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Force Design 2030

March 2020

“Transformation is a process, not an event.”
— John P. Kotter
Harvard Business School

BOTTOM LINE UP FRONT
This report describes the progress of the Marine Corps on my watch in preparing for the sweeping changes
needed to meet the principal challenges facing the institution: effectively playing our role as the nation’s naval
expeditionary force-in-readiness, while simultaneously modernizing the force in accordance with the National
Defense Strategy (NDS) – and doing both within the fiscal resources we are provided. A certain degree of
institutional change is inevitable when confronting modernization on this scale, and that type of change is
hard. As such, I want to be clear up front: our force design effort is a work in progress. Thanks to the dedication
and effort of a great many Marines, Sailors, and civilians over the last six months, we have come to a clearer
understanding of some force design changes we can confidently make today, while identifying other areas that
require additional analysis. This reports explains, at length and in some detail, my argument for change, our
force design methodology and organization, my personal assessment of the work to date, and the steps we are
taking to move the force design effort into the next phase.

Force Design 2030

1

 STRATEGIC GUIDANCE – THE NATIONAL DEFENSE STRATEGY
The 2018 National Defense Strategy redirected the
Marine Corps’ mission focus from countering violent
extremists in the Middle East to great power/peer-level
competition, with special emphasis on the Indo-Pacific.
Such a profound shift in missions, from inland to littoral,
and from non-state actor to peer competitor, necessarily
requires substantial adjustments in how we organize,
train, and equip our Corps. A return to our historic role in
the maritime littoral will also demand greater integration
with the Navy and a reaffirmation of that strategic
partnership. As a consequence, we must transform
our traditional models for organizing, training, and
equipping the force to meet new desired ends, and
do so in full partnership with the Navy.
THE ARGUMENT FOR CHANGE
Our current force design, optimized for large-scale
amphibious forcible entry and sustained operations
ashore, has persisted unchanged in its essential
inspiration since the 1950s. It has changed in details
of equipment and doctrine as technology has advanced
toward greater range and lethality of weapon systems.
In light of unrelenting increases in the range, accuracy,
and lethality of modern weapons; the rise of revisionist
powers with the technical acumen and economic heft
to integrate those weapons and other technologies for
direct or indirect confrontation with the U.S.; and the
persistence of rogue regimes possessing enough of
those attributes to threaten United States interests, I
am convinced that the defining attributes of our current
force design are no longer what the nation requires of
the Marine Corps.
IMPLICATIONS FOR FORCE DESIGN
This imperative for change explains why I concur with
the diagnosis of my predecessor that, “The Marine
Corps is not organized, trained, equipped, or postured
to meet the demands of the rapidly evolving future
operating environment.” I assess that the current force
is unsuited to future requirements in size, capacity, and
specific capability:
Size and Capacity
Operating under the assumption that we will not receive
additional resources, we must divest certain existing
capabilities and capacities to free resources for essential

2

new capabilities. The most logical way to approach
divestment is to take a systems perspective and
reduce infantry battalions while proportionally
reducing the organizations dedicated to supporting
these battalions – direct support artillery, ground
mobility assets, assault support aviation, light attack
aviation, and combat service support capabilities whose
capacity is similarly related to the size of the ground
and air combat elements to be supported.
Specific Capability
With the shift in our primary focus to great power
competition and a renewed focus on the Indo-Pacific
region, the current force has shortfalls in capabilities
needed to support emerging joint, naval, and Marine
Corps operating concepts.
We have shortfalls in expeditionary long-range precision
fires; medium- to long-range air defense systems;
short-range (point defense) air defense systems;
high-endurance, long-range unmanned systems with
Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR),
Electronic Warfare (EW), and lethal strike capabilities;
and disruptive and less-lethal capabilities appropriate for
countering malign activity by actors pursuing maritime
“gray zone” strategies.
Similarly – and understandably, in a force that was
designed with different assumptions regarding threat
and environment – there are some capabilities that I
assess we are over-invested in. A partial list includes
heavily armored ground combat systems (tanks), towed
cannon artillery, and short-range, low endurance
unmanned aerial systems (UAS) incapable of employing
lethal effects. Finally, as an element of the integrated
naval force, we have capability and capacity excesses
and shortfalls in areas not organic to the Marine Corps,
but which are essential to our ability to contribute
to sea control and sea denial in a contested littoral
environment.
These include a requirement for smaller, lower signature,
and more affordable amphibious ships and a shortfall
in affordable, distributable platforms that will enable
littoral maneuver and provide logistical support in a
very challenging theater for the kind of operations
envisioned in our current concepts.

