Case 2:17-cv-00077-RSM Document 234 Filed 03/12/20 Page 1 of 12

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THE HONORABLE RICARDO S. MARTINEZ

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON
AT SEATTLE

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LISA HOOPER, BRANDIE OSBORNE,
KAYLA WILLIS, REAVY WASHINGTON,
individually and on behalf of a class of similarly situated individuals; THE EPISCOPAL
DIOCESE OF OLYMPIA; TRINITY PARISH
OF SEATTLE; REAL CHANGE,
Plaintiffs,
v.
CITY OF SEATTLE, WASHINGTON;
WASHINGTON STATE DEPARTMENT OF
TRANSPORTATION; ROGER MILLAR,
SECRETARY OF TRANSPORTATION FOR
WSDOT, in his official capacity,

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PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION TO DISMISS
PLAINTIFFS’ CLAIMS AND THE CITY
OF SEATTLE’S COUNTERCLAIM
WITHOUT PREJUDICE1 PURSUANT
TO FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE 41(a)(2)
NOTE ON MOTION CALENDAR:
April 3, 2020

Defendants.

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No. 2:17-cv-00077-RSM

I.

INTRODUCTION

Plaintiffs seek dismissal of all of their claims and the City’s counterclaim without
prejudice pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(2) and this Court’s discretionary

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Counsel has been unable to reach some of the unhoused individual Plaintiffs, who
are without regular addresses, phone numbers, and contact information, and are thus seeking
dismissal without prejudice.

MOTION TO DISMISS WITHOUT PREJUDICE – 1
Cause No. 2:17-cv-00077-RSM

CORR CRONIN LLP
1001 Fourth Avenue, Suite 3900
Seattle, Washington 98154-1051
Tel (206) 625-8600
Fax (206) 625-0900

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authority under the Declaratory Judgment Act. Dismissal of Plaintiffs’ claims is appropriate
under Rule 41(a)(2) because Defendants will not suffer “plain legal prejudice as a result.” Smith
v. Lenches, 263 F.3d 972, 975 (9th Cir. 2001). Dismissal of the City’s counterclaim is likewise
appropriate because a declaratory judgment in the City’s favor would serve no “useful purpose.”
Only the named Plaintiffs remain as subjects of the suit and they seek dismissal of their claims.
Moreover, the City’s practices have changed in the years since limited evidence was last
submitted to this Court regarding Defendants’ conduct. Any hypothetical adjudication of the
City’s counterclaim would require the submission of substantial new evidence at this belated
point. Further, exercising jurisdiction over the City’s counterclaim would force this Court to
make needless decisions of state law. See McGraw-Edison Co. v. Preformed Line Prod. Co.,
362 F.2d 339, 343 (9th Cir. 1966). The City remains free to conduct sweeps unfettered (as it
has done since this lawsuit was filed), and there is no basis for issuing an abstract, blanket
declaration approving the City’s ever evolving and inconsistently applied policies and practices.
II.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The plaintiffs in this action are four unhoused individuals, Lisa Hooper, Brandie
Osborne, Kayla Willis, and Reavy Washington (“Individual Plaintiffs”), and three
organizations, The Episcopal Diocese of Olympia, Trinity Parish of Seattle, and Real Change
(together with Individual Plaintiffs, “Plaintiffs”). Plaintiffs’ operative complaint alleges four
causes of action against Defendants City of Seattle (“the City”), Washington State Department
of Transportation (“WSDOT”), and Roger Millar, the Secretary of Transportation for WSDOT
(collectively, “Defendants”). See Dkt. No. 87. Specifically, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants’
policy and practice of seizing and destroying the property of people who are living outside
(“sweeping” or “sweeps”) violates their right to be secure from unreasonable seizures under the
Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution; their right to privacy and protection from invasion

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MOTION TO DISMISS WITHOUT PREJUDICE – 2
Cause No. 2:17-cv-00077-RSM

CORR CRONIN LLP
1001 Fourth Avenue, Suite 3900
Seattle, Washington 98154-1051
Tel (206) 625-8600
Fax (206) 625-0900

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of their homes under Article I, Section 7 of the Washington State Constitution; and their right
to due process of law under both the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and
Article I, Section 3 of the Washington State Constitution. Dkt. No. 87.
In its answer to the amended complaint, the City asserted a vague but potentially farreaching counterclaim for a declaratory judgment “that its clean-up policies and practices,
including the prior and new MDARs,2 are lawful and constitutional.” Dkt. No. 75; Dkt. No.
92. The City’s counterclaim made no attempt to specify which constitutional provisions and
laws or which City policies and practices it wanted the court to consider in determining the
legality of the City’s sweeps. No other Defendant has asserted a counterclaim.
On October 4, 2017, this Court entered an Order Denying Plaintiffs’ Motion for Class
Certification and Denying Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction.

