Nos. 18-1323 & 18-1460

In the Supreme Court of the United States
JUNE MEDICAL SERVICES L.L.C., on behalf of its patients,
physicians, and staff, d/b/a HOPE MEDICAL GROUP FOR
WOMEN; JOHN DOE 1; JOHN DOE 2,
Petitioners,
v.
DR. REBEKAH GEE, in her Official Capacity as Secretary of
the Louisiana Department of Health,
Respondent.
DR. REBEKAH GEE, in her Official Capacity as Secretary of
the Louisiana Department of Health,
Cross-Petitioner,
v.
JUNE MEDICAL SERVICES L.L.C., on behalf of its patients,
physicians, and staff, d/b/a HOPE MEDICAL GROUP FOR
WOMEN; JOHN DOE 1; JOHN DOE 2,
Cross-Respondents.
ON WRITS OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED
STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE
FIFTH CIRCUIT
BRIEF AMICI CURIAE OF 207 MEMBERS OF
CONGRESS IN SUPPORT OF RESPONDENT AND
CROSS-PETITIONER
CATHERINE GLENN FOSTER
STEVEN H. ADEN
Counsel of Record
KATIE GLENN
NATALIE M. HEJRAN
AMERICANS UNITED FOR LIFE
1150 Connecticut Ave NW Ste. 500
Washington, D.C. 20036
Steven.Aden@aul.org
Tel: (202) 741-4917
Counsel for Amici Curiae

 i
TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ..................................... iii
INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE ............................... 1
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT.................................... 1
ARGUMENT .............................................................. 3
I.

June
Medical
lacks
a
“close”
relationship with women seeking
abortion and should not be presumed to
have third-party standing. ........................... 3
A. Louisiana abortion clinics—including
June Medical Services—have a long
history of serious health and safety
violations. ................................................... 5
B. Louisiana abortion doctors have a
long
history
of
professional
disciplinary actions and substandard
medical care.............................................. 15

II.

The Fifth Circuit appropriately applied
the Casey standard and distinguished
Hellerstedt to uphold Louisiana's act
620. .............................................................. 21

III.

Hellerstedt has aggravated the already
unworkable standard set out in Roe
and Casey, and the Court should
reconsider those precedents. ...................... 29

 ii
CONCLUSION ......................................................... 35
LIST OF AMICI ....................................................... 1a

 iii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases

Page(s)

Barnes v. Mississippi,
992 F.2d 1335 (5th Cir. 1993)........................... 33
Beal v. Doe,
432 U.S. 438 (1977) ........................................... 31
Bellotti v. Baird,
428 U.S. 132 (1976)........................................... 31
Bellotti v. Baird,
443 U.S. 622 (1979) ........................................... 31
Burnet v. Colo. Oil & Gas Co.,
285 U.S. 393 (1932) ........................................... 30
Choice Inc. v. Greenstein,
691 F.3d 710 (5th Cir. 2012)............................... 4
Cincinnati Women’s Servs. v. Taft,
468 F.3d 361 (6th Cir. 2006)............................. 28
Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n,
558 U.S. 310 (2010) ........................................... 34
City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. For Reprod. Health,
462 U.S. 416 (1983)..................................... 31, 32
Colautti v. Franklin,
439 U.S. 379 (1979) ........................................... 31

 iv
Connecticut v. Menillo,
423 U.S. 9 (1975)............................................... 31
Gonzales v. Carhart,
550 U.S. 124 (2007)............................... 25, 29, 34
Fargo Women’s Health Org. v. Schafer,
507 U.S. 1013 (1993) ......................................... 32
Harris v. McRae,
448 U.S. 297 (1980) ........................................... 31
H.L. v. Matheson,
450 U.S. 398 (1981) ........................................... 31
June Med. Servs., L.L.C., v. Gee,
905 F.3d 787 (5th Cir. 2018)...................... passim
June Med. Servs., L.L.C., v. Gee,
No. 16-444 (M.D. La. Filed July 1, 2016) ........... 5
June Med. Servs., L.L.C., v. Gee,
No. 17-404 (M.D. La. Filed June 27, 2017) ........ 5
Kowalski v. Tesmer,
543 U.S. 125 (2004)............................................. 3
Maher v. Roe,
432 U.S. 464 (1977) ........................................... 31
Mazurek v. Armstrong,
520 U.S. 968 (1997) ........................................... 22

 v
McCleskey v. Kemp,
481 U.S. 279 (1987) ........................................... 22
Nat’l Abortion Fed’n v. Gonzales,
437 F.3d 278 (2d Cir. 2006) .............................. 33
Okpalobi v. Foster,
244 F.3d 405 (5th Cir. 2001)................... 4, 16, 17
Planned Parenthood of Ark. & E. Okla. v. Jegley,
864 F.3d 953 (8th Cir. 2017)................. 23, 24, 28
Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth,
428 U.S. 52 (1976)............................................. 31
Planned Parenthood of Greater Tex. Surgical Health
Servs. v. Abbott,
748 F.3d 583 (5th Cir. 2014)............................. 25
Planned Parenthood of Idaho Inc., v. Wasden,
376 F.3d 908 (9th Cir. 2004)............................. 33
Planned Parenthood of Minn. v. Minnesota,
910 F.2d 479 (8th Cir. 1990)............................. 32
Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey,
505 U.S. 833 (1992) .................................... passim
Roe v. Wade,
410 U.S. 113 (1973) ................................. 2, 30, 31
Singleton v. Wulff,
428 U.S. 106 (1976) ............................................. 3

 vi
Smith v. Doe,
538 U.S. 84 (2003) ............................................. 22
Stenberg v. Carhart,
530 U.S. 914 (2000)..................................... 33, 34
Thornburgh v. ACOG,
476 U.S. 747 (1986)..................................... 30, 32
United States v. Clinical Leasing Serv., Inc.,
982 F.2d 900 (5th Cir. 1992)............................. 14
United States v. Salerno,
481 U.S. 739 (1987)........................................... 23
Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State Republican Party,
552 U.S. 442 (2008)........................................... 29
Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs.,
492 U.S. 490 (1989)..................................... 32, 34
Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt,
136 S. Ct. 2292 (2016)................................ passim
Statutes
La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 9:2800.12 ............................... 4
La. Rev. Stat. Ann. 44:1 et seq. ................................ 5
Other Authorities
Brief Amicus Curiae of Ams. United for Life in
Support of Cross-Petitioner, Gee v. June Med.

 vii
Servs. L.L.C., No. 18-1460 (Vide 18-1323) (2019),
https://www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/18/181460/103796/20190624094927367_181460%20Amicus%20Brief%20of%20Americans%2
0United%20for%20Life.pdf ................................ 5
Cong. Research Serv., The Constitution of the
United States: Analysis of Cases Decided by
the Supreme Court of the United States to
June 26, 2013, S. Doc. No. 112-9 (2d Sess.
2013) .................................................................. 30
Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., State
Operations Manual, Appendix Q—Core
Guidelines for Determining Immediate
Jeopardy
(Mar.
6,
2019),
https://www.cms.gov/Regulations-andGuidance/Guidance/Manuals/downloads/so
m107ap_q_immedjeopardy.pdf .......................... 6
Fed. R. Evid. 201 .................................................... 15
In the Matter of: A. James Whitmore, III, No. 00A-021 (La. Bd. Med. Exam’rs Jan. 22,
2002) ............................................................ 17, 18
In the Matter of: A. James Whitmore, No. 92-A001 (La. Bd. Med. Exam’rs May 21, 1992) ....... 17
In the Matter of: Adrian Joseph Coleman: No.
08-I-775 (La. Bd. Med. Exam’rs Mar. 15,
2010) ............................................................ 15, 16

 viii
In the Matter of: Ifeanyi Charles Okpalobi, No.
10-I-033 (La. Bd. Med. Exam’rs May 9,
2012) ............................................................ 16, 17
In the Matter of: Ifeanyi Okpalobi, No. 93-I-051X (La. Bd. Med. Exam’rs Mar. 8, 1999)............ 16
In the Matter of: Kevin Govan Work, No. 08-I774 (La. Bd. Med. Exam’rs Mar. 16,
2009) ............................................................ 19, 20
In the Matter of: Kevin Govan Work, No. 13-I014 (La. Bd. Med. Exam’rs Oct. 17, 2014) ....... 20
In the Matter of: Kevin Govan Work, No. 15-A009 (La. Bd. Med. Exam’rs Feb. 15, 2016) ....... 20
In the Matter of: Kevin Govan Work, No. 15-A009 (La. Bd. Med. Exam’rs June 20, 2017) ...... 20
In the Matter of: Kevin Govan Work, No. 19-I144 (La. Bd. Med. Exam’rs Feb. 26, 2019) ....... 20
In the Matter of: Kevin Govan Work, No. 2019A-011 (La. Bd. Med. Exam’rs Apr. 15,
2019) ............................................................ 20, 21
In the Matter of: Kevin Govan Work, No. 2019A-11 (La. Bd. Med. Exam’rs June 10, 2019) .... 21
In the Matter of: Victor Brown, No. 01-I-037 (La.
Bd. Med. Exam’rs Aug. 15, 2005) ..................... 19

