No. _______

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

GARFIELD COUNTY TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITY; et al.
Appellants,
WASHINGTON ADAPT; TRANSIT RIDERS UNION; and
CLIMATE SOLUTIONS,
Intervenor-Plaintiffs,
v.
STATE OF WASHINGTON,
Defendant,
CLINT DIDIER; PERMANENT OFFENSE; TIMOTHY D. EYMAN;
MICHAEL FAGAN; JACK FAGAN; and PIERCE COUNTY,
Intervenor-Defendants.

APPELLANTS’ EMERGENCY MOTION FOR STAY
PENDING REVIEW
DANIEL T. SATTERBERG
King County Prosecuting Attorney
David J. Hackett, WSBA #21236
David J. Eldred, WSBA #26125
Jenifer Merkel, WSBA #34472
Erin B. Jackson, WSBA #49627
500 Fourth Avenue
Seattle, WA 98104

PETER S. HOLMES
Seattle City Attorney
Carolyn U. Boies, WSBA#40395
Erica Franklin, WSBA#43477
John B. Schochet, WSBA#35869
701 5th Avenue, Suite 2050
Seattle, WA 98104

PACIFICA LAW GROUP LLP
Paul J. Lawrence, WSBA #13557
Matthew J. Segal, WSBA #29797
Jessica A. Skelton, WSBA #36748
1191 Second Avenue, Suite 2000
Seattle, WA 98101

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 TABLE OF CONTENTS
I.

INTRODUCTION ....................................................................... 1

II.

IDENTITY OF MOVING PARTIES ......................................... 3

III.

STATEMENT OF RELIEF SOUGHT ....................................... 3

IV.

FACTS RELEVANT TO MOTION ........................................... 4

A.

I-976 Purports to Cap Car Tab Fees at $30, But Neither
Achieves that Result Nor Limits Its Reach to that Subject. ........ 4

B.

The Trial Court Grants Preliminary Injunctive Relief, But
Later Reverses that Decision. ...................................................... 7

C.

Appellants Will Suffer Irreparable Harm If I-976 Is
Implemented. ............................................................................. 11

V.

GROUNDS FOR RELIEF ........................................................ 14

A.

This Court May Stay Trial Court Decisions Pending
Appeal. ...................................................................................... 14

B.

The Issues Presented on Appeal Are, at a Minimum,
Debatable. .................................................................................. 15
1.

I-976’s Ballot Title Violates Article II, Section 19’s
Subject in Title Requirement. .................................................... 17

2.

Sections 8 and 9 of I-976 Violate Article I, Section 12 By
Requiring Use of KBB Valuation, and Are Not Severable........ 19

3.

I-976 Violates the Single Subject Rule. ..................................... 21

4.

I-976 Unconstitutionally Amends Existing Law Under
Article II, Section 37. ................................................................. 24

5.

I-976 Unconstitutionally Infringes on Local Control. ................ 27

C.

The Comparative Harms of a Stay Pending Appeal Vastly
Favor Appellants. ...................................................................... 29

D.

A Stay Pending Appeal Is Necessary to Preserve the Fruits
of this Appeal and Preserve the Status Quo. ............................. 33

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 VI.

CONCLUSION ......................................................................... 34

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 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Washington State Cases
Amalgamated Transit Union Local 587 v. State,
142 Wn.2d 183, 11 P.3d 762 (2000) .............................................. passim
Black v. Cent. Puget Sound Reg’l Transit Auth.,
-- Wn.2d --, 457 P.3d 453 (2020)................................................... passim
Boeing Co. v. Sierracin Corp.,
43 Wn. App. 288, 716 P.2d 956 (1986) ................................................ 33
Burien Cmtys. for Inclusion v. Respect Wash.,
No. 77500-6-I, 2019 WL 4262081 (Wash. Ct. App. Sept. 9, 2019) ..... 34
Citizens for Responsible Wildlife Mgmt. v. State,
149 Wn.2d 622, 71 P.3d 644 (2003) ..................................................... 20
City of Burien v. Kiga,
144 Wn.2d 819, 31 P.3d 659 (2001) ......................................... 21, 23, 24
City of Seattle v. State,
103 Wn.2d 663, 694 P.2d 641 (1985) ................................................... 28
City of Seattle v. Yes for Seattle,
122 Wn. App. 382, 93 P.3d 176 (2004) ................................................ 21
El Centro De La Raza v. State,
192 Wn.2d 103, 428 P.3d 1143 (2018) ........................................... 24, 26
Gen. Tel. Co. of the Nw., Inc. v. Wash. Utils. & Transp. Comm’n,
104 Wn.2d 460, 706 P.2d 625 (1985) ................................................... 34
Gold Bar Citizens for Good Gov’t v. Whalen,
99 Wn.2d 724, 665 P.2d 393 (1983) ..................................................... 28
Howlett v. Cheetham,
17 Wash. 626, 50 P. 522 (1897)............................................................ 17

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 Kennett v. Levine,
49 Wn.2d 605, 304 P.2d 682 (1956) ............................................... 15, 33
Larson v. Seattle Popular Monorail Auth.,
156 Wn.2d 752, 131 P.3d 892 (2006) ................................................... 27
League of Educ. Voters v. State,
176 Wn.2d 808, 295 P.3d 743 (2013) ................................................... 23
League of Women Voters of Wash. v. State,
184 Wn.2d 393, 355 P.3d 1131 (2015) ................................................. 20
Lee v. State,
185 Wn.2d 608, 374 P.3d 157 (2016) ............................................. 21, 23
Moreman v. Butcher,
126 Wn.2d 36, 891 P.2d 725 (1995) ............................................... 14, 15
Pierce Cty. v. State,
150 Wn.2d 422, 78 P.3d 640 (2003) ............................................... 22, 28
Purser v. Rahm,
104 Wn.2d 159, 702 P.2d 1196 (1985) ........................................... 15, 33
Shamley v. Olympia,
47 Wn.2d 124, 286 P.2d 702 (1955) ..................................................... 33
State ex. rel. Pay Less Drug Stores v. Sutton,
2 Wn.2d 523, 98 P.2d 680 (1940) ......................................................... 34
State v. Redd,
166 Wash. 132, 6 P.2d 619 (1932)........................................................ 27
State v. Thorne,
129 Wn.2d 736, 921 P.2d 514 (1996) ............................................. 25, 26
Wash. Ass’n for Substance Abuse & Violence Prevention v. State,
174 Wn.2d 642, 278 P.3d 632 (2012) ................................................... 17
Wash. Citizens Action of Wash. v. State,
162 Wn.2d 142, 171 P.3d 486 (2007) ................................................... 20

