Electronically FILED by Superior Court of California, County of Los Angeles on 01/06/2020 04:40 PM Sherri R. Carter, Executive Officer/Clerk of Court, by K. Hung,Deputy Clerk

1 JEFFER MANGELS BUTLER & MITCHELL LLP
ROBERT E. MANGELS (Bar No. 48291)
2 rmangels@jmbm.com
MATTHEW D. HINKS (Bar No. 200750)
3 mhinks@jmbm.com
1900 Avenue of the Stars, 7th Floor
4 Los Angeles, California 90067-4308
Telephone:
(310) 203-8080
5 Facsimile:
(310) 203-0567
6 Attorneys for Defendant RELIGIOUS
TECHNOLOGY CENTER
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8

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

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COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, CENTRAL DISTRICT

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11 CHRISSIE CARNELL BIXLER; CEDRIC
BIXLER-ZAVALA; JANE DOE #1; MARIE
12 BOBETTE RIALES; and JANE DOE #2,
13

ALP

Jeffer MangeIs
Butler & Mitchell

[Assigned to Hon. Steven J. Kleifield,
Dept. 57]

Plaintiffs,

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CASE NO. 19STCV29458

v.

15 CHURCH OF SCIENTOLOGY
INTERNATIONAL; RELIGIOUS
16 TECHNOLOGY CENTER; CHURCH OF
SCIENTOLOGY CELEBRITY CENTRE
17 INTERNATIONAL; DAVID MISCAVIGE;
DANIEL MASTERSON; and DOES 1-25,
18
Defendants.
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NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION TO
COMPEL RELIGIOUS ARBITRATION
AND FOR STAY OF LITIGATION AS TO
PLAINTIFFS CARNELL BIXLER,
BIXLER-ZAVALA AND JANE DOE #1;
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND
AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT THEREOF
[Concurrently filed with Declaration of
Warren McShane]
Dept.:
Date:
Time:

57
March 26, 2020
8:30 a.m.

Action filed:
Trial date:

August 22, 2019
Not yet set

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RESERVATION ID: 294807232078

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Motion to Compel Arbitration

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TO ALL PARTIES HEREIN AND THEIR ATTORNEYS OF RECORD:

2

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE THAT on March 26, 2020, at 8:30 a.m., or as soon thereafter as

3 the matter may be heard in Department 57 of the above-entitled Court, located at 111 N. Hill Street,
4 Los Angeles, California 90012, Defendant Religious Technology Center (“RTC”) will and hereby
5 does move the Court for an order compelling Plaintiffs Chrissie Carnell Bixler, Cedric Bixler-Zavala
6 and Jane Doe #1 to comply with their written agreements with the Church of Scientology, which
7 requires them to resolve “any dispute, claim or controversy” that may arise between each of them and
8 Church of Scientology Celebrity Centre International (“CC”) or “any other Scientology church, any
9 other organization which espouses, presents, propagates or practices the Scientology religion, or any
10 person employed by any such entity,” through internal Ethics, Justice, and binding religious arbitration
11 procedures. RTC also seeks an order staying this matter pending final conclusion of those
12 proceedings. This motion is made pursuant to the Federal Arbitration Act and California Code of
13 Civil Procedure Section 1281.2, et seq., on the grounds that written agreements to arbitrate the entire
14 controversy exist and that Plaintiffs Chrissie Carnell Bixler, Cedric Bixler-Zavala and Jane Doe #1

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Butler & Mitchell LLP

15 have refused to arbitrate the controversy.
16

By this Notice and Motion, RTC also joins in the Motion to Compel Religious Arbitration

17 filed this date by Church of Scientology International (“CSI”), and specifically joins in all arguments
18 and evidence presented by CSI in its Memorandum of Points and Authorities in support of its Motion
19 to Compel Religious Arbitration.
20

This Motion and Joinder will be and hereby is made on the grounds stated in the

21 Memorandum of Points and Authorities in support of this Motion and Joinder, as well as the
22 Memorandum of Points and Authorities filed by CSI, the Declaration of Warren McShane, the
23 Declarations of Lynn R. Farny, Sarah Heller and Margaret Marmolejo (which were filed by CSI),
24 and exhibits thereto, the pleadings and other papers filed in this action, and on such other oral and
25 documentary evidence as may be presented at the hearing on this matter.
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67548720v3

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Motion to Compel Arbitration

 1 DATED: January 6, 2020
2

JEFFER MANGELS BUTLER & MITCHELL LLP
ROBERT E. MANGELS
MATTHEW D. HINKS

3
4

By:

5

MATTHEW D. HINKS
Attorneys for Defendant RELIGIOUS
TECHNOLOGY CENTER

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Jeffer Mangels
Butler & Mitchell LLP

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

2

Page

3 I.

INTRODUCTION ..................................................................................................................8

4 II.

STATEMENT OF FACTS.....................................................................................................9

5

A.

Defendants CSI, RTC and CC....................................................................................9

6

B.

Relevant Scientology Beliefs and Practices ...............................................................9

7

C.

Plaintiffs Chrissie Carnell Bixler, Cedric Bixler-Zavala, and Jane Doe #1. ............10

8

D.

Allegations of Plaintiffs’ Complaint ........................................................................11

9 III.

THIS LAWSUIT MUST BE ORDERED TO ARBITRATION .........................................12

10

A.

The Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) Controls .......................................................12

11

B.

The Arbitration Agreements Are Valid and Enforceable .........................................13

12

C.

The Dispute Falls Within Plaintiffs’ Agreements to Arbitrate ................................14

13

D.

The Court Must Order Arbitration ...........................................................................15

14

1.

Any Question Regarding the Scope of the Agreements to Arbitrate or
Their Validity Must Be Determined by the Eventual Arbitrators.................15

2.

The First Amendment Protects the Scientology Ecclesiastical
Dispute Resolution Procedures and This Court May Not Impede
Them .............................................................................................................17

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Butler & Mitchell LLP

15
16
17
a.

The First Amendment Bars Any Unconscionability
Challenge. .........................................................................................17

b.

In Any Event, the Arbitration Provisions Are Not
Unconscionable ................................................................................18

18
19
20
IV.