Force Design 2030

 STARTING POINT FOR FORCE DESIGN
– VISION AND EXPECTATIONS
The Commandant’s Planning Guidance (CPG) I issued
in July 2019 identified force design as my number one
priority. That prioritization was the result of my direct
participation in five years of naval and global war games
while the Commanding General of I MEF, Commander of
Marine Corps Forces Pacific, and Deputy Commandant
for Combat Development and Integration. Those war
games helped shape my conclusion that modest and
incremental improvements to our existing force structure
and legacy capabilities would be insufficient to overcome
evolving threat capabilities, nor would they enable us
to develop forces required to execute our approved
naval concepts.
In my planning guidance I outlined expectations
regarding future force design, to include describing
a number of specific attributes I saw as essential.
Informed by trends in military technology, specifically
the emergence and proliferation of the Mature Precision
Strike Regime (MPSR), the rise of gray zone activities,
and the Service imperative for maritime campaigning,
I provided the following direction:
(1) “We must acknowledge the impacts of proliferated
precision long-range fires, mines, and other smart
weapons, and seek innovative ways to overcome
these threat capabilities.”
(2) “Future force development requires a wider range
of force options and capabilities. The Marine Corps
must be able to fight at sea, from the sea, and from
the land to the sea; operate and persist within range
of adversary long-range fires; maneuver across the
seaward and landward portions of complex littorals;
and sense, shoot, and sustain while combining the
physical and information domains to achieve desired
outcomes. Achieving this end state requires a force that
can create the virtues of mass without the vulnerabilities
of concentration, thanks to mobile and low-signature
sensors and weapons.”
(3) In the context of force design, we need better answers
to the question “what does the Navy need from the
Marine Corps?”
(4) I highlighted the naval operating concepts that shape
the current, evolving vision of how we will fight in the
future. Central among these are the Navy’s vision of
Distributed Maritime Operations (DMO) and the related

“We must transform…to
meet new desired ends,
and do so in full partnership
with the Navy.”
Marine Corps and Navy concepts of Littoral Operations
in a Contested Environment (LOCE) and Expeditionary
Advance Base Operations (EABO). I also referenced the
draft Marine Corps concept of “Stand-In Forces,” an
offshoot of EABO that emphasizes the generation of,
“technically disruptive, tactical stand-in engagements
that confront aggressor naval forces with an array of
low signature, affordable, and risk-worthy platforms
and payloads.”
(5) “While we stand by to perform such other duties as the
President may direct, foreign humanitarian assistance,
disaster relief, and noncombatant evacuations do not
define us – they are not our identity. Rather, they are the
day-to-day consequence of being the force-in-readiness.
We are not designing an across-the-ROMO force; but
rather, a force intended to prevent major conflict and
deter the escalation of conflict within the ROMO.”
(6) “I do not believe joint forcible entry operations
(JFEO) are irrelevant or an operational anachronism;
however, we must acknowledge that different
approaches are required given the proliferation of
anti-access/area denial (A2AD) threat capabilities in
mutually contested spaces.”
(7) “As the preeminent littoral warfare and expeditionary
warfare service, we must engage in a more robust
discussion regarding naval expeditionary forces and
capabilities not resident with the Marine Corps such as
coastal/riverine forces, naval construction forces, and
mine countermeasure forces. We must ask ourselves
whether it is prudent to absorb some of those functions,
forces, and capabilities to create a single naval
expeditionary force whereby the Commandant could
better ensure their readiness and resourcing.”

