- is not an After Action Report per se, but is meant to summarize the events and -is not meant to be an all encompassing examination of the May Day 2012 events, but as recommendations as to appropriate tactics and training for future events. SEATTLE POLICE DEPARTMENT MEMORANDUM TO . DIC Nick Metz 2 DATE Operations . 0613012012 A FROM Captain Joe Kessler PAGE 1 OF 1 Ethics Section SUBJECT May Day 2012 -- Incident Commander_'s Review: Attached is review of the May Day Events that took place on May 01, 2012. The review circumstances that occurred prior to and during the operation. As noted in the review, it documentation of the plarming, deployment, tactics, command control and to make As the Incident Commander assigned to these events I am required to insure that an Incident After Action Report is completed. At the conclusion of these events, I assigned Lieutenant Eric Sano to prepare a. draft After Action Report for my review and approval. Lieutenant Sano was subsequentlyadvised by Lieutenant Levondowski, Seattle Police Operations Commander A SPOC, that been Action Report. As the former Commander of SPOC, it is not our normal protocol for the SPOC to complete the After Action Report unless they had operational command of the event. Lieutenant Sano then turned over his notes to. SPOC for preparation of the required After Action Report. As this was outside of normal protocol, I spoke to Lieutenant Levondowski and he advised that he was operating as per the direction of Assistant McDonagh. I asked to receive a copy of the report when it was completed. At this time I i have not received the required After Action Report for my review. In addition to the issues outlined in this review, a number of similar issues havealso been manifested in some of the recent "Occupy" demonstrations and other events such as the takeover of the University Bridge (North Precinct) and the Bank of America demonstration (East Precinct). In these events, the Incident Commanders were directed to use (in the opinion of the commanders) unsafe, unproven tactics and in several instances their directions were counterrnanded by the Operations Bureau Chief in the field. Please feel free to discuss these incidents with Captain Robin Clark, Captain Steve - Paulsen, Captain Mike Nolan Lieutenant and Lieutenant Von Levondowski for specific details-. - -- -- Please feel free to contact if you have any questions or need additional information. Cc: Deputy Chief Clark Kimerer -- Administration file Seattle Police Department May Day March Rally/ Protests i May 1, 2012 Westlake Park/ Downtown West Precinct [Incident C0mma11der's Review) Captain Kessler Incident Commander This document "provides a partial summary of the events and circumstances that transpired prior As the Field Incident Commander assigned to this event, I have yet to receive requested Situation: to and during the May 1" As such, this review it is not meant to be an all encompassing examination of the May Day. 2012 events, but a documentation of the planning, deployment, tactics, command control and to make recommendations as to appropriate tactics and training for future events. information maintained by the Seattle Police Operations in .order to fully complete the required Incident After Action Report as required by Seattle Police Department Policy and Procedures, Title 14.010. Therefore, this document fails to provide a complete accounting of all information archived in regard to this event. On Tuesday May 01, 2012, various protesters/demonstrators participated in a West Coast action to support the Immigration March and the May Day celebrations. The Occupy Seattle organizers had indicated that they intended to have a breakfast event and "worker speak out" at Westlake Park beginning at 0900 hours with a rally slated to begin at 1100 hours. It was also learned that the Occupy Seattle group planned to march in an undisclosed route starting at 1200' hours, a bike swarm also at 1200. hours, and finally a rally and_ another. march. beginning. at .Westlake-. Park -- 15 00 hours. Also planned for this date was a student walk-out at Seattle Central Community ll College (East Precinct) that was to commence at 1120 hours and intended to march to Westlake and meet up with the Occupy Seattle Movement. Additionally, there was a large, annual (permitted) May Day/Immigration March sponsored by _El Comite Reforam Migratoria Justica Social and the May 1st Coalition, that was taking place at Judkins Park with a march to end downtown. Estimated numbers for that group were 500 although this particular march/rally has drawn up to 5,000 participants in the past. There was also credible intelligence information that.led us to believe that the Anarchists were going to take advantage of these events to commit acts of violence and property destruction downtown. Police planning" for these events involved both the Seattle Police Operations Center (SPOC) and the West Precinct Command. Preliminary planning had been started by West Precinct personnel with SPOC subsequently assuming responsibility for the planning process. SPOC was in operation during the events. Mission: The stated mission for the Seattle Police Department was to enforce the law and preserve order. The response priorities were life safety, incident stabilization and property conservation. Planning: As in any large-scale, planned event a number of key personnel play parts i11 the planning process. The initial planning responsibility was led by Sergeant Tony Baily (West Precinct Demonstration Management Supervisor). The Immigration March from Judkins Park (East Precinct) to Downtown Seattle (West Precinct) is an annual event and has been effectively coordinated with the West and East Precincts for a number of years. The Special Event application permit was issued on or about April 18th. Sergeant Baily" began the 'preliminary planning process. The march was planned to begin at 1500 hours from udkins Park 'and culminating at a rally in the street at Avenue and Marion Street. There-was also information that members of Occupy Seattle were also planning to hold a rally at Westlake.Parl< (West Precinct). I Following some preliminary discussions, Sergeant Baily was directed to prepare tvvo Incident Action Plans (IAP's) one for the Immigration March Rally and one for the Occupy Seattle rally. Lieutenant Sim Tamayovvas assigned to be the Operations Commander at the udlcins Park event with Lieutenant Norm James being assigned as the Operations Commander" at the Westlake Park event. At that time Sergeant Baily was awaiting additional intelligence regarding these events. I During the initial planning process, there was very little, if any intelligence information being forwarded to the West Precinct commanders and no discussion or direction from Command Staff. Assistant Chief Mike Sanford sent an invitation (April 23rd) and subsequently conducted a meeting concerning the May Day events on the afternoon of April 24th (less than one week prior to the planned events). At this time, neither I nor the other designated commanders had been assigned to the event or briefed on the scope of the events. It is unknown if any of the other commanders (these events involved multiple precincts and sections including the Traffic Section) were briefed prior to the Incident Command team. During the course of Chief Sanford's briefing, I asked Who the Incident Commander (IC) was for the events. He stated that I was assigned as the Incident_Commander and that Lieutenant Eric Sano Was going to be assigned asvthe Rapid Response Commander. Chief Sanford gave a PowerPoint presentation of potential Anarchist tactics and plans and gave an Intel briefing. *"It should be noted that the PowerPoint was not