SCANNING
THE HORIZON

Sector Guide #1

 

2

“Strengthening the
adaptive and collaborative
capacity of internationallyoperating civil society
organisations (ICSOs)
related to the rise of China”

Executive summary
China’s growing influence in the world has been identified as one of the top global trends influencing the trajectory and development of other major trends relating to sustainable development.
China’s relevance for civil society organisations (CSOs) is therefore also growing rapidly on a global
scale. This means even organisations without a dedicated country programme or a physical presence in China need to study and develop future skills and strategies to navigate the impact of Chinese foreign and development policies on their activities in other parts of the world. This includes
leveraging the positive potential of Chinese financial contributions and technological innovations
for developing countries, as well as countering rising threats to civic participation and human rights
due to the Chinese Communist Party (CPP)’s promotion of an authoritarian development model.
This guide therefore takes as a starting assumption that both constructive engagement and principled advocacy efforts are required from CSOs in order to engage with China’s global impact.
Based on insights from internationally-operating CSOs (ICSOs) with very different histories of engagement with China, this guide is intended to provide strategic pointers and identify practical
entry points for senior ICSO leaders to summarise the key themes and implications for our sector.
This can help them think through the current strategies and capacities of their individual organisations and further develop future engagement and adaptation approaches, as well as strengthen
the sector’s collaborative capacity to be better prepared in face of this major trend.
This guide identifies three types of recommendations for internationally-operating CSOs which are
applicable to organisations of a range of sizes, structures and operating models (i.e. not necessarily
with a presence, office, team or representation in mainland China itself):
1. Overall cross-cutting strategy recommendations for individual ICSOs to strengthen their organsational capacity
2. Overall cross-cutting strategy recommendations for strengthening sectoral collaborative capacity allowing better preparation and adaptation to the rise of global China
3. Strategic pointers (trends and future perspectives) under four key sub-themes:
3.1 Changes in Chinese investment and development finance under the Belt and Road Initiative
(BRI)
3.2 China’s aspiration to become a global technology leader
3.3 The internationalisation of Chinese non-governmental actors
3.4 China’s growing influence on global governance and the UN system

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 THE MAIN CROSS-CUTTING RECOMMENDATIONS ARE FOR ICSOS TO:
–Develop a specific, organisation-wide Global China strategy, based on a candid assessment of
areas of complementarity and conflict between the organisation’s own mission and values, and
relevant Chinese actors’ international approaches.
–Agree on an internal risk management strategy and inclusive management process for “speaking
out” critically on issues involving China at global scale.
–Reassess regularly the costs and benefits of establishing or maintaining a physical presence in
mainland China. Considering the Chinese Party-state’s increasingly securitised approach to
“overseas NGOs” operating inside the country itself, the benefits of direct access and established
relationships need to be weighed against the risks of potential self-censorship regarding Chinarelated issues elsewhere in the world.
–Support and leverage the trend towards internationalisation among Chinese social organisations,
such as non-governmental organisations and philanthropic foundations. In the mid-term, ICSOs
should aim to move from one-way capacity-building for Chinese organisations to two-way
partnerships with tangible benefits for constituents in developing countries.
–Focus engagement efforts on issue areas where Chinese actors can realistically contribute
to global public goods, and where meaningful civil society impact is possible. This particularly
includes: climate crisis mitigation and adaptation, environmental protection and biodiversity,
equity in international development, as well as impact assessments and monitoring of Chinese
development finance.

4

–Pool resources with peer organisations to commission strategic analyses and develop joint civil
society responses, particularly in fast-moving areas like information and communication technology,
where China’s impact upon developing countries is rapidly increasing.
–Strengthen transnational sector-wide collaboration to protect spaces for civil society activity,
in particular the defence of human rights and public scrutiny of state and corporate behaviour.
While China is not the only authoritarian country trying to encroach upon freedom of expression
beyond its own borders, its current administration has shown an unprecedented determination to
ideologically influence and restrict debates about China worldwide.

CONTENTS
Introduction 6
Cross-cutting Strategy Recommendations 

7

01. Strengthening Organisational Capacity 8
Global China Strategy 

3

Internal Processes, People & Skills 

5

Communications 

6

02. Strengthening Sectoral Collaborative Capacity 

12

03. Strategic Pointers: Trends and Implications for ICSOs 

14

3.1 Changes in Chinese investment and development finance under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)
TREND ANALYSIS 

11

RECOMMENDATIONS 

12

3.2 China’s aspiration to become a global technology leader

17

TREND ANALYSIS 

14

RECOMMENDATIONS 

15

3.3 The internationalisation of Chinese non-governmental actors  

19

TREND ANALYSIS 

17

RECOMMENDATIONS 

19

3.4 China’s growing influence on global governance and the UN system  

22

TREND ANALYSIS 

21

RECOMMENDATIONS 

22

Resources 

28

The International Civil Society Centre and the Scanning the Horizon initiative 

29

Acknowledgements 

29

5

 6

INTRODUCTION

CROSS-CUTTING STRATEGY RECOMMENDATIONS

Background: This guide aims to help leaders of internationally-operating
civil society organisations better understand and engage with the
implications of China’s growing global influence for the future work of their
organisations. It is the culmination of a series of interviews and workshop
discussions with ICSOs working in, on, or with China to different degrees.
In particular, the guide builds on inputs and discussions from a three-day
conference organised by the International Civil Society Centre in Hong Kong
in June 2019. The meeting provided the opportunity for ICSOs to exchange
experiences of their current Global China strategies, identify key trends,
and discuss future possibilities for engagement and needs for adaptation.
Following the June meeting, additional interviews and validation sessions
were conducted with ICSO representatives and a range of experts from
mainland China, Hong Kong, Europe and the US.

Navigating a cross-cutting, globally relevant issue like China’s rise can be a major organisational
challenge for ICSOs, particularly those with a highly decentralised or federated structure to better
account for different local conditions in individual target countries. This section first summarises strategic considerations for individual ICSOs aiming to develop a more coherent Global China
strategy, as well as several recommendations relating to internal processes and external communication strategies. The section then includes cross-cutting recommendations for strengthening
the collaborative capacity between ICSOs to increase the sector’s overall efficiency and impact on
critical issues.

China’s rise is widely regarded as one of the top global trends influencing the trajectory of other
major megatrends for decades ahead. Already today, the People’s Republic presents a unique
case for the international civil society sector: On the one hand, it is a major emerging player in
international development finance, particularly if concessional and non-concessional flows are
considered together.1 Having managed an astounding economic transformation and achieved
considerable success domestically in terms of absolute poverty reduction, China has positioned
itself as a potential model for poorer countries. Moreover, most of the global public goods for which
civil society actors across the world are now working urgently towards, such as effective governance mechanisms to tackle the climate crisis, are inconceivable without China’s participation and
positive contribution. On the other hand, China is the largest and internationally most influential
authoritarian country, governed by an unprecedented form of market-based neo-Leninism. The
current administration has not only cracked down on civil society domestically, but is also increasingly active in promoting its own visions of governance – including the constraining of spaces for
critical public scrutiny of state behaviour – in many traditional working areas of ICSOs.2

7

From a global civil society perspective on China’s rise and global impact, pragmatic engagement
and principled advocacy are both needed. The main challenge for individual ICSOs and the sector as a whole is how to reconcile, combine or at least better coordinate both strategies. Even if
the potential for future ICSO engagement remains difficult to predict due to major geopolitical
uncertainties regarding China’s future trajectory and relationship with Western countries, several
important sub-trends shaping China’s impact on issues relevant to global civil society, particularly
in the Global South, can be identified, including:
(1) The geopolitical and diplomatic ambitions underlying China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)
(2) The Chinese government’s and companies’ concerted efforts to make China into a global technology leader  
(3) The incipient internationalisation of Chinese NGOs nevertheless under even stricter Communist
Party control
(4) China’s growing influence on global governance and the role of civil society in the UN system

Dreher, Axel, Andreas Fuchs, Bradley Parks, Austin M. Strange, and Michael J. Tierney (2017): Aid, China, and Growth:
Evidence from a New Global Development Finance Dataset. AidData Working Paper #46. Williamsburg, VA: AidData at William & Mary
1

Deibert, R. (2015). Authoritarianism goes global: Cyberspace under siege. Journal of Democracy, 26(3), 64-78.;
Gehring, Kai, Lennart Kaplan, and Melvin H. L. Wong. 2019. China and the World Bank: How Contrasting Development Approaches Affect the Stability of African States. AidData Working Paper #70. Williamsburg, VA: AidData at
William & Mary
2

 01. Strengthening Organisational Capacity
GLOBAL CHINA STRATEGY: ICSOS SHOULD
1. Complete an internal global mapping exercise to identify existing entry points
and added value. There may well be more happening in relation to analysing and engaging
Chinese actors across multiple offices or country teams in a global ICSO family or federation than
is currently “centrally” known. Comprehensively documenting these efforts can identify capacity
gaps and existing entry points to add value to initiatives teams are already working on. For instance,
one ICSO reported that its China team had only discovered through this type of concerted global
mapping that several country teams in Africa already had regular informal exchanges with Chinese
corporate actors.

