COMMITTEE ON GENERAL INVESTIGATING NIEOLESOLLIER
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ICE HAIR

December 20, 2019

Members of the Texas House of Representatives
State Capitol
Austin, Texas

Dear Members:

The Committee on General Investigating adopted the attached report of the committee?s
bipartisan panel of legal experts as the committee?s ?nal report concerning the investigation into
the facts and circumstances of the June 12, 2019 meeting between Michael Quinn Sullivan,
Speaker Dennis Bonnen, and Representative Dustin Burrows.

Pursuant to Section 301 .020(d), Government Code, the Committee makes this report to the
Members of the House for their information and consideration.

spectfully sub ed,

. er

 

 

 

 

 

Morgan 
Chairm 
Nicole D. Collier Matt Krause 
Vice Chair
.. Candy Noble Leo Pacheco

MEMBERS: MATT KRAUSE CANDY NOBLE 
MAIHNG ADDRESS: P. O. Box 2910 AUSTIN, TEXAS 78768?1910 (5 I 2) 463?0780

HON. PATRICIA GRAY

HON. WILL F. HARTNETT

HON. THOMAS R. PHILLIPS

1816 Church Street
Galveston, Texas 77550-4824

The Hartnett Law Firm
2920 N. Pearl Street
Dallas, Texas 75201

Baker Botts L.L.P.
98 San Jacinto Blvd., Suite 1500
Austin, Texas 78701

December 6, 2019

Representative Morgan Meyer, Chair
Representative Nicole Collier, Vice-Chair
Representative Matt Krause
Representative Candy Noble
Representative Leo Pacheco
House of Representatives Committee on General Investigating
Dear Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee:
The General Investigating Committee of the Texas House of Representatives requested the
Public Integrity Unit of the Texas Department of Public Safety to investigate matters related to the
conversation between Speaker Dennis Bonnen, Representative Dustin Burrows, and Michael
Quinn Sullivan recorded by Sullivan on June 12, 2019, and report their findings to the Committee.
The General Investigating Committee then appointed this panel of three Texas attorneys, all former
elected public officials, to review the results of that investigation and consider whether either
Speaker Bonnen or Representative Burrows violated:
•

The Texas Penal Code;

•

Article XVI, Section 41 of the Texas Constitution;

•

Title 15 of the Texas Election Code;

•

Chapter 572 of the Texas Government Code;

•

Any Rule of the Texas House of Representatives.

This panel was not asked to, and did not, consider what actions, if any, the Committee or the House
as a whole might take during the remainder of this legislative term with regard to Speaker Bonnen’s
and Representative Burrow’s actions.
I.

Penal Code Violations
A.

Bribery

1.

Text of statute

1

 Sec. 36.01(3) “Benefit” means anything reasonably regarded as
pecuniary gain or pecuniary advantage, including benefit to any
other person in whose welfare the beneficiary has a direct and
substantial interest.
Sec. 36.02. BRIBERY. (a) A person commits an offense if he
intentionally or knowingly offers, confers, or agrees to confer on
another, or solicits, accepts, or agrees to accept from another:
(1) any benefit as consideration for the recipient’s
decision, opinion, recommendation, vote, or other exercise
of discretion as a public servant, party official, or voter;
….
(4) any benefit that is a political contribution as defined
by Title 15, Election Code, or that is an expenditure made
and reported in accordance with Chapter 305, Government
Code, if the benefit was offered, conferred, solicited,
accepted, or agreed to pursuant to an express agreement
to take or withhold a specific exercise of official
discretion if such exercise of official discretion would not
have been taken or withheld but for the benefit;
notwithstanding any rule of evidence or jury instruction
allowing factual inferences in the absence of certain
evidence, direct evidence of the express agreement shall be
required in any prosecution under this subdivision.
….
(d) It is an exception to the application of Subdivisions (1),
(2), and (3) of Subsection (a) that the benefit is a political
contribution as defined by Title 15, Election Code, or an
expenditure made and reported in accordance with Chapter
305, Government Code.
(e) An offense under this section is a felony of the second
degree.
(emphasis added)
2.