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 Wash. Fed’n of State Emps. v. State,
99 Wn.2d 878, 665 P.2d 1337 (1983) ................................................... 15
Wash. Toll Bridge Auth. v. State,
49 Wn.2d 520, 304 P.2d 676 (1956) ..................................................... 21
Constitutional Provisions
Const. art. I, § 19 ................................................................................ 28, 29
Const. art. I, § 12 ............................................................................ 9, 10, 19
Const. art. I, § 23 ................................................................................... 9, 11
Const. art. II, § 19 .......................................................... 8, 9, 17, 18, 20, 21
Const. art. II, § 37 ........................................................................ 24, 25, 26
Const. art. XI, § 12 ............................................................................. 27, 28

Washington State Statutes
RCW 36.73.040 .................................................................................... 6, 26
RCW 4.68.010 .......................................................................................... 32
RCW 46.17.323 .......................................................................................... 5
RCW 46.68.010 ........................................................................................ 32
RCW 47.66.070 .......................................................................................... 5
RCW 81.104.160 ................................................................................ 24, 25
RCW 82.80.130 .......................................................................................... 6
RCW 82.80.140 .................................................................................... 6, 26
Title 82 RCW ............................................................................................ 32

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 Washington State Rules
CR 54(b).............................................................................................. 11, 16
RAP 2.2 ..................................................................................................... 16
RAP 2.3 ..................................................................................................... 16
RAP 8.1(b)(3) ......................................................................... 14, 15, 29, 32
RAP 8.3 ......................................................................................... 14, 15, 33
RAP 17.4(b) ................................................................................................ 4

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 I.

INTRODUCTION

All laws, whether adopted by the people or the Legislature, must
comport with our state Constitution. At issue in this appeal is whether
Initiative 976 (“I-976”) violates multiple provisions of the Constitution.
Appellants respectfully request that this Court maintain, through appellate
review, the injunction against implementation of I-976 that has been in
place since November 2019. The issues raised on appeal are (at least)
debatable, Appellants would suffer substantial harm absent relief, and the
fruits of this appeal would be lost without a stay. The injunction against
implementation of I-976 is currently set to expire on March 27, 2020. 1
There can be little dispute that the issues raised here are debatable.
In issuing the preliminary injunction against implementation of I-976, the
trial court found that Appellants were likely to prevail on the merits.
Respondent State of Washington (“State”) asserted debatable issues when
it attempted to set aside the preliminary injunction—an effort rejected by a
majority of this Court. The trial court’s ultimate decision, which flips its
own prior reasoning, further demonstrates debatable issues. Indeed, the
severance of two unconstitutional sections of I-976 despite their inclusion
in the ballot title is, by itself, highly debatable. The briefing below

1

Appellants have asked the trial court to extend this date in order to allow this Court
sufficient time to decide the question of a stay pending appeal based on orderly briefing
from the parties. See App. at 1484-91.

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 demonstrates broad constitutional concerns with I-976 that meet the
debatable issue standard.
The trial court found at both the preliminary injunction stage and
on summary judgment that implementation of I-976 would result in actual
and substantial injury to Appellants. Tens if not hundreds of millions of
dollars that would be collected under the status quo pre-dating I-976 will
be irretrievably lost—a point the State has never disputed. Simply put,
absent a stay, there is no ability to collect taxes and fees lost pending
appeal. The lost revenue will cause damage to local transportation and
transit infrastructure statewide from King County Metro service to
Spokane street improvement projects, exacerbating the impact on local
governments from the COVID-19 crisis. In contrast, if I-976 is ultimately
upheld, refunds can be issued through an established statutory procedure.
Preventing harms caused by an unconstitutional measure is the point of
Appellants’ appeal, which can be expedited to assure timely resolution.
Finally, in conducting this balance, substantial consideration must
be given to whether granting the stay is necessary to preserve the fruits of
an appeal that would otherwise be lost pending review. Indeed,
maintaining the status quo ante is the primary function of a stay.
Appellants would lose the fruits of their appeal if a stay is denied,

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 primarily because revenue foregone in the absence of an injunction can
never be recovered.
Appellants meet the standard for an emergency stay of
implementation of I-976. Their motion should be granted.
II.

IDENTITY OF MOVING PARTIES

This Motion is filed by Appellants Garfield County Transportation
Authority, Washington State Transit Association, King County,
Association of Washington Cities, City of Seattle, Port of Seattle, Intercity
Transit, Amalgamated Transit Union Legislative Council of Washington,
City of Burien, Michael Rogers, and Justin Camarata (collectively,
“Appellants”), plaintiffs in the trial court action below.
III.

STATEMENT OF RELIEF SOUGHT

Pursuant to the trial court’s order dated March 12, 2020, the
decision vacating the preliminary injunction against implementation of I976 in part will take effect on March 27, 2020 absent further relief.
Because (1) this appeal presents at least debatable issues spanning
multiple constitutional violations, (2) the harm to Appellants in permitting
I-976 to take effect far outweighs the harm to the State in staying its
implementation pending this Court’s review, and (3) a stay is necessary to
preserve the fruits of Appellants’ appeal, including multiple revenue
streams that once lost cannot be recovered, Appellants respectfully request

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 that this Court stay implementation of the trial court’s reconsideration
order and maintain the injunction precluding I-976 from taking effect for
the duration of the appeal. 2
IV.
A.

FACTS RELEVANT TO MOTION

I-976 Purports to Cap Car Tab Fees at $30, But Neither
Achieves that Result Nor Limits Its Reach to that Subject.
The self-proclaimed title of I-976 is “Bring Back Our $30 Car

Tabs,” with a stated purpose to “limit state and local taxes, fees, and other
charges relating to motor vehicles.” App. at 273-74. As the State admits,
however, I-976 does not create “$30 Car Tabs,” but actually results in a
car tab fee of at least $43.25 and often much higher. App. at 436, 447,
1676-82, 1686-90. Moreover, I-976 contains numerous other provisions
unrelated to “$30 Car Tabs.”
First, I-976 limits car tab fees by reducing or repealing multiple
fees and taxes, but the net result is not a $30 vehicle license fee. It adds a
new section to chapter 46.17 RCW that imposes a hard $30 cap on “state
and local motor vehicle license fees,” defined as “the general license tab
fees paid annually for licensing motor vehicles.” App. at 274. I-976 sets
the vehicle license fee in chapter 46.17 RCW at $30 for many vehicles.

2

Pursuant to RAP 17.4(b), Appellants provided notice to Respondents and other parties
of their intention to file this Motion. See RAP 17.4(b) Declaration of David J. Hackett,
¶¶ 2-3 & Exs. A-B.

