Nos. 18-1323, 18-1460
In the

Supreme Court of the United States
JUNE MEDICAL SERVICES L.L.C., et al.,
Petitioners,
v.
DR. REBEKAH GEE, Secretary, Louisiana
Department of Health and Hospitals,
Respondent.
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
DR. REBEKAH GEE, Secretary, Louisiana
Department of Health and Hospitals,
Cross-Petitioner,
v.
JUNE MEDICAL SERVICES L.L.C., et al.,
Cross-Respondents.
On Writs of Certiorari to the United States
Court of A ppeals for the Fifth Circuit

BRIEF OF AMICI CURIAE 197 MEMBERS OF
CONGRESS IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONERS
Claude G. Szyfer
Counsel of Record
Michele L. Pahmer
Julie G. Matos
Pamela S. Takefman
Stroock & Stroock & Lavan LLP
180 Maiden Lane
New York, NY 10038
(212) 806-5400
cszyfer@stroock.com
Counsel for Amici Curiae
292035

 A complete list of the 36 U.S. Senators and the 161
Members of the U.S. House of Representatives
participating as amici curiae is provided as
an appendix to the brief. Among them are:
Sen. Chuck Schumer

Speaker Nancy Pelosi

Sen. Dianne Feinstein

Rep. Frank Pallone, Jr.

Sen. Patty Murray

Rep. Jerrold Nadler

Sen. Richard Blumenthal

Rep. Diana DeGette
Rep. Barbara Lee
Rep. Judy Chu

 i
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
TABLE OF CONTENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . i
TABLE OF CITED AUTHORITIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  iii
Interests of amici curiae  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
ARGUMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
I.  The Right to Decide Whether
and W hen to H ave a Child
and the Right to Effectuate
That Decision is Protected by
 the United States Constitution . . . 5
II.  Respect for The Rule of Law is
 
Critical to Our Nation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
A.  State Legislatures Are Bound by This
 
Court’s Precedent  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
B.  The Right to Access Abortion Care
 
Should Not Depend on One’s Domicile  . . . 11
C.  This Cou r t’s Decision in W hole
Woman’s Health Warrants Reversal
 
of the Fifth Circuit’s Decision  . . . . . . . . . . 13

 ii
Table of Contents
Page
III. Act 620’s Admitting Privileges
R e quirement Provides No
M edical Benefit and W ill
U nduly Burden L ouisiana
 Women . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
IV.  S tates are P assing A
W ave of I ntentionally
U nconstitutional A nti A bortion L aws , F louting
H oldings of this C ourt
and the Principles of the
 Constitution  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
A.  St at es Have Ena ct ed Ta rget ed
Regulation of Abortion Providers or
 
TRAP Laws  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
B.  States Are Implementing Pre-Viability
 
Abortion Bans . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
C.  States’ Anti-Abortion Laws Derive
From the Del iberat e Campa ig n
 
of Anti-Choice Interest Groups  . . . . . . . . . 28
CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
APPENDIX  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1a

 iii
TABLE OF CITED AUTHORITIES
Page
Cases
Arizona State Legislature v.
Arizona Indep. Redistricting Comm’n,
  135 S. Ct. 2652 (2015) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Bryant v. Woodall,
  363 F. Supp. 3d 611 (M.D.N.C. 2019) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
Bush v. Orleans Par. Sch. Bd.,
  190 F. Supp. 861 (E.D. La. 1960), aff ’d,
365 U.S. 569 (1961), and aff ’d sub nom.,
City of New Orleans, Louisiana v. Bush,
  366 U.S. 212 (1961)  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Cohens v. State of Virginia,
  19 U.S. 264 (1821)  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Cooper v. Aaron,
  358 U.S. 1 (1958)  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10, 11, 13
Department of Commerce v. New York,
  139 S. Ct. 2551 (2019)  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Edwards v. Beck,
  786 F.3d 1113 (8th Cir. 2015)  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
Edwards v. Beck,
  8 F. Supp. 3d 1091 (E.D. Ark. 2014), aff’d,
  786 F.3d 1113 (8th Cir. 2015)  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

 iv
Cited Authorities
Page
EMW Women’s Surgical Ctr., P.S.C. v. Beshear,
  No. 3:19-CV-178-DJH, 2019 WL 1233575
  (W.D. Ky. Mar. 15, 2019) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
Gonzalez v. Carhart,
  550 U.S. 124 (2007) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
Isaacson v. Horne,
  716 F.3d 1213 (9th Cir. 2013)  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
Jackson Women’s Health Org. v. Currier,
  349 F. Supp. 3d 536 (S.D. Miss. 2018) . . . . . . . . . 23, 25
Jackson Women’s Health Org. v. Dobbs,
  379 F. Supp. 3d 549 (S.D. Miss. 2019) . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
June Medical Services L.L.C. v. Gee,
  905 F.3d 787 (5th Cir. 2018) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4, 5
June Medical Services LLC v. Kliebert,
  250 F. Supp. 3d 27 (M.D. La. 2017), rev’d,
Jun e Medi ca l Ser v i ces L .L .C. v. Gee,
  905 F.3d 787 (5th Cir. 2018) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . passim
Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee,
  14 U.S. 304 (1816)  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
MKB Mgmt. Corp. v. Stenehjem,
  795 F.3d 768 (8th Cir. 2015) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22, 27

 v
Cited Authorities
Page
Planned Parenthood of the Heartland, Inc. v.
Reynolds,
  No. EQCE83074, 2019 WL 312072
  (Iowa Dist. Jan. 22, 2019) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  22-23
Planned Parenthood Southeast, Inc. v. Strange,
  33 F. Supp. 3d 1330 (M.D. Ala. 2014)  . . . . . . . 14-15, 19
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern
Pennsylvania v. Casey,
  505 U.S. 833 (1992) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . passim
Planned Parenthood of Wis., Inc. v. Van Hollen,
  94 F. Supp. 3d 949 (W.D. Wis. 2015), aff’d sub
nom., Planned Parenthood of Wis., Inc. v.
  Schimel, 806 F.3d 908 (7th Cir. 2015) . . . . . . . . .  14, 19
Preterm-Cleveland v. Yost,
  394 F. Supp. 3d 796 (S.D. Ohio 2019) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
Reprod. Health Servs. of Planned Parenthood of
St. Louis Region, Inc. v. Parson,
  3 8 9 F. Supp. 3d 6 31 ( W.D. Mo. 2 019),
modified sub nom., Reprod. Health Servs.
of Planned Parenthood of the St. Louis
Region, Inc. v. Parson, No. 2:19-CV-4155-HFS,
  2019 WL 4740511 (W.D. Mo. Sept. 27, 2019)  . . . 22, 26
Robinson v. Marshall,
  No. 2:19CV365-MHT, 2019 WL 5556198
  (M.D. Ala. Oct. 29, 2019) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22

 vi
Cited Authorities
Page
Roe v. Wade,
  410 U.S. 113 (1973) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . passim
Sailors v. Bd. of Ed. of Kent Cty.,
  387 U.S. 105 (1967)  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
SisterSong Women of Color Reprod. Justice
Collective v. Kemp,
  No. 1:19-CV-02973-SCJ, 2019 WL 4849448
  (N.D. Ga. Oct. 1, 2019)  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22, 27
Smith v. Robbins,
  528 U.S. 259 (2000) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Smith v. Texas,
  311 U.S. 128 (1940)  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt,
  136 S. Ct. 2292 (2016) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . passim
Whole Woman’s Health v. Lakey,
  46 F. Supp. 3d 673 (W.D. Tex. 2014)  . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Statutes
La. Rev. Stat. A nn. § 40:1061.8 (2015) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
La. Rev. Stat. A nn. § 40:1061.10 (2016) . . . . . . . . . .  15, 17
Mo. A nn. Stat. § 188.056 (West 2019)  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

