EXHIBIT 1 From: Tim Eyman Sent: Tuesday, November 19, 2019 5:53 AM To: noah.purcell@atg.wa.gov Subject: Fwd: which will be handling l-976 litigation? Noah, Couple of questions: 1. Are you the only attorney who is going to be doing the 976 litigation? 2. Do you have a briefing schedule lined up for the injunction hearing on nov 26? 3. Has anyone asked to intervene? 4. I have heard there is an argument for change of venue something about the ?preeminence? of Thurston county when it comes to initiative litigation. Also, how can a judge be unbiased if one of the plaintiffs is his employer? Do you plan on including a change of venue motion and/or affidavit of prejudice on the judge? Please let me know. Regards, Tim Eyman tim.eyman@gmail.com landline: 425-590?9363 cell: 509-991-5295 TimDefense.com Begin forwarded message: From: Date: November 18, 2019 at 11:43:00 PM PST To: javg@atg.wa.gov, CallieC@atg.wa.gov, alanc@atg.wa.gov, jeffe@atg.wa.gov Subject: which will be handling I-976 litigation? which will be handling 1-976 litigation? Please let me know. Tim Eyman EXHIBIT 2 From: Purcell, Noah Guzzo (ATG) Sent: Tuesday, November 19, 2019 12:16 PM To: Tim Eyman Subject: RE: which will be handling l-976 litigation? Mr. Eyman, Thank you for your message. Before answering your specific questions, I want to reiterate a point that we have discussed in relation to prior initiatives that I think is worth highlighting again. Specifically, while you were the sponsor of I-976, our client when we defend initiatives in court (including l?976j is not the sponsor, but rather the people of the State of Washington, who approved the Initiative. 1 therefore cannot give you legal advice. That said, I will do my best to answer your questions in a timely way, as I would for any interested person. Turning to your specific questions: 1) The team of attorneys defending l-976 will include Deputy Solicitors General Alan Copsey, Alicia Young, and Karl Smith, plus Assistant AG Lauryn Fraas. They are all exceptionally talented attorneys. 2) The briefing schedule comes from the Court?s rules. Plaintiff?s brief was due by 5pm yesterday, the State?s reply is due by noon on Friday, and Plaintiffs? reply is due by noon next Monday. 3) To my knowledge, no one has asked to intervene. 4) Challenges to initiatives can generally be litigated in the county where the Plaintiff files suit, unless there is something specific to the type of challenge or initiative that limits the appropriate venue. For example, we defended Initiatives 1240 and 1366 in King County Superior Court, Initiatives 1351 and 1433 in Kittitas County Superior Court, and initiative 1183 in Cowlitz County Superior Court. l'm not sure if I understand your question about the judge. Our Supreme Court has held that superior court judges are both state and county officers, and the cost of their salaries is ?is divided between the state and the counties.? Parker v. Wyman, 176 Wash. 2d 212, 222, 289 P.3d 628 (2012). So if your point is that the judge works for King County, that isn?t quite accurate; he is also a state officer, so you could just as well argue that he works for the State?the Defendant in the case. in any event, we trust that he can be impartial in this matter and we have no current plans to move to change venue or to file an affidavit of prejudice (which would keep the case in King County but simply switch it to a different judgej i hope that answers your questions. if not, please let me know. Sincerely, Noah Purcell Solicitor General EXHIBIT 3 From: Purcell, Noah Guzzo (ATG) Sent: Tuesday, November 19, 2019 1:20 PM To: Tim Eyman Subject: RE: which will be handling I-976 litigation? 1 have pasted below the email addresses for the lawyers working on the case. That said, the team is exceptionally busy right now working on the response brief and supporting materials, so I am attempting to coordinate communications. Please share any ideas or questions with me and I will pass them along to the team. Alan.copsey@atg.wa.gov Alicia.young@atg.wa.gov Lauryn.fraas@atg.wa.gov Karl.smith@atg.wa.gov From: Tim Eyman Sent: Tuesday, November 19, 2019 12:19 PM To: Purcell, Noah Guzzo (ATG) Subject: Re: which will be handling l?976 litigation? Thank you for responding Would you share with me the email addresses for your team working on it? I was ho ping to share thoughts with them Regards, Tim Eyman tim.evman@gmail.com landline: 425?590-9363 cell: 509-991-5295 TimDefense.com EXHIBIT 4 From: Tim Eyman Sent: Tuesday, November 19, 2019 12:20 PM To: Copsey, Alan (ATG) Subject: Re: 1084 Eyman - No Special PreferencesG Alan, Noah said you?re part of the team gonna defend 976. May I share some thoughts with you on it? Regards, Tim Eyman tim.eyman@gmail.com landline: 425-590-9363 cell: 509?991-5295 TimDefense.com EXHIBIT 5 From: Tim Eyman Sent: Tuesday, November 19, 2019 12:58 PM To: Alan Copsey; Noah Guzzo Purcell Subject: Fwd: Possible argument in defense of Attachments: l-976 legal notesdocx; Untitled attachment 07138.htm Alan Noah, read the attached and the email thread below and consider the suggestions made in it - it is from an attorney friend Date: November 19, 2019 at 7:35:52 AM PST To: Tim Eyman Subject: Re: Possible argument in defense of I-976 Right. RCW 42.17A.555 would not prevent private parties who otherwise have standing from challenging l-976. Some private parties are already part of the existing suit. And it wouldn't prevent local governments from challenging l-976 after it takes effect. However, in order to issue a preliminary injunction, a judge is going to have to find that the parties will be seriously harmed without an injunction and that the parties are likely to succeed in proving that l-976 is illegal. If a judge can?t consider legal arguments made by/potential harm alleged by government entities, it is less likely they will enjoin 1-976 pending the ultimate outcome of the lawsuit. Seattle and King County are the heavy hitters here. If sucessful, the argument would invalidate their litigation to-date and take them out of commission until takes effect. it's a delaying action, not a silver bullet. On Tue, Nov 19, 2019, 1:09 AM Tim Eyman wrote: Wouldn?t they just pass it off to the non govt entities? Or is it too late for them to do switcheroo? Regards, Tim Eymanl On Nov 18, 2019, at 11:32 PM Hi Tim, It occurred to me recently that King County, Seattle and the other public entities seeking an injunction to block l-976 from taking effect may be violating the provision in the Fair Campaign Practices Act preventing public officials/employees from opposing a ballot proposition. if successful, this argument would mean that the public entities seeking the injunction have no standing and are, in fact, barred from challenging the initiative at this stage. That would take the harms they allege off the table for a judge considering whether to issue an injunction. We prepared and attached an outline of the argument. Are you or anyone other than the AG involved in defending the state/initiative in the litigation? Even if it is just the AGO, it might be worth forwarding to the AAGs defending the initiative. Good luck! Summary of Argument: King County, the City of Seattle, the Port of Seattle, and the Gar?eld County Transportation Authority violated RCW 42.17A.555 by using public employees to prepare a legal challenge to 1-976 before Nov. 5 and by ?ling such challenge before the end of the election and the effective date of the initiative. 1. Legal expenses to invalidate a ballot measure are ?independent expenditures? under the Chapter 42.17A RCW. a. RCW 42.17A255: (1) For the purposes of this section the term "independent expenditure" means any expenditure that is made in support of or in opposition to any candidate or ballot proposition and is not otherwise required to be reported pursuant to RCW 42.17A.225, 42.17A.235, and 42.17A.240. "Independent expenditure" does not include: An internal political communication primarily limited to the contributors to a political party organization or political action committee, or the of?cers, management staff, and stockholders of a corporation or similar enterprise, or the members of a labor organization or other membership organization; or the rendering of personal services of the sort commonly performed by volunteer campaign workers, or incidental expenses personally incurred by volunteer campaign workers not in excess of ?fty dollars personally paid for by the worker. "Volunteer services," for the purposes of this section, means services or labor for which the individual is not compensated by any person. (2) Within ?ve days after the date of making an independent expenditure that by itself when added to all other such independent expenditures made during the same election campaign by the same person equals one hundred dollars or more, or within ?ve days after the date of making an independent expenditure for which no reasonable estimate of monetary value is practicable, whichever occurs ?rst, the pgson who made the independent expenditure shall ?le with the commission an initial report of all independent expenditures made duringthe campaign prior to and including such date. b. State v. Evergreen Freedom Found. 192 Wn.2d 782, 798, 432 P.3d 805 ?Moreover, where litigation is being employed as a tool to block adoption of an initiative or to force an initiative onto the ballot, as was attempted here, the ?nances enabling such support (or opposition) would indeed appear to fall within the ?any expenditure,? triggering the reporting obligation [in RCW The contention that litigation support does not qualify as a reportable independent expenditure ignores the express purpose of the FCPA in the context of modem politics.? c. v. Ec'tmomic Board )?br '1"awma?Piercc (four/try. 441 P.3d th?, 1277520191: ?[T]he phrase ?in opposition to? [in RCW is also unambiguous. Chapter 42.17A RCW lacks a de?nition of ?in opposition to.? However, looking to the dictionary de?nition, ?opposition? is de?ned as ?hostile or contrary action or condition: action designed to constitute a barrier or check.? THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1583 (2002).? ?Litigation expenses incurred to seek a judicial directive regarding whether measures may be placed on the ballot are reportable under RCW 42.17A.255. See Evergreen, 192 Wn.2d at 787. And RCW 42.17A.255 unambiguously de?nes ?in opposition to? to include pre-election litigation expenditures on legal services to block an initiative. Thus, expenditures on legal services to block an initiative are necessarily independent gxpenditures subiect to the statute?s reporting requirements.? 