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 Id. at 274-81. In addition to limiting the vehicle license fee to $30, I-976
eliminates the electric vehicle mitigation fee established by RCW
46.17.323, and the vehicle weight fee and related statutes that authorized
rulemaking for vehicle weight determination. Id. at 281-82. But I-976
leaves in place a number of other fees paid at the time of vehicle
registration which results in a minimum vehicle license fee of $43.25.
In addition to reducing license fees, I-976 eliminates an additional
sales tax on vehicle sales that is unrelated to the cost of registration or
renewal and administered by an entirely different state agency (the
Department of Revenue, not the Department of Licensing). App. at 283.
And it also attempts to change the valuation schedule used only in
calculating the Sound Transit MVET (requiring use of Kelley Blue Book
(“KBB”) valuation, although the trial court struck these provisions). Id. at
283-84. Finally, I-976 repeals and/or limits Sound Transit’s authority to
impose future MVETs. Id. at 284-87.
Many of the vehicle-related fees reduced or eliminated by I-976
were used to fund the State Multimodal Account, which provides support
for a variety of local transportation projects and programs that would
otherwise go unfunded. See RCW 47.66.070; App. at 121-24, 305-20.
Second, despite a ballot title stating that the initiative preserves
“voter-approved charges,” App. at 292, I-976 in fact repeals all current

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 authority for voter-approved charges. It repeals RCW 82.80.130, which
authorized a voter-approved MVET for passenger ferry service. App. at
282. It also repeals RCW 82.80.140, which authorized local transportation
benefit districts (“TBDs”) to impose vehicle license fees (“VLFs”). Id.
Prior to I-976, TBD governing bodies had authority to enact VLFs up to
$50, while local voter-approved charges could bring the total up to $100.
See RCW 82.80.140; RCW 36.73.040, .065.
More than sixty TBDs throughout Washington utilize local TBD
authority to impose and collect VLFs ranging from $20 to $80 per vehicle
registration, providing these localities with millions of dollars in revenues
used to fund vital local transportation improvement projects. See App. at
103, 1093. For example, the Vancouver TBD’s $40 VLF generates
approximately $5 million annually for transportation improvement
projects and local matches for transportation grants. App. at 1132-33.
The Spokane TBD collects a $20 VLF that provides approximately $3
million annually for residential street improvements and pedestrian
projects. App. at 1154-56. And the City of Seattle imposed a $20 VLF
until 2014, when Seattle voters overwhelmingly approved a $60 increase,
with much of the voter-approved portion used to “fund Metro Transit
service.” App. at 220, 225-33; see also Declaration of Jenny A. Durkan
(“Durkan Decl.”), ¶ 2. With almost $24 million per year of this revenue,

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 Seattle contracted with King County’s Metro Transit Department
(“Metro”) to provide 350,000 additional service hours in the greater
Seattle area. See App. at 33, 220-21; see also Declaration of Rob Gannon
(“Gannon Decl.”), ¶ 11 & Ex. 1. I-976 entirely eliminates authority for
VLFs, voter-approved or otherwise, and does not leave voters with a
means to impose these fees in the future. See App. at 282.
Third, I-976 addresses Sound Transit’s bonds. App. at 288.
Contrary to an implied goal of less government spending, I-976 purports
to require that Sound Transit retire, defease, or refinance outstanding
bonds, which would necessitate Sound Transit raising significant new
taxes and incurring additional, new debt. See App. at 615-18.
Finally, I-976 sets forth effective dates that depend on Sound
Transit discretionary debt management decisions. See App. at 290.
B.

The Trial Court Grants Preliminary Injunctive Relief, But
Later Reverses that Decision.
Appellants filed a complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief

on November 14, 2019. App. at 1-23. They moved for a preliminary
injunction on November 18 to enjoin implementation of I-976 pending a
full and fair consideration of its constitutionality. App. at 353-96. On
November 27, the trial court granted Appellants’ motion and stayed
implementation of I-976 until further order of the court. App. at 526-33.

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 The court concluded that Appellants had demonstrated they were likely to
prevail on at least their constitutional challenge to I-976 based on article
II, section 19’s subject in title requirement. App. at 530. The court also
concluded that implementation of I-976 would result in actual and
substantial injury to Appellants. App. at 527-28, 531-32. Following the
trial court’s ruling, the State filed in this Court a notice of direct
discretionary review and an emergency motion to stay the trial court’s
injunction pending review, which this Court denied on December 4, 2019
through an en banc order, with three justices dissenting. App. at 1492-95,
1504-24, 1655-58. The State’s discretionary review proceeding in this
Court was dismissed on December 23, 2019. App. at 1659-60.
Recognizing the importance of speedy resolution, the parties
agreed to an expedited summary judgment proceeding. In early January
2020, the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment as to I-976’s
constitutionality. App. at 559-78, 579-610, 1181-1247. Appellants’
motion for summary judgment raised multiple constitutional arguments
and requested a permanent injunction precluding I-976 from taking effect.
App. at 1181-1247.
On February 12, 2020, the trial court denied Appellants’ motion
for summary judgment in part and declined to enter a permanent
injunction. App. at 1328-62. Based on the undisputed fact record, the

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 Court determined that Appellants established that if I-976 were to be
implemented, it would result in “actual and substantial injury” to
Appellants, including “drastic reductions in funding for public transit, road
and highway improvement projects, ferry service, and projects that are
critical from a public safety standpoint.” App. at 1335-36. But the court
denied the majority of Appellants’ constitutional challenges, retaining
only Appellants’ claims under article I, sections 12 and 23 of the
Constitution for future resolution “after pertinent discovery is
accomplished.” 3 App. at 1358-61. The court concluded that, since the
order did not dispose of all of Appellants’ constitutional challenges to I976, the preliminary injunction would remain in effect. App. at 1361-62.
The State, Appellants, and Didier moved for reconsideration of
multiple aspects of the trial court’s ruling. App. at 1363-69, 1370-97,
1398-1409. Appellants narrowly focused reconsideration on their article
II, section 37 claim given recent dispositive authority from this Court in
Black v. Cent. Puget Sound Reg’l Transit Auth., -- Wn.2d --, 457 P.3d 453
(2020), issued the day after the trial court’s summary judgment ruling.
App. at 1371, 1373-75. Appellants also requested reconsideration of the
trial court’s denial of their article II, section 19 single subject claim. App.

3

No affidavits for further discovery were ever filed by Respondents and they later
disputed requesting additional discovery. App. at 1400.

