TRAIN OPERATIONS:
Acela 21 Program Continues to Face Significant Risk of
Delays, Warranting More Contingency Planning

Certain information in this report has been redacted due to its sensitive nature.

OIG-A-2020-004   January 21, 2020

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Memorandum
To:

Roger Harris
Executive Vice President / Chief Marketing and Revenue Officer

From:

Jim Morrison
Assistant Inspector General, Audits

Date:

January 21, 2020

Subject:

Train Operations: Acela 21 Program Continues to Face Significant Risk of
Delays, Warranting More Contingency Planning (OIG-A-2020-004)

Acela is Amtrak’s (the company) most profitable business line, and the company relies
on Acela revenue to meet its financial goals. The $2.1 billion Acela 21 program is the
largest single investment in the company’s 49-year history. Through this program, the
company plans to buy 28 new trainsets to replace the 20 trainsets that have provided
high-speed service on the Northeast Corridor (NEC)the nation’s busiest passenger
rail corridorsince 2000. Each new trainset will have 82 more seats than the older
trainset it replaces; selling tickets for these extra seats should provide additional sources
of revenue. The company is scheduled to
. All 28 trainsets
are scheduled to be delivered by
2022.
The Acela 21 program is entering a critical stage if it is to begin revenue service on time.
Alstom, the trainset manufacturer, is scheduled to begin testing the first prototype
trainsets in early 2020. The company, meanwhile, is undertaking the key
stepscommonly called “program elements” necessary to launch service on time.
These include modifying critical maintenance facilities, developing and upgrading its
information technology (IT) systems to accommodate the new trainsets, and training
more than 1,000 maintenance and onboard personnel.
In November 2017, we reported that the company faced risks to completing the
program on time, 1 as well as significant oversight challenges. Given the size and
importance of the Acela 21 program to the company’s future, and to help avoid
problems the company experienced with other recent, major acquisitions, our objective
Train Operations: The Acela Express 2021 Program Faces Oversight Weaknesses and Schedule Risks
(OIG-A-2018-002) November 16, 2017.

1

Certain information in this report has been redacted due to its sensitive nature.

 2
Amtrak Office of Inspector General
Train Operations: Acela 21 Program Continues to Face Significant Risk of Delays,
Warranting More Contingency Planning
OIG-A-2020-004, January 21, 2020

for this report was to identify current risks to launching revenue service on schedule
and reassess the company’s oversight of the program.
To identify schedule risks, we interviewed key program officials, made site visits to
service and inspection maintenance facilities in Washington, D.C. and New York City,
and reviewed key programmatic documents including schedules that both the company
and Alstom produced. To assess the company’s oversight of the Acela 21 program, we
reviewed the program’s charter and monthly status updates, interviewed program
management and company executives, and attended coordinating meetings with the
Federal Railroad Administration (FRA), which oversees Amtrak, including the Acela 21
program.

SUMMARY OF RESULTS
Our previous work demonstrated that establishing an effective management structure
for major acquisitions is a fundamental ingredient for cost and schedule efficiencies.
This is particularly important in the near term because, in addition to the Acela 21
trainsets, the company plans to upgrade or replace several major fleet assets, including
diesel locomotives and passenger cars. So far, the Acela 21 program has employed some
sound program management practices. Nevertheless, management and structural
weaknesses still pose significant risks. Foremost is that project delays have eliminated
any cushion in the schedule, and multiple indicators point to further delays beyond the
planned service launch in
2021.
.
Specifically, we found the following:
•

No schedule cushion left. The company has instituted some key program
management practices for the Acela 21 program to correct earlier problems and
avoid those it experienced in other recent, major acquisitions. For example, the
company established a dedicated team to oversee the trainset acquisition,
developed an integrated master schedule and a list of program risks, and
continues to provide monthly progress updates, consistent with company
standards. Nevertheless, the program has no schedule cushion left, not only
because of Alstom’s delays in delivering the trainsets, but also because of other
management weaknesses. Specifically, key program officials have had competing
responsibilities, constraining their ability to undertake Acela 21 program
Certain information in this report has been redacted due to its sensitive nature.