Force Design 2030

3

 Broadly speaking, our future force must align to the
NDS. Thus, we will purpose-build forces capable of
assurance and deterrence – forces that are “combat
credible” in accordance with the NDS. In short, our
future forces:
• Will be capable of successfully competing
and winning in the gray zone
• Will be a single, integrated total force, and
not distinct and semi-independent active
and reserve components
• Will be, while purpose-built to support joint
maritime campaigning, inherently capable
of facilitating other joint operations
Enabling these core characteristics, our future Marines
will possess the physical and mental toughness, tenacity,
initiative and aggressiveness necessary to win in close
combat, along with the intellectual and technical skills
required to innovate, adapt, and succeed in the rapidly
changing 21st century operating environment. We will
equip our Marines with mobile, low-signature sensors
and weapons that can provide a landward complement
to Navy capabilities for surface warfare, antisubmarine
warfare, air and missile defense, and airborne early
warning. And in partnership with the Navy, our units
will possess littoral maneuver capabilities to include
high-speed, long-range, low-signature craft capable of
maneuvering Marines for a variety of missions.

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“war games helped shape
my conclusion that
modest and incremental
improvements to our
existing force structure
and legacy capabilities
would be insufficient to
overcome evolving threat
capabilities.”

Force Design 2030

 FORCE DESIGN EFFORT
METHODOLOGY
Our force design effort is framed in four phases. Phase
I focused on problem framing, began in July 2019,
and centered on a small operational planning team
(OPT) that worked directly with me to establish an initial
visualization of the future force as well as aim points
for follow-on work.
Phase II began in September 2019, when the OPT’s
initial work transitioned to the Deputy Commandant for
Combat Development and Integration (DC CD&I). The
DC CD&I subsequently established twelve functionally
and organizationally-focused Integrated Planning
Teams (IPTs) to assess our current design and develop
future force design recommendations. These IPTs
were organized to address: (1) MEU reconfiguration;
(2) the Marine Littoral Regiment construct; (3) Maritime
Prepositioning Force reconfiguration; (4) aviation in
support of the FMF; (5) logistics in support of the FMF;
(6) anti-ship capabilities; (7) medium-range air defense
capabilities; (8) infantry battalion reorganization; (9)
manned-unmanned capability balance; (10) objective
network requirements; (11) training and education; and
(12) the reserves.
Upon completion of these twelve IPTs, an overarching IPT
was established in February 2020 tasked with synchronizing
and integrating all previous outputs and producing a plan
of action for Phase III. Phase III will concentrate on rapid
and iterative wargaming, analysis, and experimentation,
while Phase IV will focus on refinement, validation,
and implementation via the Planning, Programming,
Budgeting, and Execution System (PPBES). This interim
report summarizes the results of our efforts in Phase I and
II, while articulating our plan of action for subsequent
phases of force design.
WARGAMING
Phase II of Force Design devised and executed a
series of deliberate war games providing both an initial
analysis of the Phase I effort as well as guidance to
inform subsequent efforts. Additionally, the Phase II
effort drew upon the results of a wider body of Marine
Corps and Naval Service wargaming and analysis that had
been conducted before its work began. It is important
to note that, although much has been learned from
this body of earlier work, to date we have explored
initial implications of the EABO and LOCE concepts in a
limited number of scenarios, permitting some inferences

about elements of the force design the IPT ultimately
proposed. A much more comprehensive follow-on effort
must be made to wargame and analyze all aspects of
our force design conclusions. Of particular importance in
informing the Phase II effort were a series of war games
conducted by the Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory
(MCWL), including the POM-20 wargame in March 2018
and a series of games in October 2019, the June 2019
Naval Services wargame, U.S. Indo-Pacific Command’s
(INDOPACOM) August 2019 Global XI Wargame, and
the Joint Staff J7’s Globally Integrated Wargame in
September and November 2019. While these war games,
again, were not designed to test the specific force design
recommendations advanced by the IPT, they did offer a
number of key insights. These include:
• The individual / force element which shoots
first has a decisive advantage.
• Forces that can continue to operate inside
an adversary’s long-range precision fire
weapons engagement zone (WEZ) are more
operationally relevant than forces which must
rapidly maneuver to positions outside the
WEZ in order to remain survivable. These
“stand-in” forces attrite adversary forces,
enable joint force access requirements,
complicate targeting and consume adversary
ISR resources, and prevent fait accompli
scenarios.
• Range and operational reach matters in the
Indo-Pacific Area of Responsibility (AOR).
• The hider-versus finder competition is real.
Losing this competition has enormous and
potentially catastrophic consequences. This
makes success in the reconnaissance/counterreconnaissance mission an imperative for
success.
• Forward bases and stations and fixed
infrastructure are easily targeted, and
extremely vulnerable to disruption.
• Mobility inside the WEZ is a competitive
advantage and an operational imperative.
• Logistics (sustainability) is both a critical
requirement and critical vulnerability. Forces
that cannot sustain themselves inside the