Working well, butthere was disturbing . information concerning the potential for significant criminal actionsby organized groups of Anarchists. There were no representatives from Intel present at the briefing and Chief Sanford stated at the time-that they had clone the PowerPointpresehtation and a fall Intel briefing for the Mayor and his staff the week before (this is critical information that 'may have changed the planning process and certainly the tactical considerations. During this briefing Chief Sanford stated that we would be using a new deployment model and tactics for these events to include utilizing undercover officers inside the crowd with "plainclothes" officers to mingle among the crowd (the plainclothes officers were to not "hide their identity"). The officers assigned in an "undercover" role would be the Situational Assessment Team' (SAT). - The plainclothes officers would have a contingent of uniform officers assigned to them who would remain on the periphery and only provide assistance in emergent situations. The plainclothes officers were to "mark" the subjects engaged in criminal conduct and arrest them ata more advantageous time and location (preferably away from the main body of the demonstration). A As these tactics had not been employed during previous events, there was confusion as to how": this model would work and who would fill the undercover and plainclothes roles. Lieutenant Sano and others asked Chief Sanford specifically about these issues. Chief Sanford said he wanted about 50-75 people in that capacity and suggested looking at the list of officers who had completed Undercover Training. At this time I requested that we be provided with photographs of all assigned "plainclothes officers and for photographs and information pertaining to all known anarchists/criminals and previously arrested "Occupy'-' demonstrators. This re.quest was made to insure officers assigned to the support element would know who the "plainclothes" were to avoid confusion with proposed tactics. I also brought up the issues surrounding recent events where demonstrators had carried burning torches (dripping with kerosene) and requested that SPOC work with the Fire Marshall to get an authorization for our officers to enforce the Fire Code. *We received a temporary authorization through SPOC at 1136 hours' on the day of the event. Several of the commanders in attendance questioned Chief Sanford about this new tactic as there was some uncertainty about the roles of each contingent. While the basic' concept was sound and easily understood it had never been utilized in an actual deployment nor had any training been discussed developed or completed Additionally, there was confusion as to the role of the "plainclothes" officers that would be easily recognizable as police oflicers. Next, Chief Sanford outlined the new parameters for the use of Oleoresin Capsicum (OC Pepper) Spray. 1) Personal Protection; 2) To Prevent Entry; and 3) At the order of the Incident Commander. He stressed that OC was not to be used to disperse a crowd or to clear an area. These were rules of engagement that we had discussed previously. I At the conclusion of the briefingl spoke to Chief Sanford and expressed concerns about implementing tactics that had not been trained for and that, although I concuned conceptually, l_ was uncomfortable in "going..live?.' with untested. -tactic-s.--.1.-also expressed.concerns-that. we not have enough manpower to staff these positions on such short notice. He said to do the best we could. *Chief Sanford also desigiated SPOC as the lead planners and stated that they would be responsible for completion of the IAP. I assigned Sergeant Baily as the Planning Section Chief and as our liaison with SPOC (this is less than one week before the scheduled event). On April 26th Detective Deb Brown (CIS) sent an email updating some- information from Intel. On April 27th we received another email update from Sergeant Tom Mahaffey (CIS). The email on the 27th was the first email (as far as I can determine) that mentioned issues concerning Anarchists. Also, on the 27th Detective Brown sent an email update advising of the potential student walk--out at Seattle Central Community College (East Precinct). We received a copy of a draft IAP on Friday the 27"' at approximately 1300 hours. I asked Sergeant Baily and Lieutenant Sano to review the document for any adjustments. I also requested that the roll call times be moved up and streamlined. We finally received a final copy of the IAP on Tuesday, May at the 1000 hours roll call (3 hours, after the initial 0700 hours roll call). A On 'Saturday, April Lieutenant Ron Rasmussen (North Precinct) called me regarding his concerns about Intel he was hearing regarding potential Anarchist activity at the May Day events. I asked him to attend the Monday briefing and subsequently used him as the designated'Task' Force Commander." receivedthe fina'lIAP'via" I email on Tuesday. On Monday, April 30"' at 1000 hours, we had a Commanders meeting in SPOC. This was the day before the event. At that time, Lieutenant Von Levondowski provided a general 'briefing followed by each commander outlining their respective branch mission. At this meeting I again reiterated my request for 1) photographs of "plainclothes" officers and 2) photographs of all knownfsuspected anarchists and persons previously arrested during the recent "Occupy" demonstrations. I outlined the rules of engagement and explained the undercover/plainclothes deployment (as per Chief Sanford's orders). Chief Sanford interjected and explained his philosophy concerning how the undercover/plainclothes component was to work. statements were congruent with the parameters I had outlined. Again, he stressed that he did not want officers making arrests in the crowds unless it was a life safety issue. He said to mark them and then Lieutenant Smith's uniformed officers could make the arrests at a time, place _and manner that were beneficial to us. He also stressed thathe did' not want pepper spray (OC) used unless it met the criteria"outlii1e'd previously. After that meeting, I conducted a separate meeting for the operational commanders. Lieutenant's Sano and Hay (SWAT Commander) expressed a great deal confusion and concern relating to the logistics of the undercover/plainclothes assignment. Lieutenant Hay expressed unease that his people had not trained for this type of deployment and that they didn't have an "intermediate uniform" (it was either BDU's or undercover) and he was not sure what their role was. I was unable to provide additional direction as I had already outlined the orders as they had been given by Chief Sanford. . Deployment: . - The deployment plan began with a 0630 call in for the assignment of six (6) West Precinct First Watch officers to respond to" a 0700 roll call in the West Precinct. Present at this r.oll call were the First'Watch Task orce officers, Chief Sanford, Lieutenant James, "Lieutenant Sano and Sergeant Baily. Following the roll call, the First Watch officers deployed to the area around Westlake Park and began searching the alleyways and surrounding area for potential pre-staged items from the protesters/demonstrators.- They were also to be vigilant for criminal activity related to the Occupy Seattle movement. The next roll: call occurred at 1000. This roll- call .was attended -by the West. Precinct Bike .