 3
Amtrak Office of Inspector General
Train Operations: Acela 21 Program Continues to Face Significant Risk of Delays,
Warranting More Contingency Planning
OIG-A-2020-004, January 21, 2020

activities. For example, due to a heavy workload, the Engineering department
did not fill a key vacancy for six months, which delayed critical infrastructure
modifications needed for trainset maintenance. Further, the program
sponsorthe highest ranked company official responsible for the Acela 21
program according to the program charteris also responsible for the NEC
service line and, until recently, was accountable for the Moynihan Train Hall
project, both of which are complex and significant undertakings. In addition to
these competing responsibilities, the program’s management structure does not
clearly define the program sponsor’s authority to task key program officials and
make decisions to ensure problems are addressed in a timely manner.
•

Multiple indicators of further delays, but insufficient contingency planning.
The company must complete five critical program elements before it can launch
revenue service; a delay in any one of these five program elements would delay
the launch. Two of these elements have already experienced delays, including a
projected
-day delay by Alstom in delivering the first trainset. Company
executives acknowledged that all five elements would have to proceed nearly
flawlessly to ensure on-time revenue launch in
2021. Nevertheless, although
company officials have discussed other options, the company has developed
only one contingency plan. Under this option, the company would

. The company has
not, however, developed a full range of contingency plans, such as selectively
reducing service on lower-demand Acela trains, and has not assessed their
potential impacts. As a result, the company cannot make fully informed
decisions about how to mitigate the impacts of delays, or whether to increase
resources now to try to avoid some delays in the first place.
•

Delay in generating additional revenue. Even if new trainsets enter revenue
service on time, they will not generate additional revenue when they are first
launched. Due to the projected trainset delivery delay, the company now plans to
launch revenue service
. The company has concluded, however, that before it can sell tickets for
the additional seats, it must have enough trainsets to guarantee with 99 percent
confidence that a new trainset will be available for a particular timeslot in the
Acela schedule. Absent that guarantee, the company decided not to sell the
Certain information in this report has been redacted due to its sensitive nature.

 4
Amtrak Office of Inspector General
Train Operations: Acela 21 Program Continues to Face Significant Risk of Delays,
Warranting More Contingency Planning
OIG-A-2020-004, January 21, 2020

additional tickets to avoid potentially overbooking seats and damaging the
brand. We do not question the company’s decision, but it is important to
recognize that this decision will delay capturing additional revenue from the
new, larger trainsets. We estimate that the forgone revenue could be substantial,
and, any additional delays in trainset delivery, could increase this amount into
the millions of dollars.
To minimize schedule risks and be prepared to manage any future delays in the
Acela 21 program, we recommend that the Executive Vice President / Chief Marketing
and Revenue Officer work with the Executive Vice President / Chief Operations Officer
take the following actions:
•

Ensure key program officials have sufficient capacity so that competing
responsibilities do not interfere with their ability to complete program tasks in a
timely manner.

•

Assess the extent to which the program sponsor has the authority to task key
program officials and make decisions necessary to resolve problems, and then
work with the Executive Leadership Team to address any gaps in this authority.

•

Task the program management team with developing additional contingency
plans and assessing their operational and financial impacts.

In commenting on a draft of this report, the company’s Executive Vice President/Chief
Marketing and Revenue Officer and the Executive Vice President/Chief Operations
Officer stated that the company agreed with our recommendations and described
company actions and plans to address them. These include actions it has already taken,
such as removing the Acela 21 program sponsor from being the program sponsor of the
Moynihan Train Hall project to increase her capacity to focus on the Acela 21 program.
Further, the company is now developing additional contingency scenarios, which span
from minor delays to extensive delays or disruptions, and will continue to develop
them as risks evolve and likely outcomes become more certain.
We note, however, that the company disagreed with our assessment that management
weaknesses contributed to the delays that are threatening an on-time service launch.
Instead, the company cites its management accomplishments, while only mentioning
the trainset delivery delay—implicitly attributing program delays solely to its
contractor, Alstom. While we note Alstom’s delay, we stand by our findings that other
delays were caused by management weaknesses. Further, we also believe the
management themes identified within our recommendations are germane not only to
Certain information in this report has been redacted due to its sensitive nature.

 5
Amtrak Office of Inspector General
Train Operations: Acela 21 Program Continues to Face Significant Risk of Delays,
Warranting More Contingency Planning
OIG-A-2020-004, January 21, 2020

this acquisition, but also to other ongoing projects like the Moynihan Train Hall and
upcoming projects such as the Amfleet replacement. For management’s complete
response, see Appendix B.

