An American Citizen, On the Federal Government I, II, III, Independent
Gazetteer, 26–29 September 1787
These essays by Tench Coxe were the first major defenses of the Constitution published in the
United States. They were printed in the Independent Gazetteer on 26, 28, and 29 September, and
reprinted in the American Museum, the Pennsylvania Gazette, and the Carlisle Gazette by 7
November. The Philadelphische Correspondenz printed German translations of the first essay on 13
November, the second on 20 November, and the third probably on 27 November, in an issue not
extant. The three essays were reprinted, with a fourth essay by Coxe, in an anthology, Addresses to
the Citizens of Pennsylvania, 21 October.

An American Citizen I
It is impossible for an honest and feeling mind, of any nation or country whatever, to be
insensible to the present circumstances of America. Were I an East Indian, or a Turk, I should
consider this singular situation of a part of my fellow creatures, as most curious and interesting.
Intimately connected with the country, as a citizen of the Union, I confess it entirely engrosses
my mind and feelings.
To take a proper view of the ground on which we stand, it may be necessary to recollect the
manner in which the United States were originally settled and established. Want of charity in
the religious systems of Europe and of justice in their political governments were the principal
moving causes which drove the emigrants of various countries to the American continent. The
Congregationalists, Quakers, Presbyterians and other British dissenters, the Catholics of
England and Ireland, the Huguenots of France, the German Lutherans, Calvinists, and
Moravians, with several other societies, established themselves in the different colonies,
thereby laying the ground of that catholicism in ecclesiastical affairs, which has been
observable since the late Revolution. Religious liberty naturally promotes corresponding
dispositions in matters of government. The constitution of England, as it stood on paper, was
one of the freest at that time existing in the world, and the American colonies considered
themselves as entitled to the fullest enjoyment of it. Thus when the ill-judged discussions of
latter times in England brought into question the rights of this country, as it stood connected
with the British Crown, we were found more strongly impressed with their importance and
accurately acquainted with their extent, than the wisest and most learned of our brethren
beyond the Atlantic. When the greatest names in Parliament insisted on the power of that body
over the commerce of the colonies, and even the right to bind us in all cases whatsoever,
America, seeing that it was only another form of tyranny, insisted upon the immutable truth,
that taxation and representation are inseparable, and while a desire of harmony and other
considerations induced her into an acquiescence in the commercial regulations of Great Britain,
it was done from the declared necessity of the case, and with a cautious, full and absolute
saving of our voluntarily suspended rights. The Parliament was persevering, and America
continued firm till hostilities and open war commenced, and finally the late Revolution closed
the contest forever.

 Tis evident from this short detail and the reflections which arise from it, that the quarrel
between the United States and the Parliament of Great Britain did not arise so much from
objections to the form of government, though undoubtedly a better one by far is now within our
reach, as from a difference concerning certain important rights resulting from the essential
principles of liberty, which the constitution preserved to all the subjects actually residing within
the realm. It was not asserted by America that the people of the island of Great Britain were
slaves, but that we, though possessed absolutely of the same rights, were not admitted to
enjoy an equal degree of freedom.
When the Declaration of Independence completed the separation between the two countries,
new governments were necessarily established. Many circumstances led to the adoption of the
republican form, among which was the predilection of the people. In devising the frames of
government it may have been difficult to avoid extremes opposite to the vices of that we had
just rejected; nevertheless many of the state constitutions we have chosen are truly excellent.
Our misfortunes have been, that in the first instance we adopted no national government at all,
but were kept together by common danger only, and that in the confusions of a civil war we
framed a federal constitution now universally admitted to be inadequate to the preservation of
liberty, property, and the Union. The question is not then how far our state constitutions are
good or otherwise—the object of our wishes is to amend and supply the evident and allowed
errors and defects of the federal government. Let us consider awhile, that which is now
proposed to us. Let us compare it with the so much boasted British form of government, and
see how much more it favors the people and how completely it secures their rights,
remembering at the same time that we did not dissolve our connection with that country so
much on account of its constitution as the perversion and maladministration of it.
In the first place let us look at the nature and powers of the head of that country, and those of
the ostensible head of ours.
The British king is the great bishop or supreme head of an established church, with an immense
patronage annexed. In this capacity he commands a number of votes in the House of Lords, by
creating bishops, who, besides their great incomes, have votes in that assembly, and are judges
in the last resort. They have also many honorable and lucrative places to bestow, and thus from
their wealth, learning, dignities, powers and patronage give a great luster and an enormous
influence to the Crown.
In America our President will not only be without these influencing advantages, but they will be
in the possession of the people at large, to strengthen their hands in the event of a contest with
him. All religious funds, honors and powers are in the gift of numberless, unconnected,
disunited, and contending corporations, wherein the principle of perfect equality universally
prevails. In short, danger from ecclesiastical tyranny, that longstanding and still remaining curse
of the people—that sacrilegious engine of royal power in some countries, can be feared by no
man in the United States. In Britain their king is for life. In America our President will always be
one of the people at the end of four years. In that country the king is hereditary and may be an
idiot, a knave, or a tyrant by nature, or ignorant from neglect of his education, yet cannot be