 ix
In the Matter of: Victor Brown, No. 06-A-021
(La. Bd. Med. Exam’rs Sept. 17, 2007) ............ 19
In the Matter of: Victor Brown, No. 89-A-035
(La. Bd. Med. Exam’rs Dec. 8, 1989) ................ 18
In the Matter of: Victor Brown, No. 99-I-035 (La.
Bd. Med. Exam’rs Mar. 24, 2000)............... 18, 19
John C. Jeffries, Jr., JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWEL
JR.: A BIOGRAPHY 341 (1994) ............................ 30
Kevin Martin, Stranger in a Strange Land: The
Use
of
Overbreadth
in
Abortion
Jurisprudence, 99 Col. L. Rev. 173 (1999) ....... 33
La. Dep’t of Health, Statement of Deficiencies
for Delta Clinic of Baton Rouge (Apr. 1,
2014) .................................................................. 11
La. Dep’t of Health, Statement of Deficiencies
for Delta Clinic of Baton Rouge (Dec. 7,
2009) ........................................................ 9, 10, 11
La. Dep’t of Health, Statement of Deficiencies
for Delta Clinic of Baton Rouge (Feb. 3,
2011) ............................................................ 10, 11
La. Dep’t of Health, Statement of Deficiencies
for Delta Clinic of Baton Rouge (Jan. 25,
2017) .................................................................. 10

 x
La. Dep’t of Health, Statement of Deficiencies
for Delta Clinic of Baton Rouge (Jan. 9,
2013) ............................................................ 10, 11
La. Dep’t of Health, Statement of Deficiencies
for Delta Clinic of Baton Rouge (July 13,
2018) .................................................................. 11
La. Dep’t of Health, Statement of Deficiencies
for Delta Clinic of Baton Rouge (Mar. 29,
2019) ........................................................ 9, 10, 11
La. Dep’t of Health, Statement of Deficiencies
for Delta Clinic of Baton Rouge (Oct. 9,
2007) .................................................................... 9
La. Dep’t of Health, Statement of Deficiencies
for Hope Medical Group for Women (Aug. 13,
2010) ............................................................ 6, 7, 8
La. Dep’t of Health, Statement of Deficiencies
for Hope Medical Group for Women (Aug. 30,
2011) .................................................................... 8
La. Dep’t of Health, Statement of Deficiencies
for Hope Medical Group for Women (July 25,
2012) ................................................................ 7, 8
La. Dep’t of Health, Statement of Deficiencies
for Hope Medical Group for Women (May 27,
2011) .................................................................... 7

 xi
La. Dep’t of Health, Statement of Deficiencies
for Hope Medical Group for Women (Oct. 4,
2006) .................................................................... 6
La. Dep’t of Health, Statement of Deficiencies
for Hope Medical Group for Women (Sept.
19, 2005) .............................................................. 8
La. Dep’t of Health, Statement of Deficiencies
for Hope Medical Group for Women (Sept. 3,
2009) .................................................................... 8
La. Dep’t of Health, Statement of Deficiencies
for Women’s Health Care Center (Aug. 5,
2004) ............................................................ 12, 13
La. Dep’t of Health, Statement of Deficiencies
for Women’s Health Care Center (June 19,
2018) ............................................................ 12, 13
La. Dep’t of Health, Statement of Deficiencies
for Women’s Health Care Center (Nov. 14,
2012) .................................................................. 13
La. Dep’t of Health, Statement of Deficiencies
for Women’s Health Care Center (Nov. 7,
2013) .................................................................. 12
La. Dep’t of Health, Statement of Deficiencies
for Women’s Health Care Center (Oct. 19,
2010) .................................................................. 13

 xii
La. Dep’t of Health, Statement of Deficiencies
for Women’s Health Care Center (Sept. 2,
2015) ............................................................ 12, 13
Paul Quast, Respecting Legislators and Rejecting
Baselines: Rebalancing Casey, 90 Notre Dame L.
Rev. 913 (2014) ................................................. 32
Rachel K Jones & Jenna Jerman, Abortion Incidence
and Service Availability in the United States, 2011,
46 Perspectives on Sexual & Reprod. Health 1
(2014), https://doi.org/10.1363/46e0414 ........... 25
Sandra L. Tholen & Lisa Baird, Con Law is as Con
Law Does: A Survey of Planned Parenthood v.
Casey in the State and Federal Courts, 23 Loyola
L. Rev. 971 (1995) ............................................. 32
Stanley Henshaw & Lawrence Finer, The Accessibility
of Abortion Services in the United States, 35
Perspectives on Sexual and Reprod. Health 16
(2003) ................................................................. 25
Testimony of Leroy Brinkley, In re Cnty. Investigating
Grand Jury XXIII, No. 000-9901-2010, (First Jud.
Dist. Of Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. Nov. 4, 2010) ............ 14
TE LINDE’S OPERATIVE GYNECOLOGY 448 (9th ed.
(2003) ................................................................. 25
Ushma D. Upadhyay et al., Incidence of Emergency
Department Visits and Complications After
Abortion, 125 Obstetrics & Gynecology 175
(2015) ................................................................. 25

 xiii
U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Ctrs. For
Disease Control, National Health Statistics
Reports: Ambulatory Surgery in the United States,
2006 (revised Sept. 4, 2009) ............................. 25

 1
INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE1
Amici are 207 Members of Congress, 39 Senators
and 168 Members of the House of Representatives,
representing 38 States. A complete list of Amici
Members is found in the Appendix to this brief.
Amici Members have a special interest in the
correct interpretation, application, and enforcement
of health and safety standards for elective abortion
enacted by the People of the States they represent.
Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292
(2016) created an overly subjective “balancing” test,
leading to confusion among Congress and state
legislatures alike as to which laws might withstand
constitutional scrutiny. Amici strongly urge the Court
to uphold the decision below and to provide clarity
regarding the bounds of the Government’s ability to
safeguard the lives and health of their citizens.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Amici will first address the question presented by
Louisiana: whether “abortion providers [can] be
presumed to have third-party standing to challenge
health and safety regulations on behalf of their
patients absent a ‘close’ relationship with their
patients and a ‘hindrance’ to their patients’ ability to
sue on their own behalf.” Like abortion facilities in
many States, Louisiana abortion clinics—including
No party’s counsel authored any part of this brief. No person
other than Amici and their counsel contributed money intended
to fund the preparation or submission of this brief. Counsel for
all parties have filed blanket consents to the filing of amicus
briefs in support of either or no party.
1

 2
June Medical—have a long history of health and
safety violations, and Louisiana abortion doctors have
a long history of professional disciplinary actions and
substandard medical care. This history reveals that
not only do Louisiana abortion providers lack the kind
of “close” relationship ordinarily required for thirdparty standing, but also that there is an inherent
conflict of interest between abortion providers and
their patients regarding state health and safety
regulations. Therefore, June Medical cannot be
presumed to enjoy a “close” relationship with its
patients when it comes to legal challenges brought
against the very laws the State passes for the
protection of the patients’ health and safety, and it
should not be deemed to have third-party standing.
With regard to June Medical’s question presented,
Amici submit that while the Fifth Circuit
understandably struggled with the meaning of the
“undue burden” standard put forth in Planned
Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992),
the court appropriately distinguished Hellerstedt on a
record that reflected “greatly dissimilar” facts and a
demonstrable absence of burden on abortion access
due to the operation of Louisiana Act 620.
Finally, Amici respectfully suggest that the Fifth
Circuit’s struggle to define the appropriate “large
fraction” or determine what “burden” on abortion
access is “undue” illustrates the unworkability of the
“right to abortion” found in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113
(1973) and the need for the Court to again take up the
issue of whether Roe and Casey should be
reconsidered and, if appropriate, overruled.

 3
ARGUMENT
I. JUNE
MEDICAL
LACKS
A
“CLOSE”
RELATIONSHIP WITH WOMEN SEEKING
ABORTION AND SHOULD NOT BE PRESUMED
TO HAVE THIRD-PARTY STANDING.
In Singleton v. Wulff, this Court concluded that “it
generally is appropriate to allow a physician to assert
the rights of women patients as against governmental
interference with the abortion decision.” 428 U.S. 106,
118 (1976). Based on this generality, this Court and
lower courts have assumed carte blanche that
abortion providers have third-party standing on
behalf of women seeking abortion without any
meaningful, particularized analysis. Cf. Hellerstedt,
136 S. Ct. at 2322 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“[A]
plurality of this Court fashioned a blanket rule
allowing third-party standing in abortion cases.”).
Since abortion providers routinely challenge State
health and safety regulations designed to protect their
patients, this presumption is at odds with this Court’s
third-party standing doctrine requiring a “close”
relationship between the third party and the persons
who possess the right. Kowalski v. Tesmer, 543 U.S.
125, 130 (2004).
When it comes to State health and safety
regulations, there is an inherent conflict of interest
between abortion providers and their patients. It is
impossible for abortion clinics and doctors to share or
represent the interests of their patients when they
seek to eliminate the very regulations designed to
protect their patients’ health and safety.