2. Legal expenses to strike down a ballot measure during an election or before the ballot measure takes effect are ?independent expenditures.? a. Chapter 42.17A RCW speci?es when activities in support of or opposition to a ballot measure become reportable, but does not specify when such expenses need no longer be reported/when something is no longer a ballot measure. i. RC "Ballot proposition? means any "measure" as de?ned by RCW 29A.04.091, or any initiative, recall, or referendum proposition proposed to be submitted to the voters of the state or any municipal corporation, political subdivision, or other voting constituency from and after the time when the proposition has been initially ?led with the appropriate election of?cer of that constituency before its circulation for signatures. ii. RCW 29A.04.09l: "Measure" includes any proposition or question submitted to the voters. RCW 42.1 "Election campaign" means any campaign in support of or in opposition to a candidate for election to public of?ce and any campaign in support of, or in opposition to, a ballot proposition. b. Although Chapter 42.17A does not specify when something ceases to be a ?ballot measure,? it seems unlikely that courts would conclude that something is a ?ballot measure? after it takes effect and becomes law. Nevertheless, it can reasonably be argued that legal expenses to oppose a ballot measure during an election or before it takes effect are reportable ?independent expenditures.? i. While the formal date of the 2019 general election was November 5, 2019, the election did not conclude on that day. In fact, it is still going on. ii. Washington?s 2019 general election results will be certi?ed by counties on November 26. The results will be certi?ed by the Secretary of State on December 5. The earliest that any portion of [-976 will take effect is December S, 2019. 3. Public of?cials may not use public facilities, including staff time or legal services, to oppose a ballot proposition. 3. RCW 42.17A.555: No elective of?cial nor any employee of his or her of?ce nor any person appointed to or employed by any public of?ce or agency may use or authorize the use of any of the facilities of a public of?ce or agency, directly or indirectly, for the purpose of assisting a campaign for election of any person to any of?ce or for the promotion of or opposition to any ballot proposition. Facilities of a public of?ce or agency include, but are not limited to, use of stationery, postage, machines, and equipment, use of employees of the of?ce or agency during working hours, vehicles, of?ce space, publications of the of?ce or agency, and clientele lists of persons served by the of?ce or b. State Economic Development Board for Tacoma-Pierce County. 441 P.3d 1269. 1277120191: Port made expenditures for legal services in opposition to the STW ballot propositions. Accordingly, the Port?s use of its ?nancial resources to oppose the STW ballot propositions falls within the conduct regulated by RCW 42.17A.555. The only question then, is whether an exception The Port?s lawsuit in opposition to the STW ballot propositions was neither ?normal and regular conduct? of the Port, nor merely a vote to express collective disapproval of the ballot propositions. As a result, the trial court erred by summarily dismissing the State?s complaint regarding the Port?s use of public funds to oppose the ballot propositions.? 4. King County, the City of Seattle, the Port of Seattle, and the Gar?eld County Transportation Authority violated RCW 42.17A.555 by using public employees to prepare a legal challenge to 1-976 before Nov. 5 and by ?ling such challenge before the end of the election and the effective date of the initiative. Accordingly, all of their legal ?lings, claims of standing, and requests for a preliminary injunction preventing 1-976 from taking effect are illegal and inappropriate. Government plaintiffs may not ?le legal challenges to 1-976 before the initiative?s effective date. EXHIBIT 6 From: Tim Eyman Date: Tue, Nov 19, 2019 at 1:21 PM Subject: consider these points To: Copsey, Alan (ATG) noah.purcell@atg.wa.ggr_ Seattle government?s legal complaint is sloppy and weak because it was slapped together so quickly. Seventeen years ago, various governments filed a lawsuitjust like this one against Initiative 776 which voters passed in 2002. Back then, they claimed that l-776 violated the Constitution in multiple ways. But the supreme court rejected them all. As the Seattle Pl reported thenzThe state Supreme Court upheld Eyman's Initiative 776 on every point that came before it. Eyman was ecstatic yesterday. "It's gratifying when the voters get what they voted for, he said, adding that it is "nice to see the justices moving closer to the voters. From the Court?s ruling in 2003 (again, Seattle?s lawsuit against l-976 mirrors these same complaints): 1. SINGLE SUBJECT: Opponents ?failed to show? that required the people to cast a singte vote on two unrelated, proposed laws.? EYMAN COMMENT: Seattle?s lawsuit against I-976 is the most absurd when it comes to this. The bill title reads: ACT Relating to limiting taxes, fees, and other charges relating to vehicles.? Every provision in l-976 does that. The initiative in 1 2002, like l-976, put $30 limit on tabs, repealed state taxes, local fees, the valuation schedule, and addressed bond retirement issues, etc. l-976, just like l-776, does those same things. Single subject on I- 776, single subject on l-976. 2. BALLOT Opponents have not ?met their burden? to show 776?s ballot title failed to notify the public of the subject matter of the measure.? EYMAN COMMENT: That was what the court ruled for l-776 which read: Initiative Measure No. 776 concerns state and local government charges on motor vehicles. Here is the subject matter for l-976: Initiative Measure No. 976 concerns motor vehicle taxes and fees. My current attorney and former supreme court justice Richard Sanders recently completed a policy analysis of a different tax initiative. In it, he wrote this: Does the Attorney General?s ballot title comply with the subject-in-title requirement of Article ll, Section 19 of the Washington Constitution? Const. Art. ll, Sec. 19 provides: No bill shall embrace more than one subject, and that shall be expressed in the title. The rule requires the legislation ?5 subject to be embraced in the title. For initiatives, the title is prepared by the Attorney General. The courts have been extremely reluctant to find a voter- approved initiative invalid under this requirement. Here?s an excerpt from a very recent supreme court ruling: The purpose of the subject-in-title rule is to notify members of the legislature and the public of the subject matter of a title complies with the constitution if it gives notice that would lead to an inquiry into the body of the act, or indicate to an inquiring mind the scope and purpose of the law. The title need not be an index to the contents, nor must it 2 provide details of the measure. Washington Ass ?n for Substance Abuse and Violence Prevention v. State, 174 Wn.2d 642, 660 (2012) (citations omitted). EYMAN COMMENT: The ballot title for l-776 conveyed the subject matter of the measure and was upheld; the ballot title for I-976 does the same. 3. LOCAL HOME RULE: Opponents ?contend that l-776 violates precepts of local home rule The argument lacks merit. Article Xl, section 12 permits the state to legislate what taxes and fees local governments are allowed to impose. The legislature or the people legislating by initiative may rescind by general laws the authority previously granted.? EYMAN COMMENT: It?s very weird that their lawsuit brings up the exact same argument the court rejected with The Legislature granted authority to local governments to unilaterally impose vehicle fees. And voters didn?t like that, and so they repealed that authority with I-976. A first year law student knows the idea of preemption: local governments do not have independent taxing authority they are only allowed to impose those taxes and fees the state allows them to. And as the ruling says, the state ?may rescind? the authority previously granted. And that's what the voters did when they passed l-976. 4. INITIATIVE SCOPE: ?Sound Transit argues that, in repealing the MVE T, l-776 exceeded the scope of the initiative power. As a general law repealing an existing general law, [-776 does not exceed the scope of the people?s constitutionally granted initiative power.? EYMAN COMMENT: Again, very strange this same argument is being made with Seattle?s lawsuit because it was rejected by the court before. 5. DUE PROCESS RIGHTS: ?Sound Transit suggests that l-776 violated the transit agency?s due process rights The claimed deprivation of ?life, liberty, or property? caused by l-776 presupposes that, when a local government decides to embark on a public project, the people of that jurisdiction acquire a vested property right in the 3 completion of the project, regardless of subsequent state law. No authority exists for that proposition. Sound Transit has no basis for asserting that l?776 caused a deprivation of a vested property right.? EYMAN COMMENT: bizarre court rejected this argument before. 6. BOND IMPAIRMENT: we cannot conclude that l-776 ?substantially impair[ed] King County?s contractual relationship with its bondholders. EYMAN COMMENT: l?976 takes effect on December 5, 2019. So on that day, state and local governments are obligated to follow the laws in I-976. Among those laws, there is section 12 which requires Sound Transit to retire, defease, or refinance its car-tab- taxed bonds. It reads ?In order to effectuate the policies, purposes, and intent of this act and to ensure that the motor vehicle excise taxes repealed by this act are no longer imposed or collected, an authority that imposes a motor vehicle excise tax under ROW 81 .104.160 must fully retire, defease, or refinance any outstanding bonds issued under this chapter That law, that mandate must fully retire, defease, or refinance -- takes effect on December 5. They have from now until then to prepare for that law. The Department of Licensing told KING 5 and other news outlets that Sound Transit?s taxes will continue to be imposed after December 5 and won?t go away until March 31, 2020. That is not what l-976 requires. The language is unambiguous ?must fully retire, defease, or refinance Section 16 simply says that Sound Transit?s vehicle taxes and the dishonest valuation schedule (sections 10 11) are repealed after Sound Transit complies with section 12 (retiring or refinancing the bonds on December 5). Knowing that Sound Transit is such a lawless and unaccountable government, l-976 includes a contingency: if Sound Transit goes rogue and doesn?t follow this mandate, this law, this requirement by March 31, 2020, then the 0.8% rate is reduced to But that reduction in the rate is not ?instead of? getting rid of the dishonest tax and the dishonest valuation schedule the voters voted to repeal with l-976. The lowering of 4 the rate does not obviate the statutory requirement that they retire or refinance the bonds to get the taxes and valuation schedule to go away. They still have to do that on December 5. That?s what the voters just voted for; they just told state and local governments to stop imposing those taxes and fees. Can Sound Transit retire them early? Yes. Their lawyer said so in that same Seattle Pl news story in 2003: ?Brown, the Sound Transit lawyer, said it could retire them early, but it would be costly. After 3 public votes, the voters deserve to get what they?ve voted for 3 times. 