Declaration of Douglas A. Ollivant Senior Fellow, Future of War Program, New America I, Douglas A. Ollivant, make the following declaration pursuant to 28 USC, Sec 1746, on the State of Iraqis returning to Iraq: 1. Qualifications. I am a retired Army Infantry officer who served two tours in Iraq (2004-5, 2006-7), the second as the Chief Planner for Multi-Nation al Division Baghdad. I served in both the George W. Bush and Barrack Obama administrations as Director for Iraq at the National Security Council (20089). Since 2012, I have conducted commercial business (primarily as a partner in Mantid Internationa l, LLC) in Iraq, entering the country 1-4 times/year. In 2016, I travelled to Iraq and the region as part of the Atlantic Council's FUTURE OF IRAQ project, headed by Ambassador Ryan Crocker and spoke, in Berlin, with representatives of the Christian community including Chaldean Patriarch of Baghdad Louis Raphael Sako. I most recently travelled to Iraq in late August of 2017, first to Baghdad, where I spoke directly to the Iraqi Prime Minister, and later to Mosul and the Christian regions, as part of a delegation hosted by the UN High Commissioner for Refugees. I hold an earned doctorate in political science from Indiana University. I perform analysis for two non-profit research centers or "think tanks. 11 I am the Arizona State University Future of War Senior Fellow at New America and also work, when called, as adjunct staff at the RAND Corporation, a non-profit Federal Funded Research and Development Corporation. In both of these institutions, my work centers around Iraq, Syria, ISIS, post-conflict stabilization and "small wars." With the exception of the 2010-2011 period (when I worked in Afghanistan), my work has focused either primarily or singularly on Iraq since 2004. I write frequently about Iraq, have testified to the Senate Armed Services committee about Iraq, and have frequently given commentar y on outlets such as ABC News, MSNBC, CBS, CNN, BBC, and Al Jazeera. 2. I have been asked to give my opinion about the likely treatment and conditions faced by Iraqis removed from the United States and returned to Iraq, including those convicted of crimes and members of religious minority 1 OHS 000017 groups such as Chaldean Christians. It is my considered opinion thatcontra other declarati ons-thes e individuals and/or groups are unlikely to face either persecution or torture. I understand "persecution" to be generally defined as: a threat to the life or freedom of, or the infliction of suffering or harm upon those who differ in a way regarded as offensive, and "torture" to be generally defined as: any act of severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, that is intentiona lly inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining informati on, punishment, intimidati on, coercion, or discrimination. Iraqis returned to Iraq may face harm based on perceived wealth by organized criminal groups, and those returning after long stints in the United States will almost certainly experience significant barriers to integration, possessing neither cultural awareness nor language skills. But this is quite different from being subjected to persecution and/or torture. 3. Iraqis returning to Baghdad will certainly be subject to screening. The reason for their return will not be secret, and the Government of Iraq will have a responsibility, given the criminal records of some of the returnees, to ensure that the returnees do not present a danger to Iraqi society. In addition, some returnees will not have Iraqi identification documents, so will be held in government custody until these documents can be produced. Without government documents they will not be able to freely move about the country (any more than one can fly internally within the U.S. without governme nt issued ID), but I know of no incidents of Iraqi citizens being tortured for not having proper documents or because of their criminal history in the United States-th ey are simply denied forward passage and may be detained until their identity can be verified. If torture were a common occurrence based on either of these circumstances, this would be something reported by NGOs, and I know of no evidence that these reports exist. 4. Upon release from government custody, Christian returnees will almost certainly want to move to a location secured by an Iraqi Christian militia. These militias-a lso part of the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF)-a re securing the Christian areas in Ninewah province. These militias provide "insurance" against persecution by any remnants of ISIS that might be able to act in northern Iraq. These militias are uniformed, armed, disciplined 2 OHS 000018 and locally controlled (see picture of a membe r of the Ninewah Plains Protection Unit, attached as Annex 1, photo taken by author in either Bartella or Bakhdida in Aug 2017). 