Dkt. No. 209.

Plaintiffs appealed this Court’s denial of class certification and, on December 20, 2017, this
Court granted Plaintiffs’ motion to stay proceedings in the district court pending the appeal.
Dkt. No. 221. The Ninth Circuit affirmed this Court’s denial of class certification on November
29, 2019 and issued its mandate on December 23, 2019.
On January 30, 2020, weeks before the City filed its “conversion” motion, Counsel for
Plaintiffs reached out to the City of Seattle to discuss Plaintiffs’ desire to dismiss the case.
Plaintiffs noted the dismissal would be as to all Plaintiffs’ claims against all Defendants. The
City declined Plaintiffs’ offer to dismiss. Plaintiffs promptly notified the City that they would
seek an order from this Court dismissing the case. Plaintiffs now respectfully request that the
Court dismiss Plaintiffs’ claims and the City of Seattle’s counterclaim and close this case.

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The Multi-Departmental Administrative Rules (MDARs) and Financial
Administrative Service (FAS) Rules are the City’s written policies pertaining to sweeps.

MOTION TO DISMISS WITHOUT PREJUDICE – 3
Cause No. 2:17-cv-00077-RSM

CORR CRONIN LLP
1001 Fourth Avenue, Suite 3900
Seattle, Washington 98154-1051
Tel (206) 625-8600
Fax (206) 625-0900

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III.

EVIDENCE RELIED UPON

This motion relies upon the papers and pleadings on file with the Court.
IV.

ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITY

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(2) provides that, at this stage of the proceedings:
…[The] action may be dismissed at the plaintiff's request only by
court order, on terms that the court considers proper. If a defendant has pleaded a counterclaim before being served with the plaintiff's motion to dismiss, the action may be dismissed over the defendant's objection only if the counterclaim can remain pending
for independent adjudication. Unless the order states otherwise, a
dismissal under this paragraph (2) is without prejudice.
As Plaintiffs show below, their claims should be dismissed along with the City’s
counterclaim—which the Court can and should decline to entertain.

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A. The Court Should Dismiss Plaintiffs’ Claims Without Prejudice Under Rule
41(a)(2).

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“Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(2) allows a plaintiff, pursuant to an order of the

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court, and subject to any terms and conditions the court deems proper, to dismiss an action

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without prejudice at any time.” Westlands Water Dist. v. United States, 100 F.3d 94, 96 (9th

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Cir. 1996). “A dismissal under Rule 41(a)(2) normally is without prejudice, as explicitly stated

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in that rule.” Smith v. Lenches, 263 F.3d 972, 976 (9th Cir. 2001) (discussing when a Rule

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41(a)(2) dismissal should be granted when there is a counterclaim involved). The purpose of

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Rule 41(a)(2) is “to permit a plaintiff to dismiss an action without prejudice so long as the

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defendant will not be prejudiced or unfairly affected by dismissal.” Stevedoring Servs. of Am.

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v. Armilla Intern. B.V., 889 F.2d 919, 921 (9th Cir. 1989) (citations omitted).

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As Smith makes clear, even when there is a counterclaim pending, “[a] district court

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should grant a motion for voluntary dismissal under Rule 41(a)(2) unless a defendant can show

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that it will suffer some plain legal prejudice as a result.” Smith, 263 F.3d at 975. “Plain legal

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MOTION TO DISMISS WITHOUT PREJUDICE – 4
Cause No. 2:17-cv-00077-RSM

CORR CRONIN LLP
1001 Fourth Avenue, Suite 3900
Seattle, Washington 98154-1051
Tel (206) 625-8600
Fax (206) 625-0900

