UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
NASHVILLE DIVISION
ADAMS & BOYLE, P.C., et al.,
Plaintiffs,

Civil Action No. 3:15-cv-00705

vs.

HON. BERNARD A. FRIEDMAN

HERBERT H. SLATERY, III, et al.,
Defendants.
_____________________________/
OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFFS’
MOTION FOR A PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
This matter is presently before the Court on the motion to file a supplemental
complaint [docket entry 229] and the motion for a temporary restraining order (“TRO”) and/or
preliminary injunction [docket entry 231] filed by plaintiffs and proposed plaintiffs (collectively
“plaintiffs”). Defendants and proposed defendants (collectively “defendants”) have responded to
both motions, and plaintiffs have replied. On April 17, 2020, at 11:00 a.m., the Court held a ninetyminute telephonic hearing with counsel for both sides, and oral argument was heard. For the
reasons stated below, the Court shall grant plaintiffs’ motion to file a supplemental complaint, and
it shall grant plaintiffs’ motion for a TRO and/or preliminary injunction to the extent plaintiffs
seek a preliminary injunction enjoining the enforcement of Tennessee Executive Order 25 (“EO25”) as applied to procedural abortions. 1

1

Procedural abortions are one type of abortion. Plaintiffs explain that
[t]here are two methods of abortion care available in Tennessee: medication
abortion or in-office procedural abortion (also referred to as “surgical
abortion”). Tr. Vol. 2, 57:18-22 (Young); Looney Decl. ¶ 11. For a
medication abortion, the patient takes mifepristone in the clinic and then,
24 to 48 hours later, takes misoprostol at a location of her choosing,

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 Background
Plaintiffs are providers of reproductive healthcare, including abortion services, in
Tennessee. Plaintiffs challenge Tennessee Senate Bill 1222, Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-15-202(a)-(h),
requiring women seeking an abortion to receive certain information beforehand in person from the
attending physician performing the abortion, or a referring physician, and to then wait at least
forty-eight hours after receiving the information before undergoing the procedure. Plaintiffs allege
that the statute’s “forty-eight-hour delay requirement” unduly burdens their patients’ right to
obtain an abortion. Plaintiffs, suing on their own behalf and also on behalf of their patients, assert
due process and equal protection claims under the Fourteenth Amendment. In September 2019,
the Court conducted a week-long bench trial in this matter.

