FILED

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2020 JAN 10 03:35 PM
KING COUNTY
SUPERIOR COURT CLERK
E-FILED
CASE #: 19-2-30171-6 SEA

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The Honorable Marshall Ferguson
Noted for Consideration: February 7, 2020, at 9:00 a.m.
With Oral Argument

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STATE OF WASHINGTON
KING COUNTY SUPERIOR COURT

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GARFIELD COUNTY TRANSPORTATION
AUTHORITY; et al.,
and

WASHINGTON ADAPT; TRANSIT RIDERS
UNION; AND CLIMATE SOLUTIONS,

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v.
STATE OF WASHINGTON,
Defendant,

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DEFENDANT STATE OF
WASHINGTON AND
INTERVENOR-DEFENDANT
PIERCE COUNTY’S JOINT
MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT

Intervenor-Plaintiffs,

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Plaintiffs,

NO. 19-2-30171-6 SEA

and
CLINT DIDIER; PERMANENT OFFENSE;
TIMOTHY D. EYMAN; MICHAEL FAGAN;
JACK FAGAN; and PIERCE COUNTY,
Intervenor-Defendants.

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DEFENDANT STATE OF
WASHINGTON AND INTERVENORDEFENDANT PIERCE COUNTY’S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
– NO. 19-2-30171-6

ATTORNEY GENERAL OF WASHINGTON
Solicitor General’s Office
P.O. Box 40100
Olympia, WA 98504-0100
(360) 753-6200

 TABLE OF CONTENTS

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I.

INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................. 1

II.

STATEMENT OF FACTS................................................................................................ 2
A. I-976 Passed at the November 5, 2019 General Election .......................................... 2

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B. Effect of I-976 on Existing Law ................................................................................ 2

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C. Effect of I-976 on Taxpayers ..................................................................................... 6

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D. Background on the Ballot Title Process Generally and for I-976.............................. 6
III.

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STATEMENT OF ISSUES ............................................................................................... 7
1.

Have Plaintiffs proven beyond a reasonable doubt that I-976 violates
article II, section 19 of the Washington Constitution? ....................................... 7

2.

Have Plaintiffs proven beyond a reasonable doubt that I-976 violates
article II, section 37 of the Washington Constitution? ....................................... 7

3.

Have Plaintiffs proven beyond a reasonable doubt that I-976 violates
article VII, section 5 of the Washington Constitution? ...................................... 7

4.

Have Plaintiffs proven beyond a reasonable doubt that I-976
unconstitutionally restricts local authority? ....................................................... 7

5.

Have Plaintiffs proven beyond a reasonable doubt that I-976 violates
separation-of-powers principles? ....................................................................... 8

6.

Have Plaintiffs proven beyond a reasonable doubt that I-976
unconstitutionally impairs contracts? ................................................................. 8

IV.

EVIDENCE RELIED UPON ............................................................................................ 8

V.

AUTHORITY.................................................................................................................... 8
A. Plaintiffs Must Demonstrate That I-976 Is Unconstitutional Beyond a
Reasonable Doubt ...................................................................................................... 8
B. Plaintiffs Cannot Meet Their Heavy Burden of Showing That I-976 Violates
Article II, Section 19 of the Washington Constitution .............................................. 8
1.

I-976 complies with the single-subject rule ....................................................... 9
a.

I-976’s title is general ............................................................................... 10

b.

I-976 exhibits rational unity...................................................................... 11

DEFENDANT STATE OF
WASHINGTON AND INTERVENORDEFENDANT PIERCE COUNTY’S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
– NO. 19-2-30171-6

i

ATTORNEY GENERAL OF WASHINGTON
Solicitor General’s Office
P.O. Box 40100
Olympia, WA 98504-0100
(360) 753-6200

 2.

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I-976 complies with the subject-in-title rule .................................................... 13

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C. I-976 Complies With Article II, Section 37 of the Washington Constitution ......... 16

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D. Washington Constitution Article VII, Section 5 Has No Application to I-976 ....... 19

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E.

I-976 Does Not Unconstitutionally Infringe on Local Authority ............................ 20

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F.

I-976 Does Not Violate Any Separation of Powers Principle ................................. 21

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G. Plaintiffs’ Claim of Contractual Impairment Is Limited to the City of Burien
and Does Not Otherwise Impede Implementation of I-976 ..................................... 22

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VI.

CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................... 24

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE .................................................................................................. 25

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DEFENDANT STATE OF
WASHINGTON AND INTERVENORDEFENDANT PIERCE COUNTY’S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
– NO. 19-2-30171-6

ii

ATTORNEY GENERAL OF WASHINGTON
Solicitor General’s Office
P.O. Box 40100
Olympia, WA 98504-0100
(360) 753-6200

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

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Cases

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Amalgamated Transit Union Local 587 v. State, 142 Wn.2d 183, 11 P.3d 762 (2000) ..... passim

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Brower v. State, 137 Wn.2d 44, 969 P.2d 42 (1998) ................................................................. 22

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Citizens for Responsible Wildlife Mgmt., 149 Wn.2d 622, 71 P.3d 644 (2003) .................. 12, 13

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City of Burien v. Kiga, 144 Wn.2d 819, 31 P.3d 659 (2001) .................................................... 13

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City of Wenatchee v. Chelan Cty. Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1, 181 Wn. App. 326, 325 P.3d 419
(2014) ..................................................................................................................................... 20

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Coppernoll v. Reed, 155 Wn.2d 290, 119 P.3d 290 (2005) ....................................................... 21

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Diversified Inv. P’ship v. Dep’t of Social & Health Servs., 113 Wn.2d 19, 775 P.2d 947
(1989) ..................................................................................................................................... 22

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El Centro de la Raza v. State, 192 Wn.2d 103, 428 P.3d 1143 (2018) ..................................... 19

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Filo Foods, LLC v. City of SeaTac, 183 Wn.2d 770, 357 P.3d 1040 (2015)....................... 11, 12

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Foster v. Sunnyside Valley Irrigation Dist., 102 Wn.2d 395, 687 P.2d 841 (1984).................. 21

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Fritz v. Gorton, 83 Wn.2d 275, 517 P.2d 911 (1974)................................................................ 10

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Impecoven v. Dep’t of Revenue, 120 Wn.2d 357, 841 P.2d 752 (1992) .................................... 23

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Island Cy v. State, 135 Wn.2d 141, 955 P.2d 377 (1998)............................................................ 8

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Perez-Crisantos v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 187 Wn.2d 669, 389 P.3d 476 (2017) .......... 18

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Pierce Cty. v. State, 150 Wn.2d 422, 78 P.3d 640 (2003) .................................................. passim

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Pierce Cty. v. State, 159 Wn.2d 16, 148 P.3d 1002 (2006) ............................................. 1, 12, 23

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Protect Pub. Health v. Freed, 192 Wn.2d 477, 430 P.2d 640 (2018) ....................................... 21

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Sheehan v. Cent. Puget Sound Reg’l Transit Auth., 155 Wn.2d 790, 123 P.3d 88 (2005) ........ 20

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Spokane Grain & Fuel Co. v. Lyttaker, 59 Wash. 76, 109 P. 316 (1910) ........................... 17, 19

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State v. Manussier, 129 Wn.2d 652, 921 P.2d 473 (1996) ........................................................ 19

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State v. Storey, 51 Wash. 630, 99 P. 878 (1909) ....................................................................... 22

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DEFENDANT STATE OF
WASHINGTON AND INTERVENORDEFENDANT PIERCE COUNTY’S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
– NO. 19-2-30171-6

iii

ATTORNEY GENERAL OF WASHINGTON
Solicitor General’s Office
P.O. Box 40100
Olympia, WA 98504-0100
(360) 753-6200

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Wash. Ass’n for Substance Abuse & Violence Prevention v. State, 174 Wn.2d 642, 278
P.3d 632 (2012) .............................................................................................................. passim
Wash. Ass’n of Neigh. Stores v. State, 149 Wn.2d 359, 70 P.3d 920 (2003)............................. 10
Wash. Fed’n of State Emps. v. State, 127 Wn.2d 544, 901 P.2d 1028 (1995)................. 9, 10, 23
Wash. Toll Bridge Auth. v. State, 49 Wn.2d 520, 304 P.2d 676 (1956) .................................... 13
Watson v. City of Seattle, 189 Wn.2d 149, 401 P.3d 1 (2017) .................................................. 20
Statutes
Laws of 2000, ch. 1, § 3 ............................................................................................................. 18
RCW 29A.72.010 ........................................................................................................................ 6
RCW 29A.72.050 .................................................................................................................. 6, 10
RCW 29A.72.050(1) ................................................................................................................ 6, 7
RCW 29A.72.060 ........................................................................................................................ 7
RCW 29A.72.070 ........................................................................................................................ 7
RCW 29A.72.080 ........................................................................................................................ 7
RCW 36.73.015(6)....................................................................................................................... 3
RCW 36.73.020 ........................................................................................................................... 3
RCW 36.73.040 ............................................................................................................. 17, 18, 19
RCW 36.73.065 ............................................................................................................. 17, 18, 19
RCW 36.73.065(1)....................................................................................................................... 3
RCW 36.73.065(4)....................................................................................................................... 3
RCW 46.04.671 ............................................................................................................... 3, 15, 16
RCW 46.16A.030 ........................................................................................................................ 6
RCW 46.16A.040 ........................................................................................................................ 6
RCW 46.16A.040(3) .................................................................................................................... 6
RCW 46.16A.110 ........................................................................................................................ 6
RCW 46.16A.110(1) .................................................................................................................... 6