7. ln sum, Pierce County and Sound Transit are unable to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that [-776 violated constitutional precepts of local home rule, exceeded the scope of the initiative power, or deprived the voters of a vested property right. EXHIBIT 6.5 Gmail Tim Eyman Defense of I-976 1 message Tim Eyman Wed, Nov 20. 2019 at 1:58 PM To: Noah Guzzo Purcell Bcc: calebheimlich@wsrp.org. mark@mdklaw.com, joel@ard.law, stephens@sklegal.pro. RSanders@goodsteinlaw.corn. stephen.pidgeon@comcast.net, caleb@wsrp.org, michael@brubakerlawgroupcom From a supporter: Date: November 20. 2019 at 1:49:39 PM PST To: tim.eyman@gmail.com Subject: Defense of l-976 The Washington State Constitution. Art. 1, sect.1, political power. "All political power in inherent in the People, and governments derive theirjust power from the consent of the governed. and are established to maintain and protect individual rights." It is an individuals right to CAST a ballot with the expectation that It will be counted and respected! The very idea that the government we elect to govern and pay for will turn on us and try to dismiss our democratically passed Peoples Initiative. Don 't you agree? EXHIBIT 7 From: Purcell, Noah Guzzo (ATG) Sent: Wednesday, November 20, 2019 12:04 PM To: Tim Eyman Subject: RE: Got this text from supporter - see Received. From: Tim Eyman Sent: Tuesday, November 19, 2019 8:51 PM To: Purcell, Noah Guzzo (ATG) Subject: Got this text from supporter - see I read them is an injunction hearhg on the 26th. Who as representing the people on this We camot tet this go . A190: injunction bond. We . need injunction bond set. Is anyone truly representing the: people in this case and in the beatings on Tuesday We the People voted for this so there is not possible way for it to be 'unconstitutimal? - 3693113 9:5 at us (eO?im?pmm'lo I- Constitutions including the State Constitution state what powers are granted to the Goverrment. The People did not grant the Govemnem pennission or power to ignore the will of the people. What about injunction bond? The party asking for an ?miumtion is REQUIRED by STATE LAW to put up money to cover losses in case they lose the lawsuit. In this situation, Seattle, King County. at at, need to put up injunction bond my equivalent to the dollar amount of taxes that the people repealed: ??at-SM 01? Here's how they lose the injunction; They are suing the people State for an mime-Mn and and injunction bond would have to be paid using the 9809.63 money. They (King County, City of Seattle. etc) camet sue us for repealing the taxes and expect to use OUR TAX MONEY to pay the iniunction bond to cover their losses they lose the actual It?s a No injunction or restraining order shall be wanted until the party asking it shaa enter into a bond. in such a sum as shall be 3393513 L12 9:6 $139 at ms K. on No injunction or restraining order shalt be granted or? the party asking it shat? enter into a bond. in such a sum as shall be fixed by the court or judge gramting the order, with surety to the satisfaction of the dark of the smerim com to the adverse party affected maeby, conditioned to pay all damages and costs which may accme by reason of the inimction or restraining order. The sureties shat], if required by the clerk. justify as provided by law, and until they so iustify, the clerk shall be respons?e for their 91de TM Mir? 3393353 9:5 EXHIBIT 8 From: Tim Eyman Sent: Wednesday, November 20, 2019 7:06 PM To: Alan Copsey Subject: Alan, see attached - consider this point buckleupaon JEN. Accordang its maker: for a Dre?lmanary inguncuon to prevent :mpieme-ntataon of i976. 'Pias?m?f?f GCTA provides transit services in Garfieid Come; and reii?es heaw?y on state grams for ape-rations and capizai Imgmvemems. a revenue sowce that 1?976 eliminates. Sounds- dramatzc, rgg-m? The $th is though. I976 doesn?t eirmmate the szate's authonzy to prowde grams fer transa: k?ttpg ..- ?ii?l :Den?i 86$ .lz?n? :3 3338? . That motion a frame. mess. AnyoneWugg the arguments. Regards, Tim Eyman landline: 425-590?9363 EXHIBIT 9 From: Sent: Wednesday, November 20, 2019 7:27 PM To: Subject: Attached is the governments? Motion for Injunction it's being heard on tues nov 26 at 9am beforejudge Marshall Ferguson Attachments: Motion for Injunctionpdf Original From: Tim Eyman Sent: Tuesday, November 19, 2019 8:43 AM To: Tim Eyman Subject: Attached is the governments? Motion for Injunction - it?s being heard on tues nov 26 at 9am before judge Marshall Ferguson If there is to be motion for change of venue or Af?davit of prejudice on this judge - it?s gotta be before he makes a substantive ruling. See attached for the ?ling done yesterday EXHIBIT 10 From: Sent: Wednesday, November 20, 2019 7:33 PM To: Subject: Ferguson is actively sabotaging l-976 w/ Dept of Licensing - outside counsel only option. Watch Sound Transit's TCC exec director threaten me. Here is the link to the update below: of-licensing Ferguson is actively sabotaging I-976 w/ Dept of Licensing - outside counsel only option. Watch Sound Transit's TCC Executive Director threaten me. Fri, NOV 15, 2019 Over $40.094 billion in tax savings so farl - Our thousands of supporters I fighting for taxDayerS! throughout the state (cc?d to the. media, house senate members. and Governor, and other candidates far of?ce) To: From: - Tim Eyman Fighting for Taxpayers for 22 years ph: 4254590~9363_, celi: 509.99-1-5295 tim.eyman@gmail.com i Tim-Defensemm' Watch the Executive Director of Sound Transit's Transportation Choices Coalition in Seattle threaten me: Let that sink in. Because of his longstanding support and defense of Sound Transit, Bob Ferguson is actively sabotaging Initiative 976 through the Department of Licensing (see below). As Sen. Steve O?Ban wrote in his letter to Ferguson: ?Your office must recuse itself from such a defense and hire outside legal counsel to defend the Initiative in any legal proceedings. You must agree that recusal is your office?s only option, since your office is in the midst of defending the State in a lawsuit centered on the constitutionality of the same excise tax that Initiative 976 repealed. In that case, the Attorney General joined with Sound Transit?s arguments that the motor vehicle excise tax employed by Sound Transit does not violate Article II, section 37 of the Washington State Constitution. The Attorney Genera/?3 actions to protect the same tax that Initiative 976 repealed is a clear conflict of interest that goes directly against your office ?3 capacity to defend the Initiative.? In addition, Ferguson is conflicted and must recuse and name outside counsel because, as Sen. Doug Ericksen wrote: ?Regardless of how you feel about Bob Ferguson, there is no way to argue that he is not compromised in this situation. His own actions have compromised him. The wealthy powers that be, made the $30 tab initiative about Tim Eyman. Bob Ferguson is currently engaged in a holy war against Mr. Eyman on issues prior to this initiative passing. in order for the public to have confidence that the state is doing its duty to defend the vote of the people, AG Ferguson has no choice but to contract with outside law firms for the defense of this initiative.? It is a complete farce to have pro-Sound?Transit, anti-Tim- Eyman, sabotager?in-chief?at-DOL Bob Ferguson defending voter-approved l?976. Seattle government suing the voters because they didn?t like the voters? decision is arrogant and infuriating. The people outside Seattle don?t want these dishonest vehicle taxes and fees and they shouldn?t be forced to continue to pay them just because Seattle is OK with such dishonesty. Their legal complaint is sloppy and weak because it was slapped together so quickly. Seventeen years ago, various governments filed a lawsuit just like this one against initiative 776 which voters passed in 2002. Back then, they claimed that l-776 violated the Constitution in multiple ways. But the supreme court rejected them all. As the Seattle PI reported then: The state Supreme Court upheld Eyman's Initiative 776 on every point that came before it. yman was ecstatic yesterday. ?It's gratifying when the voters get what they voted for, he said, adding that it is "nice to see the justices moving closer to the voters. From the Court?s ruling (again, Seattle?s lawsuit against l?976 mirrors these same complaints): 1. SINGLE SUBJECT: Opponents ?failed to show? that ?l?776 required the people to cast a single vote on two unrelated, proposed laws. EYMAN COMMENT: Seattle?s lawsuit against l-976 is the most absurd when it comes to this. The bill title reads: ACT Relating to limiting taxes, fees, and other charges relating to vehicles.? Every provision in l-976 does that. The initiative in 2002, like l-976, put $30 limit on tabs, repealed state taxes, local fees, the valuation schedule, and addressed bond retirement issues, etc. l-976, just like I-776, does those same things. Single 4 subject on l-776, single subject on l-976. 2. BALLOT TITLE: Opponents have not ?met their burden? to show ?l-776?s ballot title failed to notify the public of the subject matter of the measure.? EYMAN COMMENT: That was what the court ruled for l-776 which read: Initiative Measure No. 776 concerns state and local government charges on motor vehicles. Here is the subject matter for ~976: Initiative Measure No. 976 concerns motor vehicle taxes and fees. My current attorney and former supreme court justice Richard Sanders recently completed a policy analysis of a different tax initiative. In it, he wrote this: Does the Attorney General?s ballot title comply with the subject-in? title requirement of Article II, Section 19 of the Washington Constitution? Const. Art. ll, Sec. 19 provides: No bill shall embrace more than one subject, and that shall be expressed in the title. The rule requires the Iegislation?s subject to be embraced in the title. For initiatives, the title is prepared by the Attorney General. The courts have been extremely reluctant to find a voter-approved initiative invalid under this requirement. Here?s an excerpt from a very recent supreme court ruling: The purpose of the subject-in-title rule is to notify members of the legislature and the public of the subject matter of a title complies with the constitution if it gives notice that would lead to an inquiry into the body of the act, or indicate to an inquiring mind the scope and purpose of the law. The title need not be an index to the contents, nor must it provide details of the measure. Washington Ass ?n for Substance Abuse and Violence Prevention v. State, 174 Wn.2d 642, 660 (2012) (citations omitted). EYMAN COMMENT: The ballot title for l-776 conveyed the subject matter of the measure and was upheld; the ballot title for l-976 does the same. 3. LOCAL HOME RULE: Opponents "contend that l-776 violates precepts of local home rule The argument lacks merit. Article Xl, section 12 permits the state to legislate what taxes and fees local governments are allowed to impose. The legislature or the people legislating by initiative may rescind by general laws the authority previously granted. EYMAN COMMENT: It?s very weird that their lawsuit brings up the exact same argument the court rejected with l-776. The Legislature granted authority to local governments to unilaterally impose vehicle fees. And voters didn?t like that, and so they repealed that authority with l-976. A first year law student knows the idea of preemption: local governments do not have independent taxing authority they are only allowed to impose those taxes and fees the state allows them to. And as the ruling says, the state ?may rescind? the authority previously granted. And that's what the voters did when they passed l-976. 