 vii
Cited Authorities
Page
Tex. Health & Safety Code A nn. § 171.0031
  (West 2013) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Other Authorities
Will Ainsworth (@willainsworthAL), T witter
(M ay 9, 2019) retweet of Lauren Walsh (@
LaurenWalshT V), T w it t er (May 9, 2019
12:01pm), https://twitter.com/LaurenWalshTV/
 status/1126562951836635138 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
Brief of Amici Curiae American College of
Obstetricians and Gynecologists, et al., in
Support of Petitioners on Petition for a Writ of
Certiorari, June Medical Services L.L.C. et al.
  v. Gee (No. 18-1323) (2019) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15, 16
A me r ic a n s Un it e d For L i fe , Defe n din g
Life 2 019, ht t p s: //au l .or g / w p - c ont ent /
 uploads/2019/04/Defending-Life-2019.pdf . . . . . . . . 28
Phi l Br yant (@Phi l Br yant MS), T w i t t er
(March 19, 2018, 2:12pm), https://twitter.com/
 PhilBryantMS/status/975842416287715328  . . . 23, 24
Phil Br yant, Miss. Governor, State of the
State Address (Jan. 22, 2014), http://www.
jacksonfreepress.com /news/2014 /jan /22 /
 gov-bryants-state-state-speech . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .24

 viii
Cited Authorities
Page
Governor Ivey Issues Statement After Signing the
Alabama Human Life Protection Act (May 15,
2019), https://governor.alabama.gov/statements/
governor-ivey-issues-statement-after-signing the-alabama-human-life-protection-act . . . . . . . . . . 25
Governor Phil Bryant Gives His First State
of the State Address (Jan. 25, 2012), https://
w w w. g o ve r n o r b r y a n t . m s . g o v/ P a g e s /_
Gover nor-Phi l-Br yant - Gives-His-Fi rst  State-Of-The-State-Address.aspx  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
Guttmacher Institute, State Bans on
Abortion Throughout Pregnancy (2019),
https://w w w.guttmacher.org/state-policy/
 explore/state-policies-later-abortions . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
Guttmacher Institute, Targeted Regulation
of Abo r ti o n Pr o v i d ers (2 019), https: //
w w w.guttmacher.org/state-policy/explore/
 targeted-regulation-abortion-providers . . . . . . . . . . 21
H.B. 314, Reg. Sess. (Ala. 2019)  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
H.B. 481, 155th Gen. A ssemb., Reg. Sess.
  (Ga. 2019)  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
H.B. 1510, 2018 Leg., 133d Sess. (Miss. 2018) . . . . . . . . 23

 ix
Cited Authorities
Page
Tara C. Jatlaoui et al., Abortion Surveillance
– Uni t e d St a t e s , 2 015, 6 7 M M W R
  Surveillance Summaries 13, Nov. 23, 2018  . . . . . . 18
Kemp for Governor, Kemp: I’ll Sign, Fight for Pro-Life
Legislation, https://www.kempforgovernor.com/
posts/news/kemp-i%E2%80%99ll-sign-fight  pro-life-legislation (last visited Nov. 22, 2019) . . . . .24
M i s s o u r i S e n a t e R e p u b l i c a n s (@
MoSenateGOP), T w i t t er (May 16, 2019
2:01am), https://twitter.com/MoSenateGOP/
 status/1128948606378156035 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
O r der Gr a nt i ng St ipu l at e d P r el i m i n a r y
Injunction as to State Defendants, Planned
Parenthood of Utah v. Miner, (D.C. Utah April
  18, 2019) (No. 19-cv-00238-CW) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
S.B. 2116, 2019 Leg., 134th Sess. (Miss. 2019)  . . . . . . . 23
Su p r e m e C o u r t C h i e f Ju s t i c e R o b e r t s ,
C-SPAN (June 19, 2009), https://w w w.csp a n .or g / v ide o / ? 2 8 6 0 7 8 -1 /supr e me  court-chief-justice-roberts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
U.S. Const. art. III . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
U.S. Const. art. VI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

 1
Interests of amici curiae1
Amici curiae are members of Congress who are bound
to support and defend the Constitution, and who share
a concern for the continued vitality and advancement
of constitutional protections of individual rights.
These constitutional protections include the principles
enunciated by this Court, as firmly encompassed by the
right to privacy, that a woman has the right to decide
to terminate a pre-viability pregnancy without undue
governmental interference. Accordingly, amici defend
the principles recognized by this Court in Roe v. Wade,
410 U.S. 113 (1973), which were reaffirmed as the law
of the land in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern
Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 871 (1992), and
most recently in Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt,
136 S. Ct. 2292 (2016). As a fundamental right guaranteed
by the Constitution, and one that strikes at the heart of
ordered liberty and individual autonomy, a woman’s right
to decide to seek an abortion should be insulated from the
rhetoric and interests of groups whose sole purpose is
to undermine Roe and eliminate the fundamental rights
enunciated in that case.
Amici also have a particularly strong interest in
this case, because this Court’s interpretation of the
Constitution and its guarantees of individual rights
directly affects how legislators draft, consider, and enact
1.  Amici affirm that no counsel for a party authored this
brief in whole or in part, and no counsel or party made a monetary
contribution intended to fund the preparation or submission of
this brief. No person other than amici or their counsel made a
monetary contribution to its preparation or submission. Written
consent by the parties for all amicus curiae briefs is on file with
the Clerk.

 2
laws. This Court’s constitutional review of legislation
is an essential component of our federalist system of
government and the checks and balances that sustain it.
Compliance with this Court’s precedent is incumbent on
all state legislatures, and their failure to adhere to such
precedent endangers the foundations of this very system.
Moreover, as legislators, amici seek to protect the
integrity of the legislative process, which is undermined
when unnecessary, politically targeted, and intentionally
unconstitutional legislation is enacted for pretextual
reasons—like the admitting privileges requirements set
forth in Act 620. Virtually identical Texas legislation has
already been found unconstitutional by this Court for
the same reason that the District Court below found Act
620 unconstitutional: admitting privileges requirements
serve no medical benefit, while imposing undue burdens
on access to abortion through increased costs and reduced
availability of care. These burdens cause unnecessary
delays and impose health risks to women. As legislators,
amici attach considerable significance to legislative intent
in the review and construction of statutory provisions.
The true, and often overt, intent of legislators behind
pretextual laws like Act 620, which have no demonstrable
medical benefit, is to severely restrict, and ultimately
eliminate, access to legal abortion under the guise of
patient welfare. Louisiana’s state legislature exceeded the
constitutional boundaries recognized by this Court. Amici
have a profound interest in ensuring the legislative process
is faithful to our constitutional system of government and
the fundamental protections therein.
As legislators, amici also have an especially strong
interest in this case, as it implicates the doctrine of
stare decisis, which is of vital importance to protecting

 3
constitutional rights. During the confirmation process,
amici members of the Senate query each nominee to this
Court on their commitment to adhere to stare decisis,
demonstrating the significance the Senate places on
upholding this doctrine. Given it was a mere three years
ago that this Court struck down as unconstitutional a
materially identical state law, the principles of stare
decisis and adherence to the rule of law are of particular
import in this matter.
Amici are also mindful of the importance of protecting
against improper interference with a woman’s right to seek
lawful medical care. Amici recognize that Act 620 and
other laws like it often disproportionately disempower the
most vulnerable women. Accordingly, like all legislation
that contravenes bedrock principles of the Constitution,
Act 620 should be invalidated as unconstitutional.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
As this Court’s precedent in Roe v. Wade and Planned
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey
makes clear, the Constitution secures a right to personal
privacy, which encompasses the right to terminate a
pregnancy prior to viability. This Court reaffirmed that
precedent just three years ago in Whole Woman’s Health
v. Hellerstedt, and it remains the law in this country.
The law at issue here, Louisiana’s Act 620, defies
this Court’s precedent, notwithstanding that state
legislatures are bound by the U.S. Constitution. Such
defiance undermines our nation’s confidence in the
legislative process and violates the rule of law. It also
results in inconsistent enforcement of constitutional rights