CONCLUSION ....................................................................................................................22

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67548720v3

Motion to Compel Arbitration

 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

1
2

Page(s)

3 Cases
4 Alla v. Moursi,
680 N.W. 569 (Minn. Ct. App., 2004) .......................................................................................18
5
6 Am. Software, Inc. v. Ali,
46 Cal. App. 4th 1386 (1996) .....................................................................................................20
7
Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Servs., Inc.,
8
24 Cal. 4th 83 113 (2000)...............................................................................................17, 19, 21
9 AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion,
563 U.S. 333 (2011) .............................................................................................................13, 19
10
11 Avery v. Integrated Healthcare Holdings, Inc.,
218 Cal. App. 4th 50 (2013) .................................................................................................14, 16
12
Baltazar v. Forever 21, Inc.,
13
62 Cal. 4th 1237 (2016)..............................................................................................................19

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Butler & Mitchell LLP

14 BDO Seidman, LLP v. Bee,
970 So. 2d 869 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007) .........................................................................................22
15
16 Buckhorn v. St. Jude Heritage Medical Group,
121 Cal. App. 4th 1401 (2004) ...................................................................................................15
17
California Grocers Assn. v. Bank of America,
22 Cal. App. 4th 205 (1994) .......................................................................................................21
18
19 Camps Newfound/Owatonna v. Town of Harrison,
520 U.S. 564 (1997) ...................................................................................................................13
20
Church of Scientology v. City of Clearwater,
21
2 F.3d 1514 (11th Cir. 1993) ......................................................................................................20
22
Dial 800 v. Fesbinder,
118 Cal. App. 4th 32 (2004) .......................................................................................................18
23
24 Easterly v. Heritage Christian Sch.,
2001 WL 2750099 (S.D. Ind. 2009)...........................................................................................21
25
Easterly v. Heritage Christian School, Inc.,
26
2009 WL 2750099 (S.D. Ind. 2009)...........................................................................................18
27

Engalla v. Permanente Med. Grp., Inc.,
15 Cal. 4th 951 (1997)................................................................................................................14
28
67548720v3

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Motion to Compel Arbitration

 1 Erickson v. Aetna Health Plans of Calif.,
71 Cal. App. 4th 649 (1999) .......................................................................................................14
2
Erickson, et al., v. 100 Oak Street et al.,
3
35 Cal. 3d 312 (1983) .................................................................................................................14
4

Felner v. Meritplan Ins. Co.,
6 Cal. App. 3d 540 (1970) ..........................................................................................................16
5
6 Flores v. Transamerica HomeFirst, Inc.
93 Cal. App. 4th 846 (2001) .......................................................................................................19
7
Garcia v. Church of Scientology Flag Service Org., Inc., No. 8:13-cv-220-T8
27TBM, at 3-4, 16, and 20 (M.D. Fla., March 13, 2015) ....................................................19, 22
9 Garcia v. Church of Scientology Flag Service Org., Inc.,
No. 8:13-cv-220-T-27TBM (M.D. Fla., July 17, 2018) .......................................................18, 21
10
11 General Conference of Evangelical Methodist Church v. Evangelical Methodist
Church of Dalton, Georgia, Inc.,
12
807 F. Supp. 2d 1291 (N.D. Ga. 2011) ................................................................................18, 21

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13 Graves v. George Fox University,
No. CV-06-395-S-EJL, 2007 WL 2363372 (D. Idaho, Aug. 16, 2007) .....................................12
14
15 Gutierrez v. Autowest, Inc.,
114 Cal. App. 4th 77 (2003) .......................................................................................................21
16
Henry Schein, Inc., v. Archer & White Sales, Inc.,
586 U.S. __, 139 S. Ct. 524 (January 8, 2019) ...........................................................................16
17
18 Homestake Lead Co. of Mo. v. Doe Run Resources Corp.,
282 F. Supp. 2d 1131 (N.D. Cal. 2003) .....................................................................................15
19
Jenkins v. Trinity Evangelical Lutheran Church,
20
356 Ill. App. 3d 504, 825 N.E. 2d 1206 (2005) ...................................................................18, 21
21
Khalatian v. Prime Time Shuttle, Inc.,
237 Cal. App. 4th 651 (2015) ...............................................................................................12, 14
22
23 Meyer v. T-Mobile USA Inc.,
836 F. Supp. 2d 994 (N.D. Cal. 2011) .......................................................................................15
24
Nat’l Football League Mgmt. Council v. Nat’l Football League Players Ass’n,
25
820 F.3d 527 (2d Cir. 2016) .......................................................................................................22
26

Nguyen v. Applied Medical Resources Corp.,
4 Cal. App. 5th 232 (2016) .........................................................................................................12
27
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Motion to Compel Arbitration

 1 Ortiz v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.,
52 F. Supp. 3d 1070 (E.D. Cal. 2014) ........................................................................................18
2
Rent-a-Center, W., Inc., v. Jackson,
3
561 U.S. 63 (2010) .....................................................................................................................16
4

Sanchez v. Valencia Holding Co., LLC,
61 Cal. 4th 899 (2015)................................................................................................................21
5
6 Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich,
426 U.S. 696 (1976) .............................................................................................................17, 21
7
Shepard v. Edward Mackay Enterprises, Inc.,
8
148 Cal. App. 4th 1092 (2007) ...................................................................................................12
9 Sonic–Calabasas A, Inc. v. Moreno,
57 Cal. 4th 1109 (2013)..............................................................................................................19
10
11 Tomic v. Catholic Diocese of Peoria,
442 F.3d 1036 (2006) .................................................................................................................18
12
U.S. v. Rayborn,
13
312 F.3d 229 (6th Cir. 2002) ......................................................................................................13

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Butler & Mitchell LLP

14 Watson v. Jones,
80 U.S. 679 (1871) ...............................................................................................................17, 20
15
16 Statutes
17 9 U.S.C. § 2 ..........................................................................................................................12, 13, 19
18 Califoria Code of Civil Procedure
§ 367 .........................................................................................................................................8, 9
19
§ 1281.2 ........................................................................................................................................2
§ 1281.2 (b) ................................................................................................................................14
20
21 California Arbitration Act ......................................................................................................8, 14, 16
22 Federal Arbitration Act ............................................................................................................ passim
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67548720v3

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Motion to Compel Arbitration

 1 I.

INTRODUCTION

2

Plaintiffs Chrissie Carnell Bixler, Cedric Bixler-Zavala, and Jane Doe #11 are former

3 parishioners of the Scientology religion. As a condition of participating in Scientology religious
4 services, all three agreed in written agreements to resolve through ecclesiastical justice procedures
5 “any dispute, claim or controversy” that might arise in the future between them and any Scientology
6 entity, including Defendants Religious Technology Center (“RTC”), Church of Scientology
7 International (“CSI”) and/or Church of Scientology Celebrity Centre International (“CC,” and
8 collectively referred to herein with RTC and CSI, as the “Church of Scientology” or the “Church”),
9 or any Scientology official.2 Plaintiffs remained committed practicing Scientologists for many years.
10

In 2016, Plaintiff Carnell Bixler filed a police report claiming that she had been sexually

11 abused years earlier by her then boyfriend, Danny Masterson, who is also a Scientologist. Jane Doe
12 #1 made a similar report. Plaintiffs allege that, following the reports, unidentified agents of the
13 Church then harassed and surveilled them. These malicious allegations are false, and were
14 engineered by (and televised on) a now-cancelled anti-Scientology cable show, as part of a