DEFENDANT STATE OF
WASHINGTON AND INTERVENORDEFENDANT PIERCE COUNTY’S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
– NO. 19-2-30171-6

iv

ATTORNEY GENERAL OF WASHINGTON
Solicitor General’s Office
P.O. Box 40100
Olympia, WA 98504-0100
(360) 753-6200

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RCW 46.17 ......................................................................................................................... passim

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RCW 46.17.210 ......................................................................................................................... 17

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RCW 46.17.305 ......................................................................................................................... 17

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RCW 46.17.350 .................................................................................................................. passim

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RCW 46.17.355 ......................................................................................................... 4, 15, 17, 18

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RCW 46.17.365 ........................................................................................................................... 4

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RCW 46.68.415 ........................................................................................................................... 4

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RCW 81.104.140 ......................................................................................................................... 5

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RCW 81.104.160 ..................................................................................................................... 3, 5

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RCW 82.08.020 ........................................................................................................................... 4

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RCW 82.44.035 ........................................................................................................................... 5

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RCW 82.44.065 ........................................................................................................................... 5

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RCW 82.80.130 ..................................................................................................................... 4, 15

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RCW 82.80.140 .................................................................................................................. passim

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RCW 82.80.140(1)........................................................................................................... 3, 18, 20

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RCW 82.84.140 ......................................................................................................................... 18

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Constitutional Provisions

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Wash. Const. art. I, § 19 ............................................................................................................ 21

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Wash. Const. art. I, § 23 ............................................................................................................ 22

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Wash. Const. art. II, § 1(a)....................................................................................................... 1, 7

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Wash. Const. art. II, § 19 ............................................................................................................. 8

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Wash. Const. art. II, § 37 ......................................................................................... 16, 17, 18, 19

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Wash. Const. art. II, § 40 ............................................................................................................. 3

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Wash. Const. art. VII, § 5 .................................................................................................... 19, 20

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Wash. Const. art. XI, § 12.................................................................................................... 20, 22

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DEFENDANT STATE OF
WASHINGTON AND INTERVENORDEFENDANT PIERCE COUNTY’S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
– NO. 19-2-30171-6

v

ATTORNEY GENERAL OF WASHINGTON
Solicitor General’s Office
P.O. Box 40100
Olympia, WA 98504-0100
(360) 753-6200

 I.

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INTRODUCTION

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Washington voters cherish and regularly exercise their right to legislate by initiative,

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“[t]he first power reserved by the people” in Washington’s Constitution. Const. art. II, § 1(a).

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When Washington voters approved Initiative 976, they exercised this constitutionally protected

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power, sending a clear message that they wanted to achieve what the Initiative proposed:

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reducing motor vehicle fees and taxes. Under our Constitution and Supreme Court precedent,

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the voters’ decision is final unless it is clear, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the Initiative is

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unconstitutional. I-976 easily clears this hurdle, and the Court should allow the law to take effect

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as the People intended.

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Plaintiffs offer a multitude of theories as to why I-976 is allegedly unconstitutional, but

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none withstands careful scrutiny. Indeed, our Supreme Court already rejected nearly all of their

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arguments as to a very similar measure. Initiative 776, like I-976, limited state vehicle license

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fees to $30 and repealed local authority to impose certain vehicle fees and taxes. See Pierce

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Cty. v. State, 150 Wn.2d 422, 431-32, 78 P.3d 640 (2003) (Pierce Cty. I). Multiple plaintiffs

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sued, raising nearly every claim presented here: that the measure violated article II, section 19;

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exceeded the initiative power; improperly infringed on local authority; and impaired certain

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bonds. Id. at 428-29. The Supreme Court rejected all of these arguments, id. at 430-31, just as

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this Court should. While the Supreme Court later held that one section of I-776 impaired bonds

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issued by Sound Transit, Pierce Cty. v. State, 159 Wn.2d 16, 148 P.3d 1002 (2006) (Pierce Cty.

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II), I-976 specifically avoided that concern by delaying the effective date of certain sections

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affecting Sound Transit until bonds are retired.

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Even if there were no precedent so directly on point, Plaintiffs could not meet their

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burden of proving I-976 unconstitutional on any of the grounds they claim. Plaintiffs cannot

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demonstrate that I-976 contains multiple subjects because all parts of the Initiative relate to one

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general subject: “motor vehicle taxes and fees.” They cannot show that the title misrepresented

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the subject of the measure because the title accurately described the measure and gave “notice
DEFENDANT STATE OF
WASHINGTON AND INTERVENORDEFENDANT PIERCE COUNTY’S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
– NO. 19-2-30171-6

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ATTORNEY GENERAL OF WASHINGTON
Solicitor General’s Office
P.O. Box 40100
Olympia, WA 98504-0100
(360) 753-6200

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that would lead to an inquiry into the body of the act.” Pierce Cty. I, 150 Wn.2d at 436. They

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cannot show that it amended statutes without setting them forth in full, because it set forth the

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statutes it amended and there is no requirement to set forth statutes that are repealed. They

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cannot show that it impermissibly infringes local authority because local governments can only

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impose taxes specifically allowed by the State, and the State can always revoke taxing authority

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previously granted. See Pierce County I, 150 Wn.2d at 440. They cannot show that it exceeds

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the scope of the initiative power, because their argument turns entirely on inapposite cases about

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the much narrower local initiative power. And they cannot show that it impairs contracts

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because they offer no tangible evidence of impairment.
In short, the voters have spoken, and there is no constitutional flaw in I-976 that would

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justify ignoring their clear message. The Court should uphold the measure.

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II.
A.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

I-976 Passed at the November 5, 2019 General Election

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Initiative Measure No. 976 was approved with 52.99% of the vote in the November 5,

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2019 General Election. Copsey Decl., Ex. 1. More than one million Washingtonians voted in

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favor of the Initiative. Id. I-976 passed in 33 of Washington’s 39 counties. Copsey Decl., Ex. 2.

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In Pierce County, a member jurisdiction of Sound Transit, I-976 passed by a two-thirds majority.

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Id.

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B.

Effect of I-976 on Existing Law

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I-976 generally repeals, reduces, and removes state and local authority to impose certain

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motor vehicle fees and taxes. Copsey Decl., Ex. 3, § 1 (hereinafter, I-976). Before describing I-

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976 in detail, it is important to understand that Washington law as it existed before I-976

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authorized a number of distinct types of motor vehicle taxes and fees relevant here. Taxpayers

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may not have distinguished between these fees because they were paid at the same time and

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some had similar names, but each was legally distinct.

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DEFENDANT STATE OF
WASHINGTON AND INTERVENORDEFENDANT PIERCE COUNTY’S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
– NO. 19-2-30171-6

2

ATTORNEY GENERAL OF WASHINGTON
Solicitor General’s Office
P.O. Box 40100
Olympia, WA 98504-0100
(360) 753-6200

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First, chapter 46.17 RCW imposed statewide “vehicle license fees.” See RCW 46.17.350,

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.355. This type of fee was imposed only by the State, not by any local government. See

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RCW 46.04.671 (defining “vehicle license fee” as “a fee collected by the state of Washington,”

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not “taxes or fees collected by the department [of licensing] for any other jurisdiction”). “Vehicle

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license fees” are specifically regulated by Washington’s Constitution, see id., which specifies

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that “[a]ll fees collected by the State of Washington as license fees for motor vehicles . . . shall

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be paid into the state treasury and placed in a special fund to be used exclusively for highway

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purposes.” Const. art. II, § 40 (emphasis added).

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Second, RCW 82.80.140 authorized local transportation benefit districts (TBDs) to

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impose annual “vehicle fees” of up to $100 per vehicle. TBDs could impose a vehicle fee of up

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to $50 without voter approval, or up to $100 with voter approval. RCW 36.73.065(1), (4),

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82.80.140. Many TBDs in the State have imposed vehicle fees, but only one of these (Seattle’s)

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was approved by voters—the rest were approved by local TBD boards, without a vote of the

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people. See Copsey Decl., Ex. 4 at 3. While these fees were due at the time of renewing a vehicle

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license, and were collected by the Department of Licensing on behalf of TBDs, the statute makes

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clear that they are distinct from “vehicle license fees under RCW 46.17[].” RCW 82.80.140(1).

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Indeed, while “vehicle license fees” under Chapter 46.17 may constitutionally be used only for

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highway purposes, Const. art. II, § 40, “vehicle fees” collected by TBDs may be used for non-

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highway purposes. See, e.g., RCW 36.73.020 and 36.73.015(6) (together allowing TBDs to fund

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“high capacity transportation, public transportation, and other transportation projects and

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programs”).

