4, 2019. 98 Oliver Bullough, Welcome to Ukraine, the Most Corrupt Nation in Europe, Guardian, (Feb. 6, 2015). 99 See, e.g., 14th Global Fraud Survey, Ernst & Young, (2016), https://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/EYcorporate-misconduct-individual-consequences/$FILE/EY-corporate-misconduct-individual-consequences.pdf (noting that 88% of Ukrainian’s agree that “bribery/corrupt practices happen widely in business in [Ukraine]”). See also Viktor Tkachuk, People First: The Latest in the Watch on Ukrainian Democracy, Kyiv Post, (Sept. 11, 2012), 14 The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) explained Ukraine’s history of corruption in a 2006 report: From the early 1990s, powerful officials in [the Ukrainian] government and politics acquired and privatized key economic resources of the state. As well, shadowy businesses, allegedly close to organized crime, became powerful economic forces in several regions of the country. Over the course of the past decade, these business groupings—or clans—as they became called, grew into major financial-industrial structures that used their very close links with and influence over government, political parties, the mass media and the state bureaucracy to enlarge and fortify their control over the economy and sources of wealth. They used ownership ties, special privileges, relations with government and direct influence over the courts and law enforcement and regulatory organizations to circumvent weaknesses in governmental institutions. 100 Corruption is so pervasive in Ukraine that in 2011, 68.8% of Ukrainian citizens reported that they had bribed a public official within the preceding twelve months. 101 Bribery and facilitation payments102 are common schemes by which Ukrainian officials demand payment in exchange for ensuring public services are delivered either on time or at all. 103 Corruption also presents an obstacle to private and public business in Ukraine. 104 In 2011, then-President Petro Poroshenko estimated that 15%, or $7.4 billion, of the state budget “ends up in the pockets of officials” through corrupt public procurement practices. 105 Pervasive corruption in Ukraine has been one of the primary impediments to Ukraine joining the European Union.106 Corruption-related concerns also figure prominently in the E.U.Ukrainian Association Agreement, the document establishing a political and economic https://www.kyivpost.com/article/opinion/op-ed/people-first-the-latest-in-the-watch-on-ukrainian-democracy-5312797.html. 100 U.S. Agency for International Development, Final Report, Corruption Assessment: Ukraine (2006), https://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PNADK247.pdf. 101 Fighting Corruption in Ukraine: Ukrainian Style, Gorshenin Inst., (Mar. 7, 2011), http://gpfeurope.com/upload/iblock/333/round_table_eng.pdf. 102 See Facilitation Payments, Corruption Dictionary, Ganintegrity.com, (last visited Oct. 23, 2019), https://www.ganintegrity.com/portal/corruption-dictionary/. Facilitation payments, also known as “grease payments,” are a form of bribery made with the purpose of expediting or securing the performance of a routine action to which the payer is legally entitled. Id. 103 People & Corruption: Citizens’ Voices from Around the World, Transparency Int’l, (2017), https://www.transparency.org/whatwedo/publication/people_and_corruption_citizens_voices_from_around_the_wor ld. 104 Id. 105 Mark Rachkevych, Under Yanukovych, Ukraine Slides Deeper in Ranks of Corrupt Nations, Kyiv Post, (Dec. 1, 2011). 106 See, e.g., Vladimir Isachenkov, Ukraine’s integration into West dashed by war and corruption, Assoc. Press, Mar. 26, 2019. 15 association between the E.U. and Ukraine. 107 The Agreement was entered into with the intent of Ukraine committing to gradually conform to E.U. technical and consumer standards. State Department witnesses called by the Democrats during the impeachment inquiry confirmed Ukraine’s reputation for corruption. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State George Kent described Ukraine’s corruption problem as “serious” and said corruption has long been “part of the high-level dialogue” between the United States and Ukraine. 108 Ambassador Bill Taylor said corruption in Ukraine is a “big issue.” 