NATIONAL TASK FORCE ON ELECTION CRISES
COVID-19 ELECTION GUIDE1
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The novel coronavirus (COVID-19) is a global public health crisis that has already caused
thousands of deaths worldwide and is likely to worsen in the coming weeks and months. The
United States has undertaken unprecedented “social distancing” measures in response, moving
colleges and university classes online, temporarily closing public K-12 schools, cancelling
sporting events, prohibiting people from eating in restaurants and bars, and even shutting down
iconic American landmarks from the Las Vegas Strip to Disney World. Some states and
localities have also issued “shelter-in-place” orders, significantly limiting the extent to which
residents may leave their homes. The virus has also impacted the 2020 primary elections,
causing several to be postponed. Understandably, many Americans are already looking ahead to
the general election.
This Task Force initially formed last year to be prepared to respond to a wide range of potential
threats to a free and fair general presidential election in a cross-partisan, multidisciplinary
fashion. The coronavirus now presents one such threat. While we cannot say with absolute
certainty what will happen over the next several months as we approach the general election,
there is significant reason to be concerned and an imperative to prepare for the worst.
Our overarching goals here are to promote safe and secure participation in the 2020 general
election, and to ensure its legitimacy. We offer this guide to help state and local policy makers
and election officials maximize the opportunity for all eligible voters to cast their votes without
undue risk to their own health or to the broader community, and, of course, to have those votes
counted. State and local officials must begin planning now if they have not already—it will take
months to prepare for the likelihood that COVID-19 will affect the general election.2
Our approach—
This guide offers recommendations to help election officials conduct a successful 2020 general
election despite the many challenges that the coronavirus is likely to pose. This includes:
➢ Conducting the 2020 general election as scheduled;
➢ Maximizing voter participation;

1

This guide may be amended or supplemented as circumstances evolve.

We recognize that actually implementing many of these recommendations will be a significant
undertaking for election officials, to say the least. For more guidance on implementation, see,
e.g., the following: National Vote at Home Institute, ​Vote at Home Scale Plan​ (Mar. 2020);
Center for Tech and Civic Live, ​Free Vote at Home Webinars for Election Officials​ (Jan. 6,
2020).
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➢ Creating and maintaining strong protections that ensure that each ballot cast by an
eligible voter is counted, including protections against mistakes and irregularities; and
➢ Preserving public confidence in the integrity of the electoral process and the legitimacy
of the outcome of the election.
General principles—
Any actions taken by state and local governments in response to a public health emergency,
including the coronavirus, should be guided by the following basic principles to ensure a free
and fair election consistent with preserving public health and to maximize public confidence in
the results.
Government Actions Should Be Grounded in Law​. State and local responses to the
emergency should be grounded in existing law to the greatest extent possible, including powers
available to officials during bona fide emergencies, and should be conducted in a
nondiscriminatory manner. Any new laws or regulations enacted to address the emergency
must be consistent with state and federal constitutions.
Emergency Measures Should Be Justified by Facts​. In an emergency there is a greater
than usual risk of misinformation confusing the public and seeding both chaos and distrust.
That is all the more reason for state and local government officials to take extra care that the
emergency measures they undertake are justified by actual facts, including, importantly in the
case of a public health emergency, sound science.
Transparency and Communication Are Critical​. Election officials must be proactive
about educating the public as to how they will conduct the election, including any modifications
they will make in response to the coronavirus and the factual and legal basis for doing so. That
will require frequent communication that is up to date, accurate, and consistent—and available
in multiple languages. If it appears that emergency circumstances will require a departure from
ordinary election rules, those decisions should be announced as early as possible. Last-minute
changes increase the likelihood of mistakes, contribute to voter confusion, and may undermine
public confidence in the outcome of the election. In most cases, a state’s chief election official
(or otherwise the governor) should be primarily responsible for communicating information
about election-related modifications to the general public and providing guidance to county and
local officials to ensure they do not inadvertently provide incorrect information. County and
local officials should not unilaterally make announcements or take actions concerning the
election without confirming their accuracy and validity with appropriate state officials.
Emergency Efforts Should Be Bipartisan. Emergency response efforts can and should
be bipartisan in nature. A bipartisan effort to address the challenges posed by the coronavirus is
most likely to be perceived as credible and thus inspire confidence in the changes implemented
and the legitimacy of the election. A public health emergency should not be used as an excuse to
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promote a partisan agenda or to affect in any way the outcome of the election. Any indication of
opportunism will only serve to undermine the goal of promoting confidence in the election.
RECOMMENDATIONS3
It is useful to think of every state’s elections laws as being divided into two sets of authorities:
ordinary provisions that typically govern the conduct of elections, and emergency provisions
that modify those rules when emergencies occur. Elections should always be conducted
according to ordinary, generally applicable provisions to the greatest extent possible. When
emergencies require departures from those rules, they should only go as far as needed to protect
the priorities outlined above and should remain in effect no longer than necessary.
States should make all plans necessary to complete the presidential election by November 3rd,
in accordance with federal law. Importantly, election officials must begin planning ​now to
ensure they are in a position to not only exercise their generally applicable authority and
discretion as effectively as possible to respond to the coronavirus, but also to invoke emergency
powers if the situation warrants.
To the extent that a state’s ordinary and emergency election laws are insufficient to allow
election officials to respond effectively to the coronavirus or to implement these
recommendations in connection with the general election, the state legislature should amend
them well in advance of the election to minimize potential legal and constitutional problems. In
addition, Congress should make substantial federal funding available to states and localities as
soon as possible.
Ordinary Election Powers
Although state and local law varies by jurisdiction, election officials typically have many
alternatives available to them under their ordinary election powers to facilitate voting despite
the threat posed by the coronavirus.4