2. Develop specific strategy and analysis: ICSOs should aim for a cross-cutting strategy
to navigate China’s rise at an overall global level, as might be the case for other megatrends (such
as advances in digital technology or urbanisation). Individual country or regional strategies, as
well as political landscape analyses for countries with significant Chinese investment (particularly
in Southeast Asia and East Africa), should also routinely include a “China angle”, developed in
coordination with internal and external China experts.

8

3. Look for opportunities to add value to local expertise and initiatives. Any strategic
reflection process within an ICSO should start by considering and inquiring carefully about what is
already being done by mainland Chinese- and Hong Kong-based organisations, as well as transAsian civil society networks in the proposed area of work. For instance, Hong Kong-based labour
groups have already been working for more than 15 years to improve labour conditions in Chineseinvested factories and infrastructure projects across Southeast Asia, through capacity-building for
workers and management, public advocacy or promotion of collective bargaining. An ICSO with
roots outside the region should therefore inquire carefully regarding where it could make a positive
contribution and add concrete value.
4. Carry out regular internal cost-benefit assessments of establishing or
maintaining a physical presence in mainland China. Under the current challenging
domestic environment and growing constraints for civil society in mainland China, this is the
most fundamental and far-reaching strategic choice for globally-oriented ICSOs. The inevitable
trade-off is between easier access and trusted relationships which can also be key to building
global partnerships on one hand, and the possibility of speaking freely and critically about the
problematic aspects of Chinese actors’ worldwide behaviour on the other. While there is no general
“right or wrong” answer to the question, this trade-off should be candidly acknowledged as part
of a regular internal reassessment sensitive to the implications of an ICSO’s China presence for its
activities and space for advocacy in other parts of the world.
4.1 Insider or outsider strategy? At the June 2019 Hong Kong meeting, it clearly emerged that
ICSOs with a longstanding presence and well-established partnerships in mainland China will
strive to maintain them, even in increasingly difficult circumstances. For other ICSOs which
have a broad global presence and mission orientation, whether to try to establish or maintain a
representative office in mainland China in this rapidly-changing legal and political environment
is a crucial question. Recent public backlashes against ICSOs in Hong Kong for their self-imposed
silence on pro-democracy protests and police violence have further highlighted the international
reputational risks that come with concessions to Beijing.3
4.2 Legal compliance: The new Overseas Non-Governmental Organisation Management Law
(“ONGO Law”) from January 2017, leaves foreign NGOs only two ways of operating legally in mainland
China (thereby drastically reducing the space for “grey area” activities tolerated in previous years):

Several ICSOs with fundraising offices in Hong Kong reported a significant decline in donations since June 2019,
which may also however be partly because Hong Kong citizens are less willing than before to donate to projects
in mainland China.
3

-By registering a permanent representative office (代表机构), which requires a (mostly governmental)
Chinese sponsoring agency and frequent, detailed reports about all activities to the responsible
Public Security Bureau.
-By having a Chinese partner organisation file individual projects as temporary activities (临时活
动). Despite the Chinese government’s claims that the ONGO Law would drastically increase legal
certainty and predictability, many foreign NGOs’ experiences suggest that both types of operations
remain heavily predicated upon political goodwill, often that of local-level politicians or publicsecurity officials. Either way, organisations unfamiliar with Chinese law will probably be reliant on
extensive legal counselling.

5. Monitor the potential of fundraising from Chinese donors. The ONGO Law prevents

foreign-based NGOs from “public fundraising” within mainland China. It does not, however, prohibit
accepting funds from Chinese donors in principle. There are several avenues which can be explored
for programming outside of mainland China:
5.1 Fundraising in Hong Kong, including from mainland Chinese entrepreneurs or companies’
branch offices, has been a tried and tested strategy by several ICSOs over the past decades. However,
there is disagreement among ICSOs about its future potential: while some fear the negative
impact of ongoing political conflicts, others emphasise the immense potential of increasingly
internationally-minded Chinese entrepreneurs. Also note that several ICSOs which fundraise in
Hong Kong have recently come under fire (including calls for boycott) from the public there, for
not supporting the protest movement e.g. with medical assistance.

5.2 Internet philanthropy and online crowd-funding through Chinese social media platforms –
although currently not permitted for foreign NGOs in mainland China – is a rapidly accelerating
trend and important opportunity which needs to be taken into account, if only as a possibility
for Chinese partner organisations to raise funds for joint projects online4. In addition, high-profile
annual events like Tencent’s 9-9 charity day (actually several days in the run-up to 9 September)
can be used not only for fundraising but also for attracting the Chinese public’s attention to
important causes through a combination of online and offline activities5.
5.3 Setting up a local foundation or a social enterprise to raise funds in mainland China is another
possibility mentioned by three ICSOs. Such an organisation, run by Chinese staff and supported
by important Chinese public figures (e.g. philanthropists), could be a viable option for ICSOs that
enjoy a good reputation and political standing in mainland China, although this does come with
some risks.
5.4 Fundraising from Chinese companies. Service-oriented ICSOs emphasised the great potential
of using their expertise, for instance in community engagement, in joint projects which could
simultaneously alleviate the negative implications of Chinese overseas investments for local
communities and mitigate investment risks for Chinese companies. However, these cooperation
models mostly remain at a try-out stage, with only two ICSOs reporting successful implementation
of joint projects. In addition to issues of mutual trust-building, administrative questions remain
over the preferable forms of such funding (grants from company foundations or service contracts,
contracts with headquarters in mainland China or with overseas branch offices, etc.).

4
Under the Charity Law (慈善法) enacted in September 2016, online fundraising is only allowed on one of the
20 current “Online Public Fundraising Information Platforms” (互联网公开募捐信息平台), officially recognised by the
Ministry of Civil Affairs. According to official figures, the market is largely dominated by “Tencent Charity” (腾讯公益)
as well as Alibaba Group’s “Ant Love” (蚂蚁金服公益) and “Alibaba Philanthropy” (阿里巴巴公益).
5
Even non-public fundraising Chinese charities organise their own offline activities in the run-up to 9 September
as part of their awareness-raising programmes on diverse social and environmental issues.

9

 INTERNAL PROCESSES, PEOPLE & SKILLS: ICSOS SHOULD
6. Set up a special role for a Global China coordinator (or team), responsible for
knowledge-sharing and coordination between mainland China and/or Hong Kong offices,
the ICSO’s federation/headquarter/international office, and other regional and country offices.
Strategies for (domestic) China and Global China activities should follow different parameters.
This Global China coordinator, and not the regular China office staff busy with domestic projects,
should be the first “go to” point for all questions arising within the organisation related to Chinese
actors abroad. Besides building special expertise on global Chinese activities, setting up an internal
strategic “sense-making” hub which can synthesise, analyse and share key insights and learning
for busy staff would also be a worthwhile investment.

7. Use scenario-based planning tools. ICSO strategies have to take into account a high
degree of uncertainty over China’s future trajectory, regarding both geo-economic impact and the
evolution of political attitudes towards and from Western countries and actors. Using scenarios
with different possible trajectories and key assumptions could present a range of new insights to
incorporate into strategic planning.

8. Develop guidelines for managing data security risks. This includes technical as well
as international knowledge management questions. While the ONGO Law requires filing detailed
reports about all activities in mainland China to public security officials, ICSOs should also develop
guidelines for which information on global activities should be sent to mainland China, or otherwise
accessed by China-based staff.

9. Manage staff and skills for institutional memory and learning. Given the complexities

10

and sensitivities involved with personal relationships, stakeholder interactions and contextual
changes, documenting an institutional “knowledge bank” of how organisational decisions and
analysis have been made and developed from the past is particularly important. To avoid the loss
of institutional knowledge in case of turnover or other unforeseen events, at least one staff member
at federation/global or regional level with Chinese language skills should be able to communicate,
document and retain this institutional knowledge from colleagues and partner staff in China
country offices.

10. Consider introducing secondment schemes between staff from the China country
office or programme and other international offices or country programmes, e.g. in Africa, to build
colleagues’ capacity, skills or knowledge on global China and foster mutual understanding between
China and other regional or country teams.

COMMUNICATIONS: ICSOS SHOULD
11. Agree an internal risk management strategy and management process for
“speaking out” critically on issues involving (global) China. In recent years, the Communist Partystate’s sensitivity to even moderately critical remarks about China’s global impact and human
rights record has increased further. For ICSOs with a permanent presence in mainland China and/
or partnerships with Chinese organisations, this means that outspoken criticism of Chinese actors
by country offices or branches in another part of the world can create risks for staff in their China
office. For advocacy-oriented organisations without a mainland China presence, a major challenge
is how to engage potential partners and stakeholders (e.g. Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR)
departments of Chinese companies) without compromising on their own principles and demands.
Agreeing an organisation-wide protocol to guide internal communication and inclusive
decision-making and risk tolerance will help navigate these tensions within ICSOs trying to strike
a balance between constructive engagement and principled public advocacy.