typically at home. Looney Decl. ¶ 11. The pregnancy is then passed in a
process similar to miscarriage. Id.; Tr. Vol. 1, 39:15-11 (Wallett). The use
of mifepristone in combination with misoprostol is safe and effective to
terminate pregnancies up to 11 weeks LMP [last menstrual period] (or 77
days). Looney Decl. ¶ 12.
Although procedural abortion is sometimes referred to as “surgical
abortion,” it is not what is commonly understood to be surgery, as a
procedural abortion involves no incision or general anesthesia. Looney
Decl. ¶ 14. In the majority of cases, a procedural abortion is performed
using the “aspiration” technique, which involves the use of gentle suction
to empty the uterus, typically takes about 5-10 minutes, and may at times
involve local anesthesia or conscious sedation. Id.; Tr. Vol. 1, 40:12-20
(Wallett); Tr. Vol. 2, 58:9-59:1 (Young). Starting at 14-16 weeks,
physicians typically use the dilation and evacuation (“D&E”) technique,
which requires additional skills and equipment to perform, and takes longer,
including longer time spent by the patient in the recovery room. Looney
Decl. ¶ 14; Tr. Vol. 1, 40:21-8 (Wallett). Starting around 18 weeks LMP,
procedural abortion may be performed as a two-day procedure because a
patient receives medications to dilate her cervix the day before the
procedure itself. Looney Decl. ¶ 14. For some patients, procedural abortion
is safer or medically indicated over medication abortion, such as for patients
at increased risk of bleeding. Id. ¶ 13.
Pls.’ Br. in Support of Mot. for TRO and/or Prelim. Inj. at 7-8.
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 On March 23, 2020, Governor William Lee issued Tennessee Executive Order 18,
entitled “An Order to Reduce the Spread of COVID-19 by Limiting Non-Emergency Healthcare
Procedures.” This order provides in part:
2. All hospitals and surgical outpatient facilities in the State of Tennessee
shall not perform non-essential procedures, which includes any medical
procedure that is not necessary to address a medical emergency or to
preserve the health and safety of a patient, as determined by a licensed
medical provider. . . . Medical procedures excluded from postponement
include . . . pregnancy-related visits and procedures, including labor and
delivery . . . .
***
5. This Order shall be effective and enforceable at 12:01 a.m., Central
Daylight Time, on March 24, 2020, and shall remain in effect until 12:01
a.m., Central Daylight Time, on April 13, 2020, at which time the
suspension of any state laws and rules and the other provisions of this Order
shall cease and be of no further force or effect.
On April 8, 2020, Governor Lee issued Tennessee Executive Order 25, entitled “An
Order to Reduce the Spread of COVID-19 by Limiting Non-Emergency Healthcare Procedures.”
This order provides in part:
2. All healthcare professionals and healthcare facilities in the State of
Tennessee shall postpone surgical and invasive procedures that are elective
and non-urgent. Elective and non-urgent procedures are those procedures
that can be delayed until the expiration of this Order because they are not
required to provide life sustaining treatment, to prevent death or risk of
substantial impairment of a major bodily function, or to prevent rapid
deterioration or serious adverse consequences to a patient’s physical
condition if the surgical or invasive procedure is not performed, as
reasonably determined by a licensed medical provider.
3. In order to conserve personal protective equipment [(“PPE”)], healthcare
providers and facilities in Tennessee must limit attendance to essential
personnel in the rooms where surgeries and invasive procedures are being
performed.
4. Non-hospital healthcare providers impacted by this Order are requested
and encouraged to provide necessary personal protective equipment in their
possession and not required for the emergency care exempted in the Order,
3
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 including, but not limited to, medical gowns, N95 masks, surgical masks,
TYVEK suits, boot covers, gloves, and/or eye protection to the Tennessee
Emergency Management Agency by delivering such equipment to the
nearest open Tennessee National Guard Armory listed on the TEMA
website (www.tn.gov/tema) between the hours of 9:00 a.m. and 2:00 p.m.
***
6. This Order shall take effect at 12:01 a.m., Central Daylight Time, on
April 9, 2020, and shall remain in effect until 12:01 a.m., Central Daylight
Time, on April 30, 2020, at which time the suspension of any state laws and
rules and the other provisions of this Order shall cease and be of no further
force or effect.
7. Upon becoming effective, this Order amends and supersedes the
provisions of Executive Order No. 18, dated March 23, 2020.
An April 10, 2020, letter signed by defendant State of Tennessee Department of
Health Commissioner Lisa Piercey that is addressed to “Health Care Providers” states that
[t]he intent of Executive Order 25 is to protect the health care providers,
staff, patients, and the community from the transmission of COVID-19 and
prevent the unnecessary use of the PPE resources that are in extremely short
supply, especially N95 masks. Specifically, the Executive Order addresses
the following:
•

Helps ensure that PPE is preserved, and community spread through
close medical interaction is limited during the upcoming weeks in
which cases/hospitalizations are expected to increase;

•

Expands Executive Order 18 to more specifically cover all
procedures that are elective and non-urgent and can be delayed until
after the Order without risking serious adverse consequences to a
patient; and

•

Limits attendance at surgeries and invasive procedures to essential
personnel to preserve PPE to the greatest extent possible[.]

Pls.’ Mot. to File Suppl. Compl. Ex. B. The letter advises that the “failure to comply [with EO25] is a Class A misdemeanor and may result in possible disciplinary action by your respective
board.” Id.
On April 13, 2020, plaintiffs filed a motion to file a supplemental complaint and a
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 motion for a TRO and/or preliminary injunction [docket entries 229 and 231]. As noted above, on
April 17, 2020, the Court held a ninety-minute telephonic hearing on these motions in which both
sides presented extensive oral argument.
Motion to File a Supplemental Complaint
Plaintiffs seek leave to file a supplemental complaint, a copy of which is attached
to their motion as Exhibit 1, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(d). The proposed supplemental
complaint alleges that EO-25, as applied to procedural abortions, violates plaintiffs’ patients’
substantive due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment.