 4
across the nation, where the ability to obtain a safe and
constitutionally-protected abortion is no longer an equal
right guaranteed to all, but rather is dependent on where
one lives or one’s ability to access it.
This Court should reverse the Fifth Circuit’s decision
in June Medical Services L.L.C. v. Gee, 905 F.3d 787 (5th
Cir. 2018) and declare Act 620 unconstitutional because,
as other courts that have considered admitting privileges
laws have similarly found, Act 620 does not redress
any identified medical concern or offer any medical
benefit—certainly none that outweighs the significant
burdens it creates. While Act 620 purports to improve
women’s health and safety, the law will actually make
it more difficult for women in Louisiana to obtain safe
medical care. As with other statutes targeting abortion
providers and facilities, the actual legislative intent here
is to mandate requirements so difficult to fulfill that the
inevitable outcome is the shuttering of abortion clinics and
elimination of safe and legal abortions. Indeed, if Act 620
goes into effect, Louisiana will have only a single clinic
providing abortion services in the entire state.
This case is significant not just for Louisiana. Act
620 represents but one example of a recent wave of
state legislation designed to impede access to abortion
services and undermine this Court’s holdings in Roe,
Casey, and Whole Woman’s Health. These state laws go
far beyond what is necessary to ensure patient safety. As
with Act 620, these laws reflect those states’ attempts to
revisit settled constitutional law, and many lawmakers,
apparently emboldened by the change in composition of
the Court, have openly admitted as much.

 5
In blatant defiance of the Constitution and this Court’s
prior holdings, states like Louisiana burden women’s
ability to exercise their fundamental rights through
pretextual laws that purport to address problems that
do not exist. The result is a patchwork of access to safe
and legal abortion. This Court’s precedent and the rule
of law should prevail, and the rights established by the
Constitution, as upheld by this Court, must be respected
across the entire nation. We urge this Court to vindicate
these rights by reversing the Fifth Circuit’s decision in
June Medical Services L.L.C. v. Gee and declaring Act
620 unconstitutional.
ARGUMENT
I.  The Right to Decide Whether and
When to Have a Child and the Right to
Effectuate That Decision is Protected
by the United States Constitution.
Forty-six years ago in Roe v. Wade, this Court held
that the right of personal privacy embedded in our
Constitution, which this Court had applied to decisions
relating to “marriage, procreation, contraception, family
relationships, and child rearing and education,” 2 “is broad
enough to encompass a woman’s decision whether or not
to terminate her pregnancy” prior to viability. 3
This Court upheld and reinforced Roe in Planned
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,
where it made clear that “[t]he woman’s right to terminate
2.  Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153-154 (1973) (internal citations
and quotations omitted).
3.  Id. at 153.

 6
her pregnancy before viability is the most central principle
of Roe v. Wade” and “is a rule of law and a component
of liberty we cannot renounce.”4 In Casey, this Court
established the “undue burden” standard, and further
underscored the reliance interest at stake should Roe
be overruled, finding immeasurable “the certain cost
of overruling Roe for people who have ordered their
thinking and living around that case[.]”5 The reliance
interest at stake and the cost of overruling Roe has grown
substantially in the 27 years since Casey was decided.
As recently as three years ago, in Whole Woman’s
Health, this Court reaffirmed a woman’s constitutional
right to seek an abortion and emphasized that the “undue
burden” standard established in Casey “requires that
courts consider the burdens a law imposes on abortion
access together with the benefits those laws confer.”6
In analyzing the constitutionality of Texas’ House Bill 2
(“H.B. 2”)7 using the “undue burden” test, this Court held
that H.B. 2’s admitting privileges requirement failed to
“confer[] medical benefits sufficient to justify the burdens
upon access” that this requirement imposed. 8 The Court
concluded that H.B. 2 placed “a ‘substantial obstacle in
the path of a woman’s choice,’” because it resulted in the
closure of half of the state’s abortion clinics, in violation
4.  Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v.
Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 871 (1992).
5.  Id. at 856.
6.  Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292,
2309 (2016).
7.  Tex. Health & Safety Code A nn. § 171.0031 (West 2013).
8.  Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2300.

 7
of Casey and Roe.9 Thus, just three years ago, this Court
reaffirmed the continued validity of the undue burden
test established in Casey and again upheld a woman’s
fundamental right to choose as a decision that must be
shielded from unjustified state interference.10
Accordingly, the right to decide to terminate a
pregnancy prior to viability is established precedent
and this Court has made clear that it is the law for this
country. State regulations cannot place an “undue burden”
on a woman’s right to seek an abortion before viability;
stated otherwise, state laws that have “the purpose or
effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a
woman seeking an abortion of a nonviable fetus” are
unconstitutional.11
II.  Respect for The Rule of Law is Critical
to Our Nation.
Finding Act 620 unconstitutional is particularly
appropriate considering that the constitutional issues
implicated by its passage were already analyzed at length
by this Court in Whole Woman’s Health. As the Court
recognized in Casey, the issues presented in a case such
as this one are:
[T]he sort of intensely divisive controversy
reflected in  Roe and those rare, comparable
cases, [where this Court’s] decision has a
dimension that the resolution of the normal case
9. 

Id. at 2312 (citing Casey, 505 U.S. at 877), 2316.

10.  Id. at 2300.
11.  Casey, 505 U.S. at 877.

 8
does not carry. . . . But whatever the premises
of opposition may be, only the most convincing
justification under accepted standards of
precedent could suffice to demonstrate that a
later decision overruling the first was anything
but a surrender to political pressure, and an
unjustified repudiation of the principle on
which the Court staked its authority in the
first instance. So to overrule under fire in
the absence of the most compelling reason to
reexamine a watershed decision would subvert
the Court’s legitimacy beyond any serious
question.12
There is no compelling reason here to upend this settled
precedent, and no change of circumstances between Whole
Woman’s Health and this action that justifies a different
outcome. Act 620 implicates the exact same constitutional
issues and threatens the same essential rights.
Laws like Act 620, enacted in defiance of this Court’s
constitutional pronouncements, undermine our nation’s
confidence in the legislative process and the rule of law. As
members of Congress, amici have the strongest interest
in maintaining the integrity of the legislative process
and ensuring that the stated purpose of legislation is, in
fact, the true motivation for its passage and, conversely,
that legislation actually serves its stated purpose. Laws
12.  Id. at 866-867; see also Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S.
Ct. at 2321 (“So long as this Court adheres to Roe v. Wade . . . and
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey . . ., Targeted
Regulation of Abortion Providers laws like H.B. 2 that ‘do little or
nothing for health, but rather strew impediments to abortion[ ]’
. . . cannot survive judicial inspection.”) (Ginsburg, J., concurring)
(citations omitted).

 9
that purport to address a problem that does not exist and
instead seek to controvert the rule of law detract from the
validity of the legislative process. The judiciary plays a
fundamental role in ensuring that the other branches of
government do not exceed constitutional limits, and that
laws based on pretext, or designed to erode established
law, are struck down.13 When legislatures intentionally
enact unconstitutional laws, it is the responsibility of the
courts to protect the sanctity of vital constitutional rights:
“[t]he Court’s power lies . . . in its legitimacy, a product of
substance and perception that shows itself in the people’s
acceptance of the Judiciary as fit to determine what the
Nation’s law means and to declare what it demands.”14
A.  State Legislatures Are Bound by This Court’s
Precedent.
For nearly half a century, as discussed above, this
Court has reaffirmed that the Constitution guarantees
a woman’s right to terminate her pregnancy without
unnecessary government intrusion.15
State legislators, like amici, take an oath to uphold
the Constitution and they are, thus, “under constitutional
13.  Cf. Department of Commerce v. New York, 139 S. Ct.
2551, 2574-2576 (2019).
14.  Casey, 505 U.S. at 865.
15.  See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) (“This right
of privacy . . . founded in the Fourteenth Amendment’s concept
of personal liberty and restrictions upon state action, as we
feel it is . . . is broad enough to encompass a woman’s decision
whether or not to terminate her pregnancy.”); Casey, 505 U.S. at
869 (“We conclude that the basic decision in Roe was based on a
constitutional analysis which we cannot now repudiate.”).