12. Conceptualise “impact”, “influence” and “results” differently in and for Chinarelated work: Planning, measuring and communicating an organisation’s social impact has
become a common expectation among international development donors and fundraising

organisations alike. However, successful Chinese CSOs as well as ICSOs with long experience
working in the country stress the importance of not publicly claiming any kind of social change or
influence on a policy or partnership. This is particularly important for foreign organisations in times
of growing distrust from Chinese party-state actors towards foreign interference. A Chinese partner
may be discredited or get into serious trouble if an ICSO claims influence on its work, particularly
if this involves policy/advocacy with any government agency. Engagement may therefore require
different ways of conceptualising, “expecting”, tracking and claiming impact in comparison with
ICSOs’ traditional ways of doing this, which can obviously pose challenges e.g. in fundraising where
visible results, attribution or contribution are explicitly sought. This may therefore also require the
influencing and educating of international donors and supporters to accept that activities are still
important in and of themselves, even if results cannot be tracked or publicised.

13. Focus on ICSOs’ technical expertise in exchanges with Chinese counterparts. The ability
to provide data and results from an organisation’s own field research on specific problems, along
with possible solutions, was highlighted by many ICSOs as the key to building credibility. One
ICSO highlighted how its detailed case study evidence of a Belt and Road project in Myanmar,
which backfired due to public resistance, convinced Chinese policymakers to promote better risk
management safeguards for similar future projects.

14. Address and frame policy recommendations carefully. There remains a range
of possibilities for presenting recommendations to Chinese policymakers between openly
confrontational language and the uncritical adoption of official Party ideology. One strategy for
public recommendations is to use UN language to build a common basis for engagement. For
instance, instead of explicitly repeating Chinese slogans around BRI, ICSOs can refer to China’s
– actual and potential – contributions to the UN Sustainable Development Goals, which are
also consistently highlighted by Chinese policymakers. Often, the most feasible way would be
to provide recommendations internally to Chinese partners, scholars or think tank peers.
Individual government agencies may also be directly addressed with specific references to their
current policy tasks and bureaucratic interests.

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 02. Strengthening Sectoral Collaborative Capacity
COLLECTIVELY: ICSOS SHOULD
15. Build horizon-scanning capacity and pool resources to clarify blind spots
and fill knowledge gaps. ICSOs should build a trend-scanning network on global China to
informally share resources, updates, and analysis on China, and grow the “eyes and ears” necessary
to understanding the impact and influence of Chinese investment and engagement around the
world. There is currently limited capacity and funding available within most ICSOs to individually
carry out important longer-term analyses. This suggests both a clear need and opportunity for
ICSOs to pool finances and resources to jointly commission analyses and scoping work on areas
of common interest. Potential topics for longer-term analyses include central government plans
like the “Made in China 2025” strategy, but also the many individual initiatives by provincial and
municipal governments to strengthen international engagement. Issue-specific context analyses
for the whole sector could also allow ICSOs to better understand and utilise their respective
strengths and work towards common targets and goals.

16. Strategically combine “insider” and “outsider” strategies to maximise impact.
Given the benefits and limitations that come with cultivating an insider position in China, ICSOs
need to recognise that both insider and outsider actors are needed when it comes to influencing
Chinese foreign and development policies. Insider and outsider organisations working on similar
topics where Chinese policies have a significant global impact (e.g. biodiversity, climate crisis
mitigation, corruption prevention, etc.) could coordinate efforts that combine public advocacy
campaigns by outsider organisations with concrete proposals for policy changes and participation
in related working groups by insider organisations.

12

17. Promote staff meetings on China issues in Belt and Road countries, both among
ICSOs, and between ICSOs and local community-based organisations. To go beyond generalisations
about China’s impact in developing countries, it is crucial to allow for and encourage bottom-up
knowledge-gathering about specific actors and projects on the ground. Routinely sharing success
and failure stories will help all ICSOs avoid redundant efforts and better understand what works
(and what doesn’t) in individual countries.
18. Improve and systematise sector-wide exchanges between the global/
multilateral and national/local level. Some ICSOs’ representative offices at the United

ICSOs are needed to convince Chinese corporate decision-makers that engaging civil society is also
in their long-term business interests. Sharing experiences and contacts among ICSOs could help
overcome this problem.

21. Improve institutional cooperation and exchanges with local as well as
transnational civil society networks from East Asia. Many CSOs in the region have long
and valuable experiences, both in engaging with and addressing the challenges linked to the
surge of mainland Chinese actors in their respective countries. At the same time, local activists, e.g.
labour groups in Southeast Asia or East Africa, could benefit from training and knowledge-building
around broader patterns of Chinese foreign policy and development finance. To avoid duplication
or even replacement of their work by ICSOs from outside the region, better channels for mutual
consultation and assistance are desperately needed. In particular, the June 2019 meeting showed
that dialogue between the ICSO community and Hong Kong-based CSOs needs to be improved
and institutionalised.

22. Identify focus areas around which more concerted engagement with Chinese
actors is deemed necessary and promising. In these areas, ICSOs could join forces to
build up transnational issue networks specifically designed to integrate key Chinese stakeholders
(CSOs, scholars, government agencies) and thereby develop the institutional infrastructure for joint
projects, as well as policy/advocacy work. The most promising issue areas include:
22.1 Climate crisis adaptation and mitigation in particular, due to a mutually-perceived need for
action and the Chinese government’s efforts to position itself as a global leader in light of the US
retreat from multilateral cooperation.
22.2 Reducing inequalities in development to reconcile the very prominent official Chinese
“poverty alleviation” and “rural development” discourses with the priority causes of many ICSOs,
such as equal access to social services and education, gender equality and the empowerment of
marginalised communities.
22.3 Strengthening social and environmental impact assessments and due diligence frameworks
in Chinese overseas development finance. One priority should be fighting for the respect of
standards to with overseas investments that already apply domestically in China. The Chinese
government’s rhetorical commitment to building a “Belt and Road to Integrity” and related policies
on risk management in overseas investments – apparently in response to widespread criticism
including by Chinese scholars about corruption risks in BRI projects – also creates some space for
exploring joint efforts on integrity-building and anti-corruption.

Nations and other international organisations are already informally sharing their experiences
with Chinese actors. Apart from systematising these exchanges to better understand patterns of
Chinese influence on the whole sector, UN-level experiences and insights should also be shared
more systematically with country offices working on China issues.

19. Join forces to increase civil society influence on the Asian Infrastructure
Investment Bank (AIIB). As a key Chinese diplomatic initiative in international development
finance, the AIIB has made great promises since 2015 about being “lean, green and clean”. While
several ICSOs reported that access and informal dialogues with senior AIIB leaders have proven
easier than experiences with some of the other established development banks, a recent study
by the Heinrich Boell Foundation found the AIIB falling short of many promises in terms of both
environment standards and social inclusiveness.6 Inspired by the NGO Forum on ADB, which has
monitored projects by the Asian Development Bank since the 1990s, civil society coalitions are
trying to hold the new bank accountable to these standards. As far as possible, Chinese NGOs and
their perspectives should also be included within these civil society monitoring efforts.

20. Identify and jointly promote models of cooperation with Chinese companies
in developing countries to set up positive examples. Many ICSOs mentioned efforts to
establish dialogues with Chinese companies investing abroad, while some have carried out
training programmes to raise both employers’ and employees’ awareness of local labour standards.
However, trust-building remains a major challenge with international organisations now often
portrayed as “Western”, and potentially hostile, in Chinese official discourse. More joint efforts by

Horta, Korinna (2019): The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), A Multilateral Bank where China sets the
Rules, Heinrich Boell Stiftung, Publication Series on Democracy, Vol. 52, https://www.boell.de/sites/default/files/
boell_aiib_studie_0.pdf?dimension1=division_as
6

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 03. Strategic Pointers: Trends and Implications for ICSOs
China’s international presence is undergoing many rapid changes. Aiming to pinpoint the most
meaningful changes for the future of the civil society sector, four major sub-trends were highlighted
and discussed at (and since) the June 2019 meeting:
3.1 Changes in Chinese investment and development finance under the Belt and Road Initiative
3.2 China’s aspiration to become a global technology leader
3.3 The internationalisation of Chinese non-governmental actors
3.4 China’s growing influence on global governance and the UN system
Each following sub-trend section starts with a succinct trend analysis summarising current
developments and future perspectives, followed by recommendations for ICSO responses.