Analysis

Speaker Bonnen asked or suggested that Mr. Sullivan and the entity he represents,
Empower Texans, do the following:
•

Refrain from donating to Speaker Bonnen’s own opponent

2

 •

Refrain from donating to opponents of Speaker Bonnen’s allies

•

Donate to candidates who mount primary challenges to particularly incumbent
Representatives whose names were on a “list”

•

Donate to Republican candidates running against named Democrats

None of these actions can constitute a violation of the Bribery Statute unless they constitute a
“benefit” to Speaker Bonnen as defined by that statute.
a.

Are any of Speaker Bonnen’s requests “benefits”?

“Pecuniary gain or pecuniary advantage” has been interpreted by the Tenth Court of
Appeals to mean “anything to which a price can be assigned.” Smith v. State, 959 S.W.2d 1, 2021 (Tex. App.—Waco 1997, pet. ref’d). 1 In Smith, the court determined that provision of “round
trip plane tickets, hotel accommodations, meals, ground transportation, and theater tickets” was a
pecuniary benefit under the Bribery Statute. Id. at 7, 21. In part, the court reasoned that because
section 36.10 exempts items such as lodging and transportation in certain circumstances, the
Legislature must have intended that non-monetary gifts such as lodging and transportation would
otherwise constitute “benefits.”
Additionally, “[t]he inclusion of ‘anything reasonably regarded’ broadens the definition
and allows latitude in its interpretation.” Valencia v. State, No. 13-02-020-CR, 2004 WL 1416239,
at *3 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi-Edinburg June 24, 2004, pet. ref’d) (mem. op.) (concluding that
“any rational trier of fact could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant’s vote for a
salaried county constable position, could be reasonably regarded as a pecuniary gain or advantage
and thus constituted a ‘benefit.’”). 2
Black’s Law Dictionary, the acknowledged authoritative source for legal lexicology,
defines “pecuniary gain” as a “gain of money or of something having monetary value,” Gain,
Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019), and “pecuniary advantage” as “[t]he condition of being
able to gain or of having more money than another,” Advantage, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed.
2019).
The question is therefore whether Speaker Bonnen solicited any gain of something to which
a price can be assigned. There are at least two ways to conceptualize how Speaker Bonnen might
have solicited a benefit:
•

By requesting Empower Texans to “pop” Speaker Bonnen’s perceived rivals
within the Republican primary, Bonnen might conceivably improve his odds of
re-election as Speaker. 3 Re-election to that office is a benefit because it entitles

1

Note that “petition refused” does not carry the same weight in a criminal case that it does in a civil case. The Court
of Criminal Appeals refuses all petitions for discretionary review that it does not grant.
2

See footnote 1 regarding petition history for criminal cases.

3

Promises or threats made by a person, or benefits accepted by a person, to specifically influence the casting of a vote
for Speaker constitute “legislative bribery” under Subchapter C of Texas Government Code Chapter 302. “Person”

3

 Bonnen to use of the Speaker’s Apartment, and other fundraising and staffing
benefits. Other members of the Legislature must rent or purchase living
quarters when they are in Austin, often at a cost that exceeds the per diem the
State gives to Legislators while in the capital city on state business. The use of
the Apartment could therefore be assigned a price.
•

If Empower Texans were to agree to not fund Bonnen’s opponent, Bonnen
could plan to reduce his own campaign spending, thereby allowing him to use
the political contributions he receives for other legitimate purposes, such as to
defray officeholder expenditures.