BACKGROUND
In August 2016, the company received a 23-year loan from the Build America Bureau
Railroad Rehabilitation and Improvement Financing Program to finance the majority of
the Acela 21 program to upgrade its high-speed train service along the NEC. The loan
will allow the company to spend $1.6 billion purchasing 28 new high-speed trainsets
and $850 million to undertake a series of infrastructure improvements needed to
operate and maintain them. In particular, the company must modify three critical
service and inspection maintenance facilitiesin Washington, D.C., New York City,
and Boston, Massachusettsthat will be used to perform regular, federally mandated
maintenance on the trainsets. As of December 2019, the company has spent $640 million
on the program.
According to company documents, the Acela 21 program includes numerous program
elements, five of which it must complete before the company can launch revenue
service with the first trainset in
2021, as shown in Figure 1.
Figure 1. Acela 21 Program Elements
Necessary to Launch Revenue Service

Ensuring trainset delivery and performance

Modifying service and inspection (maintenance) facilities

Developing IT systems

Training employees

Complying with FRA-required safety conditions

Source: OIG analysis of Acela 21 program documents

Certain information in this report has been redacted due to its sensitive nature.

 6
Amtrak Office of Inspector General
Train Operations: Acela 21 Program Continues to Face Significant Risk of Delays,
Warranting More Contingency Planning
OIG-A-2020-004, January 21, 2020

THE PROGRAM HAS NO SCHEDULE CUSHION LEFT, DUE IN PART
TO KEY MANAGEMENT WEAKNESSES
The company has instituted some key program management practices for the Acela 21
program to correct earlier problems and avoid those it experienced in other recent,
major acquisitions, such as the replacement of its long-distance passenger cars. 2
Although some delays that reduced the company’s schedule cushion are outside the
company’s control, such as the existing and evolving delay in Alstom’s trainset delivery
schedule, other delays occurred because of management weaknesses. These include key
program officials who have multiple, competing job assignments and questions about
whether the “program sponsor,” the highest ranked company official in charge of the
program, has the authority to task program officials and make all key decisions.
In 2017, we reported that the Acela 21 program faced a trainset delivery risk. At that
time, Alstom in its monthly progress reports was already predicting the trainsets were
81-89 days behind its delivery schedule because of redesign work needed to meet
certain safety standards. We also reported that the program experienced program
management weaknesses, including oversight challenges and risks to completing the
program on time. 3 In particular, we found that management oversight and risk
management tools were only partially in place. For example, although the company had
established a dedicated team to oversee the trainset acquisition, the Engineering
department had not assigned personnel to oversee several infrastructure projects. In
response to our recommendations, the company’s Enterprise Program Management
Office (EPMO) and the Engineering department filled vacant positions. The company
also assigned trained project management staff who began developing essential projectand risk-management tools, in keeping with company standards. These tools included,
for example, a list of program risks and their mitigation plans, monthly progress
reports, and a program-wide integrated master schedule to track and communicate
program status and risks.

In 2010, the company contracted with CAF USA to acquire 130 new single level long-distance passenger
cars and experienced significant delays, which were compounded by an absence of program management
capacity and capabilities. Originally scheduled to be completed in November 2014, the program, is still
ongoing. See Asset Management: Additional Actions Can Help Reduce Significant Risks Associated with LongDistance Passenger Car Procurement (OIG-A-2016-003), February 1, 2016.
3 Train Operations: The Acela Express 2021 Program Faces Oversight Weaknesses and Schedule Risks
(OIG-A-2018-002), November 16, 2017.
2

Certain information in this report has been redacted due to its sensitive nature.

 7
Amtrak Office of Inspector General
Train Operations: Acela 21 Program Continues to Face Significant Risk of Delays,
Warranting More Contingency Planning
OIG-A-2020-004, January 21, 2020