3.1 Changes in Chinese investment and development
finance under the Belt and Road Initiative
TREND ANALYSIS

14

Since 2013, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has emerged as China’s new
overarching policy framework for “South-South Cooperation” with developing countries. BRI is by far China’s most ambitious global initiative to
date and has been continuously expanded now to an official 125 countries.7
In reality, it builds on, continues and expands previous policies for promoting Chinese companies’ internationalisation under the “going out” (走出去)
strategy. As the first G7 country, Italy controversially “subscribed” to BRI
during Xi’s state visit in March 2019.8 Most BRI projects are not aid-like but
commercial and supposedly win-win in nature, typically supported by a
combination of commercial and preferential loans. Key BRI actors include
China’s policy banks (China Exim Bank and China Development Bank) as
well as financing instruments like the Silk Road Fund and the South-South
Cooperation Assistance Fund as lenders, and major Chinese corporations
as beneficiaries and implementers of infrastructure and other “connectivity” projects in target countries. China is also heavily investing in a “Digital Silk Road”, including loans for fibre-optic cables, promotion of e-commerce, mobile payment and smart cities, all featuring Chinese companies
as technology providers.
While initial policy plans focussed on connecting Eurasia through new “economic corridors” at land and sea, today any country that supports China’s official rhetoric seems welcome to join, as the inclusion of Latin American
countries has amply demonstrated.

Besides its commercial and geostrategic nature, BRI also has a strong diplomatic component, geared at improving China’s “soft power” in the Global
South. China’s South-South Cooperation initiatives have the acknowledged
goal of building a more China-friendly media and policy environment in
partner countries, including through international media partnerships and
training programmes for officials and journalists (especially from Africa).
Regional initiatives in Southeast Asia deserve particular attention from international civil society: The Lancang-Mekong Cooperation (LMC) forum,
launched in Beijing in 2015, comes with massive Chinese investment pledges for hydropower and infrastructure in Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, Thailand
and Myanmar and is increasingly accompanied by “civil society forums” and
cooperation projects, often led by the state-backed China Association for
NGO Cooperation (CANGO).
The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), set up in 2015, has been
widely seen as a successful Chinese initiative to play a greater role in multilateral development finance. The “recalibration” of BRI announced during
the Second Belt and Road Forum in April 2019 suggests that Chinese policy-makers are increasingly concerned about critical foreign public opinion towards BRI, even if their actual responsiveness to criticism remains
uncertain. In addition, many Chinese companies which have experienced
backlashes abroad due to poor environmental or social records have – not
unlike their Western and European peers – developed international CSR
strategies, funding humanitarian, education or environmental conservation projects to prop up their image (e.g. Huawei’s Seeds for the Future
programme). 9
The China International Development Cooperation Agency (CIDCA), set
up in 2018 as the supreme coordinating agency for Chinese foreign aid at
vice-ministry level,10 has sparked considerable attention among ICSOs. The
new agency’s creation is a clear indication of substantial shifts in planning
and oversight of Chinese aid, even if its initial “Administrative Measures for
Foreign Aid”, circulated for comments in December 2018, merely reiterated
many of China’s traditional aid principles. So far, CIDCA prioritises outreach
to official aid agencies and UN institutions, rather than to NGOs. The potentially most far-reaching innovation concerns CIDCA’s proposal of a new
system for the “Supervision and Evaluation of Foreign Aid”. This, together with the interest of many leading Chinese development experts in the
monitoring and evaluation mechanisms of Western development agencies,
suggests both a closer inspection of aid projects’ governance in order to
reduce damage to China’s reputation linked to corruption, environmental

7

Typically for BRI, while the focus of the official signing ceremony in Rome was overwhelmingly on trade and
investment promises, the new partnership also quickly gave rise to spin-off cooperation activities in the non-profit sector, notably the establishment of a Sino-Italian Philanthropy Forum and subsequent visits by high-ranking
Chinese delegations, cf. China Global Philanthropy Institute (2019): “‘East-West Philanthropy Forum A Good Trip to
Italy’ Implements Joint Philanthropy Actions”, 21 July 2019, http://en.cgpi.org.cn/content/details42_1046.html.
8

Weng Xiaoxue & Lila Buckley (eds.) (2016): Chinese Businesses in Africa. Perspectives on Corporate Social Responsibility and the Role of Chinese Government Policies, International Institute for Environment and Development,
February 2016, https://www.eldis.org/document/A76340.

9

Rudyak, Marina (2019): The Ins and Outs of China’s International Development Agency, Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace, 02/09/2019, https://carnegieendowment.org/2019/09/02/ins-and-outs-of-china-s-international-development-agency-pub-79739.

10

15

 harm, etc., and potentially a move towards the greater outsourcing of aid
projects to non-governmental actors via government procurement in future, similar to domestic developments in the Chinese social policy sector
in recent years.

RECOMMENDATIONS: ICSOS SHOULD
23. Carry out more action-oriented research into the social and environmental
impact of Chinese development finance and overseas investment. Nuanced analyses
pointing to both the potential benefits of BRI for global development, and the specific shortcomings
which currently hamper this potential in many countries and issue areas, are needed to strengthen
civil society’s capacities for targeted advocacy.
23.1 The opaqueness surrounding many Chinese projects, their financing structure and relevant
stakeholders has been a significant source of foreign criticism for many years. Hong Kong-based
CSOs have further highlighted the problem that in many Southeast Asian countries, there is
almost no space for discussion of China’s presence in local media that is nuanced, i.e. between
CCP propaganda and anti-China populism. Working towards concrete improvements will require
a detailed understanding of the different incentive structures of Chinese stakeholders, depending
on the type of project and its primary (commercial, geostrategic or diplomatic) focus.

16

23.2 ICSOs can support, coordinate and scale up work already being carried out by local and regional
CSOs, such as the Hong Kong-based Asia Monitor Resource Centre, in several South and Southeast
Asian countries. Another good example for putting forward local and civil society perspectives is a
2017 joint publication by Stiftung Asienhaus and China Dialogue entitled “Silk Road Bottom-Up”.

24. Lobby the Chinese government at different levels to strengthen the
sustainability focus in BRI. The Chinese government’s official commitment to “promoting a
green Belt and Road” suggests that, at least in the environmental field, a combination of external
pressure and cooperation with interested parts of the Chinese administration – in this case the
Ministry of Ecology and Environment – can support positive policy adjustments.

25. Promote sector-wide approaches to improving business behaviour and human
rights standards along international value chains which explicitly include – but are not limited
to – the role of Chinese companies. Assessing the specific risks of Chinese business models for
workers’ rights or local communities near project sites can be useful, but public responses should
best be designed and framed as cross-cutting solutions, not targeted specifically at Chinese
actors. Advocacy campaigns that focus on a specific sector in a defined target region or country,
rather than on individual companies or countries of origin, significantly increase the likelihood of
getting Chinese companies on board for compliance initiatives or commitments to international
frameworks like the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights. Amnesty International’s
campaign against the use of child labour in cobalt mining in the DRC, along with the global
promotion of due diligence standards for the trade in minerals, is an encouraging example, even if
Chinese commitments remain voluntary and non-binding.

26. Empower local civil society in places where Chinese investment is heavily impacting
upon local communities, especially in countries with weak governance. This can be a more effective
strategy for ICSOs emphasising rights-based approaches to development, and can contribute to
generally raising the reputational cost of problematic behaviour abroad. ICSOs’ efforts to engage
constructively with China should not lead to a weakening of critical public voices on Chinese
policies worldwide.

As many host governments either lack the capacity for - or even wilfully neglect - their enforcement
responsibilities, civil society pressure is also needed to publicise and fight against the systematic
violation of local laws by foreign investors. Specific problems related to China’s development
cooperation model include the set-up and expansion of Special Economic Zones along BRI
“economic corridors” in Pakistan or Myanmar, where legal safeguards are further lowered and
human rights particularly vulnerable.11

28. Explore possibilities of trilateral cooperation involving Western and Chinese codonors and partner CSOs in third countries, similar to what has been tried out by official donor
agencies such as the UK Department for International Development (DFID). Beyond combining
the respective strengths of Western and Chinese development approaches to the benefit of poorer
countries, such trilateral projects could also promote models of engagement and trust-building in
times of growing geopolitical confrontation.

29. Explore new funding opportunities. Despite the Chinese authorities’ current distrust
of Western organisations, several service-oriented ICSOs expect Chinese development finance to
become an important funding source in the future. Chinese government funding will most likely
become available via joint ventures with Chinese social organisations or state-owned enterprises
participating in Belt and Road projects. The Chinese Ministry of Culture and Tourism also promotes
the participation of international NGOs in the BRI’s official “People-to-People” Platform (一带一
路 ——民心相通 yidai yilu – minxin xiangtong), meant to strengthen “cultural links” along the Belt
and Road. While the diversification of funding options is to be welcomed, this has to be weighed
against the pitfalls of the political strings attached to Chinese funding. The June 2019 meeting also
drew ICSOs’ attention to the indirect benefits of China’s rise in terms of aid funding, i.e. the fact
that established donors – such as Australia and New Zealand in the Pacific region – are once again
stepping up their own development funding in previously neglected areas.