Additional recommendations, including for more comprehensive or longer-term reform, can be
found here: Nathaniel Persily & Charles Stewart, III, ​Ten Recommendations to Ensure a
Healthy and Trustworthy 2020 Election,​ Lawfare (Mar. 19, 2020); Brennan Center for Justice,
How to Protect the 2020 Vote from the Coronavirus​ (Mar. 16, 2020); Bipartisan Policy Center,
Logical Election Policy​ (Jan. 2020); American Law Institute, Election Administration:
Non-Precinct Voting and Resolution of Ballot-Counting Disputes (2019).
3

Although this guide does not address voter registration, we note that increases in voting by
mail make it all the more important that registration data be kept up to date. In addition,
options like same-day voter registration may become ineffective if in-person voting is not safe or
reasonably available. Accordingly, state and local officials should consider options for
expanding voter registration opportunities.
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Absentee or Vote-by-Mail Voting5
Even in the best case scenario, absentee voting is likely to increase substantially during this
general election. In fact, to relieve pressure on in-person voting resources and to make it safer,
anyone who can vote by mail should do so. In the worst case scenario in which in-person voting
is extremely difficult because of the public health risks (or legal restrictions like shelter-in-place
orders), voting by mail may be the only option for the vast majority of voters. Either way,
election officials should begin preparing now to meet these demands.
● ​Absentee ballot request/application forms​—In jurisdictions where election officials are
required to receive a request or application from a voter before sending an absentee ballot,
election officials should proactively mail request/application forms to all voters within the
jurisdiction. The forms should be mailed to the address at which each voter is registered either
45 days prior to Election Day or at the earliest subsequent date permitted by law. Election
officials should also ensure that downloadable PDF versions of absentee ballot
request/application forms are available on their websites, and send them to any voters who ask
by telephone or email, as well. In addition, where permitted by law and with appropriate
procedures in place, election officials should allow voters to submit requests/applications for
absentee ballots either in person, by mail, over the phone, or through email or other electronic
means (including online where possible). Finally, some states also either permit or require
officials to proactively send actual ballots to ​all registered voters in a jurisdiction.6 Public
communications concerning the elections should make sure that voters understand their
options, encourage them to submit absentee ballot request/application forms where necessary,
and specify any time constraints that may apply for both submitting absentee ballot
requests/applications and returning the absentee ballots themselves.
● ​Excuse-based absentee voting—
​ In each jurisdiction with excuse-based absentee voting, the
chief election official should make a public declaration as early as possible specifying that the
threat of the coronavirus is deemed a legally sufficient “excuse” to enable absentee voting by all
eligible voters within the state, without any requirement of an individualized demonstration of
symptoms or risk factors. If this requires enacting emergency legislation in a jurisdiction, state
legislatures should do so. Alternatively, the chief election official or other appropriate official
should consider seeking an opinion from the state attorney general or an advisory opinion from
the state supreme court (where available) confirming that the risks posed by the coronavirus
qualify as an excuse.