109 Ambassador Kurt Volker testified that “Ukraine has a long history of pervasive corruption throughout the economy[,] throughout the country, and it has been incredibly difficult for Ukraine as a country to deal with this, to investigate it, to prosecute it.”110 He later elaborated: Ukraine had for decades a reputation of being just a corrupt place. There are a handful of people who own a disproportionate amount of the economy. Oligarchs, they use corruption as kind of the coin of the realm to get what they want, including influencing the Parliament, the judiciary, the government, state-owned industries. And so businessmen generally don’t want to invest in Ukraine, even to this day, because they just fear that it’s a horrible environment to be working in, and they don’t want to put – expose themselves to that risk. I would have to believe that President Trump would be aware of that general climate.111 2. President Trump has a deep-seated, genuine, and reasonable skepticism of Ukraine due to its history of pervasive corruption. Multiple Democrat witnesses offered firsthand testimony of President Trump’s skeptical view of Ukraine, as far back as September 2017. Ambassador Volker explained: “President Trump demonstrated that he had a very deeply rooted negative view of Ukraine based on past corruption. And that’s a reasonable position. Most people who would know anything about Ukraine would think that.”112 He elaborated that the President’s concern about Ukraine was genuine,113 and that this concern contributed to a delay in the meeting with President Zelensky. He explained: 107 E.U.-Ukraine Ass’n Agreement, art. 14, Mar. 21, 2014, 57 Off. J. of the E.U. L161/3 (“In their cooperation on justice, freedom and security, the Parties shall attach particular importance to the consolidation of the rule of law and the reinforcement of institutions at all levels in the areas of administration in general and law enforcement and the administration of justice in particular. Cooperation will, in particular, aim at strengthening the judiciary, improving its efficiency, safeguarding its independence and impartiality, and combating corruption. Respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms will guide all cooperation on justice, freedom and security.”). 108 Kent deposition, supra note 65 at 105, 151. 109 Taylor deposition, supra note 47, at 86. 110 Volker transcribed interview, supra note 60, at 76. 111 Id. at 148-49. 112 Id. at 30. 113 Id. at 295. 16 So the issue as I understood it was this deep-rooted, skeptical view of Ukraine, a negative view of Ukraine, preexisting 2019, you know, going back. When I started this, I had one other meeting with President Trump and [then-Ukrainian] President Poroshenko. It was in September of 2017. And at that time he had a very skeptical view of Ukraine. So I know he had a very deep-rooted skeptical view. And my understanding at the time was that even though he agreed in the [May23] meeting that we had with him, say, okay, I’ll invite him, he didn’t really want to do it. And that’s why the meeting kept being delayed and delayed. 114 Other testimony confirms Ambassador Volker’s statements. Former U.S. Ambassador to Ukraine Marie Yovanovitch confirmed the President’s skepticism, saying that she observed it during President Trump’s meeting with President Poroshenko in September 2017. 115 She testified: Q. Were you aware of the President’s deep-rooted skepticism about Ukraine’s business environment? A. Yes. Q. And what did you know about that? A. That he—I mean, he shared that concern directly with President Poroshenko in their first meeting in the Oval Office. 116 Dr. Fiona Hill, NSC Senior Director for Europe, also testified that President Trump was “quite publicly” skeptical of Ukraine and that “everyone has expressed great concerns about corruption in Ukraine.”117 Catherine Croft, a former NSC director, similarly attested to President’s Trump skepticism when she staffed President Trump for two Ukraine matters in 2017, explaining: “Throughout both, I heard, directly and indirectly, President Trump described Ukraine as a corrupt country.”118 3. Senior Ukrainian government officials publicly attacked President Trump during the 2016 campaign. President Trump’s skepticism about Ukraine was compounded by statements made by senior Ukrainian government officials in 2016 that were critical of then-candidate Trump and supportive of his opponent, former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton. Although Democrats have attempted to discredit these assertions as “debunked,” the statements by Ukrainian leaders speak 114 Id. at 41. Deposition of Ambassador Marie Yovanovitch, in Wash., D.C., at 142 (Oct. 11, 2019). 116 Id. 117 Hill deposition, supra note 12, at 118. 118 Croft deposition, supra note 60, at 14. 115 17 for themselves and shed light on President Trump’s mindset when interacting with President Zelensky in 2019. In August 2016, less than three months before the election, Valeriy Chaly, thenUkrainian Ambassador to the United States, authored an op-ed in the Washington-based publication The Hill criticizing candidate Trump for comments he made about Russia’s occupation of Crimea.119 Ambassador Chaly wrote that candidate Trump’s comments “have raised serious concerns in [Kyiv] and beyond Ukraine.” 