UNCLASSIFIED Strategy for Supplemental Funding to Prevent, Prepare for, and Resgond to Coronavirus Abroad Goal: To accelerate the global effort by the US. government (USG) to stem the further transmission and re-emergence of COVID-19, the disease caused by the novel coronavirus that originated in the People?s Republic of China (PRC), mitigate its impact, and protect the American people at home and abroad. Summary: Consistent with Section 406 of the Coronavirus Preparedness and Response Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2020 (Public Law 116-123, COVID-19 Supplemental), the US. Department of State (State) and the US. Agency for International Development (USAID), in consultation with other relevant federal departments and agencies, jointly submit this strategy for supplemental funding to prevent, prepare for, and respond to the pandemic of COVID-19 abroad. This strategy focuses on the overall approach to programming the resources appropriated by the COVID-19 Supplemental and builds upon the longstanding investments in global health made through the President?s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR), the President?s Malaria Initiative (PMI), the Global Health Security Agenda (GHSA), the US. Government Strategy on Tuberculosis (TB), efforts in maternal and child health, and other initiatives. While this strategy is primarily the guiding document for activities funded through the COVID-19 Supplemental, it will also inform activities ?nanced through other funding sources and complementary activities under PEPFAR, PMI, GHSA, the Global TB Strategy, and other activities, which will contribute to the goals of this document and serve as implementation platforms to support the response to COVID-19. Through four interrelated pillars, the USG will accomplish the following with the funds from the Supplemental: 1) Protect US. citizens and the USG community overseas, facilitate the continued work of the USG overseas, and communicate effectively to the public; 2) Prevent, prepare for, respond to, and bolster health institutions to address the pandemic of COVID-19 and the possible re-emergence of the disease; 3) Prevent, prepare for, and respond to COVID-19 in existing complex emergency reSponses and address the potential humanitarian consequences of the pandemic; and 4) Prepare for, mitigate, and address possible second-order economic, civilian-security, stabilization, and governance impacts of in part to prevent development backsliding. - This strategy includes diplomatic engagement; foreign assistance to governments and non?governmental organizations in partner with developing countries, allies, and international organizations; and direct engagement with the private sector to ensure a global response to the pandemic of consistent with the International Health Regulations (2005), best practices, and burden sharing. This strategy is speci?cally designed to allow for funding and operational ?exibility to adapt to the rapidly evolving nature of this pandemic. Effectively preventing, preparing for, and responding to the pandemic of COVID-19 will require a combination of assisting US. citizens abroad, supporting our international workforce, UNCLASSIFIED .2- providing targeted international aid, engaging with partners and the governments of affected countries, building global health security, enhancing border security, promoting effective governance and transparency, and more. This strategy expects and encourages robust participation from other donors to ensure the United States is not operating or ?nancing the global response alone. It also builds on existing White House?level strategies, including the National Security Strategy, the National Biodefense Strategy, and the Global Health Security Strategy, which already de?ned foundational objectives, roles, and responsibilities for Executive Branch departments and agencies in mitigating the Spread of infectious?disease threats abroad. State and USAID have consulted with key departments and agencies involved in the response to the pandemic of COVID-19 overseas, such as the US. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), including the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and the National Institutes of Health and the US. Department of Defense Spend plans, Congressional noti?cations, and a report State will provide pursuant to Section 406(b) of the COVID-I9 Supplemental will provide more speci?c information on the planned uses of the ?mds. Assumptions: Additional diplomatic engagement and targeted foreign assistance, including responding to the pandemic of abroad and mitigating its possible second-order impact-s, is critical for the safety and security of the American people. The pace and rapid spread of COVID-19 will likely surpass local response capacity and existing resources in many countries that are important to US. interests. Depending on the severity in each country, COVID-19 is expected to cause signi?cant economic and social disruption, including for USG personnel and their families at US. embassies, and could overwhelm healthcare institutions and lead to a multi-sector emergency. Longer-term impacts could reverse valuable economic and development gains made over many years, which could slow a country?s journey to self?reliance and undermine billions of dollars of investments by American taxpayers that have resulted in tremendous health gains through PEPFAR, PMI, the GHSA, and other efforts in global health. State and USAID will continue to monitor as it spreads around the world from China