As of December 2019, however, the program still faced management challenges.
Key program officials assigned to the Acela 21 program were concurrently assigned to
other large programs that posed competing obligations. For example, in February 2019,
the official responsible for modifications to the maintenance facilitiesa critical step the
company must complete on time to be able to maintain the new trainsetsleft the
company. The Engineering department, however, did not backfill this key position for
six months. The official responsible for doing so said he did not have the capacity to
fully focus on the Acela projects, which compete with other major programs he
manages, including the multi-billion-dollar Baltimore and Potomac tunnel. While the
Engineering position was vacant, the company made little progress on its critical
infrastructure modifications needed for trainset maintenance. For example, the
company initially planned to award construction contracts for these modifications in
August 2019, but as of January 2020, the Engineering department had not finalized
construction schedules or made the awards. As a result, the department has minimal
schedule cushion left to absorb any unexpected setbacks once construction begins.
The program sponsor also has competing responsibilities, including responsibility for
service along the NEC and, until recently, was accountable for the Moynihan Train Hall
project, both of which are significant and complex undertakings.
Further, the program’s matrixed management structure 4 does not clearly define the
program sponsor’s authority to task key program officials responsible for various
program elements and make program-level decisions to ensure that problems are
addressed in a timely manner. Under this structure, the program sponsor does not have
authority over key officialssuch as those in charge of delivering the trainsetslargely
because they report to other departments. This is similar to what we reported in 2017,
when we found that the company had assigned the EPMO as the program lead but did
not formally define its duties and authorities to manage the program, leaving it unclear
whether the EPMO had full authority over other departments with program
responsibilities. Without executive action to identify and address gaps in management
capacity and authority, the Acela 21 program remains at risk of schedule delays.
Establishing an effective management structure for major acquisitions is crucial, as we
demonstrated in our prior work documenting repeated program management
weaknesses with past acquisitions. This is especially important because, starting in
early 2020, the company plans to upgrade or replace several other major fleet assets,
According to the Project Management Institute, a matrixed management structure is in an
organizational structure in which the project manager shares responsibility with the functional managers
for assigning priorities and for directing the work of persons assigned to the project.

4

Certain information in this report has been redacted due to its sensitive nature.

 8
Amtrak Office of Inspector General
Train Operations: Acela 21 Program Continues to Face Significant Risk of Delays,
Warranting More Contingency Planning
OIG-A-2020-004, January 21, 2020

including diesel locomotives and passenger cars. Resolving these fundamental
management issues will be important to the success of these efforts.

MULTIPLE INDICATORS POINT TO ADDITIONAL DELAYS, BUT THE
COMPANY HAS NOT DEVELOPED A FULL RANGE OF CONTINGENCY
PLANS OR ASSESSED THEIR IMPACT
The Acela 21 program has already experienced delays that have eliminated any
schedule cushion, and multiple indicators point to additional delays beyond the
planned service launch in
2021. Company executives agree, are aware of this
schedule risk, and have determined that if there is a delay, the company may need to
run the older Acela trainsets longer than planned, which will be costly. The company,
however, has discussedbut not developeda full range of contingency plans to
identify the best corrective action to take to limit the negative impacts of delays or
determine whether to increase resources to avoid delays in the first place.

The Program Faces a Significant Risk of Further Delays
A delay in any one of five program elements would postpone revenue service launch.
Figure 2 illustrates that the projected delivery dates for each of the five critical program
elements compared to the
2021 service launch date leave little margin for error.
Figure 2. Projected Delivery Dates of Critical Program Elements

Source: OIG analysis of Acela 21 program documents

Certain information in this report has been redacted due to its sensitive nature.

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Amtrak Office of Inspector General
Train Operations: Acela 21 Program Continues to Face Significant Risk of Delays,
Warranting More Contingency Planning
OIG-A-2020-004, January 21, 2020

The program has already experienced delays in two of the five critical elements, and
both face risk of additional delays.
•

Ensuring trainset delivery and performance. As of December 2019, Alstom is
projecting a
-day delay in delivering the first trainset compared to its original
delivery date, eliminating most of the schedule cushion for the
2021 service
launch. This delay is largely outside the company’s control. The trainsets face
additional delivery delay risks, however. For example, on January 7, 2020,
company officials told us that Alstom may face delays obtaining some of the
equipment for the Positive Train Control safety system required for the new
trainsets. Company officials said they are working to identify short-term
workarounds until Alstom can resolve this issue, but ultimately, the train control
system delivery and functionality is Alstom’s responsibility. The trainsets could
also face additional delivery delays because they are based on designs that have
not operated in North America. Before FRA approves the trainsets for passenger
service, Alstom and the company must test them on the NEC to ensure that they
meet all contractual specifications and can operate safely. According to officials
from the company, Alstom, and FRA, it is common for such testing and
certification processes to identify problems that would delay operations. As a
result, the company will be uncertain of the trainset delivery schedule until this
testing and certification is complete. The company recognizes this risk but has
limited ability to mitigate it because trainset testing and performance is Alstom’s
contractual responsibility.

•

Modifying maintenance facilities. To help make up time after the six-month
delay in finalizing designs for the three maintenance facilities, the company has
expedited the process to solicit bids from contractors. As of January 2020,
however, the company has not yet set a construction start date or awarded a
construction contract, as it originally planned to do in August 2019. Moreover,
because of these delays, the company now has limited time to accommodate any
unforeseen setbacks once construction begins. For instance, the contractor will be
working in the facilities while they remain operational, meaning the contractor
will need to ensure that the facility modifications stay on schedule without
interrupting ongoing Acela maintenance.