- Squads (2 sergeants and 16 officers), Prisoner Processing (4 sergeants and 30 officers), Mounted Patrol (3 officers), Chief Sanford, Captain Kessler, Lieutenants James, Sano, Cordner, Smith and Sergeant Baily. Following the roll call, these resources were sent directly to the Westlake Park 'area to monitor for criminal activity and to establish a clear police presence in the downtown core area. Additional SPD deployment included civilian videographers and photographers for the event and SPOC personnel, all of whom were present at the 1000 roll call. There were several significant issues that had not been addressed during the planning process (due to its compressed time frame). Among the most irnpactful was splitting the roll call times. This served to push our available staffing out, severely limiting our tactical options. By. splitting roll call times, the plainclothes officers were not available and _many of the assigned uniformed officers did not know who they were. Additionally, the uniformed contingent of the Rapid I Response Group was not even scheduled to arrive until three (3) hours after the I undercover/plainclothes contingent had been deployed. This was confusing as their primary duties were to act as coVer/ arrest officers for the undercover/plainclothes officers under this new deployment model._ There was no real Intel input at the briefing and no plainclothes officers present. The most important issue was that there was no continuity of message and ultimately, a large contingent of officers were not available when they were most'-needed and many never received -a briefing as they had. to respond directly to the event due to emergent conditions. This was due to conducting multiple roll calls at different times and locations. overview of the pepper spray (OC) protocol and we reiterated the parameters that had been Sergeant Baily (Planning Section Chief) began the main briefing at the 1000 hours roll call. I then outlined the broad operational directions and rules of engagement including the plainclothes/undercover deployment as per Chief Sanford's orders. Lieutenant Sano gave an directed by Chief Sanford during the previous meetings." At the conclusion of my briefing, Chief Sanford told me that he had updated Intel for me to give out. I suggested that he could give it ashe had "received it directly from the source-. I introduced Chief Sanford and turned the floor lover to him to give the updated Intel briefing. He stated: "That is not what We are going to do." He proceeded to deliver a very clear directive and countermanded the operational directions that had just been given by the Incident Commander and Section Chiefs. He stated that he did not "want to see any pepper spray" which specifically countermanded the protocols he had previously set in place and had been outlined to the officers-and supervisors. He also told the roll call that he did not want "any arrests in the crowd" and clearly 'stated that he did not Want "any crowd engagement". Thereiwas an immediate, visible sense of confusion among the officers, sergeants and commanders present; .. I have been approached by _numerous per_sonnel_ (including a civilian employee) who were in attendance who expressed disbelief atthe manner and more specifically, the message that was given the Operations Bureau Commander. The overt-counterrnanding of directions given by the designated operational commanders served to undermine their authority and legitimacy and is something I have not experienced in the twenty (20) years I have served as a command level officer on the Seattle Police Department. . I The two main messages given by Chief Sanford: 1) no crowd engagement and 2) no use of pepper spray, were clearito all in attendance and therewas no attempt by Chief Sanford to clarify these points with respect to the conflicting directions given by the Incident Commander. This message was clear as Lieutenant Rasmussen stated that he was advised by Lieutenant Levondovvski that "We were not to engage the crowd and that pepper spray was only authorized for personal defense against specific attackers". The next roll call was scheduled for 1100 hours at Park 90/5 and included all of the plainclothes and undercover officers that would function as Situational Assessment Teams (SAT) and support elements. This was a concept outlined by Chief Sanford, utilizing a number of plainclothes and undercover officers to be in the crowd and on the periphery to watch for criminal activity. These undercover/plainclothes officers would mark the offenders and report back to the uniformed officers that would make arrests at a time, place and manner advantageous to the arrest teams. The personnel assigned to this function were from our Criminal Intelligence Section, Narcotics Section and from our SWAT Team. These detectives and officers were under the command of Lieutenant Mike Magee. Captain Kessler and Lieutenant Sano also attended this roll call. *Members of CIS were present at this roll call. Per the IAP, these elements would be augmented _by uniformed personnel from our Gang Unit (3 sergeants and 10 officers), two West Precinct Bicycle Squads (2 sergeants and 16 bicycles officers), three Anti-Crime Teams (3 sergeants and 24 officers), three Community Police Teams (2 sergeants and 14 officers) and two West Precinct Arrest Teams staffed by Patrol (2 sergeants and 12 officers). -These officers would function as the arrest teams and the support element for the undercover/plainclothes component.' The arrest teams were under the command of Lieutenant Ron Smith. ~""These officers were slated to have a 1 4 00 hours roll call (they were called in early with no ml! call as events dictated otherwise). By having the arrest teams/ support element start three hours later than the elements that they were to support negated the primary tactics of the deployment plan.' This proved problematic for the overall operation and most importantly, created a substantial delay in responding to the criminal activity as it began to unfold long-before these elements were even scheduled to be on duty. Following the briefing at the 1100 hours roll call, the SWAT personnel, including supervisors and the Commander, Lieutenant Hay, expressed grave concerns regarding their designated role. They reiterated that they were uncomfortable in attempting to fulfill a mission that they had not trained for and that they did not have "plainclothes" that could be identifiable as police officers. They stated that they were comfortable serving as either undercover or as a uniformed force (either Class A's or BDU's). They expressed their concerns about the functionality of their role. . During a subsequent discussion with supervisors only, I authorized SWAT to deploy in This decision was made in direct response to being advised by the SWAT supervisors and commander that they could not fulfill the mission as outlined by Chief Sanford. As the former Commander of the Metropolitan Section (Commander of SWAT) I am aware of their training and capability and believe that it was not prudent to dictate tactics that they stated they could not perform without prior training/planning. A The change in deployment scheme required them to return to their office and 'change clothes and - then prepare their gear for deployment. The roll -callthere ended at approximately 1l45.hours. thus creating a significant delay in gettingthese elements in position in the Downtown Core. Tactics: . Numerous tactical deficiencies arose on May Day, ultimately resulting in confusion on the part of the officers and supervisors, officers being out of position when Anarchist elements began doing massive property destruction, assaults and endangering the lives of citizens and officers. The tactical deficiencies included: 0 Disregarding experience; Changing successful tactics without training; I Failure" to guide/track marchers; Failure to have a strong, visible police presence from the start of the event; Not having sufficient resources available at_the start of the event; 00996' Use of Force