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Butler & Mitchell LLP

15 coordinated campaign against the Church. But false allegations aside, Plaintiffs’ agreements
16 prohibit them from proceeding with this lawsuit. They chose, as a condition of participation in
17 Church services, to be bound by Church law applied through the Church’s ecclesiastical dispute
18 resolution provisions, including, potentially, a religious arbitration.
19

Under the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) or the California Arbitration Act (“CAA”), the

20 existence of agreements to arbitrate makes arbitration compulsory. Even more importantly, under
21 the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses of the United States and California Constitutions the
22 Church may establish its own rules governing its relationship with its members exempt from civil
23 law. The Church’s ecclesiastical arbitration is a condition of participating in Scientology services.
24
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1
The use of the pseudonym, “Jane Doe,” by two of the Plaintiffs is improper. See Code of Civ.
26 Procedure § 367 (“Every action must be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest, except
as otherwise provided by statute.”). There is no applicable statute here.
27
2
Carnell executed several such agreements over many years. When she married Bixler, he adopted
28 the religion of his wife. Bixler would later execute a written arbitration agreement when he sought
to participate in Scientology services.
67548720v3

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Motion to Compel Arbitration

 1 This Court may not interfere with this condition by imposing civil rules for arbitration. The Church’s
2 arbitration agreements, as written and agreed to, must be enforced.
3 II.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

4

A.

5

Defendant CSI is a non-profit religious corporation and the “Mother Church” of the

Defendants CSI, RTC and CC

6 Scientology religion. [Declaration of Lynn R. Farny (“Farny Decl.”) Decl., ¶ 2.] CSI is dedicated to
7 the advancement and dissemination of the Scientology religion in accordance with Scientology
8 Scripture, consisting of the religious writings and recorded spoken words of L. Ron Hubbard, the
9 Founder of the Scientology religion, through the Scientology churches and missions that are under
10 its ecclesiastical direction. [Id., ¶ 2.] There are thousands of Scientology churches, missions and
11 groups in more than 167 countries, including throughout the United States. [Id., ¶ 3.] The ultimate
12 goal of Scientology is spiritual enlightenment and freedom for all. [Id., ¶ 3.]
13

RTC is a Church of Scientology. [Declaration of Warren McShane (“McShane Decl.”), ¶ 4.]

14 The central function of RTC is to ensure the orthodoxy of the Scientology religion. [Id.] While each

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15 Scientology organization and every Scientologist is expected to enforce the standard application of
16 Scientology religious technology, RTC is the final arbiter of orthodoxy worldwide. [Id.]
17

CC is a Church of Scientology located in Hollywood. [Declaration of Margaret Marmolejo

18 (“Marmolejo Decl.”), ¶ 2.] The mission of CC is to minister to its parishioners, who travel to
19 California from around the globe, including persons such as artists, politicians, leaders of industry,
20 sports figures and others seeking privacy in the exercise of their faith. [Id.]
21

B.

22

Scientology was founded by L. Ron Hubbard. A core tenet of the Scientology religion is that

Relevant Scientology Beliefs and Practices

23 parishioners and Scientology churches must resolve all disputes between each other exclusively
24 through the Scientology internal Ethics, Justice and binding religious arbitration procedures. [Farny
25 Decl., ¶ 20.] Scientologists agree to abide by Scientology ethics and justice codes as a condition for
26 participation in the religion. [Id., ¶ 17.] Issues that arise in disputes between Scientology
27 parishioners and the Church require application of Scientology doctrine, including the Church’s
28 ethical code of conduct. Only Scientologists have the background in Scientology necessary to
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Motion to Compel Arbitration

 1 understand and apply those doctrines. [Id., ¶¶ 21, 22.] Accordingly, the scripture of the religion
2 written by its Founder mandates that “we must use Scientology … justice in all our affairs.” [Id.
3 ¶ 20.]
4

C.

5

Plaintiff Chrissie Carnell Bixler (“Carnell”) “became involved in the Church of Scientology

Plaintiffs Chrissie Carnell Bixler, Cedric Bixler-Zavala, and Jane Doe #1.

6 in 1997.” [Complaint, ¶ 57.] Carnell began receiving Scientology services at the Celebrity Centre
7 in Los Angeles in March 1997, and continued to do so through 2012. [Marmolejo Decl., ¶ 6.]
8 Plaintiff Cedric Bixler-Zavala is the current husband of Carnell. [Complaint, ¶ 3.] Church records
9 show that Bixler began receiving Scientology services in 2010. [Marmolejo Decl., ¶ 8.] Plaintiff
10 Jane Doe. #1 was a Scientologist from childhood. [Complaint, ¶ 115]. She last received Church
11 services in 2004, at around age 26. [Marmolejo Decl., ¶ 10.]
12

Each of the Plaintiffs executed agreements pledging their commitment to Scientology

13 doctrine and ecclesiastical law as a condition to participate in Scientology religious services. For
14 example, each Plaintiff agreed in a Religious Services Enrollment Application, Agreement and

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Butler & Mitchell LLP

15 General Release (the “Enrollment Agreement”)3 to the following:
My freely given consent to be bound exclusively by the discipline, faith, internal
organization, and ecclesiastical rule, custom, and law of the Scientology religion
in all matters relating to Scientology Religious Services, in all my dealings of any
nature with the Church, and in all my dealings of any nature with any other
Scientology church or organization which espouses, presents, propagates or
practices the Scientology religion means that I am forever abandoning,
surrendering, waiving, and relinquishing my right to sue, or otherwise seek legal
recourse with respect to any dispute, claim or controversy against the Church, all
other Scientology churches, all other organizations which espouse, present,
propagate or practice the Scientology religion, and all persons employed by any
such entity both in their personal and any official or representational capacities,
regardless of the nature of the dispute, claim or controversy.

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[Marmolejo Decl., Exhs. 8-13, ¶ 6.a. (Carnell agreement); Id., Exh. 14, ¶ 6.a. (Bixler agreement);

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3

Carnell’s and Bixler’s Enrollment Agreements are with Defendant CC. Jane Doe #1’s Enrollment
26 Agreement is with Flag Services Organization (“FSO”), a Church of Scientology in Clearwater,
Florida. [Heller Decl., ¶ 5.] As quoted below, each Enrollment Agreement extended the arbitration
27 provision to “any other Scientology church, any other organization which espouses, presents,
propagates or practices the Scientology religion, or any person employed by any such entity, . . .”
28 Thus CSI and RTC may invoke the arbitration provision in the Enrollment Agreements with CC;
and CSI, RTC, and CC may invoke the arbitration provision in the Enrollment Agreement with FSO.
67548720v3

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Motion to Compel Arbitration