120 Although President Zelensky dismissed Ambassador Chaly on July 19, 2019, 121 the ambassador’s op-ed remains on the website of the Ukrainian Embassy in the U.S. as of the date of this report. 122 Later that month, the Financial Times published an article asserting that Trump’s candidacy led “Kyiv’s wider political leadership to do something they would never have attempted before: intervene, however indirectly, in a US election.” 123 The article quoted Serhiy Leshchenko, a Ukrainian Member of Parliament, to detail how the Ukrainian government was supporting Secretary Clinton’s candidacy. 124 The article explained: Though most Ukrainians are disillusioned with the country’s current leadership for stalled reforms and lackluster anti-corruption efforts, Mr. Leshchenko said events of the past two years had locked Ukraine on to a pro-western course. The majority of Ukraine’s politicians, he added, are “on Hillary Clinton’s side.” 125 The Financial Times reported that during the U.S. presidential campaign, former Ukrainian Prime Minister Arseniy Yatsenyuk had warned on Facebook that candidate Trump “challenged the very values of the free world.” 126 On Twitter, Ukrainian Internal Affairs Minister Arsen Avakov called Trump a “clown” who is “an even bigger danger to the US than terrorism.”127 In a Facebook post, Avakov called Trump “dangerous for Ukraine and the US” and said that Trump’s Crimea comments were the “diagnosis of a dangerous misfit.” 128 Avakov continues to serve in President Zelensky’s government. Multiple Democrat witnesses testified that these Ukrainian actions during the 2016 election campaign likely also colored President Trump’s views of President Zelensky. Ambassador Volker said: 119 See Chaly, supra note 27. Id. 121 Zelensky dismisses Valeriy Chaly from post of Ukraine’s envoy to US, Kyiv Post (July 19, 2019). 122 Embassy of Ukraine in the United States of America, Op-ed by Ambassador of Ukraine to the USA Valeriy Chaly for the Hill: “Trump’s comments send wrong message to world,” https://usa.mfa.gov.ua/en/presscenter/publications/4744-posol-ukrajini-vislovlyuvannya-trampa-nadsilajuty-nevirnij-signal-svitu. 123 Roman Olearchyk, Ukraine’s leaders campaign against ‘pro-Putin’ Trump, Financial Times, Aug. 28, 2016. 124 Id. 125 Id. (emphasis added). 126 Id. 127 Kenneth P. Vogel & David Stern, Ukrainian efforts to sabotage Trump backfire, Politico, Jan. 11, 2017. 128 Id. 120 18 Q. And you mentioned that the President was skeptical, had a deeprooted view of the Ukraine. Is that correct? A. That is correct. Q. And that, whether fair or unfair, he believed there were officials in Ukraine that were out to get him in the run-up to his election? A. That is correct. Q. So, to the extent there are allegations lodged, credible or uncredible, if the president was made aware of those allegations, whether it was via The Hill or, you know, via Mr. Giuliani or via cable news, if the President was made aware of these allegations, isn’t it fair to say that he may, in fact, have believed they were credible? A. Yes, I believe so.129 Ambassador Sondland similarly testified: Q. Did [President Trump] mention anything about Ukraine’s involvement in the 2016 election? A. I think he said: They tried to take me down. He kept saying that over and over. Q. In connection with the 2016 election? A. Probably, yeah. Q. That was what your understanding was? A. That was my understanding, yeah.130 4. U.S. foreign policy officials were split on President Zelensky, a political novice with untested views on anti-corruption and a close relationship with a controversial oligarch. Evidence obtained during the Democrats’ impeachment inquiry shows that the U.S. foreign policy apparatus was divided on the question of whether President Trump should meet with President Zelensky. President Zelensky was a first-time candidate and a newcomer to the Ukrainian political scene. Although President Zelensky ran on an anti-corruption and reform platform, the Democrats’ witnesses explained that the State Department was unsure how he 129 130 Volker transcribed interview, supra note 60, at 70-71. Sondland deposition, supra note 51, at 75. 19 would govern as president. In addition, others in the U.S. government worried about President Zelensky’s association with Ukrainian oligarch Igor Kolomoisky. President Zelensky won a landslide victory on April 21, 2019, defeating incumbent President Petro Poroshenko by a 73-24 percent margin. 