 4
Abortion providers routinely bring legal
challenges against State health and safety
regulations, and Louisiana abortion clinics and
doctors are no different.2 These cases often involve the
unsubstantiated claims that the health and safety
regulations will close clinics or “force physicians in
Louisiana to cease providing abortion services to
women.” Okpalobi v. Foster, 244 F.3d 405, 410 (5th
Cir. 2001) (en banc). Yet despite these doomsday
predictions, abortion clinics remain open and doctors
continue to provide abortions when the regulations go
into effect.3
June Medical brings the current legal challenge
against a backdrop of serious health and safety
violations by Louisiana abortion clinics and
professional disciplinary actions and substandard
medical care by Louisiana abortion doctors. In fact,
the Fifth Circuit found the history of health and safety
code violations at June Medical and Delta Clinic as
well as “generally unsafe conditions and protection of

2

See, e.g., Choice Inc. v. Greenstein, 691 F.3d 710 (5th Cir. 2012)
(legal challenge by five Louisiana abortion clinics against
licensing compliance standards); Okpalobi v. Foster, 244 F.3d
405 (5th Cir. 2001) (en banc) (legal challenge by five Louisiana
abortion clinics and doctors against a law giving women a private
tort remedy against abortion doctors for damages to both mother
and unborn child during an abortion procedure).
3 See, e.g., Okpalobi, supra note 2, at 410 (claiming if Act 825 goes
into effect, it will “eliminate abortions in Louisiana”); La. Rev.
Stat. Ann. § 9:2800.12 (Act 825 currently in effect).

 5
rapists” to be “horrifying.”4 This history amply
demonstrates that June Medical does not have a
“close” relationship with their patients and should not
be deemed to possess third-party standing.
A. Louisiana Abortion Clinics—Including June
Medical Services—Have a Long History of
Serious Health and Safety Violations.
Louisiana abortion clinics have a slew of health
and safety violations documented in Statements of
Deficiencies (SOD) by the Louisiana Department of
Health (LDH).5 Below is a summary of some of the
more egregious violations reported by LDH for the
three Louisiana abortion clinics involved in this
lawsuit—June Medical Services, Delta Clinic of Baton
Rouge, and Women’s Health Care Center.6
June Medical Services. June Medical Services,
doing business as Hope Medical Group for Women in
Shreveport, is challenging Louisiana’s admitting
privileges requirement in this case and a host of other
June Med. Servs., L.L.C. v. Gee, 905 F.3d 787, 806, n.56 (5th
Cir. 2018).
5 All the LDH SODs cited in this Brief are public records received
under Louisiana Public Records Law, La. Rev. Stat. Ann. 44:1 et
seq., and are on file with Amici’s counsel.
6 For a lengthier discussion of the history of abortion practice in
Louisiana, see Brief Amicus Curiae of Ams. United for Life in
Support of Cross-Petitioner, Gee v. June Med. Servs. L.L.C., No.
18-1460
(Vide
18-1323)
(2019),
https://www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/18/181460/103796/20190624094927367_181460%20Amicus%20Brief%20of%20Americans%20United%20fo
r%20Life.pdf.
4

 6
Louisiana health and safety regulations in other
cases.7 June Medical has been cited for violating
patient health and safety regulations, as well as
failing to ensure proper physician credentialing and
competency.8
Substandard patient care.
x

2010: Immediate Jeopardy9 situation identified
for failing to monitor each abortion patient’s
level of consciousness, respiratory status, and
cardiovascular
status
during
abortion
procedures
for
patients
receiving
administration of intravenous (IV) medications
and inhalation gas agents.10

See, e.g., June Med. Servs. L.L.C. v. Gee, No. 17-404 (M.D. La.
filed June 27, 2017) (challenging the entire out-patient abortion
regulatory scheme—at least 26 laws—including licensing and
informed consent requirements); June Med. Servs. L.L.C. v. Gee,
No. 16-444 (M.D. La. filed July 1, 2016) (challenging six health
and safety laws, including board certification requirements).
8 June Medical was cited by the LDH for failing to ensure its
physician had admitting privileges at a local hospital or a written
transfer agreement with a physician with admitting privileges.
LDH, SOD for Hope Medical Group for Women (“Hope Medical”)
1–2 (Oct. 4, 2006).
9 “Immediate Jeopardy” means “noncompliance has placed the
health and safety of recipients in its care at risk for serious
injury, serious harm, serious impairment or death. . . . [It] is the
most serious deficiency type, and carries the most serious
sanctions . . . .” Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., State
Operations Manual, Appendix Q—Core Guidelines for
Determining Immediate Jeopardy (Mar. 6, 2019).
10 LDH, SOD for Hope Medical 4, 8–9 (Aug. 13, 2010).
7

 7
x

2010: Failure to ensure that the physician
performed and documented a physical
examination on each abortion patient.11

x

2010: Failure to ensure that the physician
verified a patient’s menstrual, obstetrical, and
medical history and questioned the patient
about past complications with anesthesia prior
to
administering
the
anesthesia
and
12
performing the abortion.

x

2012: Failure to ensure an abortion patient was
medically stable upon discharge.13

x

2012: Failure to ensure all patients completed
and signed consent forms for the abortion
procedure conducted.14

Unsanitary, expired, missing, or improperly stored
instruments, medications, and medical supplies.
x

2011: Failure to label the name or strength of
stored medications and identify the patient’s
name, and the date and time the medication
was prepared.15

x

2011: Failure to document when medications
were compounded, properly store the

Id. at 13.
Id.
13 LDH, SOD for Hope Medical 3 (July 25, 2012).
14 Id. at 9.
15 LDH, SOD for Hope Medical 7–8 (May 27, 2011).
11
12

 8
medications, and identify the corresponding
storage time limit.16
x

2012: Failure to properly clean and disinfect
instruments after use in patient procedures.17

Missing facility licenses; unlicensed or uncredentialed
medical staff providing patient care.
x

2005: Failure to ensure the clinic’s Controlled
Dangerous Substance (CDS) license was up to
date.18

x

2009: Failure to ensure that laboratory
technicians dispensing medication were
licensed to do so.19

x

2010: Failure to ensure qualification, training,
and competency of staff administering IV
medications and analgesic gases to patients.20

x

2011, 2012: Failure to ensure nurse had the
competency, skills, and knowledge to compound
medication used by physicians in paracervical
blocks.21

LDH, SOD for Hope Medical 4–5 (Aug. 30, 2011).
SOD for Hope Medical 11 (July 25, 2012).
18 LDH, SOD for Hope Medical 1–2 (Sept. 19, 2005).
19 LDH, SOD for Hope Medical 1–2 (Sept. 3, 2009).
20 SOD for Hope Medical 2–3 (Aug. 13, 2010).
21 SOD for Hope Medical 1 (Aug. 30, 2011); SOD for Hope Medical
2 (July 25, 2012).
16
17

 9
Delta Clinic of Baton Rouge. Delta Clinic of
Baton Rouge has been cited repeatedly for violations
of health and safety regulations.
Substandard patient care.
x

2009: Immediate Jeopardy situation identified
for failing to follow standards of practice for
administering conscious sedation by placing
syringes in a non-sterile bag; failing to
document medication, time, and dose; failing to
monitor cardiac status; and failing to document
start and end times of abortion procedures.22

x

2019: Immediate Jeopardy situation identified
for failing to have emergency IV fluids available
for surgical abortion patient experiencing
heavy bleeding, which led to the patient being
transferred to the hospital where she
underwent a hysterectomy and bilateral
salpingectomy.23

x

2007: Failure to ensure that the physician
performed and documented a physical
examination on each abortion patient.24
2009: Failure to monitor level of consciousness,
respiratory status, and cardiac status during

LDH, SOD for Delta Clinic of Baton Rouge (“Delta Clinic”) 6–
9 (Dec. 7, 2009).
23 LDH, SOD for Delta Clinic 6–14 (Mar. 29, 2019).
24 LDH, SOD for Delta Clinic 1–3 (Oct. 9, 2007).
22

 10
abortion procedure for patients receiving
conscious sedation.25
x

2011: Failure to obtain written notarized
parental consent before performing abortion on
minor patient.26

Unsanitary, expired, missing, or improperly stored
instruments, medications, and medical supplies.
x

2019: Immediate Jeopardy situation identified
when clinic did not have IV fluids available to
stabilize patient who had surgical abortion
complications
and
experienced
heavy
bleeding.27

x

2009: Failure to follow manufacturer’s
guidelines and properly decontaminate vaginal
probes between patient use.28

x

2009: Failure to maintain aseptic technique for
syringes.29

x

2017: Failure to properly sterilize medical
equipment.30

SOD for Delta Clinic 5, 14–17 (Dec. 7, 2009).
LDH, SOD for Delta Clinic 5–7 (Feb. 3, 2011).
27 SOD for Delta Clinic 6–14 (Mar. 29, 2019).
28 SOD for Delta Clinic 34 (Dec. 7, 2009).
29 Id. at 9–11.
30 LDH, SOD for Delta Clinic 37–41 (Jan. 25, 2017).
25
26