5

​Though many jurisdictions distinguish between “absentee” and “vote-by-mail” ballots, in this

guide we use the term “absentee ballot” to refer to both types of ballots.

​ he Task Force takes no position on whether proactively sending ballots to all registered voters
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should be further authorized or undertaken in connection with the 2020 general election.
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● ​Absentee ballot supplies​—Election officials should anticipate that the overwhelming
preponderance of votes cast in the 2020 general election will be absentee or vote-by-mail
ballots. This far exceeds the usual percentage of votes cast remotely. Accordingly, election
officials should order sufficient quantities of paper ballots to conduct a 100% mail-based
election, if necessary. In ordering ballots, election officials must pay specific attention to ensure
that ​sufficient quantities of materials are available for voters with limited English proficiency​,
particularly when required by federal or state law. Election officials also will have to allocate
more resources toward ballot processing and tallying, including purchasing additional
equipment if funding is available, as existing resources may be insufficient to handle such a
tremendous influx of additional ballots.
● ​Recruit additional temporary personnel—
​ Election officials should make a special effort to
recruit additional temporary workers to assist with processing absentee ballots, especially from
groups that do not face a heightened risk from the coronavirus (e.g., students) and/or who may
not be available during typical elections (e.g., teachers or workers who have been laid off).
Election officials should reach out through a wide range of channels, including social media, to
reach these new potential pools of election workers. Because the effects of the virus cannot be
known with certainty and may lead to higher falloff of election personnel, election officials
should also recruit many more temporary workers than they think they will need. In particular,
areas that already struggle to meet recruitment needs must develop robust plans to recruit poll
workers and other personnel beginning immediately.
● ​Processing absentee ballots—
​ Again, at a minimum, an unusually high percentage of votes in
the 2020 general election is likely to be absentee. County and local election officials should take
steps to confirm the validity of absentee ballots and to process those ballots (which may include
scanning the ballots) as early as possible prior to Election Day, in order to avoid longer than
needed delays in handling unusually large quantities of absentee ballots after the election.
Election officials also should ensure t​hat anyone processing ballots is aware of and trained to
implement the jurisdiction’s signature verification ​rules, including rules related to curing.7 As
results from localities are reported after the polls close, in addition to publicizing information
about vote tallies and the percentage of precincts reporting, election officials should also
repeatedly emphasize—particularly to the news media—the number of absentee and provisional
ballots they have received, and the number of absentee ballots yet to be processed and/or
counted. In addition, to help ensure public confidence in electoral outcomes, states must
communicate clearly—well in advance of the November election—that potentially days-long
delays in reporting vote totals should be expected given the processing time associated with the
higher volume of absentee voting.
● ​Deadlines for requests and receipt​—To the extent state law grants the chief election official or
other state election authority discretion concerning the deadline for receiving absentee ballots,
​ he Task Force takes no position on the appropriate scope of signature verification rules or
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policies, or whether changes thereto are appropriate.
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they should interpret the deadline as requiring that absentee ballots be mailed, rather than
actually received by election officials, by Election Day (which can be verified by postmarks or
alternate forms of tracking). Similarly, where they have discretion, officials should permit
voters to request absentee ballots as close to Election Day as is practicably possible—so long as
there is still time for voters to return the ballots by the deadline. All deadlines should be
communicated widely to the public.
In-Person Voting
When it is possible to do so safely—or at least at a risk level comparable to allowing people to
shop in grocery stores or attend medical appointments—in-person voting should remain
available in accordance with these recommendations. Eliminating in-person voting options
would harm eligible voters who cannot easily utilize other methods of voting and may lead to
disproportionate burdens on certain historically disenfranchised communities, including Native
American voters who lack reliable postal services, some voters with disabilities, and voters with
language access needs (for example, Spanish speakers with limited English proficiency).
● ​Recruit additional poll workers—