131 The win came as a surprise to many.132 At the time of his election, Mr. Zelensky was a comedic television personality. Ambassador Volker testified that “Zelensky kind of came up out of nowhere. . . . When he arose kind of meteorically, as an outside figure and a popular candidate, I think it did take everybody by surprise.”133 Ambassador Yovanovitch also testified that Zelensky’s election came as a surprise. She explained: And I think that there was, you know, as is true, I think, probably in any country during Presidential elections, a lot of – a lot of concerns among people. This was I think a big surprise for the political elite of Ukraine, which is relatively small. And so, I don’t think they saw it coming really until the very end. And, so, there was surprise and, you know, all the stages of grief, anger, disbelief, how is this happening?134 Ambassador Yovanovitch agreed that President Zelensky was an “untried” politician: Q. And how did you feel about [Zelensky winning the election]? What were your views of Zelensky? Did you think he was going to be a good advocate for the anticorruption initiatives, as he was campaigning on? A. We didn’t know. I mean, he was an untried politician. Obviously, he has a background as a comedian, as an actor, as a businessperson, but we didn’t know what he would be like as a President. 135 Ambassador Sondland testified that there was a difference in opinion regarding whether to schedule a call between Presidents Trump and Zelensky. Ambassador Sondland recalled that he, Ambassador Volker, and Secretary Perry advocated for a call between the presidents, while NSC officials disagreed.136 Evidence suggests that U.S. officials had concerns about some people surrounding President Zelensky. Ambassador Volker testified that President Zelensky’s chief of presidential administration, Andriy Bohdan, had earlier been an attorney for “a very famous oligarch in 131 Ukraine election: Comedian Zelensky wins presidency by landside, BBC News (Apr. 22, 2019). Id. 133 Volker transcribed interview, supra note 60 at 152-53. 134 Yovanovitch deposition, supra note 115, at 73-74. 135 Id. at 74. 136 Sondland note 51, at 27-28. 132 20 Ukraine.”137 Senator Ron Johnson, who attended President Zelensky’s inauguration in May 2019, recalled “concern over rumors that [President] Zelensky was going to appoint Andriy Bohdan, the lawyer for oligarch Igor Kolomoisky, as his chief of staff. The delegation [to the inauguration] viewed Bohdan’s rumored appointment to be contrary to the goal of fighting corruption and maintaining U.S. support.” 138 President Zelensky appointed Bohdan to be head of presidential administration in May 2019. 139 In addition, Dr. Hill explained that the NSC had a concern about President Zelensky’s relationship with Kolomoisky, an oligarch who had owned the television station on which Zelensky’s comedy show aired.140 Under the Poroshenko regime, the Ukrainian government had accused Kolomoisky of embezzling from PrivatBank, which he co-owned, causing Kolomoisky to flee Ukraine.141 According to Ambassador Volker, “the Ukrainian taxpayer officially is bailing out the bank for the money that Kolomoisky stole. Because the IMF provides budgetary support to Ukraine, we [the U.S. taxpayers] actually ended up bailing out this bank.” 142 Ambassador Taylor testified that he discussed these concerns about Kolomoisky directly with President Zelensky: [T]he influence of one particular oligarch over Mr. Zelensky is of particular concern, and that’s this fellow Kolomoisky, so – and Kolomoisky has growing influence. And this is one of the concerns that I have expressed to President Zelensky and his team on several occasions very explicitly, saying that, you know, Mr. President, Kolomoisky was not elected. You were elected and he, Mr. Kolomoisky, is increasing his influence in your government, which could cause you to fail. So I’ve had that conversation with him a couple of times.143 Kolomoisky returned to Ukraine following President Zelensky’s victory. 144 5. President Trump extended an invitation to the White House to President Zelensky on three occasions without conditions. The evidence demonstrates that President Trump had a deep skepticism of Ukraine based on its history of pervasive corruption. This inherent skepticism, coupled with certain Ukrainian government officials’ criticism of candidate Trump during the 2016 campaign and President Zelensky’s untested views, contributed to President Trump’s reticence to meet with President 137 Volker transcribed interview, supra note 60, at 137. Letter from Sen. Ron Johnson to Jim Jordan, Ranking Member, H. Comm. on Oversight & Reform, & Devin Nunes, Ranking Member, H. Perm. Sel. Comm. on Intelligence 3 (Nov. 18, 2019). 139 Roman Olearchyk, Volodymyr Zelensky hires oligarch’s lawyer as chief of staff, Financial Times, May 22, 2019. 140 Hill deposition, supra note 12, at 76-77. 141 Andrew E. Kramer, Oligarch’s return raises alarm in Ukraine, N.Y. Times, May 16, 2019. 142 Volker transcribed interview, supra note 60, at 246. 143 Taylor deposition, supra note 47, at 86. 144 Kramer, supra note 141. 