Plaintiffs assert this

constitutional challenge on their own behalf and on behalf of their patients. 2 The proposed
supplemental complaint names two new plaintiffs – Knoxville Center for Reproductive Health and
Dr. Kimberly Looney (Chief Medical Officer of plaintiff Planned Parenthood of Tennessee and
North Mississippi) – and two new defendants – Governor Lee and Dr. Rene Saunders (Chair of
the Board of Licensing Health Care Facilities). Plaintiffs indicate that one of the proposed
plaintiffs “previously appeared as a plaintiff in the action” and that the proposed defendants “will
be represented by the same counsel as the other Defendants and share substantially the same
interests in this matter as the other Defendants.” Pls.’ Br. in Support of Mot. to File Suppl. Compl.
at 9; Pls.’ Reply in Support of Mot. to File Suppl. Compl. at 5.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(d) provides in relevant part: “On motion and reasonable notice,
the court may, on just terms, permit a party to serve a supplemental pleading setting out any
transaction, occurrence, or event that happened after the date of the pleading to be supplemented.”

2

“In [third-party standing] cases, the Supreme Court [has] held that abortion providers
have standing to bring due process challenges on behalf of their patients.” Planned Parenthood
of Greater Ohio v. Hodges, 917 F.3d 908, 914 (6th Cir. 2019) (citing Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S.
106, 118 (1976) (plurality); Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 65-66 (1986)).
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 “A supplemental pleading may include new facts, new claims, new defenses, and new parties.”
Brian A. v. Bredesen, No. 3:00-0445, 2009 WL 4730352, at *2 (M.D. Tenn. Dec. 4, 2009) (citing
Stewart v. Shelby Tissue, Inc., 189 F.R.D. 357, 361 (W.D. Tenn. 1999)). “Generally, [a motion to
supplement under Rule 15(d)] can be brought at any time the action is before the trial court.” Id.
at *1 (citing Stewart, 189 F.R.D. at 362). “The granting of a motion to file a supplemental pleading
is within the discretion of the trial court and, as a general rule, applications for leave to file a
supplemental pleading are normally granted.” Id. (Stewart, 189 F.R.D. at 362); see also Bostic v.
Biggs, No. 3:14-1068, 2016 WL 4177094, at *1 (M.D. Tenn. Aug. 8, 2016) (“[T]he granting or
refusing of leave to file a supplemental pleading rests in the discretion of the trial court.” (citing
Schuckman v. Rubenstein, 164 F.2d 952 (6th Cir. 1947))), R&R adopted, No. 3:14-CV-01068,
2016 WL 8730550 (M.D. Tenn. Sept. 9, 2016).
The Court finds that allowing plaintiffs to file a supplemental complaint will
promote judicial economy.

The Court is familiar with the subject matter of the proposed

supplemental complaint from having presided over the September 2019 trial. The second amended
complaint and the proposed supplemental complaint contain overlapping factual and legal issues,
and they involve overlapping parties and counsel.

The Court has considered defendants’

arguments with respect to prejudice and finds them unpersuasive. A supplemental complaint will
not prejudice defendants, who have been given notice and have had an opportunity to respond, and
the gains in terms of judicial economy outweigh any possible prejudice to them. Therefore, the
Court shall grant plaintiffs’ motion to file a supplemental complaint.
Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Injunction
Plaintiffs seek the issuance of a TRO and/or preliminary injunction pursuant to Fed.
R. Civ. P. 65(b) to enjoin the enforcement of EO-25 insofar as that order prohibits all procedural