 11
x

2009, 2013, 2018: Failure to ensure medical
supplies and medications were not expired.31

x

2019: Failure to maintain sufficient supply of
unexpired emergency medication for treating
complications.32

Incomplete, inaccurate, and untimely patient medical
records and state mandated reports.
x

2009, 2018: Failure to document name, time,
route, dose, and/or rate of administration of
conscious sedation medication and drugs for
patients receiving paracervical blocks in
patients’ medical records.33

x

2009, 2011: Failure to follow mandatory
reporting laws for carnal knowledge, incest,
and rape of minors.34

x

2014: Failure to maintain accurate medical
records on the correct age of the alleged father
of the unborn child of a minor patient.35

SOD for Delta Clinic 29–30 (Dec. 7, 2009); LDH, SOD for Delta
Clinic 1 (Jan. 9, 2013); LDH, SOD for Delta Clinic 37–38 (July
13, 2018).
32 SOD for Delta Clinic 14–16 (Mar. 29, 2019).
33 SOD for Delta Clinic 11–14 (Dec. 7, 2009); SOD for Delta Clinic
22–29, 39–43 (July 13, 2018).
34 SOD for Delta Clinic 9, 18–20 (Dec. 7, 2009); SOD for Delta
Clinic 2–5 (Feb. 3, 2011).
35 LDH, SOD for Delta Clinic 3–4 (Apr. 1, 2014).
31

 12
Women’s Health Care Center. Women’s Health
Care Center, currently operating in New Orleans, has
been cited repeatedly for health and safety violations.
Substandard patient care.
x

2004: Failure to follow up with patients
regarding potential problems resulting from
the use of an unsanitary instrument during
abortion procedure.36

x

2013: Failure to ensure a patient, referring
physician, or performing physician signed
informed consent form for an abortion
procedure.37

x

2015: Failure to document complication of a
patient who experienced heavy vaginal
bleeding eight days after her chemical abortion,
was picked up by a clinic staff member and
brought to the clinic, and was then transported
by clinic staff to the hospital.38

x

2018: Failure to inform persons inquiring about
abortion of Louisiana’s website containing
informed consent information about abortion—
including abortion options and alternatives—
during initial contact as required by law.39

LDH, SOD for Women’s Health Care Center (“Women’s
Health”) 2, 6–7 (Aug. 5, 2004).
37 LDH, SOD for Women’s Health 1–2 (Nov. 7, 2013).
38 LDH, SOD for Women’s Health 5–7 (Sept. 2, 2015).
39 LDH, SOD for Women’s Health 2–7 (June 19, 2018).
36

 13
Unsanitary, expired, missing, or improperly stored
instruments, medications, and medical supplies.
x

2004: Failure to properly sterilize surgical
equipment
and
instruments,
including
instruments used to enter the uterine cavity.40

x

2015:
Failure
to
41
ultrasound probe.

disinfect

abdominal

Missing facility licenses; unlicensed or uncredentialed
medical staff providing patient care.
x

2012: Failure to provide nursing services under
the direction of a registered nurse (RN) because
the facility did not employ one.42

x

2010, 2015: Failure to properly evaluate
licensed medical personnel and non-licensed
staff for competency.43

x

2018: Failure to ensure the clinic medical
director who procured/ordered a controlled
dangerous substance had a current CDS
license.44

Leroy Brinkley, who operates both Delta Clinic
of Baton Rouge and Women’s Health Care Center, as
well as other clinics in the past and in other States,
SOD for Women’s Health 2–6 (Aug. 5, 2004).
SOD for Women’s Health 11–13 (Sept. 2, 2015).
42 LDH, SOD for Women’s Health 1–2 (Nov. 14, 2012).
43 LDH, SOD for Women’s Health 5 (Oct. 19, 2010); SOD for
Women’s Health 3–4 (Sept. 2, 2015).
44 SOD for Women’s Health 8–10 (June 19, 2018).
40
41

 14
has a history of reportedly unscrupulous business
practices.
For example, Brinkley was held personally liable
for Delta Clinic’s fine for violating the Federal
Controlled Substances Act after the clinic failed to
pay. See United States v. Clinical Leasing Serv., Inc.,
982 F.2d 900 (5th Cir. 1992). He also employed the
infamous Dr. Kermit Gosnell as an independent
contractor at his Delaware clinic.45 Brinkley would
send women whom the Delaware clinic could not help
(presumably because they were seeking late-term
abortions) across state lines to Gosnell’s clinic in
Pennsylvania.46 Gosnell’s clinic was “convicted for the
first-degree murder of three infants who were born
alive and for the manslaughter of a patient.”
Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. at 2343 (Alito, J., dissenting).
When Brinkley was subpoenaed for Gosnell’s patient
files, he produced three but could not explain what
happened to the rest.47
The clinic violations reported in the LDH SODs
demonstrate that Louisiana abortion clinics do not
share their patients’ interests when it comes to health
and safety, and as such cannot have the necessary
“close” relationship for third-party standing.

Testimony of Leroy Brinkley, In re Cnty. Investigating Grand
Jury XXIII, No. 000-9901-2010, at 9 (First Jud. Dist. of Pa. Ct.
Com. Pl. Nov. 4, 2010).
46 Id. at 42.
47 Id. at 19–20.
45

 15
B. Louisiana Abortion Doctors Have a Long
History of Professional Disciplinary Actions
and Substandard Medical Care.
Louisiana abortion doctors have been the subject
of numerous professional disciplinary actions by the
Louisiana State Board of Medical Examiners
(“Board”). These actions reveal that past and current
abortion doctors have engaged in unprofessional and
unethical behavior and substandard medical care of
their patients.48 Five of these abortion doctors—some
of whom have been involved in legal challenges
against Louisiana health and safety laws—are
discussed below.
Dr. Adrian J. Coleman was an abortion doctor
at Delta Clinic. In 2008, his operative vaginal delivery
(OVD) privileges at a medical facility were suspended
after an infant died during a delivery he performed.
In 2009, his clinical privileges at another facility were
suspended because he had an “unacceptably high
number of absences from obstetrical deliveries, [did]
not adequately evaluate and care for his patients in
the labor and delivery unit, and fail[ed] to document
his patient care adequately and accurately.”49 As a
result, the Board placed Coleman’s medical license on
All Board disciplinary reports are judicially noticeable public
documents
available
on
the
Board’s
website:
https://secure.pharmacy.la.gov/Lookup/LicenseLookup.aspx. See
Fed. R. Evid. 201.
49 In the Matter of: Adrian Joseph Coleman: No. 08-I-775, at 1
(La. Bd. Med. Exam’rs Mar. 15, 2010).
48

 16
three years’ probation and prohibited him from
performing all OVD procedures until the Board
determined that he was “competent to perform [them]
safely and in accordance with the prevailing
standards of medical practice.”50 Coleman died in
2011.
Dr. Ifeanyi Charles Anthony Okpalobi was
involved in multiple legal challenges to Louisiana
abortion health and safety laws, including one that
created a private tort remedy for women against
abortion doctors for damages to both the mother and
unborn child during an abortion procedure. See, e.g.,
Okpalobi, 244 F.3d 405. During this time, the Board
cited him for failing to report multiple malpractice
complaints and settlements.51 This, coupled with
allegations he “demonstrated professional and/or
medical incompetency by his inability to provide
timely and appropriate care to his patients,” such as
pre- and post-natal management and “testing and
evaluation related to abortion,” resulted in a consent
order in which Okpalobi agreed to a three-year
probationary period on his medical license and to an
indefinite prohibition on his obstetrical practice.52 In
2012, Okpalobi was officially reprimanded for his
repeated failures to meet Abortion Facility Licensing
Standards and continued conduct indicative of a
practice which “fail[ed] to satisfy the prevailing and

Id. at 2–3.
In the Matter of: Ifeanyi Okpalobi, No. 93-I-051-X (La. Bd. Med.
Exam’rs Mar. 8, 1999).
52 Id.
50
51

 17
usually accepted standards of medical practice.”53 He
was required to receive Board approval for any
intended medical practice.54 Okpalobi died in 2018.
Dr. A. James Whitmore, III joined Okpalobi’s
challenge to Louisiana’s abortion tort remedy law. See
Okpalobi, 244 F.3d 405. Previously, Whitmore was
involved in two deliveries of children in which his
diagnoses and treatments were inappropriate and
resulted in the birth of one child brain damaged, the
death of one other child, and an inappropriate
Caesarean section.55 While with Delta Clinic,
Whitmore used instruments that were rusty, cracked,
and unsterile; single-use instruments on multiple
patients; and a sterilization solution that was
infrequently changed.56 After one second trimester
abortion he performed, the patient continued to have
moderate bleeding but the ambulance was not called
for nearly three hours.57 At the emergency room, they
discovered she had a perforated uterus and a
lacerated uterine artery, and it was necessary to
perform a complete hysterectomy.58 The Board found
Whitmore guilty of unprofessional conduct and
recurring practices which failed to satisfy accepted
medical standards based on his “disregard of proper
In the Matter of: Ifeanyi Charles Okpalobi, No. 10-I-033, at 1
(La. Bd. Med. Exam’rs May 9, 2012).
54 Id. at 3.
55 In the Matter of: A. James Whitmore, No. 92-A-001, at 1 (La.
Bd. Med. Exam’rs May 21, 1992).
56 In the Matter of: A. James Whitmore, III, No. 00-A-021, at 2
(La. Bd. Med. Exam’rs Jan. 22, 2002).
57 Id. at 3.
58 Id.
53

