DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
PROGRAM EXECUTIVE OFFICER
UNMANNED AVIATION AND STRIKE WEAPONS
RADM.WILLIAM A MOFFETT BUILDING
47123 BUSE ROAD BLDG 2272
PATUXENT RIVER, MD 20670-1547

 

5230
Ser 7-183
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From: Program Manager, Navy Marine Corps Small Tactical Unmanned Aircraft Systems
(PMA-263)
To: Small Unmanned Aircraft System Program Managers (SUAS-PM)

Subj: OPERATION RISKS WITII REGARDS TO DJI FAMILY OF PRODUCTS

1. Background. New counter Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) technologies have been
?elded to counter the increasing use of commercially available small UAS by our adversaries.
To support training and Tactics, Techniques and Procedures development associated with these
counter UAS systems, operational forces require threat representative Small Unmanned Aircraft
Systems (SUAS). The most prevalent of these SUAS arc the DJ I family of quadcopters. While
these systems are commonly available and low cost, the has minimal technical information
to thoroughly understand the impact of their use. The following operational risks have been
identi?ed and should be acknowledged prior to employment of these commercially procured
SU AS assets for CONUS-based training.

2. Omrational Risks.

3. Cyber vulnerabilities. A thorough study of the cyber vulnerabilities of these systems is not
available at this time. Additionally, due to the rapidly changing con?gurations and open nature
of the available software, cyber threats will continue to evolve. Of particular concern is the data
link between the aircraft and the ground station. While open source research indicates
numerous techniques available to passively view the video and metadata from the air vehicle as
well as assume control over the air vehicle by adversaries. Also, the typical Ground Control
Station (GCS) con?guration includes a COTS transmitter, controller, phone or tablet utilizing
WiFi or DJ I proprietary Open source research indicates when the transmitter,
controller, tablet or phone is connected to the web, images, video and ?ight records could be
uploaded to unsecure servers in other countries via live streaming, or transmitted once the air
vehicle is connected to a computer using the assistant application. Overall, the system
should be considered highly vulnerable in the cyber security realm and employed accordingly.

Recommended mitigations:
0 Conduct training operations in areas that limit the potential of adversaries to be in
reception range of the GCS and Air Vehicle signals.
0 Conduct training in areas that are not operationally sensitive.
0 Do not connect the GCS to military networks using wired or wireless connections.

Subj: OPERATION RISKS WITH REGARDS TO DH. FAMILY OF PRODUCTS

Avoid connecting the GCS to the world wide web using wired or wireless
connections, but if necessary, ensure all images, video and ?ight records are deleted
?om the GCS cache and micro-SD cards prior to connection to the web.

The Air Vehicle has the capability to store imagesr?video on a micro- SD card when
installed in the GCS, the air vehicle, or a combination of both. Due to the potential
for loss of the air vehicle, operation with the SD card installed is NOT
RECOMMENDED. The DH platforms can perform all necessary ?ight functions
without the use of recording media. This means both GCS internal memoly (cache),
and external memory.

Cover the camera when not in use using the plastic gimbal support included in the
kit.

Do not use Personal Phones (Le. Network) or Hot spots to access Map
Data.

b. Electromagnetic compatibility. To date, a thorough investigation of electromagnetic

 

susceptibility has not been conducted on these systems; therefore the potential to experience
interference is high. Interference can disrupt or preclude operation of the system and potentially
loss of control of the air vehicle.

Recommended mitigations:

Operation should be conducted with maximum practical standoff distance between
the Vehicle and other RF transmitters to reduce the potential for unintended
interference.

Closely monitor link quality indications (OPS signal strength} to minimize
possibility of loss of link.

c. Low reliability. While these systems are commonly available, anecdotal evidence
demonstrates that they are not highly reliable when employed in typical military environments.
Loss of the air vehicle through damage, or malfunction should be considered highly probable
over time; DJI systems are expendable.

3. Training and Technical Support. The Group 1 Unmanned Aircraft System Training and
Readiness Manual require completion of the course of instruction speci?c to the system assigned
to operate. It also requires that the SUAS Operators be designated by the unit commanding
of?cer before being authorized to operate a SUAS on the Lmit?s table of equipment or other
?elded equipment. Formal training and limited technical assistance is available for I systems
procured by PMA-263 are available at the Training and Logistics Support Activities (TALSA)
located on Camp Leieune and Camp Pendleton. No supply support will be provided beyond the
spare parts delivered with fielded systems.

Subj: OPERATION RISKS WITH REGARDS T0 FAMILY OF PRODUCTS

Recommended mitigations:
[insure SUAS operators are certi?ed and designated prior to operating the systems.

0 Commanders should allow operators to build experience with the systems under
controlled conditions prior to employment in more complex training scenarios.

0 Care should be exercised in operation to minimize damage to the systems in order to
prolong the life of these assets to the maximum extent practical.

4. PMA-263 requests that these risks be reviewed and unit operators complete applicable formal
training. Any questions concerning this letter should be addressed to the Group I

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