4. INITIATIVE SCOPE: ?Sound Transit argues that, in repealing the MVET, l-776 exceeded the scope of the initiative power. As a general law repealing an existing general law, l-776 does not exceed the scope of the people ?3 constitutionally granted initiative power.? EYMAN COMMENT: Again, very strange this same argument is being made with Seattle?s lawsuit because it was rejected by the court before. 5. DUE PROCESS RIGHTS: ?Sound Transit suggests that l- 776 violated the transit agency?s due process rights The claimed deprivation of ?life, liberty, or property? caused by [-776 presupposes that, when a local government decides to embark on a public project, the people of that jurisdiction acquire a vested property right in the completion of the project, regardless of subsequent state law. No authority exists for that proposition. Sound Transit has no basis for asserting that l? 776 caused a deprivation of a vested property right. EYMAN COMMENT: Same bizarre complaint is being made in Seattle?s new lawsuit court rejected this argument before. 6. BOND IMPAIRMENT: we cannot conclude that [-776 ?substantially impair[ed] King County?s contractual relationship with its bondholders.? EYMAN COMMENT: l-976 takes effect on December 5, 2019. So on that day, state and local governments are obligated to follow the laws in ~976. Among those laws, there is section 12 which requires Sound Transit to retire or refinance its car-tab-taxed bonds. It reads ?In order to effectuate the policies, purposes, and intent of this act and to ensure that the motor vehicle excise taxes repealed by this act are no longer imposed or collected, an authority that imposes a motor vehicle excise tax under RCW 81.104.160 must fully retire, defease, or refinance any outstanding bonds issued under this chapter That law, that mandate -- must fully retire, defease, or refinance -- takes effect on December 5. They have from now until then to prepare for that law. The Department of Licensing which shares the same building as the AG and like all state agencies is legally advised by the AG -- told KING 5 and other news outlets 8 that Sound Transit?s taxes will continue to be imposed after December 5 and won?t go away until March 31, 2020. That is not what l-976 requires. The language is unambiguous ?must fully retire, defease, or refinance Section 16 simply says that Sound Transit?s vehicle taxes and the dishonest valuation schedule (sections 10 11) are repealed after Sound Transit complies with section 12 (retiring or refinancing the bonds on December 5). Knowing that Sound Transit is such a lawless and unaccountable government, l-976 includes a contingency: if Sound Transit goes rogue and doesn?t follow this mandate, this law, this requirement by March 31, 2020, then the 0.8% rate is reduced to But that reduction in the rate is not ?instead of" getting rid of the dishonest tax and the dishonest valuation schedule the voters voted to repeal with l-976. The lowering of the rate does not obviate the statutory requirement that they retire or refinance the bonds to get the taxes and valuation schedule to go away. They still have to do that on December 5. That?s what the voters just voted for; they just told state and local governments to stop imposing those taxes and fees. Can Sound Transit retire them early? Yes. Their lawyer said so in that same Seattle Pl news story in 2003: ?Brown, the Sound Transit lawyer, said it could retire them early, but it would be costly. After 3 public votes, the voters deserve to get what they?ve voted for 3 times. 7. In sum, Pierce County and Sound Transit are unable to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that l-776 violated constitutional precepts of local home rule, exceeded the scope of the initiative power, or deprived the voters of a vested property right.? In retaliation for I-976's passage, I've been blocked from Facebook. 80 I'm censored and cannot let people know what's going on. TAX ADVOCATE TIM EYMAN LANDS IN FACEBOOK JAIL. facebook-?ail So forward this email, share this update, and get others to forward/share it too. 10 Is it any wonder that Fascist Fergie is trying so hard to shut us down? If it weren't for your prayers, friendship, and generous support, he woulda taken me out years ago. Now more than ever, I really need your help. The costs of litigation, bankruptcy, and other crap from the AG's attacks are brutal. Please help me and my new attorney Richard Sanders fight back. Please: 1) Mail check to: Tim Eyman Legal Defense Fund, 500 106th Ave NE #709, Bellevue, WA, 98004 2) Paypal: 11 3) GoFundMe: Thank you for helping me and my family during this very difficult time. I love you all. Tim Tim Eyman, 509-991-5295, tim.evman@gmail.com, TimDefense.com 12 EXHIBIT 1 1 I 'Gmail Tim Eyman Problematic refunds 1 message Tim Eyman Thu, Nov 21, 2019 at 10:13 AM To: Noah Guzzo Purcell Alan Copsey To put a hold on the initiative in its entirety would be extremely problematic for eventual refunds if later upheld - the initiative repeals numerous state taxes and fees related to vehicles - one of those is the repeal of the sales tax surcharge on vehicle sales in row 82.02080. Doing a refund on that would be almost impossible. The plaintiffs I?m sure will say no prob, we just do refunds to vehicle owners. And that may be true for weight fees imposed by state. TBD vehicle fees. even Sound Transit tax. But that's state sales tax could be argued to be impossible to administer which may be an argument against a preliminary injunction on the entire initiative?s policies. consider this point in your Friday reply. Regards. Tim Eyman tim.eyman@gmail.com landline: 425-590-9363 cell: 509-991-5295 TimDefense.com EXHIBIT 12 From: Tim Eyman Date: Tue, Nov 19, 2019 at 1:21 PM Subject: consider these points To: Copsey, Alan (ATG) noah.purcell@atg.wa.gov Seattle government?s legal complaint is sloppy and weak because it was slapped together so quickly. Seventeen years ago, various governments filed a lawsuitjust like this one against initiative 776 which voters passed in 2002. Back then, they claimed that l?776 violated the Constitution in multiple ways. But the supreme court rejected them all. As the Seattle PI reported then:The state Supreme Court upheld yman '3 Initiative 776 on every point that came before it. yman was ecstatic yesterday. "It's gratifying when the voters get what they voted for, he said, adding that it is "nice to see the justices moving closer to the voters. From the Court?s ruling in 2003 (again, Seattle?s lawsuit against l-976 mirrors these same complaints): 1. SINGLE SUBJECT: Opponents ?failed to show? that ?l-776 required the people to cast a single vote on two unrelated, proposed laws. EYMAN COMMENT: Seattle?s lawsuit against l-976 is the most absurd when it comes to this. The bill title reads: ACT Relating to limiting taxes, fees, and other charges relating to vehicles.? Every provision in l-976 does that. The initiative in 1 2002, like l-976, put $30 limit on tabs, repealed state taxes, local fees, the valuation schedule, and addressed bond retirement issues, etc. l-976, just like l-776, does those same things. Single subject on I- 776, single subject on l-976. 2. BALLOT TITLE: Opponents have not ?met their burden? to show 776?s ballot title failed to notify the public of the subject matter of the measure.? EYMAN COMMENT: That was what the court ruled for 1-776 which read: Initiative Measure No. 776 concerns state and local government charges on motor vehicles. Here is the subject matter for l-976: Initiative Measure No. 976 concerns motor vehicle taxes and fees. My current attorney and former supreme courtjustice Richard Sanders recently completed a policy analysis of a different tax initiative. In it, he wrote this: Does the Attorney General?s ballot title comply with the subject-in-title requirement of Article ll, Section 19 of the Washington Constitution? Const. Art. ll, Sec. 19 provides: No bill shall embrace more than one subject, and that shall be expressed in the title. The rule requires the legislation ?5 subject to be embraced in the title. For initiatives, the title is prepared by the Attorney General. The courts have been extremely reluctant to find a voter- approved initiative invalid under this requirement. Here?s an excerpt from a very recent supreme court ruling: The purpose of the subject-in-title rule is to notify members of the legislature and the public of the subject matter of a title complies with the constitution if it gives notice that would lead to an inquiry into the body of the act, or indicate to an inquiring mind the scope and purpose of the law. The title need not be an index to the contents, nor must it 2 provide details of the measure. Washington Ass ?n for Substance Abuse and Violence Prevention v. State, 174 Wn.2d 642, 660 (2012) (citations omitted). EYMAN COMMENT: The ballot title for l-776 conveyed the subject matter of the measure and was upheld; the ballot title for I-976 does the same. 3. LOCAL HOME RULE: Opponents ?contend that l-776 violates precepts of local home rule The argument lacks merit. Article XI, section 12 permits the state to legislate what taxes and fees local governments are allowed to impose. The legislature or the people legislating by initiative may rescind by general laws the authority previously granted. EYMAN COMMENT: It?s very weird that their lawsuit brings up the exact same argument the court rejected with l-776. The Legislature granted authority to local governments to unilaterally impose vehicle fees. And voters didn?t like that, and so they repealed that authority with l-976. A first year law student knows the idea of preemption: local governments do not have independent taxing authority they are only allowed to impose those taxes and fees the state allows them to. And as the ruling says, the state ?may rescind? the authority previously granted. And that's what the voters did when they passed l-976. 