3.2 China’s aspiration to become a global technology leader
TREND ANALYSIS
This emerged as the thematic driver for which ICSOs in general have the most
limited understanding of Chinese ambitions and aims, as well as investment and
innovation capacity. There still appear to be significant blind spots showing an
urgent need for more proactive knowledge-seeking in this area. China has the
capacity to move new technology forward at great speed and scale, and what is
seen by authorities as successful in the domestic context – for social control or
progress alike – is highly likely to be subsequently exported overseas. The Chinese
industrial policy approach that relies on heavy state interference and massive research and development (R&D) investments in key strategic sectors, epitomised
by the ‘Made in China 2025’ (中国制造 2025) strategy for technological upgrading,
also fundamentally challenges Western market-liberal principles.

27. Advocate or campaign for the respect and improvement of labour and
environmental standards in target countries. China’s leadership frequently emphasises

11

that its overseas operations “strictly obey local laws and regulations”, which however often fall far
short of international standards (e.g. labour standards set by the International Labour Organization).

tions-Reports-Thematic-reports-2017-ENG.pdf.

See also International Commission of Jurists (2017), Special Economic Zones in Myanmar and the State Duty
to Protect Human Rights, https://www.icj.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/Myanmar-SEZ-assessment-Publica-

17

 China has demonstrated different degrees of adherence to international standards and norms for technology development. It has generally followed International Organization for Standardization (ISO) norms in traditional sectors but is
developing its own standards for its own market in new sectors, like artificial intelligence (AI) and big data regulation. Most prominently, the Chinese government has successfully established the World Internet Conference (世界互联网大会
or Wuzhen summit) as a multilateral format to promote its anti-liberal “internet
sovereignty” (网络主权) agenda and thus internationally legitimise online censorship and government control.12

18

energy vehicles, mobile phone chips, etc.) remain important indicators of areas in which Chinese
technology could have a transformative global impact over the next decade.

31. Strengthen exchanges and build partnerships with IT experts and techspecialist CSOs to keep abreast of fast-moving developments in the sector generally, and in
China specifically.16

32. Proactively integrate a “China dimension” into other work on influencing
international standards. ICSOs should continue efforts to influence international negotiations
on norms and standards and promote ethical frameworks for the development of new technologies,
such as artificial intelligence, genome editing, and facial recognition systems, and wherever possible
integrate their China teams into these conversations.

One major threat for independent civil society worldwide emanates from China-originated surveillance and facial recognition technologies, which are rapidly advancing and already actively peddled to authoritarian and semi-authoritarian governments worldwide. Chinese technology companies appear to have no
qualms about offering their social control technologies to government entities
at home and abroad, thus facilitating new rights abuses or closing civic space for
communities and partners with which ICSOs work internationally. The threat of
digital surveillance against Hong Kong’s ongoing pro-democracy movement is another reminder of these potential dangers to global civil society.

33. Identify innovations to enhance service delivery: There may be particular opportunities

In terms of opportunities, innovative Chinese technology can play a key role in mitigating severe global challenges to human development, which are closely related
to the missions of many ICSOs. Chinese companies already play a world-leading
role for many of the technologies needed for climate crisis adaptation and renewable energy production, but also for IT-based innovations in fields of health,
agriculture, or rural education.13 As the US has withdrawn its support for the Paris
Agreement, China has pledged to develop renewable energy capacity equivalent
to the entire current US electricity system within the next decade.14 The Chinese
government is also pursuing the world’s most ambitious agenda to promote and
leverage technological innovation to improve social service provision,15 with potential as a model for other countries in the future.

34. Promote international ethical discussions of Chinese-originated technology
solutions for development problems, either within existing international formats on ethics in

A new generation of ambitious Chinese philanthropists is aiming to “solve” global
problems with innovative technologies and social innovations. China-originated
innovations have the potential to revolutionise access to education in remote areas, e.g. by using satellites for Nigerian online education services or through grand
experiments in artificial intelligence-led (AI) education. In the health sector, Chinese entrepreneurs are pushing ahead with similarly ambitious - albeit ethically
controversial - plans, e.g. to eradicate malaria in Kenya.

for service delivery-focused ICSOs to identify the most effective (and ethically “acceptable”) Chinese
technological developments and innovations which can help advance service-delivery aims or
efficiency in other target countries, and support their internationalisation. For instance, the USbased health ICSO PATH has successfully tapped into China’s innovation potential in healthcare
and position as the leading global producer of active pharmaceutical ingredients. It identified a
safe and effective vaccine for Japanese encephalitis developed in China, explicitly supported its
internationalisation – rigorous testing, recognition and acceptance in the global multilateral health
system (WHO prequalification) – and ensured affordability in low-income countries. It has also done
this for a Chinese female condom. Another ICSO, the Wildlife Conservation Society, entered into a
cooperation with Tencent at last year’s Tencent for the Planet Partnership Conference, to monitor
animal trafficking.

new technology, or by initiating a specific ICSO roundtable to keep abreast of Chinese innovations.
Recent examples of innovations with (potential) global relevance include Tencent’s deployment of
facial recognition technology against child trafficking, mass drug administration to fight malaria,
or the spreading of AI-based curricula or robots for remote teaching in underprivileged regions.
The World Economic Forum’s “Preparing Civil Society for the Fourth Industrial Revolution Initiative”
(CS4IR) is one such format in which several ICSOs are already represented and could promote a
stronger China dimension.

35. Focus policy/advocacy efforts and public awareness-raising on issues for which

real civil society impact is possible. Western-based ICSOs so far have almost no leverage vis à vis
Chinese technology companies, although this may change in line with their growing stake in Western
markets. Public pressure can be more effective at discouraging Western-based companies from
being complicit in strengthening China’s technological surveillance state by providing surveillance

McKunde, Sarah & Shazeda Ahmed (2018): The Contestation and Shaping of Cyber Norms Through China’s Internet Sovereignty Agenda, in: International Journal of Communication 12(2018), 3835–3855.

12

Yang, Harrison Hao, Sha Zhu & Jason MacLeod (2018): Promoting Education Equity in Rural and Underdeveloped
Areas: Cases on Computer-Supported Collaborative Teaching in China, in: EURASIA Journal of Mathematics, Science and Technology Education, 2018, 14(6), 2393-2400; Oreglia, E. (2014): ICT and (personal) development in rural
China, in: Information Technologies & International Development, 10(3), 19–30.

13

Geall, Sam & Adrian Ely (2018): Narratives and Pathways towards an Ecological Civilization in Contemporary China,
in: The China Quarterly, 236, 1175–1196, pp. 1177-8.
14

RECOMMENDATIONS: ICSOS SHOULD
30. Monitor developments in the innovation, use and export of technology in their
areas of work, from both operational and rights perspectives, and for potential opportunities and
threats. Whereas the political future of the “Made in China 2025” strategy is uncertain, the priority
sectors defined therein (industrial robots, medical devices, renewable energy equipment, new

Stepan, Matthias & Jane Duckett (eds.)(2018): Serve the People. Innovation and IT in China’s social development agenda, MERICS Papers on China, No 6, October 2018, https://www.merics.org/sites/default/files/2018-10/
MPOC_06_Serve_the_People_0.pdf.

15

A recent report by the World Economic Forum provides a good overview of tech-savvy organisations involved in
civil society capacity-building around new technologies: World Economic Forum (2019): Civil Society in the Fourth
Industrial Revolution: Preparation and Response. In Collaboration with Pact, January 2019, http://www3.weforum.
org/docs/WEF_Civil_Society_in_the_Fourth_Industrial_Revolution_Response_and_Innovation.pdf.
16

19

 technology or censorship tools for the Chinese market. Especially in semi-authoritarian countries
and weak democracies like Ecuador or Uganda, civil society has a key role to play in preventing the
purchase and rights-violating use of Chinese technology.

36. Avoid simplification of developments in China to allow for more targeted
advocacy. For instance, the Chinese Social Credit System has frequently been used as a focus for
dystopian fears about digital totalitarianism and omnipresent surveillance. At the same time, many
Western companies are actively thinking about how to conform with this system once it is formally
extended to foreign entities.17 While raising public attention of such developments can be useful
in itself, a more nuanced understanding of the system’s many components, the implementation
and actual risks for Chinese citizens, as well as foreign organisations dealing with China, is also a
prerequisite for more effective advocacy, including vis à vis Western actors.

37. Seize new opportunities for collaboration at local government or city level.
Some Chinese local governments, such as Shenzhen municipality, have already set up foundations
with the specific task of exploring possibilities of externalising Chinese technological innovations for
non-commercial, public-benefit uses in developing countries. Government agencies in landlocked
provinces like Sichuan may be less experienced but all the more eager to promote transnational
cooperation under the BRI framework.