 18
sanitary procedures, his rude and callous treatment of
his patients, his refusal to answer their questions, and
his tardy recognition of the seriousness of the
condition of [a] patient [that] endanger[ed] her life.”59
The Board had “grave reservations as to Whitmore’s
professional competency” and placed his medical
license on immediate probation for an indefinite
period.60
Dr. Victor Brown has been the subject of many
Board disciplinary actions. In 1989, after allegedly
writing and issuing prescriptions for controlled
substances to five patients without legitimate medical
justification, Brown entered into a consent order
placing his medical license on probation for three
years and prohibiting him from prescribing,
dispensing, or administering any Schedule II
controlled substance for the duration of his medical
career.61 In 1997, a medical center suspended his
surgical/invasive/endoscopic clinical privileges after
an investigation revealed that his definition,
evaluation, and treatment of infertility were
inconsistent and not in keeping with generally
recognized medical standards since he performed
dilation and curettage on almost every patient even
when not medically indicated or necessary.62 In 2000,
when the Board discovered that Brown had failed to
report the loss of his privileges on three different
Id.
Id.
61 In the Matter of: Victor Brown, No. 89-A-035, at 2 (La. Bd. Med.
Exam’rs Dec. 8, 1989).
62 In the Matter of: Victor Brown, No. 99-I-035, at 1 (La. Bd. Med.
Exam’rs Mar. 24, 2000).
59
60

 19
medical license renewal applications, he agreed to a
consent order placing his medical license on indefinite
probation and a lifetime limitation on the practice of
medicine in the field of obstetrics/gynecology.63
Specifically, he was not to perform any prenatal care
in any surgical/invasive/endoscopic procedures,
including dilations and curettages, dilations and
evacuations, dilations and extractions, abortions, and
vaginal or cesarean deliveries.64 In 2005, Brown
violated this consent order by engaging in and
practicing medicine he was not authorized to practice.
His license was again placed on indefinite probation
and he was further restricted from performing
cervical or vaginal biopsies and performing or
interpreting any ultrasounds.65 In 2007, Brown’s
medical license was revoked and cancelled for
violating the terms of the consent order,
unprofessional conduct, and professional and medical
incompetency.66
Dr. Kevin Work has also been subjected to
multiple disciplinary actions by the Board. In 2009,
Work’s medical license was placed on a one-year
probation when a hospital suspended his clinical
privileges after allegations he made “unwelcome and
inappropriate sexual comments” and finding he

Id. at 4.
Id.
65 In the Matter of: Victor Brown, No. 01-I-037, at 3 (La. Bd. Med.
Exam’rs Aug. 15, 2005).
66 In the Matter of: Victor Brown, No. 06-A-021, at 2, 5 (La. Bd.
Med. Exam’rs Sept. 17, 2007).
63
64

 20
“failed to present to the delivery unit” six times.67 In
2014, after Work allowed staff to use his name and
electronic signature and engage in the practice of
medicine, he agreed to a one-year probation on his
medical license and a requirement the Board approve
any future practice of medicine.68 In 2016, after again
allowing unlicensed staff to practice medicine by
performing ultrasounds and providing prenatal
services, Dr. Work agreed to not practice medicine in
any capacity for one year.69 In 2017, his license was
reinstated on a two-year probation requiring he only
engage in the practice of medicine as approved by the
Board and in a non-solo practitioner setting.70 But in
2019, his medical license was again suspended
pending resolution of claims relating to practicing at
an abortion clinic without prior Board approval.71 He
was officially reprimanded and placed on probation
for two years with the 2017 restrictions, the
requirement that another physician be present any
time he practice medicine, and a covenant he not
practice “abortion care” or obstetrics except when
“diagnosing pregnancy and referring pregnant

In the Matter of: Kevin Govan Work, No. 08-I-774, at 1–2 (La.
Bd. Med. Exam’rs Mar. 16, 2009).
68 In the Matter of: Kevin Govan Work, No. 13-I-014, at 1–3 (La.
Bd. Med. Exam’rs Oct. 17, 2014).
69 In the Matter of: Kevin Govan Work, No. 15-A-009, at 3 (La. Bd.
Med. Exam’rs Feb. 15, 2016).
70 In the Matter of: Kevin Govan Work, No. 15-A-009, at 1–2 (La.
Bd. Med. Exam’rs June 20, 2017).
71 In the Matter of: Kevin Govan Work, No. 19-I-144 (La. Bd. Med.
Exam’rs Feb. 26, 2019).
67

 21
patients.”72 Work’s medical license was reinstated
without restriction June 2019.73
In sum, Louisiana abortion doctors’ multiple
professional disciplinary actions for substandard
medical care and blatant disregard for their patients’
health and safety—in addition to the numerous health
and safety violations of Louisiana abortion clinics—
demonstrate that abortion providers’ interests are at
odds with their patients’ interests. As such, June
Medical cannot have a “close” relationship with its
patients and should not be deemed to possess thirdparty standing to challenge health and safety laws on
their behalf.
II. THE FIFTH CIRCUIT APPROPRIATELY APPLIED
THE CASEY STANDARD AND DISTINGUISHED
HELLERSTEDT TO UPHOLD LOUISIANA’S ACT
620.
As the Fifth Circuit observed, “[Hellerstedt’s]
analysis is rooted in Casey,” which “requires that
courts consider the burdens a law imposes on abortion
access together with the benefits those laws confer.”
June Med. Servs. L.L.C., v. Gee, 905 F.3d 787, 802 (5th
Cir. 2018), citing Casey, 505 U.S. at 877.
Parenthetically describing its decision process as a
“balancing,” Hellerstedt states that “[u]nnecessary
health regulations that have the purpose or effect of
In the Matter of: Kevin Govan Work, No. 2019-A-011, at 1–2
(La. Bd. Med. Exam’rs Apr. 15, 2019).
73 In the Matter of: Kevin Govan Work, No. 2019-A-11 (La. Bd.
Med. Exam’rs June 10, 2019).
72

 22
presenting a substantial obstacle to a woman seeking
an abortion impose an undue burden on the right.” Id.
at 802–03, citing Casey, 505 U.S. at 878.74
While the Fifth Circuit concluded that “[t]here is
no doubt that [Hellerstedt] imposes a balancing test,”
id. at 803, Amici agree it cannot be regarded as a
“‘pure’ balancing test under which any burden, no
matter how slight, invalidates the law.” Id.; see
Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. at 2323–2324 (Thomas, J.,
dissenting) (Hellerstedt “reimagine[d] the undueburden standard” and created a “free-form balancing
test”). “Casey expressly allows for the possibility that
not every burden creates a ‘substantial obstacle,’” and
“even regulations with a minimal benefit are
unconstitutional only where they present a
substantial obstacle to abortion.” Gee, 905 F.3d at 803.
Conversely, “[a] minimal burden even on a large
fraction of women does not undermine the right to
abortion.” Id.
Further, the court seems to have been correct in its
view that Hellerstedt resurrected the Casey plurality’s
“large fraction” framework (at least for now). Id. at
Where a legislature has “legitimate reasons” for acting, courts
will not infer an impermissible purpose for the law. McCleskey v.
Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 298–99 (1987); see also Smith v. Doe, 538
U.S. 84, 92 (2003) (“[O]nly the clearest proof will suffice to
override legislative intent . . . .”) (internal citation omitted).
Here, as in Mazurek v. Armstrong, “[o]ne searches the Court of
Appeals’ opinion in vain for any mention of any evidence
suggesting an unlawful motive on the part of the . . .
Legislature.” 520 U.S. 968, 972 (1997). The “purpose” analysis
should end there.
74