Force Design 2030

5

 WEZ are liabilities; however, those that
can sustain themselves while executing
reconnaissance and counter-reconnaissance
missions create a competitive advantage.
• There is no avoiding attrition. In contingency
operations against peer adversaries, we will
lose aircraft, ships, ground tactical vehicles,
and personnel. Force resilience – the ability
of a force to absorb loss and continue to
operate decisively – is critical.
MODELING AND SIMULATION
Phase II was informed by the large body of previous
campaign modeling done in conjunction with the
wargaming efforts described above (as well as other
related projects), along with modeling associated with
the concurrent Navy-led Integrated Naval Force Structure
Assessment (INFSA). This modeling informed the IPT’s
analysis on a number of considerations including munitions
and other logistical requirements; probabilities of success
in various types of surface-to-surface, surface-to-air, airto-air and air-to-surface engagements; and the range
and probability of detection of sensors employed against
various target arrays.

equipment of a Marine infantry battalion was conducted
in support of the Force 2025 force structure review in
2016. We will need to conduct full-scale, empiricallybased experimentation of the future force in realistic
maritime and littoral terrain. Our experimentation
must be deliberate and iterative, informed by both
threat developments and technology advancements.
INITIAL CMC DESIGN GUIDANCE
I provided the following specific guidance to bound
the Phase II planning effort:
• Use the 2019 Commadant’s Planning
Guidance as REF A.
• Use approved naval concepts (DMO, EABO,
and LOCE) as REF B.
• The legacy 2 MEB JFEO requirement is
unsuitable as a force-sizing construct.
• Aside from the CPG’s general guidance,
orientation, and framing, start with the
proverbial intellectual blank sheet of paper
or white board, and build the operationally
suitable force for 2030.
• Do not be constrained by current programsof-record.

EXPERIMENTATION
Limited experimentation has been conducted upon
discrete elements of the future force utilizing approved
naval concepts, to include some carefully constrained tests
of the ability of the F-35B to operate and be sustained
from austere, undeveloped landing sites. Some of this
work has been conducted in the Indo-Pacific region in
conjunction with scheduled training exercises conducted
by 31st MEU. A single, limited-objective experiment
addressing aspects of the organization, training, and

• The force will be uniquely capable
of performing EABO and Distributed
Operations (DO).
• Use a threat-informed approach and naval
warfare perspective.
• Plan for sufficient capacity to return the force
to a 1:3 deployment to dwell ratio.

“We will need to conduct full-scale, empirically-based
experimentation of the future force in realistic maritime
and littoral terrain. Our experimentation must be deliberate
and iterative, informed by both threat developments and
technology advancements.”
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Force Design 2030

 OBJECTIVE FORCE
The outcome of the Phase I and II effort was a redesigned
“Objective Force” with the following characteristics:
Total Fleet Marine Force (FMF) structure
• Reduction of approximately 12,000 Marines
relative to the current Total Force by 2030
Command Element
• Divestment of 3 active component law
enforcement battalions
Ground Combat Element
• 7 infantry regimental headquarters
(divestment of 1 regimental headquarters)
• 21 active component infantry battalions
(divestment of 3 battalions)

• 14 active component medium tiltrotor (VMM)
squadrons (recommended divestment of 3
squadrons)
• 5 active component heavy lift helicopter
(HMH) squadrons (recommended divestment
of 3 squadrons)
• 5 active component light attack helicopter
(HMLA) squadrons (divestment of 2
squadrons)
• 4 active component aerial refueler transport
(VMGR) squadrons (increase of one squadron
over current force)
• 6 active component unmanned aerial
vehicle (VMU) squadrons (increase of three
squadrons over current force)