 10
mandate to take affirmative action to accord the benefit
of this right to all those within their jurisdiction.”16 As a
result, as this Court held in Cooper v. Aaron, constitutional
rights “can neither be nullified openly and directly by
state legislators or state executive or judicial officers,
nor nullified indirectly by them through evasive schemes
. . . whether attempted ‘ingeniously or ingenuously.’”17
As Justice Frankfurter recognized in his concurrence in
that case:
[T]he responsibility of those who exercise
power in a democratic government is not to
reflect inflamed public feeling but to help
form its understanding . . . . Compliance with
decisions of this Court, as the constitutional
organ of the supreme Law of the Land, has
often, throughout our history, depended on
active support by state and local authorities.
It presupposes such support. To withhold it,
and indeed to use political power to try to
paralyze the supreme Law, precludes the
maintenance of our federal system as we have
known and cherished it for one hundred and
seventy years.18
L eg i sl at i ve d i sob e d ienc e w it h t h i s Cou r t ’s
constitutional pronouncements necessarily undermines
16.  Bush v. Orleans Par. Sch. Bd., 190 F. Supp. 861, 864 (E.D.
La. 1960), aff’d, 365 U.S. 569 (1961), and aff’d sub nom., City of
New Orleans, Louisiana v. Bush, 366 U.S. 212 (1961).
17.  Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 17 (1958) (citing Smith v.
Texas, 311 U.S. 128, 132 (1940)).
18.  Id. at 26 (emphasis added).

 11
the integrity of, and the public’s confidence in, the
legislature and the legislative process (as well as the
judiciary that fails to correct such legislative overreach).
Moreover, such disobedience threatens the vitality of
constitutional protections afforded to all. Adherence by the
states to constitutional principles is “indispensable for the
protection of the freedoms guaranteed by our fundamental
charter for all of us.”19 Thus, “Chief Justice Marshall spoke
for a unanimous Court in saying that: ‘If the legislatures
of the several states may, at will, annul the judgments of
the courts of the United States, and destroy the rights
acquired under those judgments, the constitution itself
becomes a solemn mockery . . . .’” 20
B.  The Right to Access Abortion Care Should Not
Depend on One’s Domicile.
Constitutional rights must be enforced consistently
across the country. The importance of uniformity in
guaranteeing basic constitutional protections is embodied
in the Constitution itself, through both the Supremacy
Clause and the establishment in Article III, of “one
supreme Court.” 21 This Court long ago recognized:
[T]he importance, and even necessity of
uniformity of decisions throughout the whole
United States, upon all subjects within the
purview of the constitution. Judges of equal
learning and integrity, in different states, might
19.  Id. at 20.
20.  Id. at 18 (quoting United States v. Peters, 5 Cranch 115,
136 (1809)).
21.  U.S. Const. art. VI, art. III § 1.

 12
differently interpret a statute, or a treaty of the
United States, or even the constitution itself:
If there were no revising authority to control
these jarring and discordant judgments, and
harmonize them into uniformity, the laws, the
treaties, and the constitution of the United
States would be different in different states,
and might, perhaps, never have precisely the
same construction, obligation, or efficacy, in
any two states. The public mischiefs that would
attend such a state of things would be truly
deplorable. 22
Non-uniform recognition of federal constitutional rights
creates a patchwork of laws in which one’s constitutional
protections are honored or denied based solely on where
one lives, which threatens the foundations of our federalist
system of government.
This Court’s constitutional pronouncements establish
a minimum level of protection below which state legislation
may not descend. 23 Thus, while states are free to innovate
22.  Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. 304, 347-348 (1816).
See also Cohens v. State of Virginia, 19 U.S. 264, 416 (1821)
(recognizing “the necessity of uniformity”); Supreme Court Chief
Justice Roberts, C-SPAN (June 19, 2009), https://www.c-span.
org/video/?286078-1/supreme-court-chief-justice-roberts, at 18:16
(recognizing importance of uniformity by declaring “our main job
is to try to make sure federal law is uniform across the country”).
23.  See, e.g., Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 273 (2000)
(“allowing the States wide discretion, subject to the minimum
requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment, to experiment with
solutions to difficult problems of policy”) (emphasis added); Sailors
v. Bd. of Ed. of Kent Cty., 387 U.S. 105, 109 (1967) (recognizing

 13
and serve as “laboratories for experimentation” in our
democracy, 24 state powers “must be exercised consistently
with federal constitutional requirements as they apply to
state action.” 25 The vitality of constitutional rights must
withstand the crossing of state lines, and the Constitution
itself cannot be left vulnerable to legislative balkanization,
affording disparate protections for basic rights for
individuals across the nation. Yet, as shown by the varying
state laws enacted in the past two years (see infra Part
IV), this is precisely the result of non-uniform application
of this Court’s precedents. The entire populace is entitled
to the equal implementation of this Court’s constitutional
jurisprudence, not just those who live in states that choose
to respect it.
C.  This Court’s Decision in Whole Woman’s Health
Warrants Reversal of the Fifth Circuit’s
Decision.
Following both Casey and Whole Woman’s Health,
states are constrained from enacting admitting privileges
requirements for abortion providers that do not protect
women’s health or safety, but do restrict access to
abortion. This Court has already declared facially
unconstitutional a statutory provision enacted in Texas
that was materially identical to that at issue here. 26 Yet
states’ legislative discretion unless it “runs afoul of a federally
protected right”).
24.  Arizona State Legislature v. Arizona Indep. Redistricting
Comm’n, 135 S. Ct. 2652, 2673 (2015).
25.  Cooper, 358 U.S. at 19.
26.  See infra at Part III.

 14
the Fifth Circuit’s decision below fails to conform to this
Court’s recent precedent and is constitutionally untenable.
If that decision is allowed to stand, the constitutional
protections recognized in Whole Woman’s Health will
extend no further than the Texas border, effectively
impeding the ability of a woman in Louisiana to exercise
the constitutional right that this Court most recently
defended for her neighbor in Texas. 27
This Court should reverse the decision below and
ensure that a woman does not forfeit the right to effectuate
her decision to seek an abortion simply because of where
she lives.
III. Act 6 2 0 ’ s A dmitting P ri v i l eges
Requirement Provides No Medical
Benefit and Will U ndu ly Burden
Louisiana Women.
Other cour ts that have considered admitting
privileges laws have likewise found that they confer no
medical benefit. 28 “Act 620 was modeled after similar
27.  Louisiana is not the only state that has enacted legislation
that unduly burdens a woman’s access to abortion. See Part IV,
infra.
28.  See Planned Parenthood of Wis., Inc. v. Van Hollen, 94
F. Supp. 3d 949, 953 (W.D. Wis. 2015), aff’d sub nom., Planned
Parenthood of Wis., Inc. v. Schimel, 806 F. 3d 908, 921 (7th Cir.
2015) (“And comparably in our case the requirement of admitting
privileges cannot be taken seriously as a measure to improve
women’s health because the transfer agreements that abortion
clinics make with hospitals, plus the ability to summon an
ambulance by a phone call, assure the access of such women to a
nearby hospital in the event of a medical emergency.”); Planned