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 at 1371, 1375-78. The State and Didier requested reconsideration of the
trial court’s ruling regarding Appellants’ article I, section 12 claim,
abandoning and/or disavowing their request for further discovery and
arguing the claim failed as a matter of law. App. at 1363-69, 1399-1405.
The State also requested that the court lift the preliminary injunction.
App. at 1405-06.
On March 12, 2020, the trial court disposed of all parties’
reconsideration motions. App. at 1418-23. The court denied Appellants’
motion without analysis. App. at 1418-19. As to the State’s and Didier’s
motions, the court first vacated its refusal to enter summary judgment as to
Appellants’ claim under article I, section 12 of the Constitution. App. at
1421. It then granted in part Appellants’ motion for summary judgment,
ruling that sections 8 and 9 of I-976 (requiring KBB valuation) violated
article I, section 12 of the Constitution. Id. The court next ruled without
explanation that sections 8 and 9 of I-976 “are severable and are hereby
severed from the initiative as enacted,” despite inclusion of those subjects
in the ballot title. Id. Finally, the court vacated and modified in part its
November 27, 2019, order granting Appellants’ motion for a preliminary
injunction. App. at 1421-22. Specifically, the court vacated its
preliminary injunction order as to all parties, persons, and political

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 subdivisions other than the City of Burien 4 and lifted the injunction
“except as to the severed Sections 8 and 9, which shall not be
implemented because they are unconstitutional.” Id. The court then
suspended the portions of its order vacating and modifying the injunction
until March 27, 2019 in order to allow Appellants to move to reinstate the
injunction or seek relief from an appellate court. App. at 1423.
Appellants filed a notice of discretionary appeal to this Court on
March 19, 2020. App. at 1424-27. Meanwhile, the parties submitted a
stipulation for a CR 54(b) certification and proposed judgment to the trial
court. App. at 1470-83. The court accepted and entered the stipulated CR
54(b) certification and associated judgment on March 24, 2020. App. at
1692-1710. Appellants are filing a notice of appeal directly to this Court.
Appellants now seek injunctive relief from this Court pending review.
C.

Appellants Will Suffer Irreparable Harm If I-976 Is
Implemented.
The trial court’s finding of harm in both its preliminary injunction

and summary judgment orders is supported by a comprehensive record
amply demonstrating that Appellants will suffer multiple measurable and
irreparable harms if I-976 is implemented. This record was largely
undisputed and supports several key points.

4

The City of Burien’s claim that I-976 is unconstitutional under article I, section 23
remains before the trial court.

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 Revenues lost upon implementation of I-976 cannot be
recovered later if the initiative is deemed unconstitutional. It was
undisputed that if I-976 took effect, but was later ruled unconstitutional,
that the revenue not collected while this case was pending would be
forever lost. See App. at 33-34, 100-01, 104-07, 220-21, 322-44, 346,
446-48, 465-68, 527-28, 531-32, 1094-97, 1133, 1155; see also Durkan
Decl., ¶ 3. This is because the taxes and fees impacted by I-976 cannot be
retroactively collected from vehicle owners.
I-976 will substantially harm local transit and transportation
services by eliminating TBD VLFs that were approved by local voters
and councils. Appellants also demonstrated that allowing I-976 to take
effect would substantially harm Appellants King County, City of Seattle,
and other cities across the state including Spokane and Vancouver by
removing the authority of TBDs to impose VLFs. TBD VLF revenues—
which totaled more than $58 million statewide in 2018—provide vital
funding for critical local transportation improvements and expansions and
access to transit services, are a source of matching funds for transportation
grants, and are pledged to repayment of debt on local transportation
projects. App. at 33, 103, 155-57, 217, 220, 620-21, 1093-94, 1132, 115455; see also Gannon Decl., ¶¶ 4-6, 9, 11-15; Durkan Decl., ¶ 2. This
revenue would be eliminated as soon as I-976 takes effect. App. at 104,

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 121-24, 1094; see also Gannon Decl., ¶¶ 12-14; Durkan Decl., ¶ 3. And
because cities statewide would forever lose any VLFs not collected during
the pendency of this case, projects slated to use such funds will be
underfunded or not funded at all, and in many cases halted in the midst of
pending local projects or plans. App. at 33-35, 100-01, 104-07, 155, 217,
220-21, 465-68, 1094-97, 1133, 1155; see also Durkan Decl., ¶ 4.
The $4 billion in total revenue cuts caused by I-976 causes
substantial harms statewide. The record also shows that reduction in
transportation funding and services necessitated by I-976 would
irreparably injure many other individuals, governments, and organizations
who rely on transit services and efficient and effective transportation.
Multiple diverse entities, from transit users (many of whom have special
needs), to transit agency employees, to the Port of Seattle, would suffer
impacts to mobility, job security/income, and ability to conduct their daily
business if I-976 took effect. See App. at 27-29, 33-34, 181-85, 197, 20405, 213-17, 220-21; see also Gannon Decl., ¶¶ 12-17.
The I-976 cuts will magnify the harm to the transportation
system caused by the current COVID-19 crisis, impeding recovery.
The recent COVID-19 emergency has placed municipalities in a fiscal
crisis. They have increased their expenditures to address COVID-19, but
at the same time are experiencing sudden, unanticipated, and profound

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 revenue losses as a result of COVID-19-related economic shock. Durkan
Decl., ¶¶ 3-4 & Ex. 1; Gannon Decl., ¶¶ 6-9. For example, the City of
Seattle has responded to COVID-19 by spending millions of dollars on
small business support, grocery vouchers, and shelter expansion, but
Seattle General Fund revenue projections are likely to be revised
downward by at least $110 million (7%) due to COVID-19 effects.
Durkan Decl., ¶¶ 4-5. Similarly, King County Metro is attempting to
maintain adequate transit service for necessary workers such as health care
professionals and first responders, but has been forced to adopt emergency
measures including waiver of fares (which represent approximately 18%
of Metro’s operating revenue) and a 25% reduction in service without a
corresponding reduction in expenses. Gannon Decl., ¶¶ 6-8.
Implementation of I-976 would result in immediate and permanent
additional loss of revenues, further exacerbating these and other
municipalities’ precarious social and economic circumstances and slowing
post-COVID-19 recovery. Durkan Decl., ¶ 4; Gannon Decl., ¶¶ 7-15.
V.
A.

GROUNDS FOR RELIEF

This Court May Stay Trial Court Decisions Pending
Appeal.
RAP 8.1(b)(3) and RAP 8.3 give this Court “discretion to stay the

enforcement of trial court decisions” in order to maintain the status quo
pending appeal. Moreman v. Butcher, 126 Wn.2d 36, 42 n.6, 891 P.2d

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 725 (1995). Under RAP 8.1(b)(3), the Court considers (1) whether the
moving party can demonstrate debatable issues, and (2) a comparison of
the injury that would be suffered by the moving party in the absence of a
stay with the injury to the non-moving party if a stay is issued. See id. In
evaluating whether to stay enforcement of a decision under RAP 8.3, the
Court considers “(1) whether the issue presented by the appeal is
debatable, and (2) whether a stay is necessary to preserve for the movant
the fruits of a successful appeal, considering the equities of the situation.”
Purser v. Rahm, 104 Wn.2d 159, 177, 702 P.2d 1196 (1985); see also
Wash. Fed’n of State Emps. v. State, 99 Wn.2d 878, 883, 665 P.2d 1337
(1983) (“The purpose of [these rules] is to permit appellate courts to grant
preliminary relief in aid of their appellate jurisdiction so as to prevent the
destruction of the fruits of a successful appeal.”). Appellants’ requested
stay satisfies RAP 8.1(b)(3) and RAP 8.3 and should be granted.
B.