and prioritize assistance based on US. foreign policy, and national security interests, and countries? risk pro?le in close coordination with other USG agencies, the World Health Organization (WHO), and other stakeholders. Key assumptions for this strategy include the following: 0 US. embassies, including USAID missions, will continue to operate in every region; however, some posts will be on ordered or authorized departure for extended periods; 0 State and USAID personnel will be able to travel on a limited basis to COVID- l9?affected areas to engage diplomatically and oversee foreign assistance; 0 The pandemic of COVID-19 will involve multiple waves of transmission, containment, and re-emergence of the virus over time in countries; 0 Given the rapid, ?uid nature of the pandemic and unknowns about the virus and its epidemiology, the response will need to be ?exible across geographies and activities because programmatic needs could shift and unanticipated needs arise; and 0 State and USAID will notify funding to Congress and obligate it in tranches based on need, absorptive and implementation capacity, and in anticipation of preparing and responding to multiple waves of transmission and the re-emergence of the virus. UNCLASSIFIED .3- Prioritization of Countries and Funding: The prioritization of countries for assistance will depend on a number of factors, including levels of preparedness as a result of previous USG investments in laboratory and surveillance capacity. State and USAID will make decisions about country-level allocations in close consultation with the USG interagency, donors, the governments of partner countries, and other stakeholders. Global Health Programs (GHP) funds will prioritize interventions with the potential for broad impact, both in countries Where the USG has existing presence or partners and in areas where the United States has not traditionally been active, on a case-by-case basis. Key factors include the following: 0 Caseload of (based on con?rmed cases) and the existence of community transmission; 0 Connectivity to a hotspot of transmission of Vulnerability (unstable political situation, displaced populations); 0 Particularly weak or fragile health systems and low scores for meeting core capacity requirements under the International Health Regulations (2005); The ability to leverage existing health institutions, especially those funded by U.S. programs, to strengthen the ef?ciency and scope of the response to the pandemic to increase its measurable impact and/or reduce the possibility of systemic failure; 0 Diplomatic considerations and U.S. strategic foreigmpolicy interests; and The political will of host-country governments. International Disaster Assistance (IDA) funding will prioritize populations affected by ongoing humanitarian crises, particularly displaced people, because of their heightened vulnerability, the elevated risk of severe outbreaks in camps and informal settlements, and anticipated disproportionate mortality in these populations. Complementary funding through regional bodies or global technical agencies will ensure broad coverage of technical assistance, as the public health needs related to in humanitarian emergencies become clear. Economic Support Funds (ESF) will have a longer time horizon as second-order impacts from the pandemic arise. State and USAID will identify priority national security or stabilization needs. Key factors in prioritizing countries for funding include the following: 0 Economic reliance on affected sectors g. the services sector, tourism) or on low-skill, labor-intensive industries g. subsistence agriculture); 0 Level of need to prepare and prevent/mitigate negative second-order impacts g. lack of early-warning and/or early-response plans and resources, school closings, and the degradation of critical infrastructure); 0 Impact on U.S. strategic priorities, including economic, security, and foreign policy interests, which include countering malign foreign in?uence when appropriate; 0 State fragility (security, political, and economic); 0 High population density; UNCLAS SIFIED -4- 0 Proximity and/or signi?cant transportation to countries with large outbreaks of and 0 Commitment by governments and societies to self-reliance and willingness to share the burden of responding to the pandemic. Objectives and Lines of Effort This Strategy is organized into four main pillars that represent lines of effort that will work in tandem to further the Administration?s overall goals to accelerate our global effort to stem the further transmission and re-emergence of COVID-19, mitigate the impacts of the pandemic, and protect the American people at home and abroad. Our aim for these combined efforts in targeted countries is to reduce morbidity and mortality; avoid the collapse of health care; and mitigate political or economic destabilization, development backsliding, and other second-order effects. All programming will contain a monitoring-and-evaluation component to ensure State and USAID are continuously assessing, improving, and learning from programmatic outcomes and redirecting funds to the highest-impact efforts. UNCLASSIFIED -5. USAID AND STATE Response Strategy Framework Objective .9 E) State Prevent, preparator responoto i Enre?? at: a 31; . 3 Emergency Health Response C0m0~19 an existing oomptex Governance Support i emergencyrasponses Maintain Executive 8:311:31 Strengthen Giana! Health Security Address potential humanlan?an Econ omicSup rt 33 opera?ens during comma (6H8) in attested countries consequences Mine pandemic Direct die collaboration otUB. a govemmentagena?eseno i . - LEI: coordination withether Health 33?3?"