Marc J. Randazza, JD, MAMC, LLM
Licensed in AZ, CA, FL, MA, NV

6 December 2019
Via U.S. Mail and email
C. Boyd Sturges, III, Esq.
Davis, Sturges & Tomlinson
101 Church Street
P.O. Drawer 708
Louisburg, NC 27549
bsturges@dstattys.com
Re:

Sons of Confederate Veterans, North Carolina Division
Demand Pursuant to 17 U.S.C. § 512(f)

Dear Attorney Sturges:
This law firm has the privilege and honor of representing Attorney T. Greg Doucette. It is
our understanding you represent the North Carolina Division of the Sons of Confederate
Veterans, Inc. (“NCSCV”). If this is incorrect, kindly direct this letter to their counsel or their
“Commander,” R. Kevin Stone.
Documents filed in Orange County Superior Court on November 27 indicate that, at 11:10
a.m., you filed a lawsuit against the University of North Carolina, with a sweetheart deal of
a “settlement” approved by the Court a mere seven minutes later. It appears that this was
a sham and a fraud on the Court, because statements of Mr. Stone, on behalf of your
client, indicate you knew that your client lacked standing. Specifically, Mr. Stone stated:
Since August of 2018 when he was ripped down, we have been looking for
a way through our attorney, Boyd Sturges, to accomplish one of two things:
either to have the memorial restored to its place of honour on campus while
being properly protected; or to gain possession of the memorial and make
an equally prominent public display for it at UNC’s expense.
…
As we have mentioned dozens of times, despite consulting every known
legal source, including those parties who have had success with SCV suits
in Virginia and Tennessee, we could not get past the issue in North Carolina
law of legal standing in the Silent Sam case so to bring a suit. Even if we had
filed suit, our complaint would have been challenged and dismissed
immediately without result. After extensive consultation (with judges, retired
judges, etc.), we were 100% certain that this would be the outcome.
…
Further, we have not allowed the issue of standing to be mentioned in any
way in the settlement so as not to hamper any future suits we may have to
file regarding other memorials.
…
30 Western Avenue, Gloucester, Massachusetts 01930
mjr@randazza.com   (978) 801-1776

 Sons of Confederate Veterans, North Carolina Division
Demand Pursuant to 17 U.S.C. § 512(f)
Page 2 of 4

Full credit is to be given to our attorney, Mr. Sturges, as it was only through
his expertise, his good connections with and respect by all the parties
involved, and his influence that we were approached by the enemy and
were able to work with officials at the very highest levels of the University
and State government. (Emphasis added).
It is our understanding that Mr. Stone sent this letter to NCSCV members on November 23,
immediately after the suit was filed. It appears that either he is dishonest or you have some
explaining to do.
Mr. Doucette is a proud member of the North Carolina legal community and was disturbed
by the appearance of a sham suit and Stone’s letter. In fact, any member of the
community, at all, should be disturbed when the public’s courts are used dishonestly. Mr.
Doucette may not be one to throw in with the NCSCV, but he does have an appreciation
for some of Robert E. Lee’s wisdom. “Honesty in its widest sense is always admirable. The
trite saying that 'honesty is the best policy' has met with the just criticism that honesty is not
policy… The real honest man is honest from conviction of what is right, not from policy."
What was right was that the great disinfectant of sunshine should be applied to this
conduct. Mr. Doucette, his honesty derived from his conviction of what is right, uploaded
that letter and related documents regarding the lawsuit and settlement to his Dropbox
account and shared them on his Twitter feed, @greg_doucette.
On December 2, 2019, Mr. Doucette received a notice from Dropbox that your client filed
a notice under Section 512 of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (“DMCA”) claiming that
the sharing of the letter infringed your client’s copyright. This is a craven, misleading, and
ineffective effort at silencing discussion about your wrongdoing and the wrongdoing of
UNC, a state actor.
Although the DMCA notice confirmed the authenticity of the letter, it was not without
consequence to Mr. Doucette. Dropbox disabled public sharing on his account as a result
of your client’s fraudulent notice. In short, due to your efforts to try and employ a policy of
secrecy and dishonesty, my client has been not only offended, but damaged.
Fair use gave Mr. Doucette the privilege of using the letter. See 17 U.S.C. § 107. “Any
individual may reproduce a copyrighted work for a ‘fair use’; the copyright owner does
not possess the exclusive right to such a use.” Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City
Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 433 (1984).
The purpose of copyright is to create incentives for creative effort. Even
copying for noncommercial purposes may impair the copyright holder’s
ability to obtain the rewards that Congress intended him to have. But a use
that has no demonstrable effect upon the potential market for, or the value
of, the copyrighted work need not be prohibited in order to protect the
author’s incentive to create. The prohibition of such non-commercial uses
would merely inhibit access to ideas without any countervailing benefit.
Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, 104 S. Ct. 774, 793 (1984). As you can see, the purpose
of the Copyright Act is not to censor information that you would rather hide. While a sham