• 6 reserve component infantry battalions
(divestment of 2 battalions)
• Redesign of remaining infantry battalions in
the direction of greater lethality and flexibility,
with reduced structure (a proposed reduction
per infantry battalion of approximately 200
Marines).
• 5 cannon artillery batteries (divestment of
16 batteries)
• 21 rocket artillery batteries (increase of 14
batteries over current force)
• Zero tank companies (divestment of entire
capacity of 7 companies and prepositioned
capacity)
• 12 Light Armored Reconnaissance (LAR)
companies (increase of 3 companies over
current force)
• 4 Assault Amphibian (AA) companies
(divestment of 2 companies)
Air Combat Element
• 18 active component fighter attack (VMFA)
squadrons, with a reduction in the number
of aircraft per squadron to 10

Force Design 2030

7

 OBJECTIVE FORCE IMPLICATIONS
The recommendations of the Phase II IPT result in a
potential savings of $12B to be reallocated towards
equipment modernization, training modernization,
and force development priorities. However, I must
emphasize that these initial results are just that: it remains
for us to evaluate and refine during the upcoming
Phase III effort. I have high confidence in several of
the recommendations advanced by the Phase II IPTs,
however, others require additional deliberate analysis
during Phase III.
ADDITIONAL OBSERVATIONS
I am not convinced that we have a clear understanding
yet of F-35 capacity requirements for the future
force. As a result, the Service will seek at least one
external assessment of our Aviation Plan relative to
NDS objectives and evolving naval and joint warfighting
concepts.
As described in Congressional testimony, our continued
pilot shortfalls are a factor we must consider and either
scale programs of record accordingly or implement a
sustainable, affordable solution. Other Services face
similar shortfalls. This issue has recruiting, training,
and retention factors – as well as fiscal and industrial
base factors – that we must consider in reconciling the
growing disparity between numbers of platforms and
numbers of aircrew.
While the decrease in the number of infantry battalions
is clearly articulated in the Phase II material, the absence
of a major reduction in ground tactical combat vehicles
is inconsistent with the systems-oriented reduction
discussed above. DC CD&I will need to assess existing
ground tactical vehicle programs of record and
recommend appropriate adjustments to approved
acquisition objectives.

FINDINGS IN WHICH I HAVE HIGH CONFIDENCE
Divestment of three infantry battalions
Based on the evolution of joint OPLANS that previously
influenced capacity in our “base unit,” and on my
elimination of the requirement to size the force for a
generic “2 MEB JFEO,” the remaining 21 battalions
will satisfy naval and joint requirements.
Investment in additional rocket artillery batteries
This investment provides the basis, over time, for
generating one of the fundamental requirements for
deterrence, and ultimately successful naval campaigns
– long-range, precision expeditionary anti-ship missile
fires. This requirement is based on one of the more
well-supported conclusions from wargaming analysis
conducted to date.
Divestment of tanks
We have sufficient evidence to conclude that this
capability, despite its long and honorable history in
the wars of the past, is operationally unsuitable for our
highest-priority challenges in the future. Heavy ground
armor capability will continue to be provided by the
U.S. Army.
Divestment of three heavy helicopter squadrons
Based on analysis by our aviation subject-matter-experts,
five squadrons provide sufficient capacity to satisfy our
requirements as well as our future force as described
in approved naval concepts.
Divestment of three medium-lift tiltrotor squadrons
Given the reduction of infantry battalion capacity and
associated combat support, the remaining tiltrotor force
should be sufficient to our needs.

“The recommendations of the Phase II IPT result in a
potential savings of $12B to be reallocated towards
equipment modernization, training modernization, and
force development priorities.”

8

Force Design 2030

 Divestment of at least two light attack
helicopter squadrons

Expansion and increased resourcing of training
and education

While this capability has a certain amount of relevance
to crisis and contingency missions which we must still be
prepared to execute, it is operationally unsuitable for our
highest-priority maritime challenges and excess to our
needs with the divestment of three infantry battalions.