3.3 The internationalisation of Chinese non-governmental
actors
20

TREND ANALYSIS
In recent years, the Chinese non-profit sector has experienced an ongoing rapid
development, albeit under significantly tightened political control. Most special
characteristics of China’s global presence in general, and its engagement with
non-state actors in particular, are closely related to the sweeping role and influence of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). While Party and government entities
are still formally separated in most instances, the party permeates government
agencies at all levels and ultimately controls policymaking. Since 2012, CCP chairman Xi Jinping has not only reinforced party-internal disciplinary controls and hierarchical, top-down decision-making, but also spearheaded an expansion of CCP
cells in the name of “party building” (党建 dangjian) in formally non-state organisations, including both private companies and non-profits. Significantly, the number
of “social organisations” (社会组织 shehui zuzhi) with an internal party organisation
has since skyrocketed from 115,000 in 2013 to 289,000 in 201618 and is very likely
to grow further in line with the CCP’s efforts to “guide the healthy development of
social organisations”. 19
The Party-state’s dual strategy of promoting the service delivery capacity of
non-profits while repressing their potential to challenge the status quo has been
described as the “administrative absorption of society”20 by Renmin University
professor Kang Xiaoguang. Therefore, any hopes or expectations to find truly “independent” CSOs as potential partners are bound to be disappointed. Under the
current circumstances, Chinese associations and foundations that manage to de-

velop substantive activities are able to do so only with the informal backing of
influential Party-state officials, mostly at local/municipal level. This is even more
so for the – still relatively few – non-profit organisations with an international
reach, which are operating under high degrees of uncertainty given the absence
of a coherent legal framework for overseas non-profit and charitable activities,21
combined with China’s strict cross-border capital controls.22 Despite these caveats, it should be emphasised that the Chinese non-profit sector is composed of a
wide set of actors with diverse agendas and institutional set-ups. This means that
even under a sometimes discouraging legal and policy environment for foreign
non-profit actors, there are still possibilities for fruitful engagement, as confirmed
by many of the ICSO interviewees with longstanding working experience in mainland China.
The Chinese leadership’s growing international “soft power” ambitions have
prompted it to actively encourage Chinese “NGOs” to go abroad and “spread the
China story” (讲中国好故事 jiang zhongguo hao gushi) through humanitarian work
or by strengthening transnational people-to-people ties.23 Albeit starting from
low levels, a rapidly growing number of Chinese “Government-Organised NGOs”
(GONGOs), as well as private philanthropic foundations, have initiated projects
overseas and endeavoured to enter into international cooperation agreements in
recent years. Focus countries for overseas activities so far have been Myanmar,
Nepal, Cambodia, and Ethiopia, where the China Foundation for Poverty Alleviation (CFPA) officially opened its third overseas office in September 2019.
Chinese philanthropy is becoming a relevant force in terms of financial power.
A new generation of entrepreneurs is displaying global ambitions, e.g. trying to
apply innovative, technology-based methods to “solve” global problems such as
global warming. However, Chinese philanthropists’ high ambitions and enormous
financial possibilities still stand in contrast with their limited international experience. As is readily recognised by Chinese scholars working on the topic, Chinese
NGOs in general still lack the experience and organisational capacity to achieve
lasting impact beyond one-off relief projects overseas.24 Chinese NGOs notably
lack stable sources of funding for overseas activities, long-term projects, local
staff, and legal clarity about their possibilities for financing operations abroad.

17
European Chamber of Commerce in China (2019): The Digital Hand: How China’s Corporate Social Credit System
Conditions Market Actors, 28 August 2019, https://www.europeanchamber.com.cn/en/publications-corporate-social-credit-system.
18
Shih, Lea (2017): Centralized leadership – Heterogeneous party base. Changes in the membership structure
of the Chinese Communist Party, Merics China Monitor N° 40, 16/08/2017, p.7, https://www.merics.org/sites/
default/files/2018-05/170816_Merics_China_Monitor_40_English_Web.pdf; CCP General Office (2015): 中共中央
办公厅印发《关于加强社会组织党的建设工作的意见（试行）》, 28/09/2015, http://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2015-09/28/
content_2939936.htm.
19
Luo Xu罗旭 & Wang Haokui王昊魁 (2015): 加强党建工作引导社会组织健康发展, CPC News/Guangmin Ribao,
30/09/2015, http://dangjian.people.com.cn/n/2015/0930/c117092-27650349.html.

Kang Xiaoguang (2018): Moving Toward Neo-Totalitarianism. A Political-Sociological Analysis of the Evolution of
Administrative Absorption of Society in China. In Nonprofit Policy Forum 9 (1), 795–802.
20

21

 This, in turn, offers potential for cooperation with established and experienced ICSOs on the ground. If the official rhetoric encouraging NGOs to go abroad under the
BRI framework is eventually followed with an adequate national policy framework
to improve tax regulations and address capital transfer problems, the international
role of Chinese NGOs and and foundations is likely to increase dramatically.

reports and communications.26 ICSOs without previous China experience should cross-check their
own assessments with those of peers and external experts.

RECOMMENDATIONS: ICSOS SHOULD

41. Promote two-way partnerships between ICSOs and Chinese NGOs. Within the

38. Support and leverage the trend towards internationalisation of Chinese NGOs
and philanthropic foundations. How to engage in constructive dialogues and partnerships
with a more diverse set of Chinese actors abroad is one of the key questions ICSOs are currently
struggling with in their Global China strategies. Several international grant-making foundations are
already providing sectoral capacity-building and international learning platforms for Chinese nonprofit leaders and staff. Some ICSOs also reported support for Chinese partners’ internationalisation
strategies through training and experience-sharing. Additionally, Chinese foundations and NGOs
could also be assisted in their own lobbying efforts to be included in China’s official foreign aid
framework.

39. Strengthen partnerships with Chinese academia. Scholars, universities and think

22

tanks are not only the most accessible dialogue partners for ICSOs but can also be important
bridge-builders, both for institutional partnerships and targeted policy/advocacy efforts. However,
ICSOs need to be aware of the severely heightened political pressure on Chinese academia in recent
years, especially when it comes to engaging with “Western” organisations. Thus, formal partnerships
or joint research projects are likely only promising in “non-sensitive” areas.

40. Understand the specific institutional constraints under which (prospective)
Chinese partner organisations are operating. Given the high degree of legal uncertainty
under which Chinese non-profit entities are currently operating overseas, international cooperation
outside of China will mostly involve Chinese NGOs with either formal or informal political backing.
The type of partner organisation – central or local-level GONGO, private corporate charity or nonprofit association – does, however, make an important difference.25
40.1 ICSOs should spend enough time on understanding as deeply as possible the institutional
background, agenda and specific constraints of their (potential) Chinese partners. Important - albeit
imperfect - indicators are the historical origins of an organisation, its board members, availability
of information about non-governmental funding sources, its focus areas, and the language used in
A good overview of the policy and funding constraints for Chinese NGOs willing to internationalise their work is
provided in a 2016 report by the Beijing-based Global Environmental Institute (GEI): Ji Lin & Zhang Jingwei (2016):
Chinese NGOs “Going Global”: Current Situation, Challenges and Policy Recommendations. Global Environmental
Institute. Beijing, p.10-12, http://www.geichina.org/_upload/file/report/NGO_Going_Out_EN.pdf.1
21

Mitchell, Tom & Gabriel Wildau (2017): China’s State Council Puts Seal on Capital Controls, Financial Times,
18/08/2017, https://www.ft.com/content/3a638d1c-8405-11e7-a4ce-15b2513cb3ff.
22

Luo Xu罗旭 & Wang Haokui王昊魁 (2015): 加强党建工作引导社会组织健康发展, CPC News/Guangmin Ribao,
30/09/2015, http://dangjian.people.com.cn/n/2015/0930/c117092-27650349.html.
19

Mu Jinling 牟金玲 (2017): 加强“一带一路”国际合作，促进人类共同发展——首届丝绸之路沿线民间组织合作网络论坛综述
(Strengthening International Cooperation under the “Belt and Road”, Promoting Humanity’s Common Development—a Comprehensive Survey of the First Silk Road NGO Cooperation Network Forum), in: CPC Theory / People’s
Daily, 14/12/2017 http://theory.people.com.cn/n1/2017/1214/c40531-29706496.html [10/09/2019].
23

Deng, Guosheng (2017): Trends in Overseas Philanthropy by Chinese Foundations. In Voluntas 28 (2), 40; Li, Xiaoyun; Dong, Qiang (2018): Chinese NGOs are “Going Out”. History, Scale, Characteristics, Outcomes, And Barriers. In
Nonprofit Policy Forum 9 (1), 198; Zhang, Wenjuan (2017): The Internationalisation of Chinese NGOs and Their Engagement with the United Nations. In China Report 53 (3), 307–330.