Even if Speaker Bonnen did not solicit a benefit for himself, the definition of “benefit”
includes benefits “to any other person in whose welfare [Bonnen] has a direct and substantial
interest.”
The Eighth Court of Appeals has interpreted “direct and substantial interest” in a case
involving a city councilman offering benefits to business owners in exchange for their public
support of an annexation effort. Gandara v. State, 527 S.W.3d 261 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2016,
pet. ref’d). 4 The court applied the “common meaning” of the words “direct” and “substantial” to
conclude that “the beneficiary’s interest in the welfare of the other ‘person’ cannot be unbroken
by any intermediary or agency, and not speculative or illusory, but of considerable value.” Id. at
273-74. Later, however, the court stated that “‘[d]irect and substantial interest’ for the purposes
of bribery must signify an individual or entity that can stand in [the beneficiary]’s stead more or
less in toto.” Id. at 276. This appears to be the only case interpreting “direct and substantial
interest.”
Speaker Bonnen’s political allies could receive a benefit from Empower Texans if it
refrains from donating to their opponents in the same way that Speaker Bonnen benefits – by not
having to spend campaign funds to compete with a well-funded opponent. Speaker Bonnen’s
interest in the welfare of his allies is direct, as interpreted by Gandara. The more allies Speaker
Bonnen has in the House, the easier he can enact his agenda. Arguably, his interest in their welfare
is also “of considerable value,” as their support allows him to maintain his position as Speaker and
enact his agenda. However, it is doubtful that any of Speaker Bonnen’s allies “can stand in
[Bonnen]’s stead more or less in toto.” If this last test is required, then Speaker Bonnen’s requests
on behalf of his allies did not violate the Bribery Statute.
b.

Are any of these requests “political contributions”?

Another way that the Bribery Statute may be violated is by the solicitation of “any benefit
that is a political contribution as defined by Title 15, Election Code,” if made pursuant to an
express agreement. Tex. Penal Code § 36.062(a)(4). While several of Speaker Bonnen’s requests
includes both members and candidates for membership in the House of Representatives. However, because legislative
bribery is limited to the casting of votes (as opposed to improving the chances of election by eliminating opposition),
the panel finds the actions taken by Speaker Bonnen and Representative Burrows too tangential to invoke application
of the legislative bribery statute.
4

See footnote 1 regarding petition history for criminal cases.

4

 could be characterized as “political contribution[s] as defined by Title 15, Election Code,” Speaker
Bonnen did not request that Mr. Sullivan make any political contributions to himself. The next
question is whether Speaker Bonnen requested a political contribution to “any other person in
whose welfare [he] has a direct and substantial interest.”
Under Gandara, discussed above, it is unlikely that Speaker Bonnen’s interest in the
welfare of opponents of his enemies is direct, though it may be substantial. Certainly, none of the
individuals for whom Bonnen requested political contributions could “stand in [his] stead more or
less in toto.”
The remaining question is whether the benefits are “political contributions” such that the
exception in subsection (d) applies. To the extent Bonnen is asking Mr. Sullivan to affirmatively
donate to certain campaigns, the benefits are likely “political contributions,” as the statute does
not specify that only political contributions to the beneficiary are excluded. However, to the extent
Speaker Bonnen is asking Mr. Sullivan to refrain from donating to particular campaigns, the
benefit is likely not a “political contribution.”
c.
Is it a defense to prosecution under the Bribery Statute that Speaker Bonnen
has no power to directly grant press credentials?
No. “It is no defense to prosecution under this section that a person whom the actor sought
to influence was not qualified to act in the desired way whether because he had not yet assumed
office or he lacked jurisdiction or for any other reason.” Tex. Penal Code § 36.02(b).
d.
Is it a defense to prosecution under the Bribery Statute that the press
credentials have no specific monetary value?
No. The statute is not limited to exercises of official discretion or official actions that
confer monetary benefit. Clearly Empower Texans considered the press credentials to have
significant value because it filed a lawsuit seeking to force Chairman Geren to issue them.
B.

Prohibited Gift
1.

Text of statute

Sec. 36.08. GIFT TO PUBLIC SERVANT BY PERSON
SUBJECT TO HIS JURISDICTION. (f) A member of the
legislature . . . commits an offense if he solicits, accepts, or agrees
to accept any benefit from any person.
Sec. 36.10. NON-APPLICABLE. (a) Sections 36.08 (Gift to
Public Servant) and 36.09 (Offering Gift to Public Servant) do not
apply to:
…
(4) a political contribution as defined by Title 15, Election
Code[.]

5

 2.