138 21 Zelensky. In spring and summer 2019, however, the President extended an invitation to the White House to President Zelensky on three occasions—without any conditions. On April 21, 2019, President Trump placed a brief congratulatory call to President-elect Zelensky.145 President Trump said: “When you’re settled in and ready, I’d like to invite you to the White House.”146 The presidents did not discuss any investigations, and President Trump placed no conditions on his invitation. On May 23, President Trump met with Ambassador Volker, Ambassador Sondland, Secretary Perry, and Senator Johnson—the senior U.S. officials who had comprised the official U.S. delegation to President Zelensky’s inauguration days before. The delegation sought to convey to President Trump a positive impression of President Zelensky. 147 According to Ambassador Volker: President Trump demonstrated that he had a very deeply rooted negative view of Ukraine based on past corruption. And that’s a reasonable position. Most people who would know anything about Ukraine would think that. That’s why it was important that we wanted to brief him, because we were saying, it’s different, this guy is different. But the President had a very deeply rooted negative view. We urged that he invite President Zelensky to meet with him at the White House. He was skeptical of that. We persisted. And he finally agreed, okay, I’ll do it.148 Later in his transcribed interview, Ambassador Volker provided more context for the May 23 discussion: What I heard from President Trump in the meeting in the oval office was blanket, like, “this—these are terrible people, this is a corrupt country,” you know, “I don’t believe it.” I made the argument that President Zelensky is the real deal, he is going to try to fix things, and, you know, he just did not believe it. He waved it off. So there’s a general issue there. He did not mention investigations to me in that meeting, or call for investigations. I was not aware that he did so in the July 25th call later. His attitude towards Ukraine was just general and negative.149 Ambassador Sondland similarly testified that President Trump expressed negative views about Ukraine in this meeting and mentioned how “they tried to take me down” in 2016. 150 145 Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, supra note 10. Id. 147 Hill deposition, supra note 12, at 320. 148 Volker transcribed interview, supra note 60, at 30-31. 149 Id. at 280. 150 Sondland deposition, supra note 51, at 74-75. 146 22 Although Ambassador Sondland said he was discouraged by the President’s viewpoint, he was pleased and surprised that the President later agreed to invite President Zelensky to the White House.151 Senator Johnson recalled that in this meeting, President Trump “expressed strong reservations about support for Ukraine. He made it crystal clear that he viewed Ukraine as a thoroughly corrupt country both generally and, specifically, regarding rumored meddling in the 2016 election.”152 Senator Johnson further explained: It was obvious that [the President’s] viewpoint and reservations were strongly held, and that we would have a significant sales job ahead of us in getting him to change his mind. I specifically asked him to keep his viewpoint and reservations private and not to express them publicly until he had a chance to meet [President] Zelensky. He agreed to do so, but he added that he wanted [President] Zelensky to know exactly how he felt about the corruption in Ukraine prior to any future meeting. 153 Senator Johnson recounted that he did not recall President Trump mentioning Burisma or the Bidens, but it was “obvious” that President Trump was aware of “rumors that corrupt actors in Ukraine might have played a part in helping create the false Russia collusion narrative.” 154 On May 29, President Trump wrote to President Zelensky to invite him to Washington, D.C. “as soon as we can find a mutually convenient time.”155 President Trump’s letter did not mention any investigations and placed no conditions on President Zelensky’s invitation to the White House. On July 25, during their phone conversation, President Trump reiterated his invitation to President Zelensky, again without conditions.156 6. Despite difficulty scheduling a face-to-face presidential meeting, senior Ukrainian officials interacted often with senior American officials between May and September 2019. By late May 2019, President Trump had formally extended an invitation for President Zelensky to visit the White House. Although the two presidents did not meet face-to-face until September 25, the Democrats’ witnesses testified that presidential meetings can often take time to schedule and that senior Ukrainian officials met frequently with American counterparts in the 151 Id. at 74, 81, 85-87. Letter from Sen. Ron Johnson, supra note 138, at 4. 