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prejudice” exists only where a defendant would suffer “prejudice to some legal interest, some
legal claim, some legal argument.” Id. at 976 (quoting Westlands Water Dist., 100 F.3d at 97).
“Although case law does not articulate a precise definition of ‘legal prejudice,’ the cases focus
on the rights and defenses available to a defendant in future litigation.” Westlands Water Dist.,
100 F.3d at 97 (citing 5 James W. Moore, Moore’s Federal Practice ¶ 41.05[1] nn. 51–53 and
cases cited). “Uncertainty because a dispute remains unresolved” or because “the threat of
future litigations” “causes uncertainty” does not constitute plain legal prejudice. Smith, 263
F.3d at 976 (quoting Westlands Water Dist., 100 F.3d at 96-97). Nor does plain legal prejudice
exist merely “because the defendant will be inconvenienced by having to defend in another
forum or where a plaintiff would gain a tactical advantage by that dismissal.” Id. (citing
Hamilton v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., Inc., 679 F.2d 143, 145 (9th Cir. 1982)). “Expense
incurred

in

defending

against

a

lawsuit

[also]

does

not

amount

to

legal

prejudice.” See Hamilton, 679 F.2d at 146.
Defendants will not suffer any “plain legal prejudice” from Plaintiffs’ voluntary
dismissal. Dismissing the claims in this lawsuit would not impact the rights and defenses
available to Defendants in future litigation. See Westlands Water Dist., 100 F.3d at 97. Further,
the City has continued to carry out sweeps unabated since this litigation was filed, apparently
undeterred by the unresolved questions about whether it is constitutional to do so.
That the City might prefer this Court to adjudicate any potentially viable claim against
it does not qualify as “legal prejudice” warranting the denial of voluntary dismissal here. See
e.g. Smith, 263 F.3d at 976 (“While [defendant] will be obliged to defend the state court action,
this does not add an extra burden to [defendant] because it was already engaged in defending
the state court case. In any event, the need to defend against state law claims in state court is
not ‘plain legal prejudice’ arising from voluntary dismissal of the federal claims in the district

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MOTION TO DISMISS WITHOUT PREJUDICE – 5
Cause No. 2:17-cv-00077-RSM

CORR CRONIN LLP
1001 Fourth Avenue, Suite 3900
Seattle, Washington 98154-1051
Tel (206) 625-8600
Fax (206) 625-0900

 Case 2:17-cv-00077-RSM Document 234 Filed 03/12/20 Page 6 of 12

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court.”). Moreover, even if this Court were to find “legal prejudice” existed, the appropriate
remedy would be to dismiss Plaintiffs’ claims with prejudice—not to force Plaintiffs (who lack
reliable phones, physical addresses, and who Counsel are unable to even locate) to continue
litigating and defend themselves against an abstract counterclaim that exceeds the confines of
this litigation.
B. This Court Should Dismiss the City’s Counterclaim.

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Whether dismissal of a counterclaim for declaratory judgment is appropriate is analyzed
not under Rule 41(a)(2) but under the Declaratory Judgment Act. McGraw–Edison Co. v.
Preformed Line Products Co., 362 F.2d 339, 342 (9th Cir. 1966); Smith, 263 F.3d at 977. It is
within a District Court’s sound discretion to dismiss a claim for declaratory judgment. Wilton
v Seven Falls Co., 515 U.S. 277, 288 (1994); see also Leadsinger, Inc. v. BMG Music Pub., 512
F.3d 522, 533 (9th Cir. 2008) (citations omitted) (noting the Declaratory Judgment Act gives a
District Court the authority to declare the rights and legal relations of interested parties—not a
duty to do so).
There are many circumstances in which a District Court should dismiss a counterclaim
for declaratory judgment. For example:
It is well settled that a declaratory judgment may be refused where
it would serve no useful purpose * * * or would not finally determine the rights of the parties * * * or where it is being sought
merely to determine issues which are involved in a case already
pending and can be properly disposed of therein * * * especially
if the issue is one involving a novel question of state law * * * or
is, for any other reason, one that can better be adjudicated in another court * * *.
McGraw-Edison Co., 362 F.2d at 343 (citations omitted).
As the Ninth Circuit in McGraw-Edison recognized, the broad and vague declaratory
judgment the City seeks as to the legality of its sweeps would serve no “useful purpose.”