​ Additional poll workers will be needed to assist with
in-person voting as well as ballot processing. As noted above, election officials should develop
robust recruitment plans immediately, placing particular emphasis on groups that do not face
heightened risks from the coronavirus. Election officials should also be prepared for
higher-than-usual falloff rates if poll workers become ill or decide at the last minute that the
risks of serving on Election Day are too great.
● ​Early voting—
​ To the extent state law grants election officials discretion over the number of
days during which to hold early voting, they should choose to provide as many opportunities as
possible, spreading it out over as many days as permitted, including weekends. By maximizing
the number of days on which early voting is available, election officials can reduce the number of
people in a polling place at any one time, thereby reducing the likelihood of coronavirus
transmission. Of course, early voting options should be publicized widely. Where early voting is
not already permitted by law, state legislatures should consider emergency legislation allowing
for it.
● ​Polling place hours​—To the extent state law grants election officials discretion over the
opening and closing times of polls, either during early voting or on Election Day, they should
allow polling places to remain open for as long as possible. This too should be publicized widely,
and voters should be encouraged to vote on days or at times that are typically less busy. Again,
by maximizing the amount of time available to vote, election officials can reduce the number of
people at a polling place at any one time, thereby reducing the likelihood of coronavirus
transmission.
● ​Locating polling places​—Polling places should not be located in areas within the jurisdiction,
if any, in which unusually or disproportionately high numbers of coronavirus infections have
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been reported. Nor should they be located in high-risk facilities, such as senior care or
retirement facilities. In addition, the laws of many states allow polling places to be relocated if
they become inaccessible. The chief election official for each state should exercise his or her
discretion to declare that an unusually high prevalence of coronavirus infections within an area
or other risk factors render polling places located there “inaccessible.” The chief election official
should remain in close contact with the director of the state health department to receive
updated information concerning the location of coronavirus infections within the state, and
notify county or municipal election officials for any such areas. Polling place decisions should be
made and publicly communicated early, with as much notice to voters as possible, including in
an individualized manner (i.e., with notice tailored to registered voters by precinct). In
developing these plans, officials should seek input from affected communities, such as African
American, Latino, Asian, and Native American voters, language minority voters, voters with
disabilities, and students.
● ​Public health measures—
​ If permitted by state and federal law (including privacy laws), and
consistent with anti-discrimination and equal protection principles, the chief election official for
each state should ask the director of the state health department to prohibit any person known
to be infected with the coronavirus from entering a polling place. Depending on state law, any
such person should immediately be provided with either the appropriate absentee ballot or an
absentee ballot request form/application.
● ​Sanitize polling places—
​ Election officials should ensure that each polling place is well-stocked
with hand sanitizer and antibacterial, antimicrobial cleaning supplies, which should be used,
among other things, to disinfect voting machines and voting equipment (including pens and
touchpads) between each and every use. Each poll worker should be provided with surgical
gloves and a surgical mask (if consistent with public health guidance at the time). Hand
sanitizer should also be made available—and voters should be encouraged to use it—upon
entering and exiting the polling place.
For more information, the CDC has issued
Recommendations for Election Polling Locations​, a
​ nd the U.S. Election Assistance Commission
has​ ​Coronavirus (COVID-19) Resources​ ​available.
● ​Limit voter proximity in polling places—
​ Polling place officials should promote social
distancing by limiting voters’ proximity to each other and to other people, including poll
workers. For example, polling place officials might place a piece of masking tape on the ground
approximately six feet from each polling place official’s desk to indicate where voters should
stand when checking in and interacting with them. They should also place additional pieces of
tape at approximately six-foot intervals to mark where voters should wait in line. Voters should
be encouraged to line up outside of the polling place, if possible, rather than congregating within
indoor locations. And close interactions between voters and poll workers should be avoided or
limited to the greatest extent possible.