 removed, for “he can do no wrong.” In America, as the President is to be one of the people at
the end of his short term, so will he and his fellow citizens remember, that he was originally
one of the people; and that he is created by their breath. Further, he cannot be an idiot,
probably not a knave or a tyrant, for those whom nature makes so, discover it before the age of
thirty-five, until which period he cannot be elected. It appears we have not admitted that he
can do no wrong, but have rather presupposed he may and will sometimes do wrong, by
providing for his impeachment, his trial, and his peaceable and complete removal.
In England the king has a power to create members of the upper house, who are judges in the
highest court, as well as legislators. Our President not only cannot make members of the upper
house, but their creation, like his own, is by the people through their representatives, and a
member of assembly may and will be as certainly dismissed at the end of his year for electing a
weak or wicked Senator, as for any other blunder or misconduct.
The king of England has legislative power, while our President can only use it when the other
servants of the people are divided. But in all great cases affecting the national interests or
safety, his modified and restrained power must give way to the sense of two-thirds of the
legislature. In fact it amounts to no more, than a serious duty imposed upon him to request
both houses to reconsider any matter on which he entertains doubts or feels apprehensions;
and here the people have a strong hold upon him from his sole and personal responsibility.
The president of the upper house (or the chancellor) in England is appointed by the king, while
our Vice President, who is chosen by the people through the Electors and the Senate, is not at
all dependent on the President, but may exercise equal powers on some occasions. In all royal
governments an helpless infant or an inexperienced youth may wear the crown. Our President
must be matured by the experience of years, and being born among us, his character at thirtyfive must be fully understood. Wisdom, virtue, and active qualities of mind and body can alone
make him the first servant of a free and enlightened people.
Our President will fall very far short indeed of any prince in his annual income, which will not be
hereditary, but the absolute allowance of the people passing through the hands of their other
servants from year to year as it becomes necessary. There will be no burdens on the nation to
provide for his heir or other branches of his family. Tis probable, from the state of property in
America and other circumstances, that many citizens will exceed him in show and expense,
those dazzling trappings of kingly rank and power. He will have no authority to make a treaty
without two-thirds of the Senate, nor can he appoint ambassadors or other great officers
without their approbation, which will remove the idea of patronage and influence, and of
personal obligation and dependence. The appointment of even the inferior officers may be
taken out of his hands by an act of Congress at any time; he can create no nobility or titles of
honor, nor take away offices during good behavior. His person is not so much protected as that
of a member of the House of Representatives; for he may be proceeded against like any other
man in the ordinary course of law. He appoints no officer of the separate states. He will have no
influence from placemen in the legislature, nor can he prorogue or dissolve it. He will have no
power over the treasures of the state; and lastly, as he is created through the Electors by the

 people at large, he must ever look up to the support of his creators. From such a servant with
powers so limited and transitory, there can be no danger, especially when we consider the solid
foundations on which our national liberties are immovably fixed by the other provisions of this
excellent Constitution. Whatever of dignity or authority he possesses is a delegated part of
their majesty and their political omnipotence, transiently vested in him by the people
themselves for their own happiness.