153 Id. 154 Id. 155 Letter from President Donald J. Trump to His Excellency Volodymyr Zelenskyy, President of Ukraine (May 29, 2019). Dr. Hill testified that Ambassador Sondland claimed he had dictated the paragraph inviting President Zelensky to the White House, see Hill deposition, supra note 12, at 74; however, Ambassador Sondland testified that he had no role in drafting the letter. Sondland deposition, supra note 51, at 81. 156 Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, supra note 15. 152 23 interim.157 Ambassador Volker explained that the new Zelensky regime was “actually feeling pretty good by then” about its relationship with the Trump Administration. 158 On June 4, President Zelensky attended an Independence Day dinner at the U.S. mission to the E.U. hosted by Ambassador Sondland and also attended by White House Senior Advisor Jared Kushner.159 On July 3, while in Toronto, Canada, for the Ukraine Reform Conference, President Zelensky met with Ambassador Volker and Deputy Assistant Secretary of State George Kent. 160 On July 9, Oleksandr Danylyuk, then-Secretary of the National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine, and Andrey Yermak, a senior adviser to President Zelensky, met with LTG Keith Kellogg, Vice President Pence’s National Security Advisor; Jennifer Williams, a special advisor covering European issues for Vice President Pence; and NSC staff member LTC Alexander Vindman.161 On July 10, Danylyuk and Yermak met at the White House with National Security Advisor John Bolton, Secretary Perry, Ambassador Volker, Ambassador Sondland, Dr. Hill, and LTC Vindman.162 On July 25, President Trump and President Zelensky spoke by telephone. 163 On July 26, President Zelensky met with Ambassador Volker, Ambassador Sondland, and Ambassador Taylor in Kyiv.164 Ambassador Volker testified that the meeting was scheduled before the presidents’ phone call.165 He said President Zelensky was “pleased that the call had taken place . . . . They thought it went well. And they were encouraged again because the President had asked them to pick dates for coming to the White House.” 166 On August 27, President Zelensky met with National Security Advisor Bolton in Kyiv. 167 On September 1, President Zelensky met with Vice President Pence in Warsaw, Poland, after an event commemorating the 80th anniversary of the beginning of World War II. 168 President Trump had been scheduled to attend but was forced to cancel due to Hurricane 157 Kent deposition, supra note 65, at 231; Volker transcribed interview, supra note 60, at 127. Volker transcribed interview, supra note 60, at 127. 159 Sondland deposition, supra note 51, at 26-27, 148-49. 160 Kent deposition, supra note 65, at 241; Volker transcribed interview, supra note 60, at 137. 161 Williams deposition, supra note 73, at 51-53. 162 Volker transcribed interview, supra note 60, at 66-67; Hill deposition, supra note 12, at 62-63. 163 Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, supra note 15. 164 Volker transcribed interview, supra note 60, at 312-33; Sondland deposition, supra note 51, at 29. 165 Volker transcribed interview, supra note 60, at 102. 166 Id. at 313. 167 Taylor deposition, supra note 47, at 229-30. 168 The White House, Readout of Vice President Mike Pence’s Meeting with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy (Sept. 1, 2019); Taylor deposition, supra note 47, at 34-35. 158 24 Dorian.169 According to Ambassador Taylor’s testimony, Vice President Pence reiterated President Trump’s views for “Europeans to do more to support Ukraine and that he wanted the Ukrainians to do more to fight corruption.” 170 On September 17, Secretary of State Pompeo had a telephone conversation with Ukrainian Foreign Minister Vadym Prystaiko. 171 According to a readout from the U.S. Embassy in Kyiv, Secretary Pompeo “affirmed U.S. support for Ukraine as it advances critical reforms to tackle corruption, strengthen the rule of law, and foster an economic environment that promotes competition and investment. The Secretary expressed unwavering U.S. support for Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.”172 On September 18, President Zelensky and Vice President Pence spoke by telephone. 173 The two discussed President Zelensky’s upcoming meeting with President Trump on the margins of the U.N. General Assembly and Ukraine’s effort to address its corruption challenges. 