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Finally, RCW 81.104.160 allowed regional transit authorities (namely, Sound Transit) to

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impose a motor vehicle excise tax (MVET). While this charge was also collected by the

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Department of Licensing as part of the license renewal process, it differed in important ways

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from the “vehicle license fees” addressed in chapter 46.17 RCW. Most notably, this charge is a

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tax, not a fee, and varied based on vehicle value.
DEFENDANT STATE OF
WASHINGTON AND INTERVENORDEFENDANT PIERCE COUNTY’S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
– NO. 19-2-30171-6

3

ATTORNEY GENERAL OF WASHINGTON
Solicitor General’s Office
P.O. Box 40100
Olympia, WA 98504-0100
(360) 753-6200

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I-976 altered all of these vehicle taxes and fees, as well as several others.

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Sections 2 through 4 of the Initiative amend RCW 46.17 and address “motor vehicle

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license fees” imposed in that chapter. Section 2 limits “[s]tate and local motor vehicle license

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fees” to “$30 per year.” I-976, § 2. Section 2 defines “state and local motor vehicle license fees”

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as “the general license tab fees paid annually for licensing motor vehicles,” but not including

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“charges approved by voters after the effective date of this section.” Id.

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Section 3 amends RCW 46.17.350, which sets forth “vehicle license fee by vehicle type.”

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Id. § 3(1). This section reduces the snowmobile license fee and commercial trailer fee to $30. Id.

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It further states that the “vehicle license fee” required under this subsection is in addition to other

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filing fees and any other fee or tax required by law. Id. § 3(2).

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Section 4 amends RCW 46.17.355, which sets forth “license fee by weight.” Id. § 4(1)(b).

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This section, which generally applies to trucks, reduces license fees to $30 per year for vehicles

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under 10,000 pounds. Id. §§ 4(1)(b), 4(5). This section further states that “license fees” and “the

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freight project fee” in this section are in addition to other filing fees and any other fee or tax

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required by law. Id. § 4(4).

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Section 5 reduces the electric vehicle fee from $100 to $30 and eliminates an additional
$50 electric vehicle fee. Id. §§ 5(1), 5(4)(a).

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Section 6 repeals several statutes, including RCW 46.17.365, which imposed a passenger

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weight fee of between $25 and $72 per vehicle; RCW 82.80.140, which authorized TBDs to

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impose annual vehicle fees of up to $100 per vehicle; and RCW 82.80.130, which authorized

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imposition of a local MVET to support passenger-only ferries. Id. § 6. Section 6 also repeals

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RCW 46.68.415, which addressed how the passenger weight fee would be used.

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Section 7 removes the provision in RCW 82.08.020 that imposed an additional 0.3
percent sales tax for each retail sale of a motor vehicle. Id. § 7(3).
Section 8 adds a new section to the motor vehicle excise tax chapter to require that any
motor vehicle excise tax use “base model Kelley Blue book value” of a vehicle.
DEFENDANT STATE OF
WASHINGTON AND INTERVENORDEFENDANT PIERCE COUNTY’S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
– NO. 19-2-30171-6

4

ATTORNEY GENERAL OF WASHINGTON
Solicitor General’s Office
P.O. Box 40100
Olympia, WA 98504-0100
(360) 753-6200

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Section 9 amends RCW 82.44.065 to incorporate the Kelley Blue book method for

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valuing a vehicle when persons paying state or locally imposed taxes appeal the valuation to the

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Department of Licensing.

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Section 10 amends RCW 81.104.140 to eliminate the special MVET that a regional

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transit authority is allowed to impose under RCW 81.104.160. Pursuant to section 16, section 10

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only takes effect after “the regional transit authority complies with section 12 of this act and

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retires, defeases, or refinances its outstanding bonds.” Id. § 16(1).

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Section 11 repeals RCW 82.44.035 and RCW 81.104.160. Pursuant to section 16, section

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11 takes effect only after “the regional transit authority complies with section 12 of this act and

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retires, defeases, or refinances its outstanding bonds.” Id. § 16(1).

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Section 12 states that “[i]n order to effectuate the policies, purposes, and intent of this act

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to ensure that the motor vehicle excise taxes repealed by this act are no longer collected, an

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authority that imposes a motor vehicle excise tax under RCW 81.104.160 must fully retire,

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defease, or refinance any outstanding bonds” if “[a]ny revenue collected prior to the effective

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date of this section from the motor vehicle excise tax imposed under RCW 81.104.160 has been

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pledged to such bonds” and “[t]he bonds, by virtue of the terms of the bond contract, covenants,

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or similar terms, may be retired or defeased early or refinanced.”

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Section 13 amends RCW 81.104.160 to reduce the authority for voter-approved excise

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taxes for regional transit authorities from 0.8 percent to 0.2 percent on the value of every motor

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vehicle owned by a resident of the taxing district. Pursuant to section 16, section 13 takes effect

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on April 1, 2020, if sections 10 and 11 have not taken effect by March 31, 2020. Id. § 16(2).

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Section 14 requires that the act be liberally construed to effectuate its intent, policies, and
purposes.

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Section 15 provides a severability clause.

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Section 16 sets forth the effective dates for sections 10, 11, and 13.

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Section 17 provides the title of the Act.
DEFENDANT STATE OF
WASHINGTON AND INTERVENORDEFENDANT PIERCE COUNTY’S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
– NO. 19-2-30171-6

5

ATTORNEY GENERAL OF WASHINGTON
Solicitor General’s Office
P.O. Box 40100
Olympia, WA 98504-0100
(360) 753-6200

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C.

Effect of I-976 on Taxpayers

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The repeal, reduction, and removal of motor vehicle taxes and fees will result in

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substantial savings to Washington vehicle owners. All vehicles in Washington, unless exempt,

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must be registered yearly with the Department of Licensing. RCW 46.16A.030, 46.16A.040,

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46.16A.110. At registration, all applicable fees and taxes must be paid. RCW 46.16A.040(3),

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46.16A.110(1). This currently includes TBD fees authorized under RCW 82.80.140.

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If I-976 is implemented, Washington vehicle owners will no longer pay numerous vehicle

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taxes and fees, including the passenger weight fee, the motorhome weight fee, and TBD fees.

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I-976, § 6. In addition, the following fees are all lowered to $30: vehicle license fees by weight

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for vehicles under 10,000 pounds, id., § 4; electric vehicle fee, id. § 5; snowmobile registration,

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id. § 3; and commercial trailer fee, id. And Washington residents who purchase cars will no

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longer have to pay the additional 0.3 percent sales tax on the price of the car. Id., § 7.

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I-976 would save Washington motor vehicle owners more than $300 million annually in

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state motor vehicle taxes and fees. Copsey Decl., Ex. 5 at 2. Motor vehicle owners in the 62

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municipalities across the state that impose TBD vehicle fees—which range from $20 to $80 per

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vehicle—will save an additional $58 million annually. Id. at 3; Copsey Decl., Ex. 6.

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D.

Background on the Ballot Title Process Generally and for I-976

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The process for creating a ballot title for an initiative is established by statute. After the

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sponsor files a proposed initiative with the Secretary of State, RCW 29A.72.010, the Attorney

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General’s Office must create a ballot title within five business days. RCW 29A.72.050. There

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are three parts to a ballot title: “(a) A statement of the subject of the measure; (b) a concise

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description of the measure; and (c) a question in the form prescribed in this section for the ballot

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measure in question.” RCW 29A.72.050(1).

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The first two parts of the ballot title are limited to a set number of words. The statement

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of the subject may “not exceed ten words.” Id. This ten-word statement “must be sufficiently

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broad to reflect the subject of the measure [and] sufficiently precise to give notice of the
DEFENDANT STATE OF
WASHINGTON AND INTERVENORDEFENDANT PIERCE COUNTY’S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
– NO. 19-2-30171-6

6

ATTORNEY GENERAL OF WASHINGTON
Solicitor General’s Office
P.O. Box 40100
Olympia, WA 98504-0100
(360) 753-6200

 1

measure’s subject matter.” Id. The concise description may not exceed 30 words. Id. This 30-

2

word description must “be a true and impartial description of the measure’s essential contents,

3

clearly identify the proposition to be voted on, and not, to the extent reasonably possible, create

4

prejudice either for or against the measure.” Id. Once completed, the Attorney General’s Office

5

files the ballot title with the Secretary of State, RCW 29A.72.060, who notifies the sponsor and

6

others, RCW 29A.72.070.

7

Any person may challenge a ballot title. RCW 29A.72.080. An appeal must be filed in

8

Thurston County Superior Court within five business days of the ballot title being filed with the

9

Secretary of State. Id. The Thurston County Superior Court may re-write the ballot title in a

10

manner that “it determines will meet the requirements of RCW 29A.72.060.” Id. The Court’s

11

decision may not be appealed. Id.

12
13

I-976 was filed on March 19, 2018. Copsey Decl., Ex. 7. The Attorney General’s Office
filed the ballot title for I-976 on March 26, 2018. Copsey Decl., Ex. 8.

14

The sponsor timely challenged I-976’s concise description but voluntarily dismissed his

15

challenge before the Thurston County Superior Court ruled. Copsey Decl., Ex. 9. The sponsor

16

subsequently gathered the requisite number of signatures to qualify I-976 for consideration, and

17

the Secretary of State referred the Initiative to the people in November 2019. See Wash. Const.

18

art. II, § 1(a).

19
20
21
22
23
24
25

III.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES

1.

Have Plaintiffs proven beyond a reasonable doubt that I-976 violates article II,
section 19 of the Washington Constitution?

2.