 15
laws which have had the result of closing abortion clinics
in other states” 29; indeed, Act 620 is materially identical
to Texas’ H.B. 2 in both its substance and its pretextual
character. Like its Texas counterpart, Louisiana’s Act
620 requires physicians who perform an abortion to
“[h]ave active admitting privileges at a hospital located
not further than thirty miles from the location at which
the abortion is performed or induced and that provides
obstetrical or gynecological health care services.” 30
Admitting privileges requirements generate from the
same wellspring as other abortion restrictions, and are
simply backdoor attempts to eliminate abortion by making
safe, legal abortion effectively unobtainable.
The Louisiana legislature purportedly enacted Act
620 to improve the health and safety of women seeking
an abortion. 31 Yet, “abortion has consistently been one
of the safest medical procedures performed in the
United States,” 32 and the District Court here found as
Parenthood Southeast, Inc. v. Strange, 33 F. Supp. 3d 1330, 1378
(M.D. Ala. 2014) (finding that admitting privileges requirements
do not provide health benefits to women undergoing abortions).
29.  June Medical Services LLC v. Kliebert, 250 F. Supp. 3d
27, 55 (M.D. La. 2017), rev’d, June Medical Services L.L.C. v. Gee,
905 F.3d 787 (5th Cir. 2018).
30.  La . Rev. Stat. A nn. § 40:1061.10(A)(2)(a) (2016).
31.  Kliebert, 250 F. Supp. at 58-59.
32.  Brief of Amici Curiae American College of Obstetricians
and Gynecologists, et al. in Support of Petitioners on Petition
for a Writ of Certiorari, June Medical Services L.L.C. et al. v.
Gee (No. 18-1323) (2019) (“ACOG Brief”), at 8; see also Whole
Woman’s Health v. Lakey, 46 F. Supp. 3d 673, 685 (W.D. Tex. 2014)

 16
much.33 Hospitalization following an abortion is rare, and
“most studies regarding office-based clinics reported a
less than 0.5 percent risk of hospitalization following a
first-trimester aspiration abortion (the most frequent
type of abortion).” 34 In finding Act 620 unconstitutional,
the District Court below similarly found that “[l]egal
abortions in Louisiana are very safe procedures with very
few complications.” 35 Critically, the District Court noted
the lack of evidence demonstrating a medical need for or
benefit from the legislation: “The record does not contain
any evidence that complications from abortion were being
treated improperly, nor any evidence that any negative
outcomes could have been avoided if the abortion provider
had admitting privileges at a local hospital.” 36 Consistent
with this Court’s analysis in Whole Woman’s Health, the
District Court below then assessed the burdens caused
by Act 620, finding that “approximately 70% of the women
in Louisiana seeking an abortion would be unable to get
an abortion in Louisiana,”37 as Act 620 would leave only
one clinic and one provider able to perform abortions
across the state, and thus force patients to travel greater
(“Evidence related to patient abandonment and potential improved
continuity of care in emergency situations is weak in the face of
the opposing evidence that such complications are exceedingly
rare in Texas [and] nationwide.”).
33.  Kliebert, 250 F. Supp. 3d at 64-65 (“Admitting privileges
do little to advance and are not necessary for continuity of care . .
. . Continuity of care can be accomplished by communicating with
the physician to whom the patient’s care is being turned over.”).
34.  ACOG Brief, supra note 32, at 9 (citations omitted).
35.  Kliebert, 250 F. Supp. 3d at 59.
36.  Id. at 86-87.
37.  Id. at 80.

 17
distances, wait longer to be treated, and potentially
resort to unsafe abortion procedures. 38 Here, as in Whole
Woman’s Health, “the record adequately supports the
District Court’s ‘undue burden’ conclusion.” 39
This drastic reduction in services will disproportionately
burden low-income women and women of color. The
District Court found that “[t]he vast majority of women
who undergo abortions in Louisiana are poor” and “[a]s
a result of that poverty, the burden of traveling farther
to obtain an abortion would be significant, fall harder
on these women than those who are not poor and cause
a large number of these women to either not get an
abortion, perform the abortions themselves, or have
someone who is not properly trained and licensed perform
it.”40 Moreover, “[m]any Louisiana women have difficulty
affording or arranging for transportation and childcare on
the days of their clinic visits, in addition to the challenge
of affording the abortion itself. [] Increased travel
distance to clinics exacerbates the difficulty of securing
transportation.”41 The burden is compounded in this case
because of Louisiana’s requirement that women seeking
abortions, including women living more than one hundred
fifty miles from a clinic, undergo an ultrasound at least
24 hours before the procedure.42 As the District Court
found, “[w]omen who must travel increased distances to
38.  Id. at 81-82, 87-88.
39.  Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292,
2313 (2016) (citation omited).
40.  Kliebert, 250 F. Supp. 3d at 59.
41.  Id. at 83 (citations omitted).
42.  La . Rev. Stat. A nn. § 40:1061.10(D)(2) (2016).

 18
access abortion will in many cases have to take at least
two days off from work, which has financial costs if the
time off is unpaid, as is often the case in low-wage jobs.
[] Many women are even at risk of losing their jobs for
taking time off.”43 The District Court further found
that “[i]ntercity travel for low-income women presents
a number of significant hurdles, including the logistics
and cost of transportation, the costs associated with
time off from work, and childcare costs.”44 Given that in
2015, approximately 70% of abortions in Louisiana were
obtained by women of color, it is likely that women of color
will similarly be disproportionately impacted.45
In Whole Woman’s Health, this Court held that
there was “nothing in Texas’ record evidence that shows
that, compared to prior law,” the admitting privileges
requirement “advanced Texas’ legitimate interest in
protecting women’s health,” but that “the record evidence
indicates that the admitting-privileges requirement
places a ‘substantial obstacle in the path of a woman’s
choice.’”46 Similarly, the District Court below found that
Louisiana’s “admitting privileges requirement [] provides
no significant health benefits to women. As in [Whole
Woman’s Health], Defendant has presented no credible
43.  Kliebert, 250 F. Supp. 3d at 83.
44.  Id.
45.  See Tara C. Jatlaoui et al., Abortion Surveillance –
United States, 2015, 67 MMWR Surveillance Summaries 13, Nov.
23, 2018, Table 13 (data showing that 70.4% of reported abortions
in 2015 in Louisiana were obtained by women of color).
46.  Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292,
2311-2312 (2016) (citing Planned Parenthood of Southeastern
Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 877 (1992)).

 19
evidence showing that, compared to prior law, Act 620
advances the state’s interest in protecting women’s health
and safety.”47 As this Court set forth in Whole Woman’s
Health, other courts have similarly found the lack of
medical benefit to women provided by admitting privileges
requirements.48
There is ample reason for this Court to be dubious
of Louisiana’s asserted interest in protecting women’s
health and safety, as demonstrated by the words of the
state’s then-Governor Jindal, who explained at the time
of enactment that Act 620 would “‘build upon the work .
. . done to make Louisiana the most pro-life state in the
nation.’”49 Louisiana’s true motivation behind Act 620, to
eliminate legal abortion, is further underscored by its
legislature’s codification of its opposition to abortion and
passage of a “trigger law” to immediately outlaw abortion
in the event Roe is overturned:
Further, the Legislature finds and declares
that the longstanding policy of this State
is to protect the right to life of the unborn
child from conception by prohibiting abortion
impermissible only because of the decisions of
the United States Supreme Court and that,
47.  Kliebert, 250 F. Supp. 3d at 86 (citation omitted).
48.  Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct at 2312 (citing Planned
Parenthood of Wis., Inc. v. Van Hollen, 94 F. Supp. 3d 949, 953
(W.D. Wis. 2015), aff’d  sub nom.,  Planned Parenthood of Wis.,
Inc. v. Schimel, 806 F. 3d 908 (7th Cir. 2015); Planned Parenthood
Southeast, Inc. v. Strange, 33 F. Supp. 3d 1330, 1378 (M.D. Ala.
2014) (finding that admitting privileges requirements do not
provide health benefits to women undergoing abortions)).
49.  Kliebert, 250 F. Supp. 3d at 56 (internal citations omitted).