5. When ISIS controlled Ninewah province, Iraqi Christians did face persecution and even genocide. However, the liberatio n of Ninewah provinc e-the completion of which was formally announced by the Iraqi government on August 31, 2017-- by the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) has removed the genocidal threat, though ISIS retains the ability to conduct terrorist attacks. As of this writing, ISIS controls only one city in Kirkuk province, and some small towns in western Anbar province, neither of which would be a likely destination for returnin g Iraqi Christians (see Annex 2, ISIS remaining territory in Iraq/Syria from the Institute for the Study of War). 1515 controlled territory consists of no more than 5% of the country at present. The ISF will likely clear these few remaining ISIS strongholds by the end of this calendar year, or early in 2018. 6. The largest Christian enclave is in a collection of villages just east of Mosul, in Ninewah province. I visited both Bartell a and Bakhdida, two of the major villages in this cluster, in August of 2017. The villages suffered significant damage, both from ISIS looting and collateral damage in their liberation. But both villages have a small populat ion garrisoning them as the infrastructure is repaired. They are secured by the Ninewah Plains Protection Unit, which also played a significant role in liberating them. The living in these villages will be spartan, but safe, for the foreseeable future. Further, I suspect that the returnees will be welcome there, as Patriach Sako has expressed his concern that not enough Assyrian Christians will return to, or stay in, Iraq to maintain a critical mass for his community. 7. The fact that these returnin g Iraqi Christians have been "Westernized" should be of little concern. That they were in the West makes them almost certainly innocen t of any ISIS connection, which will be the primary concern of Iraqi authorities receiving them. Further, Western influences are hardly unwelcome or uncommon in Iraq. Schools teaching English are common {the University of Kufa near Najaf teaches classes in English) and the Iraqi Prime Minister holds a graduate degree from the University of Manchester. 8. I am given to understand that there is great concern about the presence of the Iraqi Popular Mobilization Units (PMUs) and the danger they present to 3 OHS 000019 the returnees. I find this concern to be exaggerated. First, the PMUs have been, since last year, formal ly incorporated into the Government of Iraq). Second, the PMUs are not monoli thic. Almost all factions within Iraq have units within the PMUs (e.g., the Yezidi) and I have earlier discussed the Christian units with the PMUs. The PMUs were established to protec t Iraq against ISIS, and were a returnee to have ISIS ties, then he might have concerns with the PM Us. But PMU officials at the highest level have expressed affinity with Iraq's Christians, and for years spoke about the importance of liberati ng Mosul's churches. While videos released by an organization may reflect formal, rather than actual values, that the PMU office released a video glorifying the (then future) liberati on of a Mosul church shows the values the PMU officials are trying to instill in their forces. That video is available at: https:/ /www.y outube .com/w atch ?v=L3ZTj2gdNiE. 9. When PMU units (and other security forces) have been accused of crimes, the Iraqi government has responded with investigations. Even in the liberation of Mosul, about which the Iraqis took fierce national pride, the Prime Ministe r publicly allowed investigations of alleged abuses to move forward. 10. I have been asked to opine on whethe r there would be a difference in treatm ent between Iraqis returni ng on a commercial ticket, and those arriving en masse in a chartered plane. I would suspe ct-as with any bureaucratic organi zation -that the Iraqi interio r officials will be able to respond better to a large group that they are prepared for, rather than taking in returnees one at a time. However, this is based simply on my knowledge of bureaucratic processes, and I believe that neither group once their situation is fully under stood- will face any more hardship than is necessary, as this return will have been negotiated with the U.S. government. 11. In short, it is my professional opinion, based on long association with, study of, and travel to Iraq, that Christians of Iraqi origin who are returned to their country are at low risk of torture or persecution, whethe r at the hands of the government or non-government actors. The same is true for Shi a and Sunnis returni ng to Iraq. Though Sunnis suspected of ISIS affiliation may be subject to scrutiny, a returnee would not. That an 4 OHS 00002 0 individual retur ning to his home coun try after long absence with no or low language skills and little cultural attun eme nt will be vulne rable to crime and othe r predation borders on the obvious, and is equally true for Iraq as for any othe r coun try of retur n. But Iraqi Christians are work ing hard, banding together, and making their homes in Ninewah province, and I believe that returnees will be accepted in these communities. 12. I believe that my opini on is the consensus opinion of Iraq coun try experts who travel regularly to Iraq. 13.1 declare under pena lty of perju ry that the foreg oing is true and correct. ctobe r 4, 2017 . . A~ . Ollivant, Ph.D. Senior Fellow, Future of War Project, New America 2 Annexes 5 OHS 000021