 Sons of Confederate Veterans, North Carolina Division
Demand Pursuant to 17 U.S.C. § 512(f)
Page 3 of 4

lawsuit is a creative solution to a problem, it is not the kind of creativity that the Copyright
Act refers to.
Mr. Doucette used the letter to expose and criticize the fraud you perpetrated on the
Court, including suborning Mr. Stone’s perjury. After all, it was a verified complaint,
notarized by you. While this might make more shams less likely, again, this is not a “market”
for the original letter.
The misleading takedown notice was issued in bad faith, because it failed to consider
Mr. Doucette’s fair use rights. See Lenz v. Universal Music Grp., 572 F. Supp. 2d 1150, 115455 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (“An allegation that a copyright owner acted in bad faith by issuing a
takedown notice without proper consideration of the fair use doctrine … is sufficient to
state a misrepresentation claim pursuant to § 512(f) of the DMCA.") Your client clearly
made such a material misrepresentation, and my client will not allow it to go unpunished.
The NCSCV is liable to Mr. Doucette for his damages and attorneys’ fees under Section
512(f) of the DMCA. Mr. Doucette is prepared to file suit for this, as well as for a declaration
of non-infringement and any other causes of action he may have, which are still being
evaluated. Mr. Doucette is considering a lawsuit not out of bitterness or vindictive feelings,
but because it seems that the NCSCV has tried to wrest from him his dearest rights. This will
not stand, man.
Unlike your client’s other most recent litigation, this suit will be real. Important principles are
at stake, and Mr. Doucette is a man of principle.
The sham litigation was troubling, but what is really shameful is your client seeking to
suppress my client’s First Amendment rights. Lest you believe that this is a mere intellectual
property matter, you are mistaken. Fair use stands at the confluence of the Copyright Act
and the First Amendment.
Although the First Amendment does not provide a defense to copyright
infringement, when an act of copying occurs in the course of a political,
social or moral debate, the public interest in free expression is one factor
favoring a finding of fair use. Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Moral Majority, Inc.,
606 F. Supp. 1526 (C.D. Cal. 1985)
The Sons of Confederate Veterans have no qualms about seeking the protection of the
First Amendment. See, e.g., Sons of Confederate Veterans v. Vehicles, 288 F.3d 610 (4th
Cir. 2002). It is particularly poignant that “[t]he Free Speech Clause applies to the various
states through the Fourteenth Amendment.” Sons of Confederate Veterans v. City of
Lexington, 722 F.3d 224, 229 n.4 (4th Cir. 2013). One would think that Neo-Confederates
would be particularly sensitive to any erosion of this most important principle. Even the
actual Confederates would likely feel the same. The Confederate Constitution recognized
freedom of expression in its very body, rather than as an amendment to it. See Constitution
of the Confederate States of America, Art. I, §9, Cl. 12.
When freedom of expression is no longer expedient for them, the Sons of Confederate
Veterans seek to suppress that very right under the cover of a bunk-assed copyright claim?
We do not agree with much of what the Sons of Confederate Veterans may have to say,

 Sons of Confederate Veterans, North Carolina Division
Demand Pursuant to 17 U.S.C. § 512(f)
Page 4 of 4

but we would unconditionally defend their right to say it – and so would Mr. Doucette. It
is disappointing to see them comport themselves as unprincipled cowards who choose
freedom of expression when it serves their purposes, but who run like cockroaches for the
dark cover of censorship when the light of truth shines upon them.
Mr. Doucette uncovered something that stinks to high heaven. He had every right to
speak against it and to show the public what he found. And, now that NCSCV was foolish
enough to try and blow out this candle, they have, instead, knocked it over and started a
fire. Your client’s cause is lost. This information will not only go back up, but my client will
make sure that it is seen by as many people as possible. In short, if you believe that my
client infringed your client’s copyright, you may want to prepare to sue my client, because
he is going to do it again, and again, and again.
Should your client wish to avoid litigation, Mr. Doucette proposes the following: the $2.5
million your client did or will receive from UNC will be, instead, diverted to a scholarship
fund for African American students at UNC, or other similar use, subject to our client’s
approval. And of course, the DMCA notice must be immediately withdrawn. If you
accept this offer, our client shall commit to oblivion the feelings your client’s actions
engendered.
Please direct all correspondence to our Massachusetts office.
Sincerely,

Marc J. Randazza

Jay Marshall Wolman