Moreover, the company needs to complete work in three additional complex areas to
launch revenue service, each of which has minimal schedule cushion and therefore
presents an inherent risk of additional delays. These areas include developing multiple
Certain information in this report has been redacted due to its sensitive nature.

 10
Amtrak Office of Inspector General
Train Operations: Acela 21 Program Continues to Face Significant Risk of Delays,
Warranting More Contingency Planning
OIG-A-2020-004, January 21, 2020

IT systems, some of which are new and untested. Our past work has demonstrated that
the company has had limited success integrating complex systems. 5 Further, in the time
remaining before the launch date, the company must train nearly 1,000 personnel,
including conductors and engineers. To date, the company has not finalized this
training program but is working with Alstom to receive a trainset in time to use for
training. The company must also take actions to comply with 12 FRA safety
requirements that are specific to Acela service. These include adding fencing to the NEC
to protect the right-of-way from trespassers and upgrading track. As of December 2019,
the company is on schedule, and it is working with FRA to ensure that it meets all of
these requirements.

The Company Has Not Developed A Full Range of Contingency Plans
or Assessed Their Impacts to Identify the Optimum Response to
Delays
The company is aware of the Acela 21 program’s overall schedule risk; however,
contrary to its own program management guidelines, it has not developed a full range
of contingency plans and assessed their potential impacts to identify the most effective
way to respond to a delay.
The company has determined that further program delays could trigger the need to

. The company also
acknowledges that it could face significant additional costs because several legacy
trainsets will be due for FRA-required overhauls in the near-term. Company officials
also told us that (1) obtaining spare parts for the legacy trainsets may be difficult
because Alstom no longer manufactures them, and (2) if delays go beyond a year, the
company would need to assess the financial viability of continuing to operate the aging
legacy equipment.
The company, however, has not developed a full range of contingency plans to weigh
the costs and benefits of other potential scenarios. For example, instead of extending
leases on the older equipment, the company could temporarily reduce Acela service on
Safety and Security: Progress Made in Implementing Positive Train Control, but Additional Actions Needed to
Ensure Timely Completion of Remaining Tasks (OIG-A-2017-001) October 6, 2016.

5

Certain information in this report has been redacted due to its sensitive nature.

 11
Amtrak Office of Inspector General
Train Operations: Acela 21 Program Continues to Face Significant Risk of Delays,
Warranting More Contingency Planning
OIG-A-2020-004, January 21, 2020

select, lower-demand Acela trains, or use different rolling stock in a particular time slot
in the Acela schedule. One program official said that the company may be able to cut
less popular Acela trains from the schedule without significant impacts on customers or
its brand. Such options would have an impact on revenue but may be less costly than
.
The program sponsor told us that, as of December 2019, the program office had begun
calculating the revenue impacts of reducing service and had held preliminary
discussions about additional contingency plans but had not developed them. Until the
company does so, it cannot ensure that it has identifiedand would be ready to
implementthe most effective way to manage the fallout of delays. Moreover, without
a full range of contingency plans, the company does not have the information it needs
to determine whether to increase resources now to try to avoid delays in the first place.

NEW TRAINSETS WILL NOT GENERATE ADDITIONAL REVENUE AT
SERVICE LAUNCH
Even if the company launches the Acela 21 program as planned in 2021, the company
recently decided thatto protect the Acela brandit will not immediately sell the 82
additional seats on the new trainsets at service launch.
Alstom was originally scheduled to deliver up to nine trainsets by
2021. Given the
reported
-day delay in trainset delivery, however, the company now intends to
launch revenue service
: each time Alstom delivers a new trainset, the company plans to take one
legacy trainset out of service. Company officials told us, however, that they have
decided to wait to sell the additional seats until they have enough trainsets to
guaranteewith 99 percent confidencethat a new trainset will be available to run in a
given timeslot. That would allow the company to reliably sell the extra seats without
the risk of overbooking. Senior company officials told us that overbooking trains could
jeopardize customer satisfaction and the Acela’s brand as a reliable, premium, businessclass service. The company expects that it will take four months
to begin selling the additional seats.
We do not question the company’s decision to protect the brand, but doing so will delay
the company’s ability to capture additional revenue from the new seats. The company
has not estimated the amount of revenue it will forgo, but we estimate that it could be

Certain information in this report has been redacted due to its sensitive nature.