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● ​Voluntary high-risk zones—
​ When the size and set-up of polling places allow, officials should
consider creating “high-risk” zones for voters who self-identify as immune-compromised or
having other risk factors to line up, check-in, and vote at a distance from other voters.
● ​Curbside voting​—In states that allow elderly voters, voters with disabilities, or other voters to
take advantage of curbside voting, election officials should provide these opportunities to the
greatest extent possible. If necessary, and if permitted by state law, the governor or chief
election official should declare—or seek a legal opinion from the state attorney general or an
advisory opinion from the state supreme court (where available)—that legal provisions allowing
for curbside voting apply to all elderly voters due to the heightened risks they face as a result of
the coronavirus.
● ​Maximize the number of polling places—
​ If possible, county and local election officials should
exercise their discretion to maximize the number of polling places within their respective
jurisdictions. Coronavirus poses the greatest risk of contagion in crowds. A greater number of
polling places means fewer voters are assigned to each polling place, reducing the likely size of
any crowds or number of people standing in line. Among other ways, election officials might
achieve this goal by declining to consolidate polling places that received low numbers of
in-person votes in previous elections, dispersing polling places to the greatest extent possible, or
assigning the smallest legally permissible number of voters or precincts to each polling place.
● ​Other voting locations—
​ Whether to use voting “supercenters” or other non-precinct voting
locations will depend not only on state law, but on whether available facilities can be used safely,
including to allow for more distance between voting machines/booths, poll workers, voters, etc.
(e.g., because of the size and set-up of the facility). Larger facilities may offer a good addition or
alternative to smaller polling places.
Other Opportunities to Vote
● ​Medically confined voters​—In many jurisdictions, state law establishes special voting
opportunities for people who are confined to hospitals, assisted living facilities, nursing homes,
or other such places for the elderly or infirm. To the extent resources allow, county and local
election officials should proactively contact each such facility within their respective
jurisdictions to inform facility administrators of the special voting alternatives permitted by
state law and proactively provide opportunities to schedule them. In many jurisdictions, this
may entail election officials traveling to the facilities to bring ballots to the confined voters and
physically assisting them in completing the ballots (while taking necessary precautions), if they
are unable to do so on their own due to age, illness, or disability.
● ​Alternative means of returning ballots​—​To the extent permitted by law, election officials
should exercise discretion to allow voters to return absentee ballots in multiple ways, including
to drop boxes and designated vote centers. In addition, in many places, state law all​ows other
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members of a voter’s household ​to return the voter’s ballot.8 Election officials should publicize
these alternatives on their websites and in public communications concerning the
election—particularly in the week before Election Day when it may be too late to have a blank
absentee ballot mailed to a voter and then completed and returned by the voter on time.
● ​Emergency personnel​—Many states also have special voting-related provisions for law
enforcement, medical, military, or other personnel responding to declared emergencies. County
and local election officials should be aware of these statutes and designate particular workers to
be responsible for facilitating voting by members of these emergency response groups.
● ​Provisional voting​—It is likely that polling places will be asked to accept more provisional
ballots than is typical, whether due to voter confusion over polling locations or other reasons.
Accordingly, election officials should ensure that poll workers are sufficiently well trained in
applicable rules and procedures, and have the supplies needed.
Emergency Election Powers
Most states have laws in place that specifically address election-related emergencies and the
authorities available to state officials. It may become necessary for state officials to invoke those
authorities. However, any departure from the ordinary rules governing the electoral process
must be made only pursuant to clear legal authority and for nonpartisan reasons. To minimize
either the occurrence or appearance of partisan manipulation, state emergency contingency
plans should provide objective criteria to guide officials’ exercise of discretion. Any decision to
invoke emergency authorities must be based on the best information available at the time and
grounded in scientifically valid principles concerning the nature of the threat.
● ​Internal preparation—
​ Well in advance of the election, the chief election official in each state
should disseminate guidance to county and local election officials to clarify: (i) ​who ​has
authority to approve modifications to, or deviations from, standard election rules, requirements,
and procedures; (ii) ​what t​ ypes of deviations may be authorized; (iii) ​when s​ uch deviations may
occur; and (iv) the types of election modifications or deviations that are ​prohibited.​
● ​Contingency planning​—Every state and county should establish and publicize a contingency