An American Citizen II
We have seen that the late Honorable Convention, in designating the nature of the chief
executive office of the United States, have deprived it of all the dangerous appendages of
royalty, and provided for the frequent expiration of its limited powers. As our President bears
no resemblance to a king, so we shall see the Senate have no similitude to nobles.
First then not being hereditary, their collective knowledge, wisdom and virtue are not
precarious, for by these qualities alone are they to obtain their offices; and they will have none
of the peculiar follies and vices of those men who possess power merely because their fathers
held it before them, for they will be educated (under equal advantages and with equal
prospects) among and on a footing with the other sons of a free people. If we recollect the
characters, who have, at various periods, filled the seats of Congress, we shall find this
expectation perfectly reasonable. Many young men of genius and many characters of more
matured abilities, without fortunes, have been honored with that trust. Wealth has had but few
representatives there, and those have been generally possessed of respectable personal
qualifications. There have also been many instances of persons, not eminently endowed with
mental qualities, who have been sent thither from a reliance on their virtues, public and private.
As the Senators are still to be elected by the legislatures of the states, there can be no doubt of
equal safety and propriety in their future appointment, especially as no further pecuniary
qualification is required by the Constitution.
They can hold no other office civil or military under the United States, nor can they join in
making provisions for themselves, either by creating new places or increasing the emoluments
of old ones. As their sons are not to succeed them, they will not be induced to aim at an
increase or perpetuity of their powers, at the expense of the liberties of the people of which
those sons will be a part. They possess a much smaller share of the judicial power than the
upper house in Britain, for they are not, as there, the highest court in civil affairs.
Impeachments alone are the cases cognizable before them, and in what other place could
matters of that nature be so properly and safely determined? The judges of the federal courts
will owe their appointments to the President and Senate, therefore may not feel so perfectly
free from favor, affection and influence as the upper house, who receive their power from the
people, through their state representatives, and are immediately responsible to those
assemblies, and finally to the nation at large. Thus we see when a daring or dangerous offender
is brought to the bar of public justice, the people who alone can impeach him by their

 immediate representatives will cause him to be tried, not by the judges appointed in the heat of
the occasion, but by two-thirds of a select body, chosen a long time before, for various purposes
by the collected wisdom of their state legislatures. From a pretense or affection of extraordinary
purity and excellence of character their word of honor is the sanction under which these high
courts in other countries have given their sentence. But with us, like the other judges of the
Union, like the rest of the people of which they are never to forget they are a part, it is required
that they be on oath.
No ambitious, undeserving or unexperienced youth can acquire a seat in this house by means of
the most enormous wealth or most powerful connections, till thirty years have ripened his
abilities and fully discovered his merits to his country—a more rational ground of preference
surely than mere property.
The Senate, though more independent of the people as to the free exercise of their judgment
and abilities than the House of Representatives, by the longer term of their office, must be
older and more experienced men, and the public treasures, the sinews of the state, cannot be
called forth by their original motion. They may restrain the profusion or errors of the House of
Representatives, but they cannot take the necessary measures to raise a national revenue.
The people, through the Electors, prescribe them such a President as shall be best qualified to
control them.
They can only, by conviction on impeachment, remove and incapacitate a dangerous officer,
but the punishment of him as a criminal remains within the province of the courts of law to be
conducted under all the ordinary forms and precautions, which exceedingly diminishes the
importance of their judicial powers. They are detached, as much as possible, from local
prejudices in favor of their respective states by having a separate and independent vote, for the
sensible and conscientious use of which, every member will find his person, honor and
character seriously bound. He cannot shelter himself, under a vote in behalf of his state, among
his immediate colleagues. As there are only two, he cannot be voluntarily or involuntarily
governed by the majority of the deputation. He will be obliged, by wholesome provisions, to
attend his public duty, and thus in great national questions must give a vote of the honesty of
which he will find it necessary to convince his constituents.
The Senate must always receive the exceptions of the President against any of their legislative
acts, which, without serious deliberation and sufficient reasons, they will seldom disregard.
They will also feel a considerable check from the constitutional powers of the state legislatures,
whose rights they will not be disposed to infringe, since they are the bodies to which they owe
their existence, and are moreover to remain the immediate guardians of the people.
And lastly the Senate will feel the mighty check of the House of Representatives—a body so pure
in its election, so intimately connected, by its interests and feelings, with the people at large, so
guarded against corruption and influence—so much, from its nature, above all apprehensions,
that it must ever be able to maintain the high ground assigned to it by the Federal Constitution.