 12
Amtrak Office of Inspector General
Train Operations: Acela 21 Program Continues to Face Significant Risk of Delays,
Warranting More Contingency Planning
OIG-A-2020-004, January 21, 2020

more than $15,000 per trainset per departure. 6 This amount could total in the millions of
dollars before the company receives enough of the newer trainsets to reliably sell the
additional seat capacity. The amount of forgone revenue could increase if the service
launch is delayed beyond
2021 or if any of the initially delivered trainsets
experiences problems, as has occurred with past purchases of rolling stock.

CONCLUSIONS
Our prior work has documented repeated program management weaknesses with
major company acquisitions. Addressing the management weaknesses we identified
will help the company more effectively manage the Acela 21 program. In particular,
ensuring that program officials have the capacity and the authority to make decisions
and resolve problems in a timely manner will help the largest acquisition in company
history avoid further delays. Additional contingency planning will also help the
company ensure it has identified the best solution if the service launch is postponed
past
2021. Given the company’s significant upcoming acquisitions of rolling stock,
correcting these program management deficiencies is especially important.

RECOMMENDATIONS
To minimize schedule risks and be prepared to manage any future delays in the
Acela 21 program, we recommend that the Executive Vice President / Chief Marketing
and Revenue Officer work with the Executive Vice President / Chief Operations Officer
take the following actions:
1. Ensure that key program officials have sufficient capacity so that competing
responsibilities do not interfere with their ability to complete program tasks in a
timely manner.
2. Assess the extent to which the program sponsor has the authority to task key
program officials and make decisions necessary to resolve problems, and then
work with the Executive Leadership Team to address any gaps in this authority.
3. Task the program management team with developing additional contingency
plans and assessing their operational and financial impacts.

6

This estimate is based on fiscal year 2019 company data on Acela ridership and revenue.
Certain information in this report has been redacted due to its sensitive nature.

 13
Amtrak Office of Inspector General
Train Operations: Acela 21 Program Continues to Face Significant Risk of Delays,
Warranting More Contingency Planning
OIG-A-2020-004, January 21, 2020

MANAGEMENT COMMENTS AND OIG ANALYSIS
In commenting on a draft of this report, the company’s Executive Vice President / Chief
Revenue and Marketing Officer and the Executive Vice President / Chief Operations
Officer agreed with our recommendations and described the company’s actions and
plans to address them, which we summarize below.
•

Recommendation 1: Management agrees with our recommendation to ensure
key program officials have sufficient capacity so that competing responsibilities
do not interfere with their ability to complete program tasks in a timely manner.
The company also points to the recent change of responsibilities for the program
sponsor to ensure greater focus on the Acela 21 program execution. Specifically,
in late December 2019 the Moynihan Train Hall program’s executive sponsorship
transitioned from the Vice-President, Northeast Corridor Service line, to the
Vice-President, Stations, Properties and Accessibility. In addition, the company
committed to ensuring that the management team will utilize the matrixed
organization structure and tools to elevate any challenges to the appropriate
stakeholders for timely resolution. The target completion date will be ongoing
through the service launch period.

•

Recommendation 2: Management agrees with our recommendation to assess the
extent to which the program sponsor has the authority to task key program
officials and make decisions necessary to resolve problems, then work with the
Executive Leadership Team to address any gaps in this authority. The company
reiterated that the program team is encouraged to escalate matters to executive
leadership and that the Service Launch Steering Committee allow for discussion
regarding program progress, risks, and needs, and facilitate needed decisions
and action steps. The target completion date will be ongoing through the service
launch period.

•

Recommendation 3: Management agrees with our recommendation to task the
program management team with developing additional contingency plans and
assessing their operational and financial impacts. The company is now
developing a revised short-list of contingency scenarios which span from minor
delay to extensive delay or disruption. The company stated that contingency
planning will continually evolve as risk factors change and outcome variables
become more certain. The target completion date will be March 31, 2020, and
then monthly through the service launch period.
Certain information in this report has been redacted due to its sensitive nature.