 1 Declaration of Sarah Heller (“Heller Decl.”), Exh. 7, ¶ 6.a. (Jane Doe #1 agreement).] Each Plaintiff
2 further agreed that should he or she “ever sue, or otherwise seek legal recourse with respect to any
3 dispute, claim or controversy” against any Scientology organization then, “regardless of the nature of
4 the dispute, claim or controversy,” he or she intends that the Enrollment Agreement “to be a complete
5 and sufficient basis for the immediate dismissal of any and all such proceedings with prejudice to further
6 proceedings of any kind.” [Marmolejo Decl., Exhs. 8-14 & Heller Decl., Exh. 7 at ¶ 6.c.]
7

Plaintiffs thus agreed in the Enrollment Agreement that “any dispute” they may have with

8 any Scientology organization may only be resolved through Scientology Ethics and Justice
9 procedures, including, if necessary, binding religious arbitration:
In accordance with the discipline, faith, internal organization, and ecclesiastical rule,
custom, and law of the Scientology religion, and in accordance with the constitutional
prohibitions which forbid governmental interference with religious services or dispute
resolution procedures, should any dispute, claim or controversy arise between me and
the Church, any other Scientology church, any other organization which espouses,
presents, propagates or practices the Scientology religion, or any person employed by
any such entity, which cannot be resolved informally by direct communication, I will
pursue resolution of that dispute, claim or controversy solely and exclusively through
Scientology's internal Ethics, Justice and binding religious arbitration procedures, which
include application to senior ecclesiastical bodies, including, as necessary, final
submission of the dispute to the International Justice Chief of the Mother Church of the
Scientology religion, Church of Scientology International (“IJC”) or his or her
designee.

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Butler & Mitchell LLP

15
16
17

18 [Marmolejo Decl., Exhs. 8-14 & Heller Decl., Exh. 7 at ¶ 6.d.] To effectuate a religious arbitration,
19 Plaintiffs agreed to submit a request for arbitration to the IJC and designate one arbitrator to hear
20 and resolve the matter. [Id. at ¶ 6.e.i, ii.] The adverse party would then designate a second arbitrator
21 and the two designated arbitrators would select a third. [Id. at ¶ 6.e.iii, iv.] Moreover, “consistent
22 with [their] intention that the arbitration be conducted in accordance with Scientology principles, and
23 consistent with the ecclesiastical nature of the procedures and the dispute, claim or controversy to which
24 those procedures relate,” Plaintiffs agreed that all such arbitrators shall be “Scientologists in good
25 standing with the Mother Church.” [Id. at ¶ 6.e.v.]
26

D.

Allegations of Plaintiffs’ Complaint

27

Carnell alleges that she met and began living with Defendant Danny Masterson in 1996.

28 [Complaint, ¶ 56.] Carnell claims that in late 2001 to early 2002 Masterson allegedly “committed
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Motion to Compel Arbitration

 1 multiple acts of sexual violence and assault” against her. [Id., ¶ 60.] Carnell did not report the alleged
2 assault to the police until December 2016. [Id., ¶ 82.] Around the same time, Carnell “formally
3 terminat[ed] her relationship with Scientology.” [Id., ¶ 77.]
4

Jane Doe #1 alleges she met and socialized with Defendant Masterson in 1999-2000. [Id.,

5 ¶¶ 116-117.] She claims that she was sexually assaulted by Masterson in September 2002, and again
6 in April 2003. [Id., ¶¶ 119-134.] Over a year later, Jane Doe #1 reported the latter alleged assault to
7 the LAPD. [Id., ¶ 149.] The Complaint acknowledges that “no charges were filed.” [Id.] In 2016,
8 Jane Doe #1 spoke with Carnell, and then asked the LAPD to re-open its investigation of the alleged
9 assault. [Id., ¶ 151.] The Complaint does not allege the status of any such investigation.
10

Plaintiffs allege that following the reporting of Masterson’s alleged abuse to the police,

11 Defendants “conducted harassment, surveillance and abuse. . .” against them. [Id., ¶¶ 83, 154.] Each
12 cause of action alleged by the Plaintiffs—stalking, invasion of privacy, and intentional infliction of
13 emotional distress—incorporate all previous allegations, which include allegations of traumatic
14 experiences occurring while Plaintiffs were parishioners, inaccurate and inflammatory descriptions

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Butler & Mitchell LLP

15 of Scientology religious practices, such as auditing [id., ¶¶ 22-25], and assertions that Defendants
16 conspired to “conceal information” that supposedly “could have prevented” the alleged sexual
17 assault against Carnell and Jane Doe #1. [Id., ¶¶ 229-233, 239, 245, and 252].
18 III.

THIS LAWSUIT MUST BE ORDERED TO ARBITRATION

19

A.

20

The FAA applies to any “contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce” that

The Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) Controls

21 contains an arbitration provision. 9 U.S.C. § 2; Khalatian v. Prime Time Shuttle, Inc., 237 Cal. App.
22 4th 651, 657 (2015). “[T]he phrase ‘involving commerce’ in the FAA is the functional equivalent of
23 the term ‘affecting commerce,’ which is a term of art that ordinarily signals the broadest permissible
24 exercise of Congress’s commerce clause power.” Shepard v. Edward Mackay Enterprises, Inc., 148
25 Cal. App. 4th 1092, 1097 (2007). There is no requirement that all parties to an agreement be involved
26 in conduct “affecting commerce.” Nguyen v. Applied Medical Resources Corp., 4 Cal. App. 5th 232,
27 246 (2016) (sufficient nexus with interstate commerce where defendant distributed surgical products
28 worldwide, and plaintiff worked on production line for those products); Graves v. George Fox
67548720v3

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Motion to Compel Arbitration

 1 University, No. CV-06-395-S-EJL, 2007 WL 2363372 (D. Idaho, Aug. 16, 2007) (FAA applies to
2 agreement that applies Christian Conciliation Procedures).
3

Plaintiffs’ agreements with the Church affect interstate commerce. CSI is the Mother Church

4 of the Scientology religion and oversees the ecclesiastical activities of all Scientology churches and
5 groups worldwide. [Farny Decl., ¶ 4.] RTC is the holder of the ultimate ecclesiastical authority
6 regarding the standard and pure application of Scientology’s religious technologies throughout the
7 world. [McShane Decl., ¶ 4.] CC is a Church of Scientology for prominent persons who regularly
8 travel to California from other states and other countries seeking privacy in the exercise of their
9 faith. [Marmolejo Decl., ¶ 2.] FSO—the counterparty to Jane Doe #1’s Enrollment Agreement—is
10 located in Clearwater, Florida and is considered the worldwide spiritual headquarters of Scientology.
11 FSO ministers to Scientologists throughout the world who come to Clearwater for Scientology
12 services available only at that church. [Heller Decl., ¶ 2.]
13

Churches can and do engage in commerce. “The ‘business’ or ‘commerce’ of a church

14 involves the solicitation and receipt of donations, and the provision of spiritual, social, community,

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Jeffer Mangels
Butler & Mitchell LLP

15 educational (religious or non-religious) and other charitable services.” U.S. v. Rayborn, 312 F.3d
16 229, 233 (6th Cir. 2002); see also Camps Newfound/Owatonna v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564,
17 584-85 (1997) (commerce clause applies to charitable and non-profit entities). The Church required
18 Plaintiffs to execute the Enrollment Agreements as a condition for participating in Scientology
19 services. [Heller Decl., ¶ 3; Marmolejo Decl., ¶ 3.] The Enrollment Agreements contain detailed
20 provisions concerning the giving and return of religious donations that are used, in part, to help fund
21 the Church’s global ministry. [See, e.g., Marmolejo Decl., Exh. 8, ¶¶ 5.c.i-iv.] The Agreements,
22 forms of which are used by Scientology churches throughout the U.S., contain additional terms,
23 conditions and covenants that govern the way in which Scientology churches minister Scientology
24 services to parishioners throughout the country and the world. The FAA governs.
25

B.