The Issues Presented on Appeal Are, at a Minimum,
Debatable.
To be entitled to a stay, the moving party need not demonstrate

ultimate success on the merits of the appeal, but simply that the issues are
debatable. Kennett v. Levine, 49 Wn.2d 605, 607, 304 P.2d 682 (1956).
For multiple reasons, the State cannot meaningfully dispute that this
appeal presents (at least) debatable issues.

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 First, both the trial court and the State have acknowledged that at
least some of the issues present on appeal are debatable. The trial court in
this case ruled that Appellants were likely to prevail on at least their
subject in title claim and granted their motion for a preliminary injunction
on that basis. See App. at 526-33. This Court reviewed and ultimately
declined to stay that injunction. App. at 1655-56. That the trial court later
changed its mind and ruled in the State’s favor on that claim does not alter
this conclusion. Moreover, in previously seeking its own emergency stay
in this matter, the State represented to this Court that this case on the
merits “presents (at least) debatable issues,” including that “[i]t is at least
debatable that the superior court erred in its subject-in-title analysis.”
App. at 1512, 1643. The State cannot now contest that the current appeal,
involving the same claims on the merits, presents at least debatable
issues. 5
Second, the trial court struck two sections of I-976, but without
explanation, severed them to allow I-976 to go into effect. Significantly,
the subject stricken (adopting KBB values) was part of the ballot title.
The question of severability raises a significant debatable issue.

5
Appellants’ opposition to the stay focused on prudential concerns against
interlocutory appeals, and the ability to establish issues that were debatable when viewed
through the lens of RAP 2.3 discretionary review criteria. App. at 1534-1583. Here, with
the CR 54(b) certification and judgment, Appellants present an appeal as of right under
RAP 2.2.

16
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 Third, the parties extensively briefed and the trial court ruled upon
a large number of significant constitutional issues that this Court will
address on appeal. Appellants’ primary claims, 6 all of which raise at least
debatable issues for this Court to decide, include the following:
1. I-976’s Ballot Title Violates Article II, Section 19’s Subject
in Title Requirement.
I-976 violates article II, section 19’s subject in title requirement
because the ballot title substantially misleads voters and fails to disclose
its multiple subjects. A measure with a false or misleading ballot title
automatically fails constitutional requirements if it deceives voters. See
Wash. Ass’n for Substance Abuse & Violence Prevention v. State, 174
Wn.2d 642, 660, 278 P.3d 632 (2012); see also App. at 847-48. Even if
not deceitful, a ballot title survives constitutional scrutiny only if it gives
“notice which would lead to an inquiry into the body of the act” or
indicates “the scope and purpose of the law to an inquiring mind.”
Amalgamated Transit Union Local 587 v. State, 142 Wn.2d 183, 217, 11
P.3d 762 (2000) (“ATU”).
I-976’s ballot title is deceptive and affirmatively misleading, a
constitutional violation that invalidates the entire measure. Howlett v.
Cheetham, 17 Wash. 626, 635, 50 P. 522 (1897). First, the ballot title

6

Appellants present several examples of at least debatable constitutional issues below
for purposes of this Motion, but expressly do not waive arguments not addressed.

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 claims that I-976 exempts “voter-approved charges” from the $30 car tab
cap, but the initiative actually eliminates all existing voter-approved
charges and the possibility of a future vote of the people for local taxes
and fees. Second, the ballot title plainly describes a $30 cap on “annual
motor-vehicle-license fees,” but the State argued before the trial court that
multiple vehicle license fees in chapter 46.17 RCW will continue to apply
in excess of that cap 7—meaning license tab fees will substantially exceed
the promise of $30. App. at 1288-89, 1676-82, 1686-90.
Independently, I-976’s ballot title fails to give notice of important
subjects of I-976. The ballot title does not reference bond retirement
(which requires substantial expenditures and collection of additional
taxes), elimination of a specific vehicle sales tax, or other subjects that
permeate the initiative. Nor does it prompt inquiry into these topics by
including words like “bond” or “vehicle sales.” I-976 violates the subject
in title rule for this additional reason. See ATU, 142 Wn.2d at 220-27.
For these and other reasons discussed in Appellants’ trial court
briefing, see App. at 375-79, 453-54, 1199-1206, 1263-66, 1312-14, there
is at least a debatable issue as to I-976’s compliance with article II, section
19’s subject in title rule.

7

The State did so to avoid invalidation under article II, section 37 due to the implied
amendment of multiple provisions under chapter 46.17 RCW. See infra.

18
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 2. Sections 8 and 9 of I-976 Violate Article I, Section 12 By
Requiring Use of KBB Valuation, and Are Not Severable.
As the trial court correctly concluded on reconsideration, sections
8 and 9 of I-976—which require the use of the KKB valuation product for
certain vehicle taxes—violate the privileges and immunities clause of the
Washington Constitution. App. at 1421-22. The KBB valuation product
is a proprietary valuation method owned by a private, multi-national
corporation. App. at 812, 814, 816-24. I-976’s KBB specification would
require the State to enter an exclusive contract or other partnership
agreement with KBB and its owner for use of the KBB product. See App.
at 816-24. This grant of an exclusive privilege for state business to a
specific private corporate entity, without any reasonable ground to do so,
violates the Constitution. See Const. art. I, § 12. Accordingly, the trial
court properly invalidated sections 8 and 9 of I-976.
The trial court’s decision to sever sections 8 and 9, rather than
invalidate I-976 for this violation of article I, section 12, raises a
significant debatable issue. See App. at 1421-22. Crucially, the promise
to impose the KBB valuation product was expressly included in I-976’s
ballot title:
Initiative Measure No. 976 concerns motor vehicle taxes and
fees.

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 This measure would repeal, reduce, or remove authority to
impose certain vehicle taxes and fees; limit annual motorvehicle-license fees to $30, except voter-approved charges;
and base vehicle taxes on Kelley Blue Book value.
Should this measure be enacted into law?
App. at 292.
This Court has repeatedly emphasized the importance of the ballot
title, explaining that “voters will often make their decision based on the
title of the act alone, without ever reading the body of it.” Citizens for
Responsible Wildlife Mgmt. v. State, 149 Wn.2d 622, 639, 71 P.3d 644
(2003); see also Wash. Citizens Action of Wash. v. State, 162 Wn.2d 142,
154, 171 P.3d 486 (2007) (“it is the ballot title with which voters are faced
in the voting booth” (internal quotation omitted)). If sections 8 and 9 are
severed, I-976’s ballot title will no longer accurately describe the measure,
resulting in votes based on a false and unconstitutional promise of KBB
valuation. Article II, section 19 would be meaningless if it allowed
initiatives to entice voters with unconstitutional promises in the ballot title,
only to sever them prior to implementation. Nor can it be said that the
voters “would have enacted the remainder of the act” without the invalid
provisions given the express KBB valuation promise in the ballot title.
League of Women Voters of Wash. v. State, 184 Wn.2d 393, 412, 355 P.3d
1131 (2015). Given the text of I-976 and its ballot title, the valid portions