 14
Amtrak Office of Inspector General
Train Operations: Acela 21 Program Continues to Face Significant Risk of Delays,
Warranting More Contingency Planning
OIG-A-2020-004, January 21, 2020

In the response, management also provided additional company perspectives for some
of the issues the OIG identified. The company highlighted a number of the same
program management improvements we note in our report and acknowledged that
schedule compression had occurred and could worsen if there is any additional trainset
delivery delay or a delay in any other critical path deliverable.
The company did disagree with our assessment of management weaknesses and that
they played a role in delays. The company qualifies that the weaknesses did not play a
role in trainset delays—our report already attributes trainset delays in part to the
contractor, Alstom. The company’s response, however, does not directly address the
delays in other areas of the program that we identified were due to management
weaknesses, such as in filling a key vacancy that delayed beginning construction for
needed facility upgrades. We maintain that it is important for the company to take
ownership of these management weaknesses and address them, not only so that it can
head off any additional issues within the Acela 21 program, but also avoid these issues
in other ongoing projects like the Moynihan Train Hall and upcoming projects such as
the replacement of its Amfleet rolling stock. Given the billions of dollars the company
plans to spend over the next decade, positioning itself now to manage these acquisitions
most effectively will ensure good stewardship of taxpayer dollars and best serve its
customers.

Certain information in this report has been redacted due to its sensitive nature.

 15
Amtrak Office of Inspector General
Train Operations: Acela 21 Program Continues to Face Significant Risk of Delays,
Warranting More Contingency Planning
OIG-A-2020-004, January 21, 2020

APPENDIX A
Objective, Scope, and Methodology
This report provides the results of our audit of the company’s Acela 21 program.
Our objective was to identify current risks to launching revenue service on schedule
and reassess the company’s oversight of the program. Our scope included program
elements critical to service launch for the Acela 21 program. We conducted our work
from September 2019 to January 2020 in Washington, D.C.; Philadelphia, Pennsylvania;
New Castle, Delaware; Hornell, New York; and New York City. Certain information in
this report has been redacted due to its sensitive nature.
To determine which program elements were needed for service launch, we reviewed
company documents, interviewed senior company officials responsible for the program,
and attended quarterly meetings the company held to update Federal Railroad
Administration officials on the program status.
To identify risks to launching revenue service as planned, we reviewed the company’s
schedules and Alstom’s schedule. We also reviewed any changes to these schedules and
interviewed company officials responsible for each program element to understand the
risks and mitigation efforts. We conducted site visits to two of the three service and
inspection maintenance facilities that require modifications prior to service launch, and
we interviewed the official in charge of overseeing these projects. We also visited
Alstom’s facility in Hornell, New York, where the trainsets are being assembled.
To assess the company’s oversight of the program, we reviewed the program charter
and the current management structure, and we interviewed key company officials
responsible for the program. We also interviewed officials from the company’s
Enterprise Program Management Office to understand changes made to the program
management structure since our last report in 2017.
We conducted this performance audit in accordance with generally accepted
governmental auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform
the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence
obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our
audit objective.

Certain information in this report has been redacted due to its sensitive nature.

 16
Amtrak Office of Inspector General
Train Operations: Acela 21 Program Continues to Face Significant Risk of Delays,
Warranting More Contingency Planning
OIG-A-2020-004, January 21, 2020

Internal Controls
We reviewed the management controls for overseeing the program and mitigating
associated risks. In particular, we assessed the internal control components and
underlying principles and determined that three of the five internal controls areas were
significant to our audit objectives:
•

Control environment. Management should establish an organizational structure,
assign responsibility, and delegate authority to achieve the entity’s objectives.

•

Risk assessment. Management should identify, analyze and respond to risks
related to achieving the defined objectives.

•

Control activities. Management should design control activities to achieve
objectives and respond to risk.

We developed audit work to ensure that we assessed each of these controls. This
included reviewing the extent to which the company followed internal program
management standards, such as developing a risk register, maintaining an integrated
master schedule, assigning clear roles and responsibilities for program managers,
and determining if there were clear lines of authority within the program. Because our
review was limited to these internal control components and underlying principles, it
may not have disclosed all of the internal control deficiencies that may have existed at
the time of this audit.

Computer-Processed Data
Our analyses and findings did not rely on computer-generated data from any company
information systems.

Prior Reports
In conducting our analysis, we reviewed and used information from the following
reports:
Amtrak OIG:
•

Amtrak: Top Management and Performance Challenges—Fiscal Years 2019 and 2020
(OIG-SP-2018-011), September 28, 2018

•

Train Operations: The Acela Express 2021 Program Faces Oversight Weaknesses and
Schedule Risks (OIG-A-2018-002), November 16, 2017
Certain information in this report has been redacted due to its sensitive nature.