tactics -- specifically OC Spray. The commanders working these. various events had extensive command experience and have been handling the various "0ccupy" demonstrations for many months prior to these events. Experience with many of the recent Anarchist involved marches and demonstrations have shown that there needs to be adequate "staffing levels from the start and to have a strong visible presence in order to stop their ability to act with_anonymity and then move back into the crowd. As with; most. of the unpermitted-marches -that_.we- deal _with,-- therewere no specific --leaders-. and-.. - - the march routes were unknown. Complicating these issues was the fact that it was slated to begin in the middle of the work day and had a strong likelihood creating significant traffic disruptions. We had originally planned on using our bicycle officers to flank the marchers, using the sidewalks, in order to discourage damage to vehicles and plate glass windows that line the street level stores and offices. Using more undercover officers in the crowd could have been a good tactical deployment, however, by not having appropriate training and adequate briefmg/input it was not an appropriate time or place to utilize these tactics. Not having officers in a position to he a highly visible deterrent, or to have the ability to move in quickly to make arrests negated the ability to track the movement of -those involved in criminal conduct. By having our uniformed officers off the route created confusion and difficulty" in moving them into position quickly and limited the tactical options for the commanders in the field. The ability to swiftly arrest people committing unlawful acts is critical in both stopping those acts and serves to discourage others from joining this activity. Having the ability to arrest and remove those" -violating -the law most certainly-would have lessened the amount of property damage that occurred and would likely have changed the mood of the lawful demonstrators/marchers. Additionally, attempting to incorporate new tactics at essentially the last minute created difficulty in preparing a proper tactical plan, confusion and most importantly, it ultimately led to not having enough staffing available at the start of the event as resources were not in a position to respond quickly and in a tactical manner when needed *Ir is critical that there is time to review tactics, plan and provide training prior to implementing new concepts, especially when making a radical departure from tried and true strategies. As noted above, failing to guide/track marchers and maintaining an almost invisible presence slowed response times and allowed crimes to be committed with impunity. This could have been averted by using different tactics and maintaining a continuity of command. Following the initial march and subsequent property damage, the Mayor issued an Emergency Order permitting the confiscation of potential weapons within the designated area. The commanders in the field implemented the Mayor's Emergency authorization to confiscate potential weapons, and during the next unperrnitted march reverted to flanking the marchers with officers and moving officers into the crowd. There _was no additional property damage noted. *The emails below (from Chief Sanford) during the early part of the event served to clarify and enforce the orders that were given regarding the tactical deployment by the Chain of Command, outside' of the Incident Commanders on scene. From: Levandowski, Von Sent: Tuesday, May 01, 2012 11:36 AM To: Sanford, Michael; McDonagh, Paul; Kessler, Joseph; Sano, Eric Subject: Authorization to Enforce City of Seattle Fire Code Gentiemen, SFD Capt. Reba Gonzales is working in SPOC today. She facilitated the approval of SPD enforcing the City's fire code. Permission to enforce the City of Seattle Fire Code granted Re: Authorization to Enforce City of Seattle Fire Code sent: Tuesday, May 01, 2012 11:45 AM To: Levandowski, Von; McDonagh, Paul; Kessler, Joseph; Sano, Eric; From: Sanford, Michael Anback we keep rnessag? about no crowd ?n'ga'ge"ment. 10' From: Levandowski, Von Sent: Tuesday, May 01, 2012 11:56 AM To: Kessler, Joseph; Sanford, Michael; McDonagh, Paul; Baily, Anthony Subject: March 1 70-75 in street down Pine St. From: San_ford, Michael Sent: Tuesday, May 01, 2012 12:02 PM To: Levandowski, Von Subject: Re: March Staivititback! The final tactical' issue that must be vetted involves the use of Oleoresin Capsicum (OC) spray. The basic parameters for its use as outlined by Chief Sanford in the initial planning meeting were both prudent and responsible. They met the basic guidelines that had been given during recent demonstrations and matches by the Commanders in the West Precinct. These parameters allow the use of OC in circumstances that it is generally most effective. Although there are strong arguments for using OC to make'particular' areas uncomfortableto remain, there is" often collateral impact to people that are not the targets of the application. *By telling oflicers that he did not "want to see any pepper spray", Chief Sanford created confusion concerning approved tactics, created hesitation among ofiicers and undermined the authority of the Commanders. Several ofiicers who used OC spray to assist Chief Sanford in the street expressed concerns about violating his orders to not use "pepper spray". 11 Command and Control: Knovving who is in command during an incident is of the utmost importance. There must be one person who understands the objectives of the plans, receives tactical information and makes decisions with a complete understanding of all that is occurring. As the designated Incident Commander I should have been informed as soon as possible and been given all information and intelligence available at earliest possible time. During the initial planning phase of these operations the Incident Commander was given clear orders regarding the parameters of the deployment and tactics that were to be utilized (by Chief Sanford). As noted above (see Planning and Deployment sections), Chief Sanford changed the tactics Without notification of the Commanders responsible for executing the plan. This initial change, during the 1000 hours briefing, served to countermand the orders of the Incident Commander and created confusion as to what their orders Were and more importantly, who was in charge of the events. This issue was readily apparent in post event discussions and debriefmgs with officers and supervisors assigned to the events. These issues are generally addressed by our Departmenfs use of the Incident Command System (ICS) and the concept of Unity of Command vvhereby each individual assigned.to an eventanswers to one supervisor .and ultimately to one. Incident. I Commander. This concept is essential for effective management of spontaneous and pre-planned events. There must be one person who is the overall commander of the event, who understands the objectives of the plans, receives tactical information a11d 'then makes decisions with a complete understanding of all that is occurring. One of the problems that have occurred repeatedlyduring recent incidents/events, specifically in regard to those involving known Anarchist group members, is that our radio frequencies are monitored and our movements are relayed in real time to the demonstrators. During recent events we have corrected' this by using cell phones to communicate to avoid giving tactical information over non airways. This also allows multiple commanders/supervisors to be given different orders at the same time by members of the Commander Team. - Shortly after the main march began, we began getting reports-of marchers (dressed in all black clothing) damaging vehicles that were parked on the street. Additional reports of damage began coming in at a rapid rate. As the Command Van moved into position on Sixth Ave., we began to move resources into position. Each member of the Command Team was speaking directly with field supervisors and commanders tomove them-fiom the periphery into -a position so they--could-- - -- impact the criminal conduct. At this time; Chief Sanford came on the air of the primary frequency and yelled something to. efi'ec-t of "Joe, getyoiir guys in-there He did net usahis ca-ll sign-daring this and a subsequent. transmission. At that time -Ispolce to Chief Sanford directly by cellphone to advise him we were in the process of coordinating the movement of our resources into the proper position. 