Have Plaintiffs proven beyond a reasonable doubt that I-976 violates article II,
section 37 of the Washington Constitution?

3.

Have Plaintiffs proven beyond a reasonable doubt that I-976 violates article VII,
section 5 of the Washington Constitution?

4.

Have Plaintiffs proven beyond a reasonable doubt that I-976 unconstitutionally
restricts local authority?

26
DEFENDANT STATE OF
WASHINGTON AND INTERVENORDEFENDANT PIERCE COUNTY’S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
– NO. 19-2-30171-6

7

ATTORNEY GENERAL OF WASHINGTON
Solicitor General’s Office
P.O. Box 40100
Olympia, WA 98504-0100
(360) 753-6200

 1
2
3

12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19

EVIDENCE RELIED UPON

V.
A.

9

11

Have Plaintiffs proven beyond a reasonable doubt that I-976 unconstitutionally
impairs contracts?

Copsey, the exhibits attached thereto, and the pleadings and records on file in this matter.

7

10

6.

This Motion for Summary Judgment relies upon the supporting Declaration of Alan D.

5

8

Have Plaintiffs proven beyond a reasonable doubt that I-976 violates separationof-powers principles?

IV.

4

6

5.

AUTHORITY

Plaintiffs Must Demonstrate That I-976 Is Unconstitutional Beyond a Reasonable
Doubt
A law enacted through initiative is presumed constitutional. Amalgamated Transit Union

Local 587 v. State, 142 Wn.2d 183, 205, 11 P.3d 762 (2000) (ATU). In moving for a preliminary
injunction, Plaintiffs advanced many theories as to why I-976 allegedly violated the Washington
Constitution. The State and Pierce County anticipate Plaintiffs will continue that strategy, but
now their burden is more rigorous. They must demonstrate more than just a likelihood of success
on the merits. They “must, by argument and research, convince the court that there is no
reasonable doubt that the statute violates the constitution.” Island Cy v. State, 135 Wn.2d 141,
147, 955 P.2d 377 (1998). Plaintiffs thus bear a “heavy burden” to overcome the presumption of
constitutionality. ATU, 142 Wn.2d at 205.
B.

Plaintiffs Cannot Meet Their Heavy Burden of Showing That I-976 Violates Article
II, Section 19 of the Washington Constitution

20

Plaintiffs claim I-976 violates article II, section 19, which provides that “[n]o bill shall

21

embrace more than one subject, and that shall be expressed in the title.” Const. art. II, § 19. This

22

provision applies to initiatives in the same way it applies to bills enacted by the legislature. Wash.

23

Ass’n for Substance Abuse & Violence Prevention v. State, 174 Wn.2d 642, 654, 278 P.3d 632

24

(2012) (WASAVP). There are “two distinct prohibitions” within article II, section 19, both of

25

which Plaintiffs allege are contravened: (1) the single-subject rule, which precludes an initiative

26

from covering more than one subject; and (2) the subject-in-title rule, which requires that the
DEFENDANT STATE OF
WASHINGTON AND INTERVENORDEFENDANT PIERCE COUNTY’S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
– NO. 19-2-30171-6

8

ATTORNEY GENERAL OF WASHINGTON
Solicitor General’s Office
P.O. Box 40100
Olympia, WA 98504-0100
(360) 753-6200

 1

title of an initiative inform voters of the subject matter of the measure they are voting on. See

2

ATU, 142 Wn.2d at 207. Both requirements are to be “‘liberally construed in favor of the

3

legislation.’” Pierce Cty. I, 150 Wn.2d at 436 (quoting Wash. Fed’n of State Emps. v. State, 127

4

Wn.2d 544, 555, 901 P.2d 1028 (1995)). If the words in a title can be given two interpretations,

5

one of which makes the measure constitutional and the other unconstitutional, a court is to adopt

6

the constitutional interpretation. Wash. Fed’n of State Emps., 127 Wn.2d at 556.

7

I-976 complies with the single subject rule because, as expressed in its title, I-976

8

generally concerns motor vehicle taxes and fees, and all of its provisions relate to that subject

9

and to each other. I-976 complies with the subject-in-title rule because its title is accurate and

10

gives notice that would lead to an inquiry into the body of the act.

11

1.

12

The single-subject requirement of article II, section 19 requires that “no bill shall embrace

13

more than one subject.” Pierce Cty. I, 150 Wn.2d at 436. The Washington Supreme Court has

14

made clear that this rule does not require legislative bills or initiatives to be narrowly focused,

15

and it has upheld initiatives with multiple far-reaching effects.

I-976 complies with the single-subject rule

16

For example, when Washington voters enacted Initiative 1183 in 2011, they

17

“dramatically changed the State’s approach to regulating the distribution and sale of liquor in

18

Washington,” WASAVP, 174 Wn.2d at 649, including authorizing the private sale of liquor,

19

directing the state to auction off state liquor retail and distribution facilities, modifying the wine

20

distribution system, imposing a variety of new fees on liquor retailers and distributors, changing

21

laws regulating liquor advertising, and providing a $10 million public safety earmark that was

22

not directly linked to any liquor-related issues, id. at 649-51. The Supreme Court concluded that

23

all of these provisions were “germane to the general topic of I-1183, whether that is liquor or the

24

narrower subject of liquor privatization.” Id. at 656, 660.

25

Similarly, when Washington voters approved Initiative 276 in 1972, they established

26

financial disclosure requirements for elected officials, imposed registration requirements and
DEFENDANT STATE OF
WASHINGTON AND INTERVENORDEFENDANT PIERCE COUNTY’S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
– NO. 19-2-30171-6

9

ATTORNEY GENERAL OF WASHINGTON
Solicitor General’s Office
P.O. Box 40100
Olympia, WA 98504-0100
(360) 753-6200

 1

regulations for lobbyists, established campaign finance reporting requirements for candidates,

2

and required access to public records held by state and local agencies. Fritz v. Gorton, 83

3

Wn.2d 275, 290, 517 P.2d 911 (1974). Although these requirements were “new, novel, . . . most

4

extensive and very, very detailed,” id. at 286, the Court held that they all related to one

5

overarching topic: “openness in government” (a phrase that did not appear in either the title or

6

text of I-276), id. at 290.

7

a.

I-976’s title is general

8

The starting point for analyzing a single-subject challenge is the title of the measure.

9

ATU, 142 Wn.2d at 207. “A ballot title consists of a statement of the subject of the measure, a

10

concise description of the measure, and the question of whether or not the measure should be

11

enacted into law.” WASAVP, 174 Wn.2d at 655 (citing RCW 29A.72.050). Here, the ballot title

12

for I-976 read:

13
14

Statement of Subject: Initiative Measure No. 976 concerns motor vehicle taxes and
fees.

16

Concise Description: This measure would repeal, reduce, or remove authority to
impose certain vehicle taxes and fees; limit annual motor-vehicle-license fees to
$30, except voter-approved charges; and base vehicle taxes on Kelley Blue Book
value.

17

Should this measure be enacted into law? Yes [ ] No [ ]

15

18

Copsey Decl., Ex. 8.

19

A general ballot title is one that “suggests a general, overarching subject matter for the

20

initiative,” rather than one that is “specific and narrow.” Wash. Ass’n of Neigh. Stores v. State,

21

149 Wn.2d 359, 369, 70 P.3d 920 (2003). “‘[A] few well-chosen words, suggestive of the

22

general subject stated, is all that is necessary.’” WASAVP, 174 Wn.2d at 655 (quoting ATU, 142

23

Wn.2d at 209). If there is any doubt, and the title can be interpreted as general, it should be

24

understood that way to effectuate the constitutionality of the measure. Wash. Fed'n of State

25

Emps., 127 Wn.2d at 556.

26
DEFENDANT STATE OF
WASHINGTON AND INTERVENORDEFENDANT PIERCE COUNTY’S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
– NO. 19-2-30171-6

10

ATTORNEY GENERAL OF WASHINGTON
Solicitor General’s Office
P.O. Box 40100
Olympia, WA 98504-0100
(360) 753-6200

 1

Here, the ballot title of I-976 is general. The overarching subject matter, identified in the

2

Statement of Subject, is “motor vehicle taxes and fees.” This broad title description is akin to

3

initiative titles the Supreme Court has previously recognized as general, such as Initiative 1183

4

(“concern[ing] liquor: beer, wine, and spirits”) and SeaTac Proposition 1 (“concern[ing] labor

5

standards for certain employers”). See WASAVP, 174 Wn.2d at 655 (finding I-1183 title general);

6

Filo Foods, LLC v. City of SeaTac, 183 Wn.2d 770, 784, 357 P.3d 1040 (2015) (same as to

7

SeaTac Proposition 1). The title is not restrictive just because the concise description references

8

some, but not all, of the provisions in the initiative that relate to the overarching topic of motor

9

vehicle taxes and fees. Filo Foods at 784.

10

The “breadth of topics” covered by I-976 and the “structure of its title” are “not

11

appreciably different from the scope and structure” of the initiatives upheld by the Supreme

12

Court in WASAVP and Filo Foods. See Filo Foods, 183 Wn.2d at 784 (discussing initiatives

13

upheld in that case and in WASAVP). The titles of those initiatives “indicated a general topic and

14

then listed some but not all of [their] substantive measures.” Id. (emphasis added). The fact that

15

the ballot titles at issue in those cases listed “various provisions” did not make them restrictive,

16

where they also indicated a more overarching topic. Id. The same is true of I-976.