MOTION TO DISMISS WITHOUT PREJUDICE – 6
Cause No. 2:17-cv-00077-RSM

CORR CRONIN LLP
1001 Fourth Avenue, Suite 3900
Seattle, Washington 98154-1051
Tel (206) 625-8600
Fax (206) 625-0900

 Case 2:17-cv-00077-RSM Document 234 Filed 03/12/20 Page 7 of 12

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Rather, it would amount to no more than an advisory opinion in the absence of “a substantial
controversy” of “sufficient immediacy and reality.” See Maryland Cas. Co. v. Pacific Coal &
Oil Co., 312 U.S. 270, 273 (1941). Further, it would require this Court to make decisions of
state law that are better adjudicated in state court.

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1. The Court should dismiss the City’s counterclaim because there is no
“substantial controversy” of “sufficient immediacy and reality”

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Federal courts may grant declaratory relief only in “a case of an actual controversy.” 28

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U.S.C. § 2201(a). In determining whether an “actual controversy” exists under the Declaratory

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Judgment Act, “the question in each case is whether the facts alleged, under all the

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circumstances, show that there is a substantial controversy, between parties having adverse

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legal interests, of sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant the issuance of a declaratory

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judgment.” Maryland Cas. Co., 312 U.S. at 273. In order to grant a declaratory judgment,

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there must be some factual basis for distinguishing the desired declaratory judgment from an

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advisory opinion.

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(declaratory relief must be “distinguished from an opinion advising what the law would be upon

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a hypothetical state of facts”). “It is always the duty of a court of equity to strike a proper

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balance between the needs of the [party seeking declaratory relief] and the consequences of

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giving desired relief. . . . [and] courts should not intervene unless the need for equitable relief

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is clear, not remote or speculative.” Eccles v. Peoples Bank of Lakewood Vill., Cal., 333 U.S.

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426, 431 (1948).

See Medimmune, Inc. v. Genetech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 127 (2007)

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Here, there is no “substantial controversy” “of sufficient immediacy and reality to

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warrant the issuance of a declaratory judgment.” Plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction

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was denied in October 2017. The case is not a class action. And the Plaintiffs seek to dismiss

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their claims. Accordingly, there is nothing to prevent the City from engaging in sweeps.

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MOTION TO DISMISS WITHOUT PREJUDICE – 7
Cause No. 2:17-cv-00077-RSM

CORR CRONIN LLP
1001 Fourth Avenue, Suite 3900
Seattle, Washington 98154-1051
Tel (206) 625-8600
Fax (206) 625-0900

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Indeed, the City’s policies and practices have continued and with increasing frequency since
this litigation was filed.3 There is no evidence that the City has been “chilled” in its enforcement
efforts by the absence of a declaratory judgment and indeed the City’s counterclaim is devoid
of any suggestion that it is in any way harmed by the absence of a declaratory judgment. There
is simply no “immediacy and reality” to warrant the issuance of a declaratory judgment.
Furthermore, it is far from clear exactly what the City wishes this Court to declare to be
lawful or which provisions of law the City is even asking this Court to consider. The
counterclaim seeks to have the Court announce that the City’s “clean-up policies and practices,
including the prior and new MDARs are lawful and constitutional.” Dkt. 92 at 34. But the
policies and practices involved in the City’s sweeps program are extensive. The City’s
counterclaim itself refers to its “multi-faceted approach” to the housing crisis, including sweeps
targeted at encampments that “raise significant public health or safety concerns, obstruct the
intended use of public facilities, or otherwise necessitate intervention in furtherance of the
public interest.” Answer, Dkt. 92 at 34. And the City’s counterclaim nowhere states which
provisions of law it wants the Court to consider in determining the legality of these extensive
policies and practices.
To adjudicate the City’s counterclaim the Court would have to make factual findings
regarding every aspect of the City’s sweeps’ policies and practices, both as written, now or in

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See, e.g., Daniel Beekman and Sydney Brownstone, On way to long-term changes,
Seattle Mayor Jenny Durkan quietly clears homeless camps, Seattle Times, July 6, 2019,
(noting that “Seattle removed 75% more homeless encampments in the first four months of
this year than during the same period in 2018, even with this February’s record snowstorm
slowing clean-ups.”); Scott Greenstone and Sydney Brownstone, Seattle City Council again
attempts to rein in team that clears homeless encampments, Seattle Times, October 17, 2019
(noting that the City’s Navigation Team “has shifted its focus from cleanups where residents
get 72-hour notice to smaller ‘obstruction’ or ‘hazard’ encampments that don’t require
advance notice and also don’t require camp residents to be offered shelter beds, although the
city said it tries to do so.”).