Analysis

For all the reasons outlined in the section on bribery, it is possible to interpret a “benefit”
to include Mr. Sullivan’s refraining from donating to certain opponents of Speaker Bonnen and
his allies, which is also not a “political contribution” such that the exception applies. The same
limitations to “substantial and direct interest” discussed by the Eighth Court of Appeals in
Gandara similarly apply.
C.

Abuse of Official Capacity

1.

Text of statute
Sec. 39.02 (a) A public servant commits an offense if, with intent
to obtain a benefit or with intent to harm or defraud another, he
intentionally or knowingly:
(1) violates a law relating to the public servant’s office or
employment; or
(2) misuses government property, services, personnel, or any
other thing of value belonging to the government that has
come into the public servant’s custody or possession by
virtue of the public servant’s office or employment.
Sec. 39.01 (2) “Misuse” means to deal with property contrary to:
(A) an agreement under which the public servant holds the
property;
(B) a contract of employment or oath of office of a public
servant;
(C) a law, including provisions of the General
Appropriations Act specifically relating to government
property, that prescribes the manner of custody or
disposition of the property; or
(D) a limited purpose for which the property is delivered or
received.

2.

Analysis

The recording suggests that Speaker Bonnen might have attempted to misuse “services,
personnel, or any other thing of value belonging to the government that has come into the public
servant’s custody or possession by virtue of the public servant’s office or employment items” in
two forms.

6

 First, press credentials are perhaps “services” and are likely a “thing of value.” But it does
not appear that the credentials came into Speaker Bonnen’s custody or possession, and therefore
Speaker Bonnen’s attempts to distribute them would not constitute a violation, even if it would
otherwise be a “misuse.”
Second, there might be a misuse of “personnel” if Speaker Bonnen asked any state
employee to create or provide the “list.” The Report does not satisfactorily answer who created
the “list” and absent such information, it cannot be determined that Speaker Bonnen misused his
office in this regard.
Representative Burrows conveyed the “list” to Sullivan after Speaker Bonnen left the room,
though from Speaker Bonnen’s earlier comments it is plain that Speaker Bonnen was aware of the
“list” and consented to Sullivan’s receiving it. 5 If Representative Burrows used State personnel
or resources to compile the “list,” he could also be said to have violated Chapter 39.
Burrows has claimed that he “did not have a prepared list of Republican members [because]
he did not have an expectation of the meeting going to the list.” Report at 17.36. Representative
Burrows acknowledges that he and Speaker Bonnen had previously discussed which members of
their caucus they could count on for support, and that he had “pulled up a picture” of the record
vote on the taxpayer funded lobby bill from the 86th legislative session. Report at 17.36. Because
this was allegedly the only recorded vote on which the Republican caucus was significantly
divided during the session, Burrows asserted that it was the best indicator of who was and who
was not with leadership on this and other issues of interest to their conservative constituents.
Report at 17.37. No other evidence in the report confirms or refutes his explanation.
D.

Criminal Conspiracy

1. Text of Statute
Sec. 15.02. (a) A person commits criminal conspiracy if, with
intent that a felony be committed:
(1) he agrees with one or more persons that they or one or
more of them engage in conduct that would constitute the
offense; and
(2) he or one or more of them performs an overt act in
pursuance of the agreement.
(b) An agreement constituting a conspiracy may be inferred from
acts of the parties.

5

Dennis Bonnen:

And I hope you won’t fund about 90 percent of any others that show
up in a Republican primary this time, and he’ll show you the list of
who we hope someone will show up and we hope you will fund.

Transcript at 36.

7

 2. Analysis
The transcript supports the conclusion that Speaker Bonnen and Representative Burrows
coordinated on the “list” to give Sullivan before the meeting. See footnote 5. This prior
coordination supports the inference that Bonnen and Burrows agreed to ask Sullivan to target
certain Republicans, but it does not support the inference that Bonnen and Burrows agreed to seek
a benefit for Bonnen in exchange for Bonnen’s exercise of discretion as a public servant to obtain
credentials for Texas Scorecard, except to the extent that possibly improving Bonnen’s odds of reelection as Speaker could be construed as a “benefit.” See Part I.A.2.a.
E.