12 Without full situational awareness at an incident, individuals with good intentions may take actions independent of others, without understanding how those acts may impact the whole. The lack of complete situational awareness often has the effect of causing problems to become more complex and difficult to resolve. As various resources were moving into the area, we observed Chief Sanford run past our van n/b onto Sixth Avenue. He was running very fast and was dressed in a white shirt, tie, dark pants and dress shoes. "He did not have any visible markings that would identify him as a police officer and was not with any officers. Shortly after he ran down the street several officers (with long riot batons, canisters of OC spray and riot helmets) ran after him I1/b on Sixth Avenue. This failure to follow the 'chain of command or to use proper tactics impeded our ability to respond in a coordinated "tactical manner. It is criricalfor ofiicers to move in a 'methodical, disciplined manner to avoicibecoming isolated and surrounded, thereby creating a rescue Situation. (Reference the Use oforce Report and Statements for details.) Although Chief Sanford did not "officially" assume command during this event, his actions amounted to an assumption of command. The fact that he countermanded orders given by the" Incident Commander, injected himself on the radio on multiple occasions and issued direct orders to officers, made hirnthe "de facto" Incident_ Commander. This issue was corrected directly with Chief Sanford in_'a face to face conversation. During a brief meeting on the street (500 block of Pine Street) following the above incident, I asked Chief Sanford directly: "What were you thinking?" He responded by stating that: "It's no big deal." I reiterated my question and he responded by stating: wasjust trying to amp up the sense of urgency. Chief Sa:nford's failure to have "full situational awareness", follow the chain of command and follow safe, proper tactics created at the least, an inability to move in a coordinated, tactical manner and at the worst, put not only officers in a potential deadly force situation, but also put innocent citizens in_harms way. The actions taken during this incident resulted in several injuries (to both Chief Sanford and officers responding to his aid), unnecessary confusion and impeded our tactical response. Logistics: Logistics were handled through SPOC, coordinated by Officer Kearns. Unfortunately, due to limited ingressfegress to the demonstration site, logistical support became problematic with significant delays incurred. Communications: Event "communications were on Zone 1, Tac 3 and they were being staffed and monitored by Communications Section personnel. 13 Conclusion: Upon the completion of the event and the demobilization of police resources, a debriefing took place in SPOC with a number of tlie involved commanders. Several concerns were raised in the "hot--wash" including the following critical points: 9 Staffing levels were too low initially to respond i11 an adequate manner; 9 It was a mistake to bring 'in the plainclothes/undercover contingent at 1100 hours and bring their uniformed cover officers in at 1400 hours, 9 The new deployment model, utilizing undercover and plainclothes officers, was confusing and caused delays in getting the appropriate people at the event; 9 It was a mistake to attempt the implementation of a new deployment model and untested tactics without vetting, planning or training our officers: <9 Communications were confusing because of mixed messages given out at roll calls. While the command team briefed officers on items that had previously been agreed to, Chief Sanford countermanded those directions by interj ecting his philosophy which served to the officers and supervisors. In addition to the initial "hotwash" debrief, we requested observations and recommendations from involved--supervisors and commanders. --There are-a-number of concerns expressed and' - - lessons learned that are outlined below. Theseare directly from involved supervisors and commanders. Knowing that this was a national May 'Day event involving the members of the Occupy Movement, and potentially a group of militant anarchists, we should have anticipated large crowds and adjusted our staffing levels. We were significantly understaffed forvthis event (particularly at the onset) which caused. officer safety issues and prevented us from taking direct. and immediate action when the criminal activity started. By the time additional resources were called upon, the damage had been done and the Anarchists accomplished what they had planned to do. - There were serious concerns expressed in the manner the SWAT contingent was requested to deploy. As SWAT is the last line of defense if a situation gets to the level that CART capability is required, that option is severely handicapped by attempting to use them i11 a plainclothes manner. We must always keep sound tactics in mind and not allow outside concerns to dictate our deployment strategies. SAT Teams need to have dedicatedunifonn arrest teams to be available immediately to reinforce ourintention that 'no 'crime goes unaddressed. 14 Lieutenant Barden (Criminal Intelligence Section) had briefed the Chief, Command Staff and the Mayor with great specificity on what their intelligence indicated the various groups would attempt to do. During the debrief, Lieutenant Barden stated that the Anarchists did exactly What our Intelligence Unit predicted and utilized tactics and Weapons that they expected they would use. The designated Incident Commander and Section Commanders were not given adequate time, information or clear parameters to adequately determine appropriate staffmg levels to ensur_e success. The most critical issue involves the need to ensure everyone involved fully understands the plan and that there are no conflicting orders given. The assigned commanders who handle these events on .a regular basis -should plan and staff the event as well as determine the tactics that will be used. Any new deployment model should be fully vetted and every player should understand their specific-role. In addition, the various units should train together and run through "mock" drills to ensure clear understanding of the tactics, arrest procedures and contingencies. This was not the case in this instance. The field commanders, most who have years of demonstration management experience, were unclear as to the specifics of the tactical operation up to, and including, the actual day of the event. I have attached Sergeant Team) After Action. Report for review. 