?5 i Sammy 1? Stability immamleemeateemgemrw g: Protect the beam: of individuals ?mama, madness and 1' undercnietot Mission security i prmn?omgmgam resomsbiity . 3 Operating Expenses Nam: iymcovmisaemm imam tome mane causes Pillar 1: Protect U.S. citizens and the USG community overseas, facilitate the continued work of the USG overseas, and communicate effectively to the public. Lead Agency: State Other Agencies Participating: USAID, HHS Funding Identi?ed: $264 million for Diplomatic Programs and Executive Branch baseline appropriations and other funds, as needed In response to the pandemic of COVID-19, the USG will continue taking decisive action to inform and safeguard U.S. citizens overseas and individuals under the security responsibility of U.S. Chiefs of Mission overseas. The USG will seek to ensure the welfare and safety of the American peOple, protect the United States from the further spread of the virus, maintain the continuity of our diplomatic presence abroad, and communicate effectively with U.S. citizens and foreign publics; State will use Diplomatic Program funds, as well as other appropriated or available ?mds from the Consular and Border Security Program (CBSP), and Emergencies in the Diplomatic and Consular Service (EDCS) accounts) to support this pillar. UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED -6- Activities could include the following: 0 Ensuring Effective Consular and Other Operations during Decision-making concerning travel alerts, public messaging, U.S. travel restrictions, assessing the impact of international visitors, emergency preparedness planning, evacuating individuals under the security responsibility of Chiefs of Mission; 0 Maintaining Executive Branch Operations during the Pandemic of COVID-19: Planning for Continuity of Operations (COOP), travel for the response to COVID-19 and other mission critical activities, hiring to support additional surge capacity; 0 Directing the Collaboration of US. Departments and Agencies and Coordination with Other Development Partners: State should oversee that an effective response occurs such that the entire USG leverages the extraordinary competence in our international staff and builds on existing platforms as much as possible; and 0 Protecting the Health of Individuals under the Security Responsibility of Chiefs of Mission: Expand State?s capacity to detect, treat, and evacuate individuals under the secm'ity responsibility of Chiefs of Mission who are at risk of exposure, or otherwise vulnerable to negative medical outcomes. Pillar 2: Prevent, prepare for, respond to, and bolster health institutions to address the pandemic of COVID-19 and the possible re?emergence of the disease. Lead Agency: USAID and State Other Agencies Participating: HHS, CDC Funding Identi?ed: $435 million in GHP, of which not less than $200 million is transferred and merged into the Emergency Reserve Fund for Contagious Infectious-Disease Outbreaks (ERF) at USAID, in addition to Executive Branch baseline appropriations and other funds, as needed In response to the pandemic of the USG will continue to prioritize reducing the burden of disease abroad, avoiding the collapse of health care in targeted countries, and strengthening global health security. The USG response will include activities such as training health workers; promoting risk communications and engaging with communities; strengthening the prevention and control of infections in health facilities, including through the provision of personal protective equipment; increasing the ability to test for the virus; and strengthening hospitals and other health institutions to isolate and care for those who are severely ill from the Virus. The efforts under pillar 2 of this strategy will build upon and complement the longstanding investments the United States has made in global health security, PEPFAR, and other related health programs at the country level and include three additional funding components: Emergency Health Response, Global Health Security, and Support for Health Institutions. Through diplomatic and policy engagement, the United States will also coordinate with other donors and humanitarian actors, urge that governments adopt science?based measures to prevent and respond to the pandemic of and maintain communication and collaboration with international organizations. At the country level, this involves ensuring a national operational plan for readiness and response and a coordination mechanism UNCLASSIFIED .7- that includes both donors and government are in place, performing an initial gap analysis, and conducting ongoing monitoring of readiness. This also includes promoting transparency in reporting in compliance with the International Health Regulations (2005) and the sharing of samples of the virus. a) Emergency Health Response: Under this component and consistent with guidance from the WHO, the United States will assist governments and non-governmental organizations (N GOs) in selected affected and at-risk countries to address gaps in the following critical areas: 0 Strengthening Laboratory Diagnostics: Deploying diagnostic capability and strengthening laboratories' capacity to manage large-scale testing for COVID-19, including the transport of specimens and maintaining quality assurance; 0 Promoting Risk-Communications and Engagement with Communities: Communicating to the public what is known and unknown about and encouraging citizens to take public