The level of detailed planning and analysis done by
the Training and Education IPT is commendable.
I am confident that the issues identified by the IPT
are accurate, and have full confidence in its overall
recommendations. The warfighting impact of all
other future capabilities is directly tied to the level of
commitment we make to training modernization. We
have a lot of ground to make up in this area, and must
allocate adequate resources now and into the future
to close this gap.

Investment in additional Unmanned Aerial
Systems (UAS)
As a “stand-in” force of the future, the Marine Corps
requires a family of UAS capabilities. We need to
transition from our current UAS platforms to capabilities
that can operate from ship, from shore, and able to
employ both collection and lethal payloads. These future
capabilities must be expeditionary and fully compatible
with Navy platforms and command and control networks.
Divestment of 2 AA companies and reduction
of AAV and Amphibious Combat Vehicle (ACV)
requirements
With the reduction of infantry battalions and the
elimination of the 2 MEB JFEO force development
sizing construct, it follows that the requirement for
protected mobility to support them also decreases.
Divestment of three law enforcement battalions
This capacity is excess to our current needs, which can
be met by the remaining force with some adjustments
in current operational practice.
Divestment of Marine Wing Support Groups
(MWSG)
We have sufficient evidence dating back to the 2010
Force Structure Review Group analysis to support
this move.
Divestment of three bridging companies
This capability is primarily relevant to sustained land
operations. Given my guidance to avoid such criteria
in designing the force, this capability is clearly excess
to our requirements.

FINDINGS WHICH DEMAND ADDITIONAL
ANALYSIS DURING PHASE III
Based upon my assessment of the results of the first
two phases of our force design effort, we must now
spend additional time ensuring that we have accurately
framed the problem before us and continue to refine our
understanding of assumptions, constraints, restraints,
and operational realities that may affect the design of
our future force.
Additionally, there are specific outputs from the initial
phases that must be refined through focused analytic work
and deliberate experimentation. These outputs include:
Redesign of the infantry battalion
I am not confident that we have adequately assessed all
of the implications of the future operating environment
on the proposed structure of our future infantry battalion.
While I fully support redesign of the infantry battalion
in principle, I remain unconvinced that the specific
proposed new construct makes the force more capable
of Distributed Operations. We must conduct more
live-force experimentation to ensure our proposed
design results in a truly DO-capable force. I would
like to see intensive further analysis of this proposed
new structure during Phase III.

“The warfighting impact of all other future capabilities
is directly tied to the level of commitment we make to
training modernization.”
Force Design 2030

9

 Emerging naval expeditionary force formations
I am convinced that a transformation of our current
formations is essential for successful integration and
employment of future capabilities. While the Marine
Littoral Regiment (MLR), recommended as an output
from Phases I and II, appears to possess the required
characteristics, there is simply not enough evidence at
this time to support a wholesale reorganization of III
MEF. Therefore, as a first step, we will initially create a
singular MLR formation. We will use that initial formation
to test and validate our concepts and refine the structure
of the Marine Littoral Regiment during Phase III. Before
we undertake an ambitious force wide transformation,
we must validate our assumptions, wargame rigorously,
pursue the necessary modeling, and ensure that our
primary warfighting partner – Fleet Commanders – share
our conclusions.
Littoral maneuver and sustainment
I am not confident that we have identified the additional
structure required to provide the tactical maneuver and
logistical sustainment needed to execute DMO, LOCE
and EABO in contested littoral environments against
our pacing threat. While not an afterthought by any
means, I do not believe our Phase I and II efforts gave
logistics sufficient attention. Resolving these two areas
must be a priority for Phase III.
MEU redesign recommendations
The Phase II IPT seems to have produced an incrementally
improved version of today’s 3-ship ARG/MEU. This vision
falls short of our future needs. We cannot accept or
accede to recommendations for incremental change or
better versions of legacy capabilities, but must pursue
transformational capabilities that will provide naval
fleets and joint force commanders with a competitive
advantage in the gray zone and during contingency. I am
confident that, with refined planning guidance, we can
develop more operationally suitable recommendations
for analysis and consideration.
Increase in Light Armored Reconnaissance
While I have repeatedly stated that all-domain
reconnaissance and counter-reconnaissance will be
a critical element of any future contingency, I remain
unconvinced that additional wheeled, manned armored
ground reconnaissance units are the best and only
answer – especially in the Indo-Pacific region. We need
to see more evidence during Phase III to support this
conclusion before engaging in an expansion of our