26

The FAA provides that an agreement to arbitrate a dispute is “valid, irrevocable, and

The Arbitration Agreements Are Valid and Enforceable

27 enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.”
28 9 U.S.C. § 2. The FAA reflects a “liberal” federal policy in favor of arbitration. AT&T Mobility LLC
67548720v3

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Motion to Compel Arbitration

 1 v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 339 (2011). Any “doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues
2 should be resolved in favor of arbitration.” Erickson, et al., v. 100 Oak Street et al., 35 Cal. 3d 312,
3 320 (1983) (applying FAA). The California Arbitration Act (“CAA”) is similar, requiring that
4 arbitration provisions “shall” be enforced, unless certain limited exceptions apply. Cal. Civ. Proc.
5 Code § 1281.2 (b). “California law incorporates many of the basic policy objectives contained in the
6 FAA, including a presumption in favor of arbitrability.” Erickson v. Aetna Health Plans of Calif.,
7 71 Cal. App. 4th 649, 655 (1999). “Thus, even in non-FAA cases, courts ‘are guided by the rule that,
8 contractual arbitration being a favored method for resolving disputes, every intendment will be
9 indulged to give effect to such proceedings.’” Id.
10

A party seeking to compel arbitration meets its burden by “proving the existence of a valid

11 arbitration agreement by the preponderance of the evidence[.]” Engalla v. Permanente Med. Grp.,
12 Inc., 15 Cal. 4th 951, 972 (1997); see also Avery v. Integrated Healthcare Holdings, Inc., 218 Cal.
13 App. 4th 50, 59 (2013) (analyzing issue under both the FAA and CAA).
14

Here, RTC has met its burden of establishing that there exist valid arbitration agreements

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Jeffer Mangels
Butler & Mitchell LLP

15 with Plaintiffs that require them to resolve their dispute with RTC through a religious arbitration.
16 Plaintiffs’ signatures on their Enrollment Agreements with CC and FSO are properly authenticated.
17 [Marmolejo Decl., ¶¶ 5, 7; Heller Decl., ¶ 5.] RTC is an intended third-party beneficiary of the
18 Agreements. The Enrollment Agreements extend to claims Plaintiffs may have with “any []
19 Scientology church, any other organization which espouses, presents, propagates or practices the
20 Scientology religion,” which plainly includes RTC. [McShane Decl., ¶ 4.]
21

C.

22

Plaintiffs agreed in their Enrollment Agreements to arbitrate “any dispute, claim or

The Dispute Falls Within Plaintiffs’ Agreements to Arbitrate

23 controversy” that may arise between them and any Scientology entity. The word, “any” means just that
24 (“used to indicate one selected without restriction,” merriam-webster.com), and thus all of Plaintiffs’
25 claims against RTC, all of which arise out of a single nucleus of alleged fact, are to be arbitrated. It
26 does not matter whether Plaintiffs’ claims sound in tort or are based on a statute. Agreements to
27 arbitrate “all” or “any” claims cover such claims. Such “[b]road arbitration clauses” “are consistently
28 interpreted as applying to extra-contractual disputes between the contracting parties.” Khalatian v.
67548720v3

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Motion to Compel Arbitration

 1 Prime Time, 237 Cal. App. 4th 651, 660 (2015). Similarly, “contractual arbitration agreements are
2 equally applicable to statutory claims as to other types of common law claims.” Meyer v. T-Mobile
3 USA Inc., 836 F. Supp. 2d 994, 1004 (N.D. Cal. 2011).
4

Plaintiffs may argue that their claims arose after they severed their relationship with the

5 Church. However, such an argument is neither true nor legally relevant. Plaintiffs’ claims
6 incorporate by reference all previous allegations, which include allegations of traumatic experiences
7 occurring while parishioners of the Church, over a decade before the relationships with the Church
8 were severed. [Complaint, ¶¶ 61-68 (Carnell experience in reporting assaults to Church, and acting
9 out of fear she would be declared a “suppressive person”); id., ¶¶ 137-148 (Jane Doe #1’s allegations
10 of the Church subjecting her to intensive auditing for claiming that Masterson assaulted her).] All
11 causes of action specifically allege that Defendants failed to take actions that “could have prevented”
12 the alleged sexual assaults against Plaintiffs. [Id., ¶¶ 232-233, 239, 245, and 252]. Thus each cause
13 of action plainly alleges tortious conduct that happened while Plaintiffs were parishioners, and in
14 some instances pre-date Plaintiffs’ execution of the Agreements.

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Jeffer Mangels
Butler & Mitchell LLP

15

More importantly, it is legally irrelevant that some of Defendants’ alleged tortious conduct

16 occurred after Plaintiffs left the Church. Plaintiffs agreed to arbitrate any dispute that “should …
17 arise” with any Church entity, clearly intending that the agreement apply to future disputes. Plaintiffs
18 are bound by their agreements. See Buckhorn v. St. Jude Heritage Medical Group, 121 Cal. App.
19 4th 1401, 1407 (2004) (reversing denial of petition to arbitrate where agreement provided for
20 arbitration and plaintiff’s claims for defamation were based on events occurring after termination of
21 agreement); Homestake Lead Co. of Mo. v. Doe Run Resources Corp., 282 F. Supp. 2d 1131, 1140
22 (N.D. Cal. 2003) (holding that where an arbitration clause “fixes no temporal boundaries to its
23 application,” it covers disputes that arose from events occurring after termination of agreement).
24

D.

25

The Court Must Order Arbitration
1.