4. INITIATIVE SCOPE: ?Sound Transit argues that, in repealing the MVE T, [-776 exceeded the scope of the initiative power. As a general law repealing an existing general law, l-776 does not exceed the scope of the people?s constitutionally granted initiative power. EYMAN COMMENT: Again, very strange this same argument is being made with Seattle?s lawsuit because it was rejected by the court before. 5. DUE PROCESS RIGHTS: ?Sound Transit suggests that l-776 violated the transit agency?s due process rights The claimed deprivation of ?life, liberty, or property? caused by l-776 presupposes that, when a local government decides to embark on a public project, the people of that jurisdiction acquire a vested property right in the 3 completion of the project, regardless of subsequent state law. No authority exists for that proposition. Sound Transit has no basis for asserting that l-776 caused a deprivation of a vested property right.? EYMAN COMMENT: bizarre court rejected this argument before. 6. BOND IMPAIRMENT: we cannot conclude that l-776 ?substantially impair[ed] King County?s contractual relationship with its bondholders. EYMAN COMMENT: l-976 takes effect on December 5, 2019. So on that day, state and local governments are obligated to follow the laws in I-976. Among those laws, there is section 12 which requires Sound Transit to retire, defease, or refinance its car-tab- taxed bonds. It reads ?In order to effectuate the policies, purposes, and intent of this act and to ensure that the motor vehicle excise taxes repealed by this act are no longer imposed or collected, an authority that imposes a motor vehicle excise tax under ROW 81 .104.160 must fully retire, defease, or refinance any outstanding bonds issued under this chapter That law, that mandate -- must fully retire, defease, or refinance -- takes effect on December 5. They have from now until then to prepare for that law. The Department of Licensing told KING 5 and other news outlets that Sound Transit?s taxes will continue to be imposed after December 5 and won?t go away until March 31, 2020. That is not what l-976 requires. The language is unambiguous ?must fully retire, defease, or refinance Section 16 simply says that Sound Transit?s vehicle taxes and the dishonest valuation schedule (sections 10 11) are repealed after Sound Transit complies with section 12 (retiring or refinancing the bonds on December 5). Knowing that Sound Transit is such a lawless and unaccountable government, l-976 includes a contingency: if Sound Transit goes rogue and doesn?t follow this mandate, this law, this requirement by March 31, 2020, then the 0.8% rate is reduced to But that reduction in the rate is not ?instead of? getting rid of the dishonest tax and the dishonest valuation schedule the voters voted to repeal with l?976. The lowering of 4 the rate does not obviate the statutory requirement that they retire or refinance the bonds to get the taxes and valuation schedule to go away. They still have to do that on December 5. That?s what the voters just voted for; they just told state and local governments to stop imposing those taxes and fees. Can Sound Transit retire them early? Yes. Their lawyer said so in that same Seattle Pl news story in 2003: ?Brown, the Sound Transit lawyer, said it could retire them early, but it would be costly. After 3 public votes, the voters deserve to get what they?ve voted for 3 times. 7. In sum, Pierce County and Sound Transit are unable to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that [-776 violated constitutional precepts of local home rule, exceeded the scope of the initiative power, or deprived the voters of a vested property right.? EXHIBIT 13 From: stephen.pidgeon@comcast.net Sent: Friday, November 22, 2019 12:10 PM To: David.hackett@kingcountygov; Davideldred@kingcountygov; Jenifermerkel@kingcounty.gov; Erin.Jackson@kingcounty.gov; Erica.franklin@seattle.gov; John.5chochet@seattle.gov; noah.purcell@atg.wa.gov; Alan.copsey@atg.wa.gov; Alicia.young@atg.wa.gov; Karl.smith@atg.wa.gov; Lauryn.fraas@atg.wa.gov Subject: Garfield County Transportation et al State of Washington Attachments: Garfield County Transit et al Washington - Notice of Limited Appearancepdf; Garfield County Transit et al Washington -Motion to Intervene and Memorandum of Law.pdf; Garfield County Transit Washington - Certificate of Servicepdf; Garfield County Transit Washington Declaration of Tim Eyman.pdf; Gar?eld County Transit Washington Order [proposed] granting motion to intervenedoc Dear Counsel: Attached please find our Notice of Limited Appearance, Motion to Intervene and Memorandum of Law, Declaration of Tim Eyma n, Order [proposed] granting motion to intervene, together with our certificate of service by means of electronic service, all of which have been filed today. Sincerely, Stephen Pidgeon Attorney at Law, P.S. 1523 132nd Street SE Suite Everett, WA 98208 (425)347-7513 Telephone (425)265-7593 Facsimile Stephen Pidgeon, Attorney at Law, P.S. CONFIDENTIALITY NOTICE: This communication and any document(s) accompanying it contains confidential information belonging to the sender which may be protected by attorney?client privilege and other privileges pertaining to the documents. I am sure you are not interested in it, and I apologize for taking your time if you received it and have no clue as to why; so if you are not the intended recipient, you are hereby notified that disclosure, copying, distribution, or taking any action whatsoever with regard to the contents of this communication is strictly prohibited, and you can just trash it. Also, let me know by Reply, so I don't send this by error again and waste any more of your time. Thanks. Honorable Marshall Ferguson Noted for Hearing: November 26, 2019 at 9:00 am. With Oral Argument IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KING GARFIELD COUNTY TRANSPORTION KING CITY OF WASHINGTON STATE TRANSIT ASSOCIATION OF WASHINGTON PORT OF INTERCITY AMALGAMATED TRANSIT UNION LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL OF WASHINGTON, and MICHAEL Plaintiffs, v. STATE OF WASHINGTON, Defendant. CASE NO. 19-2-30171-6 SEA THIRD PARTY MOTION TO INTERVENE AND MEMORANDUM OF LAW 1.0 INTRODUCTION AND REQUESTED RELIEF Movants Clint Didier, Matthew Morell, Kevin Heinen, John Logue, and Parker Olsen, are taxpayers, vehicle owners subject to license tab charges, citizens domiciled and resident in the State MOTION TO INTERVENE AND MEMORANDUM OF LAW I STEPHEN W. Attorney at Law, RS. 3002 Colby Avenue. Suite 306 Everett. Washington 98201 (425)605-4774 Washington, and are voters who voted in support of Initiative No. 976 the same assert standing to defend the rati?cation of the Initiative by the voters of Washington in the most recent statewide general election of November 4, 2019, and move this court to intervene pursuant to CR The Attorney General has already given notice that they will not challenge venue in this action, which these taxpayers see as critical to the adjudication of this issue on the merits. Therefore, the Attorney General has refused. See Dec. of Tim Eyman. Violation of the First Amendment. These taxpayers assert that the attack on a duly enacted initiative creates a chilling effect on their First Amendment right to petition the government. Fritz v. Gar-ton, 83 Wn.2d 275, 517 P.2d 911, appeal dismissed, 417 US. 902, 41 L.Ed.2d 208, 94 2596 (1974). 3 Real Parties in Interest. While the complaint and the parties thereto effectively assert an action in mandamus (to require the court to strike down a voter-veri?ed initiative), the taxpayers in the State of Washington and not the government are the real parties in interest, pursuant to CR All political power in the State of Washington is in inherent in the People, and governments derive their just power from the consent of the governed, and are established to maintain and protect 1.1 Upon timely application anyone shall be permitted to intervene in an action: (1) when a statute confers an unconditional right to intervene; or (2) when the applicant claims an interest relating to the property or transaction which is the subject of the action and he is so situated that the disposition of the action may as a practical matter impair or impede his ability to protect that interest, unless the applicant's interest is adequately represented by existing parties. 3 A "chilling effect" on First Amendment rights is a recognized present harm, not a ?xture speculative harm, which allows third party standing when the law in question burdens constitutionally protected conduct. Tacoma v. Luvcnc, 1 18 Wn.2d 826, 827 P.2d 1374 (1992). 3 A person who is subject to service of process and whose joinder will not deprive the court of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action shall bejoined as a party in the action if (1) in the person?s absence complete relief cannot be accorded among those already parties, or (2) the person claims an interest relating to the subject of the action and is so situated that the disposition of the action in the person?s absence may (A) as a practical matter impair or impede the MOTION TO INTERVENE AND MEMORANDUM OF LAW - 2 STEPHEN W. FIDGEUN Attorney at Law, P.S. 3002 Colby Avenue, Suite 306 Everett, Washington 98201 (425)605-4774 individual rights. Washington State Constitution, Art. 1, section 1. The people have delegated their power or authority to the legislature or the judiciary in respect of initiatives and their enactment, as the ?rst power reserved to the people and not constitutionally delegated. Washington State Constitution, Art. 2, section Violation of the Ninth and Tenth Amendments. The Ninth Amendment to the US. Constitution provides that ?[t]he enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.? The Tenth Amendment to the US. Constitution provides that ?The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.? There is no reservation of rights to the judiciary to overrule the free and fair vote of the people in a general election. No Veto of an Initiative by the Judiciary is Constitutionally Authorized. There is no express constitutional authonzation for the judiciary in the State of Washington to veto any initiative enacted by the peOple. The governor is expressly prohibited from exercising a veto of any initiative enacted by the people. ?Any measure initiated by the people or referred to the people as herein provided shall take effect and become the law if it is approved by a majority of the votes cast thereon:? The only provision authorized by the Constitution of the State of Washington states that ?the vote cast upon such question or measure shall equal one-third of the total votes cast at such election and not otherwise. Such measure shall be in operation on and after the thirtieth day after the election at which it is approved." There is no constitutional authority whatsoever granted to any other entity to otherwise challenge the express provision that ?