health actions they need to take to promote public awareness and counter misinformation; . Preventing and Controlling Infections in Health Facilities (IPC): Enhancing IPC to prevent the transmission of the virus to staff, other patients, and the community: - 0 Support for IPC includes procuring and delivering personal protective equipment (PPE) from the USAID-?nanced stockpile, other selected commodities, and technical assistance; - 0 Supporting Surveillance, Rapid ReSponse, and Emergency Operations: Strengthening the prompt detection and investigation of cases and the effective tracing of their contacts and Supporting national and sub-national emergency operations to ensure the rapid and effective management of outbreaks of COVID- 19; Bolstering Capacities at Points of Entry (POE): Enhancing the ability of border security of?cials to screen passengers in air, land, and maritime POE environments through the provision of equipment and training, while improving crisis management, emergency operations, coordination, and communications efforts already under way; 0 Improving the Management of Cases of Identifying, safely isolating, and transporting affected individuals and materials to appropriate health facilities and preparing them to provide the standards of care needed to treat and prepare for a possible in?ux of cases, including the management and isolation of both mild and severe cases oxygen); 0 Planning for the Availability and Delivery of Future Vaccines, Point-of-Care Diagnostics, and Treatments: Supporting the development and approval of protocols, procurement and supply chain management, and the training of health workers on the deployment of therapeutics, vaccines, or point-of?care diagnostics for COVID-19 that are investigational, approved by a stringent regulatory authority . (such as the U.S. Food and Drug Administration within HHS), or pre-quali?ed by the WHO (in close consultation with HHS, NIH, and CDC): UNCLASSIFIED -3- 0 Note: U.S. funding and support for investigational therapeutics and vaccines will adhere to principles of informed consent; and 0 Accelerating Innovative and Market-Based Approaches: Identifying, applying, and scaling the usage of innovative products, approaches, technologies, ?nancing, and platforms for access to medicines; market-shaping; and multi-stakeholder partnerships to optimize the reach, effectiveness, and/or sustainability of critical response activities to COVID-19. b) Strengthening Health Security in Affected Countries: To address the pandemic of and its potential re-emergence, as well as other emerging infectious diseases, national governments and partners require the capacity to prevent, detect, and respond to infectious disease threats and health security risks in compliance with the International Health Regulations (2005). The United States will build on efforts to respond to COVID-19 in selected countries to strengthen nascent health security capacities and prepare them for recurrent waves of COVID-19 and other dangerous infectious diseases. These evidence-based activities will draw upon international best practices, metrics, and assessments, including through the Framework for Monitoring and Evaluation and Joint External Evaluations (J EEs) under the Global Health Security Agenda (GHSA). The USG will further develop core capacities needed to control 9 in countries that have previously received U.S. investments in global health security, with a focus on promoting risk communications and engagement with communities, improving laboratory systems, preventing and controlling infections in health facilities, increasing disease smveillance, developing the public health workforce, improving emergency operations, and tracking zoonotic diseases. In other countries that receive assistance, USAID, - HHS, and others will build selectively upon the reSponse to establish durable health security capacities. - Activities will also include engaging diplomatically with foreign partners; providing technical collaboration and assistance; facilitating public-health messaging; coordinating with other donors; maintaining support for existing best practices; including EEs and National Action Plans for Health Security maintaining US. leadership on major global initiatives such as the and ensuring rapid and transparent sharing of samples of and related information in coordination with other US. departments and agenc1es. Supporting Health Institutions: Under this component, USAID and others will strengthen key functions critical to the response to COVID-19 and the recovery from the pandemic by addressing key systemic challenges, including the continuity of services; the continued delivery of life-saving medications for interventions for malaria, TB, and maternal and child health; and the basic ?mctioning of health institutions. The investments will focus on the following: . 0 Strengthening Health-Related Supply-Chains to manage the risks posed by shortages of PPE, other infection-prevention supplies, and essential medicines, UNCLASSIFIED -9. diagnostics, and health commodities for HIV, malaria, and and any vaccines therapeutics for COVID-19 that might become available; 0 Addressing Shortages of Health Workers because of illness, isolation, and other factors related to COVID-19 through training, technical assistance, technology, and other support; 0 Supporting the Removal of Restrictive Health-Sector Policies that make it more dif?cult for public and private health institutions to respond effectively to the evolving crisis (such as limitations on community health workers); 0 Strengthening Information Systems to integrate, share, and cross-reference data (like disease surveillance and laboratory results against the availability of the workforce and in-patient capacity) critical to the response to the pandemic of COVID-19 and future emergencies; and . 