26

Any Question Regarding the Scope of the Agreements to Arbitrate or Their
Validity Must Be Determined by the Eventual Arbitrators

27

To avoid arbitration, Plaintiffs may argue that their Enrollment Agreements are

28 unenforceable. In that event, Plaintiffs have the burden of establishing a defense to enforcement of
67548720v3

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Motion to Compel Arbitration

 1 the Enrollment Agreements. See Avery, 218 Cal. App. 4th at 59. Moreover, given the parties’
2 expressed intention that any dispute between them be resolved by religious arbitration, the threshold
3 questions of invalidity and scope are to be determined by the ecclesiastical arbitrators, not the Court.
4

Validity: In Rent-a-Center, W., Inc., v. Jackson, 561 U.S. 63 (2010), the Court held that

5 where a party challenges an entire agreement as invalid, rather than challenging just the provision
6 to arbitrate, the arbitrator, not the court, is to determine the question of validity. Plaintiffs here
7 expressed the wish that disputes between them and the Church be resolved through ecclesiastical
8 dispute resolution agreements. If their argument now is that those agreements are invalid as a whole
9 (due to unconscionability, duress, or whatever theory they allege), this Court’s analysis stops here.
10 Plaintiffs agreed to arbitrate as part of their Enrollment Agreements, and any argument that the
11 agreements as a whole are invalid must be resolved through Church justice procedures.
12

Scope: In Henry Schein, Inc., v. Archer & White Sales, Inc., 586 U.S. __, 139 S. Ct. 524

13 (January 8, 2019), a unanimous Supreme Court reversed a lower court’s denial of a motion to
14 arbitrate based on a finding that the party seeking arbitration proffered a “wholly groundless” reading

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Jeffer Mangels
Butler & Mitchell LLP

15 of the scope of the arbitration agreement to include arbitration. The Court held that, “[i]f a valid
16 agreement exists, and if the agreement delegates the arbitrability issue to an arbitrator, a court may
17 not decide the arbitrability issue.” Id. at 530. The rule is the same under the CAA. Felner v. Meritplan
18 Ins. Co., 6 Cal. App. 3d 540, 543 (1970) (questions regarding agreement’s scope “are for the
19 arbitrators and not for the court to resolve”).
20

Here, the parties agreed that the civil courts should not resolve any dispute between them.

21 Rather, Plaintiffs affirmed that they would “be bound exclusively by the discipline, faith, internal
22 organization, and ecclesiastical rule, custom, and law of the Scientology religion.” such that all disputes
23 between them and “regardless of the nature of the dispute, claim or controversy” would be resolved
24 “exclusively through Scientology’s internal Ethics, Justice and binding religious arbitration procedures.”
25 [Marmolejo Decl., Exhs. 8-14 & Heller Decl., Exh. 7, ¶¶ 6.a-d.] They also agreed that civil courts were
26 to have no role whatsoever in determining the scope of that agreement. [See id., ¶ 6.a (“I am forever
27 abandoning, surrendering, waiving, and relinquishing my right to sue, or otherwise seek legal
28 recourse with respect to any dispute, claim or controversy against” any Scientology entity).]
67548720v3

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Motion to Compel Arbitration

 1 Because the parties here made clear that there would be no recourse at all to the civil courts for their
2 disputes under the agreements, this Court cannot adjudicate the scope of the arbitration agreements.
3

2.

4

The First Amendment Protects the Scientology Ecclesiastical Dispute
Resolution Procedures and This Court May Not Impede Them

5

Alternatively, Plaintiffs may not challenge the validity of the Enrollment Agreements as a

6 whole, and instead seek to avoid arbitration of their claims and oppose RTC’s motion to compel
7 arbitration by limiting their challenge to the arbitration provisions. But such a challenge will fail.
8

a.

9

The First Amendment Bars Any Unconscionability Challenge.

As a preliminary matter, the doctrine of “unconscionability,” as articulated by the California

10 Supreme Court in review of commercial employment agreements in Armendariz v. Found. Health
11 Psychcare Servs., Inc., 24 Cal. 4th 83 113 (2000), does not apply to this dispute. The U.S. and
12 California Constitutions, prohibit this Court from imposing civil concepts of due process when
13 adjudicating disputes between a church and its members. Rather, a church’s procedures for
14 addressing such disputes are all but unreviewable. In Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese v.

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Jeffer Mangels
Butler & Mitchell LLP

15 Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696 (1976), the United States Supreme Court held that the First Amendment
16 affords a church nearly unreviewable latitude in resolving internal disputes among members. The
17 Court dismissed an action brought by a bishop challenging his removal because the church failed to
18 comply with church laws and regulations. The First Amendment “permit[s] hierarchical religious
19 organizations to establish their own rules and regulations for internal discipline and government, and
20 to create tribunals for adjudicating disputes over these matters.” Id. at 724. “Constitutional concepts
21 of due process, involving secular notions of ‘fundamental fairness’ or impermissible objectives, are
22 . . . hardly relevant to such matters of ecclesiastical cognizance.” Id., at 715. So too here. The only
23 permissible inquiry is what Plaintiffs and the Church agreed to. This Court may not impose its own
24 notions of “fairness” in deciding whether Plaintiffs’ agreements with the Church are fair or right. To
25 do so would interfere with a Church’s rules over its members, which is clearly forbidden by Serbian
26 Eastern Orthodox. See also Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. 679, 729-31 (1871) (holding that civil courts
27 may not exercise supervision over how a church generally chooses to admit members and govern its
28 relations with members; “We cannot decide who ought to be members of the church. [W]hen they
67548720v3

17
Motion to Compel Arbitration

 1 became members they did so upon the condition of continuing or not as they and their churches
2 might determine, and they thereby submit to the ecclesiastical power and cannot now invoke the
3 supervisory power of the civil tribunals.”).
4

Accordingly, courts may not dictate to churches the terms upon which it accepts members.

5 In Garcia v. Church of Scientology Flag Service Org., Inc., No. 8:13-cv-220-T-27TBM (M.D. Fla.,
6 July 17, 2018) (“Garcia II”), a federal district court denied a challenge to an arbitration conducted
7 under the same arbitration clause contained in Plaintiffs’ agreements. The Garcia plaintiffs’ due
8 process objections to Scientology justice procedures could not trump the Church’s First Amendment
9 right to internal governance. See Garcia II at 8 (“While [plaintiffs] may disagree with how the
10 arbitration was conducted their arguments raise secular notions of due process. And the Free
11 Exercise Clause prohibits this Court from resolving their disputes concerning the interpretation or
12 application of Scientology doctrine.”) Courts, therefore, routinely uphold religious arbitration
13 agreements requiring resolution of disputes in ecclesiastical courts under faith-based procedures,
14 regardless of whether those procedures conform to notions of civil due process. See Tomic v.

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Jeffer Mangels
Butler & Mitchell LLP

15 Catholic Diocese of Peoria, 442 F.3d 1036, 1037 (2006) (“Federal courts are secular agencies. They
16 therefore do not exercise jurisdiction over the internal affairs of religious organizations.”)4
17

Plaintiffs’ signatures on the agreements mean ecclesiastical arbitration must proceed.

18

b.