 23
802. Although the undue burden test remains too
malleable and difficult in application, the large
fraction component, properly applied, may help inject
an objective quotient into the undue burden analysis
that could shore up the standard against judicial
subjectivity, whether based on political factors or
personal judgments.75 Objectivity is critical to keeping
the hundreds of federal judges from invalidating
abortion health and safety regulations based on
personal assessments of “burden” versus “benefit.”
The Fifth Circuit agreed with the Eighth Circuit’s
elucidation of the undue burden/large fraction
framework in Planned Parenthood of Ark. & E. Okla.
v. Jegley. 864 F.3d 953 (8th Cir. 2017). “In every other
area of the law, a facial challenge requires plaintiffs
to establish a provision’s unconstitutionality in every
conceivable application.” Gee, 905 F.3d at 815, citing
United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987)
(plaintiffs bringing constitutional challenges “must
establish that no set of circumstances exists under
which the [law] would be valid”). In the abortion
context, however, plaintiffs “are excused from that
demanding standard and must show a substantial
burden in only a large fraction of cases.” Id. Thus, as
the Eighth Circuit expressed, with facial challenges to
abortion regulations, the Court “has fashioned a
different standard under which the plaintiff can
prevail by demonstrating that ‘in a large fraction of
the cases in which [the law] is relevant, it will operate
Accord Planned Parenthood of Ark. & E. Okla. v. Jegley, 864
F.3d 953, 960 (8th Cir. 2017) (“[W]e find that [the large fraction]
standard is not entirely freewheeling and that we can and should
define its outer boundaries.”).
75

 24
as a substantial obstacle to a woman’s choice.’” Gee,
905 F.3d at 802, quoting Jegley, 864 F.3d at 958 (citing
Casey, 505 U.S. at 895).
Here, as in Hellerstedt, the Fifth Circuit treated
the denominator of the “fraction” in question as all
women seeking abortions because the statutes at
issue encompass all types of abortions. “Accordingly,
to sustain the facial invalidation of Act 620, we would
have to find that it substantially burdens a large
fraction of all women seeking abortions in Louisiana.”
Id. at 802. The court correctly held that June Medical
did not meet that standard.
The court began its application of Hellerstedt to the
circumstances in Louisiana by observing that “the
facts in the instant case are remarkably different from
those that occasioned the invalidation of the Texas
statute.” Gee, 905 F.3d at 791; cf. id. (“Careful review
of the record reveals stark differences between the
record before us and that which the Court considered
in [Hellerstedt];”) id. at 803 (Hellerstedt involved “a
substantially similar statute but greatly dissimilar
facts and geography”). Ultimately, Act 620 “passes
muster even under the stringent requirements of
[Hellerstedt].” Id. at 791.
The Fifth Circuit distinguished Hellerstedt by
observing that unlike Texas, Louisiana presented
“some evidence” of a medical benefit in the challenged
regulation and “far more detailed evidence of Act 620’s
impact on access to abortion.” Id. at 805. As to the
“benefit,” the court displayed the appropriate
deference to the State legislature consistent with the

 25
Court’s pronouncement in Gonzales v. Carhart that
States have “wide discretion” in passing health and
safety legislation, even if “medical and scientific
uncertainty” exists—a threshold of authority that
outpatient emergency admission standards easily
surmount. 550 U.S. 124, at 163 (2007). The practice of
surgical abortion overwhelmingly occurs in outpatient
clinical facilities,76 and the widely accepted overall
hospitalization rate following elective abortion (0.3%
or one in three hundred patients) is similar to rates
for other similar outpatient procedures such as
liposuction, gastrointestinal endoscopy, colonoscopy,
and upper endoscopy.77 See Gee, 905 F.3d at 805
(noting “[p]rocedures performed at [outpatient
TE LINDE’S OPERATIVE GYNECOLOGY 448 9th ed. (2003)
(reporting that 93% of abortions occur in free-standing clinics
and 2% in physicians’ offices); Rachel K. Jones & Jenna Jerman,
Abortion Incidence and Service Availability in the United States,
2011, 46 Perspectives on Sexual & Reprod. Health 1 (2014),
https://doi.org/10.1363/46e0414.
77 U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Ctrs. for Disease
Control, National Health Statistics Reports: Ambulatory
Surgery in the United States, 2006 (revised Sept. 4, 2009);
Stanley Henshaw & Lawrence Finer, The Accessibility of
Abortion Services in the United States, 35 Perspectives on Sexual
and Reprod. Health 16 (2003) (stating hospitalization rate for
abortion is 0.3%). See Planned Parenthood of Greater Tex.
Surgical Health Servs. v. Abbott, 748 F.3d 583, 595 (5th Cir.
2014) (citing figure of 210 emergency direct transfers from
abortion centers to hospitals in Texas annually). However,
because (as the panel noted), “[m]ost complications occur well
after the surgery,” Gee, 905 F.3d at 806, n.56, this figure may be
conservative. Compare Ushma D. Upadhyay et al., Incidence of
Emergency Department Visits and Complications After Abortion,
125 Obstetrics & Gynecology 175 (2015) (stating that 1 in 115
abortions resulted in an abortion-related complication treated in
an emergency room).
76

 26
surgical centers] include upper and lower GI
endoscopies, injections into the spinal cord, and
orthopedic procedures”).
The Fifth Circuit also found that the record
regarding hospital credentialing in Louisiana is
starkly different from that in Hellerstedt. Unlike
Texas, “Louisiana was not attempting to target or
single out abortion facilities. In fact, it was just the
opposite—the purpose of the Act was to bring them
‘into the same set of standards that apply to
physicians providing similar types of services in
[ambulatory surgical centers].’” Id. at 806. Act 620
“brings the requirements regarding outpatient
abortion clinics into conformity with the preexisting
requirement that physicians at ambulatory surgical
centers (“ASCs”) must have privileges at a hospital
within the community.” Id. at 805.
Additionally, unlike in Hellerstedt, Louisiana’s
emergency admission requirement “performs a real,
and previously unaddressed, credentialing function
that promotes the wellbeing of women seeking
abortion.” Id. at 806. This credentialing function
arises from the fact that “hospitals perform more
rigorous and intense background checks than do the
clinics.” Id. at 805. The Fifth Circuit noted that Doe 3,
June Medical’s Chief Medical Officer, hired and
trained doctors to perform abortions who were not
OB/GYNs, including a radiologist and an
ophthalmologist. Id. at 799. He was the only one to
evaluate their credentials and admitted he neither
performed background checks nor inquired into their
previous training. Id. “The record shows that clinics,

 27
beyond ensuring that the provider has a current
medical license, do not appear to undertake any
review of a provider’s competency. The clinics, unlike
hospitals, do not even appear to perform criminal
background checks.” Id. at 805.
As to the “burdens,” the court appropriately
determined “there is insufficient evidence to conclude
that, had the doctors put forth a good-faith effort to
comply with Act 620, they would have been unable to
obtain privileges.” Id. at 807. If the Act went into
effect, June Medical and Women’s Health could
remain open since each would have a qualified doctor.
Delta is the only clinic that would close since its doctor
lacks admitting privileges. Id. at 810. However,
Delta’s closing could not be attributed to the operation
of Act 620 since the doctor, Doe 5, testified he will be
given qualifying privileges after securing a covering
doctor. Id. at 809.78
Because no clinics would close as a direct result of
Act 620, “there would be no increased strain on
available facilities, as no clinic will have to absorb
another’s capacity.” Id. at 811–12. And Act 620 will
impose no substantial obstacle to abortion access as a
78 The Fifth Circuit should be commended for clarifying that the
actions and inactions of the Doe doctors and the independent
actions and choices of third parties cannot be attributed to Act
620. Here, “the vast majority [of Does] largely sat on their hands,
assuming that they would not qualify. Their inaction severs the
chain of causation.” Gee, 905 F.3d at 807. The court and parties
agreed that the closures of two abortion centers were unrelated
to Act 620. Additionally, the Fifth Circuit properly held that the
district court erred in factoring the strongly pro-life culture of
Louisiana into its substantial burden analysis. Id. at 810, n.60.

 28
result of increased driving distances. Id. at 791.
Finally, Act 620 would impose, at most, an increase in
volume of only 30% at just one abortion business. Id.
In seeking to determine what would constitute an
“undue burden” imposed by Act 620, the Fifth Circuit
understandably struggled with interpreting the “large
fraction” component of the undue burden test. The
court reflected that the Court “has not defined what
constitutes a ‘large fraction,’ and the circuit courts
have shed little light.” Id. at 814. The Sixth Circuit
determined that 12% was an insufficiently “large
fraction,” Cincinnati Women’s Servs. v. Taft, 468 F.3d
361, 373 (6th Cir. 2006), and other circuits have found
that “a large fraction [exists only] when practically all
of the affected women would face a substantial
obstacle in obtaining an abortion.” Gee, 905 F.3d at
814, quoting Taft, 468 F.3d at 373–74 (emphasis in
Gee).79
The court noted that Does 2 and 3 would each need
to perform an additional 550 procedures per year at
one abortion center, or six extra abortions each day
over what Doe 3 currently performs. “Using his
testimony that he can perform six abortions an hour,
that load would not result in a substantial increase in
wait times. Common sense dictates that an hour
cannot be a substantial burden.” Id. at 812–13. Nor
would a thirty percent increase in volume at one
abortion center approach “practically all” women
Accord Jegley, 864 F.3d at 959, n.8 (“We are skeptical that 4.8
to 6.0 percent is sufficient to qualify as a ‘large fraction’ of women
seeking medication abortions in Arkansas.”).
79

 29
seeking abortions in Louisiana, so it cannot be deemed
a large fraction for purposes of Hellerstedt. Id. at 814.
“To conclude otherwise eviscerates the restrictions on
a successful facial challenge.” Id. at 815.80 The Fifth
Circuit thus correctly concluded that “[i]nstead of
demonstrating an undue burden on a large fraction of
women, June Medical at most shows an insubstantial
burden on a small fraction of women. That falls far
short of a successful facial challenge.” Id.
III. HELLERSTEDT

HAS

AGGRAVATED

THE

ALREADY UNWORKABLE STANDARD SET OUT IN

ROE

COURT
RECONSIDER THOSE PRECEDENTS.
AND

CASEY,

AND THE

SHOULD

The Fifth Circuit labored to do the best it could
with the vague and opaque “undue burden” standard
on which the Court has relied since Casey. Amici
respectfully suggest that the court’s struggle—similar
to dozens of other courts’ herculean struggles in this
area—illustrates the unworkability of the “right to
abortion” found in Roe and the need for the Court to
take up the issue of whether Roe and Casey should be
reconsidered and, if appropriate, overruled.