0 Helping Governments understand how health care functions and how Ministries of Health can shift rescurces in response to the evolving crisis. Pillar 3: Prevent, prepare for, and respond to the pandemic of in existing complex emergency responses and address the potential humanitarian consequences of the pandemic. Lead Agency: USAID Other Agencies Participating: State, HHS Funding Identi?ed: $300 million in IDA in addition to other funds, as needed Severe infectious diseases can have deadly humanitarian consequences, especially among displaced populations that experience disruptions in health care, a lack of basic needs, and whose children (including orphans) are in a precarious position if primary caregivers perish. This pillar focuses on addressing the unique needs of populations that are already in the midst of a complex humanitarian crisis and in countries that are extremely fragile and could easily tip into a full-blown crisis given an external shock such as the fast-moving outbreak of COVID-19. 0 Health: Funding the suite of health interventions required to respond to the pandemic of in humanitarian contexts, including the isolation and management of cases; risk communications; engagement with communities; the prevention and control of - infections in health facilities; and diagnostics, disease surveillance, and rapid response; 0 Humanitarian Coordination: Funding United Nations Humanitarian Country Teams and members regionally and in-country to ensure harmonized, coordinated contingency planning and response: 0 Additionally, coordination mechanisms Will address the broader impacts of such as closed borders and restricted movements of camp-based populations; 0 Protection Services: Funding protection services such as support and child protection to enhance the response to the pandemic and supporting the needs of vulnerable populations g. women, children, persons with disabilities, elderly-headed households); UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED -10. 0 Water, Sanitation, and Hygiene: Promoting interventions to make water, sanitation, and hygiene accessible to support the overall public health objectives of the response to the pandemic; 0 Food Security and Livelihoods: Providing food, nutrition, access to local markets, and community-based livelihood programs for displaced people, depending on the local context; and Logistical Support: Financing the transportation and logistics needs of USG staff and humanitarian aid workers, the warehousing and transport of commodities, andfor other logistical coordination. Pillar 4: Prepare for, mitigate, and address second-order economic, civilian-security, stabilization, and governance impacts of COVID-19, in part to prevent development backsliding. . Lead Agencies: State and USAID Other Agencies Participating: None Funding Identi?ed: $250 million of up to $7 million of which USAID may transfer to its Operating Expenses (OE) account for activities under pillar I in addition to other funds, as needed. In response to COVID-19, the USG will continue communicating with US. businesses and non-governmental stakeholders regarding the effects of the pandemic on supply chains and the various ?rst? and second-order impacts of COVID-19. Impacts are expected across a range of sectors, including governance, the economy, civilian security, education, energy, tourism, agriculture, and food security, with both short-term and long-term repercussions not only on the economy and household livelihoods but also on overall stability in some of the more fragile countries affected by COVID-19. USAID will work in close coordination with the State Department on ESF programming decisions to ensure they align with US. strategic priorities, including our economic, security, and diplomatic interests. a) Support for Citizen-Responsive Governance: The pandemic can shake public con?dence in state institutions, especially in countries whose governments are not prepared to communicate and take actions transparently, which could have economic repercussions. Activities to strengthen citizen responsive governance could include the following: 0 Enhancing government communications, accountability, and transparency in health and public social services; provide govermnents with opportunities to communicate clearly and effectively with the media, and to build community relations and good governance in post-response environments; 0 Building the capacity of governments to secure their borders and protect their populations through improved civilian governance and the training of frontline of?cials and law enforcement in social distancing and protection measures and the appropriate screening of passengers; UNCLASSIFIED -11. Building trust in the actions of partner governments, particularly local ones, through bolstered delivery of basic social services, crisis management, and information sharing; Developing national action plans and policies, including legislation to create the legal framework for effective response to the pandemic and full compliance with the International Health Regulations (2005); Mobilizing domestic resources to respond to the pandemic, and Strengthening public ?nancial management, crisis response management, and ef?cient delivery of basic social services