17

b.

I-976 exhibits rational unity

18

Because the title is general, the single-subject rule is violated only if the general subject

19

and incidental subjects of the initiative lack “rational unity.” ATU, 142 Wn.2d at 209. “Rational

20

unity exists when the matters within the body of the initiative are germane to the general title

21

and to one another.” Filo Foods, 183 Wn.2d at 782-83. The court is to use “great liberality” in

22

making this determination. Id. at 782. There is no violation just because a “general subject

23

contains several incidental subjects or subdivisions.” ATU at 207.

24

Because I-976 generally “concerns motor vehicle taxes and fees,” its various substantive

25

provisions need only be germane to that subject and to one another to survive single-subject

26
DEFENDANT STATE OF
WASHINGTON AND INTERVENORDEFENDANT PIERCE COUNTY’S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
– NO. 19-2-30171-6

11

ATTORNEY GENERAL OF WASHINGTON
Solicitor General’s Office
P.O. Box 40100
Olympia, WA 98504-0100
(360) 753-6200

 1

scrutiny. Filo Foods at 782-83. Here, all of the operative provisions are germane to the general

2

subject, motor vehicle taxes and fees.

3

Sections 2 through 11 and section 13 directly address motor vehicle taxes and fees by

4

repealing, reducing, or removing authority to impose various taxes and fees on motor vehicle

5

sales or licensing. The subjects addressed—vehicle license fees (sections 2 through 4), electric

6

vehicle fees (section 5), motor vehicle excise taxes (sections 8 through 13), other fees such as

7

TBD vehicle fees or weight fees (section 6), and sales and use taxes (sections 7, 11, and 16)—

8

all involve motor vehicle taxes or fees and therefore are all germane to the overarching subject

9

of motor vehicle taxes and fees.

10

Section 12—which Plaintiffs pointed to in their preliminary injunction motion—is

11

germane to the general subject of motor vehicle taxes and fees because it is intended to ensure

12

that one type of repealed motor vehicle tax, the MVET, is no longer collected. It does so by

13

requiring bonds that rely on that tax to be retired, defeased, or refinanced to the extent possible.

14

By making the elimination of Sound Transit’s authority to levy and collect MVETs (sections 10

15

and 11) contingent on Sound Transit’s ability to retire, defease, or refinance its outstanding

16

bonds, section 12 is a rational response to avoid the unconstitutional flaw the Supreme Court

17

identified in Pierce Cty. II, 159 Wn.2d 16, 39 (holding that I-776, by limiting motor vehicle

18

excise taxes that Sound Transit could collect, unconstitutionally impaired contracts between

19

Sound Transit and its bondholders). Because section 12 helps implement sections 10 and 11,

20

those sections are germane to one another. See Citizens for Responsible Wildlife Mgmt., 149

21

Wn.2d 622, 637, 71 P.3d 644 (2003) (holding that where one section of a measure is necessary

22

to implement another section, those two sections are germane to one another).

23

In seeking a preliminary injunction, Plaintiffs cited three cases to argue that I-976 violates

24

the single-subject rule by combining a law of general application that is continuing in nature

25

with a more specific law. But I-976 is not like the laws invalidated in the case they cited; indeed,

26

the Supreme Court already distinguished those cases in Citizens for Responsible Wildlife
DEFENDANT STATE OF
WASHINGTON AND INTERVENORDEFENDANT PIERCE COUNTY’S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
– NO. 19-2-30171-6

12

ATTORNEY GENERAL OF WASHINGTON
Solicitor General’s Office
P.O. Box 40100
Olympia, WA 98504-0100
(360) 753-6200

 1

Management, 149 Wn.2d at 637-38, explaining that each of the invalidated laws contained “dual

2

subjects” having no relation to one another—one a “broad, long term and continuing” provision,

3

and the other having a more specific impact—with neither provision necessary to implement the

4

other. See id. at 637 (distinguishing ATU, 142 Wn.2d 183, City of Burien v. Kiga, 144

5

Wn.2d 819, 31 P.3d 659 (2001), and Wash. Toll Bridge Auth. v. State, 49 Wn.2d 520, 304

6

P.2d 676 (1956)). 1

7

As explained above, and in contrast to the cases Plaintiffs cited, all of the provisions in

8

I-976 either directly address motor vehicle taxes and fees—the general subject of the Initiative—

9

or are rationally necessary to implement provisions that directly address motor vehicle taxes and

10

fees. All of the sections of I-976 are thus germane to the general subject and to one other. The

11

Initiative exhibits “rational unity” and does not contain “dual subjects.”

12

2.

13

Plaintiffs claim I-976 violates the subject-in-title rule because it supposedly “misleads

14

voters on the provisions of I-976.” PI Mot. at 23. They are incorrect, and their arguments rely on

15

misunderstanding I-976 and its ballot title.

I-976 complies with the subject-in-title rule

16

The subject-in-title requirement of article II, section 19 requires that “no bill shall have

17

a subject which is not expressed in its title.” ATU, 142 Wn.2d at 207. The purpose of this rule is

18

to ensure that members of the voting public are put on proper notice “of the subject matter of the

19

measure.” Id. “To be constitutionally adequate, ‘the title need not be an index to the contents,

20

nor must it provide details of the measure.’” Pierce Cty. I, 150 Wn.2d at 436 (quoting ATU, 142

21

Wn.2d at 217)). Rather, a title is sufficient “‘if it gives notice that would lead to an inquiry into

22

the body of the act, or indicate to an inquiring mind the scope and purpose of the law.’” Id.

23

(quoting YMCA v. State, 62 Wn.2d 504, 506, 383 P.2d 497 (1963)). “Any objections to the title

24
25
26

The Court also distinguished those cases in the WASAVP decision, where it found a “closer nexus” among
I-1183’s provisions “affecting spirits and wine” that did not “combine a specific impact of a law with a general
measure for the future.” 174 Wn.2d at 658-59.
1

DEFENDANT STATE OF
WASHINGTON AND INTERVENORDEFENDANT PIERCE COUNTY’S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
– NO. 19-2-30171-6

13

ATTORNEY GENERAL OF WASHINGTON
Solicitor General’s Office
P.O. Box 40100
Olympia, WA 98504-0100
(360) 753-6200

 1

must be grave and the conflict between it and the constitution palpable” before the Court will

2

“hold an act unconstitutional.” WASAVP, 174 Wn.2d at 661 (internal quotations omitted).

3

Here, I-976’s ballot title appropriately notifies the public that it “concerns motor vehicle

4

taxes and fees” and that it would “repeal, reduce, or remove authority to impose certain vehicle

5

taxes and fees; limit annual motor-vehicle-license fees to $30, except voter-approved charges,

6

and base vehicle taxes on Kelley Blue Book value.” Copsey Decl., Ex. 8. Like the title of the

7

initiative at issue in Pierce Cty. I, this language was sufficient to “give notice that would lead to

8

an inquiry into the body of the act.” 150 Wn.2d at 436. Although space limitations did not permit

9

the ballot title to detail how a “motor-vehicle-license fee” is defined, or how and when the

10

exception for “voter-approved charges” might arise, it was sufficient to give notice that would

11

lead to an inquiry into the text of the Initiative. See id. at 436-37 (noting that state law imposes

12

a “10-word limit on the ‘statement of the subject,’ and a 30-word limit on the ‘concise

13

description,’” in concluding that a ballot title “was sufficiently detailed to prompt an inquiring

14

mind to read the initiative for further details” (quoting RCW 29.79.035(1)). There was no need

15

to parse out the particular taxes and fees at issue, or the charges that could or could not be

16

approved by voters. The language of I-976’s title was sufficient to prompt an inquiring voter to

17

ask which taxes and fees are affected, and which voter-approved charges are excepted.

18

The Court in WASAVP also held that a title may not be materially misleading or false.

19

174 Wn.2d at 660. The title of I-976 is neither. The title first clearly informs voters that the

20

measure would broadly “repeal, reduce, or remove authority to impose certain vehicle taxes and

21

fees.” Then, in a separate clause, the title explains that one specific type of fee, “annual motor-

22

vehicle-license fees,” would be limited “to $30, except voter-approved charges.” This accurately

23

reflects the language of the Initiative. Section 2 of I-976 amends chapter 46.17 RCW to provide

24

that “motor-vehicle-license fees” are limited to $30, except voter-approved charges. Section 2

25

further defines “motor vehicle license fees” as “general license tab fees paid annually for

26

licensing motor vehicles,” which specifically “do not include charges approved by voters after
DEFENDANT STATE OF
WASHINGTON AND INTERVENORDEFENDANT PIERCE COUNTY’S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
– NO. 19-2-30171-6

14

ATTORNEY GENERAL OF WASHINGTON
Solicitor General’s Office
P.O. Box 40100
Olympia, WA 98504-0100
(360) 753-6200

 1

the effective date of this section.” Thus, while the ballot title does not describe the temporal

2

limitations of voter-approved changes, section 2 clearly does. And the ballot title clearly informs

3

voters that I-976 would “repeal, reduce, or remove authority to impose certain vehicle taxes and

4

fees,” regardless of whether they were voter-approved, which would reasonably prompt a voter

5

to “read the initiative for further details.” See Pierce Cty. I, 150 Wn.2d at 436-37.