MOTION TO DISMISS WITHOUT PREJUDICE – 8
Cause No. 2:17-cv-00077-RSM

CORR CRONIN LLP
1001 Fourth Avenue, Suite 3900
Seattle, Washington 98154-1051
Tel (206) 625-8600
Fax (206) 625-0900

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the past, and as practiced, and compare each of those policies and practices to every possible
constitutional or statutory provision that could be used to challenge them. That is far beyond a
declaratory judgment this Court could order. The City is not entitled to an abstract declaration
about its policies and practices in an attempt to ward off all potential future litigation regardless
of allegations, claims, or parties. Further, the Ninth Circuit in this case determined that “there
is no evidence that every Appellant has experienced the same challenged practice or suffered
the same injury due to the implementation of the MDARs or the WSDOT Guidelines. In fact,
Appellants themselves acknowledged that ‘each sweep is different.’” Willis v. Seattle, 943 F.3d
882, 886 (9th Cir. 2019). The Court cannot issue a general order somehow interpreting all of
the components of the City’s MDARs and their application to resolve any potential future
claims whether under the federal or state constitution or other theories, nor finally determine
the rights of the parties if each sweep is different even assuming the City’s written policies stay
the same. This runs contrary to the Declaratory Judgment Act and is the opposite of judicial
efficiency. Adjudicating the City’s counterclaim on anything less than a full record reflecting
the City’s actual present and past policies and practices—which have evolved significantly
since this case was filed—would amount to “advising what the law would be upon a
hypothetical state of facts.” Medimmune, 549 U.S. at 127.

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2. The Court should dismiss the City’s counterclaim to avoid making needless decisions of state law

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Even if there were a “substantial controversy” “of sufficient immediacy and reality,”

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this Court should dismiss the City’s counterclaim, which appears to raise issues of state law, in

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the interest of efficiency and judicial comity. See e.g. Smith, 263 F.3d at 977 (noting a district

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court “may decline to exercise jurisdiction over supplemental state law claims in the interest of

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judicial economy, convenience, fairness and comity.”); McGraw-Edison, 362 F.2d at 343

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MOTION TO DISMISS WITHOUT PREJUDICE – 9
Cause No. 2:17-cv-00077-RSM

CORR CRONIN LLP
1001 Fourth Avenue, Suite 3900
Seattle, Washington 98154-1051
Tel (206) 625-8600
Fax (206) 625-0900

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(noting a basis for refusing declaratory relief when it is being sought “merely to determine
issues which are involved in a case already pending and can be properly disposed of therein”).
Although the City’s counterclaim specifies no specific provisions of law for the Court to apply
when considering whether the City’s sweeps program is “lawful and constitutional,” that
exercise would presumably include consideration of the state constitution. There is currently
separate litigation in state court asserting that the City’s sweeps program violates provisions of
the Washington State Constitution. “[W]hen a state court action is pending presenting the same
issue of state law as is presented in a federal declaratory suit, ‘there exists a presumption that
the entire suit should be heard in state court.’” Cont'l Cas. Co. v. Robsac Indus., 947 F.2d 1367,
1370–71 (9th Cir. 1991), overruled on other grounds by Gov't Employees Ins. Co. v. Dizol, 133
F.3d 1220 (9th Cir. 1998)). A district court “may decline to exercise jurisdiction over
supplemental state law claims in the interest of judicial economy, convenience, fairness and
comity.” Smith, supra, 263 F.3d at 977. In determining whether to exercise its jurisdiction
under the Declaratory Judgment Act in these circumstances, a Court should consider the
following factors:
(1) whether a refusal to entertain the request for declaratory relief
avoids needless decisions of state law by the federal court; (2)
whether the action is a means of forum shopping; and (3) whether
dismissal of the claim for declaratory relief would avoid duplicative litigation.
Smith, 263 F.3d at 977 (cited source omitted).
These factors weigh in favor of dismissing the City’s counterclaim for declaratory relief
here. First, judicial economy does not favor retaining jurisdiction over the counterclaim where
the Plaintiffs are no longer asserting any claims and only the City’s counterclaim—which is not
needed to allow the City to continue its current policies and practices—would be left pending
before this Court in this action. Further, the City’s counterclaim includes an issue of state law—