15 Recemmendatiens: During the past twenty years, the Department has brought forth a number of work groups and review teams to analyze tactics, identify issues and review large scale events (inside and outside of the City). These various efforts have resulted in the Seattle Police Department" being regarded as one of the best in the country with respect to crowd control and demonstration management. We have also developed a number of officers, supervisors andcommanders who have a demonstrated expertise in the field, including several who are nationally recognized experts. Following the May Day 2007 (Macarthur Park) incident in Los Angeles, Chief Kerlikowske tasked Captains Mike Sanford (Lead), Dick Belshay, Steve Brown, Paul McDonagh and Joe Kessler to conduct an audit of our policies related to Demonstration Management. The primary focus of this audit consisted of reviewing the issues outlined in Chief Mike Hillman's (LAPD) report to the Los Angeles Board of Police Commissioners. A number of recommendations made by the work group were adopted while one of the most important, the development of consistent, ongoing training was not. Consistent ongoing training is the key to maintaining our ability to respond to the rapidly changing environment we operate in. I In addition to the audit of May Day 2007, I have also reviewed the "Independent Review of Mardi Gras 2001" (National Tactical Officers Association), the "After Action Report of (Seattle Police Department), -"An Independent Review of the World Trade Organization - - -- - Conference Disruptions 1999" (R.M. McCarthy Associates) and other reviews. Each of these reviews/after action reports have made the recommendation that we mandate demonstration management/riot control training (to include practical application) on at least a semi--annual basis for all sworn members through the rank of lieutenant. Our WTO After Action Report recommended sustaining this training by instituting an annual refresher for all Operations Bureau officers. I recommend a refresher for all sworn personnel to ensure we are maintaining full operational preparedness. The WTO After Action Report also made specific recommendations at that time as to the use of Chemical Agent Response Teams (CART) and the establishment of a "training subcommittee with an officer of sufficient rank who can accomplish Department and regional training goals. The training program should be of sufficient length and depth, and should -include a progressive approach to building skill and competency over time, to include a program of regular refreshers". . Following Mardi Gras 2001, our After Action Report included the recommendation that "the Department should continue to train all personnel in crowd management and further develop a cadre of officers with additional training in the specialized tactics of quick crowd insertion and extraction of violent offenders andvictims"--. - - - - - - It is imperative that we move this type of training to the highest priority and insure that we provide trainingon at least a.s.en1i-annual- ha-sis.~ 16 As the Department continues working toward the development and implementation of the 20/20 Plan, these experienced practioners should be utilized to assist in this work group. Moreover, we must be mindful to ensure that all policies and operational tactics are fully vetted and training be conducted prior to any implementation. I would strongly recommend that we work with this group to explore the real issues regarding less lethal tools prior to making -decisions with respect to which tools we use and how we deploy them. Regarding the use of OC spray, we need to be careful not to restrict our ability to use this valuable tool to such an extent that we are required to use much higher levels of force in order to achieve our goals and objectives. As outlined in the 20/20 Plan summary (see bullet the recommended narrowing of the policy to only allow for the use of OC spray as a self-defense tool may very well result in significant injuries as officers are forced to use other force options. It should be noted that although the use of0C spray can be and painful for the I person(s) exposed to it, I am unaware of anyone requiring "real" medical care or hospitalization in the iweniyplus years it has been utilized during riots, demonstrations and other operations. OC spray has proven to be an eflective, low risk force option when used within the parameters of our training and policy. - One of the most important issues that have been problematic during all demonstrations and operations is communications. The lack "of having an fiequency that is operable (more than line of sight) has forced commanders to often communicate via cell phones or risk having operational directions compromised. This is an issue that has been noted many times over the years and has yet to be adequately addressed. As the challenges faced by officers and commanders in the area of demonstration management continue to evolve, it has become more imperative: that we make the training of all of officers a priority. As the cycles of demonstrations ebb and flow, we have consistently had to go back and revisit the lessons learned from events such as the Rodney King Riots, APEC, WTO and others. Although many of these recommendations have been made in the past, we have allowed 'critical training to be delayed to meet other mandates. Below are" several specific recommendations offered to assist in ensuring that we maintain ourlwell deserved reputation for professionalism as well as providing reference points as we move forward. I 0 The commitment must be made to conduct training on a semi--annual basis to assure that we are able to meet the staffing needs of demonstrations, protests and marches. Squads or teams of squads from each precinct should.be trained together. to.b.ecome.. . . . .. . comfortable in working together in a cohesive tactical manner, irrespective of where they are assigned. Precinct Task Forces should be the demonstration management team for their respective precincts and responding task force officers be assigned to handle the 9~l--l calls in the precinct. 17 0 There must be a resolution to a lack of an adequate radio channel for operations. - i Allow adequate planning time and ensure that all supervisors and commanders have adequate time to review the plans prior to the event (the final IAP was distributed after the first roll call). '9 All commanders must be given access to all intelligence in order to plan appropriately and develop-proper operational tactics. 6 Prisoner processing continues to be an issue; however, we have tasked key people to review the process in order to streamline the procedures. 6 Consideration should be given to enacting an ordinance that delineates what types of items can be brought to public spaces and demonstrations (particularly on permitted marches, demonstrations," etc.) to maintain a reasonable level _of public safety. By allowing "participants to carry deadly weapons (bats, thick dowels, torches, etc.) citizens and officers are consistently exposed to unnecessary risk. 63 When officers are moving (during marches/demonstrations) there must be support Vehicles in close proximity to provide access to equipment and provisions such as food and water. Consistent, quality training is a critical component to ensure our personnel continue to meet our mission in a professional manner. In order to- ensure that officers take the. appropriate action under all circumstances a culture of personal and organizational pride and ethical behavior must be reinforced on a regular basis. The principles of "ethical_leadership" must be Woven into the fabric of every training curriculum and lesson plan. There must be a consistent message sent from every level of the organization as to what is and. is not acceptable behavior. Each individual officer is responsible forhis/her own conduct and each supervisor/commander are responsible for ensuring that their I subordinates are operating in an ethical manner. Finally, it isincumbent upon each commander to ensure that they andtheir subordinates have proper training, understand the mission and have the necessary information to be successful. 