[a]ny measure initiated by the people person?s ability to protect that interest. MOTION TO INTERVENE AND MEMORANDUM OF LAW - 3 STEPHEN W. Attorney at Law, PS. 3002 Colby Avenue, Suite 306 Everett, Washington 98 20] (425)605-4774 referred to the peOple as herein provided shall take effect and become the law if it is approved by a majority of the votes cast thereon. A Writ of Mandamus is Improper. Writs cannot be directed at a general course of conduct. In State ex rel. Taylor v. Lawler, 2 Wn.2d 488, 490, 98 P.2d 658 I940). The jurisdiction given to the Supreme Court by the state constitution in Art. IV, 4, to issue writs of mandamus to state of?cers, does not authorize it to assume general control or direction of of?cial acts. Instead, the remedy of mandamus contemplates the necessity of indicating the precise thing to be done. Clark Cy. Department ofSocz'al Health Servs., 95 Wn.2d 445, 450, 626 P.2d 6 (1981) (citing State ex rel. Hawes v. Brewer, 39 Wash. 65, 80 P. 1001 (1905)); State ex rel. Paci?c Am. Fisheries v. Darwin, 81 Wash. 1, 12, 142 P. 441 (1914) (Citing State ex rel. Hawes v. Brewer, 39 Wash. 65, 67-69, 80 P. 1001 (1905)). As the Supreme Court stated in Walker v. Munro, 124 Wn.2d 402, 408, 879 P. 2d 920, (Wash: Supreme Court 1994): ?It is hard to conceive of a more general mandate than to order a state officer to adhere to the constitution. We have consistently held that we will not issue such a writ.? Mandamus may not be used to compel the performance of acts or duties which involve discretion on the part ot?a public of?cial. Vangor v. Munro, 115 Wn.2d 536, 543, 798 P.2d 1151 (1990); State ex rel. Paci?c Bridge Co. v. State all Bridge Auth, 8 Wn.2d 337, 342-43, 1 12 P.2d 135 (1941). Petitioners had an option to pursue the constitutionality of the initiative months ago and elected to do nothing. They hold an opinion the constitutionality of the initiative now, which requires the discretionary act of a public of?cial. [-976 does not violate the single-subject rule. This initiative sought to adjust car tabs to $30; all incidental aspects of the initiative are subordinate to this singular and general purpose. MOTION TO INTERVENE AND MEMORANDUM OF LAW - 4 STEPHEN W. PIDGEON Attorney at Law, P.S. 3002 Colby Avenue, Suite 306 Everett, Washington 98201 Movants therefore seek a limited appearance to intervene, and to move for a change of venue to the State Supreme Court for complete adjudication. 2.0 JURISDICTION AND VENUE Taxpayers have entered a limited appearance in this matter and challenge the jurisdiction of this court to consider this matter. King County is a party to this litigation. All judges in King County are elected to their respective benches by the people of King County, and therefore have an inherent con?ict. Article 4, Section 4, of the Constitution of the State of Washington provides that ?[t]he supreme court shall have original jurisdiction in habeas corpus, and quo warranto and mandamus as to all state of?cers, and appellate jurisdiction in all actions and proceedings, . . This action sounds in mandamus, and original jurisdiction is found in the State Supreme Court. Article 4, Section 6, bestows only concurrent jurisdiction on the Superior Court, and given the con?ict inherent in these proceedings, jurisdiction is rightfully with the Supreme Court only. 3.0 STATEMENT OF APPLICABLE FACTS Initiative Number 976 was filed on March 19, 2018, with the Secretary of State. Dec. of Tim Eyman. The title of the Initiative was assigned on March 26, 2018, as follows: Initiative Measure No. 976 concerns motor vehicle taxes and fees. This measure would repeal, reduce, or remove authority to impose certain vehicle taxes and fees; limit annual motor- vehicle license fees to $30, except voter-approved charges; and base vehicle taxes on Kelley Blue Book value. Should this measure be enacted into law? Voters Pamphlet 2019, p. 13. MOTION TO INTERVENE AND MEMORANDUM OF LAW - 5 STEPHEN W. Attorney at Law, P.S. 3002 Colby Avenue, Suite 306 Everett, Washington 98201 The initiative was the subject of a ballot title challenge on April 2, 2019, initiated by Tim Eyman. A hearing was set on April 18, 2018, and at that hearing, the action was dismissed on April 18, 2018. Dec. of Tim Eyman. Thereafter, a signature drive was initiated, and 352,093 number of signatures were obtained and submitted on January 3, 2019. Dec. of Tim Eyman. On Tuesday January 15, 2019, I-976 was certi?ed by the Secretary of State for the ballot. Dec. of Tim Eyman. As of November 21, 2019, the number of voters in Washington voted in favor of the Initiative were One Million Fifty-two Thousand Three Hundred and Six (1,052,306) votes yes and Nine Hundred Thirty-F our Thousand Two Hundred and Forty-Five (934,245) of voters in Washington voted against the measure, and the measure passed by 52.97% to 47.03% margin. Dec. of Tim Eyman. Outside of King County, non-King County residents approved the measure by 59%, (797,021) while King County voted 59% against. Dec. of Tim Eyman. In a recent communication with Noah Purcell, who is the attorney representing the defendant in this case on behalf of the State of Washington, who disclosed to me that the AG will not be taking any opposition to the venue in plaintiff King County, a venue in which any King County Superior Court judge will be wrestling with the con?ict between his decision concerning tax revenues to King County and his paycheck which will be at risk in his next election. Even if assigned to another King County judge, the appearance of bias does not go away. Dec. of Tim Eyman. The argument concerning con?icts also applies to Gar?eld County, leaving 37 other counties as potential venues to hear the matter. Dec. of Tim Eyman. MOTION TO AND MEMORANDUM OF LAW 6 STEPHEN W. PIDGEON Attorney at Law, RS. 3002 Colby Avenue, Suite 306 Everett, Washington 93201 (425)605-4774 Because the Attorney General will not represent the fundamental interests of Taxpayers to raise central objections to this adjudication, Taxpayers have standing to intervene. CR 24(a). 4.0 POINTS AND AUTHORITIES The Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act grants standing to persons ?whose rights are affected by a statute.? RCW 7.24.020. This is consistent with the general rule that a party must be directly affected by a statute to challenge its constitutionality. To-Ro Trade Shows v. Collins, 144 Wash.2d 403, 41 l-12, 27 P.3d 1149 (2001). Respondents must show they are being affected or denied some bene?t; mere interest in state ?inding mechanisms is not suf?cient to make a claim justiciable. See Walker v. Munro, 124 Wash.2d 402, 419, 879 P.2d 920 (1994). Standing is a party?s right to make a legal claim or seek judicial enforcement of a duty or right. State 12. Link, 136 Wn. App. 685, 692, 150 P.3d 610 (2007). The doctrine of standing prohibits a party from asserting another?s legal right. West v. Thurston County. 144 Wn. App. 573, 578, 183 P.3d 346 (2008). The rule ensures that courts render a ?nal judgment on an actual dispute between opposing parties that have a genuine stake in resolving the dispute. Lakewood Racquet Ctub, Inc. v. Jensen, 156 Wn. App. 215, 223, 232 P.3d 1147 (2010). Movants have standing to challenge governmental acts on the basis of status as a taxpayer. See, Tacoma v. O'Brien, 85 Wn.2d 266, 269, 534 P.2d 114 (1975); Calvary Bible Presbyterian Church v. Board of Regents, 72 Wn.2d 912, 917-18, 436 P.2d 189 (1967), cert. denied, 393 US. 960 (1968); Fransen v. Board of Natural Resources, 66 Wn.2d 672, 404 P.2d 432 (1965). Generally, a taxpayer is ?rst requited to request action by the Attorney General and refusal of that request before action is begun by the taxpayer. See, Tacoma v. O?Brien, supra; Citizens Coun. Against Crime v. Bjork. 84 Wn.2d 891 893, 529 P.2d 1072 (1975). However, even that requirement may be waived MOTION TO AND MEMORANDUM OF LAW - 7 STEPHEN W. PIDGEON Attorney at Law, P.S. 3002 Colby Avenue, Suite 306 Everett, Washington 98201 (425 )605-4 774 when ?such a request would have been useless.? Farris v. Munro, 99 Wn.2d 326, 329-30, 662 P.2d 821 (1983). A. 1-976 does not encompass more than one subject contrary to article 2, section 19. Assuming article 11, section 19, applies to initiatives, the question then arises whether this initiative unconstitutionally encompasses more than a single subject. The challengers contend it does, asserting the provisions of 1-976, includes multiple impermissible subjects. Plaintiffs claim that the following: That the text of [-976 includes the initiative to ?limit state and local taxes, fees, and other charges relating to motor vehicles.? Speci?cally, [-976 ?limit[s] annual motor vehicle fees to $30, except voter approved charges.? Id. 1-976 adds a new section to chapter 46.17 RCW that imposes a hard cap on vehicle registration and annual renewal fees: ?State and local motor vehicle license fees may not exceed $30 per year for motor vehicles, regardless ?66 of year, value, make or model.? The term state and motor vehicle license fees? means the general license tab fees paid annually for licensing motor vehicles . . . and do not (sic) include charges approved by voters after the effective date of this section.? The $30 motor vehicle license fee restriction applies to ?initial? registration and each annual ?renewal vehicle registration.? Sections 3 and 4 of 1?976 set the vehicle license fee at $30 for many non-commercial vehicles. Although 1?976 directly addresses some general license registration fees in chapter 46.17 RCW. it is silent on others. In addition to limiting the vehicle license fee to $30 for many vehicles. 1-976 also eliminates the electric vehicle mitigation fee established by RCW 46.17.323. Under existing law, this mitigation fee was imposed to address ?the impact of MOTION TO AND MEMORANDUM OF LAW - 8 STEPHEN W. PIDGEON Attorney at Law, P.S. 3002 Colby Avenue. Suite 306 Everett, Washington 98201 (425)605-4774 vehicles on state roads and highways and for the purpose of evaluating the feasibility of transitionng from a revenue collection system based on ?Jel taxes to a road user assessment system.? RCW 46.17.323 It is ?separate and distinct from other vehicle license fees.? Under the heading, ?Repeal and Remove Authority to Impose Certain Vehicle Taxes and Charges,? section 6 of I-976 repeals a number of statutes in total. Sega] Decl., Ex. A at 6. 1?976 repeals RCW 46. 17.3 65 and .415, which required payment of a ?weight fee in addition to all other taxes and fees required by law? and authorized WSDOT to adopt rules for determining the weight of certain vehicles. 