 20
therefore, if those decisions of the United States
Supreme Court are ever reversed or modified
or the United States Constitution is amended to
allow protection of the unborn then the former
policy of this State to prohibit abortions shall
be enforced. 50
Act 620, disguised as an effort to promote women’s health,
in reality provides no medical benefit and, instead, imposes
significant obstacles for, and undue burden on, women
seeking abortions.
IV. S tates are passing a wav e of
intentionally unconstitutional antiabortion laws, flouting holdings of
this Court and the principles of the
Constitution.
Lou isia na’s cont i nued defense of a pat ent ly
unconstitutional law is part of a concerted effort on
behalf of states and state legislatures to enact and defend
laws designed solely to impede the ability of women in
their respective states to access abortion services and to
undermine this Court’s holdings in Roe, Casey, and Whole
Woman’s Health.
Amici recognize that states have the power to
regulate on matters of public health and to establish health
care policies within their borders. State legislatures,
however, may not enact laws that contravene the federal
Constitution, nor enact laws that depart from established
Supreme Court precedent regarding access to and the
regulation of abortion.
50.  La . Rev. Stat. A nn. § 40:1061.8 (2015).

 21
Nonetheless, like Louisiana, many states have recently
passed legislation imposing undue burdens upon the right
to a pre-viability abortion in direct contravention of Roe,
Casey, and Whole Woman’s Health. Such legislation takes
the form of strict regulations on abortion clinics that go
far beyond what is necessary to ensure patient safety, or
outright pre-viability abortion bans, including so-called
“fetal heartbeat laws.” Certain states have enacted both
types. In passing these laws, states explicitly admit that
their purpose is to directly flout the rights guaranteed
under the Constitution pursuant to Roe, Casey, and Whole
Woman’s Health. State legislatures appear emboldened
by the change of composition on this Court and may be
acting under the presumption that a differently-composed
Court will abandon established precedent and ignore the
rule of law. Such an affront to the Constitution constitutes
an impermissible use of the states’ police power.
A.  States Have Enacted Targeted Regulation of
Abortion Providers or TRAP Laws.
Under the false pretenses of protecting women’s
health, many states have recently enacted strict
regulations on abortion clinics. These clinical regulations,
known as Targeted Regulation of Abortion Providers or
TRAP laws, are passed with the knowledge and hope that
they will shutter clinics that provide abortion services by
making compliance so onerous and expensive as to make
such services unattainable. 51 One such law is Act 620, at
issue here; another was the materially identical Texas
51.  Guttmacher Institute, Targeted Regulation of Abortion
Providers (2019), https://w w w.guttmacher.org/state-policy/
explore/targeted-regulation-abortion-providers.

 22
law, H.B. 2, held unconstitutional by this Court in Whole
Woman’s Health.
B.  States A re Implementing Pre-Viability
Abortion Bans.
Furthermore, a number of states have recently gone
even further and passed laws that intentionally defy the
viability standard set forth in Roe, Casey, and Whole
Woman’s Health. 52 Thirteen of those state laws have
been enjoined by court order, either preliminarily or
permanently, with many of the presiding District Courts
noting that the laws are designed to attack this Court’s
well-established precedent. 53
52 .  Guttmacher Institute, State Bans on Abor tion
Throughout Pregnancy (2019), https://www.guttmacher.org/
state-policy/explore/state-policies-later-abortions.
53.  See MKB Mgmt. Corp. v. Stenehjem, 795 F.3d 768
(8th Cir. 2015); Edwards v. Beck, 786 F.3d 1113 (8th Cir. 2015);
Isaacson v. Horne, 716 F.3d 1213 (9th Cir. 2013); Robinson v.
Marshall, No. 2:19CV365-MHT, 2019 WL 5556198 (M.D. Ala. Oct.
29, 2019); SisterSong Women of Color Reprod. Justice Collective
v. Kemp, No. 1:19-CV-02973-SCJ, 2019 WL 4849448 (N.D. Ga.
Oct. 1, 2019); Reprod. Health Servs. of Planned Parenthood of
St. Louis Region, Inc. v. Parson, 389 F. Supp. 3d 631 (W.D. Mo.
2019),  modified sub nom.,  Reprod. Health Servs. of Planned
Parenthood of the St. Louis Region, Inc. v. Parson, No. 2:19-CV4155-HFS, 2019 WL 4740511 (W.D. Mo. Sept. 27, 2019); PretermCleveland v. Yost, 394 F. Supp. 3d 796 (S.D. Ohio 2019); Jackson
Women’s Health Org. v. Dobbs, 379 F. Supp. 3d 549 (S.D. Miss.
2019); Order Granting Stipulated Preliminary Injunction as to
State Defendants, Planned Parenthood of Utah v. Miner, (D.C.
Utah April 18, 2019) (No. 19-cv-00238-CW); Bryant v. Woodall,
363 F. Supp. 3d 611 (M.D.N.C. 2019); EMW Women’s Surgical Ctr.,
P.S.C. v. Beshear, No. 3:19-CV-178-DJH, 2019 WL 1233575 (W.D.
Ky. Mar. 15, 2019); Planned Parenthood of the Heartland, Inc. v.

 23
These laws include either pre-viability bans or socalled “fetal heartbeat bans” that are effectively previability bans. For example, in 2019 alone, Missouri
enacted a ban on abortion after eight weeks;54 Georgia
passed a ban after the detection of fetal cardiac activity,
which is effectively after six weeks; 55 and Alabama
has a near outright ban, imposing criminal liability on
abortion providers for performing abortions in most
cases. 56 Mississippi legislators enacted a law banning
abortion after fifteen weeks, 57 and when that law was
enjoined, Mississippi legislators doubled down, enacting
a more draconian law that effectively bans abortion after
six weeks by prohibiting a person from performing an
abortion once fetal cardiac activity has been detected. 58
The passage of these pre-viability bans perpetuates
the campaign by these states to have this Court revisit
settled law. Many state lawmakers and governors have
openly admitted their goal of eliminating legal abortion
in their respective states. For example, after signing
the fifteen-week ban into law in Mississippi, Governor
Bryant tweeted about how “proud” 59 he was to sign a bill
Reynolds, No. EQCE83074, 2019 WL 312072 (Iowa Dist. Jan. 22,
2019); Jackson Women’s Health Org. v. Currier, 349 F. Supp. 3d
536 (S.D. Miss. 2018).
54.  Mo. A nn. Stat. § 188.056 (West 2019).
55.  H.B. 481 § 4, 155th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2019).
56.  H.B. 314, Reg. Sess. (Ala. 2019).
57.  H.B. 1510, 2018 Leg., 133d Sess. (Miss. 2018).
58.  S.B. 2116, 2019 Leg., 134th Sess. (Miss. 2019).
59.  Phil Bryant (@PhilBryant MS), T w it ter (March
19, 2 018 , 2 :1 2 pm), ht t p s: // t w it t e r.com / Ph i l Br y a nt M S /

 24
that will help further his long-time goal to “end abortion”
in Mississippi.60 In Georgia, Governor Kemp made the
following campaign promise:
[A]s we advance pro-life legislation, battle in
the courtroom, and wait on the Supreme Court
to overturn Roe v. Wade, our state must double
down on the application of pro-life laws that
currently exist. Through the Department of
Community Health, we can ensure that the
letter – and spirit – of the law is being enforced
at clinics across the state. As governor, I will
make enforcement a priority.61
After the eight-week ban passed the Missouri Senate,
legislators issued a statement that was tweeted by
the Missouri Senate Republicans celebrating “one of
status/975842416287715328 (“I was proud to sign House Bill
1510 this afternoon. I am committed to making Mississippi the
safest place in America for an unborn child, and this bill will help
us achieve that goal.”).
60.  Phil Bryant, Miss. Governor, State of the State Address
(Jan. 22, 2014), http://www.jacksonfreepress.com/news/2014/
jan/22/gov-bryants-state-state-speech (“[O]n this unfortunate
anniversary of Roe versus Wade, my goal is to end abortion in
Mississippi.”); see also Governor Phil Bryant Gives His First State
of the State Address (Jan. 25, 2012), https://www.governorbryant.
ms.gov/Pages/_Governor-Phil-Bryant-Gives-His-First-State-OfThe-State-Address.aspx (“Please rest assured that I also have
not abandoned my hope of making Mississippi abortion free.”).
61.  Kemp for Governor, Kemp: I’ll Sign, Fight for Pro-Life
Legislation, https://www.kempforgovernor.com/posts/news/
kemp-i%E2%80%99ll-sign-fight-pro-life-legislation (last visited
Nov. 22, 2019).