19

In Any Event, the Arbitration Provisions Are Not Unconscionable

Even if this Court were to engage in an unconscionability analysis, the facts show that the

20 ecclesiastical procedures used by the Church fall well within the bounds of acceptable ecclesiastical
21
22

4

See, e.g., Dial 800 v. Fesbinder, 118 Cal. App. 4th 32, 50 (2004) (affirming enforceability of
23 judgment where arbitrators were rabbis and decision would be based on Jewish law); Ortiz v. Hobby
Lobby Stores, Inc., 52 F. Supp. 3d 1070 (E.D. Cal. 2014) (enforcing employment arbitration under
24 the Institute for Christian Conciliation’s Rules of Procedure for Christian Conciliation); General
Conference of Evangelical Methodist Church v. Evangelical Methodist Church of Dalton, Georgia,
25 Inc., 807 F. Supp. 2d 1291, 1294 (N.D. Ga. 2011) (enforcing church rules that “believers should
resolve disputes among themselves or within the Church wherever possible,” and “by means of
26 Christian conciliation, mediation or arbitration”); Easterly v. Heritage Christian School, Inc., 2009
WL 2750099, at * 1 (S.D. Ind. 2009) (teachers at Christian school agreed to resolution of differences
27 by “following the biblical pattern of Matthew 18: 15-17,” and waived right to file lawsuit); Jenkins
v. Trinity Evangelical Lutheran Church, 356 Ill. App. 3d 504, 825 N.E. 2d 1206, 1212-13 (2005)
28 (enforcing Lutheran Church doctrine mandating church-based arbitration of disputes); Alla v.
Moursi, 680 N.W. 569 (Minn. Ct. App., 2004) (confirming arbitration award under Islamic law).
67548720v3

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Motion to Compel Arbitration

 1 arbitration, and thus may not be set aside as “unconscionable.” See Garcia v. Church of Scientology
2 Flag Service Org., Inc., No. 8:13-cv-220-T-27TBM, at 3-4, 16, and 20 (M.D. Fla., March 13, 2015)
3 (“Garcia I”) (finding arbitration provisions identical to those contained in the Enrollment
4 Agreements to be enforceable; rejecting procedural and substantive unconscionability arguments).
5 [Compare arbitration provision at Exhs. 8-14, pp. 4-5, with provision at Garcia I at 3.]
6

Under the FAA, an arbitration agreement is “valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon

7 such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.” 9 U.S.C. § 2. This
8 savings clause in Section 2 of the FAA “permits agreements to arbitrate to be invalidated by
9 generally applicable contract defenses, such as fraud, duress, or unconscionability, but not by
10 defenses that apply only to arbitration or that derive their meaning from the fact that an agreement
11 to arbitrate is at issue.” AT&T Mobility, LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 174212 43 (2011). Under California law, an arbitration clause may be unenforceable if it is unconscionable.
13 Baltazar v. Forever 21, Inc., 62 Cal. 4th 1237, 1243 (2016); Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare
14 Servs., Inc., 24 Cal. 4th 83, 113 (2000). However, to succeed on such a claim, a litigant must show

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Jeffer Mangels
Butler & Mitchell LLP

15 both procedural and substantive unconscionability. Armendariz, 24 Cal. 4th at 114.
16

There Is No Procedural Unconscionability. The Enrollment Agreements are not

17 procedurally unconscionable. To be procedurally unconscionable, elements of “oppression” or
18 “surprise” must be present. See Baltazar, 62 Cal. 4th at 1243; Sonic–Calabasas A, Inc. v. Moreno,
19 57 Cal. 4th 1109, 1133 (2013). “Oppression arises from an inequality of bargaining power that
20 results in no real negotiation and an absence of meaningful choice. Surprise involves the extent to
21 which the supposedly agreed-upon terms are hidden in a prolix printed form drafted by the party
22 seeking to enforce them.” Flores v. Transamerica HomeFirst, Inc. 93 Cal. App. 4th 846, 853 (2001).
23

Neither are present here. As to “oppression,” the concept of “no meaningful choice” may

24 make sense in a consumer context, but it has no bearing when an individual seeks religious services.
25 Plaintiffs here expressed their “self-determined desire to participate in the Religious Services of
26 Scientology religion” and agreed to the terms necessary to do so. Neither RTC, CSI nor CC is a
27 public accommodation, a common carrier, or a secular employer. They have a constitutional right to
28 accept or reject members on whatever basis they wish. They may also impose conditions upon
67548720v3

19
Motion to Compel Arbitration

 1 membership free from government intrusion. See Watson, 80 U.S. at 729-31; see also Church of
2 Scientology v. City of Clearwater, 2 F.3d 1514, 1544 (11th Cir. 1993) (striking down city ordinance
3 requiring church to disclose to its members expenditures from donations: “The City may not
4 intervene on behalf of such dissidents. If they remain dissatisfied with the church’s voluntarily
5 assumed disclosure policy then they may attempt to reform that policy from within, they may
6 acquiesce in the policy despite their objections or they may leave the church.”).
7

Thus, the concept of oppression is irrelevant in the context of a decision to participate as a

8 member of a church. Plaintiffs chose to participate in Scientology services well into their adult years
9 (the Bixler Plaintiffs came to Scientology as adults). While they may no longer consider themselves
10 Scientologists, the conscionability of the agreements they made to pursue their religious desires are
11 measured at the time they made those commitments. Am. Software, Inc. v. Ali, 46 Cal. App. 4th
12 1386, 1391 (1996) (“[t]he critical juncture for determining whether a contract is unconscionable is
13 the moment when it is entered into by both parties—not whether it is unconscionable in light of
14 subsequent events.”). Plaintiffs therefore repeatedly read, assented to, and experienced the terms of

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Jeffer Mangels
Butler & Mitchell LLP

15 their Agreements with the Church. This Court is in no position to question whether the terms the
16 Church established for Plaintiffs to administer religious services were “procedurally” improper.
17

“Surprise” is also not at issue here. Plaintiffs’ Enrollment Agreements set forth a dispute

18 resolution and arbitration system founded on the religious principles of Scientology. Carnell
19 executed no less than five Enrollment Agreements each containing religious arbitration dispute
20 resolution provisions, from 2002 to 2012. Bixler executed his Agreement after he married Carnell
21 and apparently adopted the long-standing religion of his wife. They did so even after the alleged
22 incidents of abuse that ultimately gave rise to this lawsuit and after Carnell allegedly reported those
23 incidents to CC. [Complaint ¶¶ 60-68.] Both therefore knew of and repeatedly agreed to abide by
24 Scientology’s dispute resolution system as a condition of their participation in the religion, and can
25 hardly claim surprise. Similarly, Jane Doe #1 grew up in the Scientology religion [Complaint, ¶
26 115], and signed the Enrollment Agreement in 2002, when she was approximately 27 years old.
27 [Heller Decl. ¶ 5.] She too cannot claim that she was “surprised” by requirements that Scientologists
28 abide by the Scientology Ethics and Justice procedures.
67548720v3

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Motion to Compel Arbitration

 1

There Is No Substantive Unconscionability. “Substantive unconscionability focuses on