Conclusion regarding the Penal Code

Accepting these scant authorities as both exhaustive and persuasive, one could argue that
Speaker Bonnen could be prosecuted for soliciting a benefit for himself (by improving his
likelihood of being re-elected Speaker or reducing his upcoming campaign expenditures) or for
his Republican allies, in whose interest he might have a “direct and substantial interest.” However,
given both the lack of guiding case law and the dissimilarity between Speaker Bonnen’s actions
and the common perception of bribery, prosecutorial discretion as this panel understands it would
likely militate against bringing such a prosecution. 6 In addition, Representative Burrows did not
stand to gain any pecuniary benefit by Speaker Bonnen’s actions—he could not receive living
quarters for his position or the other benefits associated with being Speaker, nor did Burrows ask
Sullivan to refrain from donating to his primary opponent, as Bonnen did. In short, the scope of
the key elements of the statute are not sufficiently clear, and the case authorities are too few, to
conclude with any degree of confidence that prosecution against either Speaker Bonnen or
Representative Burrows would be warranted under the Bribery Statute or Gift Statute.
II.

Texas Constitution, Article XVI, Section 41
A. Text of provision
Article XVI, Section 41, provides in relevant part as follows:
[A]ny member of the Legislature or executive or judicial officer who
shall solicit, demand or receive, or consent to receive, directly or
indirectly, for himself, or for another, from any company,
corporation or person, any money, appointment, employment,
testimonial, reward, thing of value or employment, or of personal
advantage or promise thereof, for his vote or official influence, or
for withholding the same, or with any understanding, expressed or
implied, that his vote or official action shall be in any way
influenced thereby, or who shall solicit, demand and receive any
such money or other advantage matter or thing aforesaid for another,
as the consideration of his vote or official influence, in consideration
of the payment or promise of such money, advantage, matter or thing

6

The laws of Texas vest in district and county attorneys the exclusive responsibility and control
of criminal prosecutions. Meshell v. State, 739 S.W.2d 246, 254 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987).

8

 to another, shall be held guilty of bribery, within the meaning of the
Constitution, and shall incur the disabilities provided for said
offenses, with a forfeiture of the office they may hold, and such
other additional punishment as is or shall be provided by law. . . .
B. Analysis
While every Texas Constitution has explicitly prohibited bribery, the current provision is
undoubtedly “the most detailed.” 3 Vernon’s Ann. Const. of the State of Texas 351, Interpretative
Commentary to Article XVI, Section 41. It “expand[s] and modifie[s]” Article III, Section 32 of
the 1869 Constitution, which provides in relevant part: “It shall be the duty of the Legislature
immediately to expel from the body who shall receive or offer a bribe, or suffer his vote influenced
by promise or preferment or reward . . . .” 2 George D. Braden, The Constitution of the State of
Texas: An Annotated and Comparative Analysis 781 (1977).
The current Constitution, which originally included even more rigid restrictions on the
length of legislative sessions than the current language provides for, changed the legislative duty
from the active to the passive, while at the same time expressly defining the elements of the crime
of bribery.
No court has held that a constitutional violation is itself a crime. Instead, Article XVI,
Section 41, merely “authorize[s]” the enactment of statutes outlawing bribery. Mutscher v. State,
514 S.W.2d 905, 915 (Tex. Crim. 1974) (holding that because the “Bribery of an Officer” statute
“implements the specific mandate” of Article XVI, Section 41, it could not violate the Speech and
Debate clause of the Texas Constitution).
The constitutional prohibition against a member “solicit[ing] . . . directly or indirectly, for
himself, or for another . . . any . . . thing of value or . . . of personal advantage or promise thereof,
for his . . . official influence” is broad enough to cover many types of conduct, including Speaker
Bonnen’s actions here. But because the provision itself is not self-executing, a conclusion that it
has been violated leads to no tangible penalties without further action by a prosecuting arm of
government or by the legislature itself. 7 As mentioned above, what actions, if any, the Committee
or the entire House might take is beyond the scope of the questions pose to this panel.