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MOTION TO DISMISS WITHOUT PREJUDICE – 10
Cause No. 2:17-cv-00077-RSM

CORR CRONIN LLP
1001 Fourth Avenue, Suite 3900
Seattle, Washington 98154-1051
Tel (206) 625-8600
Fax (206) 625-0900

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the constitutionality and validity of the City’s policies and practices under the Washington State
Constitution—that is more appropriately resolved in state court, particularly when there is
already an action pending involving a similar question in state court. Dismissing the City’s
counterclaim is both amply supported by federal law and would avoid needless decisions of
state law.
V.

CONCLUSION

For the aforementioned reasons, this Court should grant Plaintiffs’ motion for dismissal
without prejudice and dismiss the City’s counterclaim without prejudice.
DATED this 12th day of March, 2020.

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s/ Todd T. Williams
Blake Marks-Dias, WSBA No. 28169
Todd T. Williams, WSBA No. 45032
Eric A. Lindberg, WSBA No. 43596
Victoria E. Ainsworth, WSBA No. 49677
CORR CRONIN LLP
1001 Fourth Avenue, Suite 3900
Seattle, Washington 98154-1051
Telephone: (206) 625-8600
Email: twilliams@corrcronin.com
elindberg@corrcronin.com
tainsworth@corrcronin.com
Nancy Talner, WSBA No. 11196
Breanne Schuster, WSBA No. 49993
Lisa Nowlin, WSBA No. 51512
AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION
OF WASHINGTON FOUNDATION
901 Fifth Avenue, Suite 630
Seattle, Washington 98164
Telephone: (206) 624-2184
Email: talner@aclu-wa.org
bschuster@aclu-wa.org
lnowlin@aclu-wa.org
Attorneys for Plaintiffs

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MOTION TO DISMISS WITHOUT PREJUDICE – 11
Cause No. 2:17-cv-00077-RSM

CORR CRONIN LLP
1001 Fourth Avenue, Suite 3900
Seattle, Washington 98154-1051
Tel (206) 625-8600
Fax (206) 625-0900

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on March 12, 2020, I electronically filed the foregoing with the
Clerk of the Court using the CM/ECF system, which will send notification of such filing to the
following:

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Attorneys for Defendant City of Seattle:

Attorneys for Defendants Washington
State Department of Transportation and
Roger Millar, Secretary of Transportation
for WSDOT:

Matthew J. Segal, WSBA No. 29797
Gregory J. Wong, WSBA No. 39329
Taki V. Flevaris, WSBA No. 42555
PACIFICA LAW GROUP LLP
1191 Second Avenue, Suite 2000
Seattle, WA 98101
matthew.segal@pacificalawgroup.com
greg.wong@pacificalawgroup.com
taki.flevaris@pacificalawgroup.com

Matthew D. Huot, WSBA No. 40606
Assistant Attorneys General
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF
WASHINGTON
Complex Litigation Division
7141 Cleanwater Drive SW
P.O. Box 40111
Olympia, WA 98504-0111
MattH4@atg.wa.gov

Patrick Downs, WSBA No. 25276
Gary T. Smith, WSBA No. 29718
SEATTLE CITY ATTORNEY
701 Fifth Avenue, Suite 2050
Seattle, WA 98104-70197
patrick.downs@seattle.gov
gary.smith@seattle.gov

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s/ Todd T. Williams
Todd T. Williams, WSBA No. 45032
Attorney for Plaintiffs
CORR CRONIN LLP
1001 Fourth Avenue, Suite 3900
Seattle, Washington 98154-1051
Telephone: (206) 625-8600
Email: twilliams@corrcronin.com

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MOTION TO DISMISS WITHOUT PREJUDICE – 12
Cause No. 2:17-cv-00077-RSM

CORR CRONIN LLP
1001 Fourth Avenue, Suite 3900
Seattle, Washington 98154-1051
Tel (206) 625-8600
Fax (206) 625-0900