 25
the most pro-life bills in the United States,” which
“would outlaw abortion in Missouri upon the reversal
of Roe v. Wade.”62 Similarly, in a statement in support
of Alabama’s near outright abortion ban, Lieutenant
Governor Ainsworth emphasized that “[i]t is important
that we pass this statewide abortion ban legislation and
begin a long overdue effort to directly challenge Roe v.
Wade.”63 Once the Alabama ban passed, in her signing
statement, Governor Ivey stated openly that legislators
were specifically defying the Constitution in order “for the
U.S. Supreme Court to revisit this important matter.”64
United States District Courts reviewing these bans,
however, have overwhelmingly held them to be blatantly
unconstitutional. For instance, calling it “one of the
most restrictive abortion laws in the country,” 65 the
District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi
permanently enjoined Mississippi’s fifteen-week ban,
concluding that: “The State chose to pass a law it knew
was unconstitutional to endorse a decades-long campaign,
62.  Missouri Senate Republicans (@MoSenateGOP),
T witter (May 16, 2019 2:01am), https://twitter.com/MoSenateGOP/
status/1128948606378156035.
63.  Will Ainsworth (@willainsworthAL), T witter (M ay
9, 2019) retweet of Lauren Walsh (@LaurenWalshTV), T witter
(May 9, 2019 12:01pm), https://twitter.com/LaurenWalshTV/
status/1126562951836635138.
6 4.  Gover nor Ivey Issues Statement Af ter Signing
the Alabama Human Life Protection Act (May 15, 2019),
https://governor.alabama.gov/statements/governor-ivey-issuesstatement-after-signing-the-alabama-human-life-protection-act.
65.  Jackson Women’s Health Org. v. Currier, 349 F. Supp.
3d 536, 537 (S.D. Miss. 2018).

 26
fueled by national interest groups, to ask the Supreme
Court to overturn Roe v. Wade.”66 In Missouri, the District
Court for the Western District of Missouri enjoined that
state’s eight-week ban prior to its taking effect, reasoning
that:
While federal courts should generally be very
cautious before delaying the effect of State laws,
the sense of caution may be mitigated when the
legislation seems designed, as here, as a protest
against Supreme Court decisions. . . . The
hostility to, and refusal to comply with, the
Supreme Court’s abortion jurisprudence is
most obviously demonstrated in the attempt
to push “viability” protection downward
in various weekly stages to 8 weeks [from
the patient’s last menstrual period]. This is
contrary to repeated, clear language of the
Court.67
The District Court for the Northern District of Georgia
preliminarily enjoined the state’s six-week ban, rejecting
Georgia’s argument that the law in this area is “unsettled,”
particularly “[i]n the face of this clear Supreme Court
precedent, established nearly a half-century ago in Roe
and reaffirmed decades later in Casey and subsequent
66.  Id. at 542. The District Court saw through Mississippi’s
disingenuous professed interest in women’s health, calling it “pure
gaslighting . . . legislation like [the fifteen-week ban] is closer to
the old Mississippi—the Mississippi bent on controlling women
and minorities.” Id. at 540 n22.
67.  Reprod. Health Servs. of Planned Parenthood of St.
Louis Region, Inc. v. Parson, 389 F. Supp. 3d 631, 637 (W.D. Mo.
2019).

 27
cases.” 68 The District Court was unequivocal: “What
is clearly defined . . . is that under no circumstances
whatsoever may a State prohibit or ban abortions at any
point prior to viability, no matter what interests the State
asserts to support it.”69
Prior to this recent flurry of pre-viability bans, the
Eighth Circuit had already held similar bans in Arkansas70
and North Dakota to be unconstitutional.71 This Court
denied certiorari in both those cases, rendering the Eighth
Circuit’s decisions the final word on the constitutionality of
the states’ respective fetal cardiac activity bans. Despite
the rulings by the Eighth Circuit and the series of District
Court decisions finding such pre-viability bans to be
unconstitutional, state legislatures continue to introduce
such laws at an alarming pace. Indeed, legislatures in
Florida, Maryland, Minnesota, Texas, and West Virginia
have all introduced patently unconstitutional laws
premised on prohibiting abortions after the detection of
fetal cardiac activity, all in contravention of the principles
this Court set forth in Roe, Casey, and Whole Woman’s
Health.

68.  SisterSong Women of Color Reprod. Justice Collective
v. Kemp, No. 1:19-CV-02973-SCJ, 2019 WL 4849448, at *12 (N.D.
Ga. Oct. 1, 2019).
69.  Id. (citing Planned Parenthood of Southeastern
Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846, 879 (1992)).
70.  Edwards v. Beck, 8 F. Supp. 3d 1091, 1097 (E.D. Ark.
2014), aff’d, 786 F.3d 1113 (8th Cir. 2015).
71.  MKB Management Corp. v. Stenehjem, 795 F.3d 768,
772 (2015).

 28
C.  States’ Anti-Abortion Laws Derive From the
Deliberate Campaign of Anti-Choice Interest
Groups.
The state laws described above, like Act 620 in
Louisiana and H.B. 2, invalidated in Whole Woman’s
Health, perpetuate the brazen campaign pushed by
anti-choice interest groups to use state police power
to undermine access to safe and legal abortions and,
ultimately, to overturn Roe. Despite this Court’s
pronouncements in Casey that a “woman’s right to
terminate her pregnancy before viability is the most
central principle of Roe” and it is a “rule of law and a
component of liberty that we cannot renounce,” 72 these
organizations seek to “keep[] Roe unsettled, unworkable,
& obsolete.” 73
Though they are not health care organizations, these
anti-choice organizations distribute to both state and
federal legislators model legislation designed to appear to
protect women’s health. In reality, this model legislation
serves to restrict women’s access to abortion and other
reproductive health care services. The systematic, stateby-state adoption of these unconstitutional laws, like
Louisiana’s Act 620, is part and parcel of the strategy to
erode the protections set forth in Roe, Casey, and Whole
Woman’s Health until they are no longer meaningful.
These anti-choice interest groups are unabashed
regarding their goal to take advantage of changes in
72.  Casey, 505 U.S. at 871 (1992).
73.  Americans United For Life, Defending Life 2019, at 12,
https://aul.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/Defending-Life-2019.
pdf.

 29
the composition of this Court as part of their strategy to
undermine the foundations of Roe. Settled constitutional
principles, however, cannot be subject to shifting political
winds, much less the influence of groups that seek to put
their own political agenda above the holdings of this Court.
Nor should settled constitutional principles be vulnerable
to changes in the composition of the Supreme Court. As
Justice Ginsburg emphasized at the end of her dissent in
Gonzalez v. Carhart:
[T]he Court, differently composed than it
was when we last considered a restrictive
abortion regulation, is hardly faithful to our
earlier invocations of “the rule of law” and the
“principles of stare decisis.” Congress imposed
a ban despite our clear prior holdings that the
State cannot proscribe an abortion procedure
when its use is necessary to protect a woman’s
health . . . . Although Congress’ findings could not
withstand the crucible of trial, the Court defers
to the legislative override of our Constitutionbased rulings . . . . A decision so at odds with our
jurisprudence should not have staying power.74
This Court should decline to reexamine its precedents
in this area. If stare decisis is to mean anything, it must be
that this Court’s prior decisions are entitled to a measure
of deference such that they are not freely jettisoned simply
because current members of the Court would have decided
them differently.75
74.  Gonzalez v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 191 (2007) (citation
omitted).
75.  Id. at 190-91 (“[T]he very concept of the rule of law
underlying our own Constitution requires such continuity over

 30
Indeed, contrary to the pronouncements of these antichoice interest groups, the principles of Roe and Casey
are not “unsettled.” This Court has held consistently held
that Roe and Casey’s principles remain firmly in place.
Nevertheless, those principles remain under direct attack
by state legislatures that enact flatly unconstitutional
laws, like Act 620, and the other state laws described
above. Act 620 is an impermissible and unconstitutional
challenge to this Court’s precedents and it should be
soundly struck down by the Court.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reason, amici urge this Court to
reverse the Fifth Circuit’s decision below and declare Act
620 unconstitutional.
Respectfully submitted,
Claude G. Szyfer
Counsel of Record
Michele L. Pahmer
Julie G. Matos
Pamela S. Takefman
Stroock & Stroock & Lavan LLP
180 Maiden Lane
New York, NY 10038
(212) 806-5400
cszyfer@stroock.com
Counsel for Amici Curiae

time that a respect for precedent is, by definition, indispensable.”
(citing Casey, 505 U.S. at 854)).