2 whether the provision is overly harsh or one-sided and is shown if the disputed provision of the
3 contract falls outside the ‘reasonable expectations’ of the non-drafting party or is ‘unduly
4 oppressive.’” Gutierrez v. Autowest, Inc., 114 Cal. App. 4th 77, 88 (2003). “A contract term,”
5 including an arbitration provision, “is not substantively unconscionable when it merely gives one
6 side a greater benefit; rather, the term must be ‘so one-sided as to ‘shock the conscience.’” Sanchez
7 v. Valencia Holding Co., LLC, 61 Cal. 4th 899, 935 (2015). A substantively unconscionable
8 agreement is one that “no man in his sense and not under delusion would make on the one hand, and
9 no honest and fair man would accept on the other.” California Grocers Assn. v. Bank of America,
10 22 Cal. App. 4th 205, 214 (1994). The California Supreme Court in Armendariz, 24 Cal. 4th at 113
11 articulated a test for assessing substantive unconscionability in arbitration provisions of secular
12 commercial employment agreements, establishing “minimum requirements” such as neutral
13 arbitrators, more than minimal discovery, mutuality, and badges of substantive due process.
14

Imposition of the Armendariz substantive unconscionability tests is wholly inappropriate in

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Jeffer Mangels
Butler & Mitchell LLP

15 this context. Armendariz and its progeny concern arbitration provisions in commercial employment
16 contracts. Plaintiffs were clearly not employees of CC. More importantly, as shown above, civil law
17 standards of fairness may not serve to abrogate the conditions a church imposes in selecting
18 members. Serbian Eastern Orthodox, 426 U.S. at 724.
19

Moreover, while Plaintiffs might insinuate that they cannot expect a fair hearing before a

20 panel of Scientologists, their supposed fears of partiality do not make a term unconscionable. Garcia
21 II at 6 (currently on appeal) (“to the extent . . . [plaintiffs] challenge the partiality of the arbitrators
22 because of their standing with the Church [of Scientology], they agreed to inherent partiality in their
23 agreements”); see also Gen. Conference of Evangelical Methodist Church, 807 F. Supp. 2d at 129424 95, 1301 (enforcing arbitration provision calling for panel of church arbitrators: “The Supreme Court
25 has repeatedly counseled that [under] the FAA ... courts should not presume, absent concrete proof
26 to the contrary, that arbitration systems will be unfair or biased”); Easterly v. Heritage Christian
27 Sch., 2001 WL 2750099 (S.D. Ind. 2009) (rejecting claims that arbitrators would be inherently
28 biased because of their religious beliefs and affiliations); Jenkins v. Trinity Evangelical Lutheran
67548720v3

21
Motion to Compel Arbitration

 1 Church, 356 Ill. App. 3d 504, 512, 825 N.E.2d 1206, 1214 (2005) (rejecting partiality argument;
2 “Plaintiff has not pointed to any specific prejudice he would suffer under the bylaws, but only a
3 generalized fear of partiality. This anxiety is insufficient to overturn the LCMS arbitration process”).
4 Plaintiffs chose to have their disputes—any disputes—heard by qualified Church members. They
5 cannot now claim unfairness based on partiality when any such partiality was inherent in their choice
6 of arbitrators. Nat’l Football League Mgmt. Council v. Nat’l Football League Players Ass’n, 820
7 F.3d 527, 532, 548 (2d Cir. 2016) (“arbitration is a matter of contract, and consequently, the parties
8 to an arbitration can ask for no more impartiality than inheres in the method they have chosen”); see
9 also BDO Seidman, LLP v. Bee, 970 So. 2d 869, 873, 875 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007) (upholding arbitration
10 clause in partnership clause of accounting firm requiring arbitrators to be partners of firm).
11

Finally, the procedures are fair by any standard. As the Garcia I court noted, the arbitration

12 clauses in Plaintiffs’ Agreements “include the essential terms of an enforceable arbitration
13 agreement”: they describe how Plaintiffs are to initiate dispute resolution (first through informal
14 means, then through a request for arbitration to the IJC); identify the matters to be arbitrated (“any

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Jeffer Mangels
Butler & Mitchell LLP

15 dispute” between them and the Church); describe the selection and number of arbitrators (Plaintiffs
16 designate one, the Church another, and those two designate a third), identify the qualifications of the
17 arbitrators (Scientologists in good standing), and provide that arbitration is binding. See Garcia I, at
18 16-17. The arbitration provisions are mutually binding and impose no arbitration fee on Plaintiffs.
19 In short, there is no reason not to enforce Plaintiffs’ multiple arbitration agreements.
20 IV.

CONCLUSION

21

RTC’s motion should be granted and the Court should stay Plaintiffs’ claims against RTC

22 pending religious arbitration.
23 DATED: January 6, 2020
24

JEFFER MANGELS BUTLER & MITCHELL LLP
ROBERT E. MANGELS
MATTHEW D. HINKS

25
By:

26

MATTHEW D. HINKS
Attorneys for Defendant RELIGIOUS
TECHNOLOGY CENTER

27
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67548720v3

22
Motion to Compel Arbitration

 1

PROOF OF SERVICE

2 STATE OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES
3

At the time of service, I was over 18 years of age and not a party to this action. I am
employed in the County of Los Angeles, State of California. My business address is 1900 Avenue
4 of the Stars, 7th Floor, Los Angeles, CA 90067-4308.
5

On January 6, 2020, I served true copies of the following document(s) described as
NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION TO COMPEL RELIGIOUS ARBITRATION AND
6 FOR STAY OF LITIGATION AS TO PLAINTIFFS CARNELL BIXLER, BIXLERZAVALA AND JANE DOE #1; MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN
7 SUPPORT THEREOF as follows:
8

SEE ATTACHED SERVICE LIST

9

BY MAIL: I enclosed the document(s) in a sealed envelope or package addressed to the
persons at the addresses listed in the Service List and placed the envelope for collection and
10 mailing, following our ordinary business practices. I am readily familiar with the practice of
Jeffer Mangels Butler & Mitchell LLP for collecting and processing correspondence for mailing.
11 On the same day that correspondence is placed for collection and mailing, it is deposited in the
ordinary course of business with the United States Postal Service, in a sealed envelope with
12 postage fully prepaid. I am a resident or employed in the county where the mailing occurred. The
envelope was placed in the mail at Los Angeles, California.
13
I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the
14 foregoing is true and correct.

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Jeffer Mangels
Butler & Mitchell LLP

15

Executed on January 6, 2020, at Los Angeles, California.

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Belinda Curtis

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67548720v3

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Motion to Compel Arbitration

 1

SERVICE LIST

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Robert Thompson, Esq.
Thompson Law Offices
700 Airport Boulevard
Suite 160
Burlingame, CA 94010

Attorney for Plaintiff
Phone: (650) 513-6111
Fax: (650) 513-6071

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Butler & Mitchell LLP

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67548720v3

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Motion to Compel Arbitration

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