1-976 also repeals RCW 82.80.130, which allowed Public Transportation Bene?t Areas to submit a proposed motor vehicle excise tax of to voters for passenger ferry service. Section 7 amends RCW 8208020. The amendment would eliminate an additional sales tax on vehicle sales. Segal Decl, Ex. A at 7. Section 8 adds a new section to chapter 82.44 RCW, which states that ?any motor vehicle excise tax? must be calculated using the ?base model Kelley Blue book value.? Section 9 amends RCW 82.44.065 to implement the use of this new Kelley Blue Book valuation method. Section 10 amends RCW 81.104.140, which addresses dedicated funding sources for high capacity transportation services. The amendments purport to preclude regional transit authorities from levying and collecting the special MVET authorized by RCW 81.104.160. Section 1 1 then purports to repeal RCW 82.44.035, which established the current method of valuing vehicles. and RCW 81.104.160. which authorized RTAS covering counties with populations exceeding 1.5 million people to collect an excise tax of up to when approved by voters. MOTION TO INTERVENE AND MEMORANDUM OF LAW - 9 STEPHEN W. PIDGEON Attorney at Law. RS. 3002 Colby Avenue. Suite 306 Everett, Washington 98201 (425)605-4774 Section 12 adds a new section to chapter 81.1 12 RCW, which states that any RTA collecting taxes under RCW 81.104.160 ?must fully retire, defease or re?nance any outstanding bonds? if RCW 81.104.160 revenues are pledged, and defeasement or retirement is possible under the bond terms. Although repealed under section 1 1, RCW 81.104.160 is also amended by section 13 to purportedly reduce the authorized MVET to The question of which section prevails over the other is not clear. Section 14 requires liberal construction ?to effectuate the intent, policies, and purposes ofthis act.? Section 15 provides for severability. Section 16 establishes an effective date for certain sections of the Initiative. Under this section, sections 10 and 11 take effect on the date that the RTA complies with section 12 of 1-976. Id. But section 13 takes effect April 1, 2020, if sections 10 and 11 have not taken effect by March 2020. The RTA is supposed to inform authorities on effective dates. See Plaintiffs? Motion for Preliminary Injunction. However, these sections are rationally unified means to accomplish but a single end, the limitation of taxing authority. In fact, all of the components of the initiative are a rationally uni?ed approach to address the problem set forth in the voters? pamphlet. Voters have consistently affirmed $30 car tabs in this state, and the legislature has continually reinstated the tax, notwithstanding the consistent statement of the voters. The excising of inordinate and unwanted car tab increases is likened to cancer surgery the tumor has been repeatedly cut out but has now metastasized to multiple organs throughout the body politic. Nonetheless, the effort to restore $30 car tabs is still cancer surgery. MOTION TO INTERVENE AND MEMORANDUM OF LAW - 10 STEPHEN W. Attorney at Law, RS. 3002 Colby Avenue, Suite 306 Everett, Washington 98201 (425)605-4774 Although case law references ?rational unity,? State ex rel. Wash. 011 Bridge Auth. v. Yelle, 61 Wash.2d 28, 33, 377 P.2d 466 (1962), itself an extraconstitutional term, no authority supports any trial court's asserted distinction between ?rational link? and ?rational unity.? Notwithstanding, were we to determine this case upon the asserted semantic difference, the proponents of the initiative have asserted since that which is rationally linked must necessarily be rationally unified, in the same sense that separate links, when joined together, are uni?ed in a single chain. The constitutional single subject rule is not violated by a general subject which contains several incidental subjects or subdivisions. There is no violation of an. 11, 19 even if a general subject contains several incidental subjects or subdivisions. Wash. Fed '12, 127 Wash.2d at 556, 901 P.2d 1028; State v. Grisby, 97 Wash.2d 493, 498, 647 P.2d 6 (1982). A general title is one which is broad rather than narrow. Wash. ed in, 127 Wash.2d at 555, 901 P.2d 1028; O'Brien, 105 Wash.2d at 90, 711 P.2d 993; Gruen v. State Tax Comm'n 35 Wash.2d 1, 22, 211 P.2d 651 (1949). It may be comprehensive and generic rather than speci?c. Motors, Inc. v. McCroskey, 15 Wash.2d 665, 672, 132 P.2d 355 (1942); DeCano, 7 Wash.2d at 627, 1 10 P.2d 627. Examples of general titles are: An Act relating to violence prevention. In re Boot, 130 Wash.2d 553, 566, 925 P.2d 964, 971 (1996). An Act Relating to the amendment or repeal of statutes superseded by court rule. State v. Howard. 106 Wash.2d 39, 45, 722 P.2d 783 (1985). Shall campaign contributions be limited; public funding of state and local campaigns be prohibited; and campaign related activities be restricted? Wash. Fed'n, 127 Wash.2d at 555, 557, 901 P.2d 1028. [A]n act relating to capital O'Brien, 105 Wash.2d at 79-80, 711 P.2d 993. An Act relating to tort Scott 12. Cascade Structures. 100 Wash.2d 537, 546, 673 P.2d 179 (1983). An Act Relating to Community Wash. Educ. Ass'n v. State. 97 Wash.2d 899, 906-07. 652 P.2d MOTION TO INTERVENE AND MEMORANDUM OF LAW - ll STEPHEN W. Attorney at Law, P.S. 300.7. Colby Avenue, Suite 306 Everett, Washington 98201 (425)605-4774 1347 (1982). An Act Relating to the death State v. Grisby, 97 Wash.2d 493, 498, 647 P.2d 6 (1982). An Act Relating to industrial Wash. State Sch. Dirs. Ass'n v. Dep 'r of Labor Indus, 82 Wash.2d 367, 371, 510 P.2d 818 (1973). An Act to provide an Insurance Code for the State of Washington; to regulate insurance companies and the insurance business; to provide for an Insurance Commissioner; to establish the of?ce of State Fire Marshall; to provide penalties for the violation of the provisions of this Kueckelhan v. Fed. Old Line Ins. Co.. 69 782*782 Wash.2d 392, 402, 418 P.2d 443 (1966). An Act Relating to revenue and taxation; increasing the motor vehicle fuel tax, the use fuel tax and motor license fees, gross weight fees, fees in lieu of gross weight fees, seating capacity fees, providing for the distribution of said revenue; establishing an urban aid account in the motor vehicle fund; establishing a Puget Sound reserve account; providing for the use of the urban aid account authorizing investment of the Puget Sound reserve State ex rel. Wash. T011 Bridge Auth. v. Yelle, 61 Wash.2d 28, 31-33, 377 P.2d 466 (1962). An Act authorizing the incomoration of mutual savings banks, de?ning their powers and duties, and prescribing penalties for violations hereof. In re Peterson '3 Estate, 182 Wash. 29, 33, 45 P.2d 45 (1935). In assessing whether a title is general, it is not necessary that the title contain a general statement of the subject of an act; few well-chosen words, suggestive of the general subject stated, is all that is necessary. State ex rel. Schafield, 182 Wash. at 212, 46 P.2d 1052; accord Wash. Fed'n. 127 Wash.2d at 554, 901 P.2d 1028; In re Peterson's Estate, 182 Wash. at 33, 45 P.2d 45. Where a general title is used, all that is required is rational unity between the general subject and the incidental subjects. Wash. Fed'n, 127 Wash.2d 211556, 901 P.2d 1028', Grisby, 97 Wash.2d at 498. 647 P.2d Scott, 100 Wash.2d at 545, 673 P.2d 179; Kueckelhan, 69 Wash.2d at 403, 418 P.2d MOTION TO AND MEMORANDUM OF LAW - 12 STEPHEN W. PIDGEON Attorney at Law, RS. 3002 Colby Avenue. Suite 306 Everett. Washington 98201 (425)605-4774 443; Gruen v. State Tax Con-zm'n, 35 Wash.2d l. 22, 211 P.2d 651 (1949), overruled on other grounds by State ex rel. Washington State in. Comm. v. Martin. 62 Wash.2d 645, 384 P.2d 833 (1963). This principle has been explained as followsUnder the true rule of construction, the scope of the general title should be held to embrace any provision of the act, directly or indirectly related to the subject expressed in the title and having a natural connection thereto, and not foreign thereto. Or, the rule may be stated as follows: Where the title of a legislative act expresses a general subject or purpose which is single, all matters which are naturally and reasonably connected with it, and all measures which will, or may, facilitate the accomplishment of the purpose so stated, are properly included in the act and are germane to its title. Kueckelhan, 69 Wash.2d at 403, 418 P.2d 443 (quoting Gwen, 35 Wash.2d at 22, 211 P.2d 651). The requirement of rational unity has also been explained as follows: constitutional single-subject prohibition] does not by restricting the contents of an ?act? to one subject, contemplate a metaphysical singleness of idea or thing, but rather that there must be some rational unity between the matters embraced in the act, the unity being found in the general purpose of the act and the practical problems of ef?cient administration. It is hardly necessary to suggest that matters which ordinarily would not be thought to have any common features or characteristics might, for purposes of legislative treatment, be grouped together and treated as one subject. For purposes of legislation, ?subjects' are not absolute existences to be discovered by some sort of a priori reasoning, but are the result of classi?cation for convenience of treatment and for greater effectiveness in attaining the general purpose of the particular legislative MOTION TO AND MEMORANDUM OF LAW - l3 STEPHEN W. PIDGEON Attorney at Law, P.S. 3002 Colby Avenue, Suite 306 Everett, Washington 98201 (425)605-4714 State ex rel Washington Toll Bridge Ant/1. v. Yelle, 61 Wash.2d at 33, 377 P.2d 466 (quoting State ex rel. Test v. Steinwedel, 203 Ind. 457, 467, 180 NE. 865 (1932) (discussing Indiana constitutional provision)). Furthermore, this court ?has never favored a narrow construction of the term ?subject? as used in Const. art. 2, 19.? State v. Waggoner, 80 Wash.2d 7, 9, 490 P.2d 1308 (1971). We explored the limits of incidental subjects or subdivisions in Fritz, holding the six individual components of Initiative 276 were uni?ed by the ?generic subject? of ?openness in government,? notwithstanding these unifying words appeared nowhere in the initiative's title. Fritz, 83 Wash.2d at 290, 517 P.2d 911. Explaining the requirement of rational unity, this court said: ?[T]here must be some rational unity between the matters embraced in the act, the unity being found in the general purpose of the act and the practical problems of ef?cient For purposes of legislation, ?subjects' are not absolute existences to be discovered by some sort ot?a priori reasoning, but are the result ofclassi?cation for convenience of treatment and for greater effectiveness in attaining the general purpose of the particular legislative act.? State ex rel. Wash. T011 Bridge Ant/1., 61 Wash.2d at 33, 377 P.2d 466 (quoting State ex rel. Test v. Stetnwedel, 203 Ind. 457, 467, 180 NE. 865, 868 (1932). The electorate has every right and constitutional authority to adopt an initiative to impede taxing authority. 