40.2 In some circumstances, organisations with a strong Party-state background may actually
be good cooperation partners for ICSOs precisely because of their close ties to relevant decisionmakers, and their potential to feed information and policy advice back into the Chinese political
system. Cooperating with more independent NGOs may be preferable on issues that do not fall
neatly in line with Chinese government interests, but ICSOs will need to consider potential risks to
their Chinese partners arising from activities or public statements.
scope of an ICSO’s identity, strategy and previous contacts, it could be well placed to support
Chinese NGOs with some of the challenges the latter face in “going out” overseas, notably in terms
of operational and financial management, public awareness, or the political and legal situation in
target countries. Chinese NGOs, in turn, are much more familiar with the challenges arising from
Chinese laws and politics and may be better positioned to identify areas of potential influence.
Mutual learning can influence and enhance the expertise of both organisations. This also means
that an ICSO needs to clarify what it wants to get out of any such partnership, in terms of social
impact and/or institutional benefits.

42. Build on Chinese NGOs’ domestic experiences and related strengths. Many
Chinese NGOs “going out” are already replicating what they have been good at doing domestically,
especially in disaster relief and education sectors. Very recent first-hand experience with China’s
own rapid development and socio-economic transformation constitutes one of their unique
strengths. ICSOs could play a supportive role in both scaling-up and context-specific adaptation of
such organisations’ programmes overseas.

43. Allocate sufficient time and resources, testing different avenues for building
relationships and networks. Establishing first contact with Chinese actors abroad can be a
major challenge, especially for foreign organisations without a sustained domestic China presence
or office. Given the importance of personal trusted relationships with Chinese decision-makers,
there is no magic bullet for this challenge. Several promising avenues should be explored by ICSOs’
offices in BRI countries, with support from their Global China coordinators:
43.1 Promote dialogue formats between established and new donor agencies in developing
countries. Several ICSOs highlighted that in-country donor meetings continue to be routinely
limited to Western representatives: if genuine engagement with new donors (not only China)
is seen as desirable, more inclusive formats need to be envisaged to build trust and eventually
facilitate cooperation on concrete projects.
43.2 Recruit Chinese staff not only for in-China activities but also for global engagement. Due to
domestic capacity-building and a proliferation of social work-oriented study programmes at Chinese
universities, a new generation of highly educated and internationally-experienced employees for
the non-profit sector is emerging. ICSOs need to tap into these resources not only directly, but also
to facilitate contacts and partnerships with other Chinese organisations internationally.
43.3 Approach UN agencies as possible intermediaries: The intergovernmental focus of Chinese
development assistance explains why UN agencies are privileged partners for cooperation
agreements and have much easier access to key actors of Chinese development policy compared
Blurred lines between GONGOs and NGOs have become a global challenge today and the situation is particularly
tricky in present-day China, where more and more GONGOs are being set up as ‘transmission belts’ to society and/
or as government mouthpieces in civil society forums. For an extensive academic discussion of these developments, see Hasmath, Reza; Hildebrandt, Timothy; Hsu, Jennifer Y. J. (2019): Conceptualizing government-organized
non-governmental organizations. In Journal of Civil Society 15 (3), 267–284; and in the international context: Hsu, J.
Y. J., Hildebrandt, T., & Hasmath, R. (2016). ‘Going out’ or staying in? The expansion of Chinese NGOs in Africa. Development Policy Review, 34(3), 423–439.
25

24

26
While many Chinese actors going abroad are trying to frame their activities as part of the Belt and Road Initiative,
there is an important difference between organisations reiterating official CCP slogans on all public occasions and
those demonstrating technical expertise and project implementation in their respective field.

23

 to ICSOs. UNDP China has been at the forefront of engagement with the BRI in recent years. Other
examples include UNCHR’s efforts to leverage the BRI to tackle root causes of displacement,
as well as UN WFP’s and UNIDO’s cooperation agreements with CIDCA under the South-South
Cooperation Assistance Fund. ICSOs need to ensure that civil society voices are heard in such
cooperation formats and could also use their established contacts with these UN agencies to reach
out to Chinese partners.
43.4 Western foundations and philanthropic communities may equally serve as bridge-builders,
e.g. via elite networks such as the China-US Philanthropy Initiative.

3.4 China’s growing influence on global governance and
the UN System
TREND ANALYSIS

24

In line with China’s economic rise and boosted by intense CCP efforts to strengthen the country’s “soft power”, its diplomatic influence in international bodies is
growing dramatically. For transnational civil society actors that have long been
struggling to increase their say in global decision-making processes, the Chinese
government’s preference for intergovernmental negotiations, its insistence on
“non-intervention in internal affairs”, and Chinese diplomats’ repeated encroachments upon the speaking rights of independent civil society voices in UN forums,
are inherently problematic.
Regarding human rights advocacy, Chinese diplomatic pressure on UN committees and the harassment of independent voices has been of growing concern for
many years.27 The proliferation of GONGOs (not only, but importantly, from China)
in international civil society forums, together with Chinese diplomats’ repeated
obstruction of ECOSOC accreditation for NGOs that have been critical of China,
are obvious challenges for meaningful civil society participation in global governance. Besides obvious and largely successful efforts to block any critical examination or condemnation of its own human rights violations – particularly in
Xinjiang – by the UN Human Rights Council, Chinese diplomacy is engaged in more
long-term, systematic efforts to reshape the very definition of “human rights” and
related norms at UN level, by prioritising socio-economic development over individual freedoms, and by introducing concepts such as the “Community of Shared
Future for Mankind” (人类命运共同体) into all sorts of international declarations.28
Conversely, China’s role in global climate governance has been described as increasingly constructive in recent years.29 At the 2015 Paris Climate Summit, Xi
Jinping strongly committed to a leading role for the country in fighting climate
change, an ambition that is at least partly reflected in domestic policy reforms.30

China’s important contributions to UN peacekeeping missions are not yet considered an issue of direct concern for most ICSOs. China’s growing role and influence
in this field should however stay on the radar of organisations working on both
humanitarian and advocacy issues in countries with international peacekeeping
missions.

RECOMMENDATIONS: ICSOS SHOULD
44. Strengthen civil society monitoring of China’s contributions and influence on
UN bodies. Since China’s financial contributions have become essential to the operations of many
UN agencies, independent non-profit organisations play a crucial role in holding them accountable.
Apart from obstruction of ECOSOC (re)accreditation by the United Nations Committee on NonGovernmental Organizations, for NGOs working directly on “sensitive” issues like minority and
indigenous rights, several other ICSOs have been pressured based on alleged violations of the “One
China policy”. Interviewees reported how China’s diplomatic impact is compounded by the strategic
positioning of delegated Chinese staff in key administrative positions within the UN system, as part
of a long-term strategy that democratic governments have only slowly been catching up with.
Regarding public advocacy campaigns, monitoring tools that do not single out Chinese influence
but seek to uphold the integrity of UN bodies against undue particularistic interests are advisable.

45. Decisively counter Chinese efforts to step up pressure on critical civil society
voices worldwide. Several ICSOs reported pressure from Chinese authorities in Beijing related
to criticism voiced not within China, but by the ICSO’s federation/headquarter/international office
and/or country offices in BRI countries. This form of encroachment upon global public discourse
also needs to be addressed more systematically.

46. Hold multinational companies accountable for complicity in censorship and
rights violations. Civil society plays a crucial role in increasing pressure on multinational
companies, particularly those headquartered in Western countries, not to forsake liberal values and
even self-proclaimed ethical standards due to the political market access conditions dictated by
authoritarian governments. As the Chinese Party-state is significantly stepping up its pressure on
foreign companies to show political compliance and stay silent or even endorse CCP ideological
stances on issues like the Hong Kong protests, Taiwan’s status or the dire human rights situation
in Xinjiang, much stronger international civil society pressure is needed to prevent multinational
corporations from forsaking human rights standards and even their own ethics.