18 Chronology of Events: 0700 hours: Roll call for first officers deployed to Westlake Park. 0900 hours: "Occupy Seattle" protesters began showing up at Westlake Park for a scheduled breakfast. They numbered approximately 50 -75 people. 1000 hours: Main roll call at the West Precinct. 1100 hours: Roll call for undercover and plainclothes officers at Park 90/ 5. 1100 hours: The group had grown to approximately 300 people in_ the park, with music and speeches. - 1125 hours: Approximately 100 demonstrators gathered in the plaza at Seattle Central Community College. - I 1155 hours-: Demonstrators began marching from Seattle Central Community College down Pine St. toward Westlake Park. Many of these participants, if not_ all, appeared to be "Black Bloc Anarchists". 1205 hours: Marchers arrived at Westlake Park. 1223 -- 1238 hours: The entire group at Westlake Park (approximately 300 - 500 people) began anunpermitted march, leaving the park and going on Pike St. (they blocked all lanes of traffic). . There were a number of people in the crowd that appeared to be. Black Bloc Anagrchists- This group was covered head-to-toe in black (with their faces covered) and was interspersed with the legitimate protesters. The group turned on 3rd Ave and continued to Union St. They. continued to block all lanes of traffic on 3rd Ave. At Union St, a number of marchers began jumping up on cars and causing extensive damage to several of them. At this time, one bicycle squad split off the march to handle this activity. The remainder of the march continued to Seneca St. and turned on Seneca to 5th Ave., where they turned on 5th Ave. They turned on Spring St heading towards 611' Ave. and the on-ramp to 1-5 At this point, our officers are approximately 75 -- 100 black clad demonstrators causing damage from inside the crowd. There are indications that paint and rocks are being thrown from inside the crowd. It was also reported that some protesters are armed with tire irons, sticks and other weapons. 1238 hours: There are reports about property destruction beinglcommitted at the Wells Fargo Bank (1215 -- 4* Ave.). 5 1240 hours: There is a report of protesters climbing on the Seattle ,Public-Library. 1241 hours: A smoke grenade is set off at the U.S. Courthouse on the 6th Ave. side. The crowd is spread out and milling aboutat the intersection of Averand.-Madison St. At the sametime, . . black clad Anarchists are doing property damage to the Courthouse (breaking windows). We also receive reports that several of the protesters, members of the Black Blocand their associates, have shields behind banners they are carrying. 19 **At this time we were moving our officers into a po.sition to begin a tactical deployment from their positions (off the March route). We were also trying to get our SWAT and Gang Unit elements downtown to prepare for deployment. 1252 -- 1255 hours: Black Clad Anarchists begin launching flares and smoke bombs, spray painting cars, breaking out windows at Niketown and other businesses along 6th Ave. and breaking out car windows and flattening tires of cars parked on the street. There are "a number dressed in all black that were interspersed between police and legitimate peaceful protesters. There are also numerous uninvolved citizens on the sidewalks as the lunch hour is ending and people are heading back to their offices. . 1255 hours: As we are attempting to get sufficient officers to make a safe, tactical movement, Assistant Chief Sanford rushes into the crowd by himself and tries to arrest an anarchist. He is unidentifiable as a police officer. He is assaulted by several protesters and knocked to the ground. Officers had to move in to perform an emergency rescue of Chief Sanford. The persons who assaulted Chief Sanford ran into the crowd and Sgt. Brotherton moved him to safety. 1256 hours: An arrest is made at 1325 - 6th Ave. At the same time, the main group of Anarchists is running on Olive Way 'from 6th Ave. with additional reports of Anarchists pounding on the doors of the Bank of America at 500 Olive Way. Officers deploy before any damage is done. 1258 hours: We receive a report that members of the Anarchist group are in the middle of crowd _at Westlake-. Park and that they are changing their.clothes-. They are deep into the crowd of peaceful protesters and are trying to blend in. 1300 hours: We begin our deployment to Judkins Park for the Immigration March and Rally. Back at Westlake Park, the protesters are preparing bottles of Maalox and bandanas and it appears" as if they are gearing up for another round of activities. We tell all Rapid Response members from the various precincts and units to forego the 1400 roll call and to head directly to Westlake Park for deployment instructions. 1330 hours: The protesters have established a triage and treatment center at the south end of Westlake Park. 1340 hours: We are getting reports that the Black Bloc members have completely changed their appearance and are joining peaceful protesters and that many are leaving the park. 1345 hours: We send a team into the middle of the park to recover Weapons and tools staged by the Black Bloc Anarchists. We are still waiting for the Mayor's Emergency Proclamation to be signed thereby creating some confusion as to whether We could confiscate the staged weapons-. As the afternoon progresses, we continue to recover items that have been fashioned into make~ shift weapons, large rocks and a back pack that had a suspected incendiary device that was a number of Bic lighters taped together. - 1524 hours: We receive. notification that the .Mayor ..has.signed an Emergency Proclamation . - . authorizing us to secure any item suspected of being a weapon or implement of property destruction. Officers were immediately sent into Westlake Parkito confiscate poles that were staged and unattended. This. operation-was. successful and. approx.imatel.y 1-5 poles were confiscated with no resistance. The poles were large enough to cause damage or injury. 20 Several of them had been sharpened to a point on one end and had a large lag screws protruding from the opposite end. - 1517 hours: Demonstrators start another march -from Westlake Park going on 4th Ave. It is believed they are heading to the Seattle Center and the John T. Williams Totem Pole Memorial. In preparation for this march we have reconfigured our tactics and moved bicycle officers to - flank the March, bicycle and footbeat officers -in front of the March and footbeat officers at the rear of the march. Additionally, the Command Van and Lt. Sano's SUV are following the march. At the intersection of 4th Ave and Virginia St, we receive a report that 50 people are donning gas masks. A separate group is stopped and we recover backpacks filled with rocks. 1545 hours: The group arrives at the memorial site on the Seattle Center grounds. Officers are deployed to various venues on the Center grounds to protect property The Space Needle and the Chihuly Exhibit). A 1600 hours: Following several speeches the demonstrators began marching on 5th Ave. Officers recovered numerous potential weapons during this march without incident. The march "proceeded on Sm Ave. and turned onto Bell. They continued to 151 Ave. where they turned on 131 Ave. At Pike St., they turned where the group stopped in the 100 block. 1643 hours: We received a report that multiple subjects dressed in black and carrying gas masks are walking toward downtown from Capitol Hill. They are on Olive Way from 6th Ave. 1645 hours: Officers became a target of members of the group with an officer being struck in the head by a bottle thrown from the crowd. Officers moved" in atactical manner and arrested the bottle thrower. The crowd attempted to free the arrestee and advanced on the officers. The crowd was pushed back and at least additional person was arrested. 