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existing capacity, or committing billions of dollars
in procurement funds towards the acquisition of an
Advanced Reconnaissance Vehicle (ARV).
Retention of 18 VMFA squadrons
Employment of the F-35 in support of future naval
expeditionary TACAIR requirements requires additional
study, as I noted previously. We will continue to learn
more about the various roles that platform will fulfill,
and we must be willing to assess and adjust our VMFA
force structure and program of record accordingly.
In addition, as noted earlier, our continued inability
to build and sustain an adequate inventory of F-35
pilots leads me to conclude that we must be pragmatic
regarding our ability to support the existing programof-record. We must conduct a more thorough review of
our VMFA capacity requirements and ability to satisfy
those requirements. This will require an external review
of the issue that will inform our subsequent decisions.

“We cannot accept or accede
to recommendations for
incremental change or
better versions of legacy
capabilities, but must
pursue transformational
capabilities that will provide
naval fleets and joint
force commanders with a
competitive advantage in
the gray zone and during
contingency.”

Force Design 2030

 FOLLOW-ON GUIDANCE
In addition to the refinement areas addressed above,
we have logical next steps to take in addressing
Marine Corps structure outside the Active Component
Fleet Marine Force. Those follow-on efforts include
a comprehensive assessment of our Reserve
Component and our Supporting Establishment.
MARINE SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND
(MARSOC)
Force design places new demands on our FMF that
require us to revisit our current manpower policies
supporting MARSOC. We must develop assignment
policies that continue to satisfy MARSOC personnel
requirements while ensuring appropriate rotation
of personnel in and out of MARSOC. Any change
to the current policies should not limit MARSOC’s
ability to recruit, assess and develop relationships and
candidates, in coordination with FMF units and leaders.
Recommended changes to policy should ensure Marines
remain competitive for promotion and have broad
opportunities for assignment within the Marine Corps
and the joint force.
INFANTRY
I concur with IPT conclusions that our current entrylevel and advanced infantry training programs
and policies will not meet future demands of our
infantry elements. We will need to increase our upfront, entry-level training investment, and then look
to make corresponding modifications to advanced
infantry training to develop the quality, maturity and
capabilities envisioned – including the multi-disciplinary
infantry approach – in the IPT findings. This effort should
include looking at ways to include all components of
the 03XX occupational field, including reconnaissance
and LAR. Explore ways to challenge existing models
and paradigms to yield a more capable and mature
infantry and reconnaissance force. TECOM will develop
options for a modernized and more comprehensive
entry-level infantry school to fundamentally improve
the initial proficiency and skills of our infantry force.
EXPERIMENTATION AND WARGAMING
RECOMMENDATIONS
To further refine and develop our understanding of
force design changes, I am directing the immediate
implementation of an intensive program of iterative

concept refinement, wargaming, analysis and
simulation, and experimentation. I will be personally
involved in and responsible for setting priorities and
ensuring that necessary resources are made available
for this effort. This will be a time-limited “surge” effort
aimed at expanding and deepening the analytical basis
underpinning our force design conclusions in support of
future budget submissions. The effort will be led by the
Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory (MCWL), with
additional resourcing and personnel augmentation.
I fully understand the challenges of establishing and
sustaining a rapidly iterating research cycle, given the
realities of resourcing and available time and personnel.
It is also no panacea; there are uncertainties in the
future we must account for. Technology and available
funding are major factors, as is the rate at which our
pacing threat modernizes and expands its operational
reach. We must commit to a continuous cycle of
learning and adjustment that ensures a margin of
advantage over our adversaries, while remaining
ready to respond to crisis 24/7/365.
DESIGN LEVERS AND FUNDAMENTALS
As we continue to refine our efforts and engage in
additional IPTs, we must remain grounded in the
fundamentals of force design vice pursuing only
incremental change and minor adjustments to the current
force. When visualizing the future naval expeditionary
force, we will keep the following design levers in mind:
Organizational Design: Developing the form and
function of elements (e.g. squad, etc.)
Force Design: Combining elements to form an
organization (e.g. Brigade, FMF, JTF, etc.)
Force Structure: Capacities of elements and
organizations; aggregate force structure capacities;
setting end-strength
Force Posture: Where organizations are physically
located and their anticipated activities
Naval and Joint Force Integration: Combining
components into a system for employment; scalability
and interoperability
New Capabilities: Enablers for doing things differently;
impacts all other levers