plan addressing the various steps that will be taken in response to emergencies that impact an
impending or ongoing election, including the coronavirus, based on the authorities state law
grants them under such circumstances. Election officials at all levels should ensure they have
the resources and personnel necessary to implement such emergency plans, if required.
● ​Internet voting​—Unless expressly authorized by state law, election officials should not allow
Internet- or fax-based voting for domestic voters (i.e., people not covered by the Uniformed and
​ he Task Force takes no position on whether broader ballot collection efforts should be
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authorized or undertaken in connection with the 2020 general election.
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Overseas Citizen Absentee Voting Act) as a response to an election emergency. Specifically,
election officials should neither email blank absentee ballots to voters, nor allow voters to
submit completed absentee ballots by email or fax. However, to the extent allowed by law,
election officials should consider allowing requests/applications for absentee ballots to be made
by phone, email, and other electronic means (with appropriate procedures in place).
● ​Witness requirements​—To the extent election emergency statutes allow, election officials
should exercise their discretion to waive any requirements that either absentee
request/application forms or absentee ballots themselves be notarized or witnessed, and
announce that to the public.
● ​Relocating polling places—
​ Even if polling places have not been sited as recommended above,
officials in many states have the authority to order relocation during emergencies. Again,
relocation decisions should be made and communicated to the public as early (and often) as
possible.
● ​Canvassing and certification deadlines​—To the extent they have discretion under emergency
laws, chief election officials or other state election authorities should also consider extending
canvassing and certification deadlines to account for the additional time it will take to process
and count mail ballots, while still ensuring that these steps (and any subsequent steps or
processes) are completed within the timeframe required by federal law.
For more information on election-related emergency authorities, see resources available from
the ​National Association of Secretaries of State and the N
​ ational Conference of State
Legislatures​.
Broader Gubernatorial Emergency Powers
In addition to election-specific emergency powers, many state governors have general (and
sometimes quite broad) emergency powers available during a declared public health
emergency—including, in some cases, the ability to waive, change, or suspend state laws and
regulations. ​See, e.g., ​Gregory Sunshine et al., ​An Assessment of State Laws Providing
Gubernatorial Authority to Remove Legal Barriers to Emergency Response,​ Health Security
(Nov. 2, 2019); Michael T. Morley, ​Election Emergencies: Voting in the Wake of Natural
Disasters and Terrorist Attacks,​ 67 Emory L.J. 545, 609​–​10 & n.423​–​24 (2018). Most
governors’ emergency powers also include the authority to activate state emergency response
plans, reallocate funds to facilitate emergency response, and streamline state administrative
procedures, including procurement requirements.
Governors may use these sweeping authorities to ensure that the 2020 general election occurs as
scheduled and that voters have a full and adequate opportunity to participate. They must
nevertheless be cautious in how they exercise this discretion. Among other things, where
permissible, governors should consider using these powers to allow the state to take any of the
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steps recommended above that are not otherwise permitted by state law. In addition, governors
should consider: extending deadlines for requesting and accepting absentee ballots in response
to late-breaking emergencies; allowing voters to submit requests for absentee ballots by
telephone or electronically (with appropriate procedures in place) where not otherwise
permitted; and allowing polling places throughout the state to remain open longer to reduce
crowd sizes at polling places. Governors should not attempt to authorize ad hoc methods of
Internet- or fax-based voting beyond the limits of state law; eliminate important protections for
the integrity of the electoral process; or change mandates concerning the composition of local
election boards or polling place teams that ensure partisan balance.

*****
About the National Task Force on Election Crises
The National Task Force on Election Crises is a diverse, cross-partisan group of more than 40
experts in election law, election administration, national security, cybersecurity, voting rights,
civil rights, technology, media, public health, and emergency response. The mission of the
nonpartisan National Task Force on Election Crises is to ensure a free and fair 2020
presidential election by recommending responses to a range of potential election crises. The
Task Force does not advocate for any electoral outcome except an election that is free and fair.
The recommendations of the Task Force are the result of thoughtful consideration and input
from all of the members and therefore do not fully reflect any individual Task Force member’s
point of view—they are collective recommendations for action. More information about the
Task Force, including its members, is available at h
​ ttps://www.electiontaskforce.org/.​

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