20
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 of the initiative are not severable from the invalid provisions. See City of
Seattle v. Yes for Seattle, 122 Wn. App. 382, 394-95, 93 P.3d 176 (2004).
3. I-976 Violates the Single Subject Rule.
In addition to the subject in title requirement, I-976 violates article
II, section 19’s requirement that “[n]o bill shall embrace more than one
subject.” Initiatives with general titles 8 violate the single-subject rule if
they lack “rational unity,” i.e., if the matters within the body of the
initiative are not germane to the general title and each other. City of
Burien v. Kiga, 144 Wn.2d 819, 826, 31 P.3d 659 (2001). The multiple
subjects of I-976 9 are not fairly within the ballot title and there is no
rational unity among them.
This Court has held that initiatives violate the single subject rule
where one subject is long-term and “continuing” in nature, i.e., a general
subject, and a second subject involves a onetime event, i.e., a specific
subject. See, e.g., Wash. Toll Bridge Auth. v. State, 49 Wn.2d 520, 52325, 304 P.2d 676 (1956). 10 Below, the State claimed that all of I-976’s

8

For purposes of this Motion only, Appellants do not contest I-976’s title is general.
I-976 combines at least seven subjects: (1) a purported reduction in state vehicle
registration fees to $30, (2) elimination of locally voted registration taxes, (3) elimination
of the vehicle sales tax, (4) the removal of local voter authority to adopt vehicle fees, (5)
a purported requirement that Sound Transit repay outstanding bonds, (6) a change in a
vehicle valuation schedule only used by Sound Transit, and (7) a reduction in Sound
Transit’s authority to issue future MVETs should it not repay its bonds.
10
See also Kiga, 144 Wn.2d at 826-28; ATU, 142 Wn.2d at 216-17; Lee v. State, 185
Wn.2d 608, 621-23, 374 P.3d 157 (2016).
9

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 subjects were “continuing” in nature. See App. at 1674-75. But the plain
text of the initiative demonstrates otherwise. Section 2 of I-976 expressly
identifies the initiative’s primary subject: “State and local motor vehicle
license fees may not exceed $30 per year for motor vehicles, regardless of
year, value, make, or model.” App at 274. Section 12 of I-976, however,
contains a particularly obvious non-germane, onetime subject not
mentioned in the ballot title: the requirement that Sound Transit “fully
retire, defease, or refinance any outstanding bonds issued under [chapter
81.112 RCW]” if the bonds are secured by revenue from an MVET. App.
at 288. 11 Similarly, sections 6 and 7 of the initiative contain specific,
onetime repeals of various fees and taxes. See App. at 282-83. When
combined with I-976’s continuing $30 cap, these provisions also violate
the single subject rule.
Further, under the State’s own arguments below, I-976’s provision
limiting car tab fees to $30 except “charges approved by voters”
constitutes an unconstitutional second subject. To defend against
Appellants’ subject in title claim (discussed above), the State in its
summary judgment briefing and at oral argument claimed that the only

11

Unlike the last time this Court reviewed an initiative with an additional subject
regarding early retirement of Sound Transit’s bonds, the language in I-976 is legally
operative and not merely “precatory” in nature. See Pierce Cty. v. State, 150 Wn.2d 422,
428-29, 432-36, 78 P.3d 640 (2003) (“Pierce Cty. I”).

22
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 voter-approved charges excepted from the $30 cap were one specific
category of state motor vehicle license fees (as contrasted to local taxes or
fees) that might in future be approved by voters. See App. at 1288-89,
1683-85. In other words, under the State’s interpretation, only voters may
approve future state motor vehicle license fees in excess of the $30 cap;
impliedly the Legislature cannot, even though it previously had the power
to do so. The trial court adopted this interpretation, concluding that I-976
truthfully required any future increases in state vehicle license fees to be
voter approved. See App. at 1348-49. What the State and trial court failed
to recognize is that I-976’s change in the legislative mechanism for
increasing state vehicle license fees constitutes an unconstitutional second
subject of I-976. 12 See ATU, 142 Wn.2d at 217; Kiga, 144 Wn.2d at 82728; Lee, 185 Wn.2d at 622-23.
Additional “logrolling” issues raised by I-976 are described in
Appellants’ trial court briefing. See App. at 368-75, 454-57, 1206-15,
1258-63, 1315-17. At a minimum, Appellants present several debatable
issues as to whether I-976 violates the single subject rule, any one of

12
It also likely amounts to illegal amendment of the Constitution by initiative. See,
e.g., Lee, 185 Wn.2d at 622-23, 628-29 (restriction on legislative enactment of future
taxes was single subject violation and unlawful constitutional amendment); League of
Educ. Voters v. State, 176 Wn.2d 808, 826, 295 P.3d 743 (2013) (requirement that future
taxes be passed by supermajority was unlawful constitutional amendment).

23
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 which would fully invalidate I-976. Kiga, 144 Wn.2d at 828; ATU, 142
Wn.2d at 216.
4. I-976 Unconstitutionally Amends Existing Law Under
Article II, Section 37.
I-976 also violates article II, section 37 of the Washington
Constitution because it amends existing statutes without setting the
amendments forth in full, resulting in confusion as to the effect of the new
law. Article II, section 37 mandates that “[n]o act shall ever be revised or
amended by mere reference to its title, but the act revised or the section
amended shall be set forth at full length.” Under the two-prong test most
recently discussed in Black, this Court first considers whether the new
enactment “is a complete act, such that the rights or duties under the
statute can be understood without referring to another statute[.]” 457 P.3d
at 458 (internal quotations omitted). Second, the Court asks whether “a
straightforward determination of the scope of rights or duties under the
existing statutes [would] be rendered erroneous by the new enactment.”
Id. (internal quotations omitted); see also El Centro De La Raza v. State,
192 Wn.2d 103, 129, 428 P.3d 1143 (2018).
In Black—decided the day after the trial court ruled on the parties’
summary judgment motions in this case—this Court rejected an article II,
section 37 challenge to RCW 81.104.160(1) (the “MVET statute”), which

24
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 authorizes Sound Transit to use two separate depreciation schedules to
calculate MVETs depending on whether outstanding bonds exist to which
MVET revenues have been pledged. 13 This Court first held that the
“rights laid out in the MVET statute are readily ascertainable from its text
alone” given that the statute specifically states in which circumstance each
depreciation schedule will apply and “properly adopts both depreciation
schedules by reference.” Black, 457 P.3d at 459. Accordingly, the MVET
statute is a “complete act.” Id. Second, the Court held that the MVET
statute meets the second prong of the article II, section 37 test because it
“lists out which statutes apply at which time, and no reader is required to
conduct a thorough search of existing laws that are unreferenced to
understand the statute’s effect.” Id. at 461 (internal quotations omitted).
The Court further explained that like the statute at issue in State v. Thorne,
129 Wn.2d 736, 746, 756, 921 P.2d 514 (1996), the MVET statute’s
“notwithstanding” clause made the statute’s effect on existing laws

13

RCW 81.104.160(1) provides in relevant part:
Notwithstanding any other provision of this subsection or chapter 82.44 RCW, a
motor vehicle excise tax imposed by a regional transit authority before or after
July 15, 2015, must comply with chapter 82.44 RCW as it existed on January 1,
1996, until December 31st of the year in which the regional transit authority
repays bond debt to which a motor vehicle excise tax was pledged before July 15,
2015. Motor vehicle taxes collected by regional transit authorities after December
31st of the year in which a regional transit authority repays bond debt to which a
motor vehicle excise tax was pledged before July 15, 2015, must comply with
chapter 82.44 RCW as it existed on the date the tax was approved by voters.