Human Rights Watch (2017): The Costs of International Advocacy. China’s Interference in United Nations Human
Rights Mechanisms, HRW Report, 05/09/2017, https://www.hrw.org/report/2017/09/05/costs-international-advocacy/chinas-interference-united-nations-human-rights.
27

Gao, Charlotte (2017): ‘A Community of Shared Future’: One Short Phrase for UN, One Big Victory for China?, The
Diplomat, 05/11/2017, https://thediplomat.com/2017/11/a-community-of-shared-future-one-short-phrase-for-unone-big-victory-for-china/.
28

Geall & Ely 2018, op.cit.; Li, Lina, Stephan Wolters & Yang Fuqiang (2017): China and its Climate Leadership in a
Changing World. From Passive Follower to Constructive Shaper of the Global Order, Adelphi; Climate Diplomacy,
Discussion Paper, July 2017, https://www.adelphi.de/en/publication/china-and-its-climate-leadership-changingworld.
29

Li, Anthony (2016): Hopes of Limiting Global Warming? China and the Paris Agreement on Climate Change, in:
China Perspectives, 2016/1, 49-54; Kuhn, Berthold (2018): China’s Commitment to the Sustainable Development
Goals: An Analysis of Push and Pull Factors and Implementation Challenges, in: Chinese Political Science Review
3 (4), 359–388.
30

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 46.1 Campaigns like the “Drop Dragonfly” campaign, supported by Amnesty International, which
successfully prompted Google to retreat from plans to go back on previous promises and abide
by Chinese censorship and surveillance demands in return for renewed market access, show
the importance and promise of such indirect China-related advocacy, especially when it targets
companies relying heavily on public reputation.
46.2 As Xinjiang risks being turned by the CCP into a laboratory for tech-based surveillance and
repression with the character of a global model for repressive governments, more concerted
transnational civil society pressure is urgently needed, at least to increase the reputational costs for
foreign multinational corporations’ complicity in human rights violations, epitomised by McKinsey
& Company holding its 2018 global annual retreat in Kashgar or the Volkswagen CEO’s alleged
ignorance about detention camps in the region.

47. Weigh opportunities and risks of cooperating with Chinese (GO)NGOs at UN
level. Some ICSOs reported pilot cooperation activities, such as hosting joint side events at UN
conferences with (mostly Chinese government-backed) “civil society” platform organisations or
inviting internationally-inexperienced Chinese NGOs to participate and share their perspectives
and expertise. Given the obvious risk of merely assisting in amplifying Communist Party positions
globally, ICSOs should think more strategically about how and under which conditions to cooperate.
Joint advocacy with Chinese civil society voices may become possible on less politically sensitive
issues, such as wildlife protection or climate crisis adaptation.

48. Call upon the Chinese government to use its economic leverage in favour of
more sustainable climate and environmental governance. Due to the sheer size of

26

its market as well as the government’s high political steering capacity, meaningful sustainability
guidelines for Chinese imports, e.g. agricultural products like soy, meat or palm oil, could make a
huge contribution to alleviating some of humanity’s most urgent ecological crises.

Resources
a. Keeping track of Belt and Road developments: In addition to the Chinese government’s
official Belt and Road websites, which focus on BRI achievements, opportunities and success stories,
several international think tanks have set up Belt and Road trackers to increase transparency and
enable data-based analyses in light of official ambiguity and often opaqueness about the details
of most individual projects. Good resources are provided by the Council on Foreign Relations,
the Mercator Institute for China Studies, and the Center for Strategic and International Studies’
Reconnecting Asia project. The German NGO Stiftung Asienhaus maintains a collection of BRI
resources with direct relevance for civil society (in German).

b. Chinese NGO legislation: The Asia Society’s ChinaFile NGO Project provides a valuable and
regularly updated database with factual information about registrations and current developments
related to the Overseas NGO Law as well as other regulatory developments relevant to foreign
NGOs working in China. More analytical pieces concerning what the ONGO Law means for foreign
organisations working in mainland China have been published by ChinaFile, China Development
Brief, the GIGA Institute, or the International Center for Not-for-Profit Law, among others.

c. Chinese intermediaries, umbrella or platform organisations for the NGO and
charity sector: While the officially-backed China Association for NGO Cooperation (中国国际民
间组织合作促进会, CANGO) and China Network for International Exchanges (中国民间组织国际交流
促进会, CNIE) have a long history of facilitating international cooperation and non-governmental
partnerships, many other cross-sector organisations have sprung up in recent years.31 Prominent
examples include the private China Global Philanthropy Institute (深圳国际公益学院, CGPI), 32 the Silk
Road NGO Cooperation Network (丝绸之路沿线民间组织合作网络, initiated by CNIE) or the Shenzhen
Foundation for International Cooperation and Exchange (深圳市国际交流合作基金会). 33 The China
Council for International Cooperation on Environment and Development (中国环境与发展国际合作委
员会, CCICED) is another state-backed entity promoting international cooperation, not specifically
but including with NGOs. China House (中南屋), a Shanghai-based social enterprise dedicated to
CSR as well as promoting youth exchanges along the Belt and Road, was represented at the June
meeting and offered to help ICSOs establish contacts with Chinese enterprises in BRI countries.

d. Official non-profit information desk: The Ministry of Civil Affairs has integrated various
databases and service desks into a “China Social Organisations Public Service Platform” (中国社会组
织公共服务平台, China-NPO), which is meant to help social organisations navigate the bureaucratic
procedures and provide more transparency on developments in the Chinese non-profit sector.

e. Regional networks: The transnational Asian Venture Philanthropy Network, headquartered
For a broader overview of mostly domestically-oriented platform organisations, cf. Etzcorn, Ryan (2019): “Intermediary Nonprofits and the Rise of China’s Domestic Social Impact Ecosystem”, China Development Brief, 31 August
2019, http://www.chinadevelopmentbrief.cn/articles/intermediary-nonprofits-and-the-rise-of-chinas-domestic-social-impact-ecosystem/ [4 September 2019].
31

CGPI was set up in 2015 by a group of prominent US and Chinese philanthropists. It is conceived as a think tank,
training and international networking centre and aims, inter alia, to improve the capacity of the Chinese philanthropy sector through an academic and professional training programme building upon global best practices.
Its dean is Wang Zhenyao, one of the most eminent Chinese intellectuals in the field and also a well-connected
former Ministry of Civil Affairs official.
32

Established in 2014 by the Shenzhen municipal government to improve Shenzhen’s international networks in
charity-related fields and to help local companies increase their corporate giving, particularly in Southeast Asia.
33

Lu, Bo 陆波; Guo, Ting 郭婷; Xiang, Yingzhu 向颖著 (2015): 中国民间组织走出去. 操作手册 [Chinese NGOs going out. A
Practical Guide]. Edited by China Foundation for Poverty Alleviation. Asia Foundation. Beijing.
34

This data is, however, subject to several methodological problems and limitations, and should therefore be treated with caution (cf. Deng, Guosheng (2017): Trends in Overseas Philanthropy by Chinese Foundations, in: Voluntas
30 (2), 678–691).
35

Ma, J., Wang, Q., Dong, C., and Li, H. (2017). The Research Infrastructure of Chinese Foundations, a Database for
Chinese Civil Society Studies. Scientific Data, 4:170094.
36

in Singapore and with a Greater China office in Hong Kong, is a large network of social investmentrelated entities ranging from philanthropic foundations and social innovation hubs to for-profit
corporations with a strong social investment focus. Among its over 500 members across Asia, there
are also about 30 organisations based in mainland China.

f. The China Foundation for Poverty Alleviation (CFPA), with the support of the Asia

Foundation, elaborated a ‘Practical Guide’ for Chinese CSOs “going out” in 2015.34 The (Chineselanguage) handbook includes an overview of NGO and foundation experiences abroad as well as
practical recommendations regarding country analysis, project management or evaluation.

g. Data on Chinese foundations “going out”: The China Foundation Center (CFC) maintains
the most frequently-used dataset on Chinese foundations, including information on their overseas
activities compiled from annual reports.35 An easily accessible overview of 37 Chinese foundations
with documented overseas activities by August 2014 was presented by researcher Lu Bo. In 2017, a
group of mostly US-based Chinese researchers constructed a more comprehensive but also more
academically-oriented database, the Research Infrastructure of Chinese Foundations (中国基金会研
究基础数据库), which compiles data from six different sources to improve accuracy.36 Nonetheless,
it must be assumed that many incipient overseas activities of Chinese foundations as well as other
social organisations remain under the public radar so far.

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 The International Civil Society Centre and the Scanning the
Horizon initiative
Our mission is to strengthen the impact and resilience of international civil society organisations
and to support people to change their world for the better.
Since 2015, the Centre’s Scanning the Horizon collaborative platform has helped international civil
society organisations prepare for disruption and benefit from change. With members including
leading international civil society organisations, national CSO umbrella organisations, and private
sector companies, the platform addresses the need for collaborative trend analysis in the sector.
Futurists, strategists, trend analysts and organisational learning specialists form a cross-sector community of experts and practitioners to share insights, explore key trends and develop relevant strategies. The platform also enables mutual learning and the pooling of resources.
This is the first in a new series of annual publications aimed at sharing key insights from the platform’s thematic discussions with practitioners, strategists and leaders in the wider international
civil society sector.
Visit https://icscentre.org/our-work/scanning-the-horizon/ to find out more.

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Acknowledgements
This guidance document was written by Bertram Lang on behalf of the International Civil Society
Centre, with the kind support of our co-operation partner Stiftung Mercator. A number of international CSO practitioners, academics and other colleagues kindly shared their time, experience and
wisdom to shape the overall findings of this guidance. We could not have developed this guidance
without your support and inspiration.

29

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