174 7. The evidence does not establish a linkage between a White House meeting and Ukrainian investigations into President Trump’s political rival. The evidence in the Democrats’ impeachment inquiry does not show that a White House meeting was conditioned on Ukraine’s willingness to investigate President Trump’s political rival. Although the anonymous whistleblower, citing “multiple” secondhand sources, alleged that President Trump sought to withhold a meeting to pressure President Zelensky to “play ball,” 175 publicly available information contradicts the whistleblower’s claim. For example, Andrey Yermak, a senior adviser to President Zelensky, admitted in an August 2019 New York Times article that he discussed with Mayor Giuliani both meeting between President Trump and President Zelensky and investigations. 176 The Times reported, however, that Yermak and Mayor Giuliani “did not discuss a link between the two.” 177 Other firsthand testimony obtained during the impeachment inquiry supports this finding. For example, Ambassador Volker, the key interlocutor with the Ukrainian government, clearly testified that there was no “linkage” between a White House meeting and Ukrainian actions to investigate President Trump’s political rival. He explained: Q. Did the President ever withhold a meeting with President Zelensky until the Ukrainians committed to investigating those allegations? 169 Volker transcribed interview, supra note 60, at 130; Taylor deposition, supra note 47, at 35. Taylor deposition, supra note 47, at 35. 171 U.S. Embassy in Ukraine, Secretary Michael R. Pompeo’s Call with Ukrainian Foreign Minister Vadym Prystayko (Sept. 17, 2019), https://ua.usembassy.gov/secretary-michael-r-pompeos-call-with-ukrainian-foreignminister-vadym-prystayko/. 172 Id. 173 The White House, Readout of Vice President Mike Pence’s Phone Call with President of Ukraine (Sept. 18, 2019). 174 Id.; see also Volker transcribed interview, supra note 60, at 317-18. 175 Whistleblower letter, supra note 85, at 7. 176 Kenneth P. Vogel & Andrew E. Kramer, Giuliani renews push for Ukraine to investigate Trump’s political opponents, N.Y. Times, Aug. 21, 2019. 177 Id. 170 25 A. We had a difficult time scheduling a bilateral meeting between President Zelensky and President Trump. Q. Ambassador Volker, that was a yes-or-no question. A. Well, if I – can you repeat the question then? Q. Sure. Did President Trump ever withhold a meeting with President Zelensky or delay a meeting with President Zelensky until the Ukrainians committed to investigate the allegations that you just described concerning the 2016 Presidential election? A. The answer to the question is no, if you want a yes-or-no answer. But the reason the answer is no is we did have difficulty scheduling a meeting, but there was no linkage like that. 178 *** Q. So before we move to the text messages, I want to ask you a clarifying question. You said that you were not aware of any linkage between the delay in the Oval Office meeting between President Trump and President Zelensky and the Ukrainian commitment to investigate the two allegations as you described them, correct? A. Correct.179 Ambassador Sondland was the only witness to allege a quid pro quo with respect to a White House meeting. However, to the extent that Ambassador Sondland testified that he believed a White House meeting was conditioned on Ukrainian actions, his belief was that a meeting was conditioned on a public statement about anti-corruption—not on investigations into President Trump’s political rival.180 Ambassador Sondland testified in his closed-door deposition that “nothing about the request raised any red flags for me, Ambassador Volker, or Ambassador Taylor.”181 In his public testimony, Ambassador Sondland clarified that he believed there was linkage, but that President Trump had never discussed with him any preconditions for a White House visit by President Zelensky.182 In addition, there is conflicting testimony about what occurred during a July 10 meeting between two senior Ukrainian officials and senior U.S. officials in National Security Advisor John Bolton’s office. Ambassador Volker, Ambassador Sondland, Secretary Perry joined 178 Volker transcribed interview, supra note 60, at 35-36. Id. at 40. 180 Sondland deposition, supra note 51, at 30, 331. 181 Id. at 30. 182 Impeachment Inquiry: Ambassador Gordon Sondland, supra note 56. 179 26 Ambassador Bolton to meet with Oleksandr Danylyuk, then-Secretary of Ukraine’s National Security and Defense Council, and Andrey Yermak, an adviser to President Zelensky. 183 Dr. Hill and LTC Vindman from the NSC staff attended as well.184 Dr. Hill and LTC Vindman alleged that during the meeting, Ambassador Sondland raised potential Ukrainian actions on investigations, leading Ambassador Bolton to abruptly end the meeting.185 Dr. Hill recounted that Ambassador Bolton told her to brief the NSC Legal Advisor, John Eisenberg, and said he would not be a part of what he termed a “drug deal.” 186 Although Dr. Hill testified that she confronted Ambassador Sondland over his discussion of investigations,187 Ambassador Sondland testified in his closed-door deposition that “neither Ambassador Bolton, Dr. Hill, or anyone else on the NSC staff ever expressed any concerns to me about our efforts . . . or, most importantly, any concerns that we were acting improperly.” 