6

In their motion for preliminary injunction, Plaintiffs claimed it was misleading for

7

sections 1 and 2 of the Initiative, and, as a result, the ballot title, to state that the $30 cap on

8

“vehicle license fees” excepted “voter-approved” increases, when section 6 repealed local

9

authority to impose various voter-approved taxes and fees beyond $30. Their claim fails because

10

it ignores the title’s actual language and the differences between the types of fees and taxes I-976

11

affects.

12

Section 2 addresses “motor vehicle license fees” under chapter 46.17 RCW and limits

13

them to $30. It defines “motor vehicle license fees” to mean “the general license tab fees paid

14

annually for licensing motor vehicles.” That definition is consistent with (although not identical

15

to) the definition of “vehicle license fee” in RCW 46.04.671, which is “a fee collected by the

16

state of Washington as a license fee . . . for the act of registering a vehicle under chapter 46.16A

17

RCW.” A law duly enacted by voters is not to be invalidated based on “nuances between terms.”

18

WASAVP, 174 Wn.2d at 665.

19

In contrast, section 6 repeals statutes authorizing fees and taxes that are separate and

20

distinct from “vehicle license fees.” One statute repealed by section 6 is RCW 82.80.140, which

21

authorized local TBDs to impose an additional, separate “annual vehicle fee” on “each vehicle

22

subject to vehicle license fees under RCW 46.17.350” or “gross weight license fees under

23

RCW 46.17.355.” Thus, by its own language, RCW 82.80.140 distinguishes the TBD “vehicle

24

fees” authorized in that section from the “vehicle license fees” authorized under RCW 46.17.350

25

and 46.17.355. A second repealed statute, RCW 82.80.130, authorized certain TBDs to impose

26
DEFENDANT STATE OF
WASHINGTON AND INTERVENORDEFENDANT PIERCE COUNTY’S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
– NO. 19-2-30171-6

15

ATTORNEY GENERAL OF WASHINGTON
Solicitor General’s Office
P.O. Box 40100
Olympia, WA 98504-0100
(360) 753-6200

 1

a local option motor vehicle excise tax to provide passenger-only ferry service. Like the TBD

2

fee, it is separate and distinct from a “vehicle license fee.”

3

Neither of these repealed charges are “vehicle license fees.” Going back to the definition

4

in RCW 46.04.671, “vehicle license fee” is defined specifically to exclude “taxes and fees

5

collected by [the Department of Licensing] for other jurisdictions”—and that definition excludes

6

TBD fees and local option MVETs. Although motor-vehicle-license fees under chapter 46.17

7

RCW are collected at the same time as MVETs and TBD vehicle fees, they are separate charges.

8

Notifying voters, as the ballot title did, that the measure limited “motor-vehicle-license fees to

9

$30, except voter-approved charges,” was not misleading or false given that TBD fees and

10

MVETs are separate and would not be subject to the voter-approval exception.

11

Additionally, while I-976 does not specify how voters could approve charges above the

12

$30 cap on motor-vehicle-license fees in the future, that does not make the ballot title misleading.

13

Voters could approve such charges by initiative, or if the legislature created future authority for

14

local imposition of vehicle license fees. The title did not need to provide these details.

15

In short, I-976’s ballot title accurately informs voters as to the general impacts of the

16

measure (to “repeal, reduce, or remove authority to impose certain vehicle taxes and fees”) and,

17

more specifically, that one type of fee (“motor-vehicle-license fees”) would be limited to $30,

18

absent voter-approved charges regarding that fee. This is neither deceitful nor misleading.

19

C.

I-976 Complies With Article II, Section 37 of the Washington Constitution

20

I-976 complies with the Washington Constitution’s requirement that a law must “set forth

21

at full length” an “act revised or the section amended.” Wash. Const. art. II, § 37. I-976 is clear

22

as to which statutes it amends, and it sets those statutes forth at full length. It does not amend

23

any other provisions within the meaning of article II, section 37.

24

Article II, section 37 requires that certain amendments to statutes be “set forth at full

25

length.” The constitutional provision does not, however, apply to sections of bills that repeal

26

existing statutes, ATU, 142 Wn.2d at 254, or that are “complete acts which incidentally or
DEFENDANT STATE OF
WASHINGTON AND INTERVENORDEFENDANT PIERCE COUNTY’S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
– NO. 19-2-30171-6

16

ATTORNEY GENERAL OF WASHINGTON
Solicitor General’s Office
P.O. Box 40100
Olympia, WA 98504-0100
(360) 753-6200

 1

impliedly amend prior acts,” id. at 251 (quoting Weyerhaeuser v. King Cty., 91 Wn.2d 721, 738,

2

592 P.2d 1108 (1979) (Dolliver, J., dissenting)). The purpose of article II, section 37 is “to

3

protect the members of the Legislature and the public against fraud and deception, not to trammel

4

or hamper the Legislature” or the people “in the enactment of laws.” Spokane Grain & Fuel Co.

5

v. Lyttaker, 59 Wash. 76, 82, 109 P. 316 (1910).

6
7

On its face, I-976 complies with article II, section 37. Each provision that amends an
existing statute sets the existing statute forth at full length. I-976, §§ 3-5, 7, 9, 13.

8

Plaintiffs’ complaint rests on a misunderstanding of I-976. In their complaint, Plaintiffs

9

and Plaintiff-Intervenor allege that I-976 results in an “implied repeal of numerous statutes.”

10

First Am. Compl. (FAC) in Introduction at 2; Compl. in Intervention at 2. I-976 does not

11

impliedly repeal any statute. In prior briefing, Plaintiffs suggested two instances of alleged

12

amendment: that I-976 silently repeals various fees in chapter 46.17 RCW, and that I-976

13

amends RCW 36.73.040 and RCW 36.73.065. Plaintiffs’ assertions are both wrong.

14

I-976 does not repeal any provisions in RCW 46.17, except for those expressly identified

15

in section 6 of the Initiative. Plaintiffs simply misread the law. Section 2 of I-976 imposes a “$30

16

per year” cap on “motor vehicle license fees.” The “license fees” for motor vehicles are set by

17

RCW 46.17.350 and 46.17.355. Consistent with the cap imposed in section 2, sections 3 and 4

18

of I-976 reduce “license fees” for specified motor vehicles to $30. In addition to the “license

19

fees” for motor vehicles in RCW 46.17.350 and 46.17.355, chapter 46.17 RCW includes

20

additional fees, such as the “aquatic weed fee” and the “personalized license plate fee.”

21

RCW 46.17.210, 46.17.305. These other fees are not “license fees.” The term “license fee” does

22

not appear in the other statutes. And the text of I-976 expressly discloses the relationship between

23

“license fees” and other types of fees—the license fees are “in addition to . . . any other fee

24

. . . required by law.” I-976, §§ 3(2), 4(4).

25

Plaintiffs’ reliance on section 2 is misplaced. Plaintiffs specifically rely on the description

26

of the term “state and local vehicle license fees” in section 2(2) of I-976 and argue that any fee
DEFENDANT STATE OF
WASHINGTON AND INTERVENORDEFENDANT PIERCE COUNTY’S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
– NO. 19-2-30171-6

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ATTORNEY GENERAL OF WASHINGTON
Solicitor General’s Office
P.O. Box 40100
Olympia, WA 98504-0100
(360) 753-6200

 1

“paid annually for licensing motor vehicles” must be subject to the $30 cap. PI Reply Br. at 7.

2

But that argument ignores I-976’s use of the term “license fees,” which also appears in

3

RCW 46.17.350 and 46.17.355. Plaintiffs’ argument also ignores that I-976 expressly states that

4

there will still be “other fee[s] . . . . required by law.” I-976, §§ 3(2), 4(4). Plaintiffs further

5

ignore basic rules of statutory interpretation. I-976 expressly repeals certain sections of chapter

6

46.17 RCW. The omission of provisions repealing other sections is presumptively intentional.

7

See, e.g., Perez-Crisantos v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 187 Wn.2d 669, 680, 389 P.3d 476

8

(2017). In short, I-976 does not repeal the other fees set forth in chapter 46.17 RCW.

9

I-976 also does not amend either RCW 36.73.040 or 36.73.065. While the repeal of

10

RCW 82.84.140 has an incidental impact those statutes, that impact is consistent with article II,

11

section 37. In repealing RCW 82.80.140, the people removed the authority for TBDs to “fix and

12

impose an annual vehicle fee.” RCW 82.80.140(1). This was a “complete act,” just as I-695’s

13

repeal of the MVET was a complete act. ATU, 142 Wn.2d at 255; see also Laws of 2000, ch. 1,

14

§ 3.

15

I-976’s repeal of RCW 82.80.140 is a complete act because it creates no confusion as to

16

the authority of TBDs to impose annual vehicle fees. Neither RCW 36.73.040 nor

17

RCW 36.73.065 creates independent authority for TBDs to impose annual vehicle fees.

18

RCW 36.73.040 summarizes the types of “taxes, fees, charges, and tolls” that a TBD is

19

authorized to impose and includes “a vehicle fee in accordance with RCW 82.80.140.”