25
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 “clear.” Id. Accordingly, this Court held the MVET statute constitutional
under article II, section 37. Id. at 460-42.
In contrast to the MVET statute, I-976 is not a complete act and its
impacts cannot be determined without review of multiple other statutes.
Most notably, section 6 of I-976 completely repeals RCW 82.80.140
regarding TBD VLFs. But the initiative does not mention provisions in
chapter 36.73 RCW that separately authorize TBD VLFs. See RCW
36.73.040, .065. Nor does the initiative contain “notwithstanding” or
similar language clarifying its impact on chapter 36.73 RCW. The State
admitted, and the trial court ruled, that I-976’s repeal of RCW 82.80.140
renders portions of chapter 36.73 RCW inoperative. See App. at 418-20,
602-03, 1353. In failing to set out or otherwise disclose its effect on
chapter 36.73 RCW, I-976 renders erroneous a straightforward
determination of rights and duties thereunder. See ATU, 142 Wn.2d at
253-54; El Centro, 192 Wn.2d at 132.
Appellants’ complete grounds for I-976’s violation of article II,
section 37 are set forth at App. 379-82, 457-58, 1215-20, 1267-71, 131718, 1373-75, 1411-13. This claim at the very least presents additional
debatable issues supporting a stay.

26
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 5. I-976 Unconstitutionally Infringes on Local Control.
I-976 also infringes on the right of local control over issues of local
concern enshrined in several provisions of the Constitution. Article XI,
section 12 vests legislatively delegated taxing authority for local purposes
in local municipal governments. Known as the “home-rule provision,”
section 12 restricts “direct legislative action as to local taxing matters” so
as to “bar the state legislators, whose members come from all parts of the
state, from dictating local taxing policy and instead to allow municipalities
to control local taxation for local purposes.” Larson v. Seattle Popular
Monorail Auth., 156 Wn.2d 752, 756 n.3, 131 P.3d 892 (2006).
This Court has previously explained how the structure of section
12 restricts a fresh exercise of legislative power over a previous vesting of
municipal taxing authority for a local purpose. See State v. Redd, 166
Wash. 132, 137-39, 144-45, 6 P.2d 619 (1932). Following a proper
delegation and a local decision to exercise that vested power for a local
purpose, a legislative decision to “take away” local taxes dedicated for that
local purpose violates constitutional guarantees of local self-government.
Id. at 139, 143. Section 6 of I-976 does exactly what article XI, section 12
prohibits: it divests municipal corporations (notably TBDs) of a
previously delegated, lawfully exercised and vested authority to collect
local taxes for local purposes. This elimination of vested taxing authority

27
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 is distinct from the more general home rule claim rejected by this Court in
Pierce County I, 150 Wn.2d at 429, 440, as Respondent Pierce County
(which intervened as a defendant and generally sided with the State
below) confirmed in a separate summary judgment response as to section
12’s vesting language. See App. at 1249-50. Pierce County’s refusal to
endorse the State’s position emphasizes there is at least a debatable issue
under article XI, section 12.
I-976 also infringes on local control by interfering with local
elections. Article I, section 19 of the Constitution guarantees “free and
equal” elections and prohibits interference “to prevent the free exercise of
the right of suffrage.” This includes a prohibition on interference that is
direct (by outright prohibition of voting) and indirect (by “debasement or
dilution of the weight of a citizen’s vote”). City of Seattle v. State, 103
Wn.2d 663, 673, 694 P.2d 641 (1985); Gold Bar Citizens for Good Gov’t
v. Whalen, 99 Wn.2d 724, 730, 665 P.2d 393 (1983). As noted above, in
2014 Seattle voters overwhelmingly approved increased VLFs to fund
additional bus service and transportation needs. I-976’s repeal of TBD
VLF authority retroactively invalidates the results of this local vote despite
continued majority support for transportation-related taxes and fees by the
Seattle electorate, resulting in vote dilution and nullification in violation of

28
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 article I, section 19. See App. at 220 14 (Seattle voters approved 2014 VLF
by over 62%; 5 years later, 76% of Seattle voters rejected I-976).
Appellants’ other arguments as to I-976’s interference with local
control are set forth in their trial court briefing and, like the other issues
discussed herein, present debatable issues on appeal. See App. 1220-32,
1273-76, 1319-21.
In sum, Appellants present multiple debatable issues on appeal,
satisfying the first prong of RAP 8.1(b)(3) and 8.3.
C.

The Comparative Harms of a Stay Pending Appeal Vastly
Favor Appellants.
A comparison of harms clearly supports a stay. Appellants have

demonstrated, through an extensive and detailed record, that I-976’s
implementation will result in both an immediate and permanent loss of
incoming revenue and future impacts to transportation systems
statewide—and these harms vastly outweigh any harm to the State in
enjoining I-976 pending this appeal.
Under the trial court’s order on reconsideration, I-976 will take
effect on March 27, 2020, absent intervention by the trial court or this
Court. App. at 1423. The State has previously confirmed it intends to

14

See also https://results.vote.wa.gov/results/20191105/State-Measures-InitiativeMeasure-No-976_ByCounty.html as of 3/23/20 (searching by precincts SEA);
https://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/politics/majority-of-voters-paying-soundtransits-car-tab-taxes-opposed-i-976/ (last visited Mar. 23, 2020).