188 Ambassador Sondland testified in his deposition that he recalled no “unpleasant conversation” with Dr. Hill.189 Likewise, although Ambassador Volker assessed that the meeting was “not good,” he said it was because Danylyuk poorly conveyed the appropriate top-level message to Ambassador Bolton during the meeting. 190 In his public testimony, Ambassador Volker acknowledged that Ambassador Sondland made a “general comment about investigations,” but he disputed that the July 10 meeting ended abruptly.191 He also testified that preconditions were not discussed during the meeting. 192 Although Ambassador Sondland denied in his closed-door depositions that he raised investigations during July 10 meeting,193 he acknowledged that he did in his public testimony. 194 Even still, Ambassador Sondland denied that the July 10 meeting ended abruptly: “I don’t recall any abrupt ending of the meeting or people storming out or anything like that. That would have been very memorable if someone had stormed out of a meeting, based on something I said.” 195 He explained that Dr. Hill never raised concerns to him, and that any discussion of investigations did not mention specific investigations.196 He testified: Q. And, in fact, after the meeting, you went out and you took a picture, right? 183 Sondland deposition, supra note 51, at 27; Volker transcribed interview, supra note 60, at 50-51. Hill deposition, supra note 12, at 63; Vindman deposition, supra note 12, at 17-18. 185 Hill deposition, supra note 12, at 67; Vindman deposition, supra note 12, at 17. 186 Hill deposition, supra note 12, at 70-71. 187 Id. at 68-71. Dr. Hill testified that she also had a “blow up” with Ambassador Sondland in June about Ukraine, saying that Ambassador Sondland got “testy.” Id. at 113. 188 Sondland deposition, supra note 51, at 28. 189 Id. at 114. 190 Volker transcribed interview, supra note 60, at 66. 191 Impeachment Inquiry: Ambassador Kurt Volker and Mr. Timothy Morrison, supra note 8. 192 Id. 193 Id. at 109-10. 194 Impeachment Inquiry: Ambassador Gordon Sondland, supra note 56. 195 Id. 196 Id. 184 27 A. Yeah. We – Ambassador Bolton – or his assistant indicated that he was out of time, that he needed – he had another meeting to attend. And we all walked out of the White House. Everyone was smiling, everyone was happy, and we took a picture on the lawn on a nice sunny day. Q. Okay. Then did you retire to the Ward Room? A. I think Secretary Perry asked to use the Ward Room to continue the conversation. And the real subject that was under debate – and it wasn’t an angry debate, it was a debate – should the call from President Trump to President Zelensky be made prior to the parliamentary elections in Ukraine or after the parliamentary elections? And there was good reason for both. We felt – Ambassador Perry, Ambassador Volker, and I thought it would help President Zelensky to have President Trump speak to him prior to the parliamentary elections, because it would give President Zelensky more credibility, and ultimately he would do better with his people in the parliamentary elections. Others, I believe, pushed back and said, no, it’s not appropriate to do it before. It should be done after. And ultimately, it was done after. Q. Okay. There was no mention of Vice President Biden in the Ward Room? A. Not that I remember, no. Q. Or any specific investigation? A. Just the generic investigations.197 Contemporaneous evidence contradicts the idea that there was serious discord during the meeting. Following the meeting, Ambassador Bolton retweeted a statement from Secretary Perry about the July 10 meeting, writing it was a “great discussion . . . on U.S. support for Ukrainian reforms and the peaceful restoration of Ukrainian territory.” 198 The picture in the tweet of the U.S. and Ukrainian officials—taken immediately after the meeting in Ambassador Bolton’s office199—shows smiling faces and no indication of hostility or discord between Ambassador Bolton and Ambassador Sondland. 197 Id. John Bolton (@AmbJohnBolton), Twitter (July 10, 2019, 4:39 p.m.), https://twitter.com/AmbJohnBolton/status/1149100798632026112. 199 Sondland deposition, supra note 51, at 110. 198 28 Figure 1: Ambassador Bolton tweet following July 10 meeting a John Bolton 9 I, - Follow 1 Great discussion today with Oleksandr Danylyuk, Secretary of Ukraine?s National Security and Defense Council, on US. support for Ukrainian reforms and the peaceful restoration of Ukrainian territory. Rick Perry. sez'eisrg, Parry :cusaor at the @W'itechse tr @An?bcano ne and Ira O e