 17
Amtrak Office of Inspector General
Train Operations: Acela 21 Program Continues to Face Significant Risk of Delays,
Warranting More Contingency Planning
OIG-A-2020-004, January 21, 2020

•

Asset Management: Additional Actions Can Help Reduce Significant Risks Associated
with Long-Distance Passenger Car Procurement (OIG-A-2016-003), February 1, 2016

•

Safety and Security: Progress Made in Implementing Positive Train Control, but
Additional Actions Needed to Ensure Timely Completion of Remaining Tasks
(OIG-A-2017-001) October 6, 2016

•

Governance: Improved Policies, Practices, and Training Can Enhance Capital Project
Management (OIG-A-2014-009), July 15, 2014

Certain information in this report has been redacted due to its sensitive nature.

 18
Amtrak Office of Inspector General
Train Operations: Acela 21 Program Continues to Face Significant Risk of Delays,
Warranting More Contingency Planning
OIG-A-2020-004, January 21, 2020

APPENDIX B
Management Comments

Certain information in this report has been redacted due to its sensitive nature.

 19
Amtrak Office of Inspector General
Train Operations: Acela 21 Program Continues to Face Significant Risk of Delays,
Warranting More Contingency Planning
OIG-A-2020-004, January 21, 2020

Certain information in this report has been redacted due to its sensitive nature.

 20
Amtrak Office of Inspector General
Train Operations: Acela 21 Program Continues to Face Significant Risk of Delays,
Warranting More Contingency Planning
OIG-A-2020-004, January 21, 2020

Certain information in this report has been redacted due to its sensitive nature.

 21
Amtrak Office of Inspector General
Train Operations: Acela 21 Program Continues to Face Significant Risk of Delays,
Warranting More Contingency Planning
OIG-A-2020-004, January 21, 2020

Certain information in this report has been redacted due to its sensitive nature.

 22
Amtrak Office of Inspector General
Train Operations: Acela 21 Program Continues to Face Significant Risk of Delays,
Warranting More Contingency Planning
OIG-A-2020-004, January 21, 2020

Certain information in this report has been redacted due to its sensitive nature.

 23
Amtrak Office of Inspector General
Train Operations: Acela 21 Program Continues to Face Significant Risk of Delays,
Warranting More Contingency Planning
OIG-A-2020-004, January 21, 2020

Certain information in this report has been redacted due to its sensitive nature.

 24
Amtrak Office of Inspector General
Train Operations: Acela 21 Program Continues to Face Significant Risk of Delays,
Warranting More Contingency Planning
OIG-A-2020-004, January 21, 2020

Certain information in this report has been redacted due to its sensitive nature.

 25
Amtrak Office of Inspector General
Train Operations: Acela 21 Program Continues to Face Significant Risk of Delays,
Warranting More Contingency Planning
OIG-A-2020-004, January 21, 2020

APPENDIX C
Abbreviations
EPMO

Enterprise Program Management Office

FRA

Federal Railroad Administration

IT

Information technology

NEC

Northeast Corridor

OIG

Amtrak Office of Inspector General

the company

Amtrak

Certain information in this report has been redacted due to its sensitive nature.

 26
Amtrak Office of Inspector General
Train Operations: Acela 21 Program Continues to Face Significant Risk of Delays,
Warranting More Contingency Planning
OIG-A-2020-004, January 21, 2020

APPENDIX D
OIG Team Members
Eileen Larence, Deputy Assistant Inspector General, Audits
J.J. Marzullo, Senior Director, Audits
Melissa Hermes, Senior Audit Manager
Andrew W. Mollohan, Senior Auditor
Alison O’Neill, Communications Analyst

Certain information in this report has been redacted due to its sensitive nature.

 OIG MISSION AND CONTACT INFORMATION
Mission
The Amtrak OIG’s mission is to provide independent, objective oversight
of Amtrak’s programs and operations through audits and investigations
focused on recommending improvements to Amtrak’s economy, efficiency,
and effectiveness; preventing and detecting fraud, waste, and abuse; and
providing Congress, Amtrak management, and Amtrak’s Board of
Directors with timely information about problems and deficiencies relating
to Amtrak’s programs and operations.

Obtaining Copies of Reports and Testimony
Available at our website www.amtrakoig.gov

Reporting Fraud, Waste, and Abuse

Report suspicious or illegal activities to the OIG Hotline
www.amtrakoig.gov/hotline
or
800-468-5469

Contact Information

Jim Morrison
Assistant Inspector General, Audits
Mail: Amtrak OIG
10 G Street, NE, 3W-300
Washington D.C. 20002
Phone: 202-906-4600
Email: James.Morrison@amtrakoig.gov