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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
JACKSONVILLE DIVISION
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
vs.

CASE NO.: 3:18-cr-89-J-34JRK

REGINALD BROWN
________________________________/
DEFENDANT REGINALD BROWN’S MOTION TO DISMISS
THE INDICTMENT (SPEEDY TRIAL) AND MEMORANDUM OF LAW
The Defendant, Reginald Brown, by and through the undersigned attorney, pursuant
to Rule 12(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, the Sixth Amendment of the U.S.
Constitution, and 18 U.S.C. §3161, respectfully moves this Honorable Court to dismiss the
Indictment because the case has not been tried within the seventy-day window required by
law. As grounds for this motion, Defendant states as follows:
1.

Reginald Brown and Katrina Brown are charged in a multi-count Indictment

returned May 23, 2018. Count One charges each with conspiracy to commit wire fraud in
violation of Section 18 U.S.C. §1349. Counts Two through Fourteen charge each with
substantive counts of mail fraud in violation of U.S.C. §1341 and §2. Counts Fifteen
through Twenty-seven charge each with substantive counts of wire fraud in violation of 18
U.S.C. §1343 and §2. Counts Twenty-eight through Thirty-three charge each with
substantive counts of money laundering in violation of 18 U.S.C. §1957 and §2. Mr. Brown
alone is charged with a failure to file a 1040 tax form in Count 38.
2.

The essence of the wire fraud, mail fraud, and money laundering allegations

is that Reginald Brown and Katrina Brown concocted a scheme to defraud certain lenders

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of funds intended to finance a separate business venture of Katrina Brown and her
parents. The business venture was the production and distribution of a highly regarded
barbeque sauce, perfected by Katrina’s Brown’s father.
3.

The Indictment is returned on May 23, 2018. Mr. Brown first appears in court

on May 31st. (Doc 10). On June 14, Mr. Brown moves for the appointment of an attorney.
The motion is granted on June 15. (Doc.32). Arraignment occurs on June 25, 2018.
(Doc.40). An ore tenus joint motion to continue the trial is made by Mr. Brown and codefendant Katrina Brown at arraignment. (Doc. 40). The United States does not oppose the
motion. (Doc.45). Trial is scheduled for the September term with a status hearing set for
August 20, 2018. A special status hearing is later set for August 14, 2018. On August 14,
2018, the trial is re-set for the term beginning February 4, 2019 after another unopposed
joint motion to continue. (Doc. 55). Mr. Brown does not dispute the time from arraignment
(June 25, 2018) through the trial date in February, 2019 is “excludable time” for purposes
of 18 U.S.C. §3161.
4.

On December 21, 2018, counsel for Katrina Brown files a motion to withdraw.

(Doc.87). New counsel is quickly appointed. (Doc 96). However, given the complexity of the
case, the Court grants Katrina Brown’s motion to continue the trial at the January 17, 2019
status conference. (Doc.96). The United States does not oppose the motion. However, Mr.
Brown, anxious to have his good name and reputation vindicated, objects to any further
delay. Id. This Court specifically finds “the ends of justice [were] served by granting such a
continuance outweigh the best interest of the public and the Defendant[s] in a speedy trial.”
It sets the case for trial beginning with jury selection on August 15, 2019. It is now re-set for
August 14, 2019. Id.

This Court further directs that in the event it grants Mr. Brown’s

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pending motion to sever (Doc. 59), it will set a new trial date for him. Id.
5.

There were several motions pending as of the January 17, 2019 hearing

date. The Court denied two of those motions (Doc. 58 and 64) at the hearing. Id. The
remaining outstanding motions, including Mr. Brown’s motion to sever, were denied on
April 3, 2019 in two orders. (Doc. 114 and 115).
6.

The seventy-day speedy trial window mandated by 18 U.S.C. §3161 begins

to run again on April 4, 2019. On May 29, 2019, Mr. Brown moves to modify the conditions
of release. (Doc. 117). The motion is granted by order dated June 12. (Doc. 120). Mr.
Brown files a motion in limine which remains pending on June 19th. (Doc. 123). A total of
more than seventy non-excludable days have elapsed since Mr. Brown first appeared in
court. No other exceptions or events that would constitute excludable time under the
Speedy Trial Act have occurred. The Indictment as to Mr. Brown should be dismissed.