This approach is also consistent with Gonzales’ instruction
that facial challenges are disfavored. 550 U.S. at 167; Wash.
State Grange v. Wash. State Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442, 450
(2008). A fraction of abortions at a small number of abortion
centers—or just one abortion center—should not constitute
grounds for a holding of facial invalidity. At most, it might
constitute grounds for an as-applied challenge by that abortion
business only, which it has not made here.

80

 30
Stare decisis is not an “inexorable command,”
much less a constitutional principle. Burnet v.
Colorado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 405 (1932)
(Brandeis, J., dissenting). Instead, it is a prudential
and pragmatic judgment. Casey, 505 U.S. at 854. The
Court has exercised that judgment to overrule
precedent in over 230 cases throughout its history.81
Forty-six years after Roe was decided, it remains a
radically unsettled precedent: two of the seven
Justices who originally joined the majority
subsequently repudiated it in whole or in part,82 and
virtually every abortion decision since has been
closely divided.
Furthermore, Roe’s jurisprudence has been
haphazard from the beginning. Roe did not actually
hold that abortion was a “fundamental” constitutional
right, but only implied it.83 This ambiguity was
compounded by the Court’s concluding “summary” of
the Roe holding, which nowhere mentioned abortion
as a fundamental right, strict scrutiny analysis, or the
need to “narrowly tailor” regulations. Instead, the
Court only required that regulations be “reasonably
relate[d]” to the State’s interest and “tailored to the

Cong. Research Serv., The Constitution of the United States:
Analysis and Interpretation: Analysis of Cases Decided by the
Supreme Court of the United States to June 26, 2013, S. Doc. No.
112-9, at 2573–85 (2d Sess. 2013).
82 Thornburgh v. ACOG, 476 U.S. 747, 782–85 (1986) (Burger, J.,
dissenting); John C. Jeffries, Jr., JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL JR.:
A BIOGRAPHY 341 (1994) (referring to Roe and Doe as “the worst
opinions I ever joined”).
83 See, e.g., Roe, 410 U.S. at 155.
81

 31
recognized state interests.”84 The cases decided since
did not consistently treat abortion as a “fundamental
right” and did not consistently apply strict scrutiny.85
Besides dictum in Maher v. Roe,86 in the two
decades between Roe and Casey the majority of the
Court referred to abortion as a “fundamental right”
only twice: City of Akron v. Akron Center for

Id. at 164–65.
See, e.g., Connecticut v. Menillo, 423 U.S. 9 (1975) (no reference
to any “fundamental right” or “strict scrutiny” in per curiam
opinion); Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S.
52 (1976) (failing to use any particular level of scrutiny); id. at
71 (noting “inconsisten[cy] with the standards enunciated in Roe
v. Wade”); Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U.S. 132 (1976) (using “unduly
burdensome” standard); id. at 147 (characterizing Danforth as
holding that a law “is not unconstitutional unless it unduly
burdens the right to seek an abortion”) (emphasis added); Beal v.
Doe, 432 U.S. 438, 466 (1977) (invoking the “unduly burdensome”
standard); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 471 (1977) (referring only
indirectly to “a fundamental right” but then holding “the District
Court misconceived the nature and scope of the fundamental
right recognized in Roe”); id. at 470–71 (“the right protects the
woman from unduly burdensome interference with her
freedom”); id. at 474, (concluding that the regulation “does not
impinge upon the fundamental right recognized in Roe”);
Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 396–97 (1979) (applying an
“unduly limit” standard); Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 640
(1979) (employing an “undue burden” standard without
referencing a “fundamental right”); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S.
297, 324–26 (1980) (applying a rational basis test for the Hyde
Amendment); H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398 (1981) (upholding
the Utah parental notice law against a facial challenge, without
reference to abortion as a “fundamental” right).
86 432 U.S. 464 (1977).
84
85

 32
Reproductive Health,87 and Thornburgh v. ACOG.88
But even then the Court never expressly applied
“strict scrutiny-narrowly tailored” analysis, and the
Court overruled both cases in Casey.89
After two decades of inconsistency, the Court
officially disavowed “fundamental right” status for
abortion and strict scrutiny review, adopting instead
an “undue burden” test in Casey. Gee. 905 F.3d at 871,
874–76. But Casey did not settle the clarity of the
“undue burden” standard. As a result, consistency and
predictability continue to be undermined as federal
courts struggle to apply the Roe/Casey standard.90
Immediately after Casey, the Court again changed the
applicable standard and adopted a “large fraction”
test in Fargo Women’s Health Organization v.
Schafer91 But the lower federal courts had no better
luck discerning what a “large fraction” of “relevant
462 U.S. 416, 427 (1983).
476 U.S. 747, 789 (1986).
89 505 U.S. at 882.
90 See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Minn. v. Minnesota, 910 F.2d
479 (8th Cir. 1990) (trying to determine standard of review after
Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490 (1989)); Paul
Quast, Respecting Legislators and Rejecting Baselines:
Rebalancing Casey, 90 Notre Dame L. Rev. 913 (2014) (citing
cases); Sandra L. Tholen & Lisa Baird, Con Law is as Con Law
Does: A Survey of Planned Parenthood v. Casey in the State and
Federal Courts, 28 Loyola L. Rev. 971 (1995) (citing cases).
91 507 U.S. 1013, 1014 (1993) (O’Connor, J., joined by Souter, J.,
concurring in denial of certiorari) (“[W]e made clear that a law
restricting abortions constitutes an undue burden, and hence is
invalid, if, ‘in a large fraction of the cases in which [the law] is
relevant, it will operate as a substantial obstacle to a woman’s
choice to undergo an abortion.’”).
87
88

 33
cases” meant.92 The “large fraction” test appeared to
have been effectively abandoned in Gonzales, but was
revived in Hellerstedt. However, it was applied
incoherently such that it would always result in
invalidation of the State’s interest and the State
statute.93 And the Court in Hellerstedt once again
employed Casey’s “undue burden” test but adopted a
“benefits-and-burdens balancing test” by which
federal judges are required to assess the “medical
justification” of abortion regulations.94
In sum, Roe’s jurisprudence has been
characterized by Delphic confusion and protean
change. The Court struck down regulations in Akron
and Thornburgh later approved in Casey. The Court
identified two state interests for abortion regulations

Kevin Martin, Stranger in a Strange Land: The Use of
Overbreadth in Abortion Jurisprudence, 99 Col. L. Rev. 173
(1999); Barnes v. Mississippi, 992 F.2d 1335, 1337 (5th Cir. 1993)
(“[P]assing on the constitutionality of state statutes regulating
abortion after Casey has become neither less difficult nor more
closely anchored to the Constitution.”); Planned Parenthood of
Idaho, Inc. v. Wasden, 376 F.3d 908, 920 n.9 (9th Cir. 2004)
(noting the “large fraction” standard has been labeled “unique”);
Nat’l Abortion Fed’n v. Gonzales, 437 F.3d 278, 294 (2d Cir. 2006)
(Walker, J.) (“As it stands now, however, the Supreme Court
appears to have adopted the ‘large fraction’ standard (perhaps
modified by Stenberg [v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000)] to mean a
‘not-so-large-fraction’ standard) . . . .”).
93 136 S. Ct. at 2343 n.11 (Alito, J., dissenting) (“Under the
Court’s holding, we are supposed to use the same figure (women
actually burdened) as both the numerator and the denominator.
By my math, that fraction is always ‘1,’ which is pretty large as
fractions go.”).
94 Id. at 2324 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
92

 34
in Roe but recognized more in Gonzales.95 It struck
down limits on partial-birth abortion in Stenberg v.
Carhart96 later approved in Gonzales. It rejected facial
challenges in Gonzales97 it then resurrected, sua
sponte, in Hellerstedt.98 The Court has retreated from
Roe in at least four cases—Harris, Webster v.
Reproductive
Health
Services,99
Casey,
and
Gonzales—recalibrating the standard of review and
giving States more deference to enact health and
safety regulations and partial prohibitions. As the
Court pulled away from Roe, the States moved
forward to regulate abortion to the maximum extent
allowed to protect the “state interests” permitted in
Roe, Casey and Gonzales. These incessant
retrenchments show that Roe has been substantially
undermined by subsequent authority, a principal
factor the Court considers when deciding whether to
overrule precedent.100 Casey clearly did not settle the
abortion issue, and it is time for the Court to take it
up again.