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 abortions except those necessary “to provide life sustaining treatment, to prevent death or risk of
substantial impairment of a major bodily function, or to prevent rapid deterioration or serious
adverse consequences to a patient’s physical condition if the surgical or invasive procedure is not
performed, as reasonably determined by a licensed medical provider.” EO-25 ¶ 2.
As this Court has noted, a preliminary injunction is “extraordinary relief.” I Love
Juice Bar Franchising, LLC v. ILJB Charlotte Juice, LLC, No. 3:19-CV-00981, 2019 WL
6050283, at *3 (M.D. Tenn. Nov. 15, 2019) (citing Detroit Newspaper Publishers Ass’n v. Detroit
Typographical Union No. 18, Int’l Typographical Union, 471 F.2d 872, 876 (6th Cir. 1972)). In
determining whether to issue a TRO or a preliminary injunction the Court must weigh the
following factors: “(1) whether the movant has a strong likelihood of success on the merits; (2)
whether the movant would suffer irreparable injury absent the injunction; (3) whether the
injunction would cause substantial harm to others; and (4) whether the public interest would be
served by the issuance of an injunction.” Hall v. Edgewood Partners Ins. Ctr., Inc., 878 F.3d 524,
527 (6th Cir. 2017) (internal citations omitted). These “are factors to be balanced, not prerequisites
that must be met,” and “[n]o single factor will be determinative as to the appropriateness of
equitable relief.” Six Clinics Holding Corp., II v. Cafcomp Sys., Inc., 119 F.3d 393, 400 (6th Cir.
1997) (citing Washington v. Reno, 35 F.3d 1093, 1099 (6th Cir. 1994), and In re DeLorean Motor
Co., 755 F.2d 1223, 1229 (6th Cir. 1985)). However, “[w]hen a party seeks a preliminary
injunction on the basis of a potential constitutional violation, ‘the likelihood of success on the
merits often will be the determinative factor.’” Obama for Am. v. Husted, 697 F.3d 423, 436 (6th
Cir. 2012) (quoting Jones v. Caruso, 569 F.3d 258, 265 (6th Cir. 2009)).
Having read all of the parties’ written submissions and considered all of their
arguments carefully, and being mindful of the fact that such relief is extraordinary, the Court finds

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 that all four factors weigh in favor of granting a preliminary injunction. 3 As to plaintiffs’
likelihood of success on the merits of their constitutional challenge to EO-25,
[t]he fundamental right to privacy contained in the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment includes the right to choose to have an abortion,
subject to certain limitations. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153, 93 S.Ct.
705, 35 L.Ed.2d 147 (1973); Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v.
Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 869, 112 S.Ct. 2791, 120 L.Ed.2d 674 (1992). Casey
confirmed that a woman has the right to choose to have an abortion prior to
viability and to obtain an abortion without “undue interference from the
State.” 505 U.S. at 846, 112 S.Ct. 2791.
Women’s Med. Prof’l Corp. v. Baird, 438 F.3d 595, 602 (6th Cir. 2006). A state regulation is
constitutionally invalid if it places an “undue burden” on a woman’s right to decide to have an
abortion. Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2299 (2016) (citing Casey, 505
U.S. at 878). An undue burden exists if the “state regulation has the purpose or effect of placing
a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion of a nonviable fetus.” Casey,
505 U.S. at 877.
In the present case, plaintiffs have shown that they are likely to succeed on the
merits of their claim because the enforcement of EO-25 creates an undue burden on the right of
women in Tennessee to choose to have a pre-viability abortion. EO-25 has caused plaintiffs to
cancel all procedural abortions to avoid risking criminal and other penalties. Looney Decl. ¶¶ 5,
43; Terrell Decl. ¶¶ 36-37; Rovetti Decl. ¶¶ 5, 14. As a result, since EO-25 took effect on April 9,
procedural abortions have been unavailable in Tennessee for women who are more than eleven