 An American Citizen III
In pursuing the consideration of the new Federal Constitution, it remains now to examine the
nature and powers of the House of Representatives—the immediate delegates of the people.
Each member of this truly popular assembly will be chosen by about six thousand electors, by
the poor as well as the rich. No decayed and venal borough will have an unjust share in their
determinations. No old Sarum will send thither a Representative by the voice of a single
elector.(a) As we shall have no royal ministries to purchase votes, so we shall have no votes for
sale. For the suffrages of six thousand enlightened and independent freemen are above all price.
When the increasing population of the country shall render the body too large at the rate of
one member for every thirty thousand persons, they will be returned at the greater rate of one
for every forty or fifty thousand, which will render the electors still more incorruptible. For this
regulation is only designed to prevent a smaller number than thirty thousand from having a
Representative. Thus we see a provision follows, that no state shall have less than one member;
for if a new and greater number should hereafter be fixed on, which shall exceed the whole of
the inhabitants of any state, such state, without this wholesome provision, would lose its voice
in the House of Representatives, a circumstance which the Constitution renders impossible.
The people of England, whose House of Commons is filled with military and civil officers and
pensioners, say their liberties would be perfectly secured by triennial parliaments. With us no
placemen can sit among the Representatives of the people, and two years are the constitutional
term of their existence. Here again, lest wealth, powerful connections, or even the unwariness
of the people should place in this important trust an undeserving, unqualified or inexperienced
youth, the wisdom of the Convention has proposed an absolute incapacity till the age of
twenty-five. At twenty-one a young man is made the guardian of his own interests, but he
cannot for a few years more be entrusted with the affairs of the nation. He must be an
inhabitant of the state that elects him, that he may be intimately acquainted with their
particular circumstances. The House of Representatives is not, as the Senate, to have a
president chosen for them from without their body, but are to elect their speaker from their
own number. They will also appoint all their other officers. In great state cases, they will be the
grand inquest of the nation, for they possess the sole and uncontrollable power of
impeachment. They are neither to wait the call nor abide the prorogations and dissolutions of a
perverse or ambitious prince, for they are to meet at least once in every year, and sit on
adjournments to be agreed on between themselves and the other servants of the people.
Should they differ in opinion, the President, who is a temporary fellow servant and not their
hereditary master, has a mediatorial power to adjust it for them, but cannot prevent their
constitutional meeting within the year. They can compel the attendance of their members, that
their public duty may not be evaded in times of difficulty or danger. The vote of each
Representative can be always known, as well as the proceedings of the House, that so the
people may be acquainted with the conduct of those in whom they repose so important a trust.
As was observed of the Senators, they cannot make new offices for themselves, nor increase,
for their own benefit, the emoluments of old ones, by which the people will be exempted from
needless additions to the public expenses on such sordid and mercenary principles. They are not

 to be restrained from the firm and plain language which becomes the independent
representatives of freemen, for there is to be a perfect liberty of speech. Without their consent
no monies can be obtained, no armies raised, no navies provided. They alone can originate bills
for drawing forth the revenues of the Union, and they will have a negative upon every
legislative act of the other house. So far, in short, as the sphere of federal jurisdiction extends,
they will be controllable only by the people, and in contentions with the other branch, so far as
they shall be right, they must ever finally prevail.
Such, my countrymen, are some of the cautionary provisions of the frame of government your
faithful Convention have submitted to your consideration—such the foundations of peace,
liberty and safety, which have been laid by their unwearied labors. They have guarded you
against all servants but those “whom choice and common good ordain,” against all masters
“save preserving Heaven.”

Cite as: The Documentary History of the Ratification of the Constitution Digital Edition, ed. John
P. Kaminski, Gaspare J. Saladino, Richard Leffler, Charles H. Schoenleber and Margaret A.
Hogan. Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2009.
Canonic URL: http://rotunda.upress.virginia.edu/founders/RNCN-02-02-02-0002-0002-0011
[accessed 06 Jul 2012]
Original source: Ratification by the States, Volume II: Pennsylvania