MEMORANDUM OF LAW
“A citizen accused of a crime “shall enjoy a right to a speedy… trial…” U.S.
Constitution Amendment VI, Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 112 S. Ct. 2686, 120
L. Ed. 2d 520 (1992). There is a four-part test for analyzing a constitutional speedy trial
claim which is “length of the delay, the reason for the delay, the Defendant’s assertion of
his right, and prejudice to the Defendant.” Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 92 S. Ct. 2182,
33 L. Ed 2d 101 (1972).
The federal Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. §3161 was passed to strengthen the
constitutional mandate. US v. Ammar, 842 F.3d 1203 (11th Cir. 2016). Generally, the
accused must be tried within seventy days of the dates provided for in the statute or “the

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district court must dismiss the indictment.” Id. The statute provides a number of reasons to
toll the running of the seventy-day period. One of those reasons is the “ends of justice”
exception. 18 U.S.C. §3161(h).
Section 3161(h) of the Speedy Trial Act – the ends of justice exception “was plainly
meant to cover many of these requests” such as defense continuances. Zedner v. US, 547
U.S. 489, 126 S. Ct. 1976, 164 L. Ed. 2d 749 (2006). However, “the purposes of the act
also cut against extensions on the grounds of mere consent or waiver.” Id. In short, the
Defendant cannot waive the operation of the Speedy Trial Act. Id. Ultimately, the Supreme
Court concluded, “the act requires when a District Court grants an ends of justice
continuance, it must set forth, on the record, either orally or in writing, it’s reasons.” Id. at
767, citing statute.
Mr. Brown acknowledges this Court made an interest of justice finding when it
continued this case in January. (Doc. 96) Among other things, it found the complexity in the
case, the appearance of new counsel and the judicial economy of a joint trial satisfied the
standard. (Doc. 96) Mr. Brown respectfully contends the Court erred in finding the interest
of justice of a joint trial outweighed Mr. Brown’s constitutional and statutory right to a
speedy trial over his specific objection at the January 17, 2019 status conference.
One recognized exception to the speedy trial provisions of §3163 is pretrial
motions. “The 11th Circuit has repeatedly held that pretrial motions filed by one Defendant
tolled the speedy trial clock for all co-defendants.” US v. Al-Arian, 267 F. Supp. 2d 1258
(M.D. Fla. 2003), citing United States v. Schlei, 122 F.3d 944, 985 n.15 (11th Cir. 1997). A
second exception to the general rule a trial must at least start within seventy days of
arraignment which may be applicable to this case is the interest of judicial economy of a

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joint trial. In sum, the efficiency of a joint trial outweighs severing the trial of individual
defendants and conducting multiple trials in multi-defendant cases. Id. citing United States
v. Schlei, 122 F.3d 987, 985 n 15, United States v. Varella, 692 F.2d 1352, 1359 (11th Cir.
1982), United States v Twitty, 107 F.3d 1482, 1488 (11th Cir. 1987).
Mr. Brown notes the principal outstanding motions were resolved on April 3,
2019. (Doc. 114-115). He contends the speedy trial clock of seventy-days started again on
April 4, 2019. Counting the non-excludable days which occurred between his first
appearance and arraignment with the non-excludable days since April 4, 2019 produces a
total of more than seventy days.
Mr. Brown submits in this case his right to a speedy trial, statutory and constitutional,
outweighs the convenience of a joint trial. To the extent, the law of the 11th Circuit has been
that the convenience of a joint trial outweighs a single defendant’s right to a speedy trial, he
maintains two recently decided cases suggest that interpretation of the Speedy Trial Act
does not control the outcome, if it ever did.
One relatively recently decided case is US v. Tinklenberg, 131 S. Ct. 2007, 563 U.S.
647, 179 L. Ed. 2d 1080 (2011). Here the question was “whether this provision [filing a
pretrial motion] stops the speedy trial clock from running automatically upon the filing of
pretrial motions, irrespective of whether the motion has any impact on when the trial
begins.” Id. at 653. The Court after reviewing the statute, concluded the answer was yes,
the time is tolled. Id. Ultimately, it ruled, “the act contains no such requirement that a
pretrial motion may effect or cause delay.” Id. at 660. However, despite rejecting the 6th
Circuit’s interpretation of the tolling provision of the Speedy Trial Act, the Supreme Court
concluded the Sixth Circuit’s “ultimate conclusion that Tinklenberg’s trial failed to comply