20

(Emphasis added.) 2 Because I-976 repeals RCW 82.80.140, RCW 36.73.040 no longer

21

authorizes TBDs to impose such a vehicle fee. There is no inconsistency. Because of the cross-

22

reference in RCW 36.73.040, it is perfectly clear how the repeal of RCW 82.80.140 affects

23

RCW 36.73.040. Similarly, RCW 36.73.065 also includes cross-references to RCW 82.80.140

24

that make it clear how RCW 36.73.065 is affected by the repeal. In sum, the repeal of

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2

§ 6.”

RCW 36.73.040 now contains a Reviser’s note that states “RCW 82.80.140 was repealed by 2020 c 1

DEFENDANT STATE OF
WASHINGTON AND INTERVENORDEFENDANT PIERCE COUNTY’S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
– NO. 19-2-30171-6

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ATTORNEY GENERAL OF WASHINGTON
Solicitor General’s Office
P.O. Box 40100
Olympia, WA 98504-0100
(360) 753-6200

 1

RCW 82.80.140 is a complete act. While I-976 does not “embody the entire . . . law of the state”

2

on the fee-setting authority of TBDs, article II, § 37 does not require that it do so. Spokane Grain

3

& Fuel Co., 59 Wash. at 84.

4

I-976’s repeal of RCW 82.80.140 also does not render “a straightforward determination

5

of the scope of rights or duties under existing statutes” erroneous. El Centro de la Raza v. State,

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192 Wn.2d 103, 129, 428 P.3d 1143 (2018) (quoting State v. Manussier, 129 Wn.2d 652, 663,

7

921 P.2d 473 (1996)). A reader of RCW 36.73.040 or 36.73.065 would necessarily be aware that

8

the reference to “vehicle fee[s]” refer only to those vehicle fees “in accordance with” or

9

“authorized in” RCW 82.80.140. It would be straightforward for the reader to consult the express

10

cross-reference and learn that, at the present time, no such fees are authorized. Put differently,

11

while the effect of the repeal of RCW 82.80.140 might be “‘to restrict the operation of some

12

other statutes,’ . . . that is not a defect of a constitutional magnitude.” Manussier, 129 Wn.2d at

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665 (quoting Wash. Educ. Ass’n v. State, 97 Wn.2d 899, 905, 652 P.2d 1347 (1982)).

14

I-976 does not violate article II, section 37. Each substantive change in the law is set

15

forth at full length. Its purpose was not hidden. I-976 fully discloses that other fees remain in

16

effect and that it removes the authority of TBDs to impose additional annual vehicle fees. I-976

17

is complete as to each change that it makes and does not render “a straightforward determination

18

of the scope of rights or duties under existing statutes” erroneous. Manussier, 129 Wn.2d at 663.

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This Court should reject Plaintiffs’ invocation of article II, section 37 to “trammel or hamper”

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the People’s lawmaking power. Spokane Grain & Fuel Co., 59 Wash. at 82.

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D.

Washington Constitution Article VII, Section 5 Has No Application to I-976

22

Summary judgement also is warranted as to Plaintiffs’ claim that I-976 violates article

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VII, section 5 of the state constitution. Article VII, section 5 states, “No tax shall be levied except

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in pursuance of law; and every law imposing a tax shall state distinctly the object of the same to

25

which only it shall be applied.” Here, however, I-976 does not levy or impose any taxes. To the

26

contrary, the Initiative “repeal[s] and remove[s] authority to impose certain vehicle taxes.” I-976,
DEFENDANT STATE OF
WASHINGTON AND INTERVENORDEFENDANT PIERCE COUNTY’S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
– NO. 19-2-30171-6

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ATTORNEY GENERAL OF WASHINGTON
Solicitor General’s Office
P.O. Box 40100
Olympia, WA 98504-0100
(360) 753-6200

 1

§ 1. While Plaintiffs assert that I-976 violates article VII, section 5 “through the unlawful

2

diversion of tax revenue” they plead no facts in support of such a claim. Nor could they. Through

3

its repeal and removal of certain motor vehicle taxes and fees, I-976 does not divert motor vehicle

4

taxes “into some wholly unrelated project or fund.” Sheehan v. Cent. Puget Sound Reg’l Transit

5

Auth., 155 Wn.2d 790, 804, 123 P.3d 88 (2005). Accordingly, because article VII, section 5

6

provides no basis for invalidating I-976, summary judgment should be granted to the State and

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Pierce County as to this claim as well.

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E.

I-976 Does Not Unconstitutionally Infringe on Local Authority

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By enacting I-976, the people of the State exercised their constitutional power to rescind

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some of the taxing authority of local governments. The Supreme Court expressly recognized the

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people’s power to do this in Pierce Cty. I, 150 Wn.2d at 440. A TBD cannot, by obtaining

12

approval from the local electorate, deprive the State of its constitutionally-granted legislative

13

power. Plaintiffs’ claim that I-976 impermissibly infringes on local authority is contrary to

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fundamental principles in the Washington Constitution.

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Municipal corporations, including TBDs, have no inherent power to tax. Watson v. City

16

of Seattle, 189 Wn.2d 149, 178, 401 P.3d 1 (2017). They have only the authority the State

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legislatively grants. City of Wenatchee v. Chelan Cty. Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1, 181 Wn. App. 326,

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335, 325 P.3d 419 (2014). That authority can be granted—or withdrawn—by the Legislature or

19

by the People legislating by initiative. Pierce Cty. I at 440.

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The power to rescind taxing authority granted to a local jurisdiction is inherent in article

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XI, section 12. Id. at 440. That includes both the power to assess taxes and the power to collect

22

taxes. I-976 thus permissibly rescinds some of the taxing authority previously granted to TBDs,

23

namely, the previously-granted authority for TBDs to “fix and impose an annual vehicle fee.”

24

RCW 82.80.140(1).

25

Plaintiffs would turn the constitutional relationship between the State and municipal

26

corporations on its head, allowing the electorate of a local TBD to deprive the Legislature—or
DEFENDANT STATE OF
WASHINGTON AND INTERVENORDEFENDANT PIERCE COUNTY’S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
– NO. 19-2-30171-6

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ATTORNEY GENERAL OF WASHINGTON
Solicitor General’s Office
P.O. Box 40100
Olympia, WA 98504-0100
(360) 753-6200

 1

the People legislating by initiative—of their constitutional power to rescind a municipal

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corporation’s taxing authority. That is inconsistent with Washington’s constitutional structure

3

and unsupported by case law.

4

Plaintiffs’ reliance on article I, section 19 of the Washington Constitution is misplaced.

5

The provision provides that “[a]ll Elections shall be free and equal, and no power, civil or

6

military, shall at any time interfere to prevent the free exercise of the right of suffrage.” As its

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text indicates, this provision is concerned with the manner in which elections are conducted—

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they must be “free and equal.” Article I, section 19 does not guarantee that a measure receiving

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local voter approval will remain in effect permanently—or for any length of time at all. The only

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case Plaintiffs have cited addressing article I, section 19 does not address that issue; in Foster v.

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Sunnyside Valley Irrigation Dist., 102 Wn.2d 395, 403-10, 687 P.2d 841 (1984), the article I,

12

section 19 issue concerned who is permitted to vote in irrigation district elections, not whether

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the results of such an election can stand in perpetuity, regardless of state law.

14

Under the Washington Constitution, the People have the power to rescind taxing

15

authority that was previously granted to a municipal corporation. Pierce Cty. I, 150 Wn.2d at

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440. The People’s action in rescinding the authority of TBDs to impose vehicle fees falls

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squarely within the People’s constitutionally-granted power.

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F.

I-976 Does Not Violate Any Separation of Powers Principle

19

The state initiative power is coextensive with its legislative power and is limited only by

20

the federal and state constitutions. Coppernoll v. Reed, 155 Wn.2d 290, 299, 119 P.3d 290

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(2005); ATU, 175 Wn.2d at 545. In this litigation, Plaintiffs have cited cases addressing the scope

22

of the local initiative power. But the scope of the local initiative power is irrelevant to this

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challenge to a state initiative; the two are distinct and the state initiative power is far broader.

24

Protect Pub. Health v. Freed, 192 Wn.2d 477, 482-83, 430 P.2d 640 (2018). As explained above,

25

the power of the Legislature—and therefore of the People legislating by initiative—to rescind

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DEFENDANT STATE OF
WASHINGTON AND INTERVENORDEFENDANT PIERCE COUNTY’S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
– NO. 19-2-30171-6

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ATTORNEY GENERAL OF WASHINGTON
Solicitor General’s Office
P.O. Box 40100
Olympia, WA 98504-0100
(360) 753-6200

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taxing authority granted to a local jurisdiction is inherent in article XI, section 12. Pierce Cty. I

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at 440. I-976 is well within the state initiative power.

3

Likewise, enacting contingent legislation does not unconstitutionally delegate legislative

4

authority. Plaintiffs’ challenge to the contingency in section 16 therefore fails. That section

5

simply addresses what will happen if a regional transit authority retires, defeases, or refinances

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its outstanding bonds by March 31, 2020, and what will happen if it does not. The Washington

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Supreme Court has routinely upheld legislation that is conditioned on action by third parties,

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even where that action involves the exercise of judgment by those third parties.