29
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 change its collection procedures to comply with I-976 once the initiative
takes effect. See App. at 346, 436, 446-48. On day one of
implementation, absent an injunction, the State and its agents will cease to
collect lawfully enacted vehicle registration fees and taxes, including
about $58 million in local TBD VLFs currently imposed by more than 60
local governments. As the trial court correctly determined, once this
revenue goes uncollected, there is no way to collect it later if I-976 were
ultimately found to be constitutional. See App. at 528, 531. Indeed, the
State has never disputed (and cannot dispute) this point. The permanent
loss of revenue is a textbook example of actual, substantial, immediate,
and irreparable harm.
Moreover, as discussed supra, I-976’s immediate and permanent
revenue reductions would compound the economic shock that Appellants
and other municipalities throughout Washington are experiencing as a
result of the COVID-19 emergency. The City of Seattle, King County
Metro, and other municipal governments have necessarily increased
expenditures in response to COVID-19, while at the same time suffering
revenue losses due to service cuts and economic disruption.
Implementation of I-976 and the necessary additional service and program
cuts that would follow would worsen the current social and economic

30
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 upheaval and impede municipalities’ response to and recovery from
COVID-19-related impacts.
The loss of transportation funding resulting from I-976’s repeal of
TBD VLF authority and its limitation or repeal of various other fees and
taxes would also cause downstream effects negatively impacting
Appellants’ projects, programs, and operations. The trial court properly
concluded at the preliminary injunction stage that if I-976 were to be
implemented pending review of its constitutionality, “all
[Appellants]…would eventually, inevitably be forced to cut a wide array
of programs and services due to reductions in fee/tax revenue stemming
from I-976” and those “long-term hardships…could not be retroactively
mitigated.” App. at 532. The trial court reiterated on summary judgment
that Appellants had established I-976 “would harm them in numerous
ways, including drastic reductions in funding for public transit, road and
highway improvement projects, ferry service, and projects that are critical
from a public safety standpoint.” App. at 1335-36.
The above harms to Appellants absent a stay substantially
outweigh any alleged harm to the State if a stay is granted. The State
admits (and the trial court agreed) that there is a viable refund process in
the event I-976 is ultimately upheld. See App. at 430-31, 450, 529, 531,
1520. Indeed, the process was used following the unsuccessful initiative

31
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 challenge to I-776 and is mandated by statute. See App. at 1661-69; 15
RCW 46.68.010(1) (“A person who has paid all or part of a vehicle license
fee under this title is entitled to a refund if the amount was paid in
error…”); RCW 4.68.010(2) (“The department [of licensing] shall refund
overpayments of vehicle license fees and motor vehicle excise taxes under
Title 82 RCW that are ten dollars or more. A request for a refund is not
required.”). Any tax or fee allegedly overpaid is easily remedied through
a refund should the State prevail in this appeal. And the potential
administrative cost to the State in issuing refunds—which is grossly
overblown 16—pales in comparison to the hundreds of millions of dollars
Appellants stand to lose in revenues and funding that can never be
recovered. App. at 1507.
In sum, the record demonstrates that the harm to Appellants absent
a stay is substantially greater than the alleged harm to the State if this
Court grants a stay. Appellants meet the second prong of RAP 8.1(b)(3),
and a stay is warranted.

15

The Appendix includes this Final Order Establishing the Terms for Refunds from the
challenge to I-776, which is a publicly filed document of which the Court may take
judicial notice.
16
The State’s claim that an inefficient and bloated refund process will cause inordinate
expenditures to process refunds is not a reason to deny this emergency motion. This is a
crisis of the State’s own making. There is no indication in record materials that the State
cannot streamline its refund process, or that it actually faced these problems for refunds
processed under I-776.

32
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 D.

A Stay Pending Appeal Is Necessary to Preserve the Fruits
of this Appeal and Preserve the Status Quo.
Appellants also meet additional criteria for issuance of a stay

pending appeal under RAP 8.3, as reaffirmed by this Court in Purser:
Whether a stay pending appeal should be granted depends
on (1) whether the issue presented by the appeal is debatable,
and (2) whether a stay is necessary to preserve for the
movant the fruits of a successful appeal, considering the
equities of the situation.
104 Wn.2d at 177 (emphasis added).
Here, allowing I-976 to take effect would destroy the fruits of
Appellants’ appeal. As noted above, the comprehensive record in this
case establishes that absent injunctive relief from this Court, multiple
revenue streams would be eliminated or reduced immediately upon
implementation of I-976. App. at 100-01, 103-07, 155-57, 220-21, 436,
446-48, 1094-97, 1155. The State has never disputed that, once foregone,
these revenues cannot be recovered. The permanent inability to recoup
lost revenue is a textbook example of “fruits of the appeal” that will be
lost if this Court does not grant a stay. See Shamley v. Olympia, 47 Wn.2d
124, 126-27, 286 P.2d 702 (1955) (sale of timber pending appeal would
destroy the subject matter of the action, rendering a successful appeal
fruitless); Boeing Co. v. Sierracin Corp., 43 Wn. App. 288, 292, 716 P.2d
956 (1986) (stay appropriate where party would otherwise be forced out of
business); Kennett v. Levine, 49 Wn.2d 605, 607-08, 304 P.2d 682 (1956)

33
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 (stay appropriate where, if party were removed from office without cause,
successor could be appointed immediately).
Further, a stay will maintain the status quo. The “status quo ante”
means the “‘last actual, peaceable, noncontested condition which preceded
the pending controversy.’” Gen. Tel. Co. of the Nw., Inc. v. Wash. Utils.
& Transp. Comm’n, 104 Wn.2d 460, 466, 706 P.2d 625 (1985) (quoting
State ex. rel. Pay Less Drug Stores v. Sutton, 2 Wn.2d 523, 529, 98 P.2d
680 (1940)); see also Burien Cmtys. for Inclusion v. Respect Wash., No.
77500-6-I, 2019 WL 4262081, at *7 (Wash. Ct. App. Sept. 9, 2019).
Here, the status quo is the continued collection of taxes and fees that
would otherwise be eliminated or reduced by I-976, a condition that also
has been preserved throughout the trial court proceedings. Indeed, the
State has argued in other cases that the status quo is best preserved by
preventing the effectiveness of a new law or rule via a preliminary
injunction. See App. at 1559, 1611-12.
VI.

CONCLUSION

If a stay is not granted, Appellants will suffer substantial
irreparable injury and be denied the fruits of this appeal in the event they
prevail. The issues presented in this appeal are also at least debatable (and
should result in reversal). Appellants respectfully request that the Court

34
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 grant this Motion, stay the trial court’s order, and enjoin implementation
of I-976 pending final resolution of this appeal.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 24th day of March, 2020.
DANIEL T. SATTERBERG
King County Prosecuting Attorney

PETER S. HOLMES
Seattle City Attorney

By: s/ David J. Hackett
David J. Hackett, WSBA #21236
David J. Eldred, WSBA #26125
Jenifer Merkel, WSBA #34472
Senior Deputy Prosecuting
Attorneys
Erin B. Jackson, WSBA #49627
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney

By: s/ Carolyn U. Boies
Carolyn U. Boies, WSBA#40395
Erica Franklin, WSBA#43477
Assistant City Attorneys
John B. Schochet, WSBA#35869
Deputy City Attorney
Attorneys for City of Seattle

Attorneys for King County
PACIFICA LAW GROUP LLP
By /s Matthew J. Segal
Paul J. Lawrence, WSBA #13557
Matthew J. Segal, WSBA #29797
Jessica A. Skelton, WSBA #36748
Attorneys for Washington State
Transit Association, Association of
Washington Cities, Port of Seattle,
Garfield County Transportation
Authority, Intercity Transit,
Amalgamated, Transit Union
Legislative Council of Washington,
Michael Rogers, City of Burien and
Justin Camarata

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