1650 hours: The Immigration March began from Judkins Park toward Downtown Seattle. 165 0 hours: Demonstrators are sitting in the intersection of 2nd and Pike St. 1655 hours: Demonstrators began marching EXB on Pike St. again. Officers are monitoringsome suspected bottle throwersas well as a property damage suspect.- l700 hours: We are able to open up 1" Ave. to vehicular traffic again. 1705 hours: The demonstrators arrive at the intersection of 4th Ave. and Pike St. The Judkins Park marchers at moving on Jackson St. toward downtown. They are approximately 1500 in I number. 173 0 hours: An Anti~Border Rally begins at Westlake Park. Some protesters are in the park but the majority of the group is still occupying 4th Ave. adjacent to the park. There are numerous taunts and threats but Fourth Ave. is finally opened to traffic (one lane at a time). 1750 hours: The Westlake group starts marching on Pike St. to Ave. They turn on Ave. 'At about the same time, the Immigration march turns on 4th Ave. from Jackson St. The Westlake group continues marching.S/B on 3rd Ave. It is believed. they -are heading-to the Federal Building at 2nd Ave. and Madison St. 1806 hours: The Westlake Park demonstrators began taunting officers at?3'd Ave. and Seneca St. Officers maintained a cohesive line with no direct confrontations resulting. 1810 hours: Members of Black Bloc join the Westlake march at 3rd Ave. and Madison' St. 21 1820 hours: The two marches, the Westlake Parkigroup and the Immigration March, meet and converge into one large group. There is a minor confrontation between the two groups. 1825 hours: The entire group arrives at the Federal Building at 2nd Ave. and Madison St. They block the entire roadway between Madison St. and Marion St. Several speeches are made and there are no significant incidents of note. 1900 hours: The rally ends and Metro buses arrive at 2nd Ave. and "Madison St. to transport the Immigration March demonstrators back to Judkins Park. The rest of the Westlake group disperses. . 193 5 hours: The Federal Buildingplaza is nearly empty_with only a few peaceful demonstrators. Westlake Park is checked and monitored (there are stil140-50 people present). At this time it was raining hard and the streets were clearing. I 1900 hours: Captain Kessler turned command over to Captain Dermody. 2050 hours: Operations end and areas throughout the City are monitored for activity. 22 Siue highlighting indicates SPD staffing timeiine Green highlighting indicates event scheduie MAY DAY 2012 TIMELINE Black print indicates actual event timeline. *Provided by SPSC 0?fifl $835 70933 lfififi 1033 1G%fl 1108 1180 1180 71 1120 Rolf caii in West Precinct for 15* Watch Gfficers for Westiake Park 1 West Sgt. 5 West Side. 1" Watch SP3 Marv Bavid Sector oatroi units iogged in at Westiake Park Scheduled breakfast and worker soeakout at Westlake Park Rolf caii in East Precinct for events Nit. Yamanaka 1 - I 1 East Bike Sgt. WI 8 East Bike 0fc's_. I Rolf caii in West Precinct for Westiake Park events Lt. James 2 West Bike Sgt's. WI 15 West Bike Gfds. 1 Mounted Patroi Sgt. w] 3 iviounted Patrol Gfc's. Roll caii at SWAT office for 1 SWAT Sgt. xiv] 5 Qfc's. East Precinct is closing streets around the East Precinct facility Roil call in West Precinct for arrest team personnei Lt. Smith 2 West Patrol Sgt's. w/ 12 West Patroi 0'fc's. Scheduled time for entertainment and speakers to begin in Westlake Park Scheduied time of the student walkout at 23 21121 11252 1125 1128 11ooe 1136 1133 1134 1139 - 114p 1152 1153 1155' .1156 1157 1159 1200 1200 12ool xzoo Watch David 81 King Secter bikes and beat units legged in at Westiake Park 100 people gathered in plaza at 1 . ii Pine Street closed from 11"" to 13"" Ave's. Metro Transit advised of street closure Reii call at SWAT office for 1 SWAT Sgt. w} 6 SWAT Gfc's. Additienai bike Squad arrives at the West Precinct (Sgt. Kraus) Lt. Smith I 1 1 West Bike Sgt. hr} 3 Bike Qfc's. Scheduied time ef the student raiiy at the seuth end at SQCC Group that had been gathering just entered - Approximately 75 students inside t-rying to inspire other students to join -- them. Scheduled time for-the student march frem to Westiake Park to begin March approximately 50 people in the march March turning on Bellevue Ave. March turning onto Pine St. Group of50 Black Bloc on'Be||evue from E. Gliye Way Group of6'persons with signs that had been circling the East Precinct have left and appear to be headed towards the main event March crossing March at Ave. and Pine St. Sc_hedu_ied time for "Anti-Capitaiist" march from Westlake Park to begin Six 1" Watch Gfc's. heid over ta previde securityfer West Precinct Reil call at East Precinct fer eariy reseurces assigned te Judkins Park 24 Lt. Tamage 1 East CPT Squad w; 5 East CPT (R)fc's. 1 East ACTearn Squad WI 8 East AQT S165. 1203 March at Ave. and Pine St. 1205- March arriving at Westlake Park 1215- I Summary of SPD assigned ta Westiake Park as of this Lt. James West Bikes Squad 1 west Bikes Squad 2 East SEkes Mounted Patrei Lt..Smith Arrest Team 1 Arrest Team 2 West Night Bikes Summary ef SPD assigned to Detail as at this . Lt. Magee SWAT Squad 1 SWAT Squad -2 SWAT Squad 3 SAT Squad 1 SAT Squad 2 SAT Squad 3 SAT Squad 4 Sgt. Swank WI 8 Offs. AfSgt. Gaiieges w] 8 Gfc's. Sgt. Lam WI 8 Gfc"s. Sgt. wf 3 Gic's. Sgt. Bratherton w/ 6 0ic's. Sgt. Scott 6 Sgt. Kraus w] 8 Gfc's. Sgt. Hancock 5 _Ofc's. 6 Ofds. Sgt. Sweeney w/ 6 0fc's. Sgt. Eviahaffey WI 4 Gfds. Sgt. Q'Quin wi A 0fc's. Sgt. Deuine A Sgt. i-Eazard A Qic's. 25 1223 1223 1226 1227 1239 1232 1233 1234 1235 1237 1233 1240 1241 1243 1243 r1244 1245 - SAT Squad 5 Sgt. Littie wl 4 Qic's. Summary of additioraai SPB assigned it. Sarto SWATICART Sgt. w/ 5 Gfds. Prisoner Processing Sgt. Gracy 8: A_/Sgt. Crumb wi 14 Gic's. Approximately 30 people in the middle of the group covered head to toe in black and carrying sticks I Group is marching on Pike St, taking all lanes March is on 3rd Ave. at Union St., taking all lanes Marchers are jumping on top of cars Anticipated demobilization of East Precinct resources assigned to SEURCC march March has turned onto Seneca St. March is_S/B on 5 Ave. from Seneca St. March is close to Ave. and Spring St. on--ramp to I75 At least 75 Black Blooin the paint and rocksare being thrown Reported that protestors may have tire irons and sticks' Reported that hammers and other evidence at the Wells Fargo Bank, 1215 4th Ave. Report that protestors are climbing on the Seattle Public Library Report ofa smoke grenade at the U. S. Courthouse Crowd is spread out and milling around 6th Ave. and Madison St. "Superheroes" on the scene at U. S. Courthouse Reported that the protestors have shields behind a banner they are carrying "Superh_eroes" pepper spraying people at Ave. and Madison St., eastside of the U. 5. Courthouse 26 1251 1252 1252 1253 . 1253 1254 1255 1256 1256 1257 1258 1300 1316 - 1327' 1339 11340 1345 1400 Asst. Chief Sanford directs officers to be in the crowd, not following the crowd Marchers reportedly spray painting cars Large grouplat l\like Town breaking windows Report of individuals in black doing damage Report that marchers are throwing flares and smokebombs Report that marchers are breaking windows between Pike and Pine St's. Group is running on Olive Way from 6th ave.' with officers chasing' One suspect in custody at 1325 Ave., transport. requested Group is back at Westlake under the monorail- Report of group pounding on doors of 500_O|ivelWay. Black Bloc group in the middle of West|a|