 APPENDIX

1a
AppendixAppendix
— Amici Curiae
Members of Congress
36 United States Senators
Minority Leader Charles E. Schumer
Sen. Dianne Feinstein
Sen. Patty Murray
Sen. Richard Blumenthal
Sen. Tammy Baldwin
Sen. Michael F. Bennet
Sen. Cory A. Booker
Sen. Sherrod Brown
Sen. Maria Cantwell
Sen. Benjamin L. Cardin
Sen. Tom Carper
Sen. Christopher A. Coons
Sen. Catherine Cortez Masto
Sen. Tammy Duckworth
Sen. Richard J. Durbin
Sen. Kirsten Gillibrand

 2a
Appendix
Sen. Kamala D. Harris
Sen. Margaret Wood Hassan
Sen. Mazie K. Hirono
Sen. Tim Kaine
Sen. Angus King
Sen. Amy Klobuchar
Sen. Patrick Leahy
Sen. Edward J. Markey
Sen. Robert Menendez
Sen. Jeffrey A. Merkley
Sen. Jacky Rosen
Sen. Bernard Sanders
Sen. Brian Schatz
Sen. Jeanne Shaheen
Sen. Tina Smith
Sen. Chris Van Hollen
Sen. Mark Warner
Sen. Elizabeth Warren

 3a
Appendix
Sen. Sheldon Whitehouse
Sen. Ron Wyden
161 Members of the United States
House of Representatives
Speaker Nancy Pelosi
Rep. Frank Pallone, Jr.
Rep. Jerrold Nadler
Rep. Diana DeGette
Rep. Barbara Lee
Rep. Judy Chu
Rep. Alma S. Adams
Rep. Cindy Axne
Rep. Nanette Diaz Barragán
Rep. Karen Bass
Rep. Ami Bera
Rep. Earl Blumenauer
Rep. Lisa Blunt Rochester
Rep. Suzanne Bonamici

 4a
Appendix
Rep. Brendan F. Boyle
Rep. Anthony Brown
Rep. Julia Brownley
Rep. Salud Carbajal
Rep. Tony Cárdenas
Rep. André Carson
Rep. Matthew Cartwright
Rep. Ed Case
Rep. Sean Casten
Rep. Kathy Castor
Rep. David N. Cicilline
Rep. Gilbert R. Cisneros, Jr.
Rep. Katherine Clark
Rep. Wm. Lacy Clay
Rep. Emanuel Cleaver
Rep. Steve Cohen
Rep. Jim Cooper
Rep. Sharice Davids

 5a
Appendix
Rep. Danny K. Davis
Rep. Susan A. Davis
Rep. Madeleine Dean
Rep. Peter DeFazio
Rep. Rosa L. DeLauro
Rep. Suzan DelBene
Rep. Val B. Demings
Rep. Mark DeSaulnier
Rep. Theodore E. Deutch
Rep. Debbie Dingell
Rep. Lloyd Doggett
Rep. Eliot L. Engel
Rep. Veronica Escobar
Rep. Anna G. Eshoo
Rep. Adriano Espaillat
Rep. Lizzie Fletcher
Rep. Bill Foster
Rep. Lois Frankel

 6a
Appendix
Rep. Marcia L. Fudge
Rep. Ruben Gallego
Rep. Sylvia R. Garcia
Rep. John R. Garamendi
Rep. Jesús G. “Chuy” García
Rep. Jimmy Gomez
Rep. Josh Gottheimer
Rep. Al Green
Rep. Raul M. Grijalva
Rep. Deb Haaland
Rep. Alcee L. Hastings
Rep. Jahana Hayes
Rep. Denny Heck
Rep. Brian Higgins
Rep. Jim Himes
Rep. Steven Horsford
Majority Leader Steny H. Hoyer
Rep. Jared Huffman

 7a
Appendix
Rep. Sheila Jackson Lee
Rep. Pramila Jayapal
Rep. Hank Johnson
Rep. William R. Keating
Rep. Robin L. Kelly
Rep. Joseph P. Kennedy, III
Rep. Ro Khanna
Rep. Daniel Kildee
Rep. Derek Kilmer
Rep. Ron Kind
Rep. Raja Krishnamoorthi
Rep. Ann McLane Kuster
Rep. Brenda L. Lawrence
Rep. Al Lawson
Rep. Susie Lee
Rep. Andy Levin
Rep. Mike Levin
Rep. Ted Lieu

 8a
Appendix
Rep. Dave Loebsack
Rep. Zoe Lofgren
Rep. Alan Lowenthal
Rep. Nita M. Lowey
Rep. Ben Ray Luján
Rep. Stephen F. Lynch
Rep. Carolyn Maloney
Rep. Sean Patrick Maloney
Rep. Doris Matsui
Rep. Betty McCollum
Rep. A. Donald McEachin
Rep. James P. McGovern
Rep. Jerry McNerney
Rep. Gregory W. Meeks
Rep. Grace Meng
Rep. Gwen Moore
Rep. Joseph Morelle
Rep. Grace F. Napolitano
Rep. Joe Neguse

 9a
Appendix
Rep. Donald Norcross
Rep. Eleanor Holmes Norton
Rep. Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez
Rep. Ilhan Omar
Rep. Jimmy Panetta
Rep. Chris Pappas
Rep. Bill Pascrell, Jr.
Rep. Ed Perlmutter
Rep. Chellie Pingree
Rep. Mark Pocan
Rep. Katie Porter
Rep. Ayanna Pressley
Rep. David Price
Rep. Mike Quigley
Rep. Jamie Raskin
Rep. Kathleen Rice
Rep. Cedric Richmond
Rep. Max Rose
Rep. Harley Rouda

 10a
Appendix
Rep. Lucille Roybal-Allard
Rep. Tim Ryan
Rep. Linda T. Sánchez
Rep. John Sarbanes
Rep. Mary Gay Scanlon
Rep. Jan Schakowsky
Rep. Adam Schiff
Rep. Bradley S. Schneider
Rep. Kim Schrier, M.D.
Rep. David Scott
Rep. Robert C. “Bobby” Scott
Rep. José E. Serrano
Rep. Donna Shalala
Rep. Brad Sherman
Rep. Albio Sires
Rep. Adam Smith
Rep. Darren Soto
Rep. Jackie Speier
Rep. Eric Swalwell

 11a
Appendix
Rep. Mark Takano
Rep. Mike Thompson
Rep. Dina Titus
Rep. Rashida Tlaib
Rep. Norma Torres
Rep. David Trone
Rep. Lauren Underwood
Rep. Jeff Van Drew
Rep. Juan Vargas
Rep. Nydia Velázquez
Rep. Debbie Wasserman Schultz
Rep. Maxine Waters
Rep. Bonnie Watson Coleman
Rep. Peter Welch
Rep. Jennifer Wexton
Rep. Susan Wild
Rep. Frederica Wilson
Rep. John Yarmuth