Force Design 2030

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 In addition to the design levers identified above,
participants in our follow-on planning efforts should
remain mindful of the following design fundamentals
that will facilitate their efforts.
• Focus on capabilities and force postures that
maximize conventional deterrence such as
capabilities that provide the option for us
to strike effectively first from a force posture
(location and disposition) that balances
forward presence and integration with allies
and partners and allows for the flexibility to
dictate the time and place of action.

• Ensure composable force elements
constructed from purpose-built modified
formations.
• Maintain an all-domain (air, surface,
subsurface, space, cyberspace) perspective.
• Create greater resilience in our C4 and ISR
systems to counter more sophisticated threat
capabilities.

• Focus on capabilities required to satisfy
approved naval concepts of DMO, EABO,
and LOCE.

• Develop military deception, camouflage,
cover, concealment, and obscurant
capabilities to defeat terminal phase attack
and challenge broad area surveillance.

• Focus on capabilities that create a
competitive, asymmetrical advantage in
maritime gray zone operations globally.

• Pursue the development of organic C4ISR,
maneuver, and fires capabilities (organic
network) at all echelons.

• Focus on capabilities required to develop
a truly DO-capable force that can mass
effects while minimizing signature; maximize
efficient tactical mobility; reduce logistics
demand; and expand the range of mutual
support across all tactical echelons.

• Create purpose-built forces. (Ensure all
elements are equipped and trained for their
specified purposes. Aggregating specialized
units with base elements creates a tailored
multi-domain force in order to provide
maximum relevant combat power (RCP)
on-demand.)

• Minimize organization reliance on
attachments; goal should be to maximize
unit cohesion and implicit communication.
• Develop multi-axis, multi-domain precision
fires organic at all echelons, enabled by a
federated system of networks to ensure all
elements can fight in a degraded command
and control environment.
• Develop smaller but better-connected
formations that organically possess a
complete kill chain appropriate to echelon,
and that can prevail in a contested operating
environment.
• Factor in the increased importance of
range and endurance of manned systems,
unmanned systems, and munitions given the
expanse and non-contiguous nature of IndoPacific geography and the ever-expanding
range of threat systems.

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• Focus on rapid employment and the
scalability of Marine force elements.

“We will need to increase our
up-front, entry-level training
investment, and then look
to make corresponding
modifications to advanced
infantry training to develop
the quality, maturity and
capabilities envisioned
– including the multidisciplinary infantry approach
– in the IPT findings.”

Force Design 2030

 CONCLUSION
We have made significant progress to date in our force
design efforts. While these efforts have undeniably
been productive and will inform our divestment and
investment decisions going-forward, we should view
them as first steps in a longer journey. We have much
more work to do to ensure our recommendations rest
upon a solid analytic foundation. While I am confident
in the merits and operational suitability of many of the
IPT recommendations, in other areas we have a ways
to go before making decisions. We simply must have
more analysis and evidence, which comes from modeling
and experimentation.
While the Future Force we are developing is different in
terms of structure and capabilities, it is consistent with
our historical roots as Fleet Marine Forces and directly
supports our Title 10 responsibility to seize and defend
advanced naval bases, and perform all such duties
as directed by the President. It is also important to
note that methods and concepts such as Expeditionary
Advanced Base Operations are not the sum total of our
contribution to the joint force. We will continue to serve
as the nation’s premier crisis response force around the
globe, and contribute to the deterrence and warfighting
needs of all combatant commands.

Semper Fidelis,

David H. Berger
General, U.S. Marine Corps
Commandant of the Marine Corps

Force Design 2030

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