to improve public trust; and building civil society capacity and strengthening the ties of citizens' groups to governments. b) Economic Support: Reductions in the labor force and tourism because of restrictions on movement, absenteeism, and death, as well as disruptions in global supply chains could lead to declines in production and increased risks to business planning and private sector investment. Lower trade and production across a myriad of sectors will put upward pressure on the cost of food and other necessities Countries could face ?scal or debt crises because of lower public revenues and increased public spending on the response. Economic activities, including ESF- funded economic assistance, could include the following: Continuing monitoring and communicating with US. and local businesses and non-governmental stakeholders regarding the effects of the pandemic on supply chains and the overall global economy, through international diplomacy and private sector engagement; Engaging US. and local private sector entities that have global operations and investments, perform economic impact assessments and evaluate threats to supply chains, and maintain economic linkages with key allies and economic organizations; Mitigating international economic damage from COVID-19, particularly in aid?eligible countries that are key strategic or economic partners of the United States; Creating economic Opportunities to spur recovery efforts once the crisis has receded, by leveraging the US. International Development Finance Corporation (DF C) and other U. S. ?nancial institutions to catalyze private sector co- investment to ensure sustainability; Supporting economic recovery among marginalized and vulnerable populations, including 1n urban and rural (agriculture-dependent) populations; 0) Peace and Stability: Activities to promote peace and stability are critical to support local and national institutions. All activities would take the protection of vulnerable populations (women, children, people with disabilities, elderly?headed households) into consideration and could include the following: WP. UNCLASSIFIED -12- Supporting partner governments to take timely actions and communicate transparently to mitigate con?ict and violence and avoid exacerbating grievances; and Expanding community engagement and awareness programming that mitigates underlying con?ict factors such as religious, ethnic economic, political, cultural, social or otherwise. d) Multi?Sectoral Preparedness and Prevention/Mitigation: In anticipation of multifaceted impacts across sectors, USAID and others will review, develop, or strengthen multi-sectoral plans for emergency preparedness and response, including communications, support for early warning systems, the monitoring and analysis of sector-speci?c indicators; and assist in the coordination of emergency operations with health and other governr?nent of?cials Ministries of Education, Labor, Social Protection, Agriculture) to inform decision-making for and the implementation of response plans. State and others will also enhance biosecurity measures and standard operating procedures at entities that are tranSporting, processing, storing, or otherwise handling infectious viral material to prevent the illicit acquisition or access to such material and related information. Activities could include the following: Developing protocols and case reporting structures to detect, prevent, or mitigate the Spread of threats like pandemic diseases and other biological or chemical risks to global security in conformity with the International Health Regulations (2005) and guidance from the WHO and other international normative bodies; Bolstering biosecurity?related infrastructure and procedures at relevant facilities to prevent the accidental or intentional loss of infectious viral material; avoid illicit access to genetic sequence and other information related to the coronavirus; and mitigate biological risks associated with the transporting, storing, or handling infectious viral material; Supporting social protection measures aimed at meeting the needs of marginalized and vulnerable pOpulations; Strengthening water, sanitation, and hygiene in health facilities, schools, water points, markets, transit/transportation hubs, places of worship, government buildings, and public spaces; Strengthening food security and nutrition by re-establishing local markets where needed, identifying new markets for food, and expanding support for the local production of vegetables and animals (including horticulture, aquaculture, and small ruminants); Working with governments and the private sector to increase or maintain food producers? access to agricultural inputs such as seeds and fertilizers; and Providing technical support to strengthen the operational capacity of media Outlets, including to design and deliver behavior-change communications campaigns; Monitoring legal protections for journalists who are reporting on the pandemic of in closing spaces, and providing them with legal assistance; and .13- 0 Addressing the preparedness of educational institutions, including early warning and response plans, protocols for the safe and responsible closure of schools, and guidance on implementing distance learning. e) Operating Expenses: Pursuant to the Supplemental, USAID may transfer up to $7 million of ESF to its OE account. Such transferred funds will support the operational costs of implementing programs to prevent, prepare for, and respond to the pandemic, including the expenses of Task Force on COVID-19.