3

The Court notes that the same issue has been decided by five other courts, all of which
issued a TRO in those cases at plaintiffs’ request. See Robinson v. Marshall, No. 2:19-cv-00365
(M.D. Ala. Mar. 30, 2020); Preterm-Cleveland v. Att’y Gen. of Ohio, No. 1:19-cv-00360 (S.D.
Ohio Mar. 30, 2020); Planned Parenthood Ctr. for Choice v. Abbott, No. A-20-CV-323-LY, 2020
WL 1815587 (W.D. Tex. Apr. 9, 2020); S. Wind Women’s Ctr. LLC v. Stitt, No. CIV-20-277-G,
2020 WL 1677094 (W.D. Okla. Apr. 6, 2020), appeal dismissed, No. 20-6045, 2020 WL 1860683
(10th Cir. Apr. 13, 2020); Little Rock Family Planning Servs. v. Rutledge, No. 4:19-cv-00449KGB (E.D. Ark. Apr. 14, 2020).
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 weeks pregnant, as measured from the first day of their last menstrual period (“LMP”), 4 and for
women of any gestational age for whom a medication abortion is contraindicated. 5 Procedural
abortions made up approximately fifty to sixty percent of the abortions that plaintiffs performed
in 2019 and/or 2020. Looney Decl. ¶¶ 16-17 (2,390 procedural abortions out of 4,742 abortions
performed in 2019; 917 procedural abortions out of 1,700 abortions performed in January to March
2020); Terrell Decl. ¶ 10 (1,654 procedural abortions out of 2,792 abortions performed in 2019);
Rovetti ¶ 15 (827 procedural abortions out of 1,366 abortions performed in 2019). EO-25 currently
expires on April 30, but plaintiffs have provided evidence that the order is likely to be renewed or
extended beyond that date. Pls.’ Br. in Support of Mot. for TRO and/or Prelim. Inj. at 4 n.5, 11,
23-24; Looney Decl. ¶ 58; Terrell Decl. ¶¶ 15, 45; Rovetti Decl. ¶¶ 21-22; Pls.’ Reply in Support
of Mot. for TRO and/or Prelim. Inj. at 1. Defendants do not dispute the likelihood of a renewal or
extension of EO-25, and they acknowledge that Tennessee’s COVID-19 infections “have not yet
reached their peak.” Defs.’ Resp. to Mot. for TRO and/or Prelim. Inj. at 8, 21. Therefore, the
Court finds that, for purposes of seeking a preliminary injunction, plaintiffs have shown that EO25 “plac[es] a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion of a nonviable fetus.”
Casey, 505 U.S. at 877.
Plaintiffs have also shown that they would suffer irreparable harm if defendants are
not enjoined from enforcing EO-25 as it relates to procedural abortions. Plaintiffs argue that EO25, as applied to procedural abortions, “prevents Tennessee patients from exercising their

4

Medication abortions are available in Tennessee through eleven weeks, zero days LMP.
Looney Decl. ¶¶ 2, 15; Terrell Decl. ¶ 9. “After 11 weeks, 0 days LMP, patients will generally
need a procedural abortion.” Looney Decl. ¶ 13.
5

“[S]ome patients with pregnancies less than 11 weeks, 0 days LMP will have a procedural
abortion for various reasons, including because of an underlying medical condition, such as an
increased risk of bleeding, that makes this the safer option.” Looney Decl. ¶ 13 (footnote omitted).
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 fundamental constitutional right to terminate a pregnancy” guaranteed by the Fourteenth
Amendment. Pls.’ Br. in Support of Mot. for TRO and/or Prelim. Inj. at 30. Plaintiffs also argue
that “[f]orcing patients to forgo abortion care and remain pregnant against their will inflicts serious
physical, emotional, and psychological consequences that alone constitute irreparable harm.” Id.
at 31. “Courts have . . . held that a plaintiff can demonstrate that a denial of an injunction will
cause irreparable harm if the claim is based upon a violation of the plaintiff’s constitutional rights.”
Overstreet v. Lexington-Fayette Urban Cty. Gov’t, 305 F.3d 566, 578 (6th Cir. 2002) (citing
Connection Distrib. Co. v. Reno, 154 F.3d 281, 288 (6th Cir. 1998); Covino v. Patrissi, 967 F.2d
73, 77 (2d Cir. 1992); McDonell v. Hunter, 746 F.2d 785, 787 (8th Cir. 1984)). “[T]o establish
irreparable harm based upon the denial of a constitutional right, the plaintiff must first show a
substantial likelihood of success on the underlying constitutional claim.” Bokhari v. Metro. Gov’t
of Nashville & Davidson Cty., No. 3:11-00088, 2012 WL 1165907, at *8 (M.D. Tenn. Apr. 9,
2012) (citing Overstreet, 305 F.3d at 578). As noted above, plaintiffs have made this required
showing of success on their substantive due process claim. Moreover, abortion is a time-sensitive
procedure. See Looney Decl. ¶¶ 20, 43. Delaying a woman’s access to abortion even by a matter
of days can result in her having to undergo a lengthier and more complex procedure that involves
progressively greater health risks, see id.; Rovetti Decl. ¶ 22, or can result in her losing the right
to obtain an abortion altogether. Therefore, plaintiffs have demonstrated that enforcement of EO25 causes them irreparable harm.
In terms of balancing the harm to others, plaintiffs argue convincingly that the
irreparable harm they would suffer without injunctive relief, which includes violation of their
constitutional rights, “vastly outweigh[s]” any “temporary reduction of PPE” resulting from the
enforcement of EO-25. Pls.’ Br. in Support of Mot. for TRO and/or Prelim. Inj. at 32. Plaintiffs