550 U.S. at 157 (protecting the medical community’s
“reputation”); id. at 159 (“ensuring so grave a choice is well
informed”).
96 530 U.S. 914 (2000).
97 550 U.S. at 167 (“[T]hese facial attacks should not have been
entertained in the first instance.”).
98 136 S. Ct. at 2340 (2016) (Alito, J., dissenting) (“No court would
even think of reviving such a claim on its own.”).
99 492 U.S. 490 (1989).
100 Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 379
(2010) (Roberts, C.J., concurring).
95

 35
CONCLUSION
Amici respectfully submit that the judgment
should be affirmed, either on the ground that June
Medical lacks standing to challenge Louisiana’s
emergency admission law or on the ground that the
Fifth Circuit did not err in holding that the law does
not impose an “undue burden” on access to abortion.
Respectfully submitted,
CATHERINE GLENN FOSTER
STEVEN H. ADEN
Counsel of Record
KATIE GLENN
NATALIE M. HEJRAN
AMERICANS UNITED FOR LIFE
1150 Connecticut Ave NW
Suite 500
Washington, D.C. 20036
Steven.Aden@aul.org
(202) 741-4917
January 2, 2020

 APPENDIX

1a
APPENDIX—LIST OF AMICI CURIAE
U.S. SENATE
John Kennedy (LA)

Marsha Blackburn (TN)

John Barrasso (WY)

Roy Blunt (MO)

John Boozman (AR)

Mike Braun (IN)

Richard Burr (NC)

Bill Cassidy, M.D. (LA)

John Cornyn (TX)

Tom Cotton (AR)

Kevin Cramer (ND)

Mike Crapo (ID)

Ted Cruz (TX)

Steve Daines (MT)

Michael B. Enzi (WY)

Joni Ernst (IA)

Deb Fischer (NE)

Chuck Grassley (IA)

John Hoeven (ND)

Cindy Hyde-Smith (MS)

James M. Inhofe (OK)

Ron Johnson (WI)

James Lankford (OK)

Michael S. Lee (UT)

Jerry Moran (KS)

Rand Paul (KY)

Rob Portman (OH)

James E. Risch (ID)

Pat Roberts (KS)

Mitt Romney (UT)

Mike Rounds (SD)

Marco Rubio (FL)

Ben Sasse (NE)

Tim Scott (SC)

Thom Tillis (NC)

John Thune (SD)

Pat Toomey (PA)

Roger F. Wicker (MS)

Todd Young (IN)

 2a
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Steve Scalise (LA-01)

Michael Johnson (LA-04)

Ralph Abraham, M.D. (LA05)

Robert B. Aderholt (AL-04)

Rick W. Allen (GA-12)

Kelly Armstrong (ND-AL)

Jodey C. Arrington (TX-19)

Brian Babin, D.D.S. (TX-36)

Don Bacon (NE-02)

James R. Baird (IN-04)

Troy Balderson (OH-12)

Jim Banks (IN-03)

Andy Barr (KY-06)

Jack Bergman (MI-01)

Andy Biggs (AZ-05)

Dan Bishop (NC-09)

Rob Bishop (UT-01)

Mike Bost (IL-12)

Kevin Brady (TX-08)

Mo Brooks (AL-05)

Ken Buck (CO-04)

Larry Bucshon, M.D. (IN-08)

Ted Budd (NC-13)

Tim Burchett (TN-02)

Michael C. Burgess, M.D.
(TX-26)

Bradley Byrne (AL-01)

Earl L. “Buddy” Carter
(GA-01)

Steve Chabot (OH-01)

Liz Cheney (WY-AL)

Ben Cline (VA-06)

Michael Cloud (TX-27)

Tom Cole (OK-04)

Doug Collins (GA-09)

James Comer (KY-01)

K. Michael Conaway (TX11)

Paul Cook (CA-08)

Rick Crawford (AR-01)

Dan Crenshaw (TX-02)

 3a
John R. Curtis (UT-03)

Warren Davidson (OH-08)

Rodney Davis (IL-13)

Mario Diaz-Balart (FL-25)

Jeff Duncan (SC-03)

Neal Dunn, M.D. (FL-02)

Tom Emmer (MN-06)

Ron Estes (KS-04)

A. Drew Ferguson, IV (GA03)

Chuck Fleischmann (TN-03)

Bill Flores (TX-17)

Jeff Fortenberry (NE-01)

Virginia Foxx (NC-05)

Russ Fulcher (ID-01)

Matt Gaetz (FL-01)

Greg Gianforte (MT-AL)

Bob Gibbs (OH-07)

Louie Gohmert (TX-01)

Anthony Gonzalez (OH-16)

Lance Gooden (TX-05)

Paul A. Gosar, D.D.S. (AZ04)

Kay Granger (TX-12)

Garret Graves (LA-06)

Sam Graves (MO-06)

Tom Graves (GA-14)

Mark E. Green, M.D. (TN07)

Glenn Grothman (WI-06)

Michael Guest (MS-03)

Brett Guthrie (KY-02)

Jim Hagedorn (MN-01)

Andy Harris, M.D. (MD-01)

Vicky Hartzler (MO-04)

Kevin Hern (OK-01)

Jody B. Hice (GA-10)

Clay Higgins (LA-03)

French Hill (AR-02)

George Holding (NC-02)

Richard Hudson (NC-08)

Bill Huizenga (MI-02)

Bill Johnson (OH-06)

Dusty Johnson (SD-AL)

Jim Jordan (OH-04)

John Joyce, M.D. (PA-13)

Fred Keller (PA-12)

 4a
Mike Kelly (PA-16)

Trent Kelly (MS-01)

Peter T. King (NY-02)

Steve King (IA-04)

Adam Kinzinger (IL-16)

Darin LaHood (IL-18)

Doug LaMalfa (CA-01)

Doug Lamborn (CO-05)

Robert E. Latta (OH-05)

Debbie Lesko (AZ-08)

Daniel W. Lipinski (IL-03)

Billy Long (MO-07)

Barry Loudermilk (GA-11)

Blaine Luetkemeyer (MO03)

Roger Marshall, M.D. (KS01)

Brian Mast (FL-18)

Kevin McCarthy (CA-23)

Tom McClintock (CA-04)

Patrick McHenry (NC-10)

David B. McKinley, P.E.
(WV-01)

Mark Meadows (NC-11)

Daniel P. Meuser (PA-09)

Carol D. Miller (WV-03)

Paul Mitchell (MI-10)

John R. Moolenaar (MI-04)

Alex X. Mooney (WV-02)

Markwayne Mullin (OK-02)

Gregory F. Murphy, M.D.
(NC-03)

Dan Newhouse (WA-04)

Ralph Norman (SC-05)

Pete Olson (TX-22)

Steve Palazzo (MS-04)

Gary Palmer (AL-06)

Greg Pence (IN-06)

Scott Perry (PA-10)

Collin C. Peterson (MN-07)

John Ratcliffe (TX-04)

Guy Reschenthaler (PA-14)

Tom Rice (SC-07)

Denver Riggleman (VA-05)

Martha Roby (AL-02)

Cathy McMorris Rodgers
(WA-05)

 5a
Phil D. Roe, M.D. (TN-01)

Hal Rogers (KY-05)

Mike D. Rogers (AL-03)

Francis Rooney (FL-19)

John Rose (TN-06)

David Rouzer (NC-07)

Chip Roy (TX-21)

John Rutherford (FL-04)

David Schweikert (AZ-06)

Austin Scott (GA-08)

F. James Sensenbrenner,
Jr. (WI-05)

John Shimkus (IL-15)

Mike Simpson (ID-02)

Adrian Smith (NE-03)

Christopher H. Smith (NJ04)

Jason Smith (MO-08)

Lloyd Smucker (PA-11)

Ross Spano (FL-15)

Pete Stauber (MN-08)

Brian Steil (WI-01)

W. Gregory Steube (FL-17)

Chris Stewart (UT-02)

Van Taylor (TX-03)

Glenn ‘GT’ Thompson (PA15)

William Timmons (SC-04)

Scott Tipton (CO-03)

Michael R. Turner (OH-10)

Ann Wagner (MO-02)

Tim Walberg (MI-07)

Mark Walker (NC-06)

Jackie Walorski (IN-02)

Michael Waltz (FL-06)

Steve Watkins (KS-02)

Randy Weber (TX-14)

Daniel Webster (FL-11)

Brad Wenstrup, D.P.M.
(OH-02)

Bruce Westerman (AR-04)

Roger Williams (TX-25)

Joe Wilson (SC-02)

Rob Wittman (VA-01)

Steve Womack (AR-03)

Ron Wright (TX-06)

 6a

Ted S. Yoho, D.V.M. (FL- Lee Zeldin (NY-01)
O3)