7

The recognized procedure for determining whether a public official has done any act that by law
works a forfeiture of his or her office is through a quo warranto proceeding brought in the name
of the State of Texas by the Attorney General or the district or county attorney of the proper district
or county. See Rosell v. Cent. W. Motor Stages, Inc., 89 S.W.3d 643, 651 (Tex. App.—Dallas
2002, pet. denied); see generally Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ch. 66.

9

 III.

Election Code, Title 15 Violations
A. Unlawfully Making or Accepting Contribution
1.

Text of statute
Sec. 253.003 (a) A person may not knowingly make a political
contribution in violation of this chapter.
(b) A person may not knowingly accept a political contribution the
person knows to have been made in violation of this chapter.
Sec. 251.001
…
(2) “Contribution” means a direct or indirect transfer of money,
goods, services, or any other thing of value and includes an
agreement made or other obligation incurred, whether legally
enforceable or not, to make a transfer. The term includes a loan or
extension of credit, other than those expressly excluded by this
subdivision, and a guarantee of a loan or extension of credit,
including a loan described by this subdivision. The term does not
include:
(A) a loan made in the due course of business by a
corporation that is legally engaged in the business of lending
money and that has conducted the business continuously for
more than one year before the loan is made; or
(B) an expenditure required to be reported under Section
305.006(b), Government Code.
(3) “Campaign contribution” means a contribution to a candidate or
political committee that is offered or given with the intent that it be
used in connection with a campaign for elective office or on a
measure. Whether a contribution is made before, during, or after an
election does not affect its status as a campaign contribution.
(4) “Officeholder contribution” means a contribution to an
officeholder or political committee that is offered or given with the
intent that it be used to defray expenses that:
(A) are incurred by the officeholder in performing a duty or
engaging in an activity in connection with the office; and
(B) are not reimbursable with public money.

10

 (5) “Political contribution” means a campaign contribution or an
officeholder contribution.
2.

Analysis

The Report contains no evidence suggesting that Speaker Bonnen directly or indirectly
transferred anything to Mr. Sullivan, Empower Texans, or Texas Scorecard, or that any of them
transferred anything to him. Thus, Speaker Bonnen neither “accept[ed]” nor “ma[de]” a
contribution in violation of section 253.003 of the Election Code.
However, Election Code violations can also be attempted. Section 1.018 of the Election
Code provides that section 15.01 of the Penal Code (Criminal Attempt) applies to violations of the
Election Code.
While an “attempt to accept” does not fit the facts presented in the Report, there is an
outstanding question about whether Speaker Bonnen “attempted” to “make” a contribution in
violation of the Election Code.
The Penal Code provides that to “attempt” a crime, the individual must have a “specific
intent to commit an offense” and do “an act amounting to more than mere preparation that tends
but fails to effect the commission of the offense intended.” Tex. Penal Code § 15.01(a). Here, the
question is whether Speaker Bonnen had the “specific intent” to make an illegal contribution and
did “an act amounting to more than mere preparation that tends but fails to effect” the illegal
contribution.
a.

Are the press credentials a “contribution”?

The Texas Ethics Commission concluded that the credentials did not have a “specific
monetary value.” But that is a different definition than the one supplied by the statute, which
includes “any other thing of value.” “Value” can be defined as the “monetary worth or price of
something,” but also as the “significance, desirability, or utility of something.” Value, Black’s
Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019).
In a concurring opinion, Justice Gonzales observed that while many definitions in the
Election Code lack clarity, “[a]t least one thing is clear. An ‘expenditure’ is defined very broadly
. . . . An expenditure as minor as the cost of drafting or copying an issue-oriented handbill or
mailing a letter may trigger the Election Code’s requirements.” Osterberg v. Peca, 12 S.W.3d 31,
63 (Tex. 2000) (Gonzales, J., concurring); see also Cook v. Tom Brown Ministries, 385 S.W.3d
562, 603 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2012, pet. denied) (concluding that Church’s provision of space on
its website to circulate petitions and facilitate recall election was a “contribution” under the
Election Code). Under an expansive scope of the word “value,” the press credentials may be a
“contribution.”
b.
Is it contrary to the Election Code for Speaker Bonnen to “transfer”
the credentials to Texas Scorecard?
Texas Scorecard is operated by Empower Texans, Inc., which is closely connected with
the Empower Texans Political Action Committee. In his interview, Representative Geren insisted
11