1-976 generally limits taxing authority by reducing license fee tabs to $30. All of the additional provisions of 1-976 go to the same purpose to reduce car tabs to $30, no matter the malignancy of the bureaucracy to stretch its tentacles to the other organs of the cancerous body. The MOTION TO INTERVENE AND MEMORANDUM OF LAW - l4 STEPHEN W. PIDGEON Attorney at Law, P.S. 3002 Colby Avenue. Suite 306 Everett, Washington 98201 (425)605-4774 true question is therefore whether the voters' effort to limit taxation through the multiple means of reducing license tab fees constitutes two or more subjects, rather than simple several means to implement a single subject; $30 tabs. The uni?ed tax limitation subject found in 1-976 stands in stark contradistinction to the majority's examples of multiple and dissimilar subject enactments, such as joining criminal penalties for dognapping with attorney fees in civil replevin actions (Barde v. State, 90 Wash.2d 470, 584 P.2d 390 (1978)) or joining civil rights legislation with regulation of cemeteries (Price 12. Evergreen Cemetery 57 Wash.2d 352, 357 P.2d 702 (1960)). Those subjects bear no rational connection with one another Whereas this topic is generically linked to achieve a singular purpose. While it is believed that the single subject issue is controlled by Wash. all Bridge Auth. v. State, 49 Wash.2d 520, 304 P.2d 676 (1956), asserting a distinction between objects of an initiative which are general versus speci?c, as well as objects subject to immediate accomplishment in contrast to those which continue, the Court?s explanation of the rational unity analysis admits of no such distinctions. Rather than distinguishing between general and speci?c, continuing or final, the rational unity analysis invites the Court?s inclusion as necessarily related to the ef?cient administration and accomplishment of an overall objective. The single subject of this initiative is restraint in taxation. It is simply a democratic effort to control the taxation pegboard whereby seemingly every time one tax is limited or eliminated another springs forth or swells to take its place. It embraces but a single subject addressed through complementary measures. It therefore complies with the letter of article II, section 19's single subject rule. MOTION TO INTERVENE AND MEMORANDUM OF LAW - 15 STEPHEN W. PIDGEON Attorney at Law, P.S. 3002 Colby Avenue, Suite 306 Everett, Washington 93201 (425)605-4774 The title of I-976 is suf?cient under article 11, section 19. The Attorney General expressed the subject of I-976 by stating, ?Initiative Measure No. 976 concerns motor vehicle taxes and fees. This measure would repeal, reduce, or remove authority to impose certain vehicle taxes and fees; limit annual motor-vehicle license fees to $30, except voter- approved charges; and base vehicle taxes on Kelley Blue Book value. Should this measure be enacted into law?? (Voters Pamphlet at 13). This title provides as comprehensive and complete a description of the initiative?s subject as 25 words will permit. While Plaintiffs complain that somehow 1-976 contains multiple subjects, the single subject is de?ned within the title, namely the annual motor-vehicle license fee, except voter-approved charges; and base vehicle taxes on Kelley Blue Book value. The Court has long held that the meaning of the term ?tax" is to be determined according to the intent of the voters. Wash. State Dep 't of Revenue [12. Hoppe], [82 Wash.2d 549,] at 552[, 512 P.2d 1094 (1973)]. If this intent can be determined from the language of the initiative, the court?s inquiry ends there. Senate Republican Campaign Comm. Pub. DISC-losure Comm 133 Wash.2d 229,] at 242[, 943 P.2d 1358 (1997)]. The title of an initiative ??need not be an index to its contents; nor is the title expected to give the details contained in the bill.? Wash. Fed 'n of State Employees, 127 Wash.2d at 555, 901 P.2d 1028 (quoting reffry v. Taylor, 67 Wash.2d 487, 491, 408 P.2d 269 (1965)). The contents of an initiative can constitutionally entail "any subject reasonably germane" to its title. DeCano v. State, 7 Wash.2d 613, 627, 110 P.2d 627 (1941). A ballot title need not include a unifying ?umbrella? term but, rather, the subject of the act can be reasonably gathered from reading the title as a whole, the subject is suf?ciently expressed MOTION TO INTERVENE AND MEMORANDUM OF LAW - l6 STEPHEN W. PIDGEON Attorney at Law, P.S. 3002 Colby Avenue. Suite 306 Everett, Washington 98201 (425)605?4774 therein.? Fritz, 83 Wash.2d at 291, 517 P.2d 911 (quoting Maxwell v. Lancaster, 81 Wash. 602, 607, 143 P. 157 (1914)). In Fritz, the words ?openness in government? did not appear within the IOU?word ballot title but was determined to be the (single) subject of the act. 83 Wash.2d at 290, 517 P.2d 911. Moreover, when the words of a title may be given two interpretations, only one of which renders the act constitutional, that is the interpretation which must be adopted by the court. Wash. Fed?n ofState Employees. 127 Wash.2d at 556, 901 P.2d 1028 (quoting Tre?ty, 67 Wash.2d at 491, 408 P.2d 269). Objections to the title ?must be grave and must present a palpable con?ict between the title and the constitution before the act will be held unconstitutional.? Shea v. Olson, 185 Wash. 143, 152, 53 P.2d 615 (1936). Differing meanings attributed to the term ?tax" are neither ?grave" nor do they rise to the level of ?a palpable con?ict between the title and the constitution.? Most fundamentally an initiative title is constitutionally suf?cient ??if it gives notice that would lead to an inquiry into the body of the act, Wash. Fed ?n of State Employees, 127 Wash.2d at 555, 901 P.2d 1028 (quoting YMCA v. State, 62 Wash.2d 504, 506, 383 P.2d 497 (1963)). Statements in the of?cial voters pamphlet ?may be considered to ascertain the collective purpose and intent of the people,? home, 129 Wash.2d at 763, 921 P.2d 514. The Court in Amalgamated Transit v. State, 1 1 P. 3d 762, 798 (2000) reaches the following conclusion: [W]e conclude that prior to the people's adoption of the initiative and referendum powers in this state, the Legislature lacked the authority to condition measures on a vote of the people. MOTION TO INTERVENE AND MEMORANDUM OF LAW - l7 STEPHEN W. PIDGEON Attorney at Law. P.S. 3002 Colby Avenue, Suite 306 Everett, Washington 9821.11 (425)605?4774 However. this statement is precisely the sort of errant claim to which Justice Scalia referred when he said it is an ?erroneous and all-too-common assumption that the Constitution means what we think it ought to mean. It does not; it means what it says.? Apprendi, 530 US. at 120 at 2367 (Scalia, ., concurring). Our constitution says nothing of the kind. In fact, the Legislature was never delegated any authority over the initiative; nor was the judiciary, and in fact, the Constitution of the State of Washington makes it perfectly clear that the people enjoy an authority superior to the judiciary, and that authority was intended to be expressed in the initiative. C. Speculation as to Voter Understanding is Unlawful In the case Sane Transit v. Sound Transit, 151 Wash.2d 60, 85 P.3d 346 (2004), the Court considered the principle that acts approved by the people are construed by focusing on the language of the proposal as the average informed voter would read it. See Amalgamated Transit Union Local 587 v. State, 142 Wash.2d 183, 205, 11 P.3d 762, 27 P.3d 608 (2000); State ex rel. Evergreen Freedom ound. v. Was/1. Educ. Assn, 140 Wash.2d 615, 637, 999 P.2d 602 (2000); izfv of Spokane v. Taxpayers ofCity ofSpo/rane, Wash.2d 91, 98, 758 P.2d 480 (1988). The Court concluded as follows: In cases where voters are not provided with the full text of the measure to be voted upon, Sane Transit would have us ignore the language of the measure (emphasis added) and attempt to construe the measure based on extrinsic documents sent to the voters which the average informed voter may or may not have read. An inquiry into the voter's subjective understanding of what he or she thought he or she was enacting is a task we will not undertake. See generally Amalgamated Transit. 142 Wash.2d at 205, 11 P.3d 762 (inquiry into the voters? intent will not occur where the text of an initiative is unambiguous); City of MOTION TO INTERVENE AND MEMORANDUM OF LAW - 18 STEPHEN W. PIDGEON Attorney at Law, P.S. 3002 Colby Avenue, Suite 306 Everett, Washington 98201 (425)605-4774 Spokane, ll 1 Wash.2d at 97, 758 P.2d 480 (court will avoid entering the realm of pure speculation about what individual voters were thinking, nor will it assume voters do not read or understand the measure presented to them). Reference to the statutes governing placement of a proposal for a high?capacity transportation system on a ballot leads us to conclude that Resolution 75 was the approved proposal. RCW 29.79.0350) requires the ballot title to contain a concise description which "must clearly identify the proposition to be voted on." See also RCW 29.27.066. RCW 231.104.1400) requires reference in the ballot title to the summary pamphlet sent to voters . . . We have previously indicated that Where the ballot title would lead to an inquiry into the body of the act, proper notice, as required by article II, section 19 of the Washington Constitution, has been given to the voter about what he or she is deciding. Wash. Fed'n of State Employees v. State, 127 Wash.2d 544, 555, 901 P.2d 1028 (1995) See Sane Transit v. Sound Transit, 151 Wash.2d 60, 85 P.3d 346, 351-52 (2004), Dated this 21St day of November 2019. if" N, WSBA #25265 15:13?13:ml - use, Suite @350 Everett, Washington 98208 (425)-299-9012 MOTION TO INTERVENE AND MEMORANDUM OF LAW - l9 STEPHEN W. PIDGEON Attorney at Law, P.S. 3002 Colby Avenue, Suite 306 Everett, Washington 98201 (425)605-4774 VERIFICATWN I. Clint Dialer am a taxpayer a vehicle mum. and a. registered weer whe vmed in supper: of 1-976. mut?m?a?lldemmanIMlm . mm It! be tree 1, Kevin Heine?. am a tamyee a vehicle owner, and a registered Y?btt? whe eased in of I- 916. seek Do lemme as a third party in this mien and 1 have read the fawning, and believe the factual Wm! It: be true Kevin Hem VERIFICATIQN is Mum MMIL am. a mpeyet. a which; We and a registered voter who voted in suppm at? is 97-6. mi: tn item as a third party in ibis aetien and I haw: mast the foaming, and heiim the facial statement in be true 5/ [Meg/gear J, . .. Mam More? VERIFICATIIDN I Icahn Legitimate a taxpayer a vehicle am and a registered Wee-he voted in W017 L916 seek to Was a third party in this action and! hue-creed the Whig, and believe the I?m-eel 5 IKMM VERJFICATFDN [market-Glam. ameuxpayer,avehiele em 976-. seek in inhememe as a third party in thiseuien and 1- have read ?he feregoing. and believe the [?nal sine-mm! heme: MOTION TO INTERVENE AND MEMORANDUM OF LAW - 20 STEPHEN W. PIDGEON Attorney at Law, RS. 3002 Colby Avenue. Suite 306 Everett, Washington 98201 (425 1605?4?74