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In Brower v. State, 137 Wn.2d 44, 969 P.2d 42 (1998), for example, the Court upheld

10

legislation that was contingent on a private party entering into an agreement with the Secretary

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of State to reimburse the state and counties for the cost of a special election. Id. at 51. Whether

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to enter into such an agreement involved an exercise of judgment on the part of the third party.

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Id. at 54-55. Likewise, in Diversified Inv. P’ship v. Dep’t of Social & Health Servs., 113

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Wn.2d 19, 775 P.2d 947 (1989), the continued effectiveness of a state statute was conditioned

15

upon the federal government not finding state law to be in conflict with federal law. Id. at 22.

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The federal government necessarily exercised judgment in determining whether state law

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conflicted with federal law. See id.at 22-23. And in State v. Storey, 51 Wash. 630, 99 P. 878

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(1909), the legislation was contingent upon “10 or more freeholders” making an application for

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enforcement. Id. at 631. It was within the judgment of the freeholders whether to make an

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application. See id.
A valid contingency is not an improper delegation of legislative authority. It is a “clearly

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recognized” legislative power of long standing. Brower, 137 Wn.2d at 55.

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G.

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Plaintiffs’ Claim of Contractual Impairment Is Limited to the City of Burien and
Does Not Otherwise Impede Implementation of I-976
Finally, the FAC alleges that I-976 is unconstitutional based on the impairment of

contracts. Article I, section 23 of the state constitution provides that “[n]o . . . law impairing the

DEFENDANT STATE OF
WASHINGTON AND INTERVENORDEFENDANT PIERCE COUNTY’S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
– NO. 19-2-30171-6

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ATTORNEY GENERAL OF WASHINGTON
Solicitor General’s Office
P.O. Box 40100
Olympia, WA 98504-0100
(360) 753-6200

 1

obligation of contracts shall ever be passed.” “For an impairment to be found, there must be a

2

‘contractual relationship,’ and the law must ‘substantially impair’ that relationship.” Pierce Cty.

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I, 150 Wn.2d at 437. Unlike the other constitutional issues raised by Plaintiffs, a finding of

4

contract impairment does not void an initiative. Instead, the proper remedy is to enforce the

5

initiative except as to any existing contract rights proven to be impaired. See, e.g., Pierce Cty.

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II, 159 Wn.2d at 23, 26 (affirming trial court’s determination that Sound Transit MVET could

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not be repealed for residents in the Sound Transit district “so long as the Sound Transit Bonds

8

remain outstanding” but otherwise “enforcing the remaining operative provisions in the

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initiative” including “the imposition of any additional MVET in any portion of the state except

10

the Sound Transit district”); see also Wash. Fed’n of State Emps., 127 Wn.2d at 566 (finding

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that a campaign finance law could not be enforced to impair existing contracts but would be

12

effective as to future contracts).

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Here, Plaintiffs have identified only one contract that is purportedly impaired by I-976:

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bonds issued by the City of Burien in 2010 (“Burien 2010 Bonds”). See FAC ¶ 4. To the extent

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that Plaintiffs move for summary judgement as to the Burien 2010 Bonds, the State and Pierce

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County will address and oppose such requested relief in their opposition brief. The State and

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Pierce County further reserve the right to cross-move for summary judgment on this claim in

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their opposition brief, if appropriate, based upon their review of Plaintiffs’ evidence in support

19

of the claim. 3 See, e.g., Impecoven v. Dep’t of Revenue, 120 Wn.2d 357, 365, 841 P.2d 752

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(1992) (ordering summary judgment in favor of non-moving party where the facts were not in

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dispute (citing cases)). Regardless, however, this discrete claim (which is limited to motor

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In an effort to have this case expeditiously decided on the merits, the parties proposed a briefing schedule
in which they agreed to forego formal discovery except with leave of the Court “because the issues presented for
review are legal.” (Dkt. 89.) The Court entered this briefing schedule on December 5, 2019. (Dkt. 92.) Shortly
thereafter, on December 9, 2019, Plaintiffs filed an unopposed motion to amend their complaint, which this Court
granted on December 17, 2019. In their amended complaint, Plaintiffs added the City of Burien as a party and
alleged that I-976 unconstitutionally impairs the Burien 2010 Bonds. The parties have not yet engaged in any formal
discovery on this claim.
3

DEFENDANT STATE OF
WASHINGTON AND INTERVENORDEFENDANT PIERCE COUNTY’S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
– NO. 19-2-30171-6

23

ATTORNEY GENERAL OF WASHINGTON
Solicitor General’s Office
P.O. Box 40100
Olympia, WA 98504-0100
(360) 753-6200

 1

vehicle owners who reside in Burien) provides no basis for otherwise preventing statewide

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implementation of I-976.

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VI.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, this motion for summary judgment should be granted.
DATED this 10th day of January, 2020.
ROBERT W. FERGUSON
Attorney General

MARY ROBNETT
Prosecuting Attorney

s/Alan D. Copsey
ALAN D. COPSEY, WSBA #23305
ALICIA YOUNG, WSBA #35553
KARL SMITH, WSBA #41988
Deputy Solicitors General
P.O. Box 40100
Olympia, WA 98504-0100
alan.copsey@atg.wa.gov
alicia.young@atg.wa.gov
karl.smith@atg.wa.gov
(360) 753-6200

s/Daniel R. Hamilton
DANIEL R. HAMILTON, WSBA #14658
s/Frank A. Cornelius
FRANK A. CORNELIUS, WSBA #29590
Pierce County Prosecutor / Civil
955 Tacoma Avenue South, Suite 301
Tacoma, WA 98402-2160
dan.hamilton@piercecountywa.gov
frank.cornelius@piercecountywa.gov
Ph: 253-798-6732 / Fax: 253-798-6713

LAURYN K. FRAAS, WSBA #53238
Assistant Attorney General
800 Fifth Avenue, Suite 2000
Seattle, WA 98104
lauryn.fraas@atg.wa.gov
(206) 521-5811

Attorneys for Intervenor-Defendant Pierce
County

Attorneys for Defendant State of Washington
We certify that this memorandum contains
8,347 words, in compliance with the Local
Civil Rules.

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DEFENDANT STATE OF
WASHINGTON AND INTERVENORDEFENDANT PIERCE COUNTY’S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
– NO. 19-2-30171-6

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ATTORNEY GENERAL OF WASHINGTON
Solicitor General’s Office
P.O. Box 40100
Olympia, WA 98504-0100
(360) 753-6200

 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

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I hereby declare that on this day true copies of the foregoing document were served via

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CM/ECF and by email upon the following parties:

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Contacts for Plaintiff King County:

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Name, Title:
David J. Hackett, Attorney
David J. Eldred, Attorney
Jenifer Merkel, Attorney
Erin B. Jackson, Attorney

Email:
David.hackett@kingcounty.gov
David.eldred@kingcounty.gov
Jenifer.merkel@kingcounty.gov
Erin.Jackson@kingcounty.gov

Contacts for Plaintiff City of Seattle:
Name, Title:
Carolyn U. Boies, Attorney
Erica Franklin, Attorney
John B. Schochet, Attorney
Marisa Johnson, Legal Assistant

Email:
Carolyn.boies@seattle.gov
Erica.franklin@seattle.gov
John.schochet@seattle.gov
Marisa.Johnson@seattle.gov

Contacts for Plaintiffs Washington State Transit Association, Association of Washington
Cities, Port of Seattle, Garfield County Transportation Authority, Intercity Transit,
Amalgamated Transit Union Legislative Council of Washington, and Michael Rogers:
Name, Title:
Paul J. Lawrence, Attorney
Matthew J. Segal, Attorney
Jessica A. Skelton, Attorney
Shae Blood, Attorney
Sydney Henderson, Legal Assistant

Email:
paul.lawrence@pacificalawgroup.com
matthew.segal@pacificalawgroup.com
jessica.skelton@pacificalawgroup.com
shae.blood@pacificalawgroup.com
sydney.henderson@pacificalawgroup.com

Contact for Plaintiff-Intervenors Washington ADAPT, Transit Riders Union, and Climate
Solutions:
Name, Title:
Knoll Lowney, Attorney

Email:
knoll@smithandlowney.com

Contact for Intervenors Permanent Offense, Timothy Donald Eyman, Jack Fagan, and
Michael Fagan:
Name, Title:
Mark D. Kimball, Attorney

Email:
mkimball@mdklaw.com

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DEFENDANT STATE OF
WASHINGTON AND INTERVENORDEFENDANT PIERCE COUNTY’S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
– NO. 19-2-30171-6

25

ATTORNEY GENERAL OF WASHINGTON
Solicitor General’s Office
P.O. Box 40100
Olympia, WA 98504-0100
(360) 753-6200

 1
2

Contact for Intervenor Clint Didier:
Name, Title:
Stephen W. Pidgeon, Attorney

Email:
Stephen.pidgeon@comcast.net

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DATED this 10th day of January, 2020, at Seattle, Washington.

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s/ Morgan Mills
MORGAN MILLS
Legal Assistant

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DEFENDANT STATE OF
WASHINGTON AND INTERVENORDEFENDANT PIERCE COUNTY’S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
– NO. 19-2-30171-6

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ATTORNEY GENERAL OF WASHINGTON
Solicitor General’s Office
P.O. Box 40100
Olympia, WA 98504-0100
(360) 753-6200