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 claim that injunctive relief “will simply preserve ‘the status quo that has been in place for more
than 40 years since Roe was decided, and some 25 years since Casey followed.’” Id. (quoting
Preterm-Cleveland v. Yost, 394 F. Supp. 3d 796, 803 (S.D. Ohio 2019)). Defendants argue that
granting the requested relief would “irreparably harm Tennessee’s authority to protect the safety
and health of its citizens” and that it would “also harm the public by hindering the State’s otherwise
comprehensive efforts to respond to the COVID-19 pandemic.” Defs.’ Resp. to Mot. for TRO
and/or Prelim. Inj. at 21. But plaintiffs have provided evidence, which the Court accepts as
accurate, that they have implemented sanitation procedures, as well as procedures to minimize the
use of PPE, that they do not use N95 masks or other hospital resources needed to respond to
COVID-19, and that a procedural abortion uses less PPE and involves significantly less patient
interaction than carrying a pregnancy to term and giving birth. In addition, plaintiffs state that
women may travel out-of-state to obtain an abortion while EO-25 is in effect, risking infection of
COVID-19 and transmission to others when they return to Tennessee. See Rovetti Decl. ¶ 17
(stating that four patients with appointments on the day EO-25 went into effect were referred to an
abortion clinic in Atlanta because the patients were not eligible for medication abortion care).
While the stated goal of EO-25 to preserve PPE is unquestionably laudable, defendants have
presented no evidence that any appreciable amount of PPE would actually be preserved if EO-25
is applied to procedural abortions. Plaintiffs, on the other hand, offered convincing evidence
demonstrating the contrary. The balancing of harms therefore favors plaintiffs.
The fourth factor the Court must consider in deciding whether to issue a preliminary
injunction also favors plaintiffs because “it is always in the public interest to prevent violation of
a party’s constitutional rights.” Thomas v. Schroer, 116 F. Supp. 3d 869, 879 (W.D. Tenn. 2015)
(citing Deja Vu of Nashville, Inc. v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson Cty., Tenn., 274 F.3d

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 377, 400 (6th Cir. 2001)); see also Dodds v. U.S. Dep’t of Educ., 845 F.3d 217, 222 (6th Cir. 2016)
(stating that protection of constitutional rights “is always in the public interest”).
In seeking injunctive relief, plaintiffs ask that the Court waive the bond requirement
of Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(c). Defendants do not oppose this request. Rule 65(c) states that “[t]he court
may issue a preliminary injunction . . . only if the movant gives security in an amount that the court
considers proper to pay the costs and damages sustained by any party found to have been
wrongfully enjoined or restrained.” However, “the rule in our circuit has long been that the district
court possesses discretion over whether to require the posting of security,” Moltan Co. v. EaglePicher Indus., Inc., 55 F.3d 1171, 1176 (6th Cir. 1995) (internal citation omitted), and “a court has
no mandatory duty to impose a bond as a condition for issuance of injunctive relief.” Stooksbury
v. Ross, No. 3:09-CV-498, 2012 WL 12841901, at *6 (E.D. Tenn. Aug. 1, 2012) (citing NACCO
Materials Handling Grp., Inc. v. Toyota Materials Handling USA, Inc., 246 F. App’x 929, 952
(6th Cir. 2007)). “When determining whether to require the party seeking an injunction to give
security, courts have considered factors such as the strength of the movant’s case and whether a
strong public interest is present.” I Love Juice Bar Franchising, LLC, 2019 WL 6050283, at *14
(citing Moltan Co., 55 F.3d at 1176). In light of these factors, the Court declines to impose a bond
requirement in this case.

Conclusion
Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED that plaintiffs’ motion to file a supplemental complaint is granted.
Within seven days of the date of this order, plaintiffs shall file a version of the supplemental

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 complaint that is identical to the one attached to plaintiffs’ motion as Exhibit 1.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiffs’ motion for a TRO and/or preliminary
injunction is granted to the following extent: Defendants are hereby immediately enjoined from
enforcing EO-25 as applied to procedural abortions.

s/Bernard A. Friedman
BERNARD A. FRIEDMAN
SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
SITTING BY SPECIAL DESIGNATION
Dated: April 17, 2020
Detroit, Michigan

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