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with the Speedy Trial Act and affirmed the dismissal of the Indictment on remand. Id. at
663. The relevance of Tinklenberg to Mr. Brown’s this case is one of the reasons the
Supreme Court concluded the Sixth Circuit’s analysis of the Act was incorrect, was “we
think Congress intended sub paragraph (D) to apply automatically.” Id. at 656. In other
words, if Congress had intended to mean the tolling provisions of the statute depended on
the effect a particular motion might have on the likelihood a case would be ready for trial, it
could have said so.
The logic of the Supreme Court decision in Tinklenberg applies to the circumstances
in Mr. Brown’s case. In short, if the joint trial of an admittedly complex case always
constituted the best interest of justice and warranted a continuance over the speedy trial
demand of a single co-defendant, congress could have said so in the Speedy Trial Act. It
did not. Therefore, this Court cannot find the judicial economy of a joint trial alone warrants
a continuance over the speedy trial demand of a defendant where there is a readily
available solution, severance.
A recent 11th Circuit decision United States v. Ammar supports this position. US v.
Ammar, 843 F.3d 1203 at 1093. In Ammar, the Eleventh Circuit “vacated Ammar’s
conviction, reversed and remanded with instructions to dismiss the charge and determine
after consideration of the statutory factors enumerated in the Act, whether the dismissal
should be with or without prejudice.” Id. At 1213. Ammar and four others were indicted on
multiple charges. The most significant charge was murder. Id. at 1207. One or more of the
co-defendants were considered eligible for death penalty prosecution. Id. at 1208.
Over Ammar’s objections, the trial was continued on multiple occasions. It appears
all parties but Ammar agreed to the continuances. Applying the analysis from the Supreme

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Court’s holding in Zedner, and rejecting the notion that “magic words” were procedurally
required, the Eleventh Circuit found the “District Court did not make the proper ends of
justice findings to permit the tolling of the seventy-day period.” Id. at 1213. While the Court
did not expressly find the trial court erred in continuing the case for reasons of judicial
economy, Mr. Brown contends it is fair to infer that the Court concluded a trial court must
make a more explicit finding of best interests where one defendant objects to the delay.
The Court noted, in conclusion, “a criminal Defendant’s right to a speedy trial is one
of the most basic rights preserved by our constitution.” Id. citing Klopler v. North Carolina,
386 U.S. 213, 226, 87 S.Ct. 988, 18 L.Ed.2d 1 (1967), Congress chose to safeguard this
requirement through the rigid procedural requirements of the Speedy Trial Act. Id. at 1212.

CONCLUSION
In this case, Mr. Brown’s rights to a speedy trial outweigh the judicial economy of a
joint trial. More than seventy days have passed since April 4, 2019. The Indictment should
be dismissed with prejudice.
WHEREFORE, the Defendant, Reginald Brown, for the above-mentioned reasons
respectfully moves this Honorable Court to grant this motion.

Respectfully submitted,
S:// Thomas M. Bell
THOMAS M. BELL, #0615692
301 West Bay Street, Suite 1460
Jacksonville, Florida 32202
Telephone (904) 354-0062
Telecopier (904) 353-1315
tbellesq@bellsouth.net
Attorney for Reginald Brown

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on July 16, 2019, I electronically filed the foregoing with
the clerk of the Court by using CM/ECF system which will send a notice of electronic filing
to A. Tysen Duva, AUSA, Michael Coolican, AUSA, John P. Leombruno, Esq., and Richard
Landes, Esq.
S:// Thomas M. Bell
THOMAS M. BELL