 that this connection rendered Texas Scorecard ineligible for media credentials. 8 But even
assuming that would make Texas Scorecard a political action committee for the purposes of the
Election Code, it is not clear that the Election Code forbids a political action committee from
accepting a contribution of press credentials. The credentials would not be given in another’s
name, Tex. Elec. Code § 253.001; the credentials would not be given by a lobbyist, Tex. Elec.
Code § 253.006; the credentials were not accepted by Speaker Bonnen as a political contribution,
Tex. Elec. Code § 253.007; nor are the credentials a cash contribution over $100, Tex. Elec. Code
§ 253.033.
The Election Code also prohibits contributions to political action committees at certain
times, Tex. Elec. Code §§ 253.034, .0341, and in certain places, Tex. Elec. Code § 253.039.
Regardless of whether the recorded conversation took place at one of these restricted times or in
one of these restricted places, nothing in the recording indicates that Speaker Bonnen intended any
contribution to be made or accepted at any improper time or place.
B. Unlawfully Operating a Political Committee
1.

Text of statute
Sec. 251.001(12) “Political committee” means two or more persons
acting in concert with a principal purpose of accepting political
contributions or making political expenditures. The term does not
include a group composed exclusively of two or more individual
filers or political committees required to file reports under this title
who make reportable expenditures for a joint activity.

2.

Analysis

The definition of political committee requires two or more persons to “act[] in concert.”
Tex. Elec. Code § 251.001(12). Speaker Bonnen and Mr. Sullivan did not agree to act in concert
at any point during the recording. Speaker Bonnen asked Mr. Sullivan “[a]re you comfortable
with this?” Transcript at 34, and made references to “trying to get through 2020,” Transcript at 11,
but at no point did Mr. Sullivan agree to accept Bonnen’s “list,” or to specifically spend or withhold
funds. Moreover, both parties vigorously denied that they were trying to make an agreement.
Even if Speaker Bonnen and Mr. Sullivan could be said to have attempted to form a
political committee, merely forming a committee is not a violation. Operating a committee without
a treasurer is a violation, Tex. Elec. Code § 252.001; §253.031(b), but Speaker Bonnen and Mr.
Sullivan could not have operated a committee that was never actually formed.
Furthermore, and more importantly, the Election Code excludes from the definition of
“political committee” “a group composed exclusively of two or more individual filers or political
committees required to file reports under this title who make reportable expenditures for a joint
activity.” Tex. Elec. Code § 251.001(12). Because Speaker Bonnen is an individual filer, and
8

According to Mr. Sullivan’s written answers to the Rangers’ questions, Empower Texans, Inc., is the publisher of
Texas Scorecard and the “sponsor” of the Empower Texans PAC and Texans for Fiscal Responsibility PAC.
Evidentiary Item S18-P1.

12

 Empower Texans is a political committee, they would be entitled to “joint activity” without
forming a new political committee.
C. Conclusion on the Election Code
The facts in the Report do not support a prosecution for violations of Title 15 of the Election
Code.
IV.

Government Code Chapter 572 Violations
A. Standards of Conduct, State Agency Ethics Policy

As a member of the legislature, Speaker Bonnen is an “elected officer” and consequently
a “state officer” as defined by Texas Government Code Section 572.002(12). The two most
relevant provisions are in subsection 572.051(a), which state that a state officer “should not”:
•

“solicit any gift, favor, or service that might reasonably tend to
influence the officer or employee in the discharge of official
duties or that the officer or employee knows or should know is
being offered with the intent to influence the officer’s or
employee’s official conduct;

•

“intentionally or knowingly solicit . . . any benefit for having
exercised the officer’s . . . official powers or performed the
officer’s . . . official duties in favor of another.”

1. Did Speaker Bonnen solicit a “favor” or “benefit”?
At least one statement made by Speaker Bonnen could be interpreted as soliciting a “favor”
or “benefit” in exchange for Speaker Bonnen performing his official duties in favor of Mr.
Sullivan, Empower Texans, or Texas Scorecard:
Dennis Bonnen:

I guess that’s where I’m going, is can we kind of not
waste our resources, yours and mine and everyone
else’s, fighting over members that aren’t really a huge
problem. You might not find they’ll be your favorites,
but they’re not particularly a problem, and even help
us out, and maybe kill off one or two or three that are
never going to help. . . . But we’ve got people who
beat our Republicans, that are not even trying to act
like moderate Democrats, okay? Which is good for us
because we ought to be able to take their heads off.
But I need you firing harder that way than these
ways. Does that make sense? And let me tell you
what I’ll do for you -- real quick, you need to hear
what I want to do for you.

Michael Quinn Sullivan: I don’t need anything done.

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 Dennis Bonnen:

Well, no, you do. You do. If we can make this work.
I’ll put your guys on the floor next session.

Transcript, page 12 (emphasis added).
The “favor” or “benefit” is for Mr. Sullivan to direct his organization’s platform against
certain “unhelpful” Republicans and some Democrats, in exchange for which Speaker Bonnen
offers to perform his duties to put Mr. Sullivan’s “guys” on the floor – i.e., to arrange press
credentials for Texas Scorecard.
2. Could Speaker Bonnen “solicit” a gift or favor in exchange for a discharge or
exercise of official duties if assigning press credentials is not part of Speaker
Bonnen’s official duties?
The Speaker is entitled to appoint the chair, vice-chair, and all members of procedural
standing committees, including the House Administration Committee, which does have the
authority to assign press credentials. H.R. 1, § 15(d) (“The speaker shall appoint the chair and
vice-chair of each standing procedural committee and the remaining membership of the
committee.”); see also H.R. 3, § 16 (designating the House Administration Committee as
procedural). It would be well within Speaker Bonnen’s official duties to appoint members to the
House Administration Committee who would agree to grant credentials to Texas Scorecard.
B. Conclusion on Government Code Section 572
Speaker Bonnen’s conduct likely violated section 572.051(a) of the Government Code;
however, subsection (b) of this section provides no independent statutory consequences for a state
official who violates subsection (a).
V.

House Rules Violations
A. Rule 5, Floor Procedure
Section 20. Media Access to House Chamber — (a) When the house
is in session, no media representative shall be admitted to the floor
of the house or allowed its privileges unless the person is: . . . (2)
not engaged in any lobbying or paid advocacy, advertising,
publicity, or promotion work for any individual, political party,
corporation, organization, or government agency.
B. Analysis

Speaker Bonnen’s statement to Mr. Sullivan that he will “put your guys on the floor next
session” is a reference to Texas Scorecard’s past failed attempts to secure press credentials.
In his interview with the Rangers, Chair of the House Administration Committee Charlie
Geren stated that Texas Scorecard was not given credentials because it is “an arm of Empower
Texans, which operates a PAC,” Report at 22, and that Bonnen would have to “find another

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 Chairman or ask [Geren] to step down” if Bonnen wanted to give Texas Scorecard press
credentials, Report at 23.
If Representative Geren were correct that Texas Scorecard is engaged in lobbying, paid
advocacy, advertising, publicity or promotion work for Empower Texans Political Action
Committee, then it would be a violation of House Rule 5 for Speaker Bonnen to arrange for Texas
Scorecard to receive credentials.

Conclusion
In our opinion, the information produced for the Public Integrity Unit Report militates
against criminal prosecution of either Speaker Bonnen or Representative Burrows. As stated in
this memorandum, we did not consider what actions the Committee or the House as a whole might
take regarding Speaker Bonnen’s or Representative Burrows’ actions.

Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Patricia Gray (by permission)______________
Hon. Patricia Gray